SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITING: THE OPERATIONAL NEED FOR TARGETED RECRUITMENT OF FIRST AND SECOND GENERATION AMERICANS

by

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December 2008

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**Special Forces Recruiting: The Operational Need for Targeted Recruitment of First and Second Generation Americans**

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**Abstract**

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the operational impact of recruiting first generation Americans directly into Special Forces. Much as the draft inadvertently did during World War II, the Army could take much greater advantage than it has of first generation immigrants and naturalized citizens. Special Forces (SF) could, in turn, target recruits from within this pool. That is one proposal this thesis makes. A second aim of this thesis is to explain why this makes sense in the 21st century. This thesis reviews the use of non-citizens from WWII to the present, while also highlighting certain features of doctrinal Special Forces (SF) missions. The aim is to draw on the past in order to preview the relevant usefulness of non-citizens today.

The arguments to be presented here are conceptual in nature. They draw on the author’s experiences as an SF recruiter and on extensive conversations with other recruiters currently serving in the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB). This thesis is not designed to criticize current recruitment methods. Instead, it explores ways to enhance what Special Forces already does in order to target the kinds of candidates whom the author believes will prove crucial to 21st century operations.

**Subject Terms**

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A special thanks to the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion and its recruiters, past, present, and future for their support throughout this research phase of this thesis. Your work is truly appreciated. I want to send a special thanks to the Battalion Leadership Team of the SORB. I was extremely fortunate to have the time and opportunity to write on a topic that I truly believe will contribute to the effectiveness of Special Forces, United States Army Special Operations Recruiting Command (SORB) and the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC).
I. INTRODUCTION

John Hersey’s now-classic novel, *A Bell for Adano*, features a first generation Italian-American serving in the U.S. Army during WWII. Major Victor Joppolo does an outstanding job as the very successful mayor of post-conflict Adano. He is able to excel, in part, because of his ability to speak the local language. Thanks to his upbringing, he also understands the local populace.¹

Not surprisingly, this book is on the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Command reading list. What is surprising is that SOF continues to overlook one of the great takeaways from this book: First generation immigrants represent an invaluable pool of talent when it comes to operating in non-English speaking environments!

Much as the draft inadvertently did during World War II, the Army could take much greater advantage than it has of first generation immigrants and naturalized citizens. Special Forces (SF) could, in turn, target recruits from within this pool. That is one proposal this thesis makes. A second aim of this thesis is to explain why this makes sense in the 21st century.

The arguments to be presented here are conceptual in nature. They draw on the author’s experiences as an SF recruiter and on extensive conversations with other recruiters currently serving in the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB). This thesis is not designed to criticize current recruitment methods. Instead, it explore ways to enhance what Special Forces already does in order to target the kinds of candidates whom the author believes will prove crucial to 21st century operations.

This requires SF roles and missions to be briefly described. Second, the nature of 21st century conflict is highlighted to demonstrate the likelihood that SF will continue to operate in the non-West. Next, the current make-up of SF Groups is surveyed. Special

Forces is comprised largely of white southern males. Such individuals do not exactly match the demographics of the places where SF is most likely to operate. For this reason alone, it seems to be prudent to broaden the pool of potential candidates.

Chapter II examines SF’s composition over time, pointing to why SF should want to engage in more targeted recruitment of naturalized citizens and first generation Americans.

Chapter III reviews the current recruiting process. In considering the possibility of recruiting naturalized citizens, the first question is whether there are sufficient numbers of potential candidates to make a recruiting effort worthwhile. If it is found that this is the case, then it must be determined whether targeted recruitment is value maximizing. The next challenge is to ascertain whether candidates meet the standard for recruitment: they must be between the ages of 21 and 35, physically and mentally stable, and without moral question. Discussion about this will be followed by an assessment of whether or not the market is penetrable, whether the candidates are useful to SF, whether or not such recruits are trainable, and finally, can recruiting be conducted successfully in this market.

Chapter IV suggests a number of things that could be done, and would have to be taken into account, before SF recruits first generation Americans and recently naturalized citizens. Adequate preparation is one major concern.

Chapter V concludes with a set of recommendations for SF recruiting efforts in recruiting first generation Americans and non-citizens. Additionally, areas for future consideration aimed at developing innovative policies in regards to this thesis are suggested as well as facilitating topics for future research.
II. THE REQUIREMENT FOR CHANGE

Legal Permanent Residence (LPRs) offer an exceptional recruiting pool for Special Forces. There are approximately 45,000 non-citizens either serving in or affiliated with the United States Army today. Of those currently serving, on average, more than half become naturalized citizens before the end of their initial enlistment period. Post-9/11, recruiting efforts across the Army have met with many difficulties and setbacks. Therefore, it is important to identify market segments which will support both manpower needs as well as address critical shortages within Special Forces.

Special Forces Recruiting annually recruits over 2,000 service members for attendance at Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). The author believes that LPRs and naturalized citizens present an untapped recruiting market which, at the same time, addresses several benefits of unique significance to Special Forces. First, such individuals by definition represent cultural, racial, and linguistic diversity. Second, they possess an eagerness to learn. In fact, U.S. citizens of the millennial generation’s sense of entitlement does not exist in LPRs or first-generation Americans, who, in most cases, demonstrate an almost naïve enthusiasm for honor, patriotism, and repaying an owed debt.

Since 9/11, significant changes have been made to attract non-citizens to military service. For instance, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 allowed for expedited citizenship for LPRs after serving only one day of active federal service. This example of a coordinated inter-agency effort to boost the effectiveness of the U.S. military demonstrates the importance of LPRs and naturalized citizens to an all-volunteer military service.

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3 See USASFC mission letter and SORB mission accomplishment.

The U.S. Military and U.S. Department of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) work diligently to streamline the citizenship process for those who serve and these efforts are not without acknowledgement. However, more is needed; thus, the purpose of this study. Although the Army has acknowledged the benefits of LPRs serving in the military, Special Forces has yet to act in regard to their recruitment. The recommendations set forth in this thesis address two major issues: (a) modifications to current recruiting methodology and (b) mentoring and development of the desired target market. The author also recommends continued research and validation of performance measures for first generation Americans in Special Forces.

A. RECRUITING METHODOLOGY

Recruiting may appear to be a numbers game. The author recalls assuming command of Alpha Company, Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) and his first encounter with recruiting. While sitting with his First Sergeant in June 2004, he introduced the author to the intricacies of the Mission Accomplishment Plan (MAP), which has subsequently been replaced by the even flow “phase line report.” The even flow phase line report describes the milestones for success and failure by identifying chokepoints within the recruitment funnel. The SORB uses conversion data to describe the candidate’s matriculation through the recruitment process. Candidates are assigned to a numerical data set based on several factors.5 A Level 1 candidate represents an interested soldier who has received a Special Forces briefing. A Level 2 candidate represents a soldier who has taken the next step and signs a volunteer statement. A Level 3 candidate represents a soldier who has completed all administrative requirements and is awaiting Temporary Duty (TDY) orders for SFAS. In addition, a Level 4 candidate is a soldier as he arrives at SFAS.6

The conversion data for SFAS is complex and equates to the following: Level 1 to Level 2 conversion rate equals 50%. This means that for all soldiers receiving a Special

5 The SORB generates this data set based on historical trends and analysis. Although there are no formal regulations governing the status of a candidate, the SORB Commander has the authority to modify the classification accordingly.

6 Conversion rates may differ from based on recruiter knowledge of SF, and candidate follow through.
Forces briefing, the recruiter should receive volunteer statements from at least half. From Level 2 to Level 3, the conversion rate should equal at least 75%. This indicates, first, that the soldier has demonstrated interest and desire to become a Green Beret by signing a volunteer statement. Secondly, the soldier has received all the required information to make an informed decision. Thus, the SORB’s working assumption is that the likelihood of soldiers completing the required administrative paperwork is much higher for Level 2 than for Level 1 candidates. The conversion rate from Level 3 to Level 4 is equal to 90%. This high conversion is due to the orders process. The military, in general, is predicated on commands and orders, and once physical orders are received by a candidate, the candidate is unlikely to withdraw voluntarily at that point. At this stage of processing, the SORB recognizes that 10% of candidates may still drop out, due to a long waiting period, deployment, or family concerns. This total process is measured on the phase line report, which is broken down by SFAS courses for the Fiscal Year (FY). The numbers associated with SF recruiting are driven by mission requirements. For instance, the SORB’s recruiting mission for 2008 is 2,000 qualified soldiers to attend SFAS.

However, within the Special Forces community, numbers are not the sole driver. Rather, quality is sought over quantity. Consequently, the recruitable population is reduced significantly. This is the challenge for Special Forces recruiting. As the United States continues to expand its global role, there are over 96 countries currently hosting U.S. troops in one capacity or another. As Special Forces continues to operate abroad in regions such as Asia, the Middle East, South America, and Africa, increasing the size of the recruiting market will become a more pressing need.

The argument at the heart of this thesis is that in its quest to find recruitable markets, Special Forces has overlooked a natural national asset: the immigrant population. Given the fact that the United States is a country comprised of immigrants, and beginning in the year 2050, the white American population growth is projected to

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7 This information was supplied by the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) and are estimates based on historical data analysis from 2000-2008.

8 See USASFC 2008 SORB Mission Letter.

decrease and spanning a period of 30 years from that point, are projected to be the minority population. This statistical projection is just one indicator for more attention being paid to the immigrant population as the next recruitable market for Special Forces.

B. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS

Changes in the demographic make-up of the United States have already begun and are projected to accelerate in the coming decades. As the Baby Boomer era ends and the millennial generation is examined, a younger, more educated, and ethnically diverse population is seen. Various demographers indicate that the majority of this growth will come from minority populations and, if predictions are true, Latinos and African Americans will eventually become the majority in the United States.\textsuperscript{10} Estimates indicate that by 2020 half of the American population will belong to current minority groups, and beyond 2050 the country will be a “majority minority.”\textsuperscript{11} According to these estimates, the Hispanic population would be the largest growing group. By 2000, the Hispanic population may increase to 31 million and is projected to double its 1990 representation by 2015. In fact, the Hispanic population, which contributed 32 percent of the nation's population growth from 1990 to 2000, is expected to contribute 39 percent from 2000 to 2025, 45 percent from 2025 to 2050, and 60 percent beyond 2050.\textsuperscript{12}

Based on these projections, the nation's population is projected to increase to 392 million by 2050, more than a 50 percent increase from its 1990 population size. This assumes that net immigration would continue to reflect recent trends. Using the most conservative estimates, the population would grow slowly, peak at approximately 350


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
million by 2030, then gradually decline. Conversely, the highest estimates project the population increasing quite steadily over the next several decades, more than doubling its 1990 size by the middle of the next century.\textsuperscript{13}

Non-Latino Anglos are projected to represent about 50% of the population by 2040; Latinos will represent approximately 25% of the population; Blacks almost 15% of the population; and Asians a little over 8% of the population. These changes in population demographics are a direct result of immigration to the United States. Of the nearly 300 million people currently living in the United States, an estimated 35 million (both documented and undocumented) are foreign-born.\textsuperscript{14} Immigrants now account for 12% of the total U.S. population, and the proportion is growing.\textsuperscript{15} In less than a decade, the percentage of immigrants is projected to account for more than 14% of the population, above the peak of 1910, when nearly 14% of the population was foreign-born. In 2005, the top ten sending countries for immigrants were Mexico, China, the Philippines, India, El Salvador, Vietnam, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Canada and Korea. Significantly, belonging to some of these nationalities means members can easily disguise themselves and ‘pass’ for something other than what they may be: something that may prove especially beneficial to SF.\textsuperscript{16}

In the year 2020, the immigrant population will not only play a key role in the economy, but should also provide a much more diverse workforce for the armed forces. U.S. population growth without immigration from 2000-2050 would add only about 35 million people to the recruitable population, compared to 107.9 million with immigration.\textsuperscript{17} Without immigration, the strength of the armed forces would clearly

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
suffer. Also, given the major demographic changes to be seen in the United States over the next 50 years, the recruitable population will have to include more people of color.  

Figure 1. Projected population demographics by Race: 1990, 2000, 2025, and 2050.

Although the issue of immigration is itself highly contested, the facts are that the current U.S. immigrant population is the largest in history and is expected to rise sharply over the next 10 years. Notably as well, the majority of immigrants in the United States today are between the ages of 18 and 39. Between 2004 and 2007, an estimated 35 million people became Legal Permanent Residence (LPRs). In 2005 alone, over 1 million immigrants became LPRs. Coupled with those already residing in the country legally, the eligible immigrant population available for recruitment into the armed services jumped to almost 2.3 million. Of course, this number reflects total population available. When broken down to Special Forces’ target market, males 20-39, the recruitable market is just short of 500,000 who meet initial residency requirements and have registered for the

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19 Ibid., see *U.S. Projections for Foreign Born Immigrants to the U.S. Spanning 1990-2050*.

selective services, and thus, are eligible for active military service.\(^{21}\) The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) estimates that about 45,000 non-citizens currently serve in the active military, and an additional 16,000 in the Reserves and National Guard.\(^{22}\)

Historically, Special Forces Recruiting has not been successful at recruiting immigrant Americans or minority candidates.\(^{23}\) Based on demographic reports generated by the SORB between 2004 and 2007, minority recruitment and selection remained between .02\% and .3\%. The exact number of immigrant Americans is unclear since classification of a candidate is limited to the following categories: White, Black, Asian, Latino and Others. Most immigrant Americans fall within the “Others” category, along with those who choose not to identify themselves by race or nationality, which poses particular problems for accurate representation. Figure 2 indicates an average representation of Level 4 candidates by race.

![SORB Minority Recruiting Statistics](image)

**Figure 2. SORB Minority Recruiting Statistics\(^ {24}\)**


\(^{22}\) Information obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

\(^{23}\) This information is compiled from the author’s notes and statistical data provided by the SORB dating from 2004 to 2007.

To date, there are no known models for how to specifically recruit minorities into Special Forces. However, common sense suggests that one way to increase high-quality accession is to expand recruiting practices into untapped markets that contain large numbers of potentially qualified recruits. One such market for accession into SF is via targeted recruitment of naturalized citizens or first-generation Americans.

Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the SORB recruiting practices to determine the following.

- Were previous immigrant Americans successfully absorbed into SF?
- Do national security threats play a major role in immigrant Americans applying for SF?
- If today’s immigrant/first-generation American offer a positive, recruitable pool, how can this market be penetrated?
- Does the target audience meet the requirements for service in SF?
- What additional research might be needed to develop successful recruiting policies?

To meet these objectives, the author examined the literature on immigration and naturalization as well as current SORB recruiting operations. However, this author detected no cross-over research that successfully examines the issue of recruiting first generation Americans or naturalized citizens into SF. In addition, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) was relied upon for information referencing immigrant Americans in the Armed Forces from 2000 to 2007 and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for information on naturalizations in the United States from 2000 to 2007. The objective of this literature review is to better understand the recruiting environment, determine the penetrability of the marketplace, and assess the utility of recruiting from among naturalized citizens and first generation Americans.

A cursory analysis of this untapped marketplace suggests considerable potential. Well over 100,000 immigrants are naturalized as U.S. citizens, one third of whom meet the initial requirements for accession into SF. Furthermore; first generation Americans offer unique attributes beneficial to SF in the realms of cultural and linguistic familiarity

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25 USCIS Report.
and experience, and some have considerable knowledge about specific locales. Although the classification of immigrants and immigrant Americans continues to be difficult, for the purpose of this thesis, first generation Americans are defined as: *Those born to immigrant parents who have completed the naturalization process.*

C. SPECIAL FORCES DEPLOYS THROUGHOUT THE NON-WEST

The argument in this next section is that the force of the future must be carefully tailored to fight and win wars on tomorrow’s asymmetrical battlefield. Today’s battlefield is largely non-western and the author can only imagine that tomorrow’s battlefield will be more so. Taking into consideration the current education, doctrine, theory, and technology used to mold today’s Special Forces Soldiers, he has surmised that, without question, first generation Americans would dramatically increase the overall effectiveness of Special Forces by being able to help eliminate most cultural, ethnic, and social barriers.

Special Operations Forces deployed on more than 7,000 training or operational missions to 200 countries to date. Although Special Forces continues its global mission, because of the Global War on Terror, the number of Special Forces troops in the Middle East, Asia, and South America far outweigh Special Forces Soldiers deployed in Africa, Europe, and Asia. Nonetheless, Special Forces remains regionally oriented, and although there is some overlap, their core areas of responsibilities remain as follows.

26 USCIS Report.

1st Special Forces Group (SFG) Airborne is based out of Fort Lewis and its Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the Pacific region. Today, for instance, 1st SFG Airborne has the mission to advise the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combating terrorism in the Philippines. Many of today’s counterterrorist missions take place on the island of Basilan, a stronghold of Abu Sayyaf.29

3rd Special Forces Group is based out of Fort Bragg, and its AOR is Sub-Saharan Africa. In support of the African Crisis Response Initiative, SOF personnel have conducted pre-deployment site surveys and mobile training team missions in Senegal, Uganda, and Malawi to identify, organize, equip, train, and prepare capable African forces to conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian operations on the continent of Africa. Africa represents the clearest case of non-involvement by U.S. military forces during the past five decades. Currently, some Special Forces units also work with Algerian,

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29 Ibid.
Moroccan, and Tunisian units conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) with Pan-Shlel countries as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 3<sup>rd</sup> SFG also deploys to Afghanistan.<sup>30</sup>

5th Special Forces Group is based out of Fort Campbell and its AOR is the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. 5th Special Forces units were the first military units deployed to Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attacks and a number of Special Forces operational detachments trained and advised the Afghan Northern Alliance troops. 5th SFG also trained the first troops of the new Afghan National Army. Since the initial invasion, 5th SFG continues operations in Afghanistan along with Iraq.<sup>31</sup>

7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is based out of Fort Bragg and its AOR is South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. 7th SFG played a critical advisory role in El Salvador in the 1980s. 7th SFG (A) also played a very important role in preparing the Honduran military to resist and defeat an invasion from Nicaragua by training the Honduran military in counter-insurgency tactics. Today, 7th SFG (A) provides trained and equipped Soldiers to assist Joint Military Operations in support of Columbia’s narcoterrorism efforts and runs the American portion of the Military Observer Mission Ecuador Peru peacekeeping effort, monitoring the status of the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. 7<sup>th</sup> SFG also deploys to Afghanistan.<sup>32</sup>

10th Special Forces Group is based out of Fort Carson and its AOR is Europe. During the initial invasion of Iraq, 10th SFG led one of the most successful campaigns against Iraqi forces. Special Forces continues to support U.S. stabilization efforts in Bosnia. 10th SFG (A) has also trained various components of the militaries of several Middle Eastern countries, including Lebanon and Jordan. Today, 10th SFG has been heavily involved in the War on Terrorism, deploying to Georgia, North Africa, Afghanistan, and has been consistently engaged in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Special Operations Recruiting Briefing Dated 2008.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.
Additionally, Special Forces has two Army National Guard (ANRG) Special Forces Groups. These are 19th Special Forces Group, which spans the southwest and whose AOR supports South East Asia and the Pacific and 20th Special Forces Group, which spans the southeast and whose AOR supports Latin America, Central America, and the Caribbean.34

Given the sensitive and political nature of SF and the importance of secrecy and the limited visibility of many of its operations, it only stands to reason that a more culturally diversified organization would assist in achieving a greater degree of efficiency. Recent changes in the Special Forces training pipeline, a new emphasis on language, and cultural understanding and awareness, and the increased emphasis on regional expertise point to potential gaps that SF could address by pursuing individuals who already possess ethnic, linguistic, and cultural familiarity rather than needing to train everyone in/on these skills from scratch.

D. BRIEF HISTORY OF IMMIGRANT SERVICE

There are a number of historical precedents concerning immigrants in the military. The Department of Defense estimates that more than 65,000 immigrants (non-U.S. citizens and naturalized citizens) were serving on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces as of February 2008.35 According to USCIS, immigrants composed half of all military recruits by the 1840s and 20 percent of the 1.5 million service members in the Union Army during the Civil War.36

This section provides an historical overview of non-citizens’ service in the Army from the 1700s to the present. In order to understand the recommendations set forth in this thesis, it is first essential to understand the history of policies governing the incorporation of immigrants into the Army.

35 O’Neil and Senturk, Non-Citizens in the U.S. Military.
36 Ibid.
During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress granted citizenship to enemy troops who agreed to switch sides and fight with the Continental forces, and some colonial militias offered the reward of state citizenship to non-citizens who joined their ranks. In all, approximately 20-25 percent of the 2.5 million enlistees in the Union and Confederate militaries were immigrants. Since most immigrants arrived in Northern ports, it is not surprising that the Union Army had the preponderance of non-citizen enlistees. Indeed, roughly 90 percent of all non-citizens who served in the Civil War were enrolled in the Union’s military. Only about 5 percent of the 1 million Confederate forces were foreign-born. By comparison, the Confederate states had roughly 13.4 percent of the foreign-born population in America. Interestingly, the majority of immigrant enlistees were of German and Irish descent. In some cases, entire battalions of immigrants were recruited from individual U.S. cities or counties because of their ability to blend in and operate far behind enemy lines.

The first use of non-citizens in the military emerged in 1789 under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution; Congress is granted the power “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.” On March 26, 1790, the first naturalization act was passed. This ruling focused on free, adult men with a minimum of two years of residency in the United States and was eligible for citizenship.

Locally, state, and federal courts were all granted naturalization authority. The emphasis on naturalization continued and, in 1864, during the height of the Civil War, Congress passed legislation to encourage immigration to the United States. The federal government agreed to pay immigrants’ transportation costs in exchange for future labor. The only other times since 1868 that Congress has passed legislation encouraging

38 Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Greenwood Pub Group, June 1969), 578-80.
40 O’Neil and Senturk, Non-Citizens in the U.S. Military.
41 Ibid.
immigration was during the World Wars I and II.\textsuperscript{42} On July 28, 1868, the concept of national citizenship was solidified with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.\textsuperscript{43}

During WWII, 142,353 enlistees were naturalized between July 1, 1941 and June 30, 1947.\textsuperscript{44} A large number of immigrants who served during the war were able to attain citizenship. The multipurpose function of immigrants was a lesson clearly taken to heart by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of Special Forces.

The OSS was established by a presidential military order issued by Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 13, 1942, to collect and analyze strategic information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies.\textsuperscript{45} During WWII, the OSS adopted the notion of using foreign born natives to help fight the war. One example of how non-citizens were used in the conduct of guerilla warfare can be found in Burma in 1942. Indigenous forces were recruited and trained by the OSS to operate from bases deep behind Japanese lines. Since American agents in Burma would attract attention, Detachment 101 canvassed the British-led Burma Army for Anglo-Burmese volunteers to act in various behind-the-lines capacities. Detachment 101 likewise made significant use of local tribes-people with the ability to assist the cause.

The OSS assisted both in the arming, training, and supply of resistance movements, including Mao Zedong's Red Army in China and the Viet Minh in French Indochina, and relied on such forces to help it defeat the Axis powers. The OSS deployed in Asia and Europe, and subversion remains essential to SF’s core mission under Unconventional Warfare today.

The 1950s saw the passage of the Lodge Act authorizing the enlistment of 2,500 displaced persons from Eastern Europe into the Army. The intent of this legislation was

\begin{footnotes}

\item[43] See U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment.

\end{footnotes}
to provide the United States with a pool of skilled individuals who could assist with its Cold War efforts.\textsuperscript{46} The aim was to create teams that could be dropped into Eastern Europe to organize, train, and lead resistance members and sabotage Soviet supply lines via hasty attacks and other unconventional means. The law was amended in 1951 to increase the number authorized to 12,500 enlistees who, after completing five years of honorable service, were eligible for permanent residence in the United States. Of the 1,302 individuals who enlisted under this program, 812 (63 percent) became citizens.\textsuperscript{47}

Section 1440 of Title 8 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 expanded citizenship eligibility to include non-citizens who enlisted, reenlisted, or extended enlistments while residing in U.S. territories, or while aboard public vessels owned or operated by the United States. This act also provided for the naturalization of individuals who served during wartime whether or not they were documented immigrants.\textsuperscript{48} Congress enacted legislation in 1953 that limited citizenship eligibility to only documented immigrants because of a valid concern with Soviet espionage.\textsuperscript{49} This provision applied to individuals who served in the armed forces from June 25, 1950 through July 1, 1955. The provision expired in 1955 and, in 1961, Congress enacted legislation that authorized the naturalization of undocumented immigrant enlistees who had served during the previous five-year period.\textsuperscript{50}

While the Lodge Act was designed to enable the OSS and later Special Forces to take advantage of Europeans’ familiarity with Eastern Europe, nothing like it was developed for Southeast Asians. In 1960, Special Forces was given the mission of training and equipping the South Vietnamese Army with the intent to conduct operations

\textsuperscript{45} Gerald Astor, \textit{The Jungle War: Mavericks, Marauders, and Madmen in the China-Burma-India Theater of WWII} (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2004).

\textsuperscript{46} See The Lodge Act Congressional Order 1951.

\textsuperscript{47} Hazard, “Administrative Naturalization Abroad of Members of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

\textsuperscript{48} Legal Information Institute, U.S. Code Collection, \url{http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/8/1440.html} (accessed December 2008).


\textsuperscript{50} Darlene C. Goring, \textit{In Service to America: Naturalization of Undocumented Alien Veterans} (Seton Hall Law Review, 2000), 427.
in South Vietnam. As a result, 30 Special Forces instructors were sent from Fort Bragg to South Vietnam in May 1961 to set up a training program for the Vietnamese Army. Although ethnicity became a major factor in who could operate behind enemy lines, there is no record of Vietnamese Americans being recruited into Special Forces during this period.

Instead, under the advisement of U.S. Special Forces, several programs were initiated in late 1961 to address counterinsurgency needs. Thus, paramilitary forces were formed from excluded minority groups in South Vietnam. Special Forces detachments were assigned to provide training and advisory assistance in a series of programs, which eventually became known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program. Over time, the development of paramilitary forces from among minority groups became the primary focus of the Special Forces in Vietnam.

The successes of Special Forces in Vietnam are well documented and although it is well recognized that minorities played a major role in the CIDG, there is no account of Asians or Asian Americans being recruited into Special Forces itself. This had an effect on how intelligence was gathered. Not surprisingly, the language barrier proved to be a major obstacle for the U.S. Army in recruiting agents and acquiring information. Meanwhile, even after an agreement for cooperation was reached in the spring of 1964, the Vietnamese Special Forces units were slow to accept U.S. Special Forces participation in their intelligence operations. Mistrust was evidently mutual, but also the two allies did not always share the same agenda. Here is one instance where it could be stated that immigrants and immigrant Americans with the right cultural sensibilities might have made a difference. Many scholars of the Vietnam War argue that the entire counterinsurgency program in Vietnam was a failure because Special Forces failed to identify with the population and “win their hearts and minds.” However, even when SF Soldiers and teams did live with the local people, there were not enough Americans with

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52 Ibid., 88.
53 Ibid.
the right sensibilities in the theater and no one who could effectively mediate as Asian Americans and, more specifically, Vietnamese recruited into the U.S. Army, may have been able to do.

SF also played a critical role during the 12-year civil war in El Salvador when advisors were tasked with advising military counterparts in counterinsurgency operations. The Salvadoran Civil War occurred in the context of the Cold War, with Cuba and the USSR backing the insurgents and, most famously, the Reagan administration supporting the Salvadoran army. Unlike the efforts in Vietnam, SF could draw on personnel already in the force who came from a Hispanic background, such as Colonel (Ret.) Joe Andrade. According to then Major Andrade, who volunteered for duty in El Salvador in 1991, advisory success during the war could be attributed to three important factors: 1) low visibility of the mission, 2) its small footprint, and 3) cultural awareness and language ability on the part of the advisors. COL Andrade can recount several instances when language and cultural awareness played a major role in what he termed a successful mission. For instance, in a recent talk at the Naval Postgraduate School, he spoke of his personal experiences dealing with El Salvadorians and the difficulties inherent in “blending in.” Although trained in Spanish and Latin American culture, COL Andrade stated that “It takes more than a language rating of a 3/3. [Which is conversational level language ability]; it takes a great deal of cultural awareness.”54 This revelation prompted the author to ask him what the percentage of Hispanic Americans was among the advisors in El Salvador with him. He replied with the figure of “40 percent.” This brings up the issue, again, of why SF has not done more to maximize these percentages.

Today, Special Forces continues to demonstrate its relevance given the small footprint of an ODA verses the large footprint of conventionally mobilized troops. Just in the past decade, Special Forces has been used to coordinate activities on the ground between guerrillas and conventional forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It has, likewise, been used for its counter-insurgency capabilities in Iraq and the Philippines. There is no

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54 Notes and comments taken from a class lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School, on November 21, 2008.
telling exactly where SF might be deployed next, but chances are it will continue to need to operate closely with non-western forces for the foreseeable future.

E.  BENEFITS OF FIRST GENERATION AMERICANS

In some cases, such as conventional operations, ethnicity, culture, and appearance are not important to mission success. Unlike Special Forces, conventional forces typically deploy with numerically superior groups, heavily armored vehicles, and their purpose is not to blend in but to exert a presence of force.

Conversely, the objective of Special Forces Soldiers is to keep a low profile, and sometimes, even remain invisible while conducting operations in small numbers with little protection other than personal weapons. Given such requirements, the ability to “hide in plain sight” is a clear asset. Here is where Americans of immigrant origins should be a boon.

Recent articles point out that the notion of turning soldiers into linguists is more arduous than turning linguists into soldiers.55 At the very least, first generation Americans who grew up learning another language, even if they do not speak it fluently, will be able to pick it up more easily and with the right accent than those with no exposure to it at all. However, there are also other elements of non-verbal communication that the children of immigrants absorb, often without even realizing it. At most, these enable first generation immigrants to “act” the right part. Nevertheless, even when such individuals find themselves in an environment with which they are no more familiar than other Americans, they may still adapt faster given adaptation skills their parents likely passed on, or that they may had to discover from themselves while growing up. Without question, one of the most important aspects of the Special Forces Warrior is the ability to build rapport behind enemy lines. This trait, although taught at SFAS, relies heavily on exactly these sorts of innate abilities.

Facial features, skin color, and hair types are all inert traits first generation

Americans from non-Western backgrounds would bring with them to SF. At most, such traits and abilities would enable individuals to blend in. At least, they would prevent such individuals from standing out.

A Special Forces operator’s ability to be able to blend into his environment is crucial to clandestine operations; it is especially beneficial for SF in hostile locations. This trait is critical to missions such as Special Reconnaissance (SR). For example, even though SF operators are said to be trained in the regional language and culture, most do not “blend in” to the environment and, when clandestine operations are critical, the fact that SF Soldiers do not “look nor speak” like natives can erode the measure of effectiveness of the team. Indeed, there were several instances reported after the first Gulf War when rather than blending into the local environment, Americans SF Soldiers stood out on clandestine operations and jeopardized mission success. At the same time, there have been lengthy, even heated debates about whether SF Soldiers should be permitted to grow beards in places like Afghanistan. The argument has been that beards earn local respect and help disguise westerners. However, it is worth noting that non-westerners operating in the region are able to blend in without having this debate.

It seems only prudent to pay particular attention to overall mission requirements like these when putting together teams for certain AOR’s and missions. Two solutions or approaches are suggested. First, it is necessary to be fully aware of and knowledgeable about the regional cultural and language requirements. By analyzing what is needed, SF recruiters can tailor their market segmenting across the Army based on future likelihoods rather than just current needs. Next, SF recruiters themselves must blend into the environment they are targeting. Although this is manpower intensive and requires planning, coordination, and a degree of luck, the author believes that there are SF Soldiers and recruiters out there who fit this mold and they should be made aware of the potential impact their presence would have in the SORB.
III. SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITING

As mentioned in Chapter I, the complexities of recruiting include meeting the demands for force structure and matching these to the market. Challenges are compounded by what Special Forces calls the SOF truths: 1) humans are more important than hardware; 2) quality is better than quantity; 3) SOF cannot be massed produced; and 4) SOF cannot be created after a crisis occurs. For the SORB recruiters, the science of recruiting is predicated on keeping these principles in mind.

USAREC Manual 3-0 states that recruiting is a combination of art and science. Effective results can be achieved when the art is combined with the science to position a well-trained force in an opportune market.\(^6\) This reference to recruiting as both art and science is appropriate in that recruiting is based on both regulated policies (the science) and unregulated interpretations (the art). Since the many complexities associated with recruiting are not resolvable by science alone, Special Forces recruiters have the difficult task of making the “art” work with the “science” in what is known as a complex recruiting environment.

Here is the description of the SORB’s mission:

Conducts worldwide in-service recruiting operations to provide the strength for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Operations Aviation, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Airborne forces; Synchronizes and de-conflicts in-service ARSOF recruiting efforts; and serves as an information conduit between the ARSOF community and USAREC for non-prior service recruiting of SOF Soldiers.\(^7\)

To do this, the SORB consists of four companies and a headquarters section. The SORB has recruiting stations located in high propensity markets across the U.S. (CONUS). Recruiting stations are located at Fort Bragg, NC; Fort Benning, GA; Fort Hood, TX; Fort Lewis, WA; and outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) in

\(^{56}\) USAREC Manual 3-0 Recruiting Operations (Fort Knox: United States Army Recruiting Command, 2006), 6-1-6-5.

\(^{57}\) Special Operations Recruiting Briefing Dated 2008.
Europe and Kuwait. Prior to 2005, the SORB, then named the Special Operations Recruiting Company (SORC), was headed by a CMF18 Major (O-4). Since its provisional activation in 2005, the SORB increased in size and mission. The headquarters section is headed by an accomplished CMF18 series (SF-qualified) Lieutenant Colonel (O-5). In neither case has the commander been required to have prior recruiting experience. In contrast, the senior NCO is an experienced Command Sergeant Major (E-9) who is a 79R series trained recruiter. He, therefore, brings the expertise of recruiting into the SF environment. Both are co-located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, along with the battalion staff.58

The SORB personnel strength is comprised of 74 personnel, six officers and 68 NCOs who conduct in-service, worldwide recruiting. The SORB has a unique organizational structure depicted in Figure 4. Whereas its guidance and direction come from two different commands, USAREC and USASOC, with direct relationships with USASFC, USAJFKSWCS and subordinate brigades for guidance and support, the SORB has the responsibility for filling the directed manning requirements for the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).

**Figure 4.** SORB Organizational Structure

58 See SORB Organization and Structure

Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie Companies of the SORB are responsible for Special Forces Recruiting, whereas Delta Company is responsible for Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), Explosive Ordnance Dispos al (EOD), and Airborne forces. Below is a brief description of the disposition, composition, and strength of each Special Forces Recruiting Company SORC as of 2008.60

Alpha Company is responsible for recruiting markets within the southeastern United States and Europe. Current station locations are at Fort Benning, Fort Stewart, and Germany. Currently, the company has nine recruiters, two CMF18 (Special Forces) and seven 79R (Army Trained Recruiters).

Bravo Company is responsible for recruiting markets within the central United States, with station locations at Fort Campbell, Fort Riley, and Fort Hood. The company has ten recruiters, three CMF18 and seven 79R.

Charlie Company is responsible for recruiting markets covering the western United States, including Hawaii, with station locations at Fort Bliss, Fort Carson, Fort Lewis, and Hawaii. The company has ten recruiters, three CMF18 and seven 79R.

Each Company Leadership Team (CLT) is comprised of the Commander (SF) and First Sergeant (79R), and although these individuals are not included as recruiters, they do act as force multipliers. All SF recruiting companies share similar missions in that they conduct continuous in-service recruiting operations to provide qualified officers and enlisted soldiers for Special Forces and for other SORB assigned missions as required.

Figure 5 illustrates the current SORB company locations.61

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60 This information is in accordance with SORB alignment briefing 2008.

61 The SORBs SF Company locations are based on U.S. military markets with the highest propensity for SF - centered on both mechanized and light infantry units.
A. SF RECRUITING PROCESS

The objectives of Special Forces recruiters are to supply USASFC with the best-qualified candidates for Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). The SORB has established policies for the classing of candidates for SFAS in accordance with AR 614-200, Chapter 5 and the SORB Commander’s directive, which ensures that each candidate meets the minimum qualifications outlined below to attend SFAS prior to scheduling and notification of the soldier’s unit leadership.63

- Male soldiers in rank of E-4 through E-6 (PFCs will only be classed if they are to be promoted prior to or during the SFAS class they will be attending and must provide Memorandum or DA 4187). Must have no more than 14 years time in service (TIS). (Waiverable)
- SFCs may be recruited if they have 12 years or less time in service (TIS), and nine months or less time in grade (TIG) at the time of SFAS.
attendance. They must be either Airborne or Ranger qualified and eligible to Permanent Change of Station (PCS) within six months after completion of SFAS to the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). (Waiverable)

- GT score of 100 or higher
- Soldier is not flagged, barred to re-enlistment, or pending UCMJ action. Soldiers that have UCMJ in their official records (OMPF) must submit a request for waiver to attend SFAS.
- U.S. citizen who is eligible for a Secret clearance (if ERB or EDAS states INELG for clearance, provide memo from Unit S2 stating otherwise). If citizenship is in question, documentation must be provided proving citizenship.
- Applicant must pass an Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) demonstrating ability to obtain a minimum score of 229 in the 17-20 age group at SFAS. Preferred method of verifying is for a recruiter or “trusted representative” to give an APFT at the time of application. Additionally, each applicant’s ability to pass the APFT will be again verified within 45 days of actual attendance at SFAS. Soldiers that fail the APFT at SFAS will not be allowed to return to SFAS for a period of one year.
- Soldier must have a valid SF physical dated within two years of the start date of the class for which he is applying. Physical must be complete, legible, and meet the requirements as outlined in AR 40-501, Chapter 5 and SORB physical checklist.
- Soldiers that have attended SFAS twice and are requesting to return for a third attempt will be classed only upon approval of the SORB CDR. In addition, soldiers that drop during days 1-3 of SFAS will be considered never to return (NTR) and allowed to return only upon SORB CDR’s approval (exceptions for Red Cross, medical drop, etc. at the CDR’s discretion).
- Soldiers that are scheduled to deploy for OIF or OEF within 60 days will not be scheduled to attend SFAS unless the soldier’s unit CDR approves.
- Soldiers already on assignment instructions at the time of application will be advised that they can attend SFAS if they have time to complete the course prior to their Permanent Change of Station (PCS), but they will have to comply with the assignment instructions upon return. At no time will a recruiter tell an applicant that the recruiter can get him out of the assignment or that he will be deleted from his assignment if he gets selected.
- Soldiers PCSing to a new Permanent Duty Station (PDS) prior to the start of their SFAS class will only be classed if the soldier is PCSing within
that recruiting station’s own area of responsibility. If he is PCSing to another station’s AOR, he will be referred to that station for processing.64

B. THE ART OF RECRUITING

The art of SF recruiting consists of a recruiter’s ability to do four tasks extremely well.

1. Generate Leads and Prospecting

Generate Leads and Prospecting: As part of market penetration, upon receipt of the names of qualified candidates from the LEADS database, Special Forces recruiters send out mass emails to the hundreds of identified candidates.65 Station Commanders promote the utilization of all possible leads. Sources of leads include but are not limited to: face-to-face prospecting, telephone prospecting, unit and center of influence (COI) referrals, walk-ins and call-ins, and internet and electronic means. Potential candidates are then informed of their opportunity by form letters, which cite SF requirements, briefing locations, and times, etc. In preparation for the upcoming mission assignments, recruiters generate the letters in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year and distribute them to the potential candidates.

Face-to-face interaction after their most recent deployment accounts for at least ten percent of Level 2 candidates. Since September 11, 2001, interacting with Special Forces Soldiers in the field generates solid leads. Soldiers who have been exposed to Special Forces in action, have worked with ODA members, watched them perform their jobs, and asked them questions have accounted for a renewed interest in the “Green Beret.”

Secondly, advertising plays a major role in Special Forces recruitment. This process begins with notification of the installation commanders, Sergeants Majors, and reenlistment NCOs that Special Forces briefings will be held on post. This allows for top

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64 This list of requirements and restrictions are the minimal requirements set for by SORB Command Leadership.

65 The LEADS system is furnished by HRC and generates a listing of all active duty males, E-4, with a GT score of a 100 or above.
down support and notification of all potentially interests soldiers with unit support, as candidates are more likely to attend the briefings. Email notification is also used. This process begins with a trip to Human Resources Command (HRC). Headquarters Section, Special Forces Recruiting Battalion receives a list of qualified leads based on the following criteria: rank (E-4) and GT score (100 and above). This list is further broken down by SORB markets at the battalion level and is distributed to the companies for action at the company level. Emails are sent via “mail merge” to over 1,000 applicants within the target market. Although the benefits of e-mail are abundant, such as the immediate penetration both in breadth and depth across the market, along with the ability to field questions from candidates, this method does have its drawbacks. For instance, out of 1,000 emails, the author’s office received several replies to emails stating that the member was no longer on active duty or had been wounded and disabled in war. Although the emails are directed to individuals, they may be too impersonal in nature, not taking into sufficient accounts the background of the recipients. Alternatively, to put this another way, although numbers favor this method for getting the word out, more care should probably be taken in generating the initial list.

2. Recruiting Trips (Temporary Duty) within the Market Areas

Recruiting trips generate considerable benefits by putting a face to Special Forces. On average, recruiters spend as much as three weeks a month on the road recruiting for Special Forces. This is different from conventional recruiting where most business is on a walk-in basis. The author specifically recalls in the course of two months being TDY for seven out of eight weeks. During this time, he spent one week in Europe covering the Germany Recruiting Station, one week at Fort Stewart, GA. covering re-deploying brigades, and one week at Fort Bragg for quarterly training and mission planning briefs.

Post relationships become critical to recruiting trips because the leg work required to “post” an installation is extensive and usually precedes the actual recruiting trip by a
week or so. In most cases, recruiters will contact the installation’s reenlistment NCOs and post Sergeants Major for assistance while in the area.

3. Conducting a Special Forces Briefing

This is one of the most important aspects of Special Forces recruiting. Emphasis is placed on presenting the features and benefits of Special Forces in a group scenario, where the aim also becomes closing the cycle by obtaining a commitment in the form of signed volunteer statements from the candidates for further processing.

The one constant with the Special Forces briefing is that all Company Commanders ensure that the SORB approved brief is utilized and not modified, even though recruiters may personalize their sales message with additional “evidence” shown before or after the official briefing. The spread of the same information across installations is considered critical to mission success.

The SORB provides an extensive checklist as to what recruiters are required to cover in their briefing. The objective of this briefing is twofold: first, to provide detailed information about Special Forces to those not familiar with Special Forces, and secondly, to motivate those who are interested to begin the application process by signing a volunteer statement. This requires that the recruiter have a great degree of product knowledge about Special Forces and the recruitment process.

Although most recruiters (79R) are not Special Forces qualified, they are thoroughly trained on Special Forces missions, ODA organization, and the Special Forces training pipe line. To accomplish this task, the SORB has instituted the New Recruiter Academy which is designed to give a new recruiter to the SORB a taste of Special Forces. During this training, recruiters experience a day in the life of SFAS candidates. They tackle the obstacle course, appropriately named “Nasty Nick,” as well as leadership tasks similar to those performed by SFAS candidates. Nor are Special Forces qualified

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66 The term “posting” is a function of advertising, which refers to the process of placing notification flyers in key locations around an installation that includes briefing times and locations.

67 Volunteer statements are a measure of effectiveness in SF recruiting. It provides feedback as to quality of the briefing and assessed recruiter delivery.
recruiters exempt from this training, since the training also encompasses instruction on the policies and practices of recruiting. The bottom line is that this program is designed to let recruiters learn about Special Forces and have Special Forces personnel learn about recruiting.

A typical Special Forces briefing begins with the recruiter introducing himself. This task may be as straightforward as announcing “I am SFC Blue and I am here to give you a Special Forces Briefing.” Or, the introduction may be as innovative as beginning by speaking in a foreign language or exciting the crowd with one of many Special Forces authorized videos. Following the introduction, the recruiter presents the approved Special Forces briefing, which lasts up to 60 minutes. Briefings may go shorter or longer depending on the audience. In most cases, upon completion of the formal briefing, candidates remain behind to continue the question and answer period, and those who are satisfied that all of their questions have been answered are offered the opportunity to sign a volunteer statement. With his signature on a volunteer statement, the candidate moves into the candidate follow-up status.

4. Candidate Management and Follow-up

The process of candidate follow-up is continuous. Follow-up is an imperative task in the in-service prospecting chain. Special Forces recruiters will spend most of their time penetrating markets through casual associations, e.g., phone calls, at lunch, while candidates are training, etc. On average, the process from signing a volunteer statement to attending SFAS may be as short as a few weeks or as long as one year.68 It is in this phase when most applicants are dropped from the recruitment process.

Candidate management extends beyond the normal recruiting duties. Recruiters know that they are not just recruiting a soldier into Special Forces, but recruiting their families as well. This may be the hardest part of candidate management. Recruiters usually plan for family briefs as part of their recruiting trips. Family briefs are designed to answer the questions family members may have about life in Special Forces, pay,

68 Some candidates apply for SFAS prior to a deployment, and in most cases, will not attend until after deployment, which may be up to 15 months.
deployment, family support, and assignments. More often than not, the candidates have made up their mind but must convince their spouses that Special Forces is a good move for them. In addition, recruiters help to dispel any rumors about Special Forces that family members may have.

Candidate management also includes the preparation of a candidate for SFAS. The SORB has developed the Future SOF Soldier Program, which aims to help candidates prior to attending SFAS. This program usually includes land navigation, physical training, language training, and various other studies. Since its inception, this successful program has increased the SFAS completion rate for participants by ten percent. Candidate management also includes the management of paperwork. In some cases, candidates may be required to produce additional documentation such as naturalization and citizenship forms, graduation certificates, birth certificates, and so forth. Candidates are assisted in requesting these documents, and updating their packets on a regular basis. The author envisions this phase as being crucial to the recruitment of first generation Americans.

At a minimum, the following tasks are conducted during candidate management.

- Station Commanders verify the candidate meets all eligibility requirements to attend SFAS
- Station Commanders enforce a 30-day out candidate APFT. Candidates will not receive orders for SFAS without a 30-day out APFT. Exceptions must receive prior approval from the Company First Sergeant.
- Station Commanders enforce weekly contact with all candidates who are classed and waiting for their SFAS class date. Specific focus is placed on the questions provided on the candidate checklist.
- Station Commanders ensure that candidate out-brief checklists are initialed by all candidates prior to leaving for SFAS. Out-brief checklists will be maintained in the candidate’s residual file.

5. **SFAS Requirements**

Although recruiting can sometimes be numbers driven, the process of preparing a candidate for SFAS requires that a recruiter take a personal interest in the candidates recruited. In most cases, the quality and success of the recruits reflect the attention and
effort invested by the recruiter. As has already been described, a recruiter’s job is not just to sell candidates on Special Forces, but prepare them for SFAS by ensuring they meet the standards required to be successful at SFAS.

In-service candidates must meet eight requirements: (1) be a male, (2) be between the ages of 21-35, (3) be a U.S. citizen and have a high school diploma, (4) achieve a General Technical score of 107 or higher and a combat operation score of 98 on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), (5) be eligible for a Secret security clearance, (6) qualify and volunteer for Airborne training, (7) take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery or Defense Language Proficiency Test (officers are required to score a minimum 85 on the DLAB), and (8) achieve a minimum of 60 points on each event and overall minimum score of 229 on the APFT.

These requirements are simple, and in certain cases, waivers are possible. However, overall a candidate must be mentally and physically tough, be able to endure difficult training, and be able to face all challenges head-on. Thus, recruiters are never just salesmen. They are also coaches. More importantly perhaps, they are the gatekeepers of Special Forces. This makes their selection just as crucial, and maybe even more critical, than any other aspect of the process, as the next chapter will suggest.
IV. RECRUITABLE MARKETS AND RECRUITERS

Market segmenting is the grouping of individuals by like characteristics to target their needs and desires effectively or to more efficiently promote military service through various promotional strategies. Currently, the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) segments the market by education, aptitude, ethnicity, lifestyle, and geography with the two primary means of segmentation being education and aptitude. The education segments include Tier III graduates, those with no high school diploma but with general educational degrees GEDs), Tier II high school graduates, and Tier I graduates who are those with some college (any college credit, self-reported), A candidate’s aptitude is measured based on the ASVAB and is broken down into two major categories, Alpha and Bravo. Aptitude segments are sectioned based on the GT score. For instance, Alphas have a score of 107 and higher, Bravos 106 and below.

Since the SORB primarily focuses on in-service active duty soldiers, recruiting can focus more on aptitude and MOS. The SORB currently separates its market by three primary means: propensity, education, and aptitude. Propensity refers to those units within the Army that produce candidates with the highest propensity for success in Special Forces. Education requirements for SF are enlisted high school graduates in the pay grades E-4 through E-7, or 0-2 promotable to 0-3. The aptitude portion of assessment measures a candidate’s ability to speak a language, which is measured by the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) and the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). These elements combine to provide the mission box categories of the SORB mission requirements.

The SORB segments are not defined by race, but rather by MOS. Statistically, Infantry Soldiers and officers do much better in SFAS and SFQC than other non-combat arms MOSs. With the expansion of the market to include first generation American male immigrants, the recruitable population would automatically be expanded. However,

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69 Rank, education, and GT score restrictions reflect the basic SF prerequisites outlined in AR 614-200 and USAREC Pamphlet 601-25.

70 SORB Classing and Selection Data Reports, September 17, 2008.
just assuming that the market contains a large number of persons who meet the accession needs is insufficient. Three further questions must be addressed: (1) can the market be penetrated? (2) are recruits from the market useful to the Special Forces, and (3) does the target market provide an environment conducive to recruiting?

A. FIRST GENERATION GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

The demographic models for immigrant Americans illustrate that over one-half (56 percent) of all new citizens in 2007 lived in ten metropolitan areas across the United States.71 Seventy-six percent of all persons who became naturalized in 2007 resided in 10 states. California was home to the largest percentage of persons naturalized (28 percent), followed by New York (11 percent) and Florida (8 percent). States with the largest percentage increases in naturalizations from 2006 to 2007 included Texas, Illinois, and California. Metropolitan areas with the largest percentage increases included Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX, Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX, San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA, and Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI. In these geographic areas, Latin Americans accounted for one-third to one-half of all naturalizations in 2007.

By examining where the SORB recruiters spend much of their time and expend most of their efforts and how this aligns with where they may be recruitable communities of immigrant Americans, certain clear gaps can be seen.

The immigration geographical data indicated that in addition to the current in-service recruitable markets of the SORB, the potential immigrant American markets would provide at a minimum, ten additional recruitable markets of densely populated communities of first and second generation Americans.

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71 Beginning in 2005, the Office of Immigration Statistics redefined metropolitan areas (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas), to conform to new standards issued by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). Naturalization data for 2005 have been revised to reflect this definitional change. See Federal Register, 65, no. 249, (Wednesday, December 27, 2000), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/metroareas122700.pdf (accessed November 1, 2008). The most current CBSA definitions are available from OMB, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/statpolicy.html#fs (accessed November 1, 2008). The leading metropolitan areas of residence were New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA (15 percent), Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA (12 percent), and Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI (6 percent).
Key issues that the SORB should focus on in addition to demographics are the likely impact of social, political, and economical factors. However, while demographic factors such as population density, ethnicity, and eligible male populations affect where and how the SORB could potentially recruit differently, there are other factors to also take into account. For instance, economic factors can have a strong influence on the recruiting environment. As new arrivals to the United States, naturalized citizens and the children of immigrants are often in need of economic stability. With the current economic downturn, the propensity for first generation immigrants and others to join the armed forces is high. Statistical data shows that the relationship between economic difficulties and military enlistments is inversely related. When unemployment rates go up, enlistments go up. When unemployment rates go down, enlistments go down. Areas that are economically depressed have higher enlistment rates. This theory should apply to SF recruiting operations as well.

The social conditions in immigrants’ countries of origin should also affect the SORB recruiting. Prospects who arrive from war torn countries may be less likely to feel comfortable with military service. Conversely, experience and awareness may promote feelings of patriotism and inspire prospects to want to serve in SF, preferably if they think this offers an opportunity to improve conditions in their former homelands or their parents’ place of origin. This is a characteristic recruiters should want to analyze throughout the recruiting process.

Additionally, views expressed along party lines might also influence prospects’ interests in joining SF. To recruit along immigrant and first-generation populations successfully means being sensitive to these finds of concerns. It may also require a different kind of recruiter or a recruiter with a different set of sensibilities than those often assigned to the SORB.

B. RECRUITERS

SORB recruiters are paramount to mission success. These individuals collect, organize, manage, process and prepare, prospects and candidates for future Special Forces training. The success of the SORB is dependent on the recruiter’s ability to be effective; therefore, SF recruiters, unlike conventional recruiters’ need to possess additional traits and abilities exceeding the established norms. As part of the research for this thesis, several recruiters (both 79R and CMF18) were interviewed and asked what traits they felt were critical to successful recruitment of naturalized Americans and minorities. The recruiters cited the following elements in their assessments.

- Ethnic and cultural diversity amongst recruiters
- Ability to speak, understand, read, write various languages
- Cultural awareness and sensitivity
- Greater degree of flexibility
- Personal and professional involvement in the recruiting environment

One efficient strategy is routinely to obtain lists of recently naturalized citizens and their families from USCIS. Once obtained, the lists can be reviewed to identify men who meet SF’s enlistment requirements and possess the desired skills. Those from ethnic
backgrounds can then be targeted. For certain ethnic markets and nationalities, it might make sense to assign recruiters from similar backgrounds as the target market. Speaking the same language and understanding the culture of candidates can help facilitate the recruitment process. Sometimes, however, it may be difficult to attain a perfect match. In that case, it is at least better to have a recruiter who appreciates the importance of culture and language, and has experience operating in another culture and/or language over someone who has never deployed or is not very good at developing rapport with people who are not like him.

In order for SORB recruiters to be successful as U.S. demographics change and as SF’s needs continue to grow, the SORB needs to look more like the target market in its totality. Often what makes successful recruiters successful is going the extra mile by spending time in the community. This type of networking pays huge dividends, especially by helping foster long-standing ties that can go far towards creating multigenerational pools of potential recruits.

As most business books make clear, face-to-face communications work best for recruiting in a difficult market. However, the process of face-to-face prospecting is especially critical for the recruitment of first generation Americas. Likewise, successful conduct of SF operations relies on the ability of SF teams to establish rapport with, and positively influence, those they train. Thus, recruiters should not just want to recruit face-to-face to make their numbers; nonetheless, this method is likely to add to the quality of the candidate pool and to reinforce what SF is supposed to represent. Additionally, the ability of a recruiter to make contact with and to gain target candidates’ confidence may provide one of the best tools of intelligence gathering for future prospecting.

The author personally conducted Special Forces briefings at various recruiting events where white enlisted personnel and white officers had no problem approaching recruiters after the briefing for more information, whereas minority candidates would not attend the briefing, or if they did attend, never asked questions. The author found that a different approach was required to penetrate this demographic after gauging the audience. For instance, the author recalled one occasion when the briefing began with “Cuántos de ustedes hablan español?” This rather unconventional introduction immediately put the
predominantly Spanish speaking audience at ease and all others on edge, although shortly after the introduction, the author went on to admit that his actual target language was French. The point was made: language is important and no one was to be excluded.

During his time in recruiting, he found that most minorities were apprehensive about SFAS and its physical demands while most non-minorities were apprehensive about the cultural test they might encounter, and the DLAB, DLPT, and language training more specifically.74

Here is where it seems important to remember that the recruiter amounts to a resource conversion machine. They take inputs in the form of potential walk-in candidates from the general environment and turn them into SF recruits. A recruiter’s ability to convert these individuals into contracted outputs is critical to meeting the recruiting objective. One key to long term success is the recruiter’s ability to build the necessary social capital which will allow opportunities for future recruiting in that same environment.

Just as SF missions typically place a high premium on regional familiarity, recruiting operations need to place a high premium on not only knowing the ‘language’ of the target market, but having a thorough understanding of many cultures as well. Even with extensive preparation, cultural differences and language barriers can remain a major obstacle between recruiters and prospects. Thus, one focus of SF recruiting should be to look for candidates who may not fit the standard profile at the moment, but demonstrate the potential to be able to do so. Ideal prospects in this regard would be those who can assimilate ideas rapidly. It may be that the SORB will need to assist such prospects learn how to do so, and thereby, improve the candidates’ ability to be prepared for SF training.

This returns to the notion of follow-through. Follow-through for first generation Americans may well need to differ from follow-through for the ‘usual suspects’ recruited into SF. Recruiters will likely need to be familiar with processes and systems that accelerate or advance language and cultural assimilation skills. That means they must be

74 Statistically, most enlisted and officers candidates reported having to retake the DLPT to meet the required standard of 85, whereas naturalized Americans had no problem meeting language requirements.
familiar with these themselves, just as they will need superior interpersonal skills. Again, this makes the quality of those selected to be recruiters critical. However, as SF’s gatekeepers, recruiters are critical. By helping recruit those who have been raised in non-western, immigrant households, the SORB can help decrease immeasurably the sort of language and culture training needed on the back end of SF training.

C. THE CLASH OF ETHNIC CULTURE

The perception of whether discrimination exists in Special Forces is most often talked about in relation to race. First, it is necessary to preface this section by saying that that author does not believe that SF recruiting or SF itself practice institutional racism. Having said that though, cultural insensitivity is least likely to be perceived by those least subjected to it.

Special Forces primarily reflect the demographics of the Army, a white-male-dominated culture with which many minorities have little or no experience. Since many recruiters have little or no experience with minority cultures, it is difficult for many recruiters to understand and acknowledge the needs and concerns of people different from them, let alone appreciate how best to assist them. By not knowing or understanding each other, some misconceptions that could interfere with good judgment are bound to arise such as those mentioned earlier with the recruiters’ evaluation of a candidates commitment to becoming a Green Beret.

The questions necessary to ask are the following. Are cultural awareness and education during recruiting briefs being promoted in a positive, beneficial way? Is everything being done to ensure cultural diversity? If some of the societal differences that limit recruiting efforts can be bridged, eventually it is possible to achieve the goal of practicing what we preach.75

The author personally experienced this not in Special Forces, but with his entry into military service as an officer. As a male minority, growing up in a black

75 USAJFKSWCS has implemented multiple measures aimed at addressing the issue of culture and language skill sets, with amendments to the language training modules, and the use of target nationalities in the conduct of “Robin Sage.”
neighborhood, with no previous knowledge of military culture, he was forever changed by the military. Upon graduating from Southern University, a historically black college, and being commissioned into the Infantry, he jumped head first into what was a white-dominated culture, which proved to be a real culture shock. In retrospect, he finds it perfectly understandable that white officers had difficulty empathizing with the situation as a young African-American officer unfamiliar with the customs and standards of a different ‘society.’ The only other officers he could count on to help him overcome his cultural shock were the four other African-American officers in the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC). Support and mentoring in this situation was not very forthcoming. However, many white officers, perhaps most, have never participated in a situation like this, where they were the minorities. So it is not hard to understand why it may be difficult for them to put themselves in others’ shoes. Inadvertently, the author believes this affects SF recruiting. By failing to recognize that cultural differences are bound to affect judgment, then Special Forces recruiting or others are not served very well.

D. INSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS

Throughout this thesis, the author has made an argument for recruiting candidates about whom there are bound to be security concerns, particularly when talking about a sensitive organization such as Special Forces. This section addresses the issue of vulnerabilities related to espionage, trust, and loyalty. These are critical issues, especially since positions requiring a security clearance generally require a greater background and screening process than that conducted for naturalization.

E. THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS

The naturalization process poses one of the greatest challenges for recruiting first generation Americans. Naturalization is the legal process by which U.S. citizenship is conferred upon foreign citizens or nationals after fulfilling the requirements established
by Congress in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). After naturalization, foreign-born citizens enjoy nearly all the same benefits, rights, and responsibilities that the Constitution grants native-born U.S. citizens, including the right to vote. Naturalized citizens can also apply for a U.S. passport to travel overseas and receive U.S. government protection and assistance when abroad.

The naturalization process is relatively easy, but it does take time. According to the USCIS’s, *A Guide to Naturalization*, applicants requesting naturalization must be as follows.

- Be at least eighteen years old
- Be a lawful permanent resident of the United States
- Be a resident and physically present in the United States for at least five years at the time of application
- Be of good moral character

Upon meeting these requirements, it is then possible to apply for naturalization to the United States. To meet the requirements for Special Forces, a potential candidate must be able to meet the requirements for the Army at a minimum. However, as has been seen, there are additional obstacles: education, documentation, language deficiencies, background investigations, and operational restrictions.

Most first and second generation Americans are at a disadvantage because of the quality of their education, or the inability to verify their educational level. Verification of educational credentials is difficult for first generation Americans because those educated abroad must have their educational level evaluated prior to enlistment. This task is difficult for those who originate from developing nations without the same educational infrastructure found in developed countries. Documentation and accreditation many not be comparable; thus, excluding first generation Americans from service in both the Army and Special Forces.

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76 The INA although it abolished racial restrictions which previously existed still utilizes a quota system and the policy of restricting the numbers of immigrants from certain countries. Although, the INA established a preference system which selected which ethnic groups were desirable immigrants and placed great importance on labor qualifications. This process only limits the available pool for SF.
Special Forces is also more particular than the Army about proficiency in English. For example, upon expressing interest in Special Forces, a candidate is then scheduled for a series of assessments which measure both foreign languages and English through standardized tests such as the Tests of Adult Basic Education (TABE), Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), English Comprehension Language Test (ECLT) and Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). When first generation Americans do not meet the standards set by Special Forces, it would more often than not be due to a deficiency in speaking English.77

This process is not nearly so simple for security clearances. First, non-citizens must obtain an initial security screening, called an Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC) upon entering military service. Army recruiting personnel are responsible for preparing the required forms used for the ENTNAC: SF Form 86 (Questionnaire for National Security Positions) or Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire (EPSQ), Form S2280 or Form 258 (fingerprinting forms), and DD Form 1966 (Record of Military Processing).

Special Forces requires candidate to resubmit an EPSQ upon commitment to SF because a candidate must be eligible for an interim secret clearance to attend SFAS, and upon successful completion of SFAS, the candidate must obtain a Secret level security clearance prior to beginning the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). To do this takes more time requirements for naturalized citizens and other immigrant Americans as opposed to U.S. citizens; thus, lengthening candidate processing time.

However, the biggest practical limitation to immigrants joining Special Forces is the ability to obtain a security clearance, which currently requires U.S. citizenship through naturalization prior to applying for Special Forces training. Although the Army does enlist non-citizens, they may not enlist for any MOS, assignment, or option that requires a security clearance; thereby, limiting the training, development, and potential to

77The electronic version of this form is called the Enlisted Personnel Security Questionnaire (EPSQ).
be successful in Special Forces. Recent reports indicate that the majority of naturalized citizens enter into soft skilled MOSs. Conversely, every MOS in Special Forces requires a security clearance.

Nevertheless, recently developed programs such as those designated to prepare 09Ls and 18Xs offer candidates an excellent opportunity to develop the required skill sets needed for Special Forces and could prove to be useful avenues for recruiting exactly the kinds of candidates SF needs.

F. 09L PROGRAM

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (ASD P&R) and the Army G-1 have created a program aimed at attracting citizen and non-citizen native and heritage speakers of Arabic, Dari, Kurdish, Pashto, and Turkish into the Army through the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). This program’s goal is to produce soldiers who can work in the Translator Aide (09L) MOS overseas. The idea has been to provide more translators “on the ground,” who are language proficient and culturally aware to assist commanders. Enlistment requirements with regard to age, English proficiency, and ASVAB/AFQT were relaxed as part of building the base for this program. Enlistees commit to an 8-year Military Service Obligation (MSO) in the IRR, and upon completion of training, are promoted to the rank of E-4 at a minimum.

This program also made concessions for those who were not entirely as proficient in English by establishing a three-day base program at Fort Sill for initial processing. Individuals then move to the Defense Language Institute English language Center (DLI-ELC) where they undergo intensive English language training for a minimum of six

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78 DoD memorandums and policy letters state that the 09L program was directed in February 2003 and implemented in July 2003, under DoD guidance included (1) languages of interest, (2) enlistment into the IRR, and (3) a shortened basic training course. Noncitizens are enlisted as 09Ls; most citizens (except those who do not qualify) are enlisted as 97L (Translators/Interpreters).

79 Information provided by the USA Recruiting states that recruits for the 09L program may be up to 40 years old and must score at least Listening 2/Speaking 2 in language proficiency for their native language (meaning they are very fluent) and demonstrate some English proficiency (by scoring at least a 40 on the ECLT). There is no minimum ASVAB score requirement for those going into the English language training; those not requiring English language training must have a minimum ASVAB score of 10. They must also eventually score a reading rating of 2 by taking the DLPT.
weeks up to six months. To complete their training, 09Ls in the English language training program must attain at least an 80 on the ECLT an OPI score of L2/S2 (listening and speaking), a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of L2/R2 (listening and reading) in their target language, and an ASVAB score of at least 10. After completing their training, 09Ls go to Fort Jackson for nine weeks of Basic Combat Training and six weeks of Advanced Individual Training (AIT), which is specific to 09Ls.

Most of the program’s recruits are non-citizens. They do not need citizenship/security clearances (the 09L billets do not require clearances), although they undergo additional counterintelligence investigation. While the 09Ls are in AIT, those who are non-citizens and want to become citizens can get assistance with their applications. 09Ls train under “active-duty for training” orders, which mean that they cannot apply for citizenship. However, once assigned to active duty, they may submit an expedited application, which falls under what USCIS calls special circumstances.

Since the program is a pilot, many issues still need to be resolved, including determining the right proponenty and developing a career path for 09Ls. Again, though, the principles of the 09L program offer an excellent case study for Special Forces recruitment of non-citizens.

G. 18X PROGRAM

Another program worth exploring is the 18X program (18X). The 18X program provides an option for non prior service (NPS) recruits to enlist with an option to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). Until the reestablishment of the 18X program in 2001, the only way to join the Army Special Forces was to apply after achieving the grade of E-4 and a GT score of 110, along with meeting other requirements.80

Under the 18X enlistment option, recruits have been guaranteed the opportunity to “try out” for Special Forces by way of SFAS. This option does not guarantee that the

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80 Guidelines for 18X recruiting were obtained from USAREC recruiting stations and 18X Briefing dated 2007.
recruit will become a Special Forces soldier. This option only guarantees that the recruit will be given the opportunity to see if he “meets the requirement for future training.”

A recruit who enlists in the 18X Special Forces enlistment program will attend Infantry OSUT (One Station Unit Training), which combines Army Basic Training and Infantry AIT (Advanced Individual Training), all in one 17-week long course located at Fort Benning, GA, and upon completion, the recruits attends Airborne Training. After this, the recruits attend a 4-week Special Operations Preparation Course (SOPC), which prepares the new recruits in physical training, Special Forces basic skills, and patrolling. Upon completion of SOPC, 18Xs are sent to Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) where they are introduced to other recruits from the Active and National Guard components. Upon successful completion of SFAS, 18Xs begin the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). If a candidate does not meet the requirements, he is assigned to a conventional unit based on his training and the needs of the Army. Most 18Xs dropped from SFQC are afforded the opportunity to reapply for Special Forces training once they achieve the rank of E-4, and have gained more military experience.81

Here, then, is another path for how to ease non-conventional first generation immigrants into SF, and points to how preparation for success can be done when the need for recruitment is deemed to be urgent.

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81 This information is compiled from the author’s notes and 18X statistical data provided by both the SORB and USAREC dating from 2004 to 2007.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Currently, SF recruiting is struggling with its frontier missions and those missions’ place in doctrine. Most Americans are familiar with the frontiers in space and information. SF leadership, past and present, has placed significant emphasis on coming to grips with SF mission standards, and quality over quantity. However, frontiers have existed that have not received sufficient attention, such as opening untapped markets and making greater use of this country’s ethnic diversity.

Racial diversity in the SORB may provide a breakthrough in this regard. Although not a “glamorous” mission, it is nonetheless a vital one if Special Forces is to understand the role first generation Americans can play in SF. By 2030, the United States Special Forces will have to more closely resemble the broader demographics of the United States just to be able to keep its numbers up when, it is safe to say, white Americans may be in the minority. However, there is a more pressing need to get to that point today just given the places SF deploys.

For reasons outlined in this thesis, SORB recruiters need to be better trained to identify, recruit, and train first generation Americans for SFAS. The challenge to all SORB recruiters is fourfold. First, they must possess or develop the cross-cultural skills necessary to build the trust that is crucial to productive interpersonal relationships between first generation Americans and SF. Second, they must use these same cross-cultural skills to make themselves as “transparent” as possible in the environments in which they recruit; they must themselves begin to “blend in.” This is particularly true for SORB’s targeted recruiting efforts of first generation Americans and recent immigrants. Third, they must exploit the advanced technology at their disposal to prepare themselves to work in more insulated immigrant communities. Lastly, SORB recruiters must ultimately ensure candidates do not develop any dependence on them, lest the stage is set for failure when candidates depart developmental training.

These myriad challenges can be overcome and immigrant communities can be tapped.
The author recommends the following concepts and systems be pursued for SF recruiting operations: (1) retrofit existing recruiting tools to include immigrant Americans as “high” propensity; (2) design a marketing and advertising campaign to target first generation Americans; (3) take advantage of standard organizational resources, leads, prospecting tools, statistical reports, and targeting systems, (e.g., SAPER 3, PERSCOM Database, USCIS Database, DMDC, and other management systems); (4) minimize language barriers with “transparent” multilingual recruiters (5) develop a developmental training SF Culture Awareness Center for training, rehearsal, and assessment for both recruiters and immigrant Americans; (6) pursue sustainment systems such as close demographic mentoring of the market.

The final recommendation is to express the need for targeted recruitment of immigrant Americans in the SORB’s strategic guidance. Without reprioritizing the efforts, the approaches described in this thesis will not be possible. Without rethinking policy development, the resources required will not be provided and this untapped market will remain untapped.

A. CONTINUED AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis should also have raised issues worthy of future examination. For instance, the SORB, should systematically collect, analyze, and continue to monitor the following data.

- SF accessions data, specifically, as it relates to immigrant Americans
- SF retention rates for immigrant Americans—tracked through the recruitment process, SFAS, SFQC, onto ODAs, and beyond
- SF volunteer rates and methods (walk-in, targeted, developed, mentored etc.), specifically as it relates to immigrant Americans

In order to examine issues related to the recruitment of immigrant Americans not addressed in this thesis, SF should consider research in the following areas.

- The impact of introducing naturalized citizens into Special Forces on SF ‘culture’
- The challenges in early identification and mentoring of naturalized citizens’ recruitment into SF
• The costs associated with ‘assimilation’ programs, like those run for 09Ls and 18Xs, and whether sharing or piggy-backing on these can be done

• The reasons why Special Forces Recruiting does not currently actively seek naturalized citizens to volunteer for Special Forces training
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