ENHANCING RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF VOLUNTEERS IN THE U.S. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY

by

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December 2008

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The U.S. Coast Guard lacks the personnel and resources to fill critical gaps in its safety and security missions without help from its volunteer arm, the Coast Guard Auxiliary. It is for this reason that Department of Homeland Security and Coast Guard leaders have become dependent on the Auxiliary to achieve a number of Coast Guard missions, a reliance that has become more tenuous as Auxiliary membership dropped 20.61% since 2003 to the current 28,635. Further, at its current strength, the Auxiliary is far from the 48,000 member goal declared mission-critical by 2000 in the 1987 Coast Guard report to the U.S. Congress.

This thesis describes the Auxiliary’s 69-year history and examines the reasons for the organization’s decreasing membership. In this process, the thesis also revealed the absence of a systematic, quantitative tool to assess Auxiliary recruiting and retention practices. This thesis proposes the use of the Coast Guard Organizational Assessment Survey, already administered to all other components of the Coast Guard and which, tailored to the Auxiliary, would be extremely effective in stimulating a genuinely useful approach to increasing Auxiliary membership.
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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Coast Guard lacks the personnel and resources to fill critical gaps in its safety and security missions without help from its volunteer arm, the Coast Guard Auxiliary. It is for this reason that Department of Homeland Security and Coast Guard leaders have become dependent on the Auxiliary to achieve a number of Coast Guard missions, a reliance that has become more tenuous as Auxiliary membership dropped 20.61% since 2003 to the current 28,635. This trend is in sharp contrast to membership trends in other large volunteer groups in the U.S. Further, at its current strength, the Auxiliary is far from the 48,000 member goal declared mission-critical by 2000 in the 1987 Coast Guard report to the U.S. Congress.

This thesis describes the Auxiliary’s 69-year history and examines the reasons for the organization’s decreasing membership. In this process, the thesis also revealed the absence of a systematic, quantitative tool to assess Auxiliary recruiting and retention practices. This thesis proposes the use of the Coast Guard Organizational Assessment Survey, already administered to all other components of the Coast Guard and which, tailored to the Auxiliary, would be extremely effective in stimulating a genuinely useful approach to increasing Auxiliary membership.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1
   A. PROBLEM STATEMENT ..................................................................................1
   B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................4
   C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH ................................................................4
   D. OVERVIEW OF THESIS OUTLINE ...........................................................5

II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................7
   A. THREAT TO U.S. PORTS AND SHORELINES ........................................7
   B. STATE OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD ......................................................10
   C. U.S. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY ............................................................21
      1. History and Missions .........................................................................21
      2. Membership and Facilities .................................................................23
      3. Enabling Legislation and Authority .....................................................25
      4. Impact of the Auxiliary ....................................................................27
      5. Worth of the Auxiliary ....................................................................33
      6. Volunteerism in the Auxiliary .........................................................35
   D. VOLUNTEERISM IN THE U.S. AND WORLDWIDE ............................40
         a. Civil Air Patrol .............................................................................45
         b. U.S. Power Squadrons ...............................................................47
         c. Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary .........................................48
      2. Homeland Security Volunteering Abroad - Israeli Civil Guard ...49
         a. History of Sponsoring Agency – Israel National Police .........50
         b. Civil Guard – History, Member Composition, and Assets ....51
         c. Authority of Israeli Civil Guard ................................................54
         d. Impact of Israeli Civil Guard .....................................................54
         e. Israeli Civil Guard to the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary – A
            Comparative Analysis .............................................................56
   E. VOLUNTEER MOTIVATIONS ................................................................62
   F. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS ............................................................73
   G. TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS AND VOLUNTEERING ..................75

III. METHOD ...................................................................................................................83
   A. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................83
   B. EXISTING COAST GUARD AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP
      STUDIES ..................................................................................................83
   C. EXISTING COAST GUARD AUXILIARY DISTRICT THIRTEEN
      EXIT SURVEY DATA .............................................................................85
   D. COMPARISON OF AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP DATA TO
      NATIONAL VOLUNTEER DATA .............................................................86
   E. COMPARISON OF AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP DATA TO CIVIL
      AIR PATROL MEMBERSHIP DATA ....................................................88
   F. COMPARISON OF AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP DATA TO U.S.
      POWER SQUADRONS MEMBERSHIP DATA ....................................89
G. INTERVIEWS .................................................................................................................. 89

IV. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................. 91
   A. HISTORICAL STUDY – COAST GUARD AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP: 1952-1987 ................................................................. 91
      1. 1987 Coast Guard Auxiliary Membership Report to Congress .... 91
   B. RECENT STUDIES – COAST GUARD MEMBERSHIP: 1987-PRESENT ........................................................................... 95
      1. 2005-2007 Coast Guard Auxiliary Membership Reports......... 95
         2. Coast Guard Auxiliary District Thirteen Exit Survey Data ...... 101
   C. COMPARATIVE TRENDS AMONG THREE SOURCES OF DATA .................................................................... 106
   D. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP TRENDS ..................................................................................... 108
   E. COMPARISON OF COAST GUARD AUXILIARY VS. U.S. VOLUNTEERISM TRENDS ...................................................... 112
   F. COMPARISON OF COAST GUARD AUXILIARY VS. CIVIL AIR PATROL TRENDS ............................................................ 113
   G. COMPARISON OF COAST GUARD AUXILIARY VS. U.S. POWER SQUADRONS TRENDS .................................................. 114
   H. ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY ASSESSMENT MECHANISM .............................................................................. 116

V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................... 119
   A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ................................................................................................................................. 119
   B. COAST GUARD ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT SURVEY .................................................................................. 121
   C. PROPOSED COAST GUARD AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT SURVEY .................................................. 124
      1. Role of the Coast Guard Auxiliary Organization Assessment Survey ............................................................................. 125
      2. Refining the Coast Guard Organization Assessment Survey ..... 127
      3. Administration of Survey ..................................................................................................................................... 129
      4. Data Management and Dissemination .................................................................................................................... 130
      5. Potential Usefulness of Data .................................................................................................................................. 131
      6. Obstacles to Implementing Organizational Survey .................................................................................................. 131
      7. Recommendations ................................................................................................................................................ 132
   D. ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR THE FUTURE .............................................................................................................. 133
      1. Recruiting ............................................................................................................................................................. 134
      2. Role of the Coast Guard Auxiliary .......................................................................................................................... 137
      3. Future Research .................................................................................................................................................. 139

VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 145
   A. OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................................................... 145
   B. REVIEW OF THESIS QUESTIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE .................................................................................. 145
   C. FINAL THOUGHTS ............................................................................................................................................... 148

LIST OF REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 157

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................... 169
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coast Guard Policy Environment for the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coast Guard Organizational Graphic Design</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Coast Guard Organizational Structure</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Coast Guard Multi-Mission Focus</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Auxiliary Organizational Structure</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Coast Guard’s Four Safety and Security Efforts of Awareness, Prevention,</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection, and Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Primary Reasons Why Members Joined the Coast Guard Auxiliary</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Primary Sources of Member Dissatisfaction</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Primary Sources of Member Satisfaction</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Primary Benefit to Auxiliary Recruiting and Membership Retention</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Membership Trends – U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary – 1978-2007</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Membership Trends – U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary – 2001-2007</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Comparison of National Volunteer Numbers (in Thousands) with Auxiliary Member</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers (2001-2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Comparison of Auxiliary and Civil Air Patrol (Senior) Membership 1970-2007</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Auxiliary and Power Squadron Membership – 1984-2007</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>The Control Model (modified from original)</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Coast Guard Mission Areas. .................................................................11
Table 2. Table Illustrating Worth of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary in 2007........34
Table 3. Comparison between U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and Israeli Civil Guard.58
Table 4. Volunteer Functions Inventory Model..................................................68
Table 5. Comments from the 1986-1987 Attitude Survey of Active and Former
Auxiliarists Responding. *The three highest-ranked reasons are listed in order.*94
Table 6. Satisfaction vs. Dissatisfaction Comments from the 2005 Membership
Survey ...........................................................................................................99
Table 7. Comparative Trends Among Three Sources of Data............................106
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC – America’s Boating Course
ASC – Auxiliary Sector Coordinator
ATON – Aid to Navigation
AUXLO - Auxiliary Liaison Officer
AUXPAL - Auxiliary Personnel Augmentation List
AWW - America’s Waterways Watch

BLS - Bureau of Labor Statistics
BOCA - Coast Guard Boarding Officers Certified Ashore

C3 - Command, Control, and Communications
CAN - Citizen’s Action Network
CAP – Civil Air Patrol
CBP – Customs and Border Protection
CFR – Code of Federal Regulations
CFV – Commercial Fishing Vessel
CFVE – Commercial Fishing Vessel Examiner
CG-OAS - Coast Guard Organizational Assessment Survey
CGA-OAS - Coast Guard Auxiliary Organizational Assessment Survey
CGMS – Coast Guard Message System
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CO – Commanding Officer

DCO – District Commodore
DCP – Division Captain (soon to be called Division Commanders, DCDR)
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency
DOT – Department of Transportation

EOY – end-of-year

FC – Flotilla Commander
FHP – Florida Highway Patrol
FIST - Field Intelligence Support Team

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

ICS – Incident Command System
IDF – Israel Defense Force
IMO - International Maritime Organization
IP – Israel National Police
ISPS - International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
MARSEC – Maritime Security Level
MDA – Maritime Domain Awareness
MOM - Maritime Observation Missions
MST - Motivational Systems Theory
MTSA - Maritime Transportation and Security Act

NRC – National Response Center

OAS – Organizational Assessment Survey
OPM - Office of Personnel Management
OPR - Operation Patriot Readiness

PE- Public Education
PSI - Personnel Security Investigation Program

RBS – Recreational Boating Safety
RCO – Rear Commodore

SAR – Search and Rescue

TRACEN – Training Center Yorktown
TWIC - Transportation Worker Identification Credential

USC – U.S. Code
USCG – United States Coast Guard
USPS – U.S. Power Squadrons
UTV – Uninspected Towing Vessel

VE – Vessel Examinations
VFI - Volunteers’ Functions Inventory
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The U.S. Coast Guard is one of five branches of the Armed Forces and was, astonishingly, smaller than the New York Police Department until additional manpower was allocated to the organization following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Despite its size, the Coast Guard is charged with ensuring the safety and security of 3.4 million square miles of territorial seas, including 95,000 miles of coastlines and 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways. In order to meet all mission requirements, the Coast Guard deploys armed personnel and surface, air, and landside assets daily to patrol thousands of critical infrastructures, including bridges, dams, locks, railways, levees, pipelines, offshore and shoreside facilities, security and safety zones established around vessels and facilities, and to conduct offshore armed security boardings on high interest vessels, located in 361 port complexes nationwide. Additionally, the Coast Guard oversees the arrival of 8,000 foreign-flagged ships with over 200,000 foreign mariners at U.S. ports each year, an industry that contributes over $700 billion dollars to the U.S. economy. The production level of the Coast Guard prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was staggering considering its limited budget and resources. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has assumed even greater duties achieving objectives unequaled by most federal agencies.

Many of the achievements, both then and now, would not be attainable without assistance from the Coast Guard’s maritime volunteer organization, the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary.5 This point was expressed in the *U.S. Coast Guard Posture Statement*:

The Coast Guard’s workforce is more capable and prepared than at any time in the Service’s 217 year history. A key to our success is the vitally important integration of our Reserve force and the support provided by the nation’s premier voluntary organization, the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Over 28,000 volunteer Auxiliary members donate thousands of hours supporting a wide array of Coast Guard missions.6

No other Armed Service, excluding the U.S. Air Force with its 56,000 member Auxiliary Civil Air Patrol, has a volunteer workforce established for the sole purpose of aiding in the execution of its missions.7 The value of the Coast Guard Auxiliary as a potential role model volunteer organization in the realm of homeland security was recognized when a team of researchers from Harvard University suggested the implementation of a Border Patrol Auxiliary to augment the securing of U.S. borders. A key component of their research and thrust for the desired initiative relied in part on a case study performed on the Coast Guard Auxiliary and its role and performance within the Coast Guard.8 The Auxiliary prides itself on being the nation’s leader in recreational vessel safety education and outreach, as well as a significant contributor to a number of other Coast Guard safety and security missions. Even with the 27,122-member Auxiliary helping, the Coast Guard was only able to meet six of its 11 performance measures in 2006, one fewer than in 2005.9 The Coast Guard must devise new and innovative ways


to fill critical mission gaps in order to meet all performance targets, specifically those related to its homeland security missions. As further duties are delegated to the Coast Guard in the near future, such as the responsibilities associated with the impending regulations requiring the inspection of more than 7,000 towing vessels operating in U.S. waters, the implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential for 1.5 million waterfront and vessel employees, unexpected responses to natural disasters or terrorist attacks, and random increases in maritime security levels, the Coast Guard may struggle to meet its mission objectives.\textsuperscript{10}

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the \textit{National Small Vessel Security Strategy} in 2007 in an effort to mitigate recognized threats from smaller vessels (recreational, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, commercial fishing vessels) to large commercial ships, critical infrastructures, and key assets located in highly populated port complexes.\textsuperscript{11} With 13 million registered recreational vessels and potentially four million more unregistered, it is unreasonable to expect the Coast Guard, without help from its Auxiliary counterpart, to have the capacity to track and monitor the intentions of each vessel in areas designated as high risk. In addition to recreational vessels, there are another 110,000 small vessels operating within the maritime domain. For this reason, DHS and Coast Guard leaders are heavily reliant on Auxiliary resources and their capacity for rousing community awareness and involvement through their Recreational Boating Safety Program to achieve a number of Coast Guard missions, as well as the strategic objectives outlined in the \textit{National Small Vessel Security Strategy}.\textsuperscript{12} This may prove to be an extremely difficult task as Auxiliary membership has sharply fallen approximately 20.61\% (from 36,068 in 2003 to 28,635 in 2007).\textsuperscript{13} This decline is alarming considering that nationwide volunteer rates and community service remain at

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{13} Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District, March 2008.
\end{flushright}
historically high levels since 1974 in spite of a regression beginning in 2005.\textsuperscript{14} Even more alarming is that a 1987 internal Coast Guard audit of the Auxiliary Program estimated that 48,000 Auxiliarists would be required by the year 2000 for the Coast Guard to complete its missions effectively.\textsuperscript{15} Almost 10 years after the year 2000 benchmark, the Auxiliary membership falls far short of the goal of having 48,000 members. This issue could become a monumental problem not only for the Coast Guard organization but for the millions of Americans whose safety and security are preserved by “Team Coast Guard” men and women every day.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions are addressed in this thesis:

- What is the current status of Auxiliary membership as compared to other national volunteer service organizations?
- What mechanism does the Coast Guard presently employ to identify trends in Auxiliary membership for retention and recruitment?
- What measure(s) could be instituted to prevent or mitigate future losses in Auxiliary membership while effectively recruiting new members?

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This research is vitally important to the U.S. Coast Guard because it seeks to provide insight into the cause(s) of the declining membership found in the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and to suggest the implementation and further research of measures to prevent, or at least mitigate, future losses in Auxiliary membership. A focus on retention efforts will enable the Coast Guard to retain its current number of Auxiliary members while effectively recruiting new members in the future. Recruiting new members, especially those who leave the Auxiliary within a year, while existing members are simultaneously exiting at high rates, results in the “revolving door” effect and needless expenditure of limited organizational funding, resources, and manpower. The main objectives of this research is to collate disparate data about the Auxiliary into one


document for use by future decision-makers, to analyze the extensive database on Auxiliary membership trends, to present a proposed mechanism to produce data useful in implementing membership retention strategies. Ultimately, the goal is to reverse the rate of membership attrition in the Auxiliary to ensure that the Coast Guard’s future workforce will be augmented by well-trained, highly motivated volunteers to contend with the Coast Guard’s ever-increasing workload.

D. OVERVIEW OF THESIS OUTLINE

Chapter II of this thesis outlines the extensive literature describing the threats posed to U.S. ports and shorelines, background information on the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Auxiliary organizations, an analysis of volunteerism and an examination of a number of volunteer-related social science research studies, and a comparison of four other volunteer organizations including the Civil Air Patrol, U.S. Power Squadrons, Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary, and the Israeli Civil Guard with the Auxiliary. Following the literature review in Chapter III, the methods used in the collection and analysis of data for this thesis are described. In Chapter IV, the thesis compares and analyzes the historical membership data from the Coast Guard Auxiliary, Civil Air Patrol, U.S. Power Squadrons, and national volunteer data collected from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In addition, historical and more recent Auxiliary membership studies, as well as Coast Guard District Thirteen exit survey data, are evaluated to determine if membership trends can be identified and, if so, whether they have changed over the last 20 years. Finally, the results of the analysis are reported and recommendations presented in Chapter V, while the thesis conclusions are listed in Chapter VI.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis contains an expansive literature review beginning with a brief discussion of the threats posed to U.S. ports and shorelines from nefarious terrorist groups throughout the world. Such threats are important to be aware of because September 11, 2001 dramatically changed the organizational structure and mission emphasis of the Coast Guard, as well as expanded the role and operational opportunities for Auxiliarists. The next component of the literature review provides fundamental background information on the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Auxiliary organizations, including an estimate and a synopsis of the monetary value of the Auxiliary to the Coast Guard. A discussion of volunteerism follows, offering definitions, benefits, and several notable examples of volunteer accomplishments during volatile periods in U.S. history. Next, three domestic volunteer organizations, the Civil Air Patrol, the U.S. Power Squadrons, and the Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary, and one international volunteer organization, the Israeli Civil Guard, performing activities similar to the Coast Guard Auxiliary are discussed for the purpose of highlighting unique organizational practices and activities carried out by volunteers. Finally, the literature review concludes with an examination of a number of sociological and psychological research studies to identify motives and factors involved in the decision to join and remain a dedicated member of a volunteer organization.

A. THREAT TO U.S. PORTS AND SHORELINES

The possibility for terrorist attacks has been identified as a significant threat within the maritime domain in government directives and strategies, as well as by independent researchers.16 This is of particular importance as 85% of the American population lives within 100 miles of the coastline. Additionally, substantial economic consequences are at stake should an attack occur because approximately 60 million jobs

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producing $4.5 trillion dollars (nearly half of the U.S. GDP) are situated on or in close proximity of our nation’s coastal waterways. A key strategic objective of The National Strategy for Maritime Security is to address these threats through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is at the core of Coast Guard port-of-entry intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination for the purpose of multi-agency vessel security boardings of high interest vessels prior to entry of these vessels into U.S. waters. The National Strategy for Maritime Security and The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship also direct the need for MDA calling for the protection of critical infrastructure located in the maritime environment, sharing of intelligence among federal, state, and local agencies, as well as the private sector, and enhanced command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities for real-time decision making.

Following the attacks of 9/11, regulations were developed to protect both the critical infrastructure in ports as well as large commercial ships which transit in and out of the U.S. The implementation of the Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 was the U.S.’s initial attempt to protect its ports and waterways by precipitating the need for the development and implementation of facility and vessel security plans. Further, the MTSA promoted collaborative efforts among port stakeholders including federal, state, and local governmental entities, as well as port authorities, environmental organizations, law enforcement, and the private sector. Security regulations for vessels ventured beyond U.S. waters when the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted the fundamental groundwork and philosophy of the MTSA regulations, implementing the International Ship and Port Facility Security

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(ISPS) Code in 2003.\textsuperscript{21} The ISPS Code requires ships greater than 500 gross tons on international voyages to adhere to security requirements as outlined in ship security plans approved by flag administrations.\textsuperscript{22} For the first time in history, security regulations were fused and standardized to ensure consistent security enforcement among countries worldwide.

Although no attacks had been successfully executed by terrorists in U.S. port complexes prior to 9/11, the targeting of and attacks on commercial ships were not uncommon. The \textit{Achille Lauro} was hijacked off the coast of Egypt on October 7, 1985 by four men representing the Palestine Liberation Front demanding the release of 50 Palestinians from Israeli prisons. The hijackers eventually abandoned the liner two days later but not before killing wheelchair-bound Leon Klinghoffer, a Jewish-American, and throwing his body overboard.\textsuperscript{23} A recent attack was carried out by pirates 100 miles off the Somalia Coast on November 5, 2005.\textsuperscript{24} The \textit{Seabourn Spirit} was successfully able to outrun two heavily armed pirate vessels despite being hit by three rocket-propelled grenades and machine gunfire. Additionally, Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya targeted four cruise ships operating on the Nile River in an attempt to undermine Egyptian tourism.\textsuperscript{25} Although no recorded attacks took place, the fear instilled in tourists and the local community has notably contributed to Egypt’s lagging economy. Other attacks have been carried out on similar-sized vessels including the October 2000 bombing of the \textit{USS Cole} and the October 2002 attack on the loaded tankship, \textit{Limburg}.\textsuperscript{26} Both attacks were inspired by Osama bin Laden and planned and executed by al Qaeda operatives.\textsuperscript{27} A plot to ram explosive-laden speedboats into cruise ships carrying Israeli tourists to Turkey

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{23} Michael D. Greenberg et al., \textit{Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability} (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), 73.
\textsuperscript{25} Michael D. Greenberg et al., \textit{Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability} (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), 20.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 16-17.
\end{footnotes}
was uncovered in August 2005. The mastermind behind the operation was discovered to be a Syrian national linked to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s history of maritime attacks, as well as the extremely successful 9/11 attack, demonstrates the organization’s commitment to maritime targets and suggests that a future attack in the maritime environment is probable. Bin Laden and al Qaeda would likely seek a target offering substantial socio-political significance, which, if attacked, would result in more deaths and economic loss than America experienced after 9/11.

B. STATE OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD

The U.S. Coast Guard, founded in 1790, is the smallest branch of the Armed Forces with only 41,873 active duty, 7,057 civilian, and 8,100 reserve members for a total of 57,030 personnel. The missions and responsibilities of the Coast Guard are many and include search and rescue, marine safety, ports, waterway, and coastal security, illegal drug interdiction, undocumented migrant interdiction, defense readiness, marine environmental protection, living marine resources law enforcement, aids-to-navigation and waterways management, intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, and domestic ice operations. These missions are illustrated in Table 1.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission and program</th>
<th>Activities and functions of each program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeland security missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ports, waterways, and coastal security</td>
<td>Conducting harbor patrols, vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and analysis, and other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the damage from attacks that occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Undocumented migrant interdiction</td>
<td>Deploying cutters and aircraft to reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the United States by maritime routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Defense readiness</td>
<td>Participating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in global military operations, deploying cutters and other boats in and around harbors to protect DOD force mobilization operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-homeland security missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Search and rescue</td>
<td>Operating multimission stations and a national distress and response communication system, conducting search and rescue operations for mariners in distress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Living marine resources</td>
<td>Enforcing domestic fishing laws and regulations through inspections and fishery patrols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aids to navigation</td>
<td>Managing U.S. waterways and providing a safe, efficient, and navigable marine transportation system, maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids, monitoring marine traffic through vessel traffic service centers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ice operations</td>
<td>Conducting polar operations to facilitate the movement of critical goods and personnel in support of scientific and national security activity, conducting domestic icebreaking operations to facilitate year-round commerce, conducting international ice operations to track icebergs below the 49th north latitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Marine environmental protection</td>
<td>Preventing and responding to marine oil and chemical spills, preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and garbage in U.S. waters, preventing biological invasions by aquatic nuisance species.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Marine safety</td>
<td>Setting standards and conducting vessel inspections to better ensure the safety of passengers and crew aboard commercial vessels, partnering with states and boating safety organizations to reduce recreational boating deaths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Illegal drug interdiction</td>
<td>Deploying cutters and aircraft in high drug-trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to reduce the flow of illegal drugs through maritime transit routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other law enforcement (foreign fish enforcement)</td>
<td>Protecting U.S. fishing grounds by ensuring that foreign fishermen do not illegally harvest U.S. fish stocks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Coast Guard Mission Areas.\(^{32}\)

The laws, regulations, presidential directives, policies, international agreements, and other legislation mandating Coast Guard missions are captured in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Coast Guard Policy Environment for the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy.33

The Coast Guard witnessed a significant organizational transformation in 2003 as a result of the 9/11 attacks.34 The most noteworthy adjustment came with Sectorization or combining the “operational” and “marine safety” segments of the Coast Guard in order to unify communication and response capabilities. The hierarchy of the Coast Guard begins with Headquarters located in Washington, D.C. with information flowing down to Areas, Districts, and Sectors. There are two Area commands, Atlantic Area with five Districts and Pacific Area with four Districts. Districts command Sectors, Air Stations, and Coast Guard Cutters. Sectors command Small Boat Stations. Figures 2 and 3


34 Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on the Challenges Facing the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, August 2, 2007.
provide an illustration of the Coast Guard organization. In terms of the Auxiliary, it is important to grasp the Coast Guard organizational structure because: (1) the Auxiliary structure is intended to parallel that of the Coast Guard itself and (2) the function of the Auxiliary is distributed from the level of Stations up to the level Headquarters.

Figure 2. Coast Guard Organizational Graphic Design.  

Figure 3. Coast Guard Organizational Structure.

The transformation associated with Sectorization will be followed with further change as the Coast Guard intends to merge both Area Commands into one Operational Unit for the purpose of streamlining logistics and other operational decision-making. Additionally, new positions will be created to provide leadership and focus in areas of personnel management, acquisitions, research and development, as well as other critical areas of mission support.36

The Coast Guard is an organization accustomed to change, having evolved considerably over its 217 years of existence while shouldering new responsibilities and reprioritizing mission goals to conform to the needs of the United States. *Coast Guard Publication 1* elucidates this exclusive nature of the Coast Guard:

The Service acquired new responsibilities based on its ability to perform them with existing assets and minimal disruption to its other duties. It acquired other agencies because their maritime responsibilities were seen as intersecting with or complementing its own. The result is today’s U.S. Coast Guard - a unique force that carries out an array of civil and military responsibilities touching on almost every facet of the maritime environment affecting the United States.

What makes the Coast Guard unique is that in executing our diverse missions as America’s Maritime Guardian, we harmonize what seem to be contradictory mandates. We are charged at once to be policemen and sailors, warriors, humanitarians, regulators, stewards of the environment, diplomats, and guardians of the coast. Thus, we are military, multi-mission, and maritime.37

The multi-mission focus of the Coast Guard is further illustrated by Figure 4.

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The ability of the Coast Guard to continue assuming additional duties without additional funding, personnel, training, and assets is in question as evidenced by a recent committee meeting held on August 2, 2007 by the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure concerning the challenges facing the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program. Prominent members of industry voiced

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39 Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on the Challenges Facing the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, August 2, 2007.
concerns that the Coast Guard was not providing adequate service to the maritime industry. They attributed the Coast Guard’s lackluster performance in this mission area to the organization’s focus on homeland security responsibilities. Industry members declared that the level of customer service and technical expertise provided by Coast Guard marine inspectors, marine investigators, and marine licensors is on the decline resulting in frustration and lost revenue on the part of industry. Consequently, members of industry, as well as the Chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, James Oberstar, called for the removal of vessel inspection, marine casualty investigation, and licensing of mariners responsibilities from the Coast Guard. Oberstar declared, “We saw the Coast Guard’s duties get stretched, stretched, stretched…but we didn’t see the resources and money get stretched.” Industry is not alone in the belief that the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program has fallen short of its performance target dating back to 2002.

Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, in his written testimony, empathized with industry’s concerns but disagreed with the removal of the marine safety missions from the Coast Guard. He argued that the marine safety missions that Subcommittee members were seeking to remove from the Coast Guard are security related as much as they are safety. The Commandant said, “You get a benefit to security when you improve safety…You get a benefit to safety when you improve security.” As Admiral Allen made evident, transferring responsibilities to another agency would not eliminate the Coast Guard’s involvement in boarding a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Although the Coast Guard would not board the vessel for the sake of performing a safety examination, it would be required to board the vessel to ensure it met the security requirements of the Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA) and


42 Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on the Challenges Facing the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, August 2, 2007.

the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. What industry and other government officials were proposing would actually require that a vessel be boarded by two different entities instead of one. To remove the marine safety missions of the Coast Guard would require either the creation of a new organization with similar regulatory authority as the Coast Guard or an existing organization assuming the additional responsibilities. The solution, according to Admiral Allen, is not found with the removal of responsibilities from the Coast Guard or the creation of a new organization but lies in the allocation and assignment of properly trained personnel in sufficient numbers to complete the missions.44

The Coast Guard Marine Casualty Investigation Program, a part of the Marine Safety mission, has also been the subject of intense scrutiny stemming from the agency’s response to the Motor Vessel COSCO BUSAN striking the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge on November 7, 2007.45 The problems that were recognized in the Coast Guard’s response to that situation were not unlike those cited in the audit initiated by the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General in December 2005. That audit, done at the direction of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate, found that the Coast Guard Marine Casualty Investigation Program was plagued with qualification, resource, and training shortfalls resulting in errors in the marine casualty investigative process as well as a significant backlog of cases requiring review and closure. The audit report listed eight recommendations including the need for additional marine casualty

44 Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on the Challenges Facing the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, August 2, 2007.

45 Statement of Anne L. Richards, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Department of Homeland Security, on the Coast Guard’s Response to the M/V COSCO BUSAN allision with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, April 10, 2008.
investigators. Admiral Allen has established strategic goals to enhance the Coast Guard Marine Safety Program by establishing Centers of Excellence and is planning to add 276 marine inspectors and investigators to Sectors by the end of 2009.

Another notable issue facing the Coast Guard is its fleet of antiquated cutters. Presently, the Coast Guard is operating high- and medium endurance cutters that are older than 37 of the 39 worldwide naval fleets. New responsibilities and increased operational tempo following the 9/11 attacks are only accelerating the aging process of its surface assets, crippling the Coast Guard’s ability to respond to large, catastrophic events. To contend with the problem, the Coast Guard initiated the Deepwater Program in 1993 awarding the contract and oversight of the Program to Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. The initial budget of $17 billion rose to $24 billion dollars following 9/11 with little to show for it except upgrades to existing vessels and aircraft. The lengthening of 110 ft Patrol Boats to 123 ft initially appeared to be a success before structural failures became evident following deployment. To make matters worse, structural defects were also observed in the National Security Cutter that was

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46 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Staff Summary of Subject Matter on the May 20, 2008 Hearing on, “Coast Guard and National Transportation Safety Board Casualty Investigation Program,” to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, May 19, 2008.


49 Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on the Recent Setbacks of the Coast Guard Deepwater Program before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, February 14, 2007, 2.


51 Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on the Recent Setbacks of the Coast Guard Deepwater Program before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, February 14, 2007, 3.

commissioned in September 2006. Contrary to preliminary reports, these defects were related to the 30-year service life of the vessel rather than its present-day operational suitability. Admiral Allen indicated, in his written testimony to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, that removing the converted 123 ft Patrol Boats from service imposed a critical gap in patrol boat hours. Alternative solutions have been implemented to fill these gaps but they involve the use of Naval and other Coast Guard resources to fulfill mission mandates. This requires leaders to draw resources from already operationally depleted coastal units creating new mission gaps elsewhere. Admiral Allen, in the 2008 U.S. Coast Guard Posture Statement, affirms his commitment to modernizing the Coast Guard’s aging fleet of cutters and aircraft:

> From our extensive field visits, it is clear to me and Master Chief of the Coast Guard Skip Bowen that we only remain *Semper Paratus* through the courage, determination, and devotion of our people. At the same time, our people must have the proper equipment and resources to be successful. Growing daily demand for our services continues to take a major toll on our work force and assets. Consistent with the other Armed Forces, we must *reset, reconstitute, and revitalize* our equipment and forces during this time of unprecedented service to the Nation and the world.

> It is noteworthy that the FY 2009 budget also includes the decommissioning of the 64-year-old Coast Guard Cutter ACUSHNET from the oldest fleet of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft in our history. But let me be clear — we must honor the past, not operate in it! Our future lies in a flexible, agile, modern force backed by a transformed command and control and mission support structure.

Another extremely important component to Coast Guard readiness is the number of qualified Coast Guard Boarding Officers Certified Ashore (BOCA). Although the Coast Guard performs many of its armed patrols in small boats on navigable waterways,

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the Coast Guard is also charged with patrolling shorelines, levees, waterfront facilities including cruise ship terminals and refineries, container yards, bridges, locks, and dams. These landside patrols are conducted in government vehicles or on foot. BOCAs were required to be deputized by the U.S. Marshal Service in order to perform landside armed patrols. Now, BOCAs require only a designation from a Commanding Officer as a result of a bill (H.R. 4251) passed by Congress in May 2004 granting Coast Guard authority to carry firearms and make arrests on land. The frequency of these patrols vary based on numerous factors including maritime security (MARSEC) level changes and can be increased or decreased at the discretion of Coast Guard Captains of the Port. The qualification requirements to become a BOCA are more stringent than the typical Coast Guard Boarding Officer because of the additional authorities, which need to be learned and clearly understood. The unpredictability and locations where MARSEC levels might be increased, amplified by the challenges associated with grooming qualified BOCAs, produce another daunting challenge for the Coast Guard in fulfilling its homeland security duties.

For the security of our nation’s ports, waterways, and coastal areas, intelligence is gathered by the Coast Guard’s Field Intelligence Support Teams (FIST), which are located at local field units or Sectors. A key strategic objective of The National Strategy for Maritime Security is Maritime Domain Awareness, which is at the core of Coast Guard intelligence. Effective Coast Guard intelligence-gathering activities are essential for the successful execution of numerous Coast Guard homeland security missions including drug and migrant interdiction and high interest vessel and port state control boardings. Coast Guard leaders have made staffing Sector FIST offices a priority to enhance the ability of the Coast Guard to meet intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting objectives outlined in the The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety,

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The Coast Guard will become more reliable on this capability as worldwide maritime trade and cruise ship passengers are projected to double and triple by 2020, respectively, bringing greater security concerns to the U.S.\textsuperscript{58}

The events of September 11, 2001 sparked a revitalization of the Coast Guard and its readiness. The Coast Guard’s unofficial motto, “Do more with less,” was a way of life among Coast Guardsmen across the country. With the expansion of Coast Guard missions after 9/11, Coast Guard leadership and members of Congress aggressively pursued increased funding and billets for the organization in order to keep it afloat to contend with ever-increasing safety and security missions. The Coast Guard’s annual budget has almost doubled since September 11, 2001 rising from approximately five billion dollars to 9.3 billion dollars in just seven years. Additionally, the Coast Guard has added almost 3,000 active duty and civilian personnel to its workforce. Despite these massive budgetary and personnel increases, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General found that the Coast Guard is still having difficulties fulfilling its safety and homeland security mission requirements.\textsuperscript{59} This may be due to the fact the Coast Guard existed for so long without adequate funding and resources that allocation of these newly acquired assets simply filled deeply-rooted, longstanding gaps. Breaches in mission readiness appearing satisfied may still require supplementary financing and manpower.

C. U.S. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY

1. History and Missions

The Coast Guard Auxiliary is comprised of 28,635 unpaid, volunteer citizens from eclectic backgrounds who serve in a non-military capacity to assist the active duty


sector of the Coast Guard in all non-law enforcement missions.\textsuperscript{60} The Auxiliary was originally established by Congress in 1939 and called the Coast Guard Reserve. It was not until 1941 that the volunteer Reserve became known as the Auxiliary.\textsuperscript{61} The Auxiliary was initially instituted to respond to the desperate need for vessels to patrol the coastlines of the U.S. during World War II. German U-boats began patrolling U.S. shores in early 1942 with the intention of sinking merchant ships carrying supplies to aid in the war effort. Approximately 2,000 Auxiliary vessels patrolled local waterways until newly constructed warships were deployed. Although no Auxiliary vessels were ever credited with the sinking of a German U-boat, they rescued hundreds of merchant mariners from torpedoed ships and potentially reduced the number of would-be German attacks.\textsuperscript{62}

The Auxiliary performs and executes countless duties including search and rescue (SAR), harbor safety and security patrols, radio watchstanding, protecting property and the environment, vessel safety examinations, air and surface operations, boating safety training, language interpreting, and verifying aids to navigation.\textsuperscript{63} Each year, Auxiliarists save approximately 500 lives, assist 15,000 boaters in distress, conduct more than 150,000 voluntary vessel safety exams on recreational vessels, and provide boater safety education to 500,000 members of the public.\textsuperscript{64} The Auxiliary, working closely with the Coast Guard, other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, businesses, and the boating public, forms a vital component of America’s Maritime Megacommunity.\textsuperscript{65} A

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District, March 2008; U.S. Coast Guard, \textit{U.S. Coast Guard Posture Statement: With 2009 Budget In Brief} (Washington, D.C.: February 2008), 15.
\item \textsuperscript{61} U.S. Coast Guard, \textit{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Manual}, COMDTINST M16790.1F (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2004), Chapters 1, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Foundation for Coast Guard History, \textit{The Coast Guard} (Seattle: Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, Inc., 2004), 107.
\item \textsuperscript{63} U.S. Coast Guard, \textit{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Manual}, COMDTINST M16790.1F (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2004), Chapter 2, 3-4.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Megacommunity is a conglomeration of all stakeholders, consisting of business, government, and non-profit representatives, as well as citizens, who unify and work together toward accomplishing common goals. Each constituent of the Megacommunity is vitally important bringing to the table specialized skills, knowledge, and resources.

2. Membership and Facilities

AUXDATA is a web-based database tool used by select Auxiliary members to record and track operational and administrative volunteer hours performed, and permits users to view data by geographic locations, units, and types of missions performed. AUXINFO is a web-based program, which allows anyone to view Auxiliary data extracted from AUXDATA in a clear, concise, and explicable manner through the use of graphic “cubes.” AUXINFO data indicated that, on September 5, 2008, the Auxiliary has over 13,120 air and boat crew-qualified personnel and 1,275 units, 3,920 vessels, 217 aircraft, and 2,548 radio facilities available to conduct shoreside and landside safety and security patrols, as well as an array of other duties.66 The Coast Guard Auxiliary also possesses 288 Language Interpreters, 23 Physicians, 14 Dentists, 10 Certified First Responders, 608 Fingerprint Technicians, 5,384 Instructors, 1,055 Watchstanders, 6,275 Vessel Examiners, 194 Commercial Fishing Vessel Examiners, 134 Uninspected Passenger Vessel Examiners, 22 Uninspected Towing Vessel Examiners, 219 Harbor Safety Specialists, 52 Assistant Pollution Investigators, and 3,458 AUXOPs, meaning they have completed all of the AUXOP Courses (i.e., Navigation, Search and Rescue, Seamanship, Communications, Weather, Patrols, and Administration. The Administration Course is no longer required.).67 The Auxiliary is comprised of many members with prior military experience and/or University degrees. Others possess advanced degrees or some form of specialized training (i.e., Private Pilot License or Merchant Mariner License). All share a commitment to safeguarding the lives of the citizens and shores of the U.S. Becoming a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary is not an easy task. The application process is detailed and time consuming, requiring potential

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67 Ibid.
members to undergo security background verifications. This procedure, referred to as
the Personnel Security Investigation Program, was instituted in 2003 and helps to
safeguard security sensitive information that Auxiliarists may come in contact with when
volunteering at Coast Guard units.

Those wishing to join the Auxiliary must be at least 17 years of age and must pay
an annual membership fee. There is no maximum age or minimal volunteer time
limitations so members can remain in the organization even if they do not have recorded
volunteer hours, so long as they pay the annual dues. Auxiliarists wear the Coast Guard
active duty commissioned officer uniform with only differences in the colors of
appurtenances. Members are also provided with an employee identification number and
an identification card in order to gain access to Coast Guard facilities. Also noteworthy
is the fact that there are a handful of active duty Coast Guardsmen who are also members
of the Auxiliary.

The Coast Guard Auxiliary hierarchy begins at the National level, located in
Washington, D.C. with information flowing down to District, Division, and Flotilla
levels. Districts are segmented into several Divisions that oversee four or more Flotillas.
Flotillas, analogous to Coast Guard Stations, are the operational units of the Auxiliary
and are composed of at least 15 Auxiliary members. One Auxiliarist from each Flotilla is
voted as Flotilla Commander to lead, direct, administrate, and communicate the needs of
the Coast Guard to other Flotilla volunteer members. The Coast Guard allocates a
limited number of full-time active duty personnel to manage and oversee the program at
the National and District levels. No active duty member is stationed at the Flotilla level.
Figure 5 illustrates the Coast Guard Auxiliary organizational structure.

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68 U.S. Coast Guard, *U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Manual*, COMDTINST M16790.1F (Washington,
69 Ibid., Chapters 3, 9.
70 Ibid., 1-7 and Chapter 10, 1-6.
71 Ibid., Chapter 4, 1-40.
Figure 5. Auxiliary Organizational Structure

The organizational structure of the Coast Guard Auxiliary can be further described by the following:

- **National** – The National Office of the Auxiliary establishes policy and promotes all Auxiliary Programs. National leadership is composed of both Auxiliarists as well as Coast Guard officers, including the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
- **District** – The Auxiliary share the same Districts with the Coast Guard. Districts oversee Divisions and Flotillas located in pre-designated geographic areas and is the first level in the Auxiliary hierarchy where active duty Coast Guard officers are allocated to manage and oversee the Auxiliary Program.
- **Division** – Divisions oversee four or more Flotillas in a pre-designated geographic area and are used to provide administrative, financial, and other forms of support to Flotillas.
- **Flotilla** – Flotillas are the operational units of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and are comprised of no fewer than 15 members.72

What is important to note is that the organizational structure of the Coast Guard Auxiliary as illustrated in Figure 5 is intended to mirror the organizational structure of the Coast Guard seen in Figure 3.

3. **Enabling Legislation and Authority**

The legal authority of the Coast Guard Auxiliary is delineated from the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 1941, which gave rise to Title 14 United States Code (USC), Part II, Chapters 23 and 25, as well as Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 5. The general authority for the Coast Guard Auxiliary is understood as the

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capability to perform all missions with the exception of those directly related to law enforcement. Auxiliarists are not afforded law enforcement authority under statutory requirements outlined in 14 USC 89(a):

The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance.73

Superficially it appears that the limitations of Auxiliary authority are well established. However, the issue can become nebulous as it did following a review of 33 CFR 5.31:

Members of the Auxiliary, when assigned to specific duties shall, unless otherwise limited by the Commandant, be vested with the same power and authority, in execution of such duties, as members of the regular Coast Guard assigned to similar duties.74

Without knowledge that requirements listed in the USC always supersede those found in the CFR, one might unintentionally be led to believe that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in times of crisis or need, has the authority to allow Auxiliarists to perform all missions of active duty Coast Guardsmen. Under such an assumption, this provision would allow Auxiliarists to carry weapons, if necessary, during waterside and landside security patrols during extreme circumstances. This is simply not the case and is reinforced in the Auxiliary Operations Policy Manual and reiterated in a Coast Guard-wide message released in January 2006. The regulatory statutes and authorities, under normal operational tempos, do not permit Auxiliarists to perform law enforcement missions but allows them to perform all other Coast Guard sponsored activities including

73 Title 14 United States Code, Part I, Chapter 5, Section 89(a) – Regular Coast Guard, Function and Powers, Law Enforcement.
74 Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 5.31 – Power and Authority.
unarmed maritime observation missions (MOM), as well as recreational boating safety (RBS) and other marine safety activities without limitation under the discretion and authority of local Coast Guard Sector Commanders.\(^7^5\)

Another important justification for the Coast Guard in limiting the authority of the Auxiliary rests with the issues of liability, immunity, and training. Active duty Coast Guardsmen are protected from being sued or prosecuted under the Civil Rights Act whereas Auxiliarists are not afforded such protection and would be held liable should they illegally detain a U.S. citizen.\(^7^6\) Furthermore, immunity from certain actions relating to a shooting or other form of use of force in the line of duty is granted to active duty Coast Guardsmen but not to Auxiliarists. Finally, there currently is no formal training program for the Auxiliary to learn the skills necessary to carry firearms or execute the duties of a Coast Guard law enforcement officer. Without provisions to protect and properly train Auxiliarists to carry out law enforcement missions, it would be irresponsible to grant Auxiliarists any form of law enforcement authority.

4. Impact of the Auxiliary

The use of this vetted volunteer workforce is a smart practice, one that has been vocalized in the past and again in Admiral Thad W. Allen’s Coast Guard Auxiliary Policy Statement issued in September 2006:

The Auxiliary is a force multiplier of vetted and trained volunteers devoted to the support of Coast Guard missions and provides a broad inventory of vital skills, assets, and experience for our units across the nation. As the leading volunteer organization in the Department of Homeland Security, it is an essential component of our daily operations and an effective resource primed to prevent and respond to catastrophes in the maritime region.\(^7^7\)

\(^7^5\) U.S. Coast Guard Director of Inspections and Compliance ALCOAST 033/06 COMDTNOTE 3120 message entitled, *Clarification of Auxiliary Roles in Homeland Security*, January 19, 2006.

\(^7^6\) Title 42 United States Code, Chapter 21, Subchapter I, Section 1983 – Civil Action for the Deprivation of Rights.

The impact of the Auxiliary has been demonstrated on many occasions throughout U.S. history but never more so than during the response to Hurricane Katrina. Approximately 305 Auxiliarists integrated with 4,026 active duty, 733 civilian, and 541 reserve Coast Guard members located in Southeastern Louisiana between August 26 and September 16, 2005. Following emergency response protocol, Auxiliarists conducted overflights, port surveys, rescue operations, and aided with logistical support to first responders. One Auxiliarist, using his own boat, transported eight Coast Guardsmen to Station New Orleans in order to secure the facility for use as a staging area for response personnel and resources. He was also responsible for providing electrical power to the Station through the use of his own generator and by repairing existing damaged generators. Perhaps the most significant contribution of Auxiliarists was the reestablishment of communication towers for the Coast Guard’s search and rescue operations. Without these towers, thousands of lives that were saved may have been lost. The selfless efforts of the Auxiliary undeniably contributed to the Coast Guard’s success in response to Hurricane Katrina.

Auxiliarists in the Coast Guard’s Seventh District (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Puerto Rico), where 20% of Auxiliary members reside, saved 28 lives and more than $2.5 million in the first 9 months in 2007. Members living in vicinity of Cocoa Beach, Florida patrol security zones established around the Kennedy Space Center space shuttle launch facility. This activity prevents shuttle launch delays due to the encroachment of small vessel operators, saving the National Aeronautical and Space Administration a million dollars for each launch delay averted. Admiral Select Watson, 78 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina, GAO-06-903 (Washington, D.C.: July 2006), 8 and 30.


80 Ibid., 35.


during the 2007 District Seven Annual Conference, said, “Every day, Auxiliarists in the
Seventh District put on their uniforms, fire up their boats or radios, their cars their aircraft
or sometimes just their laptops or cell phones to help make this nation a safer place to live.”83

Members of the Auxiliary donate thousands of dollars each year to the Coast
Guard’s Mutual Assistance Fund which is used by active duty Coast Guard personnel
who encounter financial difficulties or who are in need of a loan at low interest rates.84
Auxiliarists are also responsible for saving the Coast Guard countless dollars each year
by way of special projects. Several Auxiliarists who augment a Coast Guard Station in
the New England area recently renovated the 3rd floor and constructed a new armory for
the facility. The total savings to the Coast Guard for this project alone was estimated at
$30,000.

One of many priorities outlined in *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* is
the need for layered security and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in our ports and
waterways.85 This domain is defined as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to,
adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all
maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other
conveyances.”86 MDA has far reaching implications beyond that of only security
missions. It also includes a number of safety missions including aids to navigation,
public education, vessel safety checks, and recreational boating safety because much of

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83 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, *Breeze* (Miami, Florida: Fall 2007), 23.
84 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, “United States Coast Guard Mutual Assistance,”
2005), 16-17 and 20-23.
Directive HSPD-13 (Maritime Security Policy),” 2, December 21, 2004,
security is dependent on both awareness and prevention.\textsuperscript{87} This is best illustrated in Figure 6, which outlines the four critical elements of the Auxiliary maritime safety and security strategy.\textsuperscript{88}

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\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 5.
To meet the goals of MDA and the Coast Guard’s Four Safety and Security Efforts of Awareness, Prevention, Protection, and Response, the Auxiliary initiated Operation Patriot Readiness III (OPR III). OPR III is composed of seven defined operations, placing a greater emphasis on awareness/prevention and less on protection/response:

- **District Mapping** – Identification of critical infrastructures in a given area of responsibility and pre-planning to determine which active duty or Auxiliary assets will patrol during normal or heightened maritime security levels;

- **Standard Operations** – Conduct normal safety and security missions during normal maritime security level with an emphasis on awareness/prevention missions;

- **Surge Operations** – Conduct specific safety and security missions as directed by the Sector Commander during heightened maritime security levels with an emphasis on protection/response missions;

- **Readiness Exercises** – Execute readiness exercises with active duty and Auxiliary assets to heighten awareness for real-world events;

- **Recreational Boating Safety** – Facilitate Public Education, Vessel Safety Checks, Recreational Boating Safety (RBS) Visitation Program, and America’s Waterway Watch Program;

- **Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Support** – Provide assistance to local Coast Guard units in safety and security missions related to ensuring vessels and facilities meet MTSA regulation requirements, and;

- **Auxiliary Personnel Augmentation List (AUXPAL)** – Targeted recruitment of Auxiliarists to fill critical needs of the Coast Guard.90

OPR III, through the RBS Program, enhances the public’s awareness of potential maritime threats. The Auxiliary promotes nationally sponsored programs such as America’s Waterways Watch (AWW) and the Citizen’s Action Network, which actively involve everyday citizens in the detection and reporting of known or suspicious activity to the National Response Center (NRC) for the purposes of expediting a response to a

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terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{91} AWW was established in 2004 in response to regulations set forth in Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Subchapter H, promulgated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and priorities outlined in the \textit{National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness} and \textit{The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned}, to develop and encourage community watch programs for reporting suspicious activity among members of maritime industry and recreational boaters.\textsuperscript{92}

Auxiliarists are well suited for this undertaking because they are, in contrast to their transient active duty counterparts, deeply rooted within their communities, permitting them to cultivate longstanding relationships with local marinas, boat dealers, fishermen, yacht and sailing clubs, harbor masters, and park rangers. These partnerships, combined with the fact that the Auxiliary is almost solely responsible for all boating safety training conducted by the Coast Guard, enables Auxiliarists to assemble and convey information to the public effectively. The AWW, like the Coast Guard Auxiliary, is a force multiplier with the potential to expand the number of eyes and ears in the maritime domain to millions, far beyond the personnel limitations of Coast Guard active duty, Reserve, civilian, and Auxiliary. Coast Guard members and Auxiliarists were called upon to actively lead the outreach effort in order to convey awareness to the American public.\textsuperscript{93} Despite the good intentions of the program, NRC data indicate that of 1,027 suspicious activity reports received in 2007 only 19.18\% were generated from participants of AWW, a decrease of 7\% from 2006.\textsuperscript{94} However, it must be noted that the NRC data may not accurately indicate the performance levels of AWW because one may participate in the program but simply never witness anything suspicious on the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{94} National Response Center Call Volume Statistics Provided by U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters Staff, February 2008.
\end{itemize}
waterfront. The current status or true success of AWW remains largely unknown because of a lack of available data due to the recent establishment of the program and difficulty of assigning performance metrics.\(^95\)

OPR III also allocates Auxiliarists and their personally owned vessels and aircraft to patrol critical infrastructures and key assets along coastal and inland waterways.\(^96\) The result of these patrols has been enhanced MDA via frequent inspections of waterfront facilities, bridges, locks, dams, marinas, levees, and commercial and recreational vessels. These Auxiliary patrols maximize the use of Coast Guard assets, allowing them to perform other critical missions while establishing another layer of defense.

5. **Worth of the Auxiliary**

Merrill contends that any attempt to assign dollar values to volunteers “ignore intrinsic values and costs associated with volunteering” and “fails to value the community building, citizenship development, mutual aid, skills building, personal growth, and self-esteem that occur through volunteer actions.”\(^97\) Although this may be true, possessing a general understanding for the value of a volunteer organization can be useful to reinforce a case before Congress or other authoritative regulating body for the purpose of requesting additional funding or personnel to manage such organizations. For this reason, Table 2 has been provided below to illustrate an estimated worth of the Coast Guard Auxiliary in 2007:

**Formulas - Each AUX**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{WE}_{GS} &= (H \times R_{GS}) - C \\
\text{WE}_{IS} &= (H \times R_{IS}) - C
\end{align*}
\]

**Formulas - All AUX**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{WA}_{GS} &= \text{WE}_{GS} \times T \\
\text{WA}_{IS} &= \text{WE}_{IS} \times T
\end{align*}
\]

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Formula Variables:

\[ W_{EGS} = \text{Worth of each Auxiliarist (GS-9, Step 1)} \]
\[ W_{EIS} = \text{Worth of each Auxiliarist (Independent Sector)} \]
\[ W_{AGS} = \text{Worth of all Auxiliary (GS-9, Step 1)} \]
\[ W_{AIS} = \text{Worth of all Auxiliary (Independent Sector)} \]
\[ T = \text{Total Number of Auxiliarists (Constant – 28,635)}^{98} \]
\[ H = \text{Hours Worked (Constant – 150/year per Auxiliarist)}^{99} \]
\[ C = \text{Cost Per Auxiliarist (Constant - $482 per Auxiliarist)}^{100} \]
\[ R_{GS} = \text{Rate (Constant - $19 per hour)}^{101} \]
\[ R_{IS} = \text{Rate (Constant - $19.51 per hour)}^{102} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>H Hours Worked</th>
<th>R Rate</th>
<th>C Cost</th>
<th>WE Worth = (HxR)-C</th>
<th>T Number of AUX</th>
<th>WA Total Worth = (WExT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GS-9, Step 1</td>
<td>150 Hours</td>
<td>$19/ Hour</td>
<td>$482/AUX</td>
<td>$2,368/AUX</td>
<td>28,635</td>
<td>$67,807,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Sector</td>
<td>150 Hours</td>
<td>$19.51/ Hour</td>
<td>$482/AUX</td>
<td>$2,445/AUX</td>
<td>28,635</td>
<td>$69,998,258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Table Illustrating Worth of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary in 2007

According to calculations listed in Table (2) the worth of each Auxiliarist in today’s dollars is approximately between $2,850 and $2,927 annually. The Coast Guard receives close to $70 million worth of work from the Auxiliary organization each year following the subtraction of $14 million in expenses. The value provided by the Coast Guard Auxiliary is not limited to each volunteer as is the case in many volunteer organizations. Costs associated with the operation of Coast Guard aircraft, small boats, fuel, crew training, maintenance of operational equipment, and other intangibles must also be considered. It has been estimated that a Coast Guard Auxiliary Small Boat Patrol with four crewmembers costs $67.56 less per hour than an active duty Coast Guard Small

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98 Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District, March 2008.
99 Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District, June 2008.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
Boat Patrol. Other costs, which will never be known, are those associated with federal, state, and local responses to boating accidents that have been prevented as a result of the public outreach and safe boating training provided by the Coast Guard Auxiliary. An audit conducted in 1985 by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General concluded that the Coast Guard could save one-million dollars annually through more efficient use of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, while freeing up Coast Guard assets for other missions. This figure would be double today considering that the average rate of inflation since 1985 is 3.11%.

6. Volunteerism in the Auxiliary

To begin this discussion, it is critically important that several definitions of volunteer be presented and discussed. Merriam-Webster offers the following definition:

Volunteer: 1: a person who voluntarily undertakes or expresses a willingness to undertake a service: as

a: one who enters into military service voluntarily

b: (1): one who renders a service or takes part in a transaction while having no legal concern or interest (2): one who receives a conveyance or transfer of property without giving valuable consideration.

This same definition is also listed on a Coast Guard Auxiliary website. Another definition is provided by Safrit and Merril who, in summary, consider volunteering to involve uncoerced, active participation in an activity, which promotes common good without any motivation for financial benefit. Although many other definitions for volunteers exist, the general concept is volunteers willingly perform

103 Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District, June 2008.
unpaid work without expectation for financial compensation, except for expenses, to benefit an individual, group, or organization. This definition suits Auxiliarists and helps to elucidate the value of the work performed by these volunteer members.

Volunteers can offer services individually but often times belong to a group or organization, which defines the amount and type of work required, as in the case of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Volunteer work is frequently planned and scheduled during time periods that accommodate those performing the volunteer work. However, during emergency responses, volunteerism is often spontaneous, generally offered by community members where the natural disaster or terrorism incident has occurred. This phenomenon was witnessed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and landfall of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Louisiana. Managing unsolicited volunteers who desire nothing more than to help their fellow countrymen is an emerging challenge for emergency response leaders, as made evident in a 2006 article in *Homeland Security Affairs*.108

The Auxiliary has become indispensable to the functionality and capability of the Coast Guard as evidenced by the degree of productivity, as well as the superb performance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.109 The value of a volunteer force cannot be underestimated as many organizations are reliant on them to provide and sustain public services which would be unavailable if dependent on government resources alone.110 In fact, some organizations are almost entirely composed of volunteers, including the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, U.S. Power Squadrons, Meals on Wheels, and Habitat for Humanity. Other organizations rely on volunteers to perform important work that either frees paid employees for other work or generates funds to support critical activities. Such organizations include hospitals, hospices, fire

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110 Statement of Honorable Jason Altmire on Strengthening Communities: An Overview of Service and Volunteering in America before the Subcommittee on Healthy Families and Communities and Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, February 27, 2007.
departments, national parks, state parks, libraries, museums, and animal shelters and adoption facilities. Many police departments have even implemented volunteer “Citizens on Patrol” programs in their local communities to maximize vigilance in order to minimize criminal activity.\textsuperscript{111} Although the “Citizens on Patrol” do not have law enforcement authority, they provide deputies with extra eyes and ears.\textsuperscript{112}

Another volunteer program within DHS is the Citizen Corps, which is comprised of five different programs that help to bolster America’s level of preparedness and responsiveness to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other catastrophes.\textsuperscript{113} Pamela Biladeau, in her master’s thesis, describes the roles of the Citizen Corps in detail while identifying shortfalls and proposing methods for increasing the utilization of the Citizen Corps within DHS and throughout the country.\textsuperscript{114} While it is useful to examine another volunteer program within DHS, it must be noted that the Coast Guard Auxiliary is a volunteer organization that resides, uniquely, within a multi-mission, military organization. The Coast Guard Auxiliary, unlike the Citizen Corps, has the benefit of operating within the Incident Command System of the Coast Guard when responding to disasters. The Auxiliary demonstrated its capability to assist the Coast Guard, as well as other homeland security agencies, during major catastrophes as evidenced by the Auxiliary’s successes following Hurricane Katrina. Further, the Auxiliary is an older organization, having been established in 1939.

Michael Billeaudeaux, in his master’s thesis, lays a foundation for motivational desire and pursuits of the post-9/11 volunteer in the realm of homeland security.\textsuperscript{115} This knowledge is of particular importance when considering the everyday Coast Guard

\textsuperscript{113} Citizen Corps, Uniting Communities, Preparing the Nation, “Programs and Partners,” \texttt{http://www.citizencorps.gov/programs/} (accessed November 11, 2008).
\textsuperscript{114} Pamela G. Biladeau, \textit{Strengthening and Expanding the Citizen Corps} (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006).
Auxiliarist who has invested hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars towards membership fees, uniform apparel, lifesaving gear, and operational equipment. Billeaudeaux, in his research, writes, “Volunteers responding to patriotic calls for duty — in capacities short of joining a military service — could elect to serve in many safety-or security-oriented organizations.” Interestingly, members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, in response to their personal calls to “duty,” elected to volunteer within a military organization to perform military-oriented missions. But, as in any organization, retention of its members, principally those who are productive, remains a significant challenge as demonstrated in the 2006-2007 Auxiliary Business Plan:

The Auxiliary is potentially well positioned to attract new members with its emphasis on patriotism and life saving. However, the Auxiliary is in competition with many other worthwhile opportunities as diverse as civic groups, churches and other religious organizations, hospitals, libraries, schools, museums, environmental groups, animal shelters, food banks, scouting organizations, and other government agencies (e.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land Management). The Auxiliary needs to develop and fine tune effective recruiting (and retention) methods to succeed in a highly competitive environment. Among other things, the Auxiliary needs to study the relevant literature on trends in volunteerism and volunteer-specific issues and develop initiatives based on this research.

The Auxiliary must continue to expand and its role formalized in existing Coast Guard missions, an expansion that is clearly needed if the Coast Guard is to meet its myriad of responsibilities. However, as the authors of the 2006-2007 Auxiliary Business Plan indicate, obstacles exist that potentially inhibit the growth of the Auxiliary, including the Coast Guard’s organizational transformation (Sectorization) in 2003 which Lawrence Greene describes in fastidious detail. Although Greene does not address the

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potential need for the Auxiliary reorganization in order to facilitate the integration of the Auxiliary into the new and evolving Coast Guard structure, this is suggested in the 2006-2007 Auxiliary Business Plan:

The Coast Guard periodically makes organizational changes that impact the Auxiliary. One noteworthy change is a shift from certain Groups and Activities to new units called Sectors. In some Districts this has little or no impact on the Auxiliary. But in others, the establishment of sectors will have organizational impacts on the Auxiliary and may very well call for a re-alignment of some Districts, Divisions and/or Flotillas.\textsuperscript{119}

This problem has been recognized by Coast Guard Auxiliary leadership and progress is underway to improve Auxiliary organizational alignment with Coast Guard Sectors.\textsuperscript{120} The U.S. Government Accountability Office published a list of guidelines which aid organizations during mergers which could be used as a template as further efforts are directed towards this objective.\textsuperscript{121} Such efforts should improve mission execution efficiency and effectiveness of communications among Auxiliary membership and active duty personnel. This, according to Admiral Allen, is a top priority:

Every commander, commanding officer, officer-in-charge, and program manager shall work closely with their Auxiliary counterparts to fully leverage the resources, skills, qualifications, and profound dedication that reside within the Coast Guard Auxiliary.\textsuperscript{122}

The OPR III Program is the venue for which Coast Guard leadership can strengthen and reinforce Auxiliary support. However, as indicated in this excerpt from the 2006-2007 Auxiliary Business Plan, it is further recommended that in addition to the realignment of the Auxiliary organizational structure, other management practices could also be instituted to maximize the Auxiliary’s potential:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, \textit{Quarterly Briefing to the Commandant on the State of the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary} (Washington D.C.: May 2008), 3-5.
\item \textsuperscript{122} U.S. Coast Guard, \textit{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Policy Statement} (Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006).
\end{itemize}
In order to motivate and set direction for Auxiliary units, Coast Guard planning efforts should include Recreational Boating Safety missions along with Maritime Domain Awareness, Sector alignment and other priorities. Auxiliary and Coast Guard field units should interact to balance prevention and response missions for various threat levels. With collaborative efforts at the Sector Operational Planning level and the Unit Tactical Planning level, the Auxiliary will be better equipped to recruit for needed skill sets and provide value added training to its members.\footnote{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, \emph{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Business Plan 2006-2007} (Washington, D.C.: January 2006), 4.}

This sentiment is also echoed in a separate statement:

Operation Patriot Readiness gives the Auxiliary the vehicle for collaboration with the Coast Guard, but has exacerbated the current imbalance of mission capability and capacity. Operation Patriot Readiness was and is the major thrust that has increased the Auxiliary’s operational focus, as the institution of critical infrastructure patrols, mapping, MARSEC levels, exercises, MDA and operational planning are brought to the forefront. It is important that the members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary know that the Coast Guard also values their Recreational Boating Safety (RBS) efforts and the need to stay informed, inspired and energized. This inspiration from the Coast Guard will be an important catalyst for improving performance measures in RBS programs as well as operations.\footnote{Ibid., 3.}

These observations point to a number of potential problems revolving around leadership, management practices, organizational structure, communication shortfalls, as well as other longstanding organizational deficiencies observed in corporate America and other volunteer agencies. It is important for Coast Guard and Auxiliary leadership to become cognizant of underlying issues, which could have a significant impact to member dropouts from the Auxiliary organization. Devoid of effective Auxiliary support, the Coast Guard could exhaust its limited resources.

\section*{D. VOLUNTEERISM IN THE U.S. AND WORLDWIDE}

Alexis de Tocqueville revealed nearly 200 years ago that one of the advantages of democracy was that it invigorated American citizens to volunteer and to take proactive measures to become involved in diplomatic processes as well as township affairs.

\footnote{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, \emph{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Business Plan 2006-2007} (Washington, D.C.: January 2006), 4.}
\footnote{Ibid., 3.}
Tocqueville argued that because Americans were so absorbed in the development and establishment of the political and socio-economical culture and institutions of the U.S. that an attack on these self-made institutions meant an attack on any given individual. It was this passion, this patriotism that awakened Americans to a sense of pride and duty for others and the community. This is made clearly evident in the following passage:

The citizen looks upon the fortune of the public as his own, and he labors for the good of the state, not merely from a sense of pride or duty, but from what I venture to term cupidity…As the American participates in all that is done in his country, he thinks himself obliged to defend whatever may be censured in it; for it is not only his country that is then attacked, it is himself.125

Americans have relied on the spirit of volunteerism to survive dating back to the early period of Colonialism. The War for Independence relied exclusively on volunteers and it was volunteers who remained, fought, and died at the Alamo in San Antonio, Texas.126 The country’s first volunteer firefighter company was established through the efforts of Benjamin Franklin and virtually every U.S. President since Frederick Roosevelt established or promoted the use of volunteers to improve some aspect of American life.127 In 2002 during the State of the Union address, President George W. Bush instituted the USA Freedom Corps.128 That same year, President Bush requested more than $230 million to expand the Citizens Corps as well as an array of other volunteer programs including neighborhood watch and police service programs.129 In recent testimony before the Subcommittee of Healthy Families and Communities, the Honorable John P. Sarbanes reported:


Volunteers are a large part of what makes America such a great and strong nation. Throughout this country volunteers fill in gaps where local, state, and federal governments are unable to effectively serve people. Further, the community-minded spirit fostered by volunteer activity benefits all people by strengthening the fabric of our nation.\(^{130}\)

The popularity of volunteering time and donating money to worthy organizations is advocated in Bill Clinton’s book entitled, *Giving*.\(^{131}\) President Clinton promotes citizen activism, calling for Americans to become actively engaged in their communities in order to effect change. He is not alone in this pursuit as Honorable Carolyn McCarthy, before the Subcommittee on Healthy Families and Communities, highlighted that more Americans volunteered in 2005 than in 2006 and that only one-third of those who volunteered in 2005 did not volunteer in 2006. Honorable McCarthy argues that America needs to renew its sense of service to the citizenry, estimating that national volunteer service in 2006 saved America approximately $152 billion.\(^{132}\) Theda Skocpol, a member of the American Political Science Association, discusses the changing climate of civic involvement in the U.S. and provides an excellent review of literature related to such involvement on American democracy. She promotes the need to revitalize civic democracy and warns against over-professionalization of volunteer organizations. Skocpol contends that all citizens, even those without professional degrees or specialized skills, have a voice and can effectively contribute to the very fabric of American society.\(^{133}\)

From a physiological standpoint, evidence exists which suggests that volunteering reduces stress and improves health, decreases crime and high school drop out rates, and

\(^{130}\) Statement of Honorable John P. Sarbanes on Service and Volunteering in America before the Subcommittee on Healthy Families and Communities, and Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, February 27, 2007.


lowers the rate of depression among the elderly. In fact, one researcher considers the health benefits of volunteering to be so important that she advocates that it be used as a recruiting strategy. To promote this concept, Swinson surveys 13 disparate research studies, which demonstrate that various health benefits do exist for those who volunteer. Other benefits include increases in self-esteem, camaraderie, and the attainment of specialized skills and experiences. Volunteering empowers the citizenry and provides sponsoring organizations with a vital workforce possessing invaluable skills and talents to perform an array of tasks.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, countless volunteers poured into New York City to assist with response and evacuation operations, search and rescue efforts, and to care for victims. Volunteers provided special skills and talents to help New York officials, and even fed and provided shelter to first responders for months after the attack. A high rate of volunteerism was witnessed following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and in communities following Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008. Despite the volunteering efforts by millions of Americans since 9/11, President Bush desires increased volunteer participation as communicated in a September 8, 2008 speech,

Volunteerism is strong in the country. But the truth of the matter is, the farther we've gotten away from 9/11, that memory has begun to fade. And some are saying, well, maybe I don't need to volunteer now. Maybe the crisis has passed. The aftermath of 9/11 isn't nearly as intense as it was. And my call to people is, there's always a need. You should be volunteering not because of 9/11, but you should be volunteering because our country needs you on a regular basis.


The U.S. is not the only country in the world that has been dependent on volunteers. Many other countries throughout history have utilized volunteers in their armies, navies, police, merchant ships, governments, hospitals, and schools. Arguably one of the best success stories of volunteers during a nation’s time of duress occurred during World War II between May 27 and June 4, 1940, when 338,226 British and French troops were evacuated from the coast of France and landed in England by means of 861 watercraft, ranging from military warships to privately owned yacht vessels. Of the 861 vessels engaged in the evacuation, 491 were categorized as personally owned boats that were volunteered for that purpose. The actual number of personal vessels may have been higher but an exhaustive count of private vessels could not be done in such desperate circumstances. It is known that at least 44,000 troops were delivered from certain capture by small, private watercraft between May 21 and June 1, 1940 alone. During the entire evacuation, all vessels were subject to aerial bombardment from the German Luftwaffe and, while the Royal Air Force struck back, grievous losses occurred among both the troops attempting to escape the onrushing German army and the embarkation vessels themselves.139

1. **Select U.S. Homeland Security Volunteer Organizations**

There are a number of homeland security volunteer organizations in existence throughout the U.S. However, no other U.S. volunteer organization mirrors the goals and objectives of the Coast Guard Auxiliary more than the Civil Air Patrol, U.S. Power Squadrons, and Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary. Additionally, each organization provides insight into new and innovative ways volunteers can be utilized to successfully complete safety and security missions. It is worthwhile to study or at the very least, be aware of volunteer management strategies implemented by other organizations, especially those operated for the purpose of achieving similar strategic objectives as the Coast Guard Auxiliary.

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a. Civil Air Patrol

The only other military-sponsored volunteer institution in the U.S. is the 56,000 member Civil Air Patrol (CAP) associated with the Air Force founded in 1941. The CAP was called into action one week before the attack on Pearl Harbor with a membership totaling 150,000 citizens. With over one-half million hours logged, two enemy submarines sunk, and countless rescued following World War II, President Harry Truman established the CAP as a nonprofit organization with Public Law 476 on May 26, 1948. Congress, on May 26, 1948, passed Public Law 557 resulting in the CAP becoming the Auxiliary of the newly created U.S. Air Force.140

The CAP, unlike the Coast Guard Auxiliary, is classified as a nonprofit, 501(c) (3) corporation, allowing the organization to accept donations and raise money for aircraft maintenance, fuel, and other costs and services. The CAP maintains 1,600 units and squadrons across eight geographic regions spanning all 50 States as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. Both the CAP National Headquarters and Operations Center are located at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. The CAP National Headquarters is permanently staffed with 100 corporate officers who work full-time to support the volunteer members of the organization. Members of the CAP log 110,000 hours of flying time each year, conducting approximately 90% of all inland search and rescue. In Fiscal Year 2007, the CAP was credited with saving 103 lives. Additionally, the CAP performs aerial reconnaissance for homeland security and other federal agencies. Drug smuggling interdiction, aid and damage assessment surveys following natural disasters, and transport of vital supplies are among the many duties also performed by the CAP.141

Similar to the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the CAP also sponsors a Cadet Program devoted to providing flight instruction, mentorship, and recruiting potential candidates for the U.S. Air Force Academy. The Cadet Program is open to children and young adults between the ages of 12-20 and currently possesses 22,000 members. In

140 Civil Air Patrol, Prospective Member Information Package (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 2008); Civil Air Patrol, Fact Sheet (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 2008).
141 Ibid., Civil Air Patrol, Annual Report to Congress (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 2007).
addition to the Cadet Program, the CAP promotes aerospace education to the public via community outreach programs and through the distribution of correspondence. The CAP recognizes the importance of web technology to the recruitment of younger volunteers and is planning on releasing a new, cutting-edge website incorporating multimedia in 2008-2009.

The CAP utilizes the Senior Member Professional Development Program to provide its members with training and specialized skills to be productive volunteer members within the organization. The Program employs five different levels of instruction based on the member’s position in the CAP with all members receiving Level I, Orientation Training. Level V, Executive Training is provided to CAP members who intend to assume advanced levels of leadership in the organization and include attending the National Staff College. The Development Program is highly standardized, continuously monitored and well-documented by the CAP.

The CAP, like the Coast Guard Auxiliary, does not possess or administer a national organizational assessment survey. The CAP does perform exit surveys on occasion but not on a regular basis. According to Holley Dunigan at the CAP National Headquarters,

The CAP does have the ability to administer and analyze surveys at minimal cost to us. Civil Air Patrol is different than other membership organizations, in that the volunteer membership sets the policy and National Headquarters are administrators of that policy. In addition, the national leadership in Civil Air Patrol changes every 3 years, so the focus of headquarters changes accordingly. For example, the national volunteer staff may be more focused on recruiting campaigns than retention, or vice versa, and headquarters acts and responds to the volunteers’ priorities.

142 Civil Air Patrol, Prospective Member Information Package (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 2008); Civil Air Patrol, Fact Sheet (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 2008).
143 Civil Air Patrol, Annual Report to Congress (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 2007), 38.
144 Civil Air Patrol, CAP Senior Member Professional Development Program (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: February 2007).
145 Holley Dunigan, Civil Air Patrol National Headquarters Staff, e-mail message to author, July 31, 2008.
The CAP, like the Coast Guard Auxiliary, implemented a security background check for all members in 1988. This resulted in a decrease in senior membership numbers for the next six years. According to Dunigan, “Also, when analyzing membership numbers you also need to look at what is happening in the world. We saw a great growth in membership following the 2001 September 11 attacks. Then the further we get from major catastrophes the numbers drop.”

One final item of note on the CAP is its Inspector General Program. The CAP Inspector General Program ensures the integrity of the organization and provides CAP leadership the ability to identify and rectify program shortfalls for the purpose of bolstering efficiency of the CAP. Among other objectives, the CAP Inspector General Program seeks to “Create an atmosphere of trust in which issues can be objectively and fully resolved without retaliation or the fear of reprisal.” Once every four years, the U.S. Air Force, working in conjunction with the CAP Inspector General, conducts quality assurance assessments of each of the 52 wings to streamline processes and detect and eliminate wasteful or fraudulent practices.

b. U.S. Power Squadrons

The U.S. Power Squadrons (USPS) was founded in 1941 and constitutes the only other major U.S. maritime volunteer organization in addition to the Coast Guard Auxiliary. The USPS is not associated with the military; rather, it is a self-sustaining, privately funded organization composed of 37,227 “active” members with an additional 5,000 “family” members. The operational unit of the USPS is the “Squadron” with membership subdivided into 450 Squadrons throughout the U.S., including Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. USPS members utilize Squadrons to

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146 Holley Dunigan, Civil Air Patrol National Headquarters Staff, e-mail message to author, July 31, 2008.

147 Civil Air Patrol, The Civil Air Patrol Inspector General Program (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: March 28, 2008).

148 Ibid., 2.


150 Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Power Squadrons Headquarters Director, September 11, 2008.
conduct meetings, training, social events, and other boating-related activities. The USPS works closely with organizations such as the Coast Guard, Coast Guard Auxiliary, and the National Ocean Services Division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association to promote boating safety, conduct courtesy vessel safety checks, update and correct nautical charts, and assist with other community improvement projects. The USPS offers an array of educational courses to its members, as well as the boating public, and fellowship activities both afloat and ashore.  

**c. Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary**

The Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) Auxiliary, instituted in 1957, is comprised of approximately 400 members with the authority to carry firearms and make arrests when directed by a FHP Trooper. The FHP provides each Auxiliary member with over 90 hours of extensive law enforcement training and mandates potential candidates pass a rigorous physical fitness test. Often, FHP Auxiliarists who have proven their abilities are recruited to become full-time FHP Troopers. The FHP example was recently proposed as a model volunteer organization by a team of researchers from Harvard University who suggested the implementation of a Border Patrol Auxiliary to augment the securing of U.S. borders. They suggested that Border Patrol Auxiliarists should receive training similar to FHP Auxiliarists and be granted similar authorities. Although this study also advocated the Coast Guard Auxiliary as another potential model, they alluded to the fact that the laws and regulations governing the Coast Guard Auxiliary were too restrictive and self-limiting. The researchers provided a sample set of regulations which advocated that Border Patrol Auxiliarists be granted law enforcement authority and be given full protection and immunity as afforded regular Border Patrol agents. They also conducted a cost analysis for the cost-return between a GS-11

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154 Ibid., 23-44.
Border Patrol agent versus a fully trained Border Patrol Auxiliarist and calculated a savings of $191,879 in just the first year. Additionally, it was determined that the second and third years would yield a savings of $119,162 and $133,664, respectively.\(^{155}\)

Using volunteers for the purpose of augmenting armed police officers is not a novel concept and is not restricted to the State of Florida. As of 1999, other states including Ohio, Arizona, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Vermont also made use of a state-sponsored auxiliary police force. Other states and even county jurisdictions, such as Maryland’s Baltimore County, have initiated similar programs to supplement limited police forces with trained volunteers. The New York Police Department in 1992 possessed approximately 4,400 Auxiliary members. The members attended 16 weeks (54 hours) of specialized training and were required to volunteer a minimum of four hours per week. In some cases, these members effected arrests and some were even injured or killed in the line of duty.\(^{156}\)

2. **Homeland Security Volunteering Abroad - Israeli Civil Guard**

A survey of homeland security volunteer organizations would be remiss without looking outside the borders of the U.S. Billeaudeaux, in his master’s thesis, examined the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Coastal/Airport Watch Program and its success in the detection and deterrence of nefarious activity through an informed citizen public.\(^{157}\) In similar fashion, a detailed overview of Israel’s all volunteer Israeli Civil Guard is presented for the purpose of understanding how another country, continuously on guard for fear of attack, utilizes its citizenry to protect its borders and inhabitants. Although the Israeli Civil Guard does not operate in the U.S. there are many similarities as well as differences in volunteer management practices, which should be recognized. The Civil Guard is a 70,000 member volunteer organization overseen and managed by the National


Israeli Police. The Civil Guard possesses members with varying degrees of training; some are specially trained with the authority to effect arrests and carry firearms while others have received only minimal training and conduct only unarmed missions. The extremely volatile climate of Israel was a fundamental contributor behind the establishment of the Civil Guard, which gave rise to greater authority and less restrictive limits of the civilian population volunteering in the organization. It is for this reason that the Israeli Civil Guard was analyzed in greater detail, and certain aspects even compared with the Coast Guard Auxiliary, than the domestic volunteer organizations described above.

a. **History of Sponsoring Agency – Israel National Police**

Israel, only slightly smaller than the U.S. state of New Jersey, declared itself an independent nation on May 14, 1948 and has since remained in a state of conflict with a multitude of nations, terrorist groups, and everyday criminals.\textsuperscript{158} To contend with its multifarious threats, both domestically and abroad, Israel established an elaborate counterterrorism force consisting of a Security Force (Shin Bet), Border Guard, Israel Defense Force (IDF), and the Israel National Police (IP).\textsuperscript{159} Although Israel participated in significant battles with countries and terrorist organizations outside its borders, the main focus has always remained to institute defensive measures to minimize death and destruction to the country’s citizenry and property.\textsuperscript{160} In fact, nearly 85% of all terrorist incidents directed at Israel since 1970 have occurred domestically and largely consist of the placement of improvised bombs in highly populated public areas.\textsuperscript{161} To contend with

\begin{enumerate}
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, *How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 159.
  \item \textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 3.
\end{enumerate}
Israel’s domestic threat, the IP was created the same year that Israel asserted its independence and functions to detect, prevent, and respond to acts of terrorism and criminal acts.\textsuperscript{162}

The IP is managed and overseen by the Ministry for Public Security and currently has approximately 30,000 sworn officers.\textsuperscript{163} Unlike the typical U.S. police department, having limited authority and patrol areas, the IP maintains jurisdiction over the entire State of Israel. Since 1948, the IP continually has been forced to evolve and adapt to face ever-changing threats and enemies. The 1970s particularly was marked with numerous changes as Israel witnessed three different ruling administrations, a groundbreaking peace treaty with Egypt, and an onslaught of Lebanese-led terrorist bombings in northern towns of the country. In response to these events, the new government of Israel, lead by a right-wing party (the Likud), transferred all authority for internal security to the IP. With a new host of responsibilities, the IP introduced many changes but none more sweeping than the creation of the Civil Guard in 1974.\textsuperscript{164}

\textit{b. Civil Guard – History, Member Composition, and Assets}

The Civil Guard is presently comprised of 70,000 volunteer members from various neighborhoods throughout Israel. The Civil Guard became so popular following its inception that its membership grew to 131,000 in 1976. The organization was formed largely to prevent acts of vigilantism by the citizenry who began patrolling their neighborhoods in 1973. Fear swept Israel as the country was subjected to acts of terrorism from Arab Palestinians in response to events emanating from the Yom Kippur War in October of 1973. The Civil Guard became a regulated outlet for members of the


\textsuperscript{163} Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, \textit{How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West} (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 159.

Israeli public to monitor their neighborhoods without taking the law into their own hands. For the Israeli government, the Civil Guard provided much needed augmentation to an overburdened and thinly stretched IP.\textsuperscript{165}

The IP has always maintained oversight responsibility for the Civil Guard, providing facilities, equipment, training, uniforms, transportation, and funding to volunteer members. Similar to the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the command structure, which oversees the Civil Guard, is composed of full-time IP personnel. Civil Guardsmen operate out of over 350 Community Policing Centers located throughout Israel, even in rural areas of the country. Some of these Community Policing Center are staffed with full-time IP while others are only manned with Civil Guardsmen.\textsuperscript{166}

Initially, members were trained how to identify terrorists, targets, and potential weapons (i.e., bombs, charges, etc.) in order to prevent casualties and destruction of property from terrorist attacks. However, due to a decrease in the frequency of terrorist attacks over the years, Civil Guard member training now includes measures which emphasize the deterrence of criminal activity in addition to the standard terrorist attack detection and prevention techniques to assist police in decreasing criminal activity in local neighborhoods. Not every member receives the same quantity or quality of training as there are varying levels of volunteerism in the Civil Guard. Volunteers can elect to receive only several hours of basic training for the purpose of performing unarmed neighborhood patrols or other duties such as working with the elderly, school children, or administrative work. Alternatively, volunteers can opt to endure more extensive training in firearms and defensive tactics to execute armed patrols of neighborhoods, borders, and other, potentially hazardous, locations.\textsuperscript{167}

Special volunteer units were initiated in 1989 due to significant budgetary cuts to the IP. These specialized units included Crime Prevention Units, Special Traffic


\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
Control Units, Criminal Identification Support Units, Horseback Units, Maritime Patrol Units, and an Urban Sharpshooting Unit. There also exist special units within the Civil Guard which require specialized training but not necessarily in firearms. For example, the Environmental Quality Guard is responsible for monitoring and enforcing environmental laws, as well as protecting infrastructure located in public parks and playgrounds. Volunteers in the Environmental Quality Guard receive specialized training and are provided with patrol cars and digital cameras. Additionally, they are afforded legal authority to enforce Israeli law and can issue tickets for violations.168

In order to join the Civil Guard and participate in even the most basic of volunteer duties, members must meet the minimal age requirement of 18. For those who join the Civil Guard and wish to volunteer in the organization’s specialized units, they can be no younger than 21 and no older than 55. Each member undergoes a security background check, must have a firm understanding of the Hebrew language, and be in reasonable physical shape. Members who volunteer for regular duty in the Civil Guard must perform a minimum of four hours of work per month while those who belong to specialized units, because of unique training, are required to work at least eight consecutive hours each month.169

Unlike the Coast Guard Auxiliary, some specially trained members of the Civil Guard are permitted to carry firearms and possess the legal authority to gain compliance or effect arrests when necessary. Those who carry a firearm must apply for a Ministry of Interior License and undergo basic weapon handling and shooting training. These highly trained volunteers are generally identified with uniforms, identification cards, and may even be provided with government transportation. Again, not every Civil Guard member chooses to receive firearm, defensive tactic, or other specialized training. These members do not wear police uniforms but can be identified with donned vests and government issued identification cards.170

169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
c. **Authority of Israeli Civil Guard**

The laws and regulations governing the Civil Guard are straightforward and very easy to understand. In fact, there was no legal description of authority or guiding responsibilities for the Civil Guard until four years after its establishment. It was not until the release of section 49 of the Israeli National Police Act of 1978 (and later in the 1988 Amendment to the Act) that authorities and objectives were legally defined. These objectives were presented as follows:

1. To assist in the deterrence of terrorist activities in communities within Israel’s borders.
2. To organize local neighborhoods for effective and rapid emergency operations in the event of a terrorist attack.
3. To assist in the defense of the home front in the event of a general conscription of military reserve forces or in the event of war.171

Further regulations set forth in sections 49 a-h and 37-40 of the IP Order (New Version) 5731/1971 and IP regulations (Civil Guard) 5757-1996 establish rules governing membership requirements, training, volunteer hour commitments, as well as other specific mandates related to the IP.172

d. **Impact of Israeli Civil Guard**

Determining the overall success of the Civil Guard in the past was difficult as no formal metric tool existed until recently to monitor performance and few studies have been carried out which document success or failure. As of 1980, there was no recorded case of a Civil Guard patrol or member preventing a terrorist attack.173 This does not mean that a terrorist attack had never been averted by the Civil Guard; it may never have been recognized. The Anti-Defamation League lists recent terrorist attacks in Israel and one account occurring on February 4, 2008 reports that a police officer

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recognized a suicide bomber and killed him before he was able to detonate the bomb.\textsuperscript{174} The report does not indicate whether the officer was IP or a Civil Guard member. Nevertheless, “prevention” is extremely difficult to measure and for this reason, both the IP and the Civil Guard may never know with any accuracy the number of attacks forestalled.

A crime-rate study conducted in 1970s by an Israel government committee revealed that criminal activity had been significantly reduced in areas where the Civil Guard patrolled. Advocates of the Civil Guard have also asserted that the Civil Guard has made significant strides in promoting the concept of Community Policing, a strategy implemented by the IP in 1995 to expand citizen involvement in reducing neighborhood crime rates.\textsuperscript{175} However, a three-year study conducted between 1996 and 1999 looked at the effectiveness of Israel’s Community Policing Program by analyzing policing techniques and attitudes of the IP. The results indicated that full-time IP officers did not actively promote Community Policing in neighborhoods when on patrol due to leadership and communication deficiencies prevalent in upper-level management of the IP. Although the study was not specifically targeted at Civil Guard members, it can be argued that if full-time IP officers were not pursuing the advancement of Community Policing then it is likely that Civil Guardsmen, who were trained by these officers, were not performing similar tasks with ideal proficiency.\textsuperscript{176}

It was not until 1999 that the Community and Civil Guard Department was created consolidating the Civil Guard Department and the Community Policing Unit. The primary focus for this Department is to develop community policing strategies and to adjust the priority of operations in local neighborhoods. The Department is further divided into three Divisions including Volunteers and Preventive Policing, Community


Policing Implementation, and Research, Public Information, and Community Communications. A critical component of the Research, Public Information, and Community Communications Division is to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on the successes and failures of the Civil Guard. This objective is carried out through the use of internal and external organizational surveys and periodic performance studies. Data collected from these metric tools are used to assess the overall performance levels of the Civil Guard and allow IP leadership to adjust management strategies as necessary to meet the mission needs of the IP while improving service to the Israeli public.177

e. Israeli Civil Guard to the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary – A Comparative Analysis

The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary shares a number of characteristics with the Israeli Civil Guard despite the fact that both organizations operate in different countries located on separate continents with distinct forms of government. Both organizations were formed during the same historical period in response to desperate needs of respective governments. The U.S. Coast Auxiliary and the Israeli Civil Guard provided vital civilian security forces in a time when their countries were besieged and desperately needed support. Each volunteer organization is comprised of citizen volunteers who love their country and everyday exercise courage and selflessness to ensure not only the safety and security of their beloved country but that of their neighbors as well. These core values unite the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and the Israeli Civil Guard even though differences exist between the two organizations. Table 3 provides a comparison of the primary characteristics of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and Israeli Civil Guard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>U.S. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY</th>
<th>ISRAELI CIVIL GUARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>United States - Founded in 1776 - 50 States - Canada (North), Mexico (South), Atlantic Ocean (East), Pacific Ocean (West)</td>
<td>Israel - Founded in 1948 - 1 State - Lebanon (North), Egypt (Southwest), Gaza Strip (Southwest), West Bank (East), Syria (Northeast), Mediterranean Sea (West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Peace Index</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Representative democracy with a presidential system</td>
<td>Representative democracy with parliamentary system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant Religion</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>Judaism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant Language</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsoring Agency</td>
<td>U.S. Coast Guard – Military</td>
<td>Israel National Police – National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Threat (Groups)</td>
<td>Radical Islamists, Illegal Aliens</td>
<td>Israel is virtually completely surrounded by its enemies with clandestine cells living inside the country (Palestinians, Lebanese, Hamas, PLO, radical Islamists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>Maritime - waterfront facilities, ships, critical infrastructures, civilians, illegal access into country</td>
<td>All domestic - civilians, private residences, military and government installations, public transportation, land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resiliency of Protected Public</td>
<td>Not very resilient – U.S. citizens are not accustomed to attacks on its soil. The last significant threat to U.S. shores was the Cuban Missile Crisis in the 1960s.</td>
<td>Extremely resilient – Israelis are very accustomed to random attacks, violence, and war both inside and near the outside of their border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Metric System</td>
<td>Semi-established internal system (AUXDATA) - No nationwide member surveys are conducted. - No external system</td>
<td>Established system – both internal and external. Internal auditing is conducted and external public surveys are performed to assess performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>28,635</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms</td>
<td>Wear military uniforms</td>
<td>Those specially trained wear police uniforms. Others simply wear vests and possess ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Volunteers (mean)</td>
<td>59 years of age</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Environment</td>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>City and rural neighborhoods, as well as the maritime environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Method of Patrol</td>
<td>Personally owned recreational vessels, government vehicles</td>
<td>Foot patrol, government vehicles, occasionally small boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Focus/Strategy</td>
<td>Direct involvement in safety missions and indirect involvement in security missions</td>
<td>Direct involvement in safety and security missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Fitness</td>
<td>Very limited standards</td>
<td>Physical fitness test required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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179 Based on data from U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary database, AUXDATA, September 2003.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>U.S. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY</th>
<th>ISRAELI CIVIL GUARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age Limitation</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>- 17 for youth programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 18 for routine volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 21 for special unit volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal Volunteer Hours</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>- 4 hrs/month for routine volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 8 hrs/month for special unit volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting</td>
<td>Yes – targeted recruiting conducted</td>
<td>Yes – recruiting efforts are perhaps more effective because greater opportunities for training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Somewhat – most training conducted internal to the Coast Guard Auxiliary although the Coast Guard does offer management and leadership training courses</td>
<td>Yes – basic training is provided by the IP, as well as specialized training in sharpshooting, law enforcement, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimbursement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Authority</td>
<td>No law enforcement authority and cannot carry firearms</td>
<td>Those with specialized training possess law enforcement authority and can carry firearms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing Program Instituted</td>
<td>Yes – American Waterways Watch</td>
<td>Yes - Neighborhood citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Media</td>
<td>Little to none</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Brochures</td>
<td>Somewhat – limited to those who attend boating safety courses and local marinas, marine vessel dealers, and fishing docks for the purpose of distributing American Waterways Watch materials.</td>
<td>Frequently – Brochures are often handed out to community residents to educate them on security measures, precautions to take, and who to notify if something suspicious is observed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Comparison between U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and Israeli Civil Guard

Undoubtedly, there are significant differences and obstacles with which each volunteer organization must contend in their struggle to maintain a sustainable, effective, and well-trained membership. However, the glaring differences in geography, religion, culture, language, historical perspective, threats, and sponsoring agencies cannot overshadow the uniform objective of both organizations to protect the citizenry from acts of terrorism and violence. The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary has the potential to learn a great deal from the Israeli Civil Guard, especially in the realm of public outreach and the recruitment of younger generations of American volunteers as the Auxiliary is the Coast Guard’s ambassador to the public in the realms of boating education, recreational boat inspection, and marine dealer involvement in boating safety.
A potential obstacle confronting the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary is ensuring that the organization attracts able and highly motivated volunteers. With the average age of Auxiliarists being 59 years of age, there is some concern that recruitment efforts will be hampered by the fact that potential younger member, including Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Generation Y (Millennials), opt to continue working or pursue volunteer efforts with other volunteer organizations.\footnote{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, \textit{Can the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Survive in the 21st Century? How Changing Generational Attitudes Will Affect an All-Volunteer Organization} (Washington, D.C.: August 2006), 1-17.} Common ground among all generations is a voracious desire to learn, experience, and acquire new skills.\footnote{U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, \textit{Can the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Survive in the 21st Century? How Changing Generational Attitudes Will Affect an All-Volunteer Organization} (Washington, D.C.: August 2006), 6-17; Peter F. Drucker, \textit{Managing the Nonprofit Organization: Principles and Practices} (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), 33 and 41.} It is the Member Training cornerstone of the Auxiliary that has, in the past, provided enhanced authority, training, specialized skills, and unique opportunities, that has been a major attraction to recruits. But the Auxiliary’s Member Training program, particularly in recent years, has concentrated less on operational skills and more on administrative skills. Therefore, from the recruitment standpoint, the Auxiliary might benefit from the Israeli Civil Guard example in providing strong training in practical skills that are of direct benefit to the Coast Guard and to American citizens. Also, recruitment should concentrate on Americans of all ages as each generation offers both benefits and disadvantages. For example, research indicates that the elderly, especially those with physical or mental impairments, are highly vulnerable to disasters.\footnote{Lauren S. Fernandez, D. Byard, C.C. Lin, S. Benson, and J.A. Barbara, “Frail Elderly as Disaster Victims: Emergency Management Strategies,” \textit{Prehospital and Disaster Medicine} 17, no. 2 (2002): 67-74.} On the other hand, studies also demonstrate that older people, having more life experience, are more resilient in response to natural disasters, violence, and acts of terrorism than younger generations.\footnote{Bruce Bongar et al., \textit{Psychology of Terrorism} (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2007), 293-294.} Further, younger Americans have additional responsibilities for family and career-building that older members often do not have, making them more willing to devote time to the Auxiliary. The focus should be on Americans who are both willing and able to support the Coast Guard.
As previously discussed, statutory and regulatory obstacles exist limiting the authority and, consequently, restricting a multitude of responsibilities and training opportunities for Auxiliarists. Israel is not afforded such a luxury as they must remain constantly vigilant of enemy attacks from neighboring countries and from within its borders. The people of Israel have no other choice but to defend themselves. The geography of the country permits easy access by terrorists, insurgents, and other country’s militaries. The U.S., on the other hand, is protected by vast oceans with allies in Canada and Mexico to the north and south, respectively. Although enemies can access the U.S. through the borders of these countries, the motivation is more economically driven with only a select few seeking to perform acts of terrorism. According to the Global Peace Index, only Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan are considered to be more volatile and dangerous to live in than Israel.\(^\text{184}\) Israel favors trained manpower and security over increased vulnerability and inadequate security forces to contend with insurgents, terrorists, and criminals.

Both the Civil Guard and the Auxiliary are managed and operated by national organizations with hierarchical structures. Civil Guard volunteers work mainly out of Community Policing Centers whereas Auxiliarists mobilize personnel and resources from Flotillas. Both organizations are overseen by dedicated, full-time employees from respective sponsoring organizations but only the Auxiliary elects leaders among its own organization. The Civil Guard is structured to emulate the organizational structure of the IP. The hierarchal structure of the Auxiliary does not mimic the Coast Guard’s organizational chart.

The Israeli Civil Guard offers young members of Israeli society opportunities for specialized law enforcement and weapons training. In return, these volunteers must commit to a minimal number of hours each month of volunteer work. Furthermore, the Civil Guard also requires that each member pass a physical fitness test to ensure that they are healthy and physically able to perform missions in the field. The Coast Guard Auxiliary does not implement any such standards. The IP has recruited a

number of its own full-time police officers, as well as several commanding officers, from the Civil Guard.\footnote{Uri Yanay, “Co-opting Vigilantism: Government Response to Community Action for Personal Safety,” \textit{Journal of Public Policy} 13 (1993): 394.} The Coast Guard, by expanding the roles and authorities of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, could not only attract younger members but could invariably use the Auxiliary as a recruiting pool for active duty members.

Another feature of the Israeli Civil Guard is the monthly volunteer requirement imposed on even the general volunteer members. It assures that those unwilling to volunteer hours are removed from the organization, thus reducing administrative costs to maintain personnel files and training records, issue equipment, expand facilities, and provide other resources. The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary has no such rule permitting inactive members to continue to drain limited funding available to the organization.

The IP routinely conducts surveys of the Civil Guard’s membership as well as the public to determine whether program shortfalls exist and, if so, how they can be rectified. The Coast Guard Auxiliary does not have a standardized form or assessment tool that tracks trends in Auxiliary membership. It maintains the nationally maintained database, AUXDATA, which tracks the number of members entering or leaving the Auxiliary but not reasons for such decisions. Additionally, the Coast Guard does not routinely poll the American public, specifically those intimately involved in the maritime community, to gauge the public’s perception of the Auxiliary or level of performance. This is understandable as it could potentially consume significant resources to successfully execute such a task. However, recruiting and retention efforts within any organization are handicapped when membership trends or service gaps have not been identified by some means of a recognized metric system.\footnote{Steven M. Farmer and Donald B. Fedor, “Volunteer Participation and Withdrawal: A Psychological Contract Perspective on the Role of Expectations and Organizational Support,” \textit{Nonprofit Management and Leadership} 9, no. 4 (Summer 1999): 362-364.}

Finally, perhaps most importantly, is the Civil Guard’s commitment to educating and promoting awareness among members of the public through the use of media and brochures. The resiliency of the Israel’s public, although not limitless, can be
attributed to the outreach efforts of its government and subordinate organizations. Although the Israeli Civil Guard has the benefit of twice as many members as the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and possesses unlimited jurisdiction domestically, there is much that the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary could appropriate from the Israel Civil Guard’s policies and procedures regarding this topic. As mentioned earlier, America’s Waterway Watch, like the Coast Guard Auxiliary, is a force multiplier with the potential to expand the number of eyes and ears in the maritime domain to millions, far beyond the personnel limitations of Coast Guard active duty, Reserve, civilian, and Auxiliary. The major objective of the Domestic Outreach Plan is for agencies such as the Coast Guard to facilitate discussions and actively engage port stakeholders in discussions of maritime safety and security.\footnote{The White House, \textit{Domestic Outreach Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security} (Washington, D.C.: October 2005).} The potential to increase the public’s awareness to threats associated with the maritime environment are limitless and only restricted to the level of effort afforded to the enterprise.

E. VOLUNTEER MOTIVATIONS

Every year, millions of Americans volunteer their time in order to benefit people, organizations, or to promote political, social, or religious beliefs. In fact, almost 60.8 million people, or 26.2\% of the U.S. population, volunteered with an organization at least once between September 2006 and September 2007. Despite the seemingly large number of volunteers, this is a decrease of 0.5\% from last year which follows a 2.1\% drop from the previous year. The vast majority of volunteers were between the ages of 35 to 54 (30.3\%) while people in their early twenties were least likely to volunteer (17.7\%). The highest rate of volunteerism was found with whites (27.9\%) followed by blacks (18.2\%), Asians (17.7\%), and Hispanics (13.5\%). Those married (31.9\%) and those with children (33.7\%) volunteered more than those who had never married (19.2\%) and those without children (23.2\%). Other demographic data yielded from the survey administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in conjunction with the Corporation for National and
Community Service, includes the rate of volunteerism among the employed versus the unemployed, those with high levels of education versus those having little, and the differences between genders.188

Although the breakdown of information based on race, income, gender, age, marital status, etc. can provide some useful information to understanding the type of person most likely to volunteer, it does not provide any insight into the underlying factor(s), which motivate people to volunteer, especially with an organization like the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Specifically, why do people volunteer? While most research attempts to determine who is volunteering and for what time period, most volunteer surveys fail to capture information that relates to the motivational desires or psychological needs for volunteering.189 Also, there remains scarce research on motivating factors that result in varying levels of participation among existing volunteers. That is, some members will join an organization and will provide expansive volunteer hours for many years while other members may do very little or nothing at all resulting in rapid dropout from the organization. Becoming aware of the reasons why people volunteer and remain productive members of any volunteer organization is vital to volunteer management administrators for both recruiting and retention.190 This point was echoed in a 2008 report released by the Corporation for National and Community Service:

The majority of volunteers choose to continue serving. However, roughly one third of volunteers serve one year and do not continue to do so the next-- this rate is just too high. The dramatic cycling of people in and out of volunteering reinforces the fact that volunteer management is critically important and that creating positive volunteer experiences is key to

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growing a widespread culture of service. Key findings from this research can inform strategies for organizations and civic leaders considering ways to better retain volunteers, or “plug the leaky bucket” of volunteering.\textsuperscript{191}

In addition, as Gillespie and King emphasized in their work, we cannot know what motivates people to volunteer unless they are presented with the question(s).\textsuperscript{192}

Any large volunteer organization must have a clear understanding of the motivating factors that possess people to volunteer then leave after only a short time. This understanding is particularly important for organizations that, like the Auxiliary, invest considerable time and resources in engaging members in the organization’s activities. For example, most activities in which Auxiliarists take part require education, training, hands-on practice, mentoring, and record-keeping. Therefore, each crew member, coxswain, aircraft pilot, radio watchstander, vessel examiner, marine safety professional, and public education specialist represents a substantial commitment by the Auxiliary’s functional unit, the flotilla. When members in whom much has been invested depart the Auxiliary after a short time, the effectiveness of the flotilla and of the Auxiliary is seriously impaired. Recognizing and addressing motivational pitfalls will not only improve membership retention but doing so could yield results for use in attracting new volunteers. With this issue in mind, this thesis now explores several studies, the results of which are germane to any discussion of Auxiliary recruiting and retention performance.

Some believe that recruiting a long-term volunteer today is virtually impossible due to the fact that people cannot commit the same time and effort as previous generations. According to Swinson, today’s generations are seeking flexibility with short-term commitments as a result of time-poverty.\textsuperscript{193} Others believe that information technology can alleviate these time pressures through networking and the sharing of


Identifying and understanding the internal, psychological needs motivating people to volunteer has been demonstrated to be a significant challenge. To address the issue, Smith, Bruner, and White in 1956 and, later, Katz in 1960, proposed a *functional* approach which attempts to understand the fundamental needs or desires that individuals are attempting to fulfill through actions or behaviors. People who volunteer do so because they possess a deeply rooted need, which can only be satisfied by engaging in such activity. Fulfilling these needs motivates the individual to continue to perform the activity until the need is met or another need surfaces. For each person, this need or motivation may be different; for some, only one motivation may be sought while others may have more than one motivation to satisfy. The intensities of these motivations can vary and may evolve over time to include other motivations. Another way to grasp the issue of motivation was proposed by Scott and Lyman in 1968. Their *symbolic* approach allows individuals to assign labels or motives to justify a behavior. The *symbolic* approach allows the individual to interpret or explain a behavior or action after it has taken place. The work of these theorists helped to pioneer volunteer research as these two theories became essential ingredients to several proposed volunteer motivational models in the late-1980s and early-1990s. However, the *functional* approach, as well as models utilizing its principles, became more accepted among social scientists for its ability to be validated quantitatively.

Social science researchers have been conducting research on volunteerism since the early-1960s. In 1991, Cnaan and Goldberg-Glen, both researchers from the

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University of Pennsylvania, completed an extensive survey and critique of existing volunteer research literature dating back to this time period. The review consisted of 27 studies performed by disparate researchers on volunteers in human services. The authors identified numerous flaws and weaknesses in the methodological procedures of these studies, bringing into question the validity of their results and conclusions. The second part of the author’s paper utilized the same studies to compile an aggregation (list) of 28 volunteer motivations. Using these 28 motives, they administered a survey to 258 volunteers and 104 non-volunteers to determine which attribute was most important when considering whether to volunteer and to remain in a human services organization. The authors found that an “altruistic” attribute (i.e., the opportunity to do something worthwhile) and an “egoistical” attribute (i.e., volunteering for others makes me feel better about myself) were the most highly rated motives. Furthermore, they concluded that volunteers do not distinguish between altruistic and egoistic motives; rather, they act on both.198

At the time that Cnaan and Goldberg-Glen’s paper was published, other researchers, Clary, Snyder, and Ridge, devised the Volunteers’ Functions Inventory (VFI) Model which, they believe, incorporates all of the motivational factors or functions guiding the actions of volunteers.199 Although Clary and Snyder presented the VFI Model in July 1990 at the Association of Voluntary Action Scholars annual meeting in London, England as referenced in Cnaan and Goldberg-Glen’s paper, it should be noted that Cnaan and Goldberg-Glen did not attempt to test the VFI Model during the course of their study.200 Clary, Snyder, and Ridge describe the VFI Model with the following statement:

What functions are served when a person volunteers? The logic of the functional approach to volunteerism is to identify the motives that are


satisfied, the needs that are met, and the goals that are reached when a person gets involved in volunteerism. Critical to the logic of the functional strategy is the assertion that persons can hold the same attitude or perform the same behavior for very different reasons. Acts of volunteerism that appear to be the same on the surface can actually reflect different underlying motivational processes. To the extent that these motivations can be identified, we can better understand what people are looking for when they think about volunteering and how we might help them to satisfy their needs. Finally, this strategy points to ways in which we might go about persuading nonvolunteers to participate in volunteer activities. If we can correctly identify the motivation that a potential volunteer seeks to satisfy, then persuasive messages can target that motivation and demonstrate how the motivation can be satisfied by a particular volunteer activity. Persons who believe that their needs and goals will be satisfied by volunteering are more likely to engage in the service than those who have no such assurance.

Clary, Snyder, and Ridge created the VFI to be simple and easy to administer using a survey. The VFI is composed of six functions (social, value, career, understanding, protective, and esteem) with each motivational function possessing five reasons for volunteering. In whole, the VFI yields a total of 30 reasons that would lead someone to volunteer. When presented in survey format, each reason is measured using a seven-point Likert rating scale with seven representing the greatest importance to that individual. When completed, six scores are tallied, each representing the mean for each motivational function. The highest score reflects the most important function or motivational factor while the lowest score represents the least important function. Using the scores, a volunteer administrator can easily determine the rank-order of motivational factors for any given individual. It is important to note that the esteem function was later renamed, becoming the enhancement function. Table 4 provides an illustration of the VFI Model.

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### Table 4. Volunteer Functions Inventory Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My friends volunteer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People I’m close to volunteer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People I know share an interest in community service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others with whom I am close place a high value on community service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering is an important activity to the people I know best.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am concerned about those less fortunate than myself.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am genuinely concerned about the particular group I am serving.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel compassion toward people in need.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel it is important to help others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can do something for a cause that is important to me.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering can help me get my foot in the door at a place where I would like to work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can make new contacts that might help my business or career.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering allows me to explore different career paths.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering will help me to succeed in my chosen profession.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering will look good on my résumé.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I can learn more about the cause for which I am working.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering allows me to gain a new perspective on things.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering lets me learn through direct hands-on experience.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can learn how to deal with a variety of people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can explore my own strengths.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protective</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doing volunteer work relieves me of some of the guilt over being more fortunate than others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering helps me work through my own personal problems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering is a good escape from my own troubles.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No matter how bad I’ve been feeling, volunteering helps me to forget about it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By volunteering I feel less lonely.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enhancement</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering makes me feel important.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering increases my self-esteem.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering makes me feel better about myself.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering is a way to make new friends.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering makes me feel needed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each function seeks to serve a specific motivation for the volunteer. The social function permits an individual to improve communication skills, gain friendship, and develop relationships while the value function allows a person to express “altruistic” qualities using a humanitarian approach. The career function serves to provide the

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volunteer with valuable skills and training to be used in a paid job and the understanding function allows the volunteer to gain additional knowledge or utilize existing skills not normally exercised on a daily basis. Finally, both the protective and enhancement functions serve “egoistical” needs of the volunteer. The protective function helps the individual reduce stress, negative feelings, and guilt while the enhancement function provides the volunteer with opportunities to develop self-esteem.205

Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Miene, and Haugen conducted a study in 1994 to determine if people subjected to advertisements suggesting that personally relevant (matched) motives could be fulfilled through volunteering would be more or less likely to join an organization than someone exposed to an advertisement with unrelated (mismatched) motives. As predicted, tailored messages provided to nonvolunteers increased the likelihood for volunteering more than ambiguous, mismatched messages. This is an extremely important finding, according to the authors, because of the following:

…organizations that are dependent on the efforts of volunteers may find, if they apply the techniques of the present research that their recruitment of volunteers will be most effective when they tailor their recruiting messages to appeal to the psychological motives of prospective volunteers. Although the most effective use of this strategy most certainly occurs when one knows the most important function or functions for a specific individual, one might also be able to make fairly accurate guesses as to which functions are most important for particular groups of people.206

A study conducted in 2002, which reviewed U.S. Army recruiting material between 1954 and 1990, discovered that the U.S. Army employed a continuously evolving, targeted recruitment strategy during different time periods, using motives other than monetary incentives. Moreover, researchers found that 33% of advertisements used by the U.S. Army to promote recruitment of servicemen during the All-Volunteer Force


Period (1973-1980) revolved around job, career, and education themes. Adventure and challenge themes were next highest, comprising 25% of the recruiting advertisements followed by patriotism (14%), travel (11%), miscellaneous (9%), social status (4%), and money (4%). This research demonstrates the importance of understanding motives as it relates to recruitment and engaging the target audience with the most appropriate (matched) recruiting advertisements.\textsuperscript{207}

The validity of the VFI Model as a pragmatic and effective tool for volunteer administrators to recruit and retain volunteers has been demonstrated by several studies and researchers.\textsuperscript{208} Allison, Okun, and Dutridge conducted a comparative study to determine which method, the VFI Model (functional approach) or an open-ended probe (symbolic approach), would prove more accurate in identifying motives of volunteers. The conclusion of the study, according to the authors, was the following:

In conjunction with previous research, the results of the present study support using the VFI to assess volunteer motives. The VFI is easy to administer and to score.\textsuperscript{209}

While the authors reported that VFI is the preferred method for assessing volunteer motives, they also observed that it does possess weaknesses. First, the scores on the six functions are substantially correlated to one another meaning that it would be difficult for a volunteer administrator to differentiate volunteers into distinct motive types. Although the study found that 84% of the study participants selected the value


function as their most important motive for volunteering, the remaining five functions were rated statistically similar. Second, the VFI did not capture some of the motives suggested from the open-ended probe such as enjoyment, religiosity, and team building. Finally, the VFI assumes that respondents are answering the questions posed in the survey truthfully. In conclusion, the authors recommend that the open-ended probe, although far more subjective and difficult to implement, be used to supplement the VFI.

Another model for assessing the motivations of volunteers was conceived by Yeung in 2004. Following an extensive literature review of the socio-political affects on individualism and its impact on volunteerism, as well as a survey of assorted volunteer motivational studies, Yeung proposed the use of a phenomenological approach to volunteer motivation with the Octagon Model. The Octagon Model is fundamentally grounded on M. E. Ford’s Motivational Systems Theory (MST), which up until 2004, had never been used in volunteer research. M. E. Ford explains MST as follows:

…a comprehensive theory of human functioning and development that is designed to represent all of the component processes of the person and how they are organized in complex patterns of unitary functioning in variable environments. The anchoring of MST in this broader framework makes it possible to describe how motivational processes interact with biological, environmental, and nonmotivational psychological and behavioral processes to produce effective or ineffective functioning in the person as a whole.

Yeung’s Octagon Model attempts to capture how people experience volunteering holistically. This is indicated in a passage from her work:

A central point here is that personal motivation is not-as psychological terms are sometimes taken to be-a vacuous inner factor, but a phenomenon that includes environment and individual reflection. This study also

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approaches motivation in all three time-perspectives: past, present, and future. Motivation is seen as interconnecting both motives and the elements of commitment. Additionally, this paper views human motivation having a trajectory: individual volunteer motivation changes over time.213

Yeung conceptualized the Octagon Model using data from 18 interviews of volunteers from the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. The scripts from each 107 minute interview were read six different times resulting in the extraction of 767 motivational elements or meaning units.214 As the author explains, “Several painstaking but intriguing steps took place in creating the themes that would best describe the essence of the meaning units and faithfully convey their content in more abstract concepts. Eventually, four dimensions incorporating eight poles emerged: getting-giving, continuity-newness, distance-proximity, and thought-action.”215 From this unformulated process, Yeung constructed the four dimensional Octagon Model arranging 527 motivational elements along dimensions and 240 at intersections between dimensions. According to Yeung,

The latter particularly indicate the holistic and interlocking nature of the four dimensions, which together form a consistent description and synthesis of the volunteer phenomenon. The process of building them into one synthetic model (both in terms of content and visual presentation) was heuristic. Many versions were tried—especially visually—before the final synthesis was achieved: an octagon model.216

The greater concentration of motivational factors at one or more of the eight poles signified what the individual considered most important when volunteering.217 The model proves to be extremely complicated and, as the author admits, “…the octagon model could be utilized in the practical context of voluntary work activity in personal reflection and conversations and courses as a baseline for discussions, contemplation, or

214 Ibid., 26-32.
215 Ibid., 31.
216 Ibid., 32.
217 Ibid., 26-38.
To date, no research has been conducted to corroborate the validity of the Octagon Model or the study’s results. Despite the absence of model verification, the work contributes to the field of volunteer research by expanding the list of potential motivational elements involved in the decision process to volunteer.

F. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS

Farmer and Fedor believe that there is more to understanding the behaviors of volunteers than just desires to satisfy inherent needs or motivations. They introduce a psychological-contract approach which attempts to describe the volunteer’s level of participation while in an organization and what prompts those who become disconnected to withdraw altogether. Rousseau defines psychological contracts as, “individual beliefs in a reciprocal obligation between the individual and the organization.” That is, the individual and the organization must be bonded by a relationship and the individual believes that the organization will fulfill certain unwritten expectations. As these expectations become obligations, at least from the perspective of the individual, a psychological contract is formed. Any breach of this contract, or perception that the organization failed to meet the individual’s pre-conceived expectations, may result in withdrawal of the volunteer from the organization. Morrison and Robinson consider a perceived violation or breach of a psychological contract to be, “the cognition that one’s organization has failed to meet one or more obligations within one’s psychological contract in a manner commensurate with one’s contributions.” In addition to redefining and institutionalizing a new model for psychological contract violations, Morrison and Robinson provide a detailed literature review of the development of the

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psychological contract and list several studies demonstrating that violations of the contract have shown to result in decreased productivity, trust, job satisfaction and likelihood of employees to remain with an organization.223

Farmer and Fedor conducted a study using a survey of 451 volunteer members of a health advocacy organization to test whether volunteers, perceiving that expectations were being met, would report higher levels of participation and less withdrawal from the organization than those with unmet expectations. Not only did the results from the study confirm the hypothesis above but also it uncovered a startling finding:

The pattern of results showed, though, that the impact of organizational support was stronger than the effects of met expectations (this can be seen by a simple comparison of the magnitude of the coefficients). ...Because these volunteers tended to share a common set of values with the organization, they may have been somewhat willing to overlook particular unmet expectations in their work but particularly sensitive to an overall feeling that the organization did not care about their well-being...If volunteers felt valued and appreciated, and felt that the organization genuinely cared about their efforts and well-being, withdrawal intentions were lower (that is, they reported wanting to stay with the organization longer).224

Although the conclusions from this study offer unusual insight into the importance and interrelatedness of volunteer motives and psychological contracts, it should be noted that the study’s survey respondents were the most actively engaged volunteers in the organization.225 Nevertheless, Fedor believe that the results of their study have implications to volunteer management and advocate that administrators use assessment tools to gage the level by which the expectations of their volunteer members are being met.226 Another study conducted by Becky Starnes in 2007 confirmed Farmer and Fedor’s findings. It too, however, contained limitations including a statistically small

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225 Ibid., 361.

226 Ibid., 362-364.
sampling size. Notwithstanding, the role of psychological contracts in volunteer organizations is worth continuing to study, especially as they are so heavily dependent on trust.

G. TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS AND VOLUNTEERING

The issue of trust/confidence is especially important in recruiting and retaining members in a volunteer organization. Specifically in the Auxiliary, prospective members have confidence that, as an Auxiliarist, they will have the opportunity to make meaningful contributions to the missions of the Coast Guard. When, after joining, a member perceives that the opportunity to serve is minimal or that their efforts are trivialized by the organization’s leadership, he/she will not remain long a part of the Auxiliary. In some of the exit surveys reviewed for this thesis, departing members expressed dissatisfaction with the limited number of opportunities available to them to serve the Coast Guard. Because trust and confidence is at the root of motivation to become and remain a volunteer in the Auxiliary, this thesis includes a discussion of this issue in order to emphasize its importance in defining the future role, therefore effectiveness, of the Auxiliary.

Terry Bacon, with nearly 30 years of coaching and teaching management techniques to high-level businessmen and women, conducted a study in 2004 and 2005 through the Lore Research Institute to ascertain the top needs of people in the workplace. He surveyed 500 people from eclectic business backgrounds and discovered that the most important need for people is to feel that they are trusted. Patrick Lencioni, the author of the book entitled, The Five Dysfunctions of a Team: A Leadership Fable, lists the

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number one dysfunction of a team as the absence of trust. Stephen Covey devotes an entire book to the subject of trust considering it to be the essence of everything in life. This is best exemplified from his following comment:

Extending trust to others rekindles the inner spirit—both theirs and ours. It touches and enlightens the innate propensity we all have to trust, and to be trusted. It brings happiness to relationships, results to work, and confidence to lives. Above all, it produces an extraordinary dividend in every dimension of our lives: the speed of trust.

Political Scientist Russell Hardin examines trust from psychological, philosophical, economical, and political standpoints and argues that the concept of trust is limited to individuals and how they relate to one another. Hardin believes that large social institutions are likely not dependent on trust remaining steadfast that trust is, “inherently a micro-level phenomenon.” Despite his beliefs, many of the bestselling management and strategic change books are fundamentally constructed around the notion of trust.

Brafman and Beckstrom’s book entitled, The Starfish and the Spider, highlights the benefits and competitive advantages to decentralized organizations as compared to well-defined, hierarchical organizations using an assortment of real-world examples. The

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231 Stephen M. R. Covey and Rebecca R. Merrill, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 322


233 Ibid., 200.

Starfish represents the decentralized organization, which has no head or top executive while the spider possesses a head which, if removed, would result in the timely death of the spider. According to the book, the spider’s neuro-centralized network makes it extremely vulnerable while the headless starfish will thrive even when cut in half. Starfish organizations utilize knowledge and ideas spread throughout the organization where everyone can contribute freely whenever a problem arises or a need is identified. The power of one or the few does not exist in a starfish organization as each person possesses stakeholder status and is intimately concerned with the success of the company or organization. Spider organizations, on the other hand, are built around one or several top executives whose ideas are what are emphasized and implemented. Innovative ideas are only elicited periodically, if at all, from boilerplate employees and, when they are offered, many are quashed before they ever reach top-level executives. Stakeholder status for the everyday employee in a spider organization is minimal so the overall concern for the success of the company is given very little thought by the stakeholders. In spider organizations, employees generally feel that their opinions and ideas carry little weight so their devotion to the institution is lackluster.235

A vital component to the success of starfish or decentralized organizations is the notion of trust as they are dependent on leaderless networks, which govern themselves. Spider organizations are constructed in a hierarchical manner so everything produced by a low-level employee must be seen and approved by a more senior employee. With each level of management come greater liberties to edit, steal, or even block innovative ideas. Often the opinions of low-level employees are seen as worthless simply because of position or seniority in the company. There are few opportunities for employees to trust or be trusted in spider organizations. Starfish organizations are universally dependent on trust and rely on the principle that people want to trust and be trusted.236

Bryson’s Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations discusses key leadership qualities required to effect organizational change. The book also outlines

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236 Ibid.
a step-by-step, systematic process for initiating and executing strategic planning for the purpose of increasing organizational effectiveness and competitiveness. Such processes include eliciting new and innovative ideas from employees, identifying stakeholders and their level of importance or ability to influence change, and foreseeing potential obstacles which may impede modifications to current practices. The resources contained in the book provide a complement of tools, which capture the spirit of collaboration among employees as well as managers. Bryson defines the spirit of collaboration as the following:

That is, the hopes for, or even ideology of, embracing, empowering, involving, and mobilizing participants to achieve desired outcomes.237

Unknowingly, Bryson advocates one of the most critical concepts behind The Starfish and the Spider; the importance of involving employees in the strategic planning process. The difference, however, is a starfish organization is always strategically planning or evolving as employees are constantly engaged in everyday decisions while Bryson’s basis of strategic planning involves pre-planned, highly-structured forums for brainstorming. Moreover, members of the starfish organization not only recommend change but also often implement almost as quickly as the idea is conceived. Although Bryson’s strategic planning process allows for innovative ideas from company or government employees, these concepts are often condensed, vetted, and can be curtailed as early as the facilitator in charge of the collaborative forum or in the remaining process. In some cases, the tools themselves may restrict ideas, representing the relentless ability of even the most basic functions of the company to be controlled. Starfish organizations are fundamentally dependent on chaos with limited or no control. Both forms of strategic planning empower employees and promote trust-building but the initiatives outlined in The Starfish and the Spider offer greater opportunities for creativity and innovation.238


The importance of *trust* in strategic planning is stressed by Bryson through the following passage:

Trust in practice must be built, which means there must be enough trust for collaborators to take a risk and do something together, and then if it turns out the trust was justified, more can be done together. Trust thus ends up being an outcome of collaboration as much as a precondition of it.\(^{239}\)

Bryson asserts that most organizations in the process of strategic planning possess untrusting employees and that the collaborative process generally leads to an increase in *trust* as opposed to others who say that trust must be established before the collaborative process can be successful. This is an extremely important point because employees who feel they cannot be trusted will not provide input if they feel that they could be punished or ridiculed. The *Starfish* organizations do not have this problem because they are built and rely on a foundation of *trust*. Any member of a *starfish* organization incapable of being trusted is shunned (fired) because any *trust* infraction might lead to the spread of *mistrust* and a potential end to the organization. Bryson comprehends the importance of *trust* and attempts to provide tools and processes to strengthen or reinvigorate *trust* in the workplace. The weakness to his approach is that the strategic planning process is fleeting and self-limiting; any *trust* that is gained during the strategic planning process can be lost without a continuation of collaborative exercises. That is, people will return to the way things were and any gains made will soon be forgotten.\(^{240}\)

Peter Drucker, a well-known and respected author on leadership and management, provides insight on the significance of trust in non-profit organizations:


You cannot prevent a major catastrophe, but you can build an organization that is battle-ready, that has high morale, and also has been through a crisis, knows how to behave, trusts itself, and where people trust one another. In military training, the first rule is to instill soldiers with trust in their officers, because without trust they won’t fight.241

There is some evidence to suggest that trust may be measured scientifically. Paul Zak, a professor of economics and founding director at the Center for Neuroeconomics Studies at Claremont Graduate University, has performed research, which indicates that the neurobiological compound (neurotransmitter), oxytocin, may play a significant role in people's perception of trust. His research also found that males, more than females, become angry when they feel that they cannot be trusted. This is believed to be caused by the physiological release of dihydrotestosterone into the male bloodstream.242 Other research performed by Zak has also uncovered the following:

…we discovered that trust is among the strongest known predictors of a country’s wealth; nations with low levels tend to be poor. Our model showed that societies with low levels are poor because the inhabitants undertake too few of the long-term investments that create jobs and raise incomes. Such investments depend on mutual trust that both sides will fulfill their contractual obligations.243

Billeaudeaux, in his Master’s thesis, investigated the importance of trust using a survey administered to 184 participants of the Coast Guard’s Citizen’s Action Network (CAN), a group of volunteers living in Oregon, Washington, and Vancouver, British Columbia. Thirty of these 184 participants were Coast Guard Auxiliary members. Among eight Community of Practice, Community Engagement, and Community Efficacy variables captured in the survey tool, “Trust-based Social Capital,” received the highest mean among them all with a mean of 4.47 on a five-point scale. “Social Identification”

243 Ibid., 88.
ranked second with a mean of 3.78 while “Goal Clarity” ranked third with a mean of 3.35. These findings clearly indicate that trust and organizational identity are extremely important qualities among CAN volunteers.244

As traditional public funding declines in the face of enormous needs to fulfill mission workloads, organizations that rely on volunteers will find that the aspects of volunteer motivation discussed here, including the psychological contract, the role of trust, and potential volunteer recruitment/management tools, may become progressively more important.

III. METHOD

A. INTRODUCTION

The three questions that this thesis seeks to answer are:

• What is the current status of Auxiliary membership as compared to other national volunteer service organizations?
• What mechanism does the Coast Guard presently employ to identify trends in Auxiliary membership for retention and recruitment?
• What measure(s) could be instituted to prevent or mitigate future losses in Auxiliary membership while effectively recruiting new members?

An extensive search was done to identify and collect all information on Auxiliary membership since the organization was founded in 1939. This search resulted in data being collected from previously released Department of Transportation (DOT) and U.S. Coast Guard reports, U.S. Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary Office in Washington, D.C., U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District Office in Seattle, Washington, U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary’s AUXDATA database, Civil Air Patrol (CAP) National Headquarters Office at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, U.S. Power Squadrons (USPS) National Headquarters, and through telephone and email interviews. All reports and data are listed in the Bibliography and Appendix of this document. The data collected from these very disparate sources were analyzed using a number of quantitative and qualitative methods described below, and the results synthesized and reported. In doing this data search, this thesis generates an easily accessible compilation of Auxiliary information, which may be useful to future decision-making on the Auxiliary.

B. EXISTING COAST GUARD AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP STUDIES

Only one U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Membership Report was ever formally released to the public by the Coast Guard. The report was prepared in 1987 by the U.S. Coast Guard’s Office of Boating, Public, and Consumer Affairs in 1987 as a result of requirements set forth in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-640). The Congressional mandate required the Coast Guard to assess the status of Auxiliary
membership following the implementation of the Coast Guard’s Non-emergency Assistance policy in 1982. This policy required that commercial salvage be provided an opportunity to tow disabled recreational vessels safely to port in lieu of a free tow by the Coast Guard Auxiliary, which previously had been authorized to tow any vessel requesting assistance. A primary focus of the report was an investigation of the feasibility of employing the Auxiliary to improve the operational effectiveness of the Coast Guard.\textsuperscript{245} This report provides an historical perspective of Auxiliary membership trends prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks with recommendations to Congress for administrative improvements to bolster and solidify the Auxiliary organization.\textsuperscript{246} Data from this report were synthesized and findings summarized in the Analysis Section of this thesis.

Another six unpublished reports and data streams, composed in 2005, 2006, and 2007 by Commodore Charles G. (Tony) Morris, who formerly served as the National Directorate Commodore, Member Services during the period November 2002 to September 2004, were also reviewed and analyzed. Commodore Morris also taught research design and data analysis for almost 40 years at the University of Michigan. These reports provide a glimpse into the status of Auxiliary membership following both the 9/11 terrorist attacks as well as the implementation of the security background checks associated with the Personnel Security Investigation Program instituted in 2003. Specifically, Commodore Morris analyzed membership attrition rates in CY 2004 and CY 2005 and discussed results from a survey administered to 2,364 Auxiliary members in 2005.\textsuperscript{247}


\textsuperscript{246} Ibid.

C. EXISTING COAST GUARD AUXILIARY DISTRICT THIRTEEN EXIT SURVEY DATA

The Coast Guard Auxiliary does not possess or administer a national organizational assessment survey, like the Coast Guard Organizational Assessment Survey administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and there appears to be no desire to do so in the future. In lieu of a national organizational assessment survey, exit surveys are sporadically handed out for completion by departing Auxiliary members and are the responsibility of Coast Guard District Offices. This research attempted to determine how many Coast Guard District Offices utilize an exit survey or metric tool to assess Auxiliary membership trends. Solicitations for exit surveys from all Coast Guard District Offices yielded a total of 65 surveys from Coast Guard District Thirteen. This is an extremely low sample number (0.2%) considering that Auxiliary membership has ranged from 28,635 and 33,828 (mean = 31,655) between years 2001-2007. Furthermore, these exit surveys were limited to only one geographic location of the U.S. Exit surveys administered at the District level are not uniform and the information collected is not stored, analyzed, or reviewed at the national level. Each District Office is responsible for recruiting and retention within their area of responsibility.

Exit surveys ask departing Auxiliary members to explain reasons for their disenrollment from the Auxiliary. District Thirteen exit surveys were composed of 13 questions and administered to departing members between September 2001 and March 2008. There were no dates on the exit surveys to indicate when the member completed the form. The first seven questions of the survey were closed-ended questions while the remaining six were open-ended questions. Answers to all questions were quantified in a Microsoft® Excel spreadsheet. Tallying answers to the first seven questions were easy as

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248 U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District, e-mail message to author, August 25, 2008.

249 U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District, e-mail solicitation message to all U.S. Coast Guard Directors of Auxiliary, March 20, 2008; U.S. Coast Guard Director of Auxiliary, Thirteenth District, e-mail message to author, April 29, 2008.

250 Commodore Charles G. (Tony) Morris, e-mail message to author, March 8, 2008.
answers to the closed-ended questions were limited to “yes or no” answers. However, quantifying answers for the last six open-ended questions of the survey was difficult due to the following:

- The limited amount of literature devoted to addressing open-ended questions (probes) as witnessed in the literature review;
- What literature does exist, specifies that assigning answers to open-ended questions (probes) is subjective, time-consuming, and, at present, quantitatively unverifiable; and,
- No formalized method for formatting answers was previously established for the District Thirteen Exit Survey.

Additionally, there were occasions when open-ended questions captured answers encompassing more than one of the pre-assigned answers on the Microsoft® Excel spreadsheet. In some cases, as many as three pre-assigned answers were recorded based on a lengthy or detailed answer from a survey respondent. Conversely, some members chose not to answer the open-ended questions so no responses were recorded in these cases. The data was reviewed only once so the validity of the data, specifically data related to the open-ended questions, is uncertain. This reaffirms the disadvantages of open-ended questions and that they should be used sparingly, if at all, in organizational surveys. Nonetheless, the data does illustrate several patterns, which are not only interesting but may be of use in the development of future surveys.

D. COMPARISON OF AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP DATA TO NATIONAL VOLUNTEER DATA

In order to determine if Auxiliary membership trends were anomalous or consistent with those of other large volunteer organization in the United States, this thesis compared data on the Auxiliary with those compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).

U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data from end-of-year (EOY) 1970-1986 was obtained from Enclosure (4) of the 1987 U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress on

the Coast Guard Auxiliary. The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data between EOY 1987-1990 and EOY 2002-2007 was compiled from statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary Office. The data provided for EOY 1987-1990 was described as a “ballpark” range while the dataset for EOY 2002-2007 was extremely accurate. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data between EOY 1991-2001 was assembled from Commodore Morris’ unpublished paper.

National Volunteer Data was gleaned from reports generated by the U.S. Census Bureau and the BLS. The Corporation for National and Community Service requested that the U.S. Census Bureau and the BLS perform the survey annually in order to gather important information on volunteering trends in the United States. BLS has administered the survey as a supplement of the Current Population Survey, a monthly survey of approximately 60,000 households which gathers information on employment and unemployment among the nation’s population for those 16 years old and over. Unfortunately, volunteer data only dates back to CY 2002. It is unknown if Coast Guard Auxiliarists were incorporated into the survey results as the survey is administered randomly and different families receive the survey each year. However, if Auxiliarists were included in the results of the survey, it is anticipated that the level of participation was negligible due to the size of the U.S. population.

Data from both datasets were entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, analyzed, compared, and interpreted using quantitative statistics outlined in Leedy and Ormrod. Charts of the both datasets were also generated.

253 Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, National Director Staff, March 7, 2008.
E. COMPARISON OF AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP DATA TO CIVIL AIR PATROL MEMBERSHIP DATA

U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data from EOY 1970-1986 was obtained from Enclosure (4) of the 1987 U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress on the Coast Guard Auxiliary.257 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data between EOY 1987-1990 and EOY 2002-2007 was compiled from statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary Office.258 The data provided for EOY 1987-1990 was described as a “ballpark” range while the dataset for EOY 2002-2007 was extremely accurate. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data between EOY 1991-2001 was assembled from Commodore Morris’ unpublished paper.259

Membership data for the CAP for EOY 1956-2007 was provided by Holley Dunigan, a member of the CAP National Headquarters Staff. Data was separated into two columns, Cadets and Senior volunteers. For the purpose of this study, only Senior volunteers were considered and compared with Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data. Senior, in this case, is defined as any CAP volunteer who is not a Cadet. Additionally, data between EOY 1956-1983 was not utilized because accurate Auxiliary membership data for this time period was not available.260

Data from both datasets were entered into a Microsoft® Excel spreadsheet, analyzed, compared, and interpreted using quantitative statistics outlined in Leedy and Ormrod.261 Charts of the both datasets were also generated.

258 Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, National Director Staff, March 7, 2008.
260 Resource statistics provided by the Civil Air Patrol National Headquarters Staff, July 24, 2008.
F. COMPARISON OF AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP DATA TO U.S. POWER SQUADRONS MEMBERSHIP DATA

U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data from EOY 1970-1986 was obtained from Enclosure (4) of the 1987 U.S. Coast Guard, *Report to Congress on the Coast Guard Auxiliary.* 262 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data between EOY 1987-1990 and EOY 2002-2007 was compiled from statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary Office. 263 The data provided for EOY 1987-1990 was described as a “ballpark” range while the dataset for EOY 2002-2007 was extremely accurate. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership data between EOY 1991-2001 was assembled from Commodore Morris’ unpublished paper. 264

Membership data for the USPS for EOY 1984-2007 was provided by Mary Catherine Berube, Headquarters Director of the USPS. The membership data only includes “active” members as the USPS also has an additional 5,000 “family” members. 265

Data from both datasets were entered into a Microsoft® Excel spreadsheet, analyzed, compared, and interpreted using quantitative statistics outlined in Leedy and Ormrod. 266 A chart of the both datasets was also generated.

G. INTERVIEWS

Two interviews were conducted in accordance with guidance provided by Leedy and Ormrod. 267 The first interview was performed over the phone with Paul Redmond,


263 Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, National Director Staff, March 7, 2008.


265 Resource statistics provided by the U.S. Power Squadrons Headquarters Director, September 11, 2008.


267 Ibid., 146-149.
Program Analyst and U.S. Coast Guard Human Resources Survey Coordinator.268 The interview was digitally recorded and the audio file outsourced for transcription into Microsoft® Word. The second interview was carried out with Dr. Tarl Roger Kudrick, Lead Personnel Research Psychologist with the U.S. OPM, Human Resources Products and Services Division.269 The initial email interview began on August 16, 2008 and was completed on August 25, 2008.

268 Paul Redmond (Program Analyst and U.S. Coast Guard Human Resources Survey Coordinator), interview with author, June 30, 2008.

IV. ANALYSIS

There were relationships established between findings identified in the literature review, synthesis of DOT and Coast Guard membership reports, examination of Coast Guard District Thirteen exit survey data, analysis of membership data from the Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol (CAP), U.S. Power Squadrons (USPS), U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and interview results. From this analysis, Auxiliary membership trends were compared with other volunteer organizations and assessed to determine potential reasons for the decline in membership.

A. HISTORICAL STUDY – COAST GUARD AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP: 1952-1987

Reviewing the Report to Congress on the Coast Guard Auxiliary drafted for Congress in September 1987 was vital to this project in order to understand the underlying issues behind the drop in Auxiliary membership between the years 1980-1986. More importantly yet were the recommendations made in the report and whether they remain applicable today.

1. 1987 Coast Guard Auxiliary Membership Report to Congress

The methods employed in the development of the report included a review of all previous studies done prior to 1976, an analysis of the Auxiliary information database (AUXMIS), a comparison of membership parameters for the Auxiliary with those of other volunteer organizations in the United States, an attitude survey of current Auxiliarists, and a solicitation of public comment.

The report’s conclusions were grouped into five categories, which addressed the questions posed, by Congressional members and the issues that arose during the development of the report. The first four categories discussed the following topics.

- The decline in Auxiliary membership that began in the mid-1970s
- The impact of the decline in Auxiliary membership on the maritime community
• The influence of the Coast Guard’s Non-emergency Assistance Policy on Auxiliary membership

• The optimum membership size for the Auxiliary

The last category addressed in the report covered miscellaneous concerns about the impact of reduced Auxiliary membership on the Coast Guard’s mission readiness.

The study’s findings revealed that Auxiliary membership had declined approximately 20% since 1976 with most of that decline occurring during the 1980-1986 period. An analysis of this decline in member numbers indicated that the Auxiliary’s membership trends were contrary to those of six other large volunteer organizations at that time (CAP, American Red Cross, Boy Scouts of America, Girl Scouts of America, USPS, YMCA, and Kiwanis), prompting the authors of the report to search for factors that could shed light upon the Auxiliary’s member losses. A review of available data revealed that no single, quantitative metric tool had been utilized to track trends in Auxiliary membership and activities. The best data were obtained from AUXMIS, a data management system known to be seriously flawed and which has since been replaced. Therefore, in order to gather reliable data on the reason(s) for the decline in Auxiliary membership over the period 1970-1986, an Attitude Survey was developed and implemented within the ranks of Auxiliary and active duty members.

The Attitude Survey involved a total of 3,071 individuals who represented three groups: active Auxiliarists, former Auxiliarists, and Commanding Officers and Officers-in-Charge. The survey was conducted by telephone and by paper questionnaires. The survey led to the following conclusions concerning member opinions (Table 5):

• Over 75% of the current Auxiliarists surveyed joined the organization for the purposes of:
  • Assisting others on the water and promote boating safety, and
  • Gaining knowledge and experience in boating.

  The above reasons were less important for former Auxiliarists, but 65% of former members reported that these reasons were some of the primary reasons for joining.

• Auxiliarists most enjoyed activities that involved operations, teaching public education (PE) classes, conducting vessel examinations (VE), fellowship with other Auxiliarists, and boating-related training.
Auxiliarists had major complaints concerning the organization’s politics, poor leadership and communication, the requirement for accountability paperwork, the Coast Guard’s change in towing policy, and the frequency and magnitude of changes taking place in Auxiliary programs, which limited Auxiliarists’ range of activities and made it harder to participate in Auxiliary programs.

Auxiliarists who left the organization were dissatisfied over several factors including:

- Organization politics within the Auxiliary and the burdensome administrative policies and paperwork requirements;
- The commitment of time needed to be an active participant in Auxiliary programs;
- The many changes that were being made that affected Auxiliarists’ activities; and
- The Non-emergency Assistance Policy implemented in 1984, which substantially restricted the use of the Auxiliary in providing assistance towing on the water.

Generally, active duty members expressed confidence in the Auxiliary but mentioned some reservations in cases in which physical strength is a factor in mission accomplishment.

It was believed by long-time Auxiliarists that morale was worsening rather than improving.

The report also noted that the decline in member numbers resulted in a concomitant reduction in the services that had been routinely provided to the public and to the Coast Guard by Auxiliary members. For example, over the 1976-1986 time period, there was a 23% decrease in the number of operational patrols, a 14% decrease in the number of recreational vessel safety examinations, and a 19% reduction in the number of people attending Auxiliary classes. The net outcome of reduced Auxiliary membership was deemed an undesirable one in that the Coast Guard, through the Auxiliary, was left with significantly less positive contact with the public in the realm of recreational boating safety.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>% of those responding*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason for joining the Auxiliary:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Service to others on the water</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Increase boating knowledge &amp; skills</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Fellowship</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The most enjoyed activities related to:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Operations, PE, Vessel Examinations</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Fellowship</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Training</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major complaints involved:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Organization politics, poor leadership &amp; communication, paperwork.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Change in towing policy.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Frequency and magnitude of changes in Auxiliary programs.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for leaving the Auxiliary included:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Organization politics, poor leadership &amp; communication, paperwork.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Requires too much time.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Frequency and magnitude of changes in Auxiliary programs.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents were able to check more than one answer to questions in the survey.

Table 5. Comments from the 1986-1987 Attitude Survey of Active and Former Auxiliarists Responding. *The three highest-ranked reasons are listed in order.*

The Report also concluded that there appeared to be no single cause for dissatisfaction leading to a member’s leaving the Auxiliary. Two significant causes of disenrollment that were identified, however, were the more rigorous requirements in the Boat Crew Qualification procedures and the restriction of Auxiliarists in the towing of recreational vessel that resulted from the change in the Coast Guard’s towing policy. Both of these changes resulted in members leaving the Auxiliary and in significant dissatisfaction within members who remained with the organization. Public comment on the Report also revealed considerable dissatisfaction within the boating public concerning the towing policy. Aside from those two factors, the other sources of dissatisfaction were less defined but many of them can be grouped into deficiencies within the Auxiliary’s leadership, communications, and information management systems.

The report also pointed out that the Auxiliary as it existed then (at approximately 30,472 members) was too small to satisfy the needs of the Coast Guard through the year 2000. The report recommended that Auxiliary membership increase 3% each year to
ensure a total of 48,000 active members by that date. It is interesting to recall that in 2000, there were a total of 32,950 members. The Report also recommended that the Auxiliary effectiveness as related to membership size be examined periodically in order to make timely adjustments to meet the needs of the Coast Guard.

The Report pointed out that the Coast Guard’s policy on non-emergency towing was restrictive on Auxiliarists and that the policy was only a policy and not law.

The Report’s recommendations, listed below, are timely and relevant to today’s Auxiliary:

- Increased opportunities should be developed for the Auxiliary to participate in Operations activities, particularly SAR; and
- Steps should be taken to improve the understanding and communications between Regular Coast Guard members and the Auxiliary at all levels.

B. RECENT STUDIES – COAST GUARD MEMBERSHIP: 1987-PRESENT

Reviewing the most recent Auxiliary membership reports and exit surveys was critical to determine if some or any of the factors identified in these reports were similar to those outlined above in the 1987 Report to Congress on the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Namely, are the same problems which were identified 20 years ago still a lingering problem today? Can accurate comparisons be made using data gleaned from the more recent reports and exit surveys?

1. 2005-2007 Coast Guard Auxiliary Membership Reports

Commodore Charles G. (Tony) Morris performed a detailed analysis of the loss of membership in CY 2004. He found that what initially appeared to be only a 15.8% decrease in Auxiliary membership from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2005 actually resulted in a loss closer to 22%. This was attributed to the fact that the Coast Guard Auxiliary lost 7,839 members during CY 2004 but that these losses were partially offset by a gain of 2,125 new members. Commodore Morris observed that 12% who left the Auxiliary did so as a result of the Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) Program while
the remaining 10% were lost due to sicknesses, death, retirement, and other voluntary and involuntary reasons. Finally, no correlation between those who left the Auxiliary and the amount of time they were a member was identified.270

Next, Commodore Morris performed an analysis of the membership attrition rate for CY 2005. He observed that the attrition rate in CY 2005 was 11.5% with a majority of these members leaving possessing no more than five years in the Auxiliary. That is, a majority of the members who left in CY 2005 were relatively new members having joined on or after CY 1999. Commodore Morris also found that the attrition rate was steady at 10% for members with more than 5 years in the Auxiliary. As a result, his belief is that retention efforts should be focused on the members having five years or less of experience. This facet of Auxiliary membership requires further study to determine if subsequent data for CY 2006, CY 2007, and CY 2008 demonstrate similar patterns.271

Commodore Morris also performed a second analysis on CY 2005 Auxiliary membership data. He observed that as of January 1, 2005 the Coast Guard Auxiliary had 13,103 members who joined between the year 2000 and 2004. Moreover, he noticed that of the 13,103 who joined, 1,805 of these members left at the end of 2005. Commodore Morris decided to determine if the 11,298 who remained in the Auxiliary were more active and productive in the organization than those who left at the end of 2005. His hypothesis proved true as those who remained behind held more qualifications and elected positions than those who left the organization. But, he warned that retaining members is not correlated to holding office or attaining qualifications. Rather, he believes that dissatisfied members were probably less motivated to seek out elected positions or pursue qualifications. Commodore Morris does believe that members in 1-6 years of membership who are not holding office or holding qualifications are of greatest risk of leaving the Auxiliary, and that these are legitimate warning signs for retention efforts.272

272 Ibid.
A significant contributor to the drop in Auxiliary membership following the 9/11 terrorist attacks was caused by the implementation of the PSI Program initiated in 2003. For this reason, Commodore Morris looked at whether the significant drop in membership since 2003 affected the Coast Guard Auxiliary’s ability to execute its missions. Looking at data from AUXDATA on January 9, 2007, the Auxiliary’s centralized database for all Auxiliary missions, he noted that 2,626 members had been disenrolled as a result of failing to submit the extensive PSI administrative package. This loss accounted for 9% of the existing membership at that time. What he discovered was 71% of those who were disenrolled had not attained any competency (qualification) while 63% of those who complied with the PSI requirements and submitted a package did possess at least one competency. He also determined that 91% of those disenrolled held no elected office compared to 42% of those in compliance with PSI requirements. According to Commodore Morris:

The loss of 9% of our membership is significant by any measure. We have 76 fewer Boat Crew, 27 fewer Coxswains, 52 fewer Vessel Examiners, 57 fewer Instructors, and 134 fewer AUXOP members than would otherwise have been the case. While some of those people may belatedly decide to submit PSI packages and thus return to the fold, it is likely that the vast majority are permanent losses. And of course losing more than 2,600 members will have a significant effect on funding of CGAUXInc. However, there is a silver lining to this cloud. To put it bluntly, though there are clear exceptions, the great majority of those who were disenrolled were “deadwood” who were not qualified in any program, not occupying elected or appointed offices, and who had few other skills that would make them valuable resources for the Auxiliary.

The final analysis conducted by Commodore Morris, and arguably the most significant, was performed using an online attitude survey of Auxiliary membership. The online survey located on the AUXWEB website was completed by 2,364 members. An additional 146 mail-in surveys were received and processed for a total of 2,510 respondents. The survey was composed of 43 questions. There were 41 close-ended questions and two open-ended questions at the end of the survey. Unfortunately, the 146

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274 Ibid.
mail-in surveys were missing the two open-ended questions so only 2,364 responses for the open-ended questions were obtained. The first 17 questions collected demographic information on the respondent while the remaining 24 close-ended questions were scored from 1-5 using a Likert-scale with a 6th “have no knowledge” selection choice. This scale was then converted into a 0-100 scale where 1 (Strongly Disagree – 0) and 5 (Strongly Agree – 100).275

Analysis of the online survey found that participating members were among the most active holding qualifications and computer literate. A vast majority had no fewer than six years of membership in the Auxiliary. Approximately 25% were AUXOP and more than 33% of the respondents held an elected office. Understanding the background and experience of the respondents is important because it explains the higher level of response rate but it also illuminates the fact that even the most motivated Auxiliary members are dissatisfied with certain aspects of the Auxiliary, which could potentially result in their disenrollment.276

The overall satisfaction of respondents was positive (mean = 68.1). Respondents were most satisfied with operational missions and member involvement at the Flotilla level, camaraderie, and training provided by the Auxiliary. They were most dissatisfied with AUXDATA and communication shortfalls from senior leadership. This next excerpt from Commodore Morris is taken directly from the Executive Summary of the report in which he explains several intricate details of his findings:

Member satisfaction varies significantly among regions/districts. Satisfaction also varies significantly among some sub-groups of members: Women are much more positive than men, and elected officers are much more positive than others. Coxswains, members with high income, and boat owners (particularly large boat owners) are much less satisfied than others. Those who have belonged for 11-20 years are significantly less positive than newer and older members. ATON verifiers, AUXOP members, and members with more education are also significantly less

276 Ibid.
satisfied than others. Contrary to what one might expect, having regular access to a computer, having access to the Internet, and the member’s age are not significantly related to overall satisfaction.277

As reported earlier, the survey possessed final open-ended questions. They were as follows:

- What aspect of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary do you find most rewarding? Why have you decided to remain a member?
- What aspect of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary do you think is most in need of changing?

Surprisingly, 2,030 (85% response rate) responded to the open-ended questions resulting in 239 pages of comments. For the purpose of the study, Commodore Morris sorted all comments by Coast Guard District and then analyzed every tenth page (or 10%) of the 239 page document. This resulted in a 27 page document containing comments from 239 respondents from each District. The 239 responses from the 27 page document were extrapolated and assigned to 709 discrete comments (generalized answers). Of the 709 discrete comments, 380 were positive while 329 were negative.278 The results of this analysis are found in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction Comments</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Dissatisfaction Comments</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Mission (Serving Country, Community)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>Information Services</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in Operations</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Personnel Services and PSI</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellowship</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Received</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Public Education</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Organization as a Whole</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working w/Coast Guard, Recognition</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing Recreational Boating Safety Missions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing Vessel Safety Checks</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Member Training, Mentoring</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Personnel Services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Coast Guard</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as an Elected Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Awards System</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as an Instructor (both PE and MT)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Uniforms</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in Marine Safety</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Inactive Members</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working on Publications</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lack of Fellowship</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Received (Flotilla, National)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yacht Club</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Public Affairs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as Career Counselor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications (Received)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing Uniforms</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving Awards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Satisfaction vs. Dissatisfaction Comments from the 2005 Membership Survey

278 Ibid.
From a positive standpoint, members were most satisfied with overall missions, participating in operations, fellowship, and in the training available to them. A sense of duty to country, community, and the Coast Guard overwhelmed all other comments. The following quote, taken anonymously from the survey, summarizes this feature:

I have joined and decided to remain a member because I am actually doing worthwhile service. This is not just a social club or a sit-around-and-talk-about-it group. We are out in boats helping people or examining boats for safety or watching ports and shorelines for pollution or suspicious activity. I am doing something for my community and my country.279

The primary concern for members were issues related to Information Services, which include AUXDATA (the successor to AUXMIS), paperwork, and access to computers and the Internet. Personnel Services, incorporating recruiting, mentoring, and PSIs was the second greatest distress. Leadership followed closely behind Personnel Services and, in fourth place, was limited opportunities for specialized training. Below, are several quotations taken directly from the 2005 survey which describe the frustrations of members concerning to the top dissatisfaction factors (“dissatisfiers”) listed above.280

AUXDATA is the worst computer system ever devised. I can think of no program that is worse, even Windows….I have many years of computer experience and even minored in college in computer science. And never have I seen a worse program….The system needs to be scrapped and replaced ASAP.

There is too much paperwork. I know that a paper trail is needed to show the support the Auxiliary provides to the USCG, but it seems that all we do is fill out forms.

The Auxiliary needs to appeal to younger people. The mean age of my Flotillas is about 60-65. These people are a wealth of knowledge but have no one to pass this knowledge on to. The auxiliary needs to have social events, and projects that will appeal to people in their 20's and 30's.

The red tape involved in old members receiving their ID Cards. In my case I transferred from the 7th Dist to the 5th. Over 14 months have gone by and I still do not have a new ID. I worked for CIA & DIA for almost 30

280 Ibid.
years. I have held the highest access clearances in being. I have had at a minimum over 5 National Security Updates and yet I still do not have an ID card. I am frustrated to the point of being ready to resign from the Aux. Our leadership at Div, Dist, and National levels do not seem to care about the inordinate delays nor will they address this issues.

There seems to be a slight disconnect between the national level and the membership. All too often the membership is told what they will like rather than being asked. ABC versus Boating Safely PE courses is an example.

When I feel that I no longer make a difference to the Auxiliary I will retire. The clock is at 5 minutes to midnight. Main beef: We elect members to be FCs, DCPs, RCOs, DCOs who never were in a supervisory capacity in private life and expect them to succeed leading a unit. Auxiliary training is available but seldom taken advantage of. Perhaps leadership training should be made mandatory for those seeking elected office. I was on the National Staff for (1992-2004) 12 years and worked with all levels in the organization. We should and could do better.

Again, there are 239 pages of comments reflecting the opinions of active Auxiliary volunteers who desire nothing more than for the Auxiliary to excel as a volunteer organization. However, the opportunity to capture this type of data is rarely pursued and, as a result, comparisons to assess performance (for the good or bad) simply cannot be completed.

2. **Coast Guard Auxiliary District Thirteen Exit Survey Data**

Twenty-one of 65 survey respondents possessed over seven years of experience in the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Only two respondents were Auxiliary members for less than one year. This fact is noteworthy as the data provided from these exit surveys were not provided from members unfamiliar with Auxiliary policy and procedures. Additional analysis found that 21 members were Vessel Examiners, 22 were instructors, 36 were pilots, air observers, coxswains, or crew, 19 held an elected office, and 37 held an appointed office. Additionally, 31 members completed a combined total of 93 Coast Guard Auxiliary Specialty Courses. Thirty-seven revealed that the Auxiliary satisfied their reasons (motivations) for joining, while 26 indicated that they were not satisfied.
Question 8 of the survey (open-ended question) asked respondents why they joined the Auxiliary. There were 86 responses recorded which are illustrated in Figure 7.

According to the responses received, a majority of members (30%) joined the Coast Guard Auxiliary hoping to learn specialized skills with 24% doing so for patriotic reasons.

Question 10 of the survey (open-ended question) asked respondents what turned members off the most as Auxiliary members. There were 101 responses recorded which are illustrated in Figure 8.
Topping the list of reasons was burdensome administrative work required of members. Poor leadership was second including problems associated with communicating goals and providing clear policy to members. Surprisingly, the category consisting of unfriendly members was third on the list at 11%. The results from Figure (8) are closely related to the outcomes from Commodore Morris’ 2005 Survey. Comments related to problems with Information Services were incorporated into the Burdensome Administration category for exit survey data.

Question 11 of the survey (open-ended question) asked respondents what turned members on the most as Auxiliary members. There were 101 responses recorded which are illustrated in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Primary Sources of Member Satisfaction

Camaraderie topped the list with members’ ability to perform operational missions and a sense of accomplishment coming in 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd}, respectively. These results also closely mirror results from the Commodore Morris’ 2005 Survey.

Question 12 of the survey (open-ended question) asked respondents what would be the greatest benefit to recruiting and retaining Auxiliary members. There were 99 responses recorded which are illustrated in Figure 10.
Departing members felt that improvements in leadership, greater opportunities to perform operational missions, and less burdensome administrative work would greatly benefit membership retention and recruiting efforts in the Auxiliary.

Although it is important to note that the sample size and the number of exit surveys reviewed in this section is minute when compared to the size of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the data should not be discounted. The data does illuminate several key issues, which appear to be important factors in determining whether a member remains, or departs the Auxiliary, including leadership, administration burden, training and operational mission opportunities, duty along with a sense of accomplishment, and even unfriendly members. These factors could be scrutinized even further in future surveys to validate their importance to Auxiliary membership.
C. COMPARATIVE TRENDS AMONG THREE SOURCES OF DATA

This section attempts to compare volunteer trend data provided by the 1987 Report to Congress on the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the 2005 Commodore Morris Report, specifically responses to the two open-ended questions on the survey, and District Thirteen exit surveys from 2001-2007. It must be noted that each source collected data on membership trends differently, making comparison challenging at the onset, and required varying levels of subjective “guessing” in order to align responses to open-ended questions with assigned answers. Additionally, demographics, geographic locations, and stages of membership surveyed also varied. The 1987 Report surveyed an eclectic group of Auxiliarists, both current and former members, as well as active duty Coast Guardsmen, while the 2005 Report studied trends from existing and highly productive Auxiliary members. The exit surveys contained data only from Auxiliary members who were departing the organization residing in the northwest U.S. Finally, any trends identified from the below analysis are based on data streams collected from an extremely small sample size which likely did not adequately represent Auxiliary membership.

Despite the shortfalls and limitations of the data, it is worth performing a comparison to determine if any trends can be gleaned from Auxiliary membership data for future study. This data is presented in Table 7.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for Joining Auxiliary</td>
<td>1. Service/Duty</td>
<td>No data provided</td>
<td>1. Learn knowledge/skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Learn knowledge/skills</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Service/Duty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Fellowship</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Enjoy Boating</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Fellowship</td>
<td>2. Operations/Missions</td>
<td>2. Operations/Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Learn knowledge/skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Turned Members “Off”</td>
<td>1. Leadership, Politics,</td>
<td>1. Information Services</td>
<td>1. Burdensome Admin</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>2. Personnel Services</td>
<td>2. Leadership</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Towing Policy Change</td>
<td>3. Leadership</td>
<td>3. Unfriendly Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for Leaving Auxiliary</td>
<td>1. Leadership, Politics,</td>
<td>No data provided</td>
<td>1. Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications, Burdensome Admin</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Operations/Missions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Too Much Time</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Burdensome Admin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Required of Members</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Improve Relationship w/Active Duty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Changes in Auxiliary</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Items represent most important factors and are listed in order of precedence (“1” is of highest importance)

Table 7. Comparative Trends Among Three Sources of Data
Table 7 illustrates that there appears to be commonalities between the 1987 Report and District Thirteen exit survey answers concerned with reasons for joining the Auxiliary. Service/duty and learning specialized skills (related to boating) have remained important motivations over the last 20 years to people joining the Auxiliary. These are motives, which should be noted and tested in future recruiting studies. Once members joined the Auxiliary, the data indicates that service/duty, fellowship, opportunities to learn specialized skills, and participate in operational missions are highly desired motivational factors keeping (retaining) members in the organization. These findings are notable because the activities that engaged members are inherent qualities of the Coast Guard. That is, all Auxiliary members will be exposed in some way to these activities by simply being a member of the Auxiliary organization. The level at which members are exposed to these activities may vary based on the member and restrictions imposed or opportunities afforded by Coast Guard and Auxiliary leadership.

The correlation between factors that engaged or discouraged members with respect to the Auxiliary organization were abstract and more difficult to discern. Leadership appears to be a significant problem but the topic of leadership is broad extending into the realm of communication, management, etc. No specific instructions defined “leadership” to respondents at the time of survey administrations; consequently, what one member may have thought was a leadership problem may actually have been a communication problem. Future surveys must distinguish between these variables and dissect the “root” problems associated with each variable, whether it is leadership, communication, etc. Another factor gleaned from the data demonstrates that Auxiliary members feel that they are overburdened with administrative work. In fact, the administrative burden on ordinary members was a significant issue 20 years ago and remains an obstacle today. The 2005 Report describes the issue as “Information Services” indicating that the Auxiliary databases, AUXDATA and AUXINFO, are problematic to a point that it was listed as the highest discouraging factor. The District Thirteen exit surveys did not directly mention AUXDATA or AUXINFO as a potential issue but information management could have been included as part of the loathsome administrative burden, also a primary discouraging factor. A final similarity in the data
between the 1987 Report and the District Thirteen exit surveys is that two major Coast Guard Program initiatives are listed as injurious to membership: the Coast Guard policy change in Auxiliary towing involvement and the PSI Program. What is of most concern is the fact that Auxiliary members, in the District Thirteen exit surveys, ranked unfriendly members as the 3rd highest problem, even above PSIs.

The remaining category focuses on the factors causing members to leave the Auxiliary. This category contained only data from the 1987 Report and District Thirteen exit surveys. The most significant factors appear to revolve around leadership, communication, administrative burden, and a desire for greater opportunities to learn specialized skills and perform operational missions. The conclusion from this finding is that all of the factors listed in this category can be modified by Coast Guard and Auxiliary leadership as future survey results dictate. It is also clear that some of the sources of member dissatisfaction revealed during the earlier studies remain to be addressed.

D. COAST GUARD AUXILIARY MEMBERSHIP TRENDS

Prepared from a combination of the report by Commodore Morris and the 1987 Report to Congress, Figure 11 displays U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary membership trends for the years 1970 through 2007. A trend line and coefficient of determination (R^2) are also indicated.
It can be noted that there have been a number of peaks and valleys associated with membership numbers over the period indicated. The drop of membership in 1976 was attributed to an attempt to increase the “quality” of members. High goals as a result of the “Goals Attainment Program” led flotillas to disenroll non-performing members. A decline in numbers in 1984 was attributed to an increasingly difficult boat crew program and a towing policy which resulted in a loss of towing by the Auxiliary with a resultant decrease in morale. The sharp decrease noted in 2004 was attributed to the PSIs begun in response to 9/11. It could also be argued that members who joined following the 9/11 attacks desiring to help the Coast Guard with its homeland security missions felt “unused” and began leaving the Auxiliary in 2003-2004. What is clear, however, is that the trend in Auxiliary membership is down. This is contrary to a recommendation in the


282 Ibid., Executive Summary (vii-ix).

1987 report to Congress that membership in the Coast Guard Auxiliary should have expanded at a rate of approximately 3% per year for the purpose of strengthening membership to 48,000 by the year 2000.\textsuperscript{284} Although membership numbers were not proposed beyond the year 2000, it can be assumed at a steady 3% increase per year that Auxiliary membership should have reached 60,805 by 2008.

The coefficient of determination ($R^2$) is a measure of how well the regression line represents the relationship between the data and is a useful tool to determine how certain one can be in making predictions from a particular model or graph. The coefficient measures the proportion of variance (fluctuation) of a predictable variable from another variable, which is unpredictable. In the case of the Figure 11 above, $R^2 = 0.1761$ signifying that the correlation between the constant variable, time, and the unpredictable variable, Auxiliary membership, is not able to be predicted with any degree of certainty.\textsuperscript{285}

To determine whether a trend could be predicted with a greater degree of accuracy, a new graph was developed using data between 1978 and 2007. It was thought that the sharp spike in Auxiliary membership between 1970 and 1977 was a potential outlier due to the nature of the data at that time. Figure 12 displays the results.

\textsuperscript{284} U.S. Coast Guard, \textit{Report to Congress on the Coast Guard Auxiliary}, CGD87-029 (Washington, D.C.: September 1987), Executive Summary (x).

In the case of the Figure 12 above, $R^2 = 0.2584$ signifying that the correlation between the constant variable, time, and the unpredictable variable, Auxiliary membership, remain relatively unpredictable.\(^{286}\) A final graph was produced using only Auxiliary membership data between 2001 and 2007 to determine if a future decrease in Auxiliary membership could be predicted with any degree of certainty. The results are illustrated in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Membership Trends – U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary – 2001-2007

R² = 0.7238 and is much higher that previous R² values. This is a much better statistical indication that Auxiliary membership will continue to decrease with time because of the high quality and proximal collection time period of these data. Nonetheless, this analysis is based only on six years of data, only a small fraction of the time that the Coast Guard Auxiliary has been in existence.

E. COMPARISON OF COAST GUARD AUXILIARY VS. U.S. VOLUNTEERISM TRENDS

A comparison of membership numbers between the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and U.S. Volunteerism as a whole may be seen in Figure 14.

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From 2001 through 2007, the Coast Guard Auxiliary lost 5,193 members. This represents a loss of 15.4% of the membership during that period. On the other hand, the number of national volunteers increased by 1,675,000 individuals representing a 2.8% increase. While Coast Guard Auxiliarists are included in the national volunteer numbers, the 12.6% difference in membership losses between the Auxiliary and volunteers as a whole is sufficiently large to suggest an actual trend.

F. COMPARISON OF COAST GUARD AUXILIARY VS. CIVIL AIR PATROL TRENDS

Figure 15 provides a comparison between membership in the U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) (Senior members) for the years 1971-2007.
It is evident that both organizations have exhibited some remarkable changes in membership over time. Both organizations were apparently affected by security checks (CAP in 1988 and the Coast Guard Auxiliary in 2004) which resulted in significant membership losses. More recently, the Coast Guard Auxiliary lost 7,466 members or 20.7% of their membership between 2003 and 2007 while the CAP lost 688 individuals or 2% of their membership during the same period. It is noteworthy that a very small number of Coast Auxiliarists are also CAP members.

G. COMPARISON OF COAST GUARD AUXILIARY VS. U.S. POWER SQUADRONS TRENDS

Figure 16 provides a comparison between membership in the U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and the U.S. Power Squadrons (USPS) for the years 1984-2007.
Analysis of the data indicates that membership in both maritime organizations are declining. USPS membership peaked in 1991 at 62,156 before dropping to 40,673 EOY 2007. A membership study conducted by Dave Hinders, National Secretary for the USPS, using 2007 volunteerism data from the Corporation for National and Community Service, found that 39% of USPS members live in the top 10 U.S. states with the lowest Volunteering Rank. The USPS is not directly involved in homeland security missions so it possibly explains why there is no dramatic increase in membership in 2001-2002 as witnessed in the Auxiliary and CAP. Viewing USPS membership data between September 2001 and June 2002, the number of volunteers does increase from 48,655 to 54,884 before dropping off to 47,049 in July 2002. Another trend was discovered following a review of USPS monthly membership data. Between 1984 and 1994, the membership systematically increased with each month. However, this trend changes in

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288 Dave Hinders, U.S. Power Squadrons National Secretary, e-mail message to author, September 11, 2008.
1995 as USPS membership increased steadily between January and June before falling dramatically in the month of July. This pattern continues today and has resulted in as much as a 9,846 loss of membership from June to July in 2001. The average attrition rate between June-July since 1995 is -13%. Membership dues may be a likely cause for this drop in membership.289

What is disturbing about the two sets of data is the declining membership of the two dominant U.S. maritime volunteer organizations. Unlike the CAP which is experiencing an increase in membership, the Auxiliary and USPS are losing members and at a time when recreational vessel registration and other safety and security needs of the country are at a peak. One potential reason instigating volunteers to leave the maritime sector could be related to economical reasons, including the cost of fuel, insurance, berthing and mooring fees, and membership fees. It should be noted once more that a very small number of volunteers possess memberships with both the Coast Guard Auxiliary and USPS.

H. ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY ASSESSMENT MECHANISM

The nature and sources of the data compiled and discussed in this thesis indicate the absence of systematic, comprehensive survey to determine the needs and opinions of members of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary. The only published data is in the 1987 report to Congress, and this is not commonly known to be available and is difficult to obtain. Since that time, it appears that only exit surveys have been sporadically carried out by Coast Guard District Offices and, in some cases, not completed at all or inconsistently. The 2005 Auxiliary membership surveys and membership trend analysis performed by Commodore Morris provided invaluable information on Auxiliary membership. Despite this, Commodore Morris was only able to obtain approximately 2000 responses, equal to 6% of the Auxiliary membership at the time. It is unlikely that a similar survey or analysis will be pursued systematically to compare Commodore Morris’ results with future membership trends.

289 Dave Hinders, U.S. Power Squadrons National Secretary, e-mail message to author, September 11, 2008.
Taking into consideration the immense workload of the U. S. Coast Guard, the need for a strong and active Auxiliary, evidence proving that membership in the Auxiliary is declining, and the fact that there has not been any systematic attempt by the U.S. Coast Guard or the U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary to determine membership trends for the purpose of retention and recruitment, it behooves the Coast Guard to produce, test, and disseminate to all Auxiliarists a comprehensive survey instrument. The Coast Guard Organizational Assessment Survey is administered biennially to all Coast Guard members (active duty, reserve, and civilian) with the exception of Auxiliarists in order to answer the same questions being posed within this thesis. Moreover, this survey benefits from a 60% response rate and can be easily adapted and used for the Coast Guard Auxiliary.290

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V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A number of facts have been cogently established in the course of this paper:

- The Coast Guard Auxiliary membership has been declining in terms of numbers since 1976 with the exception of peaks in 1990-1994 and 2001-2004 time-periods. Since 2004, membership numbers have consistently decreased.

- There has not been any systematic, quantitative survey to assess the working conditions and morale of the Coast Guard Auxiliary members. Additionally, there has been no systematic, quantitative exit survey employed for the purpose of developing strategies to reverse the downward trend of membership attrition or to improve recruiting tactics.

- Volunteerism in the U.S. remains at historically high levels since 1974 in spite of a regression beginning in 2005 in contrast to the decline in membership in the Auxiliary. Statistical analysis of Auxiliary membership data from 2001-2007 suggests that Auxiliary membership may continue to decrease with time.

- Coast Guard Auxiliary membership is declining while membership in the Civil Air Patrol is rising.

- The Auxiliary did not meet the membership criteria of 48,000 in CY 2000 as recommended in the 1987 Report to Congress.

- A simple cost analysis calculation using 2007 data revealed that the Coast Guard Auxiliary performs nearly $70 million dollars of work for the Coast Guard each year.

- A global review of literature related to volunteer administration revealed that trust and psychological contracts have significant impacts to the level of volunteer commitment devoted to an organization. Volunteer organizations which are effective in matching the motivational factors or functions guiding the actions of volunteers with the organization’s missions are more likely to retain their volunteers.

- A review of the literature related to recruiting volunteers found that subjecting potential volunteers (nonvolunteers) to advertisements promoting personally relevant (matched) motives were more likely to join an organization than someone exposed to an advertisement with unrelated (mismatched) motives.

- A review of other volunteer organizations, both domestically and internationally, demonstrate the reliance of certain organizations, even countries, on volunteers to ensure the safety and security of its citizenry.
Moreover, close study of other volunteer organizations provide evidence that volunteers can be entrusted with great responsibility given the appropriate level of training, including law enforcement authority.

- Service/duty and learning specialized skills (related to boating) have remained important motivations over the last 20 years to people joining the Auxiliary. These are motives, which should be noted and verified in future recruiting studies.

- Once members joined the Auxiliary, the data indicates that service/duty, fellowship, opportunities to learn specialized skills, and participate in operational missions are highly desired motivational factors keeping (retaining) members in the organization.

- Factors discouraging members appear to be leadership, administrative burden, including Information Services and Coast Guard Program initiatives (change in towing policy and the implementation of the Personnel Security Investigation Program).

- Issues motivating members to leave the Auxiliary include deficiencies in leadership and communication, administrative burden, and limitation for greater opportunities to learn specialized skills and perform operational missions.

- The Coast Guard relies on the Coast Guard Auxiliary as a force multiplier. Any decrease in numbers in the Auxiliary makes it more difficult for the Coast Guard to accomplish its missions. A declining Auxiliary membership results in reduced functions and value to the Coast Guard.

The U.S. Coast Guard lacks the personnel, qualifications, financial resources, and surface and air assets to fill critical gaps in its safety and security missions, specifically those related to monitoring local harbors, marinas, fishing docks, unpopulated coastlines, boat ramps, and other areas where recreational, fishing, commercial fishing, and towing vessels moor, operate, and anchor. The Coast Guard’s Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), intelligence collection, as well as many other safety and security programs rely on Auxiliary participation for success. This was made evident by Rear Admiral Brian Salerno, the Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Policy and Planning, during a his speech at the 2007 Leadership Council when he said, “The Coast Guard relies heavily on your ‘can-do’ spirit” and “Your members are a vital force-multiplier across the country, especially as our active-duty and Reserve components are [being] stretched quite thin, to cover the full spectrum of Coast Guard missions.”

291 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, *Navigator* (St. Louis, Missouri: Fall 2007), 14.
Homeland Security and Coast Guard leaders in the abilities of the Coast Guard Auxiliary is also demonstrated in the *National Small Vessel Security Strategy* as strategic objectives were written with the expectation that Auxiliarists would help achieve them.292

The Coast Guard Auxiliary is losing members despite a spike in membership after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the tremendous Coast Guard response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.293 The suspected reason(s) for the drop remain unknown but it is suspected that most of them are correlated in some way to PSIs, deficiencies in leadership, communication, and management, limited opportunities for learning specialized skills and participating in operational missions, administrative burden, and whether the benefits of volunteering outweigh the costs. The authors of the Auxiliary Business Plan 2006-2007 believe that the problem may involve a combination of the aforementioned as indicated by the account,

> Both Coast Guard and Auxiliary leaderships need to explain new Coast Guard and related Auxiliary missions/programs in maritime security and MDA carefully to reduce this confusion and capitalize on the possible attractiveness of these missions to increase member motivation, participation, and possibly member recruitment.294

Whatever the deterrents may be to Auxiliary membership retention and recruitment, it is critical that they be exposed and resolved quickly before the Coast Guard Auxiliary loses more members, further taxing the Coast Guard’s already strained and overworked personnel and resources.

B. COAST GUARD ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT SURVEY

The Organizational Assessment Survey (OAS) is a standardized Likert-scale survey used by many organizations comprised of 110 questions covering 17 core dimensions including Leadership and Quality, Training/Career Development, Innovation, Fairness, Treatment of Others, and others (see Appendix). These core questions are used


294 Ibid., 14.
to compare the Coast Guard organization to other Federal agencies. In addition to the core 110 questions, the Coast Guard OAS (CG-OAS) possesses 37 demographic questions and 46 tailored questions, which address Coast Guard-specific issues such as evaluations, working conditions, information services, and mentorship.\(^\text{295}\) The CG-OAS was last administered in the spring 2008 to all regular, reserve and civilian members of the Coast Guard. The CG-OAS was also given in 2002, 2004, and 2006. A CG-OAS was given in 1995 to approximately 6000 individuals but the analysis was not available until 1997 and not widely disseminated.\(^\text{296}\)

The OAS was originally designed with research on employee satisfaction and general organizational climate in the early 1990’s. According to Dr. Kudrick, “It was designed as a research instrument to analyze the factors that research shows relate to high-performance organizations.”\(^\text{297}\) The OAS has evolved over the years as indicated by Dr. Kudrick below:

Refinements in the OAS since 1996 have come primarily through psychometric research allowing us to re-organize the survey and to eliminate questions that seemed important in theory, but in practice didn’t tell us very much. Third, we’ve found over the years that the organizations we work with, in general, don’t care why the OAS works nearly as much as they care that it works. We can point to various theorists who will state that what the OAS measures has a demonstrated relationship to organizational performance, but I can’t remember the last time anyone’s asked us to, except in a general way…The survey’s gotten shorter and is psychometrically stronger. That means, we’ve eliminated questions that didn’t give us much useful information and we’ve re-organized the OAS’s 17 dimensions a bit. For instance, we took one survey item out of the “Innovation” dimension and moved it to the “Training/Career Development” dimension. Several years’ worth of data showed that the item related to the training dimension more strongly than the innovation dimension.”\(^\text{298}\)


\(^\text{296}\) Paul Redmond (Program Analyst and U.S. Coast Guard Human Resources Survey Coordinator), interview with author, June 30, 2008.


\(^\text{298}\) Ibid.
The CG-OAS is a voluntary and confidential survey administered online. Every two years, the CG-OAS is promulgated and advertised to the Coast Guard community using the Coast Guard Message System (CGMS). Additionally, marketing materials are available for distribution by units wishing to meet a 100% response rate. All results of the CG-OAS are collected, stored, and reported by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The Coast Guard cannot access personal responses. The CG-OAS requires approximately 30-45 minutes to complete and benefits from a 60% response rate. This is compared to the 6% response for the survey of Auxiliarists carried out by Commodore Morris in 2005 and described earlier in this document.

The purpose of the CG-OAS according to the 2008 Coast Guard-OAS Frequently Asked Questions Sheet is the following:

The CG Organizational Assessment Survey (CG-OAS) is designed to help the Coast Guard become a better service by providing a process by which CG people can tell their chain of command what they are thinking and feeling about their work, their lives, their careers and their relationship with the Coast Guard.

The results of the survey are provided to senior leadership of the Coast Guard for the purpose of assessing current levels satisfaction or dissatisfaction and to gain a better understanding of the issues and concerns affecting members and employees. Results from the CG-OAS have been used by Coast Guard leaders to modify policies and programs. The results of each CG-OAS are compared against results from previous years in order to determine if progress has been made to rectify issues from the past. This can be done accurately as the survey has largely remained unchanged over the years with

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only minor adjustments made to the survey questions. Furthermore, the CG-OAS does not possess open-ended questions, only close-ended questions ensuring that only data for quantitative analysis is collected.303

C. PROPOSED COAST GUARD AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT SURVEY

The U.S. Coast Guard systematically employs the CG-OAS, a proven assessment tool, to assess the working conditions and morale among active duty, reserve, and civilian employees. Unfortunately, active duty, reserve, and civilians comprise only three of the four components of “Team Coast Guard.” Why is a similar tool not used for the Coast Guard Auxiliary? According to Mr. Redmond, incorporating Auxiliarists into the CG-OAS was considered in 2002 but no action was ever taken to implement.304 Auxiliarists outnumber both reservists and civilians, yet causes for a declining membership remain unknown. If asked, theories and hypothetical guesses can be provided by just about any Auxiliary member or administrator. But, are they really known? Are senior Department of Homeland Security and Coast Guard leaders, as well as members of Congress, willing to fund initiatives and programs, especially those related to membership, based on educated guesses? The data analyzed above provides some indicators as to the issues facing the Auxiliary but there is no systematic, quantitative assessment tool in place to scientifically identify, track, and compare results for future generations of Auxiliarists.

No method currently exists which allows Auxiliary leadership or Coast Guard Auxiliary Program administrators to quantitatively assess the Auxiliary organization (i.e., morale, satisfaction with missions, membership dues, ability to raise funds for respective Flotillas, leadership, AUXDATA, AUXINFO, administrative burden, reimbursement, etc.). AUXDATA and AUXINFO is only as good as the data inputted into the database. There are numerous members who fail to properly log hours for missions performed into the system. Moreover, AUXDATA and AUXINFO do not track information related to


304 Paul Redmond (Program Analyst and U.S. Coast Guard Human Resources Survey Coordinator), interview with author, June 30, 2008.
retention and recruitment with the exception of membership numbers. As a District Director of Auxiliary, would it not be useful to know that Auxiliary members in your area of responsibility are having difficulty with reimbursements or 30% of your membership is seriously considering leaving the organization? Although several Coast Guard District Offices offer exit surveys to departing members in order to ascertain reasons why they are leaving the Auxiliary, this policy does nothing to keep this member from departing the organization. Moreover, what change can be instituted if the Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary never has the opportunity to review this data?

An amendment to this policy is in order. There is an existing mechanism for the distribution, collection, analysis, and reporting of survey results, there is an office with experienced employees in place with the time and expertise to administer the survey, and there are experts capable of designing Auxiliary-specific questions and removing those questions not applicable to the Auxiliary. With many of the significant obstacles towards the implementation of the Coast Guard Auxiliary OAS (CGA-OAS) already remediated, the decision is evident.

1. **Role of the Coast Guard Auxiliary Organization Assessment Survey**

As previously discussed, the CG-OAS is a feedback tool for Coast Guard leadership to determine the satisfied and the dissatisfied among active duty, reservists, and civilian members and employees. However, what processes are affected by this feedback tool? What processes would be measured through the implementation of a CGA-OAS? The question can be answered by looking at Robert Bennett’s Control Model as illustrated in Figure 17.
Bennett describes each block illustrated above as follows:

- **Needs** – What I want
- **Principles** – What I think will get me what I want
- **Rules** – The principle defined in specific terms
- **Behavior** – The rules applied in a particular situation or context
- **Results** – What happened because of the behavior or actions
- **Feedback** – Were the NEEDS met?

The Control Model can be used in many ways to achieve a desired result and to assess whether the result achieved the need. In the case of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the Control Model could be used to achieve a highly motivated, productive volunteer force. To meet this objective, needs, principles, rules, behavior, results, and feedback were assigned using the Control Model.

- **Needs** – Highly motivated, productive volunteer force
- **Principles** – Research studies have demonstrated that trust and organizational commitment (psychological contracts) are important to volunteers
- **Rules** – Build trust and commitment with volunteer force
- **Behavior** – Pursue initiatives to integrate volunteer force into Coast Guard missions

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306 Ibid., 61.
• **Results** – Increased volunteer commitment and productivity (possibly higher rates of retention and recruitment)

• **Feedback** – Was increased volunteer commitment and productivity observed? If not, why? If so, what initiatives worked? What initiatives failed? What processes need improvement? What processes have been beneficial and should be pursued further?

The Control Model is a basic, common-sense means to illustrate the goals and objectives for any organization. The Control Model also clearly shows that feedback, a critical component, is missing from the Auxiliary organization. Such feedback could be achieved through the implementation of a systematic survey to collect data to gauge member satisfaction.

2. **Refining the Coast Guard Organization Assessment Survey**

The CG-OAS survey now given to the Coast Guard regular, reservists and civilian employees could be readily adapted for use by the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Among the most important steps to refining the CG-OAS into an effective CGA-OAS is the institution of a focus group. This focus group must be composed of individuals knowledgeable of survey methods and the Auxiliary and its functions. This group should include at a minimum Dr. Tarl Roger Kudrick, Mr. Paul Redmond, additional psychologists (as needed), Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary, National Commodore of the Auxiliary, select District Directors of Auxiliary, active duty members, and active Auxiliarists (senior leadership and general membership). It is extremely important that Auxiliarists at the Flotilla level be included in this focus group to ensure “boots-on-the-ground” have an opportunity to communicate concerns and offer potential questions to effect change. This group would, over a few hours, remove questions not pertinent to the Auxiliary and suggest and design Auxiliary-specific questions for

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inclusion into the new CGA-OAS. All of the significant issues identified in the literature review (i.e., trust, training and learning opportunities, leadership, communication, information services, personnel services, administration, awards and recognition, etc.) are presently captured in the CG-OAS survey so only minor editing to the existing CG-OAS would be necessary. The majority of the work would be dedicated to devising new questions specifically relevant to volunteers as identified in the literature review and analysis of this paper.

A pretest of the CGA-OAS using 20-40 respondents from the Coast Guard Auxiliary would be appropriate immediately following the development of questions by the focus group. The pretest would be used to ensure the clarity, comprehensiveness, and acceptability of the survey questions to determine if modifications or changes needed to be made to the CGA-OAS prior to implementation. There would be no need to sample the respondents randomly for the pretest but it is important that chosen respondents represent the study’s general population. Consideration for the amount of time required to complete the survey should also be evaluated. Time is of particular importance as one could expect that volunteers would be appreciative of efficiency in any administrative function such as survey development and implementation. In most cases, only one pretest is required but others can be performed as necessary. Pending any modifications to survey questions, the CGA-OAS would be ready for implementation.

Beyond the creation of a new CGA-OAS is the need for a slight modification to the existing CG-OAS to include several questions on the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Specifically, questions which assess the perception and effectiveness of the Coast Guard Auxiliary should be incorporated into the CG-OAS to obtain opinions from Coast Guard active duty, reserve, and civilians. Other questions should be incorporated to ascertain the level of fundamental knowledge and understanding of active duty, reserve, and civilian Coast Guard members in matters related to the Auxiliary. This is of particular importance because no formal training is provided to active duty, reserve, or civilian

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members on the history, authority, organizational structure, roles, or capabilities of Coast Guard Auxiliarists. Without a basic understanding of the Auxiliary, it is unlikely that these Coast Guard members will consider using Auxiliarists to perform missions for which they are well-suited. Alternatively, it is possible that these same members unknowingly use Auxiliarists for unauthorized missions. Currently, there is no formalized method to gauge the level of familiarity of active duty, reserve, or civilians of the Coast Guard on the Auxiliary. The appropriate questions could be formulated by the same members of the CGA-OAS focus group.

3. Administration of Survey

It has been calculated that almost 80% of Coast Guard Auxiliarists have access to the Internet, whether via a personal computer or a Coast Guard Workstation III. Considering a population of 30,000 members, approximately 6,000 members would require a mailed survey with a self-addressed envelope to return the survey following completion. For this reason, the CGA-OAS would be administered electronically. That is, it would be posted online for Auxiliary members to complete. Members without Internet access would receive a mailed survey so not to be excluded. The CGA-OAS would be given every two years but not in the same years that the CG-OAS was administered. This would aid in the distribution of workload among OAS administrators and would provide active duty leaders the opportunity to encourage Auxiliarists attached to their units to participate in the survey.

It is anticipated that the CGA-OAS would be promulgated with a message released on the CGMS. Additionally, it would be expected that articles summarizing and describing the purpose and importance of the CGA-OAS could be placed in Coast Guard and Coast Guard Auxiliary publications and websites in order to maximize participation. To further encourage Auxiliarists to complete the survey, a $5 reduction in membership fees could be proposed for those who participate and tracked using membership numbers.

Administering the CGA-OAS at the District level is not feasible because of cost and logistics. Maintaining the CGA-OAS at the National level where a collection, analysis, and reporting framework has already been long established is cheaper and more efficient. Another advantage of administering the CGA-OAS at the National level is it permits senior Coast Guard and Coast Guard Auxiliary leadership and Program Analysts like Paul Redmond, the opportunity to review data at the macro level. Since data can be segmented by Areas, Districts, Sectors, Air Stations, and Stations, it adds little value to administer the survey at the District level.

4. Data Management and Dissemination

All results of the CGA-OAS should be collected, stored, and reported by OPM as it currently is for the CG-OAS. Similarly, the Coast Guard or Coast Guard Auxiliary should not have any opportunity to access personal responses. It is important that the survey data be handled and processed by impartial administrators to prevent the deletion or manipulation of data, and to ensure that the data can be compared with data from previous surveys in the future. The results of the survey must be placed in the hands of individuals capable of making policy and program decisions as the main objective of the CGA-OAS is the reduction or elimination of factors influencing members to leave the Auxiliary and to expose motivations, which influence members to join and remain in the organization. It is important, therefore, to provide a written report of the results to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary, District Directors of Auxiliary, and most importantly, Auxiliary leadership. It would be imperative that CGA-OAS results be published in Coast Guard Auxiliary magazines and posted electronically on the CGMS and on the Coast Guard Auxiliary website.


5. Potential Usefulness of Data

The benefits of the CG-OAS have been detected quantitatively according to Dr. Kudrick, “Benefits have been observed from following up on the results of the survey. Because the Coast Guard leadership see, take seriously, and react to OAS data, aspects of the Coast Guard experience have improved for Coast Guard members. I know that because the results of subsequent surveys tell me so.” The Coast Guard Leadership Advisory Council made use of the CG-OAS to develop the Coast Guard Leadership and Management School and Program Managers have used the results to perform special studies, monitor issues, and adjust policy. The impact of the CG-OAS should become more pronounced on future Coast Guard programs and policymaking as the amount of data generated from the survey increases and trends are identified.

It has been established that the Coast Guard Auxiliary serves as a force multiplier for the Coast Guard. It is imperative for the success of the Coast Guard that the Auxiliary remains a large, vibrant volunteer force to be used to supplement the regular, reserve, and civilian components of the Coast Guard. This survey, if properly designed and utilized, can provide invaluable information needed to reduce membership attrition and increase recruiting efforts of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Reducing sources of dissatisfaction will inevitably reduce attrition permitting the Auxiliary to function as a reliable and valuable resource for the Coast Guard.

6. Obstacles to Implementing Organizational Survey

As with any new initiative, there are obstacles, which must be addressed prior to implementation. A primary deterrent to conducting the CGA-OAS are the costs associated with the production, administration, and analysis of the survey. The potential cost would be minimal of $100,000 per administration every two years. However, this

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318 Paul Redmond (Program Analyst and U.S. Coast Guard Human Resources Survey Coordinator), interview with author, June 30, 2008.
amount takes into account a population of 30,000 members with approximately 80% of the membership having access to the internet with the remaining 6,000 members requiring a mailed survey. The $100,000 price tag amounts to $50,000 per year, approximately 0.07% of the $70 million dollars saved by the Coast Guard each year through work performed by the Auxiliary. A second obstacle is failing to follow up after survey results have been reported. This, according to Dr. Kudrick, can actually be more damaging to an organization than not doing a survey at all. This warning is summarized below:

It’s critical to understand that administering an OAS will hurt an organization unless that organization takes visible, meaningful action as a result of the survey’s findings. If you ask someone for their opinion, they’ll give it, but if they see that you never do anything with their opinions, they’ll stop giving them—and their opinion of the organization will get worse. That’s not speculation; we’ve seen it.\(^{320}\)

Yet, another obstacle is the truthfulness or accuracy of responses to survey questions. All surveys are subject to false positives, which can distort the results. Finally, the remaining dilemma is the possibility that some members of the Auxiliary and even of the Coast Guard will not wish to hear the reasons why individuals are dissatisfied with the organization. No one likes to be criticized. Nevertheless, the value of the Auxiliary, if only in monetary worth of the hours contributed by its members, clearly warrant the expenditure of funds to ensure the organization’s future existence and usefulness.

7. **Recommendations**

Based upon the facts and discussion noted above, the following recommendations are made:

- The Coast Guard, working through OPM, should administer a modified CGA-OAS to all Auxiliarists on a biannual basis. The CGA-OAS should not be administered in the same year as the CG-OAS.
- The survey should be administered by an entity independent of the Coast Guard and the Auxiliary, preferably OPM.

\(^{320}\) Dr. Tarl Roger Kudrick (Lead Personnel Research Psychologist with the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Human Resources Products and Services Division), interview with author, August 25, 2008.
Questions in the existing CG-OAS now administered to regular, reserve, and civilian members of the Coast Guard which are not applicable to the Auxiliary should be revised or deleted.

Questions specific to the Auxiliary should be produced and incorporated into the CGA-OAS. These questions should be devised through the use of a focus group including at a minimum Dr. Tarl Roger Kudrick, Mr. Paul Redmond, additional psychologists (as needed), Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary, National Commodore of the Auxiliary, select District Directors of Auxiliary, active duty members, and active Auxiliarists (senior leadership and general membership).

The CGA-OAS should be pretested with the 20-40 respondents representing the general Coast Guard Auxiliary membership to ensure clarity, comprehensiveness, and acceptability of the survey questions. Additionally, the time required to complete the CGA-OAS should also be evaluated.

The CGA-OAS should be administered online for Auxiliary members to complete. Members without Internet access would receive a mailed survey so not to be excluded. It is further recommended that the survey be advertised on the CGMS and articles summarizing and describing the purpose and importance of the CGA-OAS be placed in Coast Guard and Coast Guard Auxiliary publications and websites in order to maximize participation.

Questions relating to the perception and effectiveness of the Coast Guard Auxiliary should be incorporated into the CG-OAS to obtain opinions from Coast Guard active duty, reserve, and civilians. Other questions should be incorporated to gauge the level of fundamental knowledge and understanding of active duty, reserve, and civilian Coast Guard members in matters related to the Auxiliary. Such questions could be formulated by the CGA-OAS focus group.

The results and analysis of the survey should be provided to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Coast Guard Chief, Director of Auxiliary, District Directors of Auxiliary, and most importantly, Auxiliary leadership. It would be imperative that CGA-OAS results be published in Coast Guard Auxiliary magazines and posted electronically on the CGMS and on the Coast Guard Auxiliary website.

D. ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR THE FUTURE

This section describes significant issues for Coast Guard and Auxiliary leaders and policymakers to take into account as the Auxiliary approaches 70 years of existence. Issues such as recruiting, future roles and responsibilities, and proposed research are all discussed.
1. Recruiting

A well-conceived recruiting strategy is vital to sustaining a productive volunteer organization. However, according to Susan Ellis, founder and president of Energize, Inc., “If you are constantly recruiting new people because current volunteers are departing, stop recruiting until you have analyzed why retention is a problem.” Ellis’ book outlines key issues to aid volunteer administrators devise recruitment strategies specifically tailored to specific objectives of an organization. She also advocates the use of a survey or another equivalent assessment tool to identify trends affecting organizational members, arguing that understanding these trends will improve recruiting efforts. Querying new members having less than one year of experience to determine where they became aware of the volunteer organization, why they joined, or uncovering obstacles encountered in joining are all factors, which can help to improve a recruiting campaign.

Research noted in the literature review acknowledges the importance of recruiting and suggests that specific recruiting campaigns be organized to target potential volunteers seeking to fulfill (match) motives in line with those exuded by the organization. That is, members wishing to learn more about boating may volunteer with either the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary or the U.S. Power Squadron. What would make a volunteer choose one organization over another? Perhaps this volunteer is also a veteran and would like an opportunity to serve a military service. If so, the volunteer would likely opt for the Auxiliary. However, this same volunteer may not desire to wear a uniform or undergo a background check. In this case, the volunteer would likely join the U.S. Power Squadrons. Understanding the motivations, which the Coast Guard Auxiliary can fulfill and attempting to match these motives with volunteers is vitally important to recruiting.

Understanding generational attitudes is also important but generalizing massive groups of people and failing to target recruits based on researched motives could result in a loss of potential volunteers. Moreover, when we look at generational attitudes, are we

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322 Ibid., 42, 128-130, and 139-140.
not simply looking at motivational values? A 2006 Coast Guard Auxiliary Study, largely based on the views expressed in Putnam’s, *Bowling Alone*, is founded on the premise that the American public is not coming forth and volunteering as they have in the past.\(^{323}\) The data does not entirely support this premise. Americans are volunteering at record numbers although there has been a moderate decline since CY 2005; they simply are not looking to volunteer for the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Why? What processes are in place that are leading potential volunteers to devote their time elsewhere? Where are Auxiliarists recruiting? One potential hindrance to recruiting may be the result of the online version of America’s Boating Course (ABC). Traditional recruiting remains largely dependent on Safe Boating Courses offered by local Flotillas. With the implementation of ABC, face-time between Auxiliarists and the boating public has declined. Arguing that a desire to learn about boating is a fundamental motive for many Auxiliary volunteers, losing an opportunity to recruit new members who are interested in boating (whatever generation) may be having a significant impact, not to mention hindering a Flotilla’s ability to raise funds for other programs.

Research and reviews of other domestic and international volunteer organizations, including the 2006 Coast Guard Study, provide many good recommendations including expanding learning and training opportunities for members, offering flexibility in volunteer schedules, and expanding the use of the internet to stimulate social networks and improve communication.\(^{324}\) However, with these recommendations, the Coast Guard Auxiliary must also promote “its” message as described in Billeaudeux’s article, “The Importance of Telling Your Auxiliary Story.”\(^{325}\) Billeaudeux promotes the idea of *Right Audience* with the *Right Message* at the *Right Time* (3 R’s). It is firmly held that storytelling is a powerful and highly influential tool, which can be used to motivate or


convey complicated messages.\textsuperscript{326} The challenge is determining the right audience based on pre-identified motives, which only Auxiliary leaders and administrators can define. This initiative can be satisfied with the implementation of the CGA-OAS. Once these core motives have been identified, recruiting messages can be tailored and given to specific audiences. As studies have shown, tailored messages provided to nonvolunteers increased the likelihood for volunteering more than ambiguous, mismatched messages.\textsuperscript{327}

Finally, further research must be performed to identify potential volunteers (customers). This strategy is as important to volunteer management as it is to business. Identifying those who should or could be customers but are not for some minor reason is a vital component to the argument presented in \textit{Blue Ocean Strategy}.\textsuperscript{328} The authors consider these potential customers as noncustomers breaking them into three tiers. The first tier are noncustomers closest to your market, second tier are noncustomers who refuse to utilize your company’s offerings, and the third tier are noncustomers furthest from your market. Providing first tier noncustomers an alternative, perhaps a new or modified opportunity, these noncustomers will eagerly join your organization. These noncustomers can and should be considered to be an untapped resource. Drucker reinforces this philosophy as evident in this statement:

\begin{quote}
The most important person to research is the individual who should be the customer, the people who are believers but who have stopped going to church...But even if you have market leadership, noncustomers always outnumber customers. The most important knowledge is the potential customer. The customer who really needs the service, wants the service, but not in the way in which it is available today.\textsuperscript{329}
\end{quote}


The 2006 Coast Guard Auxiliary Study maintains that recruiting and retention in today’s volunteer organization is imprecise and extremely difficult. Nevertheless, efforts to recruit and retain Auxiliary members are made all the more difficult without reliable and verifiable data on existing and future members. As the report indicates, “The Auxiliary can’t rely on past recruiting practices to remain a viable and vital organization able to meet mission requirements.”

2. Role of the Coast Guard Auxiliary

The role of the Auxiliary was discussed extensively in both the 1977 Report entitled, Report of the Long-range Planning Board for the Coast Guard Auxiliary, and in the 1987 Report to Congress on the Coast Guard Auxiliary. The 1977 Report was incorporated into the 1987 Report as an enclosure. In both cases, the essential value of the Auxiliary was confirmed and specific missions were identified as both appropriate and desirable for the Auxiliary to perform. There was considerable agreement between both reports in terms of the missions in which the Auxiliary should be involved. However, the 1987 Report provided more detailed recommendations for each mission. Both reports agreed that the Auxiliary missions in Public Education, Program Visitor (formerly Marine Dealer Visitor program), and Vessel Examinations should be continued. From an operations standpoint, both reports defined roles for the Auxiliary in the following areas:

- Aids to Navigation: Observe and report deficiencies in Aids, transport Coast Guard personnel for repair of Aids;
- Search and Rescue: Respond with inspected boats, aircraft, and Auxiliary crew as directed by Coast Guard operational units, maintain Auxiliary readiness to respond, participate in combined SAR operations with Coast Guard and other responding entities;
- Port Security and Safety: Perform on-the-water and aerial patrols of ports and harbors, assist in training of Coast Guard members;

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331 Ibid., 30.
• Augmentation of Coast Guard Stations: Perform watchstanding and crew duties if Coast Guard qualified, function as Officer of the Day if qualified;
• Readiness Plans and Operations: Provide area familiarization for Coast Guard members; provide boats and aircraft for training Coast Guard members, assist with boats, crews and other personnel during emergency response operations, provide boats and crews for special event operations;
• Patrols on the water: Perform on-the-water safety patrols;
• Law Enforcement: Provide vessels and crews for training Coast Guard members, perform unobtrusive law enforcement observations, allow Auxiliarists to perform safety boardings of recreational boats, provide transportation and platforms for Coast Guard boarding parties.

While many of these missions are conducted by the Auxiliary, participation by the Auxiliary is by no means uniform throughout all Districts as a result of factors discussed in this document.332 Since the release of the 1987 Report, other operational missions have become available to Coast Guard Auxiliarists. Prevention (previously known as Marine Safety) provides the Auxiliary with many opportunities including commercial vessel, facility, and container inspections, pollution investigations, and harbor safety patrols.333 As described in the literature review, Auxiliarists also provide vital assistance in the validation process for Merchant Mariner credential applications and execute a slew of other missions incorporated into programs such as America’s Waterway Watch and Operation Patriot Readiness.

Despite the existing number of opportunities to volunteer, even greater opportunities could be made available to Auxiliarists, especially as additional responsibilities are allocated to the Coast Guard. These new possibilities require imagination;334 a characteristic which Drucker warns can become suppressed in volunteer organizations:

Non-profits are prone to become inward-looking. People are so convinced that they are doing the right thing, and are so committed to their cause, that they see the institution as an end in itself. But that’s a bureaucracy. Soon people in the organization no longer ask: Does it service our mission? They ask: Does it fit our rules? And that not only inhibits performance, it destroys vision and dedication.335

Permitting Auxiliarists to perform new missions first requires that some level of research be performed. This can be satisfied through case studies of existing volunteer organizations, survey research in the case of the proposed CGA-OAS, interviews with longstanding Coast Guard and Auxiliary members, historical use of volunteers to fulfill a similar mission requirement, a legal review, and a cost analysis to determine if using volunteers are truly cost-effective option as opposed to using paid employees to perform the task. Keeping in mind that laws, regulations, policies, and organizational attitudes are capable of being modified to accommodate evolving circumstances, and that it is generally in the best interest of any organization, especially one that is voluntary, to pursue opportunities for continuous improvement, it is critically important that Coast Guard and Auxiliary leadership remain receptive to innovative solutions which promote competiveness in the volunteer market. This will foster a climate promoting greater number and diverse training and operational opportunities for Auxiliary members. Some of these options are discussed in the future research section of this paper.

3. Future Research

The benefits of volunteer research will become increasingly important as the demands and responsibilities of organizations grow, especially federal, state, and local agencies conducting and overseeing homeland security missions. Whether responding to a terrorist attack or emergency catastrophe, the need for volunteers is always present. The Coast Guard Auxiliary is a unique volunteer organization as it is the only one of its kind nestled within a military agency and dependent almost entirely on Coast Guard funding to function. The Auxiliary has proven its worth since 1939 and remains a productive workhorse for the Coast Guard. The implementation of upcoming

uninspected towing vessels and Transportation Worker Identification Credential requirements will increase the vessel inspection and marine casualty investigation workload significantly. The burden of even greater homeland security and operational responsibilities further tax Coast Guard crews and push antiquated surface and air assets to their limits. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Coast Guard to meet its mission objectives with current personnel and asset resource shortfalls. Making matters worse, future funding remains uncertain with the upcoming change of Presidential Administration. Will the Coast Guard continue to grow with its laundry list of new responsibilities? If not, who will perform the missions? If so, can the Coast Guard, with its current allocation of funding and approved number of billets, be able to meet its mission workload or are these newly acquired resources just going to fill longstanding gaps, which were desperately needed years ago?

Nobody can predict the future and, for this reason, the Coast Guard should be prepared. After all, the motto for the Coast Guard is *Semper Paratus* or “Always Ready.” Research to create a more efficient and productive volunteer force should be initiated without haste. Preparedness and seizing opportunities to learn the *unknown* reinforces resiliency while simultaneously minimizing the impact of unforeseen events.336 Below is a list of potential areas for future research. However, by no means is an all encompassing list.

- As organizational factors, including leadership and communication, were sources of dissatisfaction, it would be appropriate to conduct further studies of the Auxiliary organization to identify potential obstacles to Auxiliary membership retention. Such a study was conducted recently resulting in the renaming of several Auxiliary leadership positions and the creation of the Auxiliary Sector Coordinator (ASC).337 The ASC position may improve communication and relationships with active duty, reserve, and civilian members of the Coast Guard. However, the nature and effectiveness of this position should be monitored and evaluated in the

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future. Additional organizational shifts to consider would be attaching Auxiliarists involved in air operations to Coast Guard Air Stations rather than Auxiliary Flotillas (similar to the Civil Air Patrol).

- Arguably, the most critical need for study is discovering new approaches that would apportion greater funding to the Auxiliary for training, fuel, and equipment for the purpose of conducting air and water patrols to strengthen security layers called for by our national leaders. Eliminating superfluous offices or positions, wasteful or redundant processes, and unlocking opportunities to allow Flotillas to raise or receive funding would support the purchase of equipment and greater numbers of patrols. More funding will be needed to compensate for rising fuel costs to conduct patrols, as well as rising bills to insure, maintain, and heat/cool Flotilla buildings. Admiral Allen has convincingly fought for and received unprecedented funding for Coast Guard and Coast Guard Auxiliary missions. It is imperative that the Auxiliary, particularly Flotillas, be allocated greater funding in order to cover expenses related to mission critical activities.

A chief objective of the Auxiliary is to remain self-sufficient, especially with the maintenance and upkeep of its Flotilla buildings. The means by which Flotillas fulfill this objective is raising money through its educational outreach and fundraising programs. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard has imposed restrictions that severely limit how money can be raised. Methods used in the past such as car washes and raffles are now prohibited. A Central Florida Flotilla recently learned that it will cost approximately $3000 to replace the rotted wood floor in its Flotilla building. Due to fundraising restrictions and difficulties associated with obtaining Coast Guard financial support, Flotilla members had to pay out-of-pocket to purchase materials to rebuild the floor. Moreover, boating safety classes, which constitute a majority of Flotillas’ educational outreach programs, have been undermined by DVDs of the Auxiliary’s Boating Safety Class, which are sold online. The profits made from the online sale remain at the National level for use in other initiatives instead of being sent to Flotillas where funding is needed. Without donations or fundraising capabilities, Flotillas around the country could be forced to shut down, unable to cover building maintenance fees, rising member dues, replacement of old lifesaving and personal protection equipment, purchase of vessel patrol signs, and expenses linked to other exigent circumstances. New technology has permitted the expansion for the delivery of boating safety courses and related materials online, and failing to take advantage of this tool would only hinder innovative practices. However, such practices cannot be instituted to the detriment of the organization.
• Investigate the potential issues or obstacles preventing time spent by regular Coast Guard members on Auxiliary facilities from counting toward the hours required to meet operational currencies, particularly for area familiarization. In most cases, Auxiliarists possess far more knowledge of any given operational area because that is where they live. Making this time count for active duty members could potentially promote the concept of “Team Coast Guard” and free Coast Guard standard small boats for other missions.

• Consider performing a cost analysis and feasibility study to determine if allocating full-time billets at the Sector level would promote greater use of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Currently, Auxiliary Liaison Officer (AUXLO) positions are typically nothing more than a collateral duty, usually staffed by an inexperienced junior officer. Because junior officers are focused on learning primary duties and earning qualifications, little time is spent working with Auxiliary members or attending functions. This results in the Auxiliary becoming, “out of sight, out of mind.” Would this position be better suited with a full-time position and staffed by an experienced officer such as a Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander? This billet could drastically improve communication between District Offices and Flotillas, foster relationships between Sectors and Flotillas, entice increased Auxiliary volunteerism and recruiting efforts, and demonstrate the critical importance of the Auxiliary to the successful completion of everyday Coast Guard missions. In this case, would recruiting several hard working, conscientious Auxiliarists within each Sector return the Coast Guard’s full-time billet allocation investment?

• Consider researching and expanding the implementation of Web 2.0 technology to promote social networks and communication among Auxiliary members nationwide. Coast Guard District Thirteen has employed The Maritime Information Initiative powered and hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School. LCDR Michael Billeaudeaux, Director of Auxiliary, Coast Guard District Thirteen, is assessing the value of this forum in sharing information among Auxiliarists and Citizen’s Action Network volunteers on the west coast of the U.S. Such a paradigm could be used to aid in recruiting, fill crucial gaps in Coast Guard missions, pass timely information to Auxiliary members, and nurture relationships (fellowship) among Auxiliarists living thousands of miles apart. The Maritime Information Initiative has the potential to revolutionalize the Auxiliary organization and provide those subjected to time poverty an opportunity to volunteer, even if it is only performed online (i.e., expert advice, translators, web design, drafting correspondence, statisticians, etc.).

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Auxiliary recruiting efforts are essential to the future success of the Coast Guard. In addition to the recommended research on this topic discussed above, the Coast Guard should also consider assisting Auxiliary recruitment efforts by providing an annual report outlining specific organizational deficits in operational, technical, and educational expertise (e.g., professional gun range masters to provide training to Coast Guardsmen for qualification on the Sig-Sauer .40 Caliber pistol). A targeted recruitment strategy will enable Auxiliarists to focus efforts in specific geographic locations and professions instead of wasting valuable volunteer hours seeking potential members using unapprised criteria. This strategy will preclude the Coast Guard from the need to fund the education of an active duty member or outsource to third-parties in order to accomplish specialized tasks. The opportunity for the Coast Guard to conserve budgeted funds using an Auxiliary targeted recruitment strategy is very promising.

Investigate the potential of expanding the authority of the Coast Guard Auxiliary to include basic law enforcement. Similar to volunteer organizations that provide law enforcement training to volunteers and permit them to carry out law enforcement missions with other qualified full-time employees, Coast Guard Auxiliarists could be used to perform recreational boating safety boardings in non-threatening environments with other qualified active duty Coast Guardsmen. This initiative could attract younger members or members already possessing law enforcement training to the Auxiliary. Similar to the Israeli Civil Guard, another potential gain might include an expansion for recruitment of young volunteer members who may otherwise have never joined the Coast Guard.

It is recommended that further study be conducted to measure the level of knowledge of Auxiliary authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities held by active duty, reserve, and civilian members and employees. Enhancing awareness of the Auxiliary among active duty, reserve, and civilians is likely to increase the likelihood that Auxiliarists will be utilized in future Coast Guard missions. Implementing annual training for all Coast Guard members should also be considered.

It would be wise for other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies, as well as governmental or private institutions existing outside DHS, using or desiring to use volunteers to further study the value and implementation of a standardized organizational survey assessment tool.

Because many people join the Auxiliary to gain specialized training, it could be helpful to bolster the Member Training cornerstone by enhancing class offerings and by making training more accessible and cost-free to members. Some potential avenues to explore in the arena of Member Training include:
• The development of short courses in topics of interest (such as Navigation Rules, chart-reading, Global Positioning System concepts, and radar use) to assist in maintaining interest in the Auxiliary;

• Updating and expanding all AUXOP courses, and providing hard copy study materials to all students, and;

• Allowing Auxiliary members with specialized skills (i.e., lawyer, vessel surveyor of recreational vessels, police investigator, judge, environmental science, etc.) to attend Marine Inspection, Casualty Investigation, and Waterways Management courses at Training Center (TRACEN) Yorktown, Virginia for the purpose of augmenting units lacking these resources. Other potential courses could include Commercial Fishing Vessel Examiner (CFVE) or Uninspected Towing Vessel (UTV) Courses in order to learn regulatory requirements to assist the inspection of CFVs and UTWs (soon to be inspected). Auxiliarists can use this knowledge to augment Sector Inspection Divisions and help maintain consistency among port stakeholders, an on-going dilemma faced by the Prevention Program today. In this case, the Coast Guard could also establish formalized courses at TRACEN Yorktown that cover information related to the OPR Program to fill critical gaps in waterside and landside patrols. Doing so will accelerate the learning process for Auxiliarists advancing their understanding of fundamental OPR Program knowledge such as regulations linked to Coast Guard jurisdictional authority and limitations, Ports and Waterways Safety Act, Refuge Act, Oil Pollution Control Act, safety and security zones, recreational and commercial vessels, waterfront facilities, bridges, as well as other information. A secondary advantage of formalized training is minimized disruption to active duty personnel actively engaged in Coast Guard operations. Time that would have been spent training Auxiliarists will be spent doing the job.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. OVERVIEW

The original intent of this thesis was to identify predominant reasons for the declining membership in the Coast Guard Auxiliary and to recommend potential strategies to reverse the trend. It was assumed that the Auxiliary already possessed some universal mechanism to identify, track, and mitigate factors causing members to leave the organization. Research into the problem found that no such mechanism exists and, surprisingly, there is no plan to implement any type of system in the future. This finding resulted in a combination of amendments to the questions contained in this thesis, recognizing that the problem was far more complex than originally anticipated. Instead of picking up at an intermediate stage, this thesis commenced at an elementary stage, describing the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Auxiliary and compiling historical studies related to Auxiliary membership, existing research on volunteer retention and recruiting, and smart practices employed by other relevant volunteer organizations. Additionally, different datasets from several studies and a survey were compiled, compared, and found to yield insights into potential factors causing members to both join and leave the Auxiliary. However, inconsistencies among the datasets and the inability for direct comparison resulted in limitations in the conclusions to be drawn from the datasets. Realizing that a rigorous scientific analysis would be restricted with existing data, this thesis evolved once more to incorporate the possibility of implementing a process by Coast Guard and Auxiliary leaders could accurately detect membership trends. In the end, through interviews and a review of a proven survey tool, this research produced a viable and inexpensive recommendation to construct a consistent data stream from which to base future decisions on Auxiliary membership and programs.

B. REVIEW OF THESIS QUESTIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE

This section summarizes the details and significance of each research question for clarity and purpose.
What is the current status of Auxiliary membership as compared to other national volunteer service organizations?

Membership in the Coast Guard Auxiliary is on the decline when compared with the national volunteer rates, as well as membership levels in the Civil Air Patrol (CAP). Despite the waning membership, the Auxiliary is faring better than membership in the U.S. Power Squadrons (USPS). The fact that the volunteer rate for the Auxiliary is lower than it is nationally demonstrates that Americans are volunteering; they are simply not volunteering for the Auxiliary in the same numbers as in years past. What is most alarming is the rate of decline since 2003 (20.61%). Also, the 1987 Coast Guard Report to Congress estimated that 48,000 Auxiliarists would be necessary by the year 2000 for the Coast Guard to prosecute its missions effectively. Although this might be an easy statistic to dismiss, it should be noted that this estimation was conceived without knowledge of the 9/11 attacks and the additional safety and security missions now planned and executed by the Coast Guard. Moreover, Auxiliary membership in 2008 is far below the figure of 48,000 believed necessary by 2000.

Knowing that Auxiliary membership is faring better than the USPS but worse than the CAP provides a vital platform for comparison. That is, what is the CAP and USPS doing that is helping to retain its membership and what is not being done which could be enhancing retention efforts? Perhaps it has nothing to do with administration of the volunteer force but everything to do with the type(s) of mission, costs for joining and remaining a member, learning and operational opportunities, etc. Both organizations have been successful throughout the years and, for this reason, much can be learned from each.

What mechanism does the Coast Guard presently employ to identify trends in Auxiliary membership for retention and recruitment?

This thesis revealed that there has not been any systematic, quantitative survey to assess the working conditions and morale of the Coast Guard Auxiliary members, to develop strategies to reverse the downward trend of membership attrition, or to improve recruiting tactics. The primary sources of data collected since the Auxiliary was founded in 1939 include surveys performed in 2005-2007 by Commodore Charles G. (Tony) Morris, a membership report to Congress on the Auxiliary in 1987, and a limited number
of exit surveys collected by Coast Guard District Thirteen from 2001-2008. None of this information was widely disseminated nor was it analyzed in relation to membership data from other large service-oriented volunteer organizations. The end result is that there is no systematically collected quantitative data available on the reason(s) that members leave the Auxiliary. On the basis of the limited data, the reasons for the Auxiliary membership trends remain vaguely defined, but most of them are correlated in some way to the following factors: the recent requirement for Personnel Security Investigations, deficiencies in leadership, communication, management, limited opportunities for learning specialized skills and participating in operational missions, administrative burden, and costs for volunteering versus the benefits. Because of the Auxiliary’s critical role in supporting the Coast Guard, it is important to identify the reasons for the observed decline in Auxiliary membership in order that ameliorative measures can be implemented to restore the Auxiliary to its former strength.

• What measure(s) could be instituted to prevent or mitigate future losses in Auxiliary membership while effectively recruiting new members?

To develop a strategy to stem the loss of Auxiliary members, a tool is needed to identify quantitatively the motivations of those who join the Auxiliary and, at the same time, reveal the trends responsible for a declining membership. Strategies might include, but are not limited to, expanding operational and training opportunities in certain mission areas, consider payback requirements for Auxiliarists who receive specialized training, targeting and providing incentives to younger members who volunteer (i.e., expedited process for joining the Coast Guard should they choose to do so, waiving membership dues and/or help with uniform costs, etc.), revising and expanding authoritative restrictions imposed on Auxiliarists permitting physically fit and properly trained members the opportunity to participate in greater mission areas, providing the Auxiliary, specifically Flotillas, the ability to raise funds within the ethical standards of the Coast Guard, aligning the Auxiliary organizational structure with the Coast Guard’s new Sector construct, allocating a full-time, seasoned commissioned officer (promotable) billet to Coast Guard Sectors for the purpose of enhancing communication and utilization of Auxiliary resources, and instituting annual Coast Guard-wide training on the Auxiliary.
Although there are other areas for consideration, it is crucial that these types of decisions, which could adversely affect the Coast Guard by way of funding, personnel, resources, and public scrutiny if not implemented properly, be founded on reliable data.

In order to accumulate reliable data, it must not only be collected over time but using a systematic and scientifically accepted method. Fortunately, such a tool already exists. Within the Coast Guard organization, a proven tool is utilized to assess cultural status of the Coast Guard in terms of member satisfaction, career goals, personal goals, and organizational effectiveness. That tool is the Coast Guard Organizational Assessment Survey, a survey developed and administered by the Office of Personnel Management. The Office, an autonomous organization from the Coast Guard, distributes the survey every two years to active duty, reserve, and civilian members of the Coast Guard but not to Auxiliary members. Modified specifically for the Auxiliary, the data-gathering tool now used by all other components of the Coast Guard organization would be an effective means for use in developing strategies to reverse the current declining trend in Auxiliary membership while promoting volunteer recruitment.

C. FINAL THOUGHTS

The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary performs vital services to the U.S. Coast Guard in virtually every mission area. Currently comprised of approximately 28,000 members, the Auxiliary has experienced significant peaks and declines in membership during several periods in its almost 70-year history. Particularly since 2003, Auxiliary membership has decreased to one of the lowest levels since reliable records have been maintained (1970). Because of the Auxiliary’s important roles in assisting the Coast Guard and because the Coast Guard itself is understaffed, it is critical to identify ways to increase Auxiliary membership and capitalize upon the personnel resources contained in the Auxiliary.

This research proposes the implementation of a relatively inexpensive national survey to identify membership trends in the Auxiliary for the purpose of bolstering the retention and recruiting efforts of the Auxiliary. A survey template and the processes for the administration, collection, analysis, and reporting of survey data already exist within
the Coast Guard. Moreover, the survey has already proven to be an important tool to Coast Guard leadership in managing its active duty, reserve, and civilian workforces. Insofar as the future effectiveness of the Auxiliary is concerned, the next step is a commitment to devote resources to this proposal in some form and a willingness to accept organizational change. According to Fixler, Eichberg, and Lorenz, “organizational change happens in three stages: letting go of old ways of doing business, a transitional phase, and an integration of new practices.”339

Further study of innovative volunteer management practices and recruitment strategies must be pursued to improve and strengthen the ranks of the Coast Guard Auxiliary on a continuing basis. Jim Collins, in his book entitled, *Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap…and Others Don’t*, offers the following:

> Perhaps your quest to be part of building something great will not fall in your business life. But find it elsewhere. If not in corporate life, then perhaps in making your church great. If not there, then perhaps a non-profit, or a community organization, or a class you teach. Get involved in something that you care so much about that you want to make it the greatest it can possibly be, not because of what you will get, but just because it can be done…For in the end, it is impossible to have a great life unless it is a meaningful life. And it is very difficult to have a meaningful life without meaningful work. Perhaps, then, you might gain that rare tranquility that comes from knowing that you’ve had a hand in creating something of intrinsic excellence that makes a contribution. Indeed, you might even gain that deepest of all satisfactions: knowing that your short time here on this earth has been well spent, and that it mattered.340

The Coast Guard Auxiliary is that meaningful organization described above, which all who are involved can strive to improve, knowing with utmost confidence that their efforts do matter and they will have a positive impact on the lives of others. A properly trained and ready volunteer force could prove invaluable should the U.S. sustain

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a future terrorist attack, an assault from a foreign power, or a devastating natural disaster. Community policing and citizenry involvement will foster resiliency among U.S. citizens, just as occurred during WWII when German U-boats cruised offshore in the Atlantic and the Auxiliary together with private citizens stood watch over our shores.
# APPENDIX

## DISTRICT THIRTEEN EXIT SURVEY DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How long were you a member of the Auxiliary?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 Year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 and under 3 Years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 and under 5 Years</td>
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<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 and under 7 Years</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 7 Years</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>Total Survey Response</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>2. Were you a Vessel Examiner?</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Were you an Instructor or Aide?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Did you patrol as Covswain, Pilot, Crew or Observer?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Did you hold an elected office during your Auxiliary Career?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Did you hold an appointed staff office?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Have you completed any of the Specialty Courses for AUXOP?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>7a. Course completed. (NOTE: More than one selected)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weather</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>Sailing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seamanship</td>
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<td>Patrols</td>
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<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Why did you join the Auxiliary? (NOTE: More than one selected)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach (Instruct)</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty (Patrol)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learn Specialized Skills</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoy Boating</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camaraderie</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in Operational Missions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER (Cook for Active Duty Members)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Did the Auxiliary satisfy your reasons for joining?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. Reasons, if no? (NOTE: More than one selected)</td>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>Percent of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too Military</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Recognition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burdensome Administrative Work</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too Expensive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Ability to Perform Operational Missions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule Conflicts</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired Greater Learning Opportunities (specialized skills)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. During your Auxiliary career, what one thing can you think of that most “turned members off”?</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too Military</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Military Enough (lack of structure)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too Many Meetings</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burdensome Admin (Orders, Reimbursement, Policies, AUXDATA, Web Access, etc.)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too Expensive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Requirements</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired Greater Learning Opportunities (specialized skills)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Leadership</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Recognition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Need By Active Duty Coast Guard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Access to Coast Guard Facilities (security measures)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Mentorship</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unfriendly Members</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. What one thing can you think of that most “turned members on”? (NOTE: More than one selected)</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camaraderane</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Learn Specialized Skills</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Teach/Instruct</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Perform Operational Missions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Duty and Accomplishment (patriotism)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Work with Active Duty Coast Guard</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. From your point of view, what changes should be made in the Auxiliary that would be the greatest benefit to recruiting and retaining members? (NOTE: More than one selected)</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better Leadership</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Relationship with Active Duty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Recognition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burdensome Administration (Orders, Un timely Reimbursement, Policies, AUXDATA, etc.)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Opportunity to Perform Operational Missions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superfluous Training (TCI, Sexual Harassment, etc.)</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mentoring Program</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target Younger Members</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Relations (Exposure)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Military</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Military</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. If you have other comments or suggestions, we would appreciate having you state them here:</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaving the Auxiliary For Health Reasons</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving the Auxiliary Because of Move to Another State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving the Auxiliary for Personal Reasons (illness, poverty, financial, other interests, volunteer elsewhere, etc.)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving the Auxiliary due to Poor Experiences (leadership, unfriendly members, paperwork, etc)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
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### U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Membership Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>30,221</td>
<td>30,607</td>
<td>32,594</td>
<td>34,224</td>
<td>41,008</td>
<td>43,944</td>
<td>38,165</td>
<td>37,587</td>
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<tr>
<td>37,348</td>
<td>37,201</td>
<td>35,715</td>
<td>35,405</td>
<td>34,667</td>
<td>33,904</td>
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<tr>
<td>30,472</td>
<td>32,400</td>
<td>32,383</td>
<td>33,464</td>
<td>34,986</td>
<td>34,432</td>
<td>34,863</td>
<td>34,635</td>
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<td>34,698</td>
<td>33,944</td>
<td>33,644</td>
<td>32,943</td>
<td>32,780</td>
<td>32,876</td>
<td>32,950</td>
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<tr>
<td>35,375</td>
<td>36,101</td>
<td>30,387</td>
<td>30,179</td>
<td>29,134</td>
<td>28,635</td>
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### National Volunteer Data (In Thousands)

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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>59,163</td>
<td>59,783</td>
<td>63,791</td>
<td>64,542</td>
<td>65,357</td>
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### Civil Air Patrol Membership Data (Only Seniors)

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>36,367</td>
<td>37,415</td>
<td>35,124</td>
<td>34,937</td>
<td>35,271</td>
<td>36,404</td>
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<td>37,668</td>
<td>40,024</td>
<td>41,669</td>
<td>41,605</td>
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<td>40,991</td>
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<td>42,331</td>
<td>40,151</td>
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<td>34,551</td>
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<td>33,353</td>
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<td>35,991</td>
<td>35,209</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>33,492</td>
<td>33,697</td>
<td>34,521</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### U.S. Power Squadrons Membership Data

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>52,309</td>
<td>53,189</td>
<td>54,776</td>
<td>56,709</td>
<td>58,563</td>
<td>60,787</td>
<td>61,601</td>
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<td>61,491</td>
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<td>57,971</td>
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<td>53,112</td>
<td>52,336</td>
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<td>52,480</td>
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<td>50,083</td>
<td>47,965</td>
<td>46,868</td>
<td>44,670</td>
<td>42,574</td>
<td>40,673</td>
</tr>
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# Definitions of Organizational Assessment Survey (OAS) Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rewards/Recognition</td>
<td>Rewards are diverse, related to organizational values, linked to performance, and perceived as fair by employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Training/Career Development</td>
<td>Employees are provided with continuous education and learning opportunities for effective job performance and career development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Innovation</td>
<td>Creativity and risk-taking in adapting to change are encouraged and rewarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Customer Orientation</td>
<td>Employees are empowered to provide high-quality products and services, while soliciting feedback necessary to respond to customer needs and expectations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Leadership and Quality</td>
<td>Management promotes continuous improvement by setting performance goals and communicating the mission, vision, and values of the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fairness and Treatment of Others</td>
<td>The rights of all employees to a fair and respectful work environment are protected by promoting equal access to training and career development and providing a fair dispute resolution system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Communication</td>
<td>There is free exchange of information upward, downward, and horizontally to meet the need for effective performance and mission accomplishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Employee Involvement</td>
<td>Organizational emphasis is placed on involvement and participation in work design and decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Use of Resources</td>
<td>Necessary resources, including well-trained employees, are available and allocated to ensure effective performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Work Environment</td>
<td>Physical harm in the workplace is prevented through facilities that are conducive to safe and effective work, along with programs that encourage good health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Work and Family/Personal Life</td>
<td>Flexible work schedules, leave, and other programs and policies that help employees balance work, family, and personal life needs are supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Teamwork</td>
<td>Teamwork is encouraged within units and across functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMENSION</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. <strong>Readiness to Reshape Workforce</strong></td>
<td>There is commitment to the morale and effectiveness of employees by emphasizing job security and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. <strong>Strategic Planning</strong></td>
<td>With an orientation toward the future, organizational leaders monitor and respond to the realities and requirements of the external environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. <strong>Performance Measures</strong></td>
<td>Information is regularly collected on employee and organizational performance and used for benchmarking, standard setting, and quality improvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. <strong>Diversity</strong></td>
<td>Differences in employee backgrounds, perspectives, and attitudes are valued by embracing programs that promote tolerance and equal opportunity across the broadest ethnic, racial, religious, gender, and cultural groupings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. <strong>Supervision</strong></td>
<td>Supervisors clearly communicate goals, priorities, and standards, provide constructive feedback and guidance, and give fair performance evaluations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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