THE MILITARY IN THE INTERAGENCY: IMPROVING THE NATIONAL INTERAGENCY RESPONSE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PABLO ESTRADA, JR.
United States Army National Guard

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Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
160 Packard Avenue
Medford, MA 02155

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9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
160 Packard Avenue
Medford, MA 02155

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14. ABSTRACT Today’s security environment is at best unpredictable. The actors in today’s world range from drug lords and insurgencies in the South American continent, failing states in the African continent, non-state actors and terrorist in the Asian continent, and nuclear posturing from nation states vying for a greater role in world stage. These conditions along with those brought on by forces of nature reflect the range of security concerns our nation’s leadership is faced with today. The new security landscape requires a coordinated response from all elements of the United States (U.S.>) instruments of national power. The interagency process required for such coordination does not exist. In turn, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as the most prepared of the interagency members, has found itself taking a larger role in operations of development and security assistance.

This research paper describes reasons why DOD has been the primary agency in the United States Government(USG) response in complex, in particular nation building, civil military campaigns. This research will show reasons why post conflict operations within the military realm of responsibility tend to creep outside this boundary including nation building. Initiatives and directives issued to correct deficiencies throughout the 1990s to the present will be discussed. A short comparative analysis of two military operations will highlight the need for an interagency planning, coordinating, and training mechanism. Finally, this report will show what the USG can do to start building a planning and coordination framework capable of providing an interagency response at the national level.

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Lieutenant Colonel Pablo Estrada, Jr.
United States Army National Guard

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Project Adviser

Colonel Mark J. Eshelman
United States Army War College Faculty Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

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and coordination framework capable of providing an interagency response at the national
level.
"There is no strictly military solution to the problem we face…. It requires that we move together on the political front, on the economic front, on the reconstruction front in a manner that is synchronized and coordinated. If we don’t do that, I do not believe that we can be successful. So you can pay the military to stay there, but you are only paying U.S. to stay forever.”

General John Abizaid

General John Abizaid’s testimony is indicative of the frustration felt by many in the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DOD) as it continually finds itself performing civil military tasks the United Nations (UN), federal agencies, or coalition partners more directly affected by these security situations should be doing. In Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Winning the Peace, Robert C. Orr list 10 essential principles for developing a cohesive strategic response to post-conflict nation-building requirements. The list is as follows:

1. The people of the country in question must own the reconstruction process and be its prime movers.

2. A coherent international strategy based on internal and external parties’ interests is crucial.

3. The international community must address the problem of post-conflict reconstruction holistically, building and deploying capacity to address a broad range of interrelated tasks.

4. Security is the sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction.

5. Success is made on the ground.

6. Needs must be rigorously prioritized and activities sequenced accordingly.

7. International interventions are extraordinary and should take all necessary measures to avoid undermining local leaders, institutions, and processes.
8. Mechanisms are needed to rapidly mobilize and coordinate needed resources and sustain them for appropriate periods of time.

9. Accountability is essential for both host country and international actors.

10. The timing of an operation must be driven by circumstances on the ground, not by artificial deadlines or by externally driven bureaucratic imperatives.\(^2\)

His fourth principle addresses security. This principle in more detail states, "if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail."\(^3\) Here lies the key as to why DOD has historically been the “catch all, do all” for complex operations requiring an interagency response. This report will look at reasons why DOD has been the primary agency in the United States Government (USG) response in complex emergencies and in particular nation-building civil-military campaigns. Bottom line is the USG interagency failed to implement affective changes to address lessons learned from operations in the post Cold War era. This research will show reasons why post-conflict operations within the military realm of responsibility tend to creep outside this boundary including nation-building. Initiatives and directives issued to correct deficiencies throughout the 1990s to the present will be discussed. A short comparative analysis of two military operations will highlight the need for an interagency planning, coordinating, and training mechanism. Finally, this report will show what the USG can do to start building a planning and coordination framework capable of providing an interagency response at the national level.
Why DOD?

Of Orr’s 10 security principles mentioned above, his fourth principle, security, highlights two issues as to why DOD finds itself as the executing agency of most nation building responses for the USG. First, the UN and nations who would most likely be our coalition partners do not possess the capability to provide security on a large scale or in a quick, responsive manner. Only the U.S. has that capability through DOD. Second, in post conflict situations, the interagency and international response has been historically slow and chaotic. Inherently, the U.S. military is called on to commit more resources to the post conflict response. For the most part, the additional mission requirements have historically been requested without an adequate increase in the number of soldiers deployed.

The dilemma for commanders on the ground is deciding how to maintain security, rather than increase security, with less forces while task organizing for a mission at the opposite end of the full spectrum of conflict. Reassigning of units must take place at the expense of security. If security is lost rendering the area of operations too “hostile” for non-military personnel, the military will execute both the security and post conflict missions with very little support from civilian agencies. As Sarah Sewell points out, “If these other instruments of national power don’t show up, can’t stay, or aren’t effective, the buck passes back to the military forces. Hence, until security can be assured for these diplomats very few will volunteer to go and none will be made to go.” Arguments from the State Department have been that putting its agents in place can only happen after the area is secure or “passive.” These personnel and nation building organizations, they argue, do their work through diplomatic procedures not weapons. The other scenario is
that the security situation becomes “passive” to allow the military to maintain a larger share of the post conflict mission requirements, thus becoming the deployable resource the civil agencies lack.

One reason the U.S. military finds itself in these situations is that it is forward deployed and is readily available. Along with its resources and its ability to execute operational level missions, the military often finds itself as the executing agency for many complex emergency operations long after combat has ceased. Nation building is a task the military has long avoided formally adding to its lexicon of tasks but has often found itself doing. The military in turn has referred to these tasks as “non-military” as found in LTC Nagl’s foreword to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual Counterinsurgency (COIN), “The field manual emphasizes the primary role of traditionally non-military activities…”

Why then do DOD and the U.S. military find themselves executing complex emergency and host nation support operations? This answer is quite simply that there is no else to do it. This lack of a civilian agency response has been an issue throughout the post Cold War era. Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr. noted in his study, titled In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama following Just Cause, “the civilian agencies of the U.S. government were much less prepared, both conceptually and organizationally, and this undermined interagency organization…..No such team was in place in Panama; it should have been.”

Post conflict Iraq has served to remind the military of the need to be prepared to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations after combat is an imminent fact. Some cite Title 10, Chapter 307, of the U.S. Code to “suggest the military should
conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations as a logical extension of combat operations on land.\footnote{7} I partially agree with this. I would agree more if the suggestion was further clarified to state the military should conduct these operations, \textit{initially, to establish the foundation required to transition operational control to the authoritative civilian agencies.}

The civilian agency response cannot be ad hoc or an after thought to military combat operations. Examples of the lack of a coordinated and planned civilian response are discussed in \textit{Cobra II}. They range from the LTG(R) Jay Garner’s post conflict team, then LTG Casey’s Joint Task Force-4 (JTF-4), and the Civilian Provisional Authority – Iraq.\footnote{8} Transition to operationally inexperienced civilian agency teams in post conflict operations can cause a loss of momentum that may have been gained by the military up to that point. Rajiv Chandrasekaran discusses argument in his \textit{Foreign Policy} essay, \textit{Who Killed Iraq}. He states, “Had military commanders on the ground been consulted and empowered by the CPA, instead of stymied by it, they would likely have played a far more effective role in Iraq’s reconstruction.”\footnote{9} This brings with it setbacks in the trust and relationships built up to that point. Any loss of momentum provides an opportunity for opponents to the U.S. efforts to undermine and breach the security established.

\textbf{USG Response to Interagency Lessons Learned}

Due to the increased number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars following the end of the Cold War, the USG found an effective response to these situations would require a better coordinated response. During the mid-1990’s, the NSC realized the interagency plans being briefed lacked coordination. In response to this deficiency, the NSC formulated the Political Military (Pol-Mil) Planning process
and directed the agencies to use it for complex emergencies. President Clinton in May 1997 signed Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) “Managing Complex Contingency Operations” calling for the implementation of the integrated political-military (Pol-Mil) planning into the interagency planning process. This planning process would further serve as the basis for developing a training program for policy makers and their staffs. PDD-56 started the interagency work on establishing the framework for implementing the Pol-Mil planning process.

In January 2003, the National Defense University published The Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook which describes the integrated political-military implementation plan (Pol-Mil plan) process and mechanisms initiated by PDD-56. Many of these mechanisms have been continued through current interagency initiatives. The handbook does an excellent job of describing what should be included in the Pol-Mil plan once the process is started. The handbook states the coordinating process begins after the emergency arises. Contingency planning in the national interagency level is non-existent. This process is paraphrased as follows. When an emergency situation is identified, the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) frames the issues for discussion in the Deputies Committees who further refine the issues and prepare policy options to the Principals Committee who then make recommendations for action to the President. The handbook then states:

“Although in some cases individual agencies may undertake initial planning for a complex crisis, official interagency planning does not begin until the Deputies authorize it.”

In essence, work on the operational plan to coordinate and synchronize all the instruments of national power for a nation building operations does not begin until after
the complex emergency arises and is understood well enough by the Deputies Committee to authorize work to begin. The handbook encourages planning by the individual agencies and states that the Pol-Mil planning is a “mechanism for harmonizing agency plans and actions”\textsuperscript{13}

At the operational level, military planners focus great amounts of time and energy on the most difficult part of planning which is the coordination and synchronization or “harmonizing” of the operation. Furthermore, this lack of prior coordination and planning allows for very little contingency planning at the interagency level. As the military has learned, “the enemy has a vote” and in complex contingency operations, the adversary, whether it is an insurgent or the weather, has a say in how operations will be conducted. Options and experience gained from contingency planning and exercises conducted are valuable when responding to dynamic emergencies. Success requires agility and flexibility to maintain the momentum by reacting to information as it becomes available. Coordination and contingency planning in military operations are extremely important and difficult. The military conducts this planning using Standard Operations Procedures (SOP) with personnel of similar background, training, and experiences as opposed to a process that is “laden with agencies that have their own culture, philosophy and bureaucratic interest.”\textsuperscript{14}

In December 2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” NSPD-44 superseded PDD-56. NSPD 44 focuses on the coordination required to achieve maximum effect during these types of operations. It identifies the Secretary of State as the principal in the National Security Council (NSC)
responsible for coordinating and integrating the USG efforts in preparing, planning, and conducting of Stability and Reconstruction activities. It also directs the Secretaries of State and Defense to integrate plans within the departments, but more importantly NSPD 44 specifically calls for “a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.”


Post conflict operations by the military should lead to nation building operations which require an interagency response. Where the two meet is where the military tends to creep into nation building operations. As DOD has found itself more and more in this predicament, writings have focused on what can be done to improve DOD’s effectiveness in transitioning from post conflict operations to nation building. Dr. Shultz summarizes the lessons learned in the aftermath of Operation Just Cause as a guide to be used for future contingency operations planning for post conflict situations. Dr. Shultz provides six lessons learned from Panama. He summarizes them as follows:

1. Do not allow senior DOD officials to ignore planning for postconflict situations; such planning will be critical in the new international environment.

2. Do not allow the planning process to be compartmentalized within DOD; postconflict situations have to be planned in a civilian-military interagency setting.

3. Do not bifurcate the process within DOD into war fighting and postconflict compartments; bifurcation is a prescription for ignoring the latter.

4. Do not assign the task within DOD to those who lack an understanding of the situation and the historical and cultural context; make use of expertise that exists.

5. Do not limit resources, particularly personnel that are necessary for effective planning.
6. Do not fail to review, review, and review the product.

Of the six lessons, four specifically are directed at DOD. Despite also acknowledging in the study that the interagency group, which DOD is one member, could drive the development of an integrated strategy for post conflict scenarios.\(^\text{16}\)

Other studies written have focused on complex emergencies and the military’s role within an interagency response as opposed to the interagency role in a military response. One such study, *Doing Windows: Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies*, was written by Brad C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands and published by CCRP in 1998. This study focused its research on a simple but complex question posed by the Joint Warfare Analysis Center of the Naval War College, “How can the U.S. Military, during its involvement in a complex contingency operation, support (or at least do no harm to) the longer term, non-military efforts to create a stable, civil society?”\(^\text{17}\) In the conclusion section, the authors find that the military will continue to conduct missions in support of complex emergencies and, therefore; “must look beyond traditional roles to see how it can assist in rehabilitation and development.” In the end, the study does point out that the military has an important role to play in establishing stable civil society, but in the long term civil agencies must take the lead. In order for this transition to happen the authors call on military commanders to increase the involvement of Civil Affairs personnel into the planning process as early as possible.\(^\text{18}\) Yet, the study never looks at this issue from the interagency perspective.

In the post 9/11 world, literature on the topic of post conflict and nation building continues to focus on DOD’s role. In *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Dr. Barnett describes America as a “system-level power” within “the Core” of nation states which needs to
develop a strategy to use its instruments of power as a “Sys-Admin force” to grow “the Core” and shrink “the Gap” between the nations of “haves and have nots.”

Dr. Barnett states that he thinks the future management challenge for national security within the “interagency” has moved beyond “jointness” and cooperation amongst military services. He also makes a point of saying that he believes DOD will change the least of all the agencies in the federal system. DOD is already prepared to perform coordination and planning not just within its organization but with other agencies and governments as well.

Most importantly, Dr. Barnett states future flag officers are calling for “a new definition of war beyond warfare” which would include waging war against terror and insurgents amongst the people. In this type of war, weeding out the enemy will take weapons and capabilities beyond the scope, capabilities, and in some cases, responsibility of DOD. This new definition of “war beyond warfare” in the book is clearly the key to taking war and peace out of DOD and up to the next level at the National Security Council (NSC). Yet, his book’s focus is clearly on DOD and its role in this new national security landscape.

Other authors have written on DOD’s need for added capabilities to perform these mission requirements. Colonel (COL) Thomas X. Hammes in his book, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, calls for “medium weight forces” to allow DOD the capability to respond to fourth generation warfare (4GW) requirements. As a way to address the requirements the military finds itself continuously performing, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Gregory L. Cantwell proposes the American military integrate “the organic capabilities required for nation-building” LTC Cantwell recommends
establishing brigade sized joint nation building organizations within each combatant command to provide the ability to respond to post combat operations requirements. These writings focus on DOD’s effectiveness to meet its executing responsibilities in post conflict operations. In a post Cold War security environment, this theme must change to address the lack of an interagency response required at the national level. A timely and coordinated response required both globally and at home, can only be provided by the NSC.

**Why is change required?**

In the buildup to the Iraq war, news agencies and political strategist were worried about entering into another Vietnam scenario. If the capability for timely and comprehensive comparative analysis had existed within the interagency, the focus would have rightly been on avoiding a larger more politically and economically consequential Panama scenario. Instead, many in the research and strategic communities chose to compare Operation Iraqi Freedom to the politically charged Vietnam War, but in reality, the less conspicuous, Operation Just Cause, was a similar but smaller version of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Dr. Shultz’s study reads like a prescription for how to fight the wars in Iraq or any other war with the same conditions. To start the Panama/Iraq comparison, both operations were conducted in a post Cold War environment. Both countries were ruled for a long period of time by a government which used force through its military to maintain power and control. Both countries controlled or could control resources which directly affect the globally, interdependent economy so restoring order and stability were crucial not just to U.S. interest but had global impact as well. The objectives of both
military operations were directed at defeating the country’s military forces and replacing the governing leadership because they had lost credibility and their actions were posing a national threat to U.S. interest. Both war campaigns were offensive in nature and executed extremely well by a small amount of forces with few casualties. Most interestingly, as the authors of Cobra II describe for Operation Iraqi Freedom, both operations gave very little consideration for post conflict operations and made assumptions about the status of the country’s political culture and infrastructure. In Panama, “Destabilizing developments that were not foreseen weakened the restoration efforts.” Of these destabilizing developments in Panama, the only difference from Iraq 13 years later was the lack of an organized and externally supported insurgency. Despite the availability of Dr. Shultz’s report, the lessons learned resulted in no change to address within the USG to address the problems identified. DOD decided post conflict operations were outside of their realm of responsibility beyond providing security and continued to focus on war fighting. The civilian agencies went to work on fixing the issues described without inclusion of DOD.

Despite having “Lessons Learned” from very similar case studies, the USG lacks the mechanisms required to exercise the civil-military interagency process to test the lessons it has learned and make the changes necessary to address these shortfalls. “Lessons learned are only lessons learned if they result in changes to correct the problems identified in the lessons learned.” The preceding quote from Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff is apropos to the situation. The USG needs to move to the next level of truly learning from the lessons and not merely acknowledging them. The inability to conduct comparative analysis highlights the need for an interagency post conflict training and
planning mechanism to address these lessons. The mechanism would consist of situational training exercises where lessons learned can be reinforced and trained. These exercises would be inclusive of all the agencies in the National Security Council, including DOD. This would allow civilian agencies to explore methods of dealing with known emergencies and complex situations and develop doctrine. This mechanism would also allow the interagency to achieve a better understanding of mission transition and responses available to given situations and would help to develop procedures on how to best transition from military to civilian operations.

The military must continue to focus on fighting our nation’s wars. Having resources tied to establishing civil societies will eventually pose a threat to the military’s ability to effectively respond to other missions which may arise in the full spectrum of conflict. As operations requiring a civil-military response become more frequent and complex, the interagency and the military have to work together to resolve the gap on how to transition from the military centric post conflict to national centric nation building operations. In recognition of this fact, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations”. This policy states “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations……”\(^{27}\) This acknowledgement by DOD has started efforts and initiatives to implement this requirement into the military doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). The other agencies in the USG need to take similar actions.
When the President of the United States declares war, he commits all the nation’s instruments of power to achieving the objective. Today’s security environment requires Dr. Barnett’s “definition of war beyond warfare.” Defeating a nation’s military, toppling its government, and quelling or defeating the insurgency within it are not enough to declare victory. These actions are intermediate objectives in the overall campaign to eliminate and improve the national security issue. When the U.S. decides to take military action in a region of the world, it needs to look beyond just winning the combat portion of the war. U.S. success depends on its ability to build consensus and coalitions with the international community. Before the U.S. can declare victory, it needs to demonstrate to these partners that the actions the U.S. is taking will improve or cause no harm to the overall global security system. Victory in future wars requires more than studies in warfare as an extension of the political process. It will be fought beyond the battlefield to the hearts and minds of the host nation populace and in the eyes of the global community from our allies to nations looking exploit any U.S. diplomatic weaknesses. The new paradigm of war brings with it second order and unintended effects, seen and unseen, upon the global security system that our nation’s resources, beyond the military, need to be ready and willing to address. As such, all agencies involved in our national security should be prepared for war on a moments notice to allow our Commander in Chief the flexibility required for quick and decisive action.
What can be done?

LTC Cantwell’s proposed solution of adding nation building organizations to each combatant command would further alienate the civilian and the military organizations as an interagency. With separate and distinct capabilities, neither agency would feel the need to come together to plan and coordinate. There would be a distinct and separate civilian and a military nation building response capability. In the long run, such standing organizations would be costly and for the most part under utilized in areas where there is little need for these organizations and over utilized in others leaving DOD in the same situation it finds itself in today. DOD would have to continue the practice of relieving units in the combat area by training other non nation building organizations, in this case, to perform this mission on a rotation cycle. This solution assumes future civil-military missions will be conducted in a post combat manner which caters to the long time criticism that the military often prepares to fight the last war. I do agree this capability is required, but not as a force structure organization but rather as a mission set that needs to be trained as part of the Full Spectrum of Conflict which the military has to be prepared to fight and function in.

The new definition of “war beyond warfare” entails that when our nation goes to war it will send more than its military. Lawyers, politicians, bankers, doctors, business leaders, and farmers, just to name a few, will be part of the integrated package required to affect the positive change necessary to promote development and stability. Today, this is taking place in Afghanistan in the form of Agricultural - Provincial Reconstruction Teams. In this case, the National Guard Bureau was tasked to provide this assistance due to the fact that many soldiers in the National Guard are farmers. The National
Guard Bureau asked members of the Missouri Farm Bureau Association for support and together they formulated the concept of Agricultural Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The first teams have deployed to Afghanistan to teach farmers there how to improve their farming practices to produce greater yields and reduce the Afghan farmer’s reliance on poppy fields as their cash crop. This training is given by civilian experts who have volunteered their capabilities while the U.S. military forces provide security.\textsuperscript{28}

**Recommendations**

Using DOD’s organizational framework and capabilities as the point of departure, there is a way to develop an interagency process that is capable of planning and executing a political-military campaign to achieve our nation’s objectives in a global, economically interdependent world. The combatant command structures within DOD give a regional focus on which to start building this civil - military operational planning and executing environment. This approach would require three initiatives using resources which would require changes to what is already a part of the military framework or the expansion of others which have already been started. First, one such initiative which SOUTHCOM has implemented is making their J-9, Civil Military Operations directorate, a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES).\textsuperscript{29} This initiative gets directly at bringing the interagency into the planning and execution process of civil – military operations. Next, the Civil Affairs Commands of which four currently exists and are commanded by two star Army officers should be given the additional task of being the Joint Force Headquarters Element for Civil - Military Affairs operations within each combatant command. Third, add 6 battalion sized (1000-1500 soldiers) civil-military mission set requirements to the Army ARFORGEN cycle. These
units would be task organized either Army pure or Joint based on the combatant command’s civil-military mission requirements. These units within this structure would drive planning and training through simulations and actual mission deployments within the combatant command’s area of responsibility (AOR) which would lead to the development of policies, procedures and better doctrine in the use of military forces for civil–military operations.

Assign a SES from an NSC agency as the J9 Directorates

The Report to Congress on Implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05), dated April 2007, describes initiatives that have been implemented in DOD and at each combatant command to comply with the directive. One action is in U.S. Southern Command where the J9 directorate has been made a position filled by a member of Senior Executive Service. Furthermore, the J9 heads the Joint Inter – Agency Coordination Group (JIACG) for the command. This goes a long way in bringing the interagency into the process of operational planning. This action needs to be emulated in every combatant command. The NSC should take further action to ensure that this lesson learned is not forgotten. First, the NSC needs to establish the minimum number of positions to be available by agency and then direct that they be filled. Next, the NSC needs to formulate the directives necessary to make this a part of the process for developing the future leaders within the interagency. The old method of training and selecting agency leadership is no longer good enough. These J9 assignments need to be made a part of the professional development track for a senior executive in the NSC agencies going forward. The positions within the JIACG at each combatant command need to be a minimum two year professional development positions for mid level
executive managers in their appropriate agencies. This would help to make these positions sought after by “high potential” managers within the interagency as opposed to positions which would be seen as outside the agency. Once established this J9 directorate would then serve as the interagency expert during planning, training, and operations for the Combatant Commanders.

Use Civil Affairs Command as JTF Commands

In Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, the authors recommend, “the COCOM should also designate a subordinate commander to lead the military’s participation in interagency campaign planning for the mission.” For this purpose using the Civil Affairs Command Commander habitually assigned to each combatant command as this position is best qualified to perform this function. This commander would be the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander for the execution of civil military affairs operations. Furthermore, each combatant command and functional command which has a Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group should have an assigned civil affairs command. Placing a civil affairs flag officer in the position of responsibility for civil-military and post conflict operations will ensure proper use of civil affairs assets. This would bring civil affairs resources into the planning for contingencies earlier and would elevate their role to a joint command for a specific portion of the operation.

The responsibilities of Civil Military Affairs JTF (CMA-JTF) commander would be dual in nature. First as the commander, he would be responsible for ensuring his command is ready to support the higher headquarters requirements. Second, he would be the subject matter expert for civil military operations coordination to the Combatant Commander of all the civil military assets under his control. The CMA-JTF commander
would also be responsible for providing assessments, options, and recommendations for using these assets to the highest level of effectiveness. Civil Affairs officers are part of the Special Operations Command (SOC). Their understanding of how SOC functions and the ability to work with the SOC would aid in coordinating and receiving intelligence on the civil infrastructure, governance, and level of services available in the area of operations. This would allow for planning decisions to be made with a better and earlier understanding of the indigenous civil and political environment.

Use the ARFORGEN model

By providing a method to coordinate the policy making side of the operational planning, *The Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook* with the Pol-Mil process will get the interagency moving in the right direction, but more than this handbook is needed to address the gains that are made when organizations train and rehearse during peaceful times and in controlled environments. Six Task Force element (battalion sized: 1000-1500 soldiers) nation building mission sets should be added into the Army’s ARFORGEN cycle. The Task Forces would be organized to support the interagency missions at each combatant command. Mission set required capabilities would be established based on the needs of the region and requests from ambassadors in the region which have priority of needs and approval by the NSC. The ARFORGEN mission set approach as opposed to a force structure unit would allow for more organizations to train on and conduct post conflict to nation building type operations over a period of time. This would increase the experience level in the military of working in and with the interagency. This approach would utilize the modularity concept of our organization to build, train, and deploy the proper response required by
the mission. In times of war or need, these Task Forces could be combined to provide a “surge” of forces to the Combatant Commander allowing him to address post conflict civil-military operations without having to give up forces from the security mission. The lessons learned from deploying these units on a yearly basis would serve as the foundation for training and deploying follow on forces, if required.

The focus for training of these task forces would be on “establishing a safe and secure environment while simultaneously working with interagency, coalition, and multinational partners to establish domestic order in the host nation.” Staffs of these organizations would be trained on the Pol-Mil process. The process needs to be trained progressively from doctrine to hands on experience at the individual, team, and the interagency level. A good process for doing this type of training is the simulation process as described by Michele Flournoy, “Simulations offer a way of replicating real world conditions and experiences outside an operational environment” She further goes on to describe an actionable agenda for training and educating the USG in Post-Conflict operations. Flournoy’s plan mirrors what the military currently does to train, rehearse, and also certify its personnel for mission requirements.

It would not be impossible to quickly and effectively integrate the interagency into this process. The military’s training centers conduct collective training events where civilian role players are employed to play the role of indigenous populations ranging from store shop keepers to government officials. These training events could be used as capstone training events in which to gauge the level of preparedness of the USG to provide a response. This training will also provide direct feedback on improvements
needed to ensure a more effective response due to a better understanding of the process and capabilities of fellow agencies.

To further increase the training value of these mission sets, these mission set requirements should be assigned to units in the Reserve Component\textsuperscript{33}. First, this would allow for an expanded training period due to the longer Reserve Component ARFORGEN cycle. This would provide time for the staff planning exercises which Reserve Component battalion staffs need. The ARFORGEN cycle is currently, five years in the Reserve Component as opposed to 3 for the Active Component. The goal is for missions to be assigned in the third year of the cycle, otherwise known as Available – 2. While soldiers train on individual skills and tasks to prepare for the Civil – Military mission, the staff can use the additional training days provided to conduct staff exercises with the newly organized unit as well as with its higher headquarters. In the following year, Available – 1, the unit would train at a collective level, where the capstone event would be a collective training event at one of the military training centers available throughout the world. Second, it would help implement the recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves final report to Congress, that Reserve Component officers be required to achieve the joint assignment qualifications the same as the active component.\textsuperscript{34}

**Conclusion**

A mechanism to help the USG remember what it has so painfully learned again is what I am proposing. In an “era of persistent conflict,” the USG cannot allow the environment to provide such a mechanism.\textsuperscript{35} The nation must actively seek to improve the USG’s capabilities to have a framework on which to plan and coordinate effective
responses to post conflict and transition quickly and effectively to nation building operations. It must not squander the opportunity to bring the interagency into the operational planning and executing environment. The civil-military team can grow to provide an effective national response to the “wars beyond warfare” the U.S. will face in the future.COL Johnston, in the opening paragraph of his foreword to the Dr. Shultz Panama study, captures this need accurately and in its entirety in 1993.

“In a more benign post-cold war international system, where no threat approaches that of the former Soviet Union, the rationale for the use of U.S. military power cannot be based solely on the national interest. It will have to reflect concern with and support for such issues as self-determination, democratization, human rights, and economic development. The United States must have a postconflict reconstruction assistance policy that contributes to a positive consolidation of the situation and that promotes developments seen as contributing to stability and positive change. The use of force without a policy for the postconflict situation will be politically precarious.”

Furthermore, the recommendations of the study Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, which focus on the NSC’s role as the planning, coordinating, and approving mechanism in post conflict/nation building should be implemented. The NSC needs to take the lead in these efforts and relieve DOD of this requirement. The NSC has access to all agencies and all elements of national power and is best suited to integrate strategy and develop the needed capabilities for nation building operations. This doctrine has to be formulated at the national level. The NSC could use DOD as the starting point and the framework that can be leveraged to build a doctrine and a planning and coordination process. The interagency, not just DOD, needs to effective in planning and responding to operations from Humanitarian Assistance, Peace Keeping, Peace Enforcement, and Post Conflict operations as well as complex emergencies that can arise anywhere including the realm of Homeland Security.
Endnotes


2 Ibid., 19-33.

3 Ibid., 23

4 Ibid., xxxi.


7 Gregory L. Cantwell, “Nation Building: A Joint Enterprise” in Parameters 37(Autumn 2007), 58. LTC Cantwell explains how this argument can be made under Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 307, Section 3062.

8 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E, Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 163-168, 171-183,545-569. Chapter 8 highlights how late in the planning the military and the DOD started forming teams to deal with post-conflict operations. Chapter 24 gives a description the issues encountered when the Coalition Provisional Authority was established in Iraq.

9 Rajiv Chandrasekaran., “Who Killed Iraq?” in Foreign Policy 156 (September/October, 2006),39. The author’s essay discusses how an uncoordinated and inexperienced team caused Iraq to become more dangerous in the post-conflict phase rather than move towards democracy. His opening comments ends with “This is how it all went wrong-before it ever had a chance to go right.”


12 Ibid., 7.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 6.

16 Shultz, 70-71.


18 Ibid., 236-243.


20 Ibid., 372.

21 Ibid., 271.

22 Thomas X. Hammes, (COL, USMC), The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, (Zenith Press, 2006), 260-267. This books uses the term 4th Generation Warfare as the type of asymmetric warfare used by small forces to wage war against countries of greater capability. This type of war is protracted and phased with the capability to move back and forth from one stage to the next as done by insurgencies in China and Vietnam.

23 Cantwell, 56.

24 Gordon, 158-187. Chapter 8 gives an account of the lack of postwar planning conducted in the prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

25 Shultz, 70.

26 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, quote from classroom discussion on lessons learned at Tuft University’s School of International Law and Diplomacy.


28 Clyde A. Vaughn, (LTG, Director, U.S. Army National Guard) , On February 8, 2008, LTG Vaughn was the guest speaker at a National Security forum for Security
Fellows in the Boston area at Harvard University. During his presentation, he described how the Agricultural, Provincial Reconstruction Teams were formed and were ready to deploy.


30 Clark Murdock et al., eds., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Report Phase 2, U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Unifying Effort in Interagency Operations*, (Washington D.C.: CSIS), 47. Currently, there are only four Civil Affairs Commands. Northern Command and the new Africa Command have not been assigned a Civil Affairs Command headquarters.

31 Gates, 13.


33 The Reserve Component term here is inclusive of all Reserve type units, irregardless of agency, and includes the National Guard units as well.

34 The Commission on National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserve into a 21st Century Operational Force*, final Report to congress, 31 Jan 2008, 139-149.


36 Shultz, v.


Vaughn, Clyde A. Comments given in a presentation at Harvard University for the National Security Studies Fellows Lecture series on 08 February 2008 at Cambridge, MA.