ARMY RESERVE: AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE 21ST CENTURY OPERATIONAL FORCE

BY

COLONEL DAVID W. SPENCE
United States Army Reserve

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
Army Reserve: An Integral Part of the 21st Century Operational Force

Colonel David W. Spence, USAR

Culminating the first 100 years of its unique history, the Army Reserve has experienced an unprecedented and profound mobilization, operational tempo (OPTEMPO), and transformation while supporting the Army in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Over six years of continuous deployments and sustained combat operations have severely stretched and stressed the nation’s ground forces, including the Army Reserve. When the 2008 election ends, the political landscape will change again of course, and the Army Reserve, while now in the midst of transforming itself to an operational force, will undoubtedly find itself existing and functioning within the context of altered, if not new, policy and strategies that will affect how the Army continues to prosecute “the long war” - and perhaps with a severely constrained budget. Moreover, after military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan eventually end and military forces are subsequently withdrawn, the Army Reserve will need putting back together along with the rest of the Army. However, will we place the Army Reserve back on the proverbial shelf to become a strategic reserve of last resort again or continue using it as a valued and effective operational force for the next hundred years?
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Colonel David W. Spence
United States Army Reserve

Dr. Harry Fair
Program Adviser
The University of Texas at Austin

Disclaimer

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the Army and Army Reserve future force plans, senior leader vision, Army Reserve history, structure, transformation, modernization, deployment and employment, and funding. It attempts to make some judgments on relevant policies and strategies and make actionable recommendations on the future of the Army Reserve.

Culminating the first 100 years of its unique history, the Army Reserve has experienced an unprecedented and profound mobilization, operational tempo (OPTEMPO), and transformation while supporting the Army in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Over six years of continuous deployments and sustained combat operations have severely stretched and stressed the nation’s ground forces, including the Army Reserve. When the 2008 election ends, the political landscape will change again of course, and the Army Reserve, while now in the midst of transforming itself to an operational force, will undoubtedly find itself existing and functioning within the context of altered, if not new, policy and strategies that will affect how the Army continues to prosecute “the long war” - and perhaps with a severely constrained budget. Moreover, after military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan eventually end and military forces are subsequently withdrawn, the Army Reserve will need putting back together along with the rest of the Army. However, will we place the Army Reserve back on the proverbial shelf to become a strategic reserve of last resort again or continue using it as a valued and effective operational force for the next hundred years?
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“They’re volunteer Soldiers; they’re volunteer Families; they’re proud of who they are, and they’re proud of what they do. We all are inspired by their service and humbled by their sacrifice.” – Secretary of the Army Peter Geren

Introduction

Culminating the first 100 years of its unique history, the United States Army Reserve (USAR) has experienced an unprecedented and profound mobilization, operational tempo (OPTEMPO), and transformation while supporting the Army in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Over six years of continuous deployments and sustained combat operations have severely stretched and stressed the nation’s ground forces, including the Army Reserve. When the 2008 election ends, the political landscape will change again. The Army Reserve, while now in the midst of transforming itself to an operational force, will undoubtedly find itself existing and functioning within the context of altered, if not brand new, policy and strategies that will affect how the Army continues to prosecute “the long war” - and perhaps with a severely constrained budget. After military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan eventually end and military forces are subsequently withdrawn, the Army Reserve will need putting back together along with the rest of the Army. However, will we place the Army Reserve back on the proverbial shelf to become a “strategic reserve” of last resort again or continue using it as a valued and effective operational force for the next hundred years?

On the eve of the 100th birthday of the USAR, the process of transforming itself from a strategic reserve to an operational force is gaining some momentum. It is a big job and much easier said than done. During a recent town hall meeting at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, Lieutenant General (LTG) Jack C. Stultz, Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) and Commanding General (CG), United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), using a rather benign analogy, equated the process and difficulty of transforming the Army Reserve while at war to changing the sparkplugs in an automobile while driving down the freeway at sixty miles per hour. Well, if there is anyone who does not know a single thing about changing the sparkplugs in a vehicle, they should certainly understand that it
would be an extremely challenging, risky, and seemingly impossible proposition to do on
the move, with the motor running…something no one is ever likely to try. In the case of
transforming to an operational force, though, it is a difficult task that must be done on the
go, and the Army Reserve is doing it in full stride while actively supporting the Army in
the GWOT. So what does *operationalize* mean?

Operationalizing the Army Reserve means changing it from a force traditionally
considered a force of last resort (strategic reserve) to one that immediately contributes to
military operations and early success (operational reserve). Historically, a strategic
reserve is one that deploys very late in a contingency, after conducting extensive and
intensive post-mobilization training and equipping, to replace or augment active-duty
forces. A modern operational force is intended to be a more responsive, ready, and
capable expeditionary force that deploys much sooner and fights shoulder-to-shoulder
with the active Army and/or joint force to meet the needs of a combatant commander.³

The reserve operational force complements, rather than supplements, the active force, as
explained in a recent briefing from the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR):

During the Cold War, the Reserve Components were mobilized as an exception.
The Army Reserve, which was then comprised of combat arms, combat support
and combat service support units, supplemented the active Army with like-units
for similar missions. Since September 11, 2001, the mobilization of Reserve
Components has become the norm. Yet now, the Army Reserve is made up
primarily of combat support and combat service support units. This unique
composition allows the Army Reserve to provide skill-rich capabilities that
complement the active Army in the joint and expeditionary fight.⁴

But just as our experience has taught us that most military operations are hard to
execute, this too will not be easy to do. The old school of thought was that the Army
Reserve forces would be temporarily mobilized, employed to augment or replace the
active Army forces, and then when no longer needed, demobilized and not called on
again for a very long time: one and done. The new school of thought is that the Army
will repeatedly call on the Army Reserve over a much shorter period and perhaps
numerous times for the same contingency or emergency operation. Units and Soldiers of
the modern Army Reserve mobilize to complete the active Army force requirements,
demobilize, reset, and then do it all over again on a predictable, rotational basis. Without
implementing serious and deep reforms, sustaining such a capability will be an enormous
challenge that will prove most difficult and perhaps impossible to accomplish. This is a significant paradigm shift for the future Army Reserve, but change is nothing new to the Army Reserve, as recorded history shows.

**The First 100 Years**

Although the antecedents and heritage of the Army Reserve are found as far back as the French and Indian War (1756 - 1763), today’s Army Reserve traces its official beginning to April 23, 1908, when Congress created the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC). The MRC was the first reserve force centrally controlled by the federal government, which gave the Army an avenue and means to access a trained reservoir of officers with the most up-to-date medical experience residing in the civilian sector: a pool of citizen-soldier volunteers all; ready, able, and willing to serve when called on. Since 1908, the Army Reserve has changed on occasion in name, size, capabilities, roles, and missions. For example, in 1916 and 1920, Congress created the Officer’s Reserve Corps (ORC) and the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC), respectively, later collectively renamed the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC), which were forerunners of the current USAR as designated in 1952.

Today the Army Reserve is composed of three categories—Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Ready Reserve—and collectively is over one million strong. However, this paper primarily concerns the Ready Reserve, but only one subcategory—the Selected Reserve—which is composed of Troop Program Units (TPUs) (i.e., drilling reserve Soldiers), Active Guard/Reserve Soldiers (AGRs) (i.e., active-duty reserve Soldiers; a.k.a. “full-timers”), and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). These “Selected” Army Reserve Soldiers get pay for service, whether in a part-time or full-time duty status, and they are the subject of this paper and the terms Army Reserve and/or Operational Reserve, unless otherwise noted. Table 1 shows the current strength in various categories of the total Army Reserve.
Since its initial establishment as a medical reserve force consisting of about 300 individuals, the Army Reserve (Selected Reserve) grew considerably to nearly 325,000 personnel with significant force structure. During the Cold War era, it eventually consisted of numerous combat, combat support, and combat service support type units. However, in the early 1990s, the Army Reserve transferred almost all its combat forces to the Army National Guard, keeping only one deployable infantry battalion in its structure, concentrated on the core mission of combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS), and drew down below a mandated manning cap of 205,000 Soldiers.9

More significantly, though, in its relatively short existence, nearly a million warrior-citizens have answered the call to duty putting boots on the ground in response to the needs of the active Army and the nation during numerous emergencies. The first mobilization of the Army Reserve occurred in 1916, when 3,000 Soldiers mobilized and deployed in the “punitive expedition” led by General John J. Pershing against Mexican
revolutionary bandit Pancho Villa. In World War I, nearly 90,000 Soldiers answered the call. During the 1930s, more than 30,000 Army Reserve Officers mobilized to help manage the 2,700 Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps envisioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Over 200,000 members of the Organized Reserve Corps participated in World War II, providing twenty-nine percent of the Army’s officers. During the Korean Conflict, over 400 reserve units and 240,500 reserve Soldiers deployed to the Korean Peninsula. Over 60,000 were activated for the Berlin Crisis in 1961, and during the Vietnam Conflict, nearly 6,000 reserve Soldiers were mobilized. In the Persian Gulf War, over 84,000 Army Reserve Soldiers participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Many others have provided support in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Central America, and at home. As Table 1 indicates, today’s Selected Reserve portion of the total Army Reserve is about 190,000 strong. Since 2001, over 180,000 of them have served in the GWOT, including Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.

Throughout recent history, the Army Reserve was able to meet the demands of the Army when called on. So, why “operational” now and what does it entail?

The Next 100 Years

The large Army (active and reserve components combined) of the Persian Gulf War era was considerably downsized in the 1990s to about half its previous size. Today the total Army is about one million strong. Since then, the Army Reserve has gradually evolved into an integral, indispensable part of the much smaller Army, and the active component (AC) simply cannot do its job without relying heavily on the reserve component (RC). As LTG James J. Lovelace, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G3), US Army, put it, “the RC provides the campaign quality—the staying power—to our total force. Without their contribution, the Army does not have the strategic depth to sustain a protracted campaign to secure enduring victory in this long war.” When the Army goes to war, it depends in large measure on the Army Reserve to rapidly provide trained and ready units and Soldiers who bring critical skills and abilities to the fight that simply are not found, or found in insufficient quantities, in the active force. However, on September 11 (9-11), 2001, the entire Army, both active and reserve
components, was largely ill prepared for the ensuing long war: the GWOT. It was still a Cold War Army.\textsuperscript{16} The Army Reserve in particular was structured, funded, manned, equipped, mobilized, trained, and operated under policies and procedures prescribed for a strategic reserve of the Cold War era, waiting around for the next “big one.” As a result of that unfortunate situation, and as the conflicts dragged on in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, strategic decisions at the Secretary of Defense, Congressional, and Presidential levels drove the Army to “\textit{Transform the Force to Sustain the Full Range of our Global Commitments}.”\textsuperscript{17} And transforming the RC is just a part of the much larger task.

\textbf{Balancing the Force}

Shortly after General (GEN) George W. Casey Jr. was designated the Chief of Staff (CSA) of the US Army last year, he conducted an extensive review of the force taking into account the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other commitments around the world. His findings led him to discount the notion held by some people that the Army is hollow or broken and conclude, “the Army is out of balance.”\textsuperscript{18} GEN Casey indicated the Army is consumed by the demands of the current operations and, as a result, unable to do the things necessary to prepare for the future and sustain the all-volunteer force. In addition, as any good staff officer would do, he developed a plan to deal with the problem. While speaking on the subject of rebalancing the force at a recent breakfast engagement, sponsored by the Association of the United States Army, GEN Casey said:

\begin{quote}
This is not an impossible position, particularly with the support of Congress and the American people. And we have a plan to put ourselves back in balance. But it is going to take three or four years and we have to do four things: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

\textbf{Army Imperatives}

Those four things—sustain, prepare, reset, and transform—are significant Army imperatives, fundamental in successfully achieving the desired endstate of the force balancing act: “a campaign quality expeditionary Army that can support our combatant commanders in the challenges of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century across the [full] spectrum of conflict.”\textsuperscript{20}
**Sustain**

Sustaining the force translates to ensuring appropriate polices, benefits, and entitlements are in place and resources made available to ensure Soldiers voluntarily stay in the Army. This is critically important for noncommissioned officer corps and mid-grade officers: i.e., sergeants first class, captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. As a rule of thumb, it generally takes about ten to twelve years to grow these highly effective noncommissioned officers and mid-grade officers that the Army desperately needs to retain. They are, unequivocally, the glue that holds the Army together, and especially so during war that is second only to the American Revolutionary War, in that only volunteers are asked to fight and win it for the nation. Since then, and until now, every major conflict the United States military has ever engaged in was fought with a mixture of volunteer and conscript Soldiers.

**Prepare**

Preparing is to ensure that the Soldiers now fighting in the GWOT are equipped and trained to do their jobs in a world that is unlikely to present a break in conflict in the near future. According to GEN Casey, “America’s Soldiers must be prepared for continued persistent conflict around the world” and “we are absolutely committed to making sure every soldier that goes in harms way is well trained, well equipped, and has what they need to be able to accomplish the mission.”

**Reset**

Resetting is “reconstituting or replacing lost, aging, or spent equipment and materials. It’s also about ensuring Soldiers themselves have the time they need to recuperate from fighting and deploying.” However, it is more than that. Families are just as important as the Soldiers and equipment, and GEN Casey made a point not to exclude them saying, “We can also not look the other way when it comes to fixing Soldiers and Families when they come back.” So resetting is some about fixing and/or replacing equipment and material, providing essential warrior training, resting, and recuperating from previous deployments in order to be ready and available for future deployments, but in reality, it is mostly about money. That is, getting the necessary level of funding to resource the aforementioned activities in order to meet future requirements.
Transforming is about preparing for the future: future warfare that is. GEN Casey expressed his vision of future war as, “…conflict that is a mix of irregular warfare and conventional warfare. I see it fought in a lot of urban areas… We are going to fight in cities. And it’s going to be fought more with non-state actors and individual groups.”

As GEN Casey sees it, “the force has to be agile - agile in its ability to deploy quickly [and] to change missions quickly. And we are not very agile as an institution now. Our institutions were designed for an earlier pre-September 11 Army.”

In addition to adapting to changes in warfare and how the Army trains to fight and operates as an institution, transforming also includes growing in size and in capabilities. Over the next two years, the total Army (Active, Guard, and Reserve) will increase by 74,200 Soldiers: 65,000, 8,200, and 1000, respectively. Since the onset of the GWOT, the Army has been moving from a division-centric force to a more agile, expeditionary, modular force with the “brigade” as the centerpiece of warfighting formations. In that vein, the Army plans to increase the number and types of certain units, such as Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), Support Brigades (SBs), and CS/CSS units, as well as restationing (relocating) others to “provide additional forces to meet strategic demands and mitigate persistent capability shortfalls.”

Army Initiatives

The United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Army Reserve both derive their mission tasks from the Army. As discussed, balancing the force consists of the four Army imperatives, which apply to both the active and reserve components. While sustain, prepare, and reset primarily concern the current force and its ability to sustain the GWOT and other commitments, transformation concerns the Army’s ability to meet the demands of an unpredictable future.

Subsequently, the CSA promulgated several key initiatives associated with his plan to balance the force. One of them is Department of the Army Initiative Four (AI4), which simply states, “Transition the Reserve Component to an Operational Force.”

The CSA then gave FORSCOM the job to develop a Concept Plan (CONPLAN) in close coordination with the RC to implement AI4. To be clear, while AI4 applies to both the
Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, this paper concerns only the Army Reserve transformation, not the National Guard.

FORSCOM is responsible for developing and writing a Concept Plan (CONPLAN) for DA, which focuses on the essential tasks to accomplish, associated timelines, milestones, and the like. The Army Reserve in concert with DA executes them. While FORSCOM is essentially the primary planner and DA is the synchronizer for transition, the Army Reserve is the executor of the various activities required to affect the necessary changes.

**Army Reserve Imperatives**

While there may be some merit to the argument that the Army Reserve has been an operational force by default since the 1990s, it was not structured, sourced, managed, or mandated to operate as such. The events of 9-11 and the ensuing long war significantly changed how people viewed the reserve contribution. Moreover, with a continuing heavy reliance on the reserves to provide operational forces on a rotating basis, it quickly became very clear that we needed profound change.

Recognizing this need, LTG Stultz, aligned with the CSA’s campaign plan to transform and specified six imperatives essential for transforming the Army Reserve to an operational force. They are: reengineer the mobilization process; transform command and control; restructure units; improve human resources staff, technologies, and business practices; build [a] rotational-based force; and improve individual support to combatant commanders.29 Each deserves a brief explanation.

**Reengineering the Mobilization Process**

Reengineering the mobilization process involves streamlining and automating procedures that are time-sensitive, paper-based, multi-layered, and tied to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process discussed below. It is essential to making the operational force ready and available quickly to meet the needs of a combatant commander. Traditionally, the strategic reserves followed a sequential mobilization process of *train, alert, train, and deploy*, whereas units accomplished a limited amount of premobilization training and the bulk of it completed post-mobilization at a designated mobilization station such as Fort Polk, Fort Dix, or Fort McCoy. Post-mobilization
training was more extensive and intensive; often taking several months for some units to become combat ready. That process proved problematic and inadequate for post 9-11 operations. An operational force will follow a more aggressive mobilization process of *train, alert, and deploy*. Units will accomplish the majority of their individual and collective training before mobilization, referred to as “left-of-mob,” and a much smaller amount of training—primarily “theater-specific” requirements—after mobilization, referred to as “right-of-mob.” The Army Reserve leadership expects that the revamped mobilization process will decrease deployment timelines considerably from several months to only a few weeks in some cases. However, accomplishing the necessary pre-mobilization training will likely be a difficult challenge requiring new and innovative approaches, because it will demand more resources, such as money and time, than are currently available or authorized under existing policies and programs. Garnering support from civilian employers alone for additional, extended annual training time and/or prolonged pre-mobilization training will be a crucial element in making it realistically achievable. Many reserve Soldiers have crucial civilian jobs in the local communities, and extended absences from these jobs for additional military duty will put an added burden on their employers.

*Transforming Command and Control*

Transforming command and control of regional commands aims at focusing on training, leader development, unit readiness, and shortening the mobilization timelines. It consists of disestablishing some commands, establishing others, and realigning the command and control force structure to better execute the core mission of providing trained, ready Soldiers and units to the Army when needed. It has already started and planned completion scheduled for 2009.

Over the next two years, the Army Reserve will continue reorganizing the command structure to serve better the Army’s operational needs worldwide. The legacy, or strategic, force was composed of many general officer level commands that have command and control of reserve units primarily based on geographic locations. Some of them reported to the USARC, while others were designated direct reporting units…reporting directly to the Army or to another major command such as the Army Special Operations Command, as in the case of Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations Commands for example. That is no longer the case. The future, or operational, force structure will be composed of fewer high-level commands, with no reduction in the number of general officer billets, organized and arrayed on a functional basis under command and control of the USARC. Figure 1 shows the USAR command structure changes.

![USAR Command Structure](image)

**Figure 1. USAR Command Structure (OCAR)**

**Restructuring Units**

Restructuring aims at making the force more flexible and adaptable with the ability to meet anticipated mission requirements within the resource cap of 205,000 Soldiers. Central to restructuring units is converting them into a modern, modular, expeditionary capable force. Some force structure will be divested if it is irrelevant, habitually unready, or too costly to modernize to get the maximum value and use of money spent. Also due to the low-density, high-demand and availability of certain capabilities, some specific unit types may permanently transfer to the active Army force structure to meet continuous mission requirements.
Improving Human Resources Staffs, Technologies, and Business Practices

Improving human resources staff, technologies, and business practices is essential to assist commanders and leaders to recruit, develop, train, and care for Soldiers, Families, Civilians, and Contractors. The old Cold War era way of managing people and other resources is not conducive to an operational force intended to be flexible, responsive, and dynamic. To meet this challenge, the Army Reserve Command established a permanent Business Process Improvement/Lean Six Sigma (BPI/LSS) office and tapped into the civilian-acquired skills of Army Reserve Soldiers certified in LSS through their civilian employers to augment a contract support. Limited implementation and operations have already shown substantial dollar savings in short order; $47 million in FY 2006, for example. As this new office matures and begins to leverage best business practices focusing on speed, efficiency, precision, and accuracy, the Army Reserve can anticipate dollar savings ranging into the hundreds of millions.

Building Rotational Force

Building a rotational force aims at creating additional depth and developing a training, mobilization, and deployment mechanism so an Army Reserve soldier will only deploy for 12 months every five to six years versus one year in three for the AC. This initiative is necessary and intended to provide stability and predictability to Soldiers, families, and employers while simultaneously supporting the global war on terror, other major combat operations, and smaller scale contingencies. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process is the mechanism or model for building rotational forces and managing them throughout the process. Like the active Army and Army National Guard, the Army Reserve similarly contributes to the process of cycling reserve units through clearly defined phases to reset, train, equip, and attain full mission readiness to become available for deployment. This phased approach is composed of structured, progressive training, resourcing, and unit readiness over time, which ultimately results in recurring periods of trained and ready cohesive units prepared and available to support combatant commander requirements worldwide. The main difference in the ARFORGEN process between the Active Army and the Army Reserve is that the reset/train-ready-available timelines vary between components. Figure 2 shows a basic comparison between the active and reserve force generation cycles.
As the Army Reserve transitions into the progressive cycles of the ARFORGEN process, equipping the rotational forces is paramount to building a viable expeditionary capability. Therefore, the Army Reserve is developing new strategies to make the best use of equipment used for both training and deployment operations. As LTG Stultz explained it, “this includes maintaining equipment at four main sites: home station, strategic deployment sites, individual training sites, and collective training sites. We are undertaking significant efforts to replace Army Reserve equipment that was damaged or left in theater.”

Equipment left behind either was destroyed during combat operations or continues to support the GWOT. In addition to the new equipping strategy, training the rotational forces requires a new training strategy as well.

The Army Reserve now employs the Army Reserve Training Strategy (ARTS), which is a five-year training cycle encompassing the basic concepts of train-alert-deploy, as previously discussed on reengineering the mobilization process. This strategy includes
progressive training and readiness cycles, priorities for resources, managed readiness levels, and predictable training as determined by the ARFORGEN cycle. With a mature ARFORGEN process, units in years one to three (reset/train) will reconstitute and train on common tasks, also called warrior tasks, and basic mission essential tasks list (METL) tasks. This is a mixture of professional education at service schools, individual training, squad-company level collective training at various training sites, and functional exercises. The reset/train phase of the five-year training cycle will conclude with a Warrior Exercise (WAREX); a multi-functional, multi-echelon event to improve unit proficiency. In the fourth year (ready), unit training focuses on collective warfighting skills and theater-specific tasks. After units successfully complete the required ready-phase training and demonstrate proficiency by completing a combat training center (CTC) or comparable event to validate their combat skills, they will move into year five (available) for potential mobilization and deployment if needed.

Improving Individual Support

Improving individual support to combatant commands primarily aims to increase the number of trained and ready Soldiers in critical military occupational specialties (MOS) available for individual augmentation, primarily from the Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) manpower pool of the Ready Reserve. Overcoming impediments such as system issues, bureaucracy, training, and communications problems are essential to improving support to meet the Army’s increased demand for individual soldier capabilities without threatening unit readiness.

Shaping the Force

The Army Reserve aligned closely with the Army’s plan to transform into a modular, expeditionary force and even without an approved FORSCOM concept plan, has already achieved remarkable success thus far. Some of the achievements are rather significant considering the magnitude and difficulty of the changes within the institution. According to the 2007 Army Reserve Posture Statement, some of the most significant organizational changes already accomplished during Fiscal Year 2006 (October 1, 2006 – September 30, 2007), or in progress include:
• Activating two Theater Signal Commands (TSC) and three Expeditionary Support Commands (ESC) to better support Operation Iraqi Freedom and/or other potential contingencies.

• Inactivating ten Regional Readiness Commands (RRC) and activating four Regional Sustainment Commands (RSC) to lower overhead and better support units regionally.

• Realigning 80 percent of Army Reserve forces into ARFORGEN including 58 modular combat support/combat service support brigades and eight civil affairs brigades.

• Using the ARFORGEN model to mobilize over 77 percent of all reserve units mobilized in 2006.

• Realigning command and control of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to the U.S. Army Reserve Command.

• Realigning the U.S. Army Reserve Command from the U.S. Army Forces Command to a direct reporting command of the Department of the Army.

• Advancing plans to close 176 Army Reserve facilities under Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) and building 125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers.

• Advancing plans to activate another Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) and a Theater Aviation Command (TAC).

• Implemented the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to give senior leaders knowledge of Army Reserve capabilities to support future requirements.

According to the USARC Transformation Integration Office (TIO), the Army Reserve will continue with transformation execution to:
• Complete over $3 billion in military construction (MILCON) projects in the next three years building 125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) in 39 states and Puerto Rico.

• Accelerate alignment of RRC units to Operational and Functional (O&F) Commands.

• Complete activations and conversions of modular units.

• Complete phased disestablishment of RRCs.

• Build full operational capability (FOC) of RSCs.

• Manage processes to ensure no GWOT mission failure while transforming.

• Complete all transformation actions by 2011.  

In summary, the Army Reserve is undertaking a massive and difficult reconfiguring effort that affects virtually every reserve unit and every reserve Soldier. As Mr. Linwood Bailey, Director, TIO, USARC, suggests, “These are the balls we must juggle without dropping a single one in order to be successful. All the while, we must continue to sustain the GWOT mission.”

Funding the Force

Without adequate funding, substantive change will be less forthcoming and risk to the operational force conversion will become obvious. According to a recent legislative report, the Army Reserve will get $2.5 billion in operations and maintenance in 2008; however, as of late, the Army budget does not have a funded AI4 program and the outlook is somewhat bleak. Transformation momentum could be at risk, as inferred from the following message from a staff officer in the DA G8 Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Office:

It's not like we did a macro level query on how much will transformation cost, instead we determined what we had to do to adapt to new challenges, provide capabilities, and operate more effectively. I do think the start point was with looking at force structure and concept plans… For the 08 supplemental
amendment, left-of-mob, we funded RC at about $1B (more to ARNG than to AR) with portions that are correlated to AI4. *Nothing is officially [sic] approved yet for AI4 in the POM*, but decisions will be made in the next couple [of] weeks... What we have laid out as AI4 parts are just our best guess and we don't know if they will really work. FORSCOM's time horizon goes to 2020 so the transformation is expected to take a long time. We don't expect an increase in funding for the current POM since a new administration is coming on board, so the strategic direction is key...  

As part of transformation, the Army Reserve has asked the Army to accelerate authorization and funding to increase validated Full Time Support (FTS) staff to 100 percent. Historically, FTS funding has had a low priority in the Army’s budget and often served as a bill payer for higher Army priorities. However, the FTS staff, composed of active duty Soldiers (AC and RC), military technicians (MILTECHs), and DA Civilians (DACs), is a critical enabler for the Army Reserve to provide trained, qualified units and Soldiers when the Army needs them. Their defined support roles of “organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components” are essential for mobilizing and enhancing the deployability of reserve units and Soldiers. They will be invaluable for an effective operational force and must be fully funded.

**Advancing the Force**

Based on a final report by the congressionally appointed independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR), Congress should quickly act on their recommendations to affect the operational force. Following over two years of extensive research and analysis, the final CNGR report calls for profound reform concerning the National Guard and Reserves use, roles and missions, stipulating some 131 findings, 95 recommendations, and 6 major conclusions. Many of the recommendations concern the laws and policies dating back to WWII, and the CNGR advocates changing them to move us in the right direction toward creating an enduring operational force.

The Reserve Officers Association of the United States (ROA) fully endorses the CNGR’s main conclusions, surmising that:

- A strong reserve component is essential to sustaining the All-Volunteer Force.

- Since 2001, the availability of the Reserve and National Guard for worldwide missions has saved the country from a draft.
• The men and women of the Guard and Reserve have performed magnificently.

• The Reserve Component is an extraordinary bargain for the taxpayers.

• The nation needs both an operational and strategic reserve and that an effective continuum of service policy is essential to achieving the right balance between these two parts of our service.

• The nation’s employers play a critical role in the success of the Reserve Components and deserve additional support.

After eight months of deliberate and comprehensive analysis, FORSCOM just recently published their CONPLAN for AI4 that, according to their CG, “parallels the CNGR recommendations and findings.”

It also prescribes major paradigm changes to policies and resourcing required to increase readiness, and establishes six essential tasks required to transition the RC into a relevant, operational force. They are:

• Adapt pre- and post-mobilization training cycles.
• Adapt RC generating force.
• Adapt incentives for Citizen-Soldiers, their families and employers.
• Adapt RC pre-mobilization equipping strategies.
• Facilitate a continuum of service.
• Adapt necessary statutes, policies, and processes.

As we continue fighting our enemies in the GWOT, we are also waging war on an obsolete Cold War era Army and Army Reserve. However, the institution moves slowly. For example, FORSCOM has recently published their formal CONPLAN for which action plan development for implementation and execution will follow. Moreover, it suggests a long-range transformation strategy, which potentially increases risk of losing momentum depending upon the strategic direction a future administration might take with regard to national security strategy, which drives our national defense and national military strategies. On the bright side though, that has not hindered the Army Reserve
from moving out anyway and making some significant incremental changes in its structure, training, readiness processes, and business practices.

**Recommendations**

Obviously, our senior leaders at the highest levels of military and government clearly see a compelling need for change, and their desires to change seem apparent in their words and deeds. Although some significant changes are already in place and taking hold, we could do much more, faster to keep moving to an ideal operational force. Therefore:

- Congress and Department of Defense (DoD) should immediately act to implement changes proposed in the CNGR findings and recommendations.
- Congress should fully-fund AI4.
- DA should immediately develop action plans for implementation in accordance with the FORSCOM CONPLAN for AI4 recommendations.
- DA should fully-fund FTS at 100% of validated requirements.
- USARC should continue aggressively leading the charge on transforming the force.

Future research should consider and evaluate the outcome of both the CNGR and FORSCOM recommendations. Both documents are new and substantial. It will take considerable time for the staffs at DA, DoD, and Congress to dissect them and develop courses of action to implement relevant statute and policy changes.

**Conclusion**

Clearly, the Army Reserve has come a long way in its first 100 years. There are many historical and anecdotal examples demonstrating that along the way, it has made many significant and lasting contributions to the Army and the Nation. The Army Reserve truly is a national treasure and is well on the way to becoming the valued, effective, and integral part of a 21st century operational force our senior leaders envision. However, to remain a relevant resource for the American people, we must stay the course.
on our transformation journey. A modern Army Reserve must adapt and better partner with and support the active Army to effectively respond to security threats in the current and future strategic environments in, what a former CSA, GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, described as, “an era of uncertainty and unpredictability.” He further predicted, “the nation will remain engaged in a long struggle of continuous and evolving conflict,” and no one has refuted it yet.

Nearly two decades ago, author A.J. Bacevich, describing military institutions as “in the midst of continuous transformation, redesigning, restructuring, and reorganizing in a hell-bent rush to embrace the future,” concluded:

If forces designed and equipped in compliance with the dictates of the future are ill-suited for dealing with civil wars, ethnic conflicts, failed states, and terror, then they are of limited utility in the world as it exists.

Bacevich was right back then—our post-9-11 military confirmed it—and he seems to be right now. The Army in general and the Army Reserve in particular must change and adapt with the dictates of this century to be of unlimited utility. In addition to needing good and timely guidance, full funding, and unwavering support from the Congress, DoD, and DA, it will require continued support from civilian employers and the general public as well. Moreover, it will require exceptional leadership, courage, and precision execution by the whole Army Reserve to posture the operational force for the next 100 years. As the Army Reserve marches onward with transforming itself into a modernized operational force, while engaged in a long war, it should be reassuring and encouraging for all concerned to keep in mind a notable quote by a former CAR, LTG James R. Helmly:

What hasn’t changed in our [100] years is the courage, commitment, and sacrifice of our people who voluntarily accept the challenge of serving.

That tested and proven “Warrior-Citizen” tradition should never change.
ENDNOTES:

1 Quote attributed to Secretary Geren as he was speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee about the Army and all Soldiers—Active, Guard, Reserve; see Gerry J. Gilmore, “Army Posture: Strong, But Stretched, Leaders tell Senate”, American Forces Press Service, 26 Feb 2008, available from http://www.army.mil--news/2008/02/27/7646-army-posture-strong-but-stretched-leaders-tell-senate/: Internet; accessed 29 Feb 2008.

2 Analogy attributed to LTG Jack C. Stultz as he was speaking at a town hall meeting hosted by General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Scott Air Force Base, IL, during the 2005 USTRANSCOM Reserve Component Chiefs and The Adjutants General (RCC/TAG) Conference.

3 The Unified Command Plan (UCP) describes the two types of combatant commands (geographical and functional) and the combatant commander’s role:

The commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA [National Command Authority] for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. Combatant commanders prescribe the chain of command within their commands and designate the appropriate level of command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders. The military departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. This branch of the chain includes all military forces within the respective Services not specifically assigned to commanders of combatant commands.


9 The USAR end strength will increase to 206,000 by 2013 under the “Grow the Army (GTA)” initiative to increase the Army 74,200 to meet long-term operational needs and sustain the All Volunteer Army. More information is available from http://www.army.mil/growthearmy/: Internet; accessed 29 Feb 2008.

10 Lee S. Harford Jr., et al., p. 8.

In 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt envisioned a Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) that would recruit thousands of unemployed young men, enroll them in a peacetime army, and send them into battle against destruction and erosion of our natural resources. With the combined efforts of the Departments of War, Labor, Interior, and Agriculture, this massive mobilization of manpower became a reality on April 17, 1933. About three million unemployed and unmarried men between the ages of 18 and 24 were enrolled in the Civilian Conservation Corps. Much of the conservation work was located in the western United States. Thousands of men were transported from eastern cities westward. Natural resource agencies, such as the U.S.D.A. Forest Service, were given the boost they needed to move their management activities 20-30 years ahead. Until the demise of the Civilian Conservation Corps in 1942, millions of men worked tirelessly on a myriad of natural resource projects. During the nine years of the CCC:

- 89,000 miles of telephone line was installed
- 126,000 miles of roads and trails were constructed
- 6,459,000 man-days were expended fighting fires
- 6,660,000 erosion control check dams were built
- 2,356,000,000 trees were planted

As the country moved into World War II, the CCC was directly involved in assisting the Armed Forces with manpower and supplies. The CCC had in its ranks thousands of men, toughened by rigorous outside work, who were used to the strict discipline of the military. It is widely accepted that one important outcome of the Civilian Conservation Corps was the ability of the United States to win World War II. See http://www.fs.fed.us/r8/gwj/lee/cultural/ccc/index.shtml.


21 GEN George W. Casey Jr., “Maintaining Quality in the Force”, p. 6

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.
23 Ibid.


27 Ibid.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.


33 LTG Jack C. Stultz, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Reserve 2007...”, p. 12. As of this report, the Army Reserve has 143 general officers; 71 have been mobilized or deployed to support the Army since 9-11, 2001.

34 LTG Jack C. Stultz, “Organized for Success”

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.


38 LTG Jack C. Stultz, “Organized for Success”.


40 Ibid.


43 LTG Jack C. Stultz, “Organized for Success”.


Ibid.


LTC Kevin J. Vink, HQDA G8 PA&E, email message to author 31 Jan 2008.


10 USC 12310.


Ibid., p.


GEN Charles C. Campbell, “Memorandum for Chief of Staff, United States Army; Subject: Concept Plan for Army Initiative 4 (AI4); Transition the Reserve Components (RC) to an Operational Force”, dated Feb 25, 2008, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA: NOTE: This memorandum is the transmittal cover letter of the AI4 CONPLAN.


Ibid.

Francis J. Harvey and GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, p. 5.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 49.