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*Intelligence in Another Era*
All the Brains I Can Borrow: Woodrow Wilson and Intelligence Gathering in Mexico, 1913–15

*Will They Fight?*
US Intelligence Assessments and the Reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, 1946–89

*“The Mystery of ALES”*
Once Again, the Alger Hiss Case

**Reviews**

*Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security*

*Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art*

*Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I*

The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Books Reviewed in 2007

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All the Brains I Can Borrow: Woodrow Wilson and Intelligence Gathering in Mexico, 1913–15(U)

Mark E. Benbow

A mere two weeks before Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States, Mexico's Gen. Victoriano Huerta overthrew his country's elected president, Francisco Madero, who would later be assassinated. Wilson was concerned because he feared that foreign policy issues might prove a distraction from the domestic reform measures he wanted to pass through Congress. In fact, during the period 1913–15, Mexico was one of Wilson's main foreign policy concerns, and after June 1914 it was second only to the war in Europe.1

Throughout this period, Wilson struggled not only with forming a policy toward Mexico but more fundamentally with learning what was happening in Mexico's revolution. Wilson did not believe he could trust his usually primary source of information, the Department of State. Instead of relying on diplomatic reporting, Wilson cobbled together a network of formal and informal sources to observe and report on events.

In the process, Wilson's efforts illustrate some of the difficulties presidents faced when gathering intelligence for policymaking before a more formal intelligence-gathering structure was established with the Coordinator of Information in 1941.2

Confronted with the revolution in a neighboring country, Wilson had to judge numerous parties in an ever-changing political and military situation as each faction vied for support inside Mexico and from the United States. In this paper, I will examine the types of intelligence Wilson used to evaluate events in Mexico, their limitations and their strengths, and how Wilson identified and dealt


2 The office was created by Franklin Roosevelt in July 1941. Headed by William J. Donovan, it was a civilian office attached to the White House. It was succeeded by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942.
President Wilson considered any information coming from the embassy in Mexico City to be tainted.

with bias among his sources. I will also examine how Wilson evaluated the information from his various informants. In short, how did Wilson, as a consumer of intelligence, deal with the issues normally presented to intelligence collectors and analysts?

Of the numerous types of intelligence, or “INTs,” as they are recognized by the Intelligence Community today, some, such as MASINT (Measurement And Signatures Intelligence) rely on technology that did not exist in 1913 while others, IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) and SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) were of limited use during the crisis in Mexico. SIGINT was used for counterintelligence purposes during this period, and it would be useful again later, in 1916 during Pershing’s intervention to catch Pancho Villa, but it was of little value in supporting the political analysis Wilson needed during 1913–15. The other major INTs, HUMINT (Human Intelligence) and OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) both played important roles in Wilson’s informal intelligence network. But how useful were these types of sources, and how reliable did they prove to be for Wilson?

HUMINT was Wilson’s most valuable source. Traditionally, presidents before Wilson received their information about overseas events through the State Department. This took the form of reports from ambassadors, ministers, and consuls. Consuls were often US citizens already living overseas, usually for business purposes, rather than foreign service professionals. Consuls received stipends, official titles, and reported on events in their regions and promoted US businesses in their area.

Cables sent by US diplomats in Mexico City and by consuls around the country were received in the State Department, then located in the Executive Office Building next to the White House. In the department they would be hand-carried to the geographical divisions within the building and to the Division of Information, a predecessor of the current Bureau of Intelligence and Research. If judged to be of sufficient importance, a cable could then be forwarded to the secretary of state or to an undersecretary, or even to the president.

The many conflicting perspectives flowing into Washington from US representatives in Mexico during the crisis only clouded the president’s view of events there. The ambassador and the consuls all had their own interpretations of what was happening. Some praised Huerta. Others lauded the revolutionaries, known as the “Constitutionalists.” As a result, President Wilson came to distrust much of the diplomatic reporting from Mexico. But he especially distrusted the reports of his ambassador.

The US ambassador in Mexico City, Henry Lane Wilson, was a conservative Republican

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3 Today, IMINT commonly brings to mind satellite photography, but it also includes ground photography, which was well within 1913 technological capabilities. However, it was normally used by the War Department for tactical planning in which Wilson did not engage.

4 The United States maintained approximately 20 consulates in Mexico during this period.
and an appointee of Wilson’s predecessor, William Howard Taft. Ambassador Wilson strongly advocated US recognition of the Huerta government. He also actively assisted the plotters who overthrew President Madero in February 1913.

**Wilson’s “Confidential Men”**

Just three days after President Wilson was inaugurated on 4 March 1913, the New York World published a front page story revealing Ambassador Wilson’s role in Huerta’s coup. The World was the president’s strongest supporter in the press and it was the newspaper he most trusted. The World’s report reinforced the president’s decision to delay recognition of Huerta’s government, despite the ambassador’s strenuous lobbying. Also as a result of the World’s reports, President Wilson considered any information coming from the US embassy in Mexico to be tainted.5

Presented with conflicting information and distrustful of State reporting, Wilson looked for more reliable sources. First he turned to a reporter, William Bayard Hale, who had been an Episcopalian priest. Hale wrote for the progressive journal World’s Work and had written Wilson’s campaign biography in 1912. Hale would become the first of several reporters, or “confidential men,” picked to go to Mexico to get the “exact facts.” The president asked Hale to “tour” the Latin American states—even though he spoke no Spanish—“ostensibly on your own hook” and report “just what is going on down there.”6

Hale reached Mexico City on 24 May, accompanied by rumors that he was there to investigate the New York World's reports. Hale denied the rumors and claimed that he was only there to research a series of magazine articles. President Wilson also issued a statement denying that Hale was investigating Ambassador Wilson’s role in the coup. The type of information Hale reported to the president indicated that he probably did seek information about Ambassador Wilson’s role in the February 1913 coup, but the president also sought information on Huerta’s legitimacy.

Hale sent his first report to the President Wilson on 18 June 1913. His conclusions confirmed Wilson’s worst fears. President Madero was overthrown in a coup begun by those opposed to his reforms. The coup would have failed if Gen. Huerta, Madero’s own commander, had not betrayed him. To make matters worse, Huerta acted only because he had the active support of Ambassador Wilson. Hale’s report indicated that the official US representative, in fact, confirmed Woodrow Wilson’s worst fears...[the coup leader] acted only because he had the active support of US Ambassador Wilson.


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5 In retrospect, the World’s reporting on Ambassador Wilson’s activities was accurate, notwithstanding his denials. Compare New York World, 7–9 March 1913 with Alan Knight’s discussion of events in The Mexican Revolution, Volume I, Porfiriants, Liberals and Peasants (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 484–90.
The ambassador sought to undermine the Wilson administration’s policy by trying to create the specter of armed intervention.

Hale concluded that “thousands of Mexicans believe that the Ambassador acted on instructions from Washington and looked upon his retention under the new American President as a mark of approval, blaming the United States for the chaos into which [Mexico] has fallen.”

Hale also revealed how the ambassador sought to undermine the Wilson administration’s policy by trying to create the specter of armed intervention by suggesting that Wilson’s policies would inevitably lead to a war in Mexico. Moreover, Hale reported, Ambassador Wilson was noisily attacking President Wilson’s administration calling it “a pack of vicious fools.” As for Huerta, Hale described him as “an ape-like old man…said to subsist on alcohol” and interested in holding power only for the abuses the position allowed him to inflict.

Suspecting what the reporter was doing, Ambassador Wilson attacked Hales’ reports in embassy cables to Washington. Falling back on the tactic he used against Madero in his messages to the Taft administration, the ambassador attacked his adversary’s [Hale’s] sanity: “His mind appears to me to be unevenly balanced.” Furthermore, the ambassador continued, while “some” [like Hale] were trying to describe Madero as “a martyr to democratic ideals,” the former Mexican president had actually been corrupt and robbed his own government, emptying the country’s treasury. The ambassador concluded one of his messages by claiming that “all of the true and secret history of [Madero’s] brief rule in Mexico and prior thereto is known to no one but to me.”

On the basis of Hale’s reports, President Wilson recalled Ambassador Wilson in mid-July 1913 to confer with him and Secretary of State Bryan. The ambassador arrived in Washington ready to personally lobby the administration to extend formal recognition to Huerta’s regime. Wilson and Bryan listened for an hour to the man the president once called “that unspeakable person.” As he spoke, Ambassador Wilson realized that his audience was only giving him cursory attention, and he resigned soon after the meeting. His resignation left Nelson O'Shaughnessy as the US representative in charge at the embassy. However, O'Shaughnessy was also on friendly terms with Huerta, and his reporting remained tainted in the president’s estimation, although Wilson considered him “honest,” if somewhat biased.

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7 A Report by William Bayard Hale, 18 June 1913, PWW 27:536-552. Hale’s sources included American businessmen in Mexico City, members of the Mexican government, and several members of the US embassy staff. Not all of his sources were identified. See Hill, 25–29.

8 There is no direct evidence of the reaction William Jennings Bryan, Wilson’s secretary of state and a dedicated prohibitionist, might have had to this line. Hale may have aimed his statement at the secretary, knowing it would influence his view of Huerta.

9 William Bayard Hale to Ben Davis, 15 July 1913, PWW, Series 2; cable from William Bayard Hale, 15 July 1913, PWW, Series 2; Hale, “Memoranda on Affairs in Mexico,” 9 July 1913, PWW 28:31.

10 Henry Lane Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, 1 July 1913, WWP, Series 2.

Hale remained in Mexico, reporting first from Mexico City and then from Constitutionalist territory in northern Mexico, until January 1914.

Hale had been joined in August 1913 by John Lind, a former governor of Minnesota and member of the US House of Representatives. Like Hale, Lind spoke no Spanish and carried strong Protestant, anti-Catholic prejudices into the overwhelmingly Catholic Mexico. Unlike Hale, however, Lind was empowered to negotiate with Mexican officials. Wilson had instructed Lind to press Huerta’s government for “an immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico,” an “early and free election” in which all parties could participate, a promise from Huerta not to be a candidate, and an agreement by all parties to respect the results of the election. In return, the United States promised to recognize the newly elected government. The Huerta regime met with Lind but refused to accede to Wilson’s demands.12

Lind left Mexico City for the port of Veracruz, where he continued to gather information and report to Washington. Lind sent his reports to Wilson via official cable channels. His reports were a mixture of HUMINT and OSINT. Lind’s data came from human sources, including some who did not wish to be identified, and from the Mexican press. Lind also met with diplomats of other countries anxious to pass their impressions of Mexico to Washington.

Lind was prone to trying to influence policy by suggesting courses of action; seeking to direct, in addition to informing. In the spring of 1914, Lind urged Wilson to intervene militarily in Veracruz, assuring Wilson that US troops would be greeted as liberators. Wilson usually disregarded such suggestions and concentrated on the information his agents reported.

Veracruz proved to be an exception, however. Wilson accepted Lind’s judgment that “To dispose of the present regular army will be an easy task. If the officers in command ‘break ranks’ and say ‘shoo’ they will scatter and never be heard of again except as inmates of jails and almshouses;” and the president authorized an occupation of Veracruz. When Mexican civilians resisted the occupation, which resulted in the deaths of 19 Americans and several hundred Mexicans, Wilson was shocked. After that experience, he viewed such analysis more skeptically, and Lind’s influence was sharply curtailed.13

Other Sources

Wilson’s other “confidential men” were openly known to be US representatives, despite some like Hale, who acted under a thin cover story. They all solicited information from official and unofficial sources alike, meeting with Mexican government officials and revolutionary leaders as well as with unofficial supporters and opponents of the Huerta regime. The material they sent to Wilson was a blend of analysis and raw data. His representatives not only told him what they had learned but also included their judgments and recommendations for action.

Wilson did not rely solely on his confidential men. He also

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12 Instructions to John Lind, 4 August 1913, PWW 28:110-111; see also a copy of Lind’s instructions with edits in Wilson’s hand, Ray S. Baker Papers, LC. Lind’s instructions were leaked to the press, apparently from within the State Department, and appeared in print before Lind arrived in Mexico. See The New York Times, 5 August 1913. Reporters at the time had easy access to State Department offices and often freely read cables from overseas; Hill, 90–93.

sought information from businessmen and friends with contacts in Mexico. He read unsolicited reports from people trying to influence his policies. He received a flood of mail from many unofficially credentialed, self-credentialed, and non-credentialed representatives, all aimed at garnering Wilson’s support for the Mexican leader of their choice. Potentially useful material flooded the White House mail room along with a profusion of crank mail. The president’s secretary, Joseph Tumulty, sorted through it all and forwarded a large representative sample to Wilson.14

Wilson’s Analytical Method

Wilson used all these sources to search for consistent elements in a plethora of information to eliminate his own uncertainties about which Mexican revolutionary faction to support. He believed that pieces of truth would fit together as a whole. The trick was to tease the facts from the propaganda and lies in a rudimentary form of content analysis. As he noted in early 1915,

“Things that are not so do not match. If you hear enough of them, you see there is no pattern whatever; it is a crazy quilt, whereas the truth always matches, piece by piece, with other parts of the truth. No man can lie consistently, and he cannot lie about everything if he talks to you too long. I would guarantee that if enough liars talked to you, you would get the truth; because the parts that they did not invent would match each other, and the parts that they did invent would not match one another. Talk long enough, therefore, and see the connections clearly enough, and you can patch together the case as a whole. I had somewhat that experience about Mexico, and that was about the only way in which I learned anything that was true about it, for there had been vivid imaginations and many special interests which depicted things as they wished me to believe them to be.”15

This sorting of information for consistency applied to the press as well as to the mail Wilson received. He distrusted much of the Washington press corps. As he wrote to a friend in September 1913,

“Do not believe anything you read in the papers. If you read the papers I see, they are utterly untrustworthy.... Read the editorial page and you will know what you will find in the news columns. For unless they are grossly careless the two always support each other. Their lying is shameless and colossal!”16

Wilson held the press of William Randolph Hearst in particular contempt. The Hearst papers were among the loudest of those trying to influence Wilson’s Mexico policy, with the New York American and the San Francisco Examiner leading the way. These papers regularly brandished lurid headlines to discredit the Constitutionalists, accusing them of a wide range of atrocities, including murder, looting and rape. At one point, Hearst’s New York American published photos of children playing on a beach in British Honduras—photos that had originally appeared in the New York Tribune in 1912—with a caption falsely claiming they were children in Mexico lined up to be shot by revolutionaries, “proof of an almost unbelievable state of barbarity.” Wilson ignored such reports. He had little use for Hearst, but the stories contaminated the public debate and so may have influenced

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14 Some of the crank mail can still be found in Wilson’s papers with his notes on them. These provide the best evidence that he had perused some of the letters himself. It is likely Tumulty gave him selected material as entertainment as well as to improve the president’s perspective on Mexico. See for example, Sidney A. Witherbee to Wilson, 10 November 1913; Witherbee to Wilson, 14 November 1913, both in WWP Series 4, Case 95. Witherbee, who may have been an entrepreneur with interests in the country, tried unsuccessfully to convince Secretary of State Bryan to send him to Mexico to kill Huerta. There were also warnings to the president about a conspiracy by the pope, Protestants, Masons, or Jews, depending on the writer’s personal prejudices.


16 Wilson to Mary Allen Hulbert, 21 September 1913, PWW 28:311.
Throughout the crisis, the notable exception to Wilson's attitude toward the press remained the New York World. Wilson wrote to the World's publisher, Ralph Pulitzer, in 1914,

Let me say that every day I open the editorial page of the World expecting to find what I do, a real vision of things as they are.

Wilson also held the Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican in high regard. Secretary Tumulty pasted together long sheets with selected editorials and stories from other newspapers for Wilson's reading. But, while Wilson discounted much of the press coverage on Mexico, a small group of reporters—perceived to be accurate—were called to Washington for personal interviews with Wilson. In this select group was World reporter John Reed, who met Wilson in 1914 to give the president his first hand impressions. Reed emphasized the revolution as a justified fight against powerful landowners and a corrupt Catholic Church, and he painted Pancho Villa in a very positive light. Wilson told his ambassador to Britain to read Reed's articles on Mexico because he "had it right." 

Much less reliable as sources for Wilson were American businessmen who tended to back whichever faction posed the least threat to their property or whichever faction their business rivals opposed. For example, American mine owners, the dominant US business in Mexico, generally favored Pancho Villa because he controlled much of the area in which US-owned mines were located and he had promised to protect the mines so long as their owners advanced him large "loans."

The Phelps-Dodge Corporation, headed by Wilson's good friend from Princeton, Cleveland Dodge, however, favored Venustiano Carranza, head of the Constitutionalists, as did Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor. American oil interests also preferred Carranza, who controlled many of the oil-producing areas in northeast Mexico. They also hoped to benefit if Carranza ousted Huerta, who had the backing of rival British oil companies. The expatriate American business community in Mexico City supported Huerta, but Wilson largely ignored them because he did not trust anyone who supported Huerta. No significant international business group supported another contestant for power, Emiliano Zapata, most likely because he controlled a region in which there was no significant US business interest.

Although Wilson did not trust reporting from businessmen with interests in Mexico because of their biases, he did...
read some of the reports businessmen sent to him or to his cabinet members, particularly if they came from men with ties to political allies or to Princeton.

One Princetonian businessman, John Silliman, actually enlisted as a representative. Silliman happened to be vice consul in Coahuila and had known Carranza before the revolution. Unfortunately for Wilson, his old colleague was a less-than-perfect choice. Silliman was timid and spoke Spanish so poorly that Carranza never took him seriously. Some of Carranza's staff began calling the envoy "silly man." In at least one case, Carranza made Silliman read one of Wilson's messages in Spanish to embarrass him. Nonetheless, Wilson kept him in his position, not wanting to humiliate him with a recall. Wilson judged that Silliman was doing a capable job just passing messages back and forth. The State Department, however, did send a translator to work with him.20

The US military was notably absent from Wilson's list of intelligence collectors. Their role, in the president's mind, was to plan the tactical details of the military operations they were ordered to undertake.

An important exception was Gen. Hugh Scott, commander of the Army's Southern Department. Wilson consulted Scott, but only about Villa and Carranza, especially since Scott had met Villa several times.

Wilson chose not to tap Scott's superior, Secretary of War Lindley Garrison, an officer the president did not know well. Garrison was chosen for the cabinet position only because Wilson's secretary, Tumulty, knew Garrison from service in the New Jersey state government. Garrison turned out to be a vocal hawk favoring military intervention in cabinet meetings, basing his comments and reports on information he received from officers stationed along the US-Mexican border. Garrison soon realized, however, that Wilson did not often take his advice on foreign policy questions. The secretary of war, like the generals he managed, was consigned to tactical and administrative issues on Mexico.21

Another exception was Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, who was a member of Wilson's inner circle.22 Wilson knew him well and because Daniels, unlike Garrison, was not an interventionist, Wilson trusted his judgment. In addition, because the United States maintained a naval presence in Mexican ports, a practice begun by President Taft, Daniels was getting information from navy officers on the scene.23

Wilson had a strict view of his cabinet's role, and he expected its members to stay within the well-defined bounds of their departments. Thus, in keeping diplomatic and strategic initiatives in his office, even members Wilson trusted were isolated from decisionmaking on Mexico—and thus of no intelligence value to the president. For example, he complained to his fiance, Edith Galt, that his son-in-law, Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo, was trying to influ-


20 Hill, 210-14. Silliman was promoted to full consul in 1914; Mexican Herald, Mexico City and Veracruz, 28 April 1914: 1; 12 May 1914: 1; 13 May 1914: 1.


22 Daniels had been a leader in Wilson's 1912 presidential election campaign.

23 Wilson to Mrs. Galt, 23 June 1915, PWW 33:446.
ence his Mexican policies, which were, in the president’s words, “none of his business.” Only Secretary of State Bryan and, to a lesser extent, Daniels advised Wilson on Mexico. Bryan was included because US policy toward Mexico was in his portfolio of duties.

**IMINT and SIGINT, Lesser Players**

Types of intelligence other than HUMINT and OSINT had only minor roles in informing Wilson’s policies. IMINT was limited to ground photography used as tactical intelligence for the military.\(^4\) In preparation for possible armed intervention in 1914, the US Navy sent officers into Mexico to photograph bridges and railways. One Marine officer even passed himself off as a US businessman writing a guide book for Mexico City and received a tour of the Mexican Presidential Palace and its defenses. These missions played no role in White House decisions.\(^5\)

**SIGINT play an important part, but it was largely a counterintelligence tool, used to monitor the activities of foreign intelligence services in the United States.**

SIGINT played an important part, but it was largely a counterintelligence tool, used to monitor the activities of foreign intelligence services in the United States. It was limited at the time to tapping telephone lines and telegraph cables, and intercepting wireless radio communications. SIGINT, in contrast to Wilson’s HUMINT and OSINT, came mostly through official channels, rather than through the informal ones Wilson had established.

**SIGINT turned out to be especially useful in the spring of 1915 in preventing Huerta’s return to Mexico from exile in Spain, to which he had fled in July 1914. The Germans, eager to embroil the United States in a war with Mexico, courted Huerta. In February 1915, a German naval officer, Captain Franz von Rintelen, visited Huerta in Spain and offered to back him in a counterrevolution. Encouraged by fighting then underway between Villa and Carranza, Huerta agreed to consider the idea and went to New York, landing on 12 April 1915. His reception by a crowd of Mexican supporters bolstered the former dictator’s plans. He was greeted by admirers everywhere he went. The atmosphere, at least in the exile community, seemed to favor his return.\(^6\)**

Treasury Secretary William McAdoo’s men tapped German and Austrian diplomatic telephones in Washington and New York to monitor foreign diplomatic communications.\(^26\)

\(^4\) Aerial photography was possible and was under development in Europe, but it was not used in Mexico. For a history of its development, see Terrence J. Finnegain, Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, 2006).

25 Legendary Marine officer Smedley Butler played the businessman in Mexico City. In effect, he was an early non-official cover officer. The ground photographs of the areas around Tampico and Veracruz are in the Office of Naval Intelligence files, Lot 2428, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division.


Gen. Victoriano Huerta (center) on his arrival in New York City. (Bettmann/CORBIS)
York and relayed the reports to Wilson. These reports focused more on the activities of German and Austrian diplomats and their possible complicity in sabotage in the United States than they did on Mexico, but they did include information about German plotting in Mexico.27

By 24 June 1915, mistakenly thinking he had shaken pursuers, Huerta boarded a train in New York bound for San Francisco, switching later to one for El Paso. At the same time, Villa’s representative in Washington reported to the Wilson administration that numerous former Huertista officers were on their way to El Paso from places of exile in the United States. The next day, United States marshals arrested Huerta as he stepped from his train in Newman, Texas, only a few miles from the border. Supporters waiting in a car to drive him across the border were also arrested.28

SIGINT thus provided “actionable” information about Huerta’s plotting just as Hale’s HUMINT had given the president the information he needed to dismiss a US ambassador. Wilson’s other sources provided less definitive information. Some reports improved his awareness of key issues, most notably land reform. However, much of the reporting simply made him cautious in choosing one factional leader over another. In his notes to Secretary of State Bryan, Wilson demonstrated a willingness to recognize whichever revolutionary faction could demonstrate that it had gained Mexican public support.

Wishing for More Information

However, until late 1915 the information Wilson was receiving could not help him come to a conclusion. For example, Wilson once complained that US consuls reporting from Mexico “sent me only a small batch of ‘flimsies’ [telegrams printed on very thin paper] and they contained nothing but multiplied details—and very small details at that—of the chaos that is Mexico.”

In all likelihood, Wilson’s ambivalence was also influenced by the efforts of those vying for power in Mexico. The Mexicans were well aware of Wilson’s actions and each political and military faction did its best to influence his interpretation of events, through lobbying, personal contacts, and in the US press. Huerta had considerable support in the United States, especially among business leaders, but Wilson’s negative opinion of Huerta was firmly set. Carranza and Villa, however, both had fairly sophisticated public relations campaigns aimed at the United States and the White House. Carranza had a press office in New York and Washington DC, which issued regular releases to reporters and to members of


Congress. Villa encouraged reporters, like Reed, who gave him favorable coverage, and his military train included a press car in which reporters could sleep and eat. He also allowed them to use the Mexican telegraph system, often free of charge, to contact newspapers at home.

Because Wilson insisted on concrete information before acting, he was frustrated by the lack of definitive reporting. As he would tell Edith Galt, "The fact is, I never have had any patience with 'ifs' and conjectural cases. My mind insists always upon waiting until something actually does happen and then discussing what is to be done about that."^30

Wilson's frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence is neither hard to understand nor uncommon to presidents, as they and other policymakers often expect and demand more from intelligence than it can deliver. To be fair to Wilson's sources, it was not until 1915 that any faction in Mexico gained enough dominance to legitimately earn US recognition.

Lack of definitive judgments on Wilson's part reflected the lack of a stable reality on the ground. By late summer 1915, however, it was clear that Carranza led the most powerful revolutionary faction, and, in October 1915, Wilson extended recognition to Carranza's government.

In the end, Wilson's system produced mixed results, with more problems than would be acceptable in a professionalized system.

An Assessment of Wilson's System

In the end, Wilson's system produced mixed results, with more problems than would be acceptable in a professionalized system. Wilson received a lot of good information, particularly from American reporters in Mexico and from the US consuls who had built personal ties to Mexico's revolutionary leaders. Wilson did trust some official State Department reporting, but only from sources that seemed to him to be accurate.

The informality of Wilson's system made his method cumbersome, but, possibly worse, his approach to assessing the reliability of reports by determining its consistency with other facts was itself unreliable. As future intelligence failures would demonstrate, Wilson was wrong to believe that only the truth could be consistent. Falsehoods we now know can also seem logical and factually consistent if key contradictory information remains unknown, ignored, or analyzed on the basis of faulty assumptions.

Fortunately for Wilson, his initial assumption that Huerta's government lacked popular support relative to the Constitutionalist revolutionaries was based on accurate information—including the New York World's reporting—and so provided a firm foundation for judging later information. The quality of the World's reporting helped Wilson. In hindsight it appears to have been accurate in comparison to other major US newspapers, the Hearst chain in particular. Had Wilson based his judgments on the reporting of Ambassador Wilson or on the Hearst newspapers, his system would have served only to reinforce erroneous assumptions.^32

Wilson tapped sources that were diverse, decentralized, and with different kinds of expertise. Because of this variety, no one source could dominate Wilson's thinking and he was able to avoid the traps of groupthink. Because Wilson's policies were still forming, he also heard different viewpoints about the Mexican factions.

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Wilson learned from his efforts to understand events in Mexico, including the lesson that foreign information had to come from more places than the usual State Department channels.

although he did ignore most of Huerta’s supporters. The end result of this information flow may have been chaotic, but it gave Wilson a wide range of opinions and information.

Wilson was also sensitive to the proclivity of his sources to suggest policy. Although he sometimes took that advice—as he did Lind’s urging to occupy Veracruz in early 1914—in general, Wilson dismissed the policy suggestions of his reporters.

After World War I ended, Wilson took another approach to gathering intelligence and created a new organization, the Inquiry, to pull together information and provide analysis on the issues raised at the Versailles Peace Conference. The Inquiry consisted of area experts—including members of the military, academics, and reporters—who knew the different regions and populations affected by the war.

In establishing the Inquiry, Wilson elected to use a more formal structure of intelligence collection and analytic expertise than he had employed in trying to understand Mexico. The Inquiry was disbanded immediately after the Versailles conference ended, but it demonstrated that Wilson had learned from his efforts to understand events in Mexico, including the lesson that foreign information had to come from more places than the usual State Department channels.33

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Readers interested in additional material on this subject may refer to a bibliography accompanying Web versions of this article at https://cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.htm.

Will They Fight?

US Intelligence Assessments and the Reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, 1946–89 (U)

James D. Marchio

US Intelligence Community judgments on Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces influenced in important ways how the United States waged “cold war” as well as how it prepared for a potential “hot” conflict. The analytic lessons of the period are relevant today.

Gen. Nathan Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), was clear in telling Congress in January 1959: “As we are all aware, the mere recital of numbers will not tell the entire story. The Soviet bloc and allied divisions are not equally effective, nor of the same size and composition. The political reliability, as well as dependability, of the satellite divisions is questionable.”

The next four decades would show Gen. Twining could not have been more truthful or accurate.

Following is my reconstruction of the story of the US Intelligence Community’s (IC) efforts to address one of the central analytical questions of the Cold War—whether and how well Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) military forces would fight for their Soviet masters in the event of a conflict. In describing how the IC wrestled with this difficult issue, I have attempted to answer several related questions:

• First, how important, in fact, was the NSWP topic to intelligence managers, and what analytical effort did they assign to dealing with it?

• Second, what challenges did analysts confront when examining this issue, and how were they similar to or different from those facing IC analysts working other analytic problems during the Cold War?

• Third, what conclusions did the IC reach on the reliability of East European forces and how confident were they in their judgments? Did their assessments change over time and, if so, how?

• Fourth, did IC analyses of this issue matter in any significant way? That is, did they affect US policies and programs or were they academic exercises?

• Finally, are the lessons from this chapter in the Cold War of any value to today’s intelligence analysts?

The bibliographic references accompanying this article can be found in its Web versions on https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.html.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
US officials saw Soviet concerns over East European and NSWP reliability as a deterrent to war and a moderating influence on Soviet behavior.

The Analytical Effort—How Much and Why

A review of the scholarly literature on NSWP reliability suggests little work was accomplished on this topic—within or outside the IC—until the late 1970s. Then and continuing for nearly a decade, the question drew considerable scholarly attention. Since the Cold War’s end, however, historians have written extensively on the Cuban Missile Crisis, the “Bomber Gap,” and technological advances in collection capabilities, but no significant historical assessment of NSWP forces, employing unclassified or declassified national security products, has emerged.

Archival material made accessible over the past two decades, however, reveals NSWP reliability was the subject of attention at many levels of the IC. At the national level, two national intelligence estimates (NIEs) were devoted solely to the issue. The first was published in 1966 (“Reliability of the USSR’s East European Allies,” SNIE 11-15-66), and the other (“Military Reliability of the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact Allies,” NIE 12-11-83) in 1983. But several dozen other NIEs contained analysis relevant to the topic. These estimates examined issues such as the capabilities of Soviet general purpose and theater forces, Soviet military policy, and the Kremlin’s concepts and capabilities for going to war in Europe.

Reliability issues also appeared in assessments of arms control and force reduction proposals for Europe and in multiple analyses exploring the nature and implications of political and societal unrest in Eastern Europe. Indeed, a whole series of “vulnerability” and “resistance potential” studies produced over the years discussed factors integral to the reliability issue as part of problems affecting the stability of East European regimes.

Such now declassified studies document that attention was also paid to reliability issues at the theater and service level, where the topic was of enduring interest to senior command and service leaders. The US European Command’s ground component—US Army Europe (USAREUR)—and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) produced assessments on the subject; annual and quarterly USAREUR intelligence assessments examined reliability factors in their main bodies as well as in annexes devoted to “reliability” and “resistance potential.”

The most comprehensive of these works was a 1972 USAREUR study that focused exclusively on NSWP northern tier countries. Service-level interest was evident in a series of RAND studies sponsored by the US Air Force on political and military aspects of the Warsaw Pact. Air Force intelligence also reportedly supported an “Achilles” program, dedicated to researching Soviet vulnerabilities.

The IC interest in and effort devoted to East European reliability issues reflected in part the importance senior US national security leaders and military commanders attributed to the topic. In public remarks and in national security memorandums, US officials saw Soviet concerns over East European and NSWP reliability as a deterrent to war and a moderating influence on Soviet behavior.

In October 1953, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, a former director of central intelligence (DCI) then serving as undersecretary of state, publicly asserted that the Soviet Union would not start an offensive war against Western Europe unless its lines of communication (LOC) through the satellite countries were more secure than they were then. He noted that the greatest deterrent to Soviet aggression was the “unsettlement” in the neighboring satellites.

Reliability concerns also were perceived to be a force multiplier for the West should con-
Reliability issues were studied more closely in the 1950s... [but] Washington’s Flexible Response defense policy of the 1960s and 1970s ensured reliability issues remained of interest.

The current status of the Czechoslovak forces is a key factor in Warsaw Pact capabilities for both immediate and reinforced military action against NATO. At present, the Soviets almost certainly would not count on these forces in any serious contingency. Further, should armed conflict with NATO occur in the present circumstances, the Soviets would probably feel it necessary to use some of their own forces for occupation duty in Czechoslovakia. The unreliability of the Czechs is probably highly disruptive to Warsaw Pact military planning.12

Other studies looked at potential aid to resistance movements and dissident elements in Eastern Europe to ensure their militaries remained passive or actively resisted Soviet efforts to suppress popular unrest.13

The IC’s level of effort on this topic varied over time, driven by factors and developments on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For sure, reliability issues were studied more closely in the

1950s, when the United States perceived a real possibility that war with the Soviet Union might erupt. Fostering uncertainty over the loyalty of Moscow’s Warsaw Pact allies and the security of Soviet LOCs through Eastern Europe and laying the groundwork for active resistance behind enemy lines were seen as prudent military measures.

During the 1960s and 1970s Washington’s Flexible Response defense policy—with its greater reliance on conventional military means and the need to counter the Warsaw Pact’s larger ground forces—ensured reliability issues remained of interest. Unrest and rising nationalism in Eastern Europe spurred study as well. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Solidarity crisis in Poland as well as Romania’s foreign policy “deviations” all served to highlight that, despite prophylactic measures by Moscow and the East European regimes, the reliability of NSWP forces was in doubt.14

Growing East European nationalism also was perceived as potentially offering greater insight into Soviet attack plans. A 1966 NIE, “Warning of Soviet Intention to Attack,” concluded that

the chances of obtaining indications for warning are enhanced by the growing independence of the East European states in both political and military matters, and by their demands for more discussion and mutual agreement on Warsaw Pact planning and the role of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.... We think the chances are good that through such channels we would get some knowledge of Soviet intentions.15

Lastly, changes in Soviet military policy and its war-fighting strategy—changes that greatly increased the role and importance of NSWP forces—drove ongoing interest. Nikita Khrushchev’s push to reduce Soviet general purpose forces and rely more on Moscow’s growing strategic nuclear deterrent initially generated the requirement for greater East European military capability, a requirement that was reinforced by a growing awareness that a war with NATO might have to be fought with forces already in Eastern Europe.16

Challenges to Analysis

Determining whether East European military forces would fight and, if they did, how well they would perform was neither simple nor merely “bean counting.” The IC was confronted with a host of analytic
challenges ranging from defining the problem to overcoming the paucity and dubious reliability of available sources. These challenges were compounded by the lack of subject matter expertise in the community and by intermittent bureaucratic support.

Although the issue was important to the IC, where its components came down on the key questions wasn’t always clear. Despite the term’s use in dozens of in-depth intelligence assessments into the 1980s, what was meant by “military reliability” was not explicitly defined until the 1983 NIE on the subject. In that estimate, the concept was used in two contexts. The first was as an assessment of whether NSWP armed forces would carry out Warsaw Pact directives in the period before or during a conflict with NATO. The other addressed Soviet perceptions of NSWP reliability.17

Not only did the IC lack definitions, but it apparently did not have an agreed upon methodology for assessing NSWP reliability. Warszawa Pact forces would affect whether and how NSWP forces would fight.

IC analyses also closely examined the political and military situation in each NSWP country and its implications for reliability. In the 1970s and 1980s, IC products increasingly focused on Warsaw Pact command and control (C2) arrangements, the types of military equipment NSWP forces possessed, and the frequency and nature of military training.18 Additional insights were gleaned from examinations of East European forces’ performance during crises, from the 1953 East German Uprising to the Solidarity crisis in Poland.19

Beyond methodological issues, lack of reliable sources hindered IC analysis. Estimates of the Cold War period acknowledged this limiting factor.20 The fielding of national technical collection systems in the 1960s and 1970s did little for the IC elements that followed the issue. Instead, their problem became more acute with the erection of the Berlin Wall and the reduction to a trickle of the flow of escapees and travelers who could offer the kind of insights the IC needed.

The quality of the information they did get left much to be desired. Collection by units like the US Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in East Ger-

many and other means addressed some of these shortfalls, but quantity and quality remained problems.21 Debriefings of escapees, refugees, and travelers provided the majority of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) on NSWP reliability. This HUMINT was usually based on second- or third-hand access and often was no more than rumor and hearsay. Attaché, foreign liaison service, and embassy reporting occasionally offered insight, as did material generated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Radio Free Europe, and emigré newspapers and journals.22

High-ranking sources—like colonels Oleg Penkovskiy and Rudyard Kuklinski—with access to senior Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders were clearly the exception, not the rule.23 Consequently, it is not surprising that the 1983 NIE on reliability readily conceded:

For the most part the perceptions of Soviet leaders described in the study are our own judgments of their probable views, buttressed by observations of their precautionary actions.24

Two additional factors not common to other Cold War intelligence disciplines hindered IC analysis of NSWP. For one, the advanced social science skills best suited to assessing the complex issue were not widely found in the military intelligence establishment or, for that matter, initially in
other elements of the community. Although service and command intelligence organizations contributed key inputs on topics like training, discipline, and morale, they lacked the expertise to integrate such analyses with the larger political and societal issues that would play roles in determining whether and how well Moscow's allies would fight.

This deficiency limited the community's capacity to produce on the topic and forced a heavy reliance at times on think tanks and universities for analytic skills, at least early in the Cold War. Later, as the military services produced and employed intelligence specialists with advanced degrees and foreign area officers (FAOs) with regional and language expertise, this reliance diminished.25

The other limiting factor was the lack of a strong bureaucratic supporter. Reliability assessments—unlike estimates identifying a "bomber gap" or new or more numerous Soviet tanks—could do little to spur larger procurement budgets. In fact, assessments questioning the reliability of NSWP forces could be perceived as undermining the need to match larger Warsaw Pact capabilities. Candid assessments posed problems, particularly in the NATO arena, where a viable Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact threat was needed to justify even modest defense budgets. Consequently the few advocates of reliability and associated vulnerability studies were generally found in the special operations and psychological warfare communities, neither of which carried much bureaucratic clout after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.26

What Did They Find?

Consensus and consistency, not discord or significant change, generally characterized the IC's overall assessments of NSWP reliability of which had combat experience, most lacked modern equipment and had, from the Soviet viewpoint, "serious shortcomings in organization, leadership, and political reliability."27

The June 1953 East German Uprising and unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe reinforced the IC's initial judgment that "the question of political reliability of the Satellite armies places a significant limitation upon their military usefulness."28 Even so, some analysts believed Soviet and East European measures implemented after 1953 to bolster reliability were at least partially successful.29 Noting the possibility that satellite forces might be employed in certain situations "Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956," NIE 12-54, concluded:

We believe that while the Satellite armed forces would probably fight well against traditional enemies, their reliability will remain sufficiently questionable during the period of this estimate to place a significant limitation upon their military usefulness in event of general war.30

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and Poland's defiance of Moscow in the days before the Hungarian revolt raised new
The expanded role of NSWP forces in Pact plans and their improved military capabilities and reliability became the focus of IC analysis during the next eight years.

Questions about NSWP reliability and Soviet policies. Noting that the Polish army supported the nationalist opposition and most Hungarian soldiers either went over to the rebellion or did not oppose it, NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure," concluded the year after the revolt:

The Soviet leaders probably now believe that for many purposes the reliability of these forces cannot be counted upon, and that, in circumstances where internal uprisings or foreign war raised hopes of attaining national independence, they might become an actual danger to Communist regimes.

The NIE went on to predict that "intensive efforts will be undertaken to improve security controls within Satellite forces, especially among higher officers."

Theater- and national-level estimates monitored and noted improvement among NSWP forces in the years that followed. By 1960, the IC's assessment had evolved based on this progress, albeit with reservations remaining over NSWP reliability. USAREUR's annual intelligence estimate, for example, stated:

While we anticipate continued improvement of the military posture of Satellite forces during the period of this estimate, the Soviets probably would employ only Bulgarian and Czech forces in offensive operations. The remaining Warsaw Pact forces would probably be used in various internal defensive roles.

1961–1976

The expanded role of NSWP forces in Pact plans and their improved military capabilities and reliability became the focus of IC analysis during the next eight years. By 1964 the IC recognized that Khrushchev's decision to cut overall Soviet defense spending—largely at the expense of conventional forces—had enormous implications for NSWP forces. The same was true for the evolution of Soviet views on limited wars, where Moscow went from "holding that limited non-nuclear wars would almost certainly escalate" to "a growing acceptance of the possibility of limited non-nuclear conflict."

These changes in strategy were reflected in the four-fold increase in Warsaw Pact exercises between 1961 and 1965 and multiple other measures designed to transform the organization into an alliance capable of waging war. The IC monitored Moscow's progress in training, integrating, and equipping its bloc allies. To the Intelligence Community's credit, it recognized that the Kremlin's success did not come without a cost. A 1964 estimate noted that

while the Soviets are evidently disposed to give East European forces greater responsibilities within the Warsaw Pact structure, the growing political autonomy of these countries probably tends to reduce the USSR's confidence in its ability to marshal them for an offensive against NATO.

Six months later the IC went even further, observing that

as autonomy spreads in Eastern Europe, the range of contingencies in which the USSR can rely on effective military support from the Warsaw Pact allies will narrow.... This may require the Soviets to re-examine their concept of a rapid offensive sweep through Western Europe, at least to the extent that they had depended on the Satellite forces for supporting action.

The IC's most significant assessment of the monumental changes going on in Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact was delivered in August 1966 in the first of the two estimates the Intelligence Community would devote solely to the subject, SNIE 11-15-66 ("Reliability of the USSR's East
European Allies"). Prompted by a request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the SNIE explored the factors affecting the political/military reliability of the East European Warsaw Pact nations as allies of the USSR, "particularly in respect to the Soviet assessment of those factors." The request specifically asked the IC to assess East European reliability under three assumed circumstances in which the USSR might conceivably plan to engage the West in non-nuclear combat: 1) a Berlin crisis; 2) a deliberate non-nuclear attack on Western Europe; and 3) a conflict arising by accident.40

The writers of the SNIE discerned that the Pact's military purposes were intertwined with political objectives, and thus they examined what they considered the major considerations affecting NSWP reliability—the growth of national communism and Soviet strengthening of the Warsaw Pact.

The assessment correctly recognized that Moscow was engaged in a "delicate task of giving the East Europeans more stature within the Pact while tightening the actual alliance by a more thorough integration of East European forces into Soviet operational plans and deployments." The SNIE concluded that Moscow was succeeding in this effort despite the growth of East European nationalism and an emerging independent voice in Romania.42

The assessment also acknowledged that Soviet policy and success varied behind the Iron Curtain, and that key differences existed between the military capabilities and importance it attributed to the Warsaw Pact's northern (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) and southern tiers (Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria). Nonetheless, the SNIE's bottom-line was clear:

We believe that they [Soviet leaders] must now reexamine their decision of the late 1950's to place much heavier reliance on East European armies in operations against the Central Region of NATO. The Czechoslovak situation is but the latest in a series of developments putting in question the reliability of East European forces in the event of war. We, too, believe that this would be the case, at least initially.44

The Soviets probably believe that strict military discipline, Communist indoctrination, and the careful selection of East European officers and career NCOs, will ensure the reliability of the East European forces in the event of war. The 1968 "Prague Spring" and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that the IC had overestimated Moscow's success in controlling and channeling East European nationalism.

Ironically, only seven years earlier, Czechoslovakia had been assessed in a USAREUR intelligence estimate as one of Moscow's most capable and reliable allies. Yet the IC's failure to foresee the Prague Spring did not blind it to the profound political and military ramifications the events that year would have for the Soviets. A SNIE published in October 1968, "Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact Against NATO," noted:

We believe that they [Soviet leaders] must now reexamine their decision of the late 1950's to place much heavier reliance on East European armies in operations against the Central Region of NATO. The Czechoslovak situation is but the latest in a series of developments putting in question the reliability of East European forces—Romanian insubordination, the abortive Bulgarian military coup, and Polish military disgruntlement at involvement in the Middle East crisis of 1967.

The 1968 "Prague Spring" and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that the IC had overestimated Moscow's success in controlling and channeling the rising tide of East European nationalism. While the Kremlin could take solace in the fact that token East German, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian forces had obeyed orders to provide "fraternal assistance," the August invasion highlighted the fragility of NSWP reliability.

The contribution of each East European country would have to be weighed separately by the Soviets since there are wide variations in reliability. Soviet concern on this account may result in broad changes in Warsaw Pact organization.
Uncertainty surrounding the Kremlin’s course of action in the aftermath of the 1968 invasion initially prompted disagreement within the IC on the issue of NSWP reliability.

and troop dispositions, but it is still too early to predict them.47

The SNIE’s conclusions echoed a number of familiar themes—from whether and how Moscow might employ NSWP forces to variations in the reliability of each of the East European militaries. Nevertheless, these issues required reexamination in light of the 1968 events, potential Soviet responses, and the military and political implications for the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Uncertainty surrounding the Kremlin’s course of action in the aftermath of the 1968 invasion initially prompted disagreement within the IC on the issue of NSWP reliability. The 1970 interagency study, “The Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO,” acknowledged that some analysts doubt that East European forces would prove reliable in a variety of contingencies while others consider that the East Europeans would be reliable in most circumstances.48

Elaborating, the study went on to note that some members of the estimate’s working group believe that the other East European forces in the Central Region could probably become almost totally unreliable for use against NATO.

Others qualified this judgment, arguing that “in certain cases these forces would be reliable—for example, Polish forces in contingencies which raised the specter of East Germany’s reunification with West Germany.”49

Disagreement over Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact reliability was fed by reports that East German-Polish relations had deteriorated seriously as a result of West Germany’s Ostpolitik foreign policy, changing Soviet security considerations, and the rise of a more assertive East Germany. Reliable reporting indicated that the Poles had implied to the Soviets that the East Germans were unreliable members of the Bloc, alleging in this connection both that the East German army was ideologically impure and that East German propaganda had been soft on [Czechoslovak Prime Minister] Dubček.50

While IC analysts acknowledged that such charges probably had been “exaggerated by the Poles for polemical purposes,” they viewed these charges—voiced secretly to Moscow—as indicative of intra-Pact strains that could undermine reliability.51

These doubts largely dissipated over the next five years as Soviet and East European measures to improve NSWP reliability were taken. A detailed 1972 USAREUR study on the Warsaw Pact’s northern tier, for example, concluded that the East Germans would respond to a call by the Warsaw Pact for hostile action against the West and would be particularly effective in the short run. As with earlier IC assessments, the 1972 study acknowledged that East German reliability in a longer conflict or one in which setbacks were experienced might deteriorate.52 Similar conclusions were drawn about the Polish and Czech armies.53

The 1975 NIE “Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO” echoed many of the same themes. The estimate concluded that the armed forces of Eastern Europe were loyal to their national regimes and that, should a general war erupt, the East Europeans would fight.54 On the other hand, the NIE qualified this judgment by asserting that the basic question of whether or not an East European regime would commit itself to Pact wartime operations would be “heavily influenced by the perceptions of the national leaders and the political circumstances leading to war.”55

The NIE also acknowledged the limitations of the IC’s analysis:

We cannot judge the enthusiasm with which East Europeans will support the conflict. Neither can we fore-
see how they would view their own national interests in the course of a conflict nor the inducements that would be required to make them quit the war.\textsuperscript{56}

The estimate was more confident in its assessment of NSWP military contributions and the Kremlin’s reliance on these forces:

While Soviet leaders may have private doubts of whether the Pact cohesiveness would withstand the strains of war, they have committed themselves to relying on East European forces to carry out wartime functions potentially critical to the Pact’s prospects for success in a war with NATO.\textsuperscript{57}

The military importance of NSWP forces and the ability of Moscow to commit these forces by bypassing their national regimes became a key IC focus in the years ahead and an important variable in the community’s assessment of NSWP reliability.

1977–1989

The Warsaw Pact’s last years were reminiscent of its rocky origins, with concerns over unrest and questions surrounding the reliability and effectiveness of non-Pact forces dominating. As it had before, Moscow successfully dealt with the immediate challenge of Poland but ultimately could not stem the political and economic forces that would bring down the Berlin Wall and spark the 1989 East European revolutions.

IC assessments during this period likewise mirrored earlier patterns, shifting from pessimistic views of political turmoil and Warsaw Pact disintegration to acknowledgement that Soviet and East European control mechanisms had proven effective in yet another intra-Pact operation.

The IC was quick to recognize the approaching political upheaval in Poland and the ramifications for the Warsaw Pact. A June 1977 assessment, “Probable Soviet Reactions to a Crisis in Poland,” concluded that Moscow would first search for a nonmilitary solution in addressing labor unrest and political dissidence. The Kremlin, it asserted, recognized that an invasion of Poland—with its much larger population of intensely nationalistic and anti-Soviet people—would pose much more serious challenges than those faced in Czechoslovakia. Any intervention would, with near certainty, “be met with widespread and bloody opposition, including some from elements of the Polish army.”\textsuperscript{58}

Although this assessment varied some over the next four years, the IC remained confident in its judgment that Moscow could not count on the Polish military for much assistance in resolving its “Polish problem.”\textsuperscript{59}

Between 1977 and the December 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland, over a half-dozen NIEs or substantial intelligence assessments addressed the dilemma Moscow faced with Poland and overall NSWP reliability and its bearing on the larger question of the military balance of power in Europe and Moscow’s perceived more aggressive foreign policy. IC assessments repeatedly pointed out that the Pact’s numerical advantage in ground forces in Central Europe was tempered by the questionable reliability of the East European forces. An assessment in 1977, for example, noted that “they [the East Europeans] probably would respond with a total military commitment only to a clear and present danger to their homelands.”\textsuperscript{60}

The IC also saw the impact of the unreliability of NSWP forces on the Kremlin’s willingness and ability to go to war. “Doubts that its East European allies might not fight loyally and effectively” a 1978 assessment argued, “constrain Moscow’s planning for aggressive war.”\textsuperscript{61} Several estimates suggested that the problems in Poland or elsewhere in Eastern Europe would severely undermine the capacities of the Soviet war machine. The
refusal of an East European ally to participate fully in an offensive against NATO would tie down Soviet forces on the territory of the recalcitrant ally with “policing” and logistic transport responsibilities. Moreover, the Soviets, according to one assessment, "probably would have to bring in additional forces from the USSR prior to hostilities, thus affording NATO additional warning and reaction time."62

The potential problems and implications were even greater if Poland was that “recalcitrant ally.” As a July 1981 assessment indicated:

Because Poland’s role in Soviet plans for war against NATO is critical, a Soviet invasion could do substantial damage to the warfighting capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.63 ... even if all Polish military units stood absolutely aside during a Soviet invasion (which we regard as unlikely), Moscow would not be able to interpret that passive response as ensuring the continuation of Poland’s current role in Warsaw Pact plans for war.64

The declaration of martial law in December 1981 and Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski’s initial success in its implementation was somewhat surprising and forced the IC to back off its earlier, more pessimistic assessments. For example, a March 1982 SNIE asserted that

Moscow’s concern about the willingness of Polish Army and internal security units to maintain control in Poland probably has been allayed by the forces’ effective performance in implementing martial law....[and] the substantial and well-trained forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have acted effectively in implementing martial law, and we believe they—with continuing support of the Army—have a good chance of maintaining order.65

The assessment acknowledged that “the Soviets probably have some doubts about the ability of the regime to mobilize Poland if it were called to support military operations against NATO.”66 However, unless the situation in Poland deteriorated dramatically, it concluded, the “Polish role in Warsaw Pact warfighting strategy will probably not change.”67

A more sanguine assessment was reflected as well in the IC’s 1983 NIE “Military Reliability of the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact Allies.”68 In the first and most extensive national-level work on the issue of reliability since 1966, the NIE concluded that Moscow had probably drawn mixed lessons from the experiences of the past several years in Poland. The estimate maintained that the Soviets had grave concerns about resistance from the Polish army if a Warsaw Pact invasion had occurred. Yet it conceded Moscow probably was encouraged that “the Polish military performed as expected by its commanders and when and as required by its government.”69

The estimate described a “progressively more elaborate set of statutory and military command and control procedures” instituted by the Kremlin to minimize the potential for East European military unreliability.”70 According to the NIE, the Soviet control system was “considered pervasive in the Pact” and “certainly afforded Moscow a high degree of control over a chain of command that is virtually all-Soviet by definition.”71

Ultimately the NIE came down where so many other earlier IC assessments had on the issue of reliability—initial NSWP compliance, albeit with variation among its members, with subsequent performance and continued allegiance determined by multiple, conditional factors:

We believe that Soviet orders to go to war would be successfully transmitted from the Soviet General Staff to NSWP line units that would, in the main, obey these orders at least during the initial stages of a conflict with NATO. However, we also believe that NSWP military reliability could be degraded by a static
The NIE ended by expanding on this last issue, identifying a host of potential East European vulnerabilities that NATO might exploit to amplify Kremlin concerns about NSWP reliability. J ust as in the past, the potential return from such efforts was considered high: “Without reasonable assurance of participation by most Pact forces, we believe Moscow is unlikely to initiate hostilities against NATO.” Consequently the IC launched multiple studies to examine the nature and extent of these vulnerabilities and what factors might prevent their exploitation.

The IC’s analytic focus shifted somewhat during the Warsaw Pact’s last five years. Although NSWP reliability continued to be assessed, several factors led the IC to look more closely at the growing capability gap between the East European forces and their Soviet counterparts. One was the perceived success of Soviet control mechanisms instituted in the early 1980s to specifically address reliability concerns. A 1985 NIE noted that

the Soviets apparently have in place with most East European forces a system that effectively places the NSWP forces under Soviet control from the outset of hostilities.

The estimate went on:

Soviet fiat, however, cannot close the widening gap between modern Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and those of Soviet allies. This disparity in combat potential is most pronounced in Eastern Europe’s southern tier and in Poland. It will probably lead to operational adjustments in Soviet plans against NATO in the years ahead.

Eastern Europe’s widespread economic problems thus had not only spurred labor unrest but they had also adversely affected the willingness and ability of these nations to modernize their military forces in accord with Soviet dictates. The IC recognized that despite Soviet pressure, “none of the East European forces have kept pace with Soviet force improvements” and that this disparity would probably worsen in the years ahead.

The community also grasped that this gap, like the reliability issue, created potential weaknesses that might prompt changes in Soviet war plans. “Because the East Europeans will have difficulty in adopting the latest Soviet organizations or operational concepts,” the 1985 estimate concluded, “the Soviets may increasingly be forced to augment or replace first-echelon East European forces with their own forces drawn from the western USSR.”

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision in the late 1980s to reduce Soviet general purpose forces and defense spending had implications for NSWP reliability. On the one hand, these developments lessened the importance of the reliability issue by reducing the likelihood of conventional conflict in Europe. On the other, lower defense budgets and force reduction treaties made it even more critical that the remaining forces be capable and reliable. As the February 1989 NIE “Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces” asserted:

The Soviets almost certainly are aware of the operational price they will pay if their NSWP allies are not able to perform their assigned missions alongside Soviet forces. The impact of these force deficiencies on operational planning will become more apparent to the Soviets after their force reductions in Central Europe and the western USSR are completed.

The revolutions that swept throughout Eastern Europe during the remainder of 1989 made this point largely moot. In an anti-climatic coda, the IC’s final judgment on the NSWP reliability issue was delivered in April 1990. In a National Intelligence Council memorandum, “The Direction of Change
Intelligence Estimates of the Warsaw Pact

in the Warsaw Pact,” IC specialists concluded:

Recent political events in Eastern Europe will further erode Soviet confidence in their allies. Moscow cannot rely upon Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces; it must question its ability to bring Soviet reinforcements through East European countries whose hostility is no longer disguised or held in check.81

An Assessment of IC Work

In summary, the IC’s 40-year effort to assess NSWP reliability had come full circle. In the 1950s, the community correctly concluded that the East European satellites were largely unreliable, possessed limited military capabilities, and held a minor part in Soviet war plans. A decade later this assessment had evolved, recognizing the progress of Soviet and East European efforts to mold more loyal and capable forces. NSWP forces were considered—at least initially in a conflict—to be largely reliable, militarily proficient, and important players in Moscow’s strategy for defeating NATO. By the late 1980s, however, the IC’s findings had returned largely to where they had been three decades earlier, with NSWP forces assessed as less capable, of uncertain reliability, and constrained in the roles they could play in Warsaw Pact military operations.

In retrospect, IC analyses compared favorably with work done by multiple scholars and think tanks during the late 1970s and 1980s. Much like the IC, they found the NSWP reliability question difficult to answer. As Condoleezza Rice acknowledged in her 1984 study of the Czech military: “The search for indicators of reliability continues, but there is, in the absence of conflict, no way to test the potency of the explanations explored.”82

Most academics came to the same conclusions as the IC did on NSWP reliability. After surveying 59 former East European servicemen and conducting exhaustive research, A. Ross Johnson and Alexander Alexiev asserted: “This study thus provides empirical support for earlier studies concluding the USSR can rely on NSWP forces—but very conditionally.”83

Non-IC research also painted a picture of reliability that varied among countries and even among levels within individual country’s military.84 Scholarly assessments of NSWP reliability—again mirroring the IC—also evolved over time. These studies recognized that NSWP forces were increasingly more of a liability for the Kremlin than an asset. Daniel Nelson perhaps summed it up best, noting in 1984: “After almost thirty years, I think it is fair to regard the Warsaw Pact as more a symbol of Soviet weakness than of Soviet strength…. In short, there is little about which Moscow or East European rulers can be fully assured in the Warsaw Pact.”85

The IC’s judgments concerning NSWP reliability also have fared well in light of the evidence that has emerged from East Bloc archives since the fall of the Berlin Wall. These snapshots from Warsaw Pact files suggest Moscow’s assessment of the reliability of her NSWP allies, on one hand, was even more pessimistic than that held in the West. Col. Oleg Penkovskiy’s posthumously published memoir repeatedly noted Soviet concerns about East German forces. Penkovskiy, for instance, cited Gen. Kupin, the Commander of the Soviet Tank Army in Dresden and others stationed in East Germany as asserting that

in case of a Berlin crisis or a war we would have to kill both West and East Germans. Everything is ready to fight against not only West Germany but East Germany as well, because the Germans have anti-Soviet sentiments.86

Similarly, a series of after-action reports on the July 1968 military maneuvers codenamed Sumava—a prelude to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia—cast significant
doubt on the reliability of other Warsaw Pact armies if their readiness were ever tested in a conflict with NATO. Two Hungarian generals reported to their Politburo in July 1968:

The experience of the entire exercise unfortunately confirmed that there are unacceptable shortcomings, irregularities, and inadequate provisions in the Warsaw Pact. All this clearly demonstrates that sooner or later these deficiencies will erode the dignity of the Soviet Union and undermine the Pact.

And yet, much like the West, Moscow's confidence varied over time, with the ally, and even among elements of the NSWP militaries. For example, Soviet officers sent to Poland to assess the military’s attitudes were satisfied that the country’s officer corps—though not necessarily the troops—could be counted upon. In another instance, a 1984 East German intelligence agency (Staatsicherheit [Stasi]) report—citing a NATO study it had acquired on Warsaw Pact reliability—did not contradict NATO’s assessment that “reliability in general is high and that the internal structure of the Warsaw Pact forces is settled.”

A 1982 Soviet war-game suggests Kulikov was not spouting propaganda. The exercise assumed that “an extremely unstable situation” had developed in Poland and Romania and that both countries wanted to leave the Warsaw Pact. A report on the exercise noted that “one of the goals of this exercise obviously consists in testing whether the operational-strategic tasks of the Unified Armed Forces can also be accomplished without the Polish Army and the forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania.”

On the other hand, formerly classified Soviet memoranda and exercise data indicate that Gen. Kulikov and the Soviet military were planning for the worst case scenario in Poland but were confident they could still achieve their military objectives in a war with NATO without the participation of key NSWP members. In an interview more than a decade after the Pact’s collapse, Kulikov would assert that, from the military point of view, Solidarity’s coming into power would have made no difference and Poland’s departure from the alliance would have been “a mere inconvenience rather than a serious blow to Soviet military plans.” In a war with NATO, he maintained, “Moscow would have had enough advance warning to secure the passage of its troops through Poland without difficulty.”

The “So What”—Then . . .

IC assessments of NSWP reliability not only scored high in relevance when they were written but retain their relevance in the post 9/11 world.

IC analyses of NSWP reliability appeared to have played a role in informing and shaping US national security policies during much of the Cold War. IC and theater-level intelligence on NSWP reliability served to educate key decision-makers at each level. Its focus and findings went beyond simply counting tanks and bombers. Reliability and vulnerability analyses highlighted the critical relationship between political, economic, social, and military factors at play behind the Iron Curtain and made clear that the Warsaw Pact’s military prowess was inherently linked to its success in the political realm.

Four decades of IC study made US decisionmakers aware that the Warsaw Pact was not “ten feet tall” and that there were multiple vulnerabilities that potentially could be exploited to deter conflict or aid in winning a war should it erupt. On the other hand, these same studies documented that Moscow had made progress in improving the military reliabil-
IC assessments of NSWP reliability also appear to have influenced the way the United States prepared for a potential conflict and actually waged “cold war.”

NSWP reliability even factored into National Security Council discussions in 1959 on a nuclear policy for Eastern Europe. The State Department argued that an automatic decision to attack the bloc countries at the advent of war would “tie the hands of the United States in advance” and would result in war on these countries whether or not they actually engaged in hostilities against the United States on the side of the Soviet Union.

Some of these Bloc countries might actually take the opportunity of general war to rebel against Soviet domination in the event of a war in which they are not attacked by the U.S. 94

Similarly, formerly Top Secret national security documents reveal contingency planning in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution to support the Polish military—even employing American conventional air strikes—should the Soviet Union invade Poland. 95

Nearly three decades later, reliability and vulnerability assessments responded to US senior-level policy interest in and initiatives to exploit East European vulnerabilities in the wake of Poland’s Solidarity crisis and the 1983 Soviet-American war scare. 96 A declassified study of emigrés produced in 1986 reported:

Respondent testimony suggests that there is considerable unrealized potential for Western information sources, primarily radio broadcasting, to affect the outlook and reliability of NSWP soldiers, in peacetime as well as in crises. 97

... and Now

Possible lessons learned from the IC’s four-decade long effort to assess the reliability of NSWP forces stand out in at least three areas.

Determining whether and how well Moscow’s allies would fight resembles many of the difficult intelligence problems confronting the IC today. Analysts then worked with limited data, fought for scarce HUMINT collection, and wrestled with source bias. Although national systems provided some insight into the weapons of NSWP forces and the disposition of Soviet units, they ultimately could never answer the most basic question about the fighting will and ability of East Europeans.

Much like many of today’s most difficult intelligence problems, assessing NSWP reliability defied simple answers. In many ways it was more a “mystery” than a “puzzle.” 98 Providing a penetrating analysis of the reliability issue required analysts to understand the intricate relationship between political, military, economic and social issues in the multiple

ity and usefulness of its allies and that at least initially, key units would fight. This body of work—stretching from the 1950s to the 1980s—also made clear that not all East European economic, military, political, or social vulnerabilities were easily exploited.

The caveats the IC advanced with their analyses were as important as their findings. The IC recognized the difficulty of making these judgments and attempted to provide nuanced understanding of likely outcomes given a multitude of independent variables that changed over time and in response to developments on the ground.

IC assessments of NSWP reliability also appear to have influenced the way the United States prepared for a potential conflict and actually waged “cold war.” Intelligence assessments early in the Cold War supported efforts to encourage defections among East European satellite military forces and other psychological warfare initiatives. 93 Resistance potential and vulnerability studies likewise facilitated unconventional warfare planning, helping to refine the target focus for resistance elements to nurture behind the Iron Curtain during the “cold war” as well as those to employ in wartime.

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NSWP countries. Integrated, holistic analysis was required to assess these complex links—the same approach needed for understanding and evaluating the sources and resiliency of terrorism and extremism in today's world.

The IC's efforts to overcome these Cold War analytic challenges also offer guidance for the Director of National Intelligence and other senior Intelligence Community leaders. The IC initially turned to and drew heavily on valuable social science expertise found only in academia and think tanks to assess vulnerabilities and resistance potential behind the Iron Curtain.

Later, the IC benefited not only from contracted studies but also from the rich academic debate that emerged in the 1980s on the subject. These exchanges helped better define the reliability issue and the methodological approaches employed, infusing needed analytic rigor. Recommendations on how to better exploit collection on the reliability question emerged from the work of these non-IC organizations as well.99

Finally, given four years of war in Iraq and a strategy that relies increasingly on Baghdad's forces to conduct its day-to-day combat operations, IC analysts might benefit from reviewing the variables and factors used to determine NSWP reliability. Although many years and marked cultural differences separate the eras, using some of the key variables employed to assess NSWP reliability during the Cold War—unit morale and discipline, the nature of the conflict, the opponents faced, and battlefield success—may aid in developing a similar approach for predicting the performance of Iraqi Security Force units. For while American forces in Iraq may never have to worry that—unlike the Soviets—their allies might “shoot in the wrong direction,” they will have to continue to wrestle with the same question that Moscow did for 40 years—will they fight and how well?100

* * *
Once Again, the Alger Hiss Case

John Ehrman

The Alger Hiss case has again come to public attention, and once more supporters are claiming vindication of the man at the center of one of the most notorious spy cases in US history. This is a remarkable development, because the case against Hiss has steadily grown more damning and complete as researchers have delved into the files of his lawyers, declassified US intelligence documents, and Soviet-bloc archives.

In April 2007, a prominent American historian, Kai Bird, and his Russian collaborator, historian Svetlana Chervon- naya, stepped forward at a conference to claim that the central piece of evidence against Hiss—an intercepted cable in the VENONA series, No. 1822, naming a Soviet asset, ALES—did not refer to Hiss, as the FBI and NSA had judged, but someone else.

If it could be proved, this claim would have significant implications for the history of the case and for historical interpretations of the Cold War era and might affect current politics. In the field of intelligence it would call into question the credibility of US intelligence efforts of the 1950s and raise new doubts about the validity of its current threat assessments. Under careful examination, however, the Bird-Chervon- naya assertion is built on thin reeds, suppositions, and unsup- portable “ifs then thats.” But the stubborn efforts to exoner- ate Hiss, even if unsuccessful, will nevertheless have consequences for innocent bystanders and the conduct of intelligence today.

The Controversy

The story of the Hiss case is well known and needs only a brief review. In 1948, Whit- taker Chambers, a self-confessed former communist and Soviet spy, alleged that Alger Hiss, who had been a high-level official in the State Department during the 1930s and 1940s and who had worked closely with Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, had also been a communist and a spy. After a dramatic series of events and two trials, Hiss was convicted in 1950 of perjury for lying when he denied having passed documents to Chambers in 1938. Hiss served almost four years in a federal prison and for the rest of his life—he

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
The Alger Hiss case has taken on a life of its own. For more than 40 years, bitter arguments have been waged over the case.

died in 1996—denied all of Chambers's charges.

The case, meanwhile, took on a life of its own. For more than 50 years, intellectuals, journalists, and political figures have bitterly argued over Hiss's guilt or innocence. All the participants have understood that at stake is not only the question of whether Hiss had been the victim of a miscarriage of justice but also fundamental questions about American liberalism, responsibility for the outbreak and direction of the Cold War, and, later, which side would control the writing of the war's history.

The debate ought to have ended after the publication of Allen Weinstein's definitive history of the case, Perjury in 1978, and with the release in the mid-1990s of the VENONA cables in the United States and archival materials in the former East Bloc. As Thomas Powers, one of the most astute observers of US intelligence affairs, wrote in 2000, the “evidence following the publication of VENONA...is simply overwhelming.” By then all but a few determined Hiss supporter-

Focus on Venona

Many aspects of the case remain complicated and confusing, however, and academic and journalistic treatments often are off-putting or too one-sided for lay readers. Discussions of the Hiss case since the late 1990s have focused on VENONA 1822, the message from the NK GB residency in Washington to Moscow on 30 March 1945 that named ALES (see facing page). This cable, unlike many of the other materials in the case, is less than a page long and, in clear language, lays out four identifying characteristics of ALES:

- He had worked for the GRU (Neighbors) since 1935.
- He led a small group of spies that included his relatives.
- He passed military information and had been at the Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945).
- Finally, he had gone to Moscow after the conference.

With the help of footnotes that identify ALES—even though the notes do not explain how the FBI and NSA made the identification—the cable makes for an easily understood case against Hiss, who appears to fit all the criteria. As a result, public debate has tended to overlook the mountain of other evidence and treat the cable as if it were the only evidence in the case. Hiss's defenders have encouraged this perception and have made determined efforts to break the link between ALES and Hiss.

The effort to downplay the significance of the ALES cable started in the pages of the Nation, which has defended Hiss since the case began, and picked up in October 1995, as the VENONA cables started to become public. In October of that year, lawyer William Kunstler, the late advocate of many radical causes, warned against accepting with “childlike faith” the authenticity of the documents, which turned out to be beyond serious question.

Others, taking a more subtle approach, noted that decrypting the Soviet cables was an extremely difficult task and that gaps in the decrypts, the second- or third-hand nature of much of the information reported in the cables, assump-

tions by the codebreakers, and the inevitable errors meant that the cables should not be viewed as reliable evidence. Reading VENONA was not a case in which “history was re-enacted before our eyes,” wrote Walter and Miriam Schneir, who had defended Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Indeed, they claimed, those using VENONA to support espionage charges often made their arguments by using a “broad brush, ignoring fine points, and lumping everything together with no thought given to ambiguity or nuance.” The clear implication of these arguments was that, regardless of what VENONA seemed to say, no one should accept it as proving anything, let alone Hiss’s guilt.3

Who was ALES? Round One

In 2000, one of Hiss’s lawyers, John Lowenthal, published an article in the scholarly journal Intelligence and National Security that claimed not only to show that ALES was not Hiss, but that all

the VENONA cables were unreliable.

- Lowenthal began by trying to show that Hiss did not fit the four identifying criteria of VENONA 1822. Hiss, he pointed out, had been accused of committing espionage only up to 1938; was said to have acted alone except for the aid of his wife and Chambers; and had been said to have passed State Department, not military, documents.

- He cited another VENONA cable, No. 1579 (right), dated 28 September 1943, from the GRU in New York to Moscow that mentioned a State Department official named Hiss (paragraph 2). For the GRU to mention Hiss by name, argued Lowenthal, would have been an unthinkable breach of security had he truly been the spy code-named ALES. "It would seem to be a first-time reference to someone unknown to the GRU and not a spy," concluded Lowenthal.

- Lowenthal went on to assert that the codebreakers had mistranslated the ALES cable. He suggested that a correct translation would have indicated that the cable discussed Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky’s presence at the Yalta Conference, not that of ALES, and that it was Vyshinsky who then traveled to Moscow.

- In addition, he accused the codebreakers of distorting the
cable to show that ALES was Hiss. When Hiss appealed his conviction in 1950, Lowenthal claimed, the "FBI had an urgent need...for new evidence," and a "Soviet spy-message construed as incriminating Hiss might do."

Finally, he concluded, because ALES was falsely identified as Hiss, all VENONA cables had to be treated with "caution and skepticism" because the "professional involvement of intelligence agencies in deception and disinformation" had poisoned their cultures and prevented them from revisiting the translations to fix their errors.4

Lowenthal’s argument was, to say the least, selective in its use of evidence. His claim that Hiss had not been charged with spying after 1938 was accurate only because Chambers, who defected in April of that year, never claimed knowledge of Hiss's activities after that time. The argument that Hiss had not been in a position to pass military information assumed a narrow definition of such information—a cursory glance at the Pumpkin Papers, copies of State Department documents that Hiss passed to Chambers, shows that Hiss had provided papers on military-strategic issues that would have been of great value to the GRU.

Moreover, Lowenthal presented no hard evidence to back up his claim that the FBI and NSA had distorted the meaning of the cables. Indeed, in making this point, Lowenthal resurrected old, and discredited, claims that the government had framed Hiss. But two of his points still were worth consideration: was it possible that there were important translation errors in the decrypted VENONA cables, and was it possible that the FBI-NSA identification was wrong and ALES was someone other than Hiss?

In 2000, it appeared that the translation issue would not be answered quickly, as NSA was unwilling to release the original Russian versions of the cables. Researching the identity of ALES was possible, however, although it took much more effort than Lowenthal apparently had been willing to expend.

Eduard Mark, an historian for the US Air Force, undertook the task of identifying ALES in 2003. Mark combed through the National Archives to track the movements of US officials who attended the Yalta conference and found eight, including Stettinius and Hiss, who had traveled to Moscow immediately afterward. Mark then checked the records of their movements in Moscow, as well as their employment histories.

When Mark was finished, it was clear that only Hiss met all the criteria—he was a State Department employee, not detailed from the military or another agency; had been named by Chambers as involved in espionage in the mid-1930s along with his wife and brother, Donald; would have had several opportunities to speak with Vyshinskiy in Moscow; and had returned to Washington directly from Moscow with Stettinius.

Mark went on to dispose of Lowenthal’s argument that because Hiss was named in VENONA 1579, he could not have been a spy. Mark noted that there are numerous instances in the VENONA cables of the Soviets mistakenly using the true names of assets rather than their cryptonyms, so the reference to Hiss proves nothing one way or another. Thus, concluded Mark, the FBI and NSA’s conclusions were “eminently reasonable,” and the evidence showed that “ALES was very probably Hiss.”5

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Mark’s work essentially quieted the controversy about ALE’s identity. Defenders of Hiss fell back to discussing the degree of harm he and others might have done.

Who was ALES? Round Two

There matters rested until 5 April 2007, when Hiss partisans gathered at New York University at a conference entitled “Alger Hiss and History.” It was largely a gathering of the faithful—historian Ronald Radosh complained in the New Republic of the conference’s one-sided nature—with the keynote address given by longtime Nation editor Victor Navasky, and an appearance by Timothy Hobson, Hiss’s stepson, at which he denied key elements of Chambers’s testimony.

The highlight of the day, however, and the part that generated the most press coverage, was the Bird and Chervonnaya presentation. Indeed, they acknowledged, there had been a Soviet spy at the State Department codenamed ALES, but it was not Hiss. Instead, they argued, it was Wilder Foote.

Almost every observer, whether at the conference or reading about it on the Internet or in the international media, must have asked the same question—who was Wilder Foote?

Henry Wilder Foote was born into an old New England family in 1905. He graduated from Harvard in 1927, began working as a journalist, and in 1931 moved to Vermont, where he bought three local weekly newspapers and became their editor and publisher.

Bird and Chervonnaya pointed out that, like many of his ancestors, Foote was a man of Progressive sympathies—he was a liberal Democrat, admired Franklin Roosevelt and, in the tense times before the United States entered World War II, was an internationalist and supported aid to Britain. In November 1941, Foote moved to Washington to become an information officer with the Office of Emergency Management. In 1942, he moved to the Office of War Information, where he met Stettinius. In February 1944, Foote left the Office of War Information to become a special assistant to Stettinius, who was then under secretary of state.

When Stettinius became secretary of state in December 1944, he made Foote an assistant. Foote was at Yalta and went with Stettinius to Moscow. Because of his presence


there, Foote was one of the people Eduard Mark had examined as a candidate for ALES. Mark crossed him off the list, however, for the simple reason that Foote had spent the 1930s in Vermont, which Mark believed made it unlikely that Foote would have come to the attention of Soviet intelligence before his arrival in Washington.8

If Bird and Chervonnaya were to show that Foote—or anyone other than Hiss—was ALES, they would need new evidence. Fortuitously, they found it. Aleksandr Vassiliev, Allen Weinstein’s coauthor of The Haunted Wood (1999), had sued John Lowenthal for libel after Lowenthal accused him of sloppy research. In the evidence from the trial were notes Vassiliev had taken in the KGB archives on a cable from the Washington Residency, written on 5 March 1945. According to those notes, the 5 March cable stated that ALES had been at Yalta but had not yet returned to Washington (Weinstein had cited part of this cable, but not the section mentioning that ALES was in Mexico City, in the updated edition of Perjury).9

The importance of this, in Bird and Chervonnaya’s account, is that both Hiss and Foote had accompanied Secretary Stettinius to Mexico City on 20 February to attend the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace. Stettinius almost immediately sent Hiss back to Washington, however, to work on preparations for the upcoming San Francisco conference for the founding of the United Nations.

Next, on 3 March, Moscow asked in VENONA 195 for information on the San Francisco conference. That evening, as it turned out, Hiss appeared on a State Department radio show broadcast on NBC, and his appearance was reported in the 4 March Washington Star and New York Times. According to Bird and Chervonnaya, either NKGB Washington Resident Anatoliy Gorskiy, whose cover as a press officer required him to monitor news broadcasts and the papers, or one of his officers “would have been listening” to the broadcast.

Bird and Chervonnaya further note that Hiss participated in a radio press conference on the morning of 5 March, and Gorskiy either should have listened to or been informed of this appearance. Thus, Gorskiy “would have to have been incompetent not to know that Hiss had returned from Mexico City.” The 5 March cable that Vassiliev saw in Moscow was Gorskiy’s interim response, in which he told the Center that he would obtain the requested information on the San Francisco conference once ALES returned to Washington. Bird and Chervonnaya conclude, therefore, that because Gorskiy knew when he wrote the 5 March cable that Hiss was in Washington, ALES must have been someone else.9

Bird and Chervonnaya never say explicitly that Foote was ALES, but they present a detailed circumstantial case that leaves no doubt they believe he was a Soviet spy. They start by turning to Igor Gouzenko, the code clerk at the NKGB’s Ottawa Residency who defected to the Canadians in September 1945, and cite his report of a spy at the State Department who was an “assistant to Stettinius.”

According to Bird and Chervonnaya, Soviet records consistently refer to Foote as an assistant to the secretary, while Hiss is variously referred to as a deputy director or director at State, depending on his position at any given time. Bird and Chervonnaya also cite examples of classified State Department information found in the Soviet archives to which Foote

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had access, and “so might have been the source.” They also note that Foote later became a high-level adviser and confidant to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie and that the Soviets received numerous documents from a source close to Lie.

Finally, Bird and Chervonnaya presented material from the FBI’s file on Foote, accumulated during several investigations while he was at State during the 1940s and later during the McCarthy period. The files show that Foote not only had progressive sympathies but also long years of friendship with individuals on the left or with communist ties. These ties, Bird and Chernnovaya say, “suggest at a minimum” that he may have been recruited as a spy while he was in Vermont. They acknowledge, however, that the Bureau’s investigations found no evidence to indicate Foote was disloyal.10

A Serious Charge with no Evidence

Making a charge of espionage or insinuating that someone is a spy is an extremely serious matter and needs to be backed with hard evidence. Despite their efforts to show that Foote was ALES and spied for the Soviets, Bird and Chervonnaya fail to present that kind of evidence, let alone proof. One supposition follows another in their paper, and Bird and Chervonnaya pile on the “ifs”—“if Gorsky was doing his job,” he listened to the 3 and 5 March broadcasts and knew Hiss was in Washington; Foote “might have been of interest to the Soviets” when he was an editor in Vermont; Foote had the types of friendships and leftist affiliations that “sometimes led to the world of Soviet espionage.” It takes the reader awhile to realize it, and the footnotes add an impressive air of authority, but by the end of the article it is clear that Bird and Chernnovaya have nothing approaching true evidence against Foote.11

Bird and Chervonnaya cannot present such evidence because, on the key points of their case, it probably does not exist. Consider the likelihood that Foote might have been working for the GRU since 1935, when he was editing his newspapers in Vermont; John Earl Haynes, the leading historian of Soviet espionage in the United States during that period, has noted that there is “no evidence whatsoever that GRU had any operations in Vermont in the 1930s.” With a population at the time of about 360,000 people, few manufacturing establishments, and a National Guard strength of only 2,100 men, the state would have been of almost no interest to the GRU. Similarly, notes Haynes, absolutely no evidence has been found in any archive or record of investigations that connects Foote to the Communist Party. To put it simply, there is no reason to believe that Foote could have been “working with the Neighbors continuously since 1935.”12

Bird and Chervonnaya’s efforts to fill the evidentiary gaps with assertions and analogies are so stretched, in fact, that a reader might wonder how much they know about the workings and history of Soviet espionage or the history of the Hiss case. For example:

- Trying to show that Foote would have been of interest to Soviet intelligence while he was in Vermont, Bird and Chernnovaya cited the example of British spy Kim Philby to show that Moscow “placed a premium on the recruitment of journalists” who might move into government service. True as this might have been, it is a poor analogy, given that Philby had been a Communist Party mem-

10 Bird and Chervonnaya provide details of Gouzenko’s claim, descriptions of Foote and Hiss’s titles, Foote’s access to State and UN documents in Soviet hands, Foote’s friendships, and the FBI investigations in the Internet version of “The Mystery of Ales.”

11 Bird and Chernnovaya, 26, 30, 33.

ber and active in the European communist underground before the NKVD recruited him to penetrate British intelligence. Philby only went to work as a journalist after his attempt in 1934 to join SIS failed.

- Bird and Chervonnaya’s claim that Gorskiy, because of his cover as a press officer, must have heard Hiss’s radio appearances shows they do not understand the work of a residency. As NKGB resident, Gorskiy was responsible for overseeing numerous clandestine operations, maintaining the security of the Soviet colony in Washington, answering a large volume of routine inquiries from Moscow (like that of 3 March), as well as mundane administrative chores. This would have left little time for cover duties—assuming he even paid attention to them, and it is unlikely that Gorskiy spent his Saturday nights listening to dull State Department broadcasts or combing the Sunday papers for brief mentions of his assets. To have assigned his subordinates to report on Hiss’s whereabouts, moreover, would have breached the strict compartmentation that the NKGB practiced in its operations.

- The Soviet references to “an assistant to” Stettinius mean less than Bird and Chervonnaya believe. While Foote had this formal title in 1945 and Hiss did not, given that Hiss worked closely with Stettinius at Yalta, it was by no means unreasonable to describe him as an assistant, especially in a brief cable reference.

- Bird and Chervonnaya repeated the erroneous claim that, because Hiss was a “diplomat with a legal background,” it would have been a violation of the “elementary logic of intelligence tradecraft” for the Soviets to have used him as a source for military information. As noted above, a check of the Pumpkin Papers is enough to show that Hiss was an excellent source of such information.13

By the end, it is clear that Hiss alone remains the best candidate to be ALES. His espionage career from the mid-1930s has been well documented, and he fits all the other criteria set out by VENONA 1822. As for the 5 March 1945 cable placing ALES in Mexico City, the simple explanation is the strongest. Gorskiy, because he was busy and also to avoid drawing attention to his agents, was unlikely to have kept daily track of the whereabouts of residency assets. When he sent his interim reply to the 3 March cable, Gorskiy believed Hiss still was in Mexico. Like residents and chiefs of station since time immemorial, Gorskiy simply had his facts wrong and sent erroneous information to his headquarters.

13 Bird and Chervonnaya, 30, 24.

Why It Matters

“The Mystery of Ales” has much in common with the many efforts to exonerate Hiss since 1950 that have come up with one explanation after another to clear Hiss. Alger Hiss himself claimed that the physical evidence against him had been forged, and other writers have claimed that Whitaker Chambers stole documents from the State Department himself, or that another official was the spy, or that Chambers’s tortured psyche drove him to make up the whole story. In each of these efforts, an author invented a scenario and then did his best to prove it through selective use of evidence, bending the facts, or filling in the blanks with unfounded speculation. Like this latest effort, none of these alternative narratives holds up to serious examination.14

Regretably, “The Mystery of Ales” is unlikely to be the last round in the Alger Hiss debate.

round in the Alger Hiss debate. The case remains too important in American history to be left alone. Arguments about whether the United States or Soviet Union was responsible for the start of the Cold War, debates regarding military and diplomatic strategies, as well as discussions about the role of intelligence and counterintelligence during the era are as vigorous as ever, as are disputes about who can claim credit for the eventual US victory. For today’s left, the inheritors of the Progressive tradition that was driven from national politics by the defeat of Henry Wallace in the 1948 presidential campaign and then often presented as treacherous because of its association with Hiss, proving Hiss’s innocence would be a big step toward reclaiming a major role in modern American political life. For today’s conservatives, Hiss is a demonstration that significant internal threats can exist in the United States and, even if communism is gone as a threat, new dangers exist.

These disputes are not abstract and can intrude into national politics in surprising ways. In 1996, for example, President Clinton’s nomination of Anthony Lake to be director of central intelligence failed, in part, because Lake stated in a television interview that he was not sure if Hiss was guilty. Most recently, President George W. Bush’s nomination in 2004 of Allen Weinstein, the author of Perjury, to be archivist of the United States, led to an uproar among those still angered by the impact of Weinstein’s research and conclusions almost three decades ago.

Intelligence officers now and in the future have a stake in the accuracy of histories of the Hiss case. Many of the critical issues we confront today—terrorism, weapons proliferation, rogue state threats—present questions similar to those of the early Cold War era. Then, as now, public debates focused on the questions of how much responsibility the United States bore for the development of problems overseas, how accurately the government was assessing threats, and whether the government was deliberately overstating internal dangers.

The pro-Hiss view, consistent with Progressive views from the late 1940s through the present, fixed responsibility for the start of the Cold War squarely on the United States, argued that the government greatly exaggerated internal and external dangers, and claimed that the Hiss case started the McCarthy period. Should this view gain ground in the academy and in popular accounts of the late 1940s and 1950s, debate on current issues will be affected. Intelligence and security agencies may find their analyses of threat under intense suspicion—if the government framed Hiss as a spy and covered it up for six decades, why should Washington’s current claims of internal threats be believed?—because of suspicions that old hysterias are returning. That would be a sad and dangerous development.

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(Another VENONA document and a timeline accompany the Web version of this article on https://www.cia.gov/library/cold-war-triumphalism/index.html. Readers interested in the full CIA/NSA joint publication on Venona cited in footnote 1 may view it at: https://www.cia.gov/library/cold-war-triumphalism/index.html. Readers interested in the full CIA/NSA joint publication on Venona cited in footnote 1 may view it at: https://www.cia.gov/library/cold-war-triumphalism/index.html.)
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

 Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security

Reviewed by Nicholas Dujmovic

Twenty years ago, the economist and essayist Thomas Sowell published a persuasive treatise on the history of ideas, A Conflict of Visions, in which he posited that political differences and policy preferences stem not so much from one's political priorities as from one's view of the essential nature of man.1 There are two kinds of people in the world, Sowell argued: those with a “constrained vision” see mankind as unchanging and imperfect, while those with an “unconstrained vision” view man as a malleable, changeable, even perfectible animal. Policy choices follow accordingly.

Likewise with the field of intelligence. Whether as process, product, or profession, it comes down to people, and one’s view of intelligence and what ought to be done about it ultimately is shaped by how one views people, with all their virtues and achievements, vices and shortcomings.

In this important collection of essays, Dr. Richard K. Betts of Columbia University demonstrates the consistently clear thinking that has marked his writings on intelligence for the past three decades.2 Though he does not mention Sowell’s work, Betts’s work is fundamentally an application of Sowell’s thesis to intelligence. Betts seems to suggest that, when it comes to intelligence, there also are two kinds of people: those who believe intelligence can be made perfect or nearly so—all we need is the right reform package—and those who doubt that any kind or degree of reform can prevent failures.

Betts addresses what too often has been lacking in the national debate about intelligence and its reform since the attacks of 11 September 2001: a sober and realistic assessment of what intelligence can be expected to do and, more importantly, what it cannot reasonably be expected to do because of its built-in, and therefore unavoidable, limitations.

2 Among Betts’s voluminous writings on national security, two of his works on intelligence, separated by a quarter century, stand out as classic essays: “Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,” World Politics (October 1978); and “Fixing Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs (January-February 2002).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
These limitations, which Betts calls "enemies of intelligence," are behind all intelligence failures, so they bear scrutiny. Betts groups them into three categories. The first is obvious: "outside enemies" are literally our national enemies—the foreign adversaries whose capabilities we must divine, whose plans we must thwart, and whose allies here must be caught.

Betts's second category, "innocent enemies," consists of organizational shortcomings that cause failure, including institutional myopia, negligence in standard procedures, gaps in coverage, inefficiencies caused by organizational redundancies, the lack of particular skill sets—the kinds of things that bureaucracies, particularly government bureaucracies, do or don't do out of institutional legacies or laziness. Betts finds that most of the debate about intelligence focuses on this category of enemies: if we hire better people and organize them properly, it is widely assumed, we can prevent intelligence failures. Fix the wiring diagram of US intelligence and all will be well.

Betts is having none of this; he is skeptical about the efficacy of organizational reform in eliminating failure not only because intelligence is genuinely challenged by the guile of outside enemies but because of "inherent enemies," his third category of enemies. These are the limitations that are part of the human condition and that exist in the nature of the practice of intelligence itself. They "pervade the process no matter who is involved, and they intrude time and time again. Although not immune to defeat, they are extraordinarily resistant." Critics of intelligence often do not appreciate, usually because they've had no relevant experience, that the demands placed on the human brain by the requirements of intelligence operations and analysis quite literally can go beyond reasonable expectations regarding perception, reasoning, memory, and imagination. As Betts observes, "cognition cannot be altered by legislation."

Critics also often fail to recognize that the practice of intelligence always involves trade-offs: analytic accuracy versus timeliness, organizational centralization versus pluralism, the need to share information versus the imperative for security, the benefits of expertise versus the fresh views of non-experts, to mention just a few of the prominent dilemmas. The WMD Commission in 2005, for example, recommended that the Intelligence Community create more centers to achieve "fusion" in analysis; Betts points out the downsides of such centers, including diminished competitive analysis, creation of new "stovepipes" for information, and entrenched large, new bureaucracies.

Expectations must take these realities into account. Unrealistic expectations, like a "zero defects" standard, will hinder effective reform. Betts is particularly critical, and with good reason, of those who think that we can prevent intelligence failures by improving analytic procedures. Tweaking processes, of course, can improve analysis, but such improvement will be marginal rather than radi-

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3 The organizational focus of the history of intelligence reform proposals and prescriptions can be seen in Michael Warner and J. Kenneth Macdonald, US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005).
4 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 12; emphasis added.
cal, according to Betts, for the simple reason that intelligence failures most often result not from analytic error but from mistakes by policymakers: “Failures occur more often at the consuming than the producing end of intelligence.”

Ultimately, Betts’s argument seems to be directed more at policymakers and other consumers of intelligence than at practitioners of intelligence, who already know their craft’s inherent limitations. Policymakers, says Betts, can’t have it all when faced with the dilemmas practitioners face: they cannot insist on the benefits of multiple opinions and on a single, coordinated analytic line; or force a consolidation of resources while expecting intelligence to maintain worldwide coverage; or demand analysis that is honest in describing complex realities and unambiguous. Policymakers have the responsibility to learn about intelligence and its limitations, to provide guidance, and to understand that intelligence paradoxically provides the unwanted news the policymaker needs, and should want, to hear. Above all, Betts wants policymakers to set priorities and accept, simply as a mature, realistic stance, that there will be the occasional and unambiguous disaster and that, by contrast, intelligence successes are difficult to measure and assess (and therefore to take credit for). We tend not to notice the disasters that did not happen.

None of this is to let intelligence professionals off the hook. Improvement should always be worked for, and this requires intelligence officers to press policymakers for guidance, to show some independence in implementing requirements, and even, on occasion, to present unwelcome news in such a way that it cannot be ignored—what Betts calls “grabbing the lapels” of the policymaker. National security is not served when intelligence considers “the customer” always right, or says “yes” when a “no” is warranted. Though Betts does not say so directly, this was the major problem of the directorship of George Tenet, as one can conclude from Tenet’s recent memoir.5

The most controversial part of this book concerns Betts’s conclusions about the proper balance between security and freedom. When it comes to collecting intelligence to prevent another 9/11, Americans need to realize that the right to privacy is not on the same plane as other civil liberties: “It is reasonable to invade the privacy of some citizens in order to gain information that might help protect the lives of all citizens.” Many will disagree, and Betts admits his argument derives from a practical sense of what needs to be done rather than a legally recognized “hierarchy” of rights in the Constitution.6 Nonetheless, Betts deserves attention on this score. The panic that would result from another dramatic attack, he argues, will “sweep away” our devotion for civil liberties generally—Betts is particularly concerned about due process for citizens—unless careful steps are taken beforehand to reduce the expectation of

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5 George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
6 One reviewer, Steven Aftergood in his blog on the Federation of American Scientists Web site (www.fas.org/blog/secret/2007/09/in_print_enemies_of_intelligence.html), asserts that Betts’s argument would turn the US Constitution itself into an “enemy of intelligence.” This is a misreading that ignores the boundaries of Betts’s categories and his advocacy of ways to preserve civil liberties against government encroachment.
privacy, with proper precautions to limit the government’s use of such information, not its ability to collect it.⁷

A brief review cannot do justice to this rich and densely argued book. Betts uses historical cases well, particularly on the issue of politicization during the Vietnam war, the Team A & B controversy over Soviet strategic forces in the 1970s, and Iraq analysis in 2002 and 2003. Other important points that Betts makes include:

• It is possible to be wrong for the right reasons and not because analysts were somehow derelict; we have to avoid the temptation to define “sound” judgments solely as those that turn out to be accurate.

• The main intelligence failure before the 9/11 attacks was the “insufficient collection of unambiguous information,” but the trade-offs from a maximum effort includes the loss of focus and the risks taken by deployed collection platforms (the Pueblo, e.g.).

• A realistic reform proposal would be to institutionalize an analytic process that included the views of a generalist (or non-specialist) known for “exceptional thinking” to argue the case for discontinuity in any major estimate or analytic assessment.⁸

• The twin failures of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraqi WMD estimate made intelligence reform politically imperative, but the resulting structural change left basic questions unanswered: for example, the DNI is basically the same figure as the DCI, but DCIs could have had more authority if only presidents were willing to give it. Will presidents or the Congress give the DNI the authority he needs, that is, over military agencies?

Whether one agrees with all of Betts’s conclusions, this illuminating discussion of intelligence in the post-Cold War age is necessary reading for the intelligence professional, and for those served by the profession. I would also recommend its use in academic courses dealing with intelligence and reform.

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⁷ Others have argued for the need for “rules of engagement,” both to protect American civil liberties and to allow intelligence officers to do their jobs. See David Robarge’s review of James Olsen’s Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2006), in Studies in Intelligence 51 no. 1 (2007).

⁸ This is hardly a fresh idea (see Bruce Reidel’s discussion of the Israeli use of such a system in the Winter 1986 issue of Studies in Intelligence), but sometimes new situations require fresh looks at old ideas.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

**Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art**


*Reviewed by Loch K. Johnson*

This compilation of 10 articles on interrogation methods and their efficacy comprises the first phase of a larger project sponsored by the Intelligence Science Board, which was chartered in 2002 to advise senior intelligence officials on scientific and technical issues of importance to the Intelligence Community. Robert A. Fein, a member of the Science Board, chaired the effort by what appears to have been a truly high-powered team. Eleven individuals with security and counterintelligence experience served on his “experts committee,” drawn chiefly from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and military intelligence units. The project also enlisted an outside advisory group, made up of three Harvard University professors (including the distinguished historian and intelligence scholar Ernest May), two college presidents, a scientist with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and a Goldman Sachs vice president. The dozen authors of these articles include forensic psychologists; a policy analyst; lawyers; a “neuroscience thrust lead” (whatever that is); a computer scientist; intelligence officers; a psychiatrist; experts in negotiation practices; and engineers. Several have been or are affiliated with the MITRE Corporation.

In producing this introductory volume, this body of experts has provided a very good service and my hat’s off to the board and its authors for seriously pondering the weighty issues surrounding interrogation. But readers must first be warned: this anthology is not an easy read. Written, as it is, by a wide array of experts, it is laden with footnotes and professional jargon. One chapter alone offers 525 notes of legalistic overkill by two young scholars from Harvard University’s School of Law. Beyond this challenge is the Orwellian, repellent nature of the topic itself—the pulling-out-of-fingernails connotation that the word “interrogation” carries. The extraction of information from unwilling subjects is obviously an unpleasant matter. It has also been hounded by controversy ever since the exposés at Abu Ghraib, which revealed questionable approaches adopted in 2003 by US military intelligence officers in their efforts to elicit information from Iraqi prisoners in Baghdad.

The odd and esoteric title, Educing Information, is an attempt to soften the topic for potential readers, but I doubt if it will accomplish much more than to confuse library catalogers as well as those searching for material on “interrogation,” not “eduction.” Since this is, after all, a Department of Defense publi-
cation, acronyms in the text are inevitable, and "educing information" is reduced to "EI" throughout the book.

In sum, the articles point to a central finding, one not so much confirmed by rigorous empirical inquiry as it is felt to be true by professionals in the field (the "art" side of the subtitle, I suppose). That conclusion: pain, coercion, and threats are unlikely to elicit good information from a subject. (Got that, Jack Bauer?) As one writer puts it, "The scientific community has never established that coercive interrogation methods are an effective means of obtaining reliable intelligence information." (130) The authors hedge their bets, however, by suggesting repeatedly that more research needs to be done on this question. (Any volunteers for these experiments?)

As I read the volume, my thoughts drifted back to James J. Angleton, the CIA's chief of counterintelligence from 1954 to 1974. In 1975, Senator Frank Church of Idaho led a Senate investigation into alleged intelligence abuses. I was his special assistant on the committee, and one of my assignments was to spend time with Angleton, probing his views on counterintelligence. At Angleton's suggestion, he and I met weekly for a few months at the Army-Navy Club in Washington DC. One of the key principles of counterintelligence interrogation, he emphasized to me, was this: if you torture a subject, he will tell you whatever you want to hear. The infliction of pain was a useless approach—"counterproductive," as some of the authors in this anthology would put it. Angleton also had little regard for the polygraph or for chemicals as instruments of truth-seeking. He was not above using some forms of discomfort, though, such as Spartan quarters for the subject, along with sleep deprivation, time disorientation, and exhaustive questioning by way of a "good cop, bad cop" routine. Like some of the authors in this volume, he believed in using a combination of rapport-building (the good cop) and the engendering of some fear (the bad cop—although not one armed with a pair of pliers).

If Angleton had been able to read this book, he would have discovered a considerable corpus of research that suggests that the induction of sleep deprivation, fatigue, isolation, or discomfort in a subject merely raises the likelihood of inaccurate responses during subsequent questioning. As for the polygraph, researchers in this study tell us that this approach has definite shortcomings, but "there is currently no viable technical alternative to polygraphy." (85)

"You shall know the truth, and the truth will make you free," states the oft-cited Biblical injunction (John 8: 31–32) engraved in the foyer of CIA Headquarters. That is the purpose of interrogation: trying to find out the truth from suspected adversaries—especially truth about nefarious schemes they may be plotting that could take the lives of American citizens. Interrogation can be an exceedingly important responsibility that might well save a platoon in Iraq or the entire city of Chicago or Washington. The stakes could be high.

Yet we also strongly value the protection of civil liberties and other human rights; we don't want the United States to turn into a Third Reich, Stalinist Russia, or today's North Korea. That is why we spend billions each year on national defense; we are determined to shield our democratic way of life, free from the
pernicious influence of dictators, terrorists, and thugs around the world. By agreeing to the Geneva Conventions, we also have signaled (along with other civilized nations) that the protection of our own civil rights requires us to respect the basic rights of others—even enemies on the battlefield. This is not simply a matter of altruism; it is a matter of self-interest. If you won't torture my soldiers, I won't torture yours.

It is easy to stray from this commitment to civil liberties. As Gijs de Vries, a Dutch former counterterrorism coordinator for the European Union, has noted, "One of the time-honored tactics of terrorists is to draw government into overreacting." He cautions: "Governments should resist public pressure to pile on new [security] measures after each [terrorist] incident." During the Church Committee hearings in 1975, a key witness (Tom Charles Huston), the author of a master spy plan prepared for President Richard M. Nixon in 1970, remorsefully testified about what can happen when inappropriate intelligence-collection methods are adopted by the government:

The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible to political considerations as opposed to national security considerations, or would construe political considerations as opposed to national security considerations—to move from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just keep going down the line.²

Here is the dilemma: we want to know the truth, especially when it comes to dangers that imperil the United States; but, at the same time, we don't want to pull out the fingernails of people we have captured on battlefields, or spy at home on individuals of Arab or Southwest Asian descent who are law-abiding US citizens. That's what happens in dictatorships, not democracies, and preserving the difference between the two types of regimes is important to most of us—all important.

Can interrogation methods be developed that draw out information from adversaries without the use of force and other harsh measures? The most thoughtful of the articles in this volume grapple with this central question, but none of the authors offers a definitive answer. Evidently even the experts in this field remain unsure about how, or if, this objective can be achieved. Perhaps Phase II will open up new vistas.

Even in this preliminary work many useful ideas emerge. One of the most promising research directions for understanding how effective interrogations can be conducted within the framework of democratic values may well be the study of negotiation theory. As one of the authors, Daniel L. Shapiro of Harvard University, observes, an interrogation "can be viewed as a complex set of negotiations. Government officials have information needs, and sources have information they can disclose. The challenge is to determine how the government can negotiate most effectively for that information" (267).

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² Loch K. Johnson, Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 1985), 82.
Negotiation theory, first articulated in the 1960s, consists, some 40 years later, of a significant inventory of well-tested propositions. The focus has been on how individuals can develop sufficient trust in one another to exchange information about their preferences, then seek an accommodation of their differences. As the authors who write on this subject in the anthology concede, they are not entirely sure how good the fit is between negotiation behavior and interrogations; however, their work suggests heuristic parallels and their call for more research about the similarities makes sense.

Perhaps the most appealing and relevant aspect of negotiation theory is the principle that one should try to learn as much as possible about an opponent’s strengths, weaknesses, fears, needs, and aspirations. This is exactly what good interrogators try to do as well. It is an approach that can lead to the development of a human connection between two sides. In contrast to the adoption of harsh measures involving the use of force, interrogations that rely on building rapport with a subject—so vital to successful negotiations—would seem an attractive method. It has the added advantage of comporting well with America’s long-standing devotion to human rights and fair play. As with virtually all aspects of interrogation as a discipline of study, this rapport hypothesis has not been systematically and thoroughly tested. The tenets of negotiation theory may provide a valuable framework for additional scientific testing of interrogation practices.

Just as one appreciates the solid work that has gone into this initial exploration into interrogation, so does one look forward to further findings in the anticipated Phase II. The Intelligence Science Board should be careful, though, not to cast its net too narrowly, focusing only on the empirical science of how most profitably to question subjects. While this topic is important, the board needs to pay attention as well (as it does only fleetingly here) to the key ethical and foreign policy implications of interrogation techniques.

Perhaps nothing has hurt America’s standing in the world so much recently as the media stories related to Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, secret detention centers abroad, and extraordinary renditions. All are related to interrogation as a means of intelligence collection. Any research team that looks seriously into the topic of interrogation should pay closer attention to this broader picture. Interrogation methods are not just about what works best to gather information; they are also about what can stand the light of day from a moral point of view in the eyes of American citizens and people around the world. For the next iteration, the Intelligence Science Board may wish to have an ethicist on board, and perhaps an expert or two who can look at the wider foreign policy implications that flow from the choices America makes about how to question detainees.

It would be helpful, as well, to have someone prepare a more refined index in the next volume, rather than simply offer a list of terms with dozens of page numbers that follow each item.

One can only wish the board well in carrying forward this vital research, helping the United States find better ways to protect itself through interrogations without throwing away its cherished identity as a champion of individual liberties.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I


Reviewed by Thomas Boghardt

World War I gave birth to modern intelligence. Before 1914, nations like Great Britain, France and the United States possessed only minuscule intelligence gathering capabilities. By 1918, their various secret services had matured into permanent, large-scale organizations that conducted a variety of sophisticated intelligence operations. Code-breaking, espionage and covert action in World War I have attracted scholarly attention, but the subject of aerial reconnaissance has remained a gap in historical research—until now.

Terrence Finnegan's Shooting the Front is a massive, expertly written and richly illustrated history of British, French and American aerial surveillance on the Western Front. The book's findings are based on meticulous archival research, especially in the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, for the American side, and London's National Archives for the British. Finnegan's prose is precise and clear, and he provides the necessary historical context to make his work accessible to expert and layman alike. The photographs of the battlefield, surveillance aircraft, and deception devices—as well as maps, line

The products of WW I reconnaissance, these comparative images of Passchendaele, Belgium, and the disposition map (original in color) on the following page, for example, may look familiar today,...
drawings and other items—form an integral part of the book and complement the text perfectly.

Shooting the Front is divided into four parts: the first part chronologically describes the evolution of aerial surveillance during the Great War. Part two details how Allied intelligence matured in conjunction with aerial photography, with a particular focus on photographic interpretation. The third part addresses the challenges aerial reconnaissance faced on the battlefield. And part four outlines its professional legacy. As aerial surveillance evolved and was refined throughout the war, it became a critical tool for all combatants in the mostly static battlefield of the Western Front.

Indeed, photographic images provided crucial intelligence to prepare artillery barrages and validate damage in the wake of an attack. Finnegan also points out that intelligence cooperation was critical for the Allies, but contrary to popular notions, the Americans actually worked more closely with the French than with the British (thus mirroring the intimate US-French relationship on the battlefield). Last but not least, Allied intelligence officers could be extremely inventive when faced with a particular challenge; in order to confuse German aviators, the Allies formed camouflage units to disguise...but the human and technological dimensions seem distant. (Here an officer receives a camera and its photographic prize to be processed in the field and its pieces assembled painstakingly, by hand, into a (hopefully) revealing mosaic (next page).
emplacements and create dummy devices, such as wooden tanks, to convey the presence of armor where there was none. The French enlisted Cubic artists who put their expertise in abstract art to good use in camouflage and appropriately chose a chameleon as their insignia. Allied intelligence also became skilled at counterdeception, for instance, by generating three-dimensional portrayals of the terrain through dual optics, which would endow the interpreter with perspective and depth, a technique that could occasionally penetrate German camouflage efforts.

Finnegan concludes that, for all its horrors, trench warfare on the Western Front begot “one of the most important sources of military information in the 20th century.” While technology and military strategy caused aerial reconnaissance to undergo many changes after 1918, its underlying principles remained basically the same—reconnoitering defense and infrastructure installations within enemy borders. The strategies developed in World War I were most recently applied during the Gulf War of 1991 when the U.S.-led coalition succeeded in outflanking the Iraqi positions, thanks to intelligence provided by space-borne imagery. The legacy of World War I aerial reconnaissance is by no means negligible.

(Photos from Shooting the Front, courtesy of the National Defense Intelligence College.)
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Nation of Secrets: The Threat to Democracy and the American Way of Life, Ted Gup

Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right, Richard L. Russell

General Intelligence

STRATAGEM: Deception and Surprise in War, Barton Whaley

Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Privacy, History, & Applications (Revised and Expanded), J. K. Petersen

The US Intelligence Community: Fifth Edition, Jeffrey T. Richelson

Historical

The Lie Detectors: The History of an American Obsession, Ken Alder

Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter & Vietnamese Communist Agent, Larry Berman

Reclaiming History: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Vincent Bugliosi

Setting the Desert On Fire: T. E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918, James Barr

Skating On The Edge: A Memoir and Journey through a Metamorphosis of the CIA, Carlos D. Luria

Intelligence Services Abroad

Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service, James Sanders

CANARIS: The Life and Death of Hitler’s Spymaster, Michael Mueller

Death Of A Dissident: The Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the Return of the KGB, Alex Goldfarb with Marina Litvinenko

India’s External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Maj. Gen V. K. Singh

The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China, Ralph D. Sawyer with the collaboration of Mei-Chu Lee Sawyer
Current


Currently a journalism professor at Case Western University and formerly an investigative reporter with Time and the Washington Post, Ted Gup has spent nearly 30 “years reporting from within the various subcultures of secrecy.” (9) The subject now obsesses him. In *Nation of Secrets* he attempts to make a convincing case that secrecy is threatening the nation’s democratic existence. The issue, he concludes, is pervasive and its consequences are evident throughout society, including the corporate world—the Enron scandal was the fault of excessive secrecy, not illegal business practices—and even in the media. But his central theme is excessive government secrecy and inadequate transparency. To that topic he devotes most of the book, with the CIA his favorite exemplar.

There is little new in the book. The cases and examples he summarizes have all been written about elsewhere. Take the argument that there are too many government secrets. He gives numbers in the millions, although he never says just what a secret is, how it is counted, or what a satisfactory number of secrets is. As to the CIA, he is, inter alia, upset with its classification authority, dislikes its cover regulations, and is furious with its publication review policy. He cites several examples of what he calls excessively redacted documents. What he doesn’t do is explain the constraints under which the reviews take place. The performance of intelligence relative to 9/11 comes under similar attacks, with secrecy, in his view, explaining why it happened.

Professor Gup hints at his solution to unnecessary classification when he admits, “I have revealed a number of secrets, but on occasion, where genuine national interests could be adversely affected, I have also remained silent.” (9) The reader is left wondering whether letting journalists decide what is really classified would be prudent or successful.


The author is a former CIA political-military analyst who resigned just before 9/11 after 17 years, because the Agency prevented him “from honing expertise in international security affairs.” (ix) Now “unshackled,” he has put his thoughts on the intelligence profession on the record. *Sharpening Strategic Intelligence* does three things: First, it is a brutally candid critique of the bu-

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
reaucratic and operational problems in the CIA and the Intelligence Community that led him to leave. Second, it explains why the reforms instituted after 9/11 will not by themselves solve the operational problems they were intended to correct. And finally, Russell outlines the fundamental changes required to produce accurate and timely intelligence and, incidentally, to keep others from quitting as he did.

To make his point that the CIA track record is one of repeated strategic incompetence, Russell enumerates nearly every failure attributed to the CIA since its creation. The result is, in terms of pages at least, Legacy of Ashes-lite (702 vs. 214); the issues covered are the same, although Russell focuses on 9/11 and the Iraq War. Sharpening Strategic Intelligence, however, is a perceptive insider view. This is not to say that he has got it right but rather that his observations deserve close attention.

The basic faults Russell identifies are “spies who do not deliver,” and “analysts who are not experts,” and he devotes a chapter to each. But he also takes a broader view. On the subject of the post-9/11 reforms, he notes that “the creation of the DNI position will do nothing to correct the fundamental and root cause of the CIA intelligence failures.” On the subject of the objectivity of the 9/11 Commission, he quotes Judge Richard Posner, who argued that allowing “several thousand emotionally traumatized people to drive major public policy in a nation of almost 300 million is a perversion of the democratic process.” In fact, Russell concludes, “The American public mistakenly believes that our intelligence problems have been fixed, when the reality is that we have created even more problems with the reforms that have been implemented.” (2–3) Sharpening Strategic Intelligence examines them in detail.

Russell recommends a number of solutions intended to improve CIA and Intelligence Community performance. None are startling, and each concentrates on the “what,” not the “how.” For example, he contends that human intelligence and analysis “will have to be retooled and nurtured somewhere under the DNI’s authority,” foreign language skills must be strengthened, and managerial incompetence eliminated. (150) He also suggests separating the analytic function from CIA and creating a new organization, without commenting on the operational and personal turmoil this would produce (148). Whatever solutions are imposed, he recommends that the “DNI and CIA director will have to move decisively against the bureaucracies that have produced a dismal showing against WMD threats for the past couple of decades.” (169)

The bottom line on Sharpening Strategic Intelligence is that it is specific on what is wrong with operations, analysis, bureaucracy, and management but very general in its suggestion for fixing the problems. But for the intelligence professional and the decisionmakers, it is a book worthy of close and serious scrutiny.
General Intelligence


Barton Whaley has devoted his professional life to the study of deception. In this, the second edition of STRATAGEM—an artifice or trick in war for deceiving and outwitting the enemy and a synonym for strategic deception—Whaley presents the early results of his research in two parts. The first discusses the history, theory, and ethics of stratagem, as well as counterdeception. It includes some "speculative conclusions" concerning his theory, which he admits is only a guide and subject to "the awesome tyranny of chance." (138). He also examines the background and deception doctrines of nine practitioners—Britain, Germany, the United States, Russia, Italy, Japan, France, Israel, and China. Part two contains case-study summaries of 115 instances of surprise in warfare—68 strategic, 47 tactical, that formed the basis for his work. Case A6 covers the famous "haversack ruse" supposedly conducted by Col. Richard Meinertzhagen, since shown to have been a fabrication, although the principles described are genuine.

As he reviews the history of his work, Whaley gently points out that one of the best known explanations of deception, Robert Wholstetter's "signals-obscured-by-noise" model, is incorrect and makes no provision for predicting deception. Whaley's model does just that. It is a "cross-disciplinary attack" that relies on specific clues that "point to deception." It is important to understand, however, that his model is not a step-by-step approach to the assessment or use of deception and surprise, it is a way of thinking or reasoning about stratagem. He sees the principal value of the book as a "template of how to study and analyze deception operations." (xiii)

Although STRATAGEM is well footnoted and each case has its own bibliography, it lacks an index, which complicates its use. Nonetheless, if one is after the basics of the subject, STRATAGEM is a good place to start.


In this second and revised edition of Understanding Surveillance Technologies, the author describes the basic concepts of various types of electronic surveillance—radar, sonar, video, audio devices, and radio systems. In the

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1 See George Constantinides, Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography (Boulder, CO: 1983), 480–81, for a review of the first edition. For reasons not explained, it was never published and existed only in typescript form.
2 Although Sun Tzu is mentioned from time to time, the references to China do not mention historical views on the unorthodox in warfare.
electromagnetic category, she includes ultraviolet and infrared cameras, aerial photography, and imaging satellites. Other technologies included are ultrasound, cryptologic devices, computers, chemical and biological surveillance, wiretapping, secret writing, and techniques for genetic profiling. She describes the contemporary equipment available and discusses the legislation that guides their use.

She also looks at the historical background for the devices and techniques described, correcting, in many cases, the conventional wisdom associated with their origins. For example, she points out that radar was not invented during WW II as commonly supposed. The concept and early devices existed in the 1800s. The book is intended as a college-level guide for those working in law enforcement, forensics, military surveillance, covert operations, counterintelligence, and journalism and politics. It is well-illustrated, and, though there are no endnotes, each chapter has many references. A very valuable reference.


The first edition of The US Intelligence Community (1985) had 358 pages. The 20 thoroughly documented chapters in the current edition depict the organizations—with their wiring diagrams, missions, functions, management structure, and interrelationships as presently configured. The nearly doubling of its pages reflects both the changes since 1985—most occurring since 9/11—and the amount of data available in the public domain. As a reference book, it is mainly a descriptive rather than a critical account of operations and organizations, though the final chapter does discuss “issues concerning recent intelligence performance,” including leadership, HUMINT since 9/11, secrecy, data mining, and related topics. Here Richelson suggests that the analytic functions of CIA be placed under the ODNI.

The structure of the book is functional, beginning with the nature of intelligence itself (chapter 1) and then discussing each national-level organization. This is followed by chapters and sections on collection, SIGINT, MASINT, space surveillance, HUMINT, utilization of open sources, liaison with foreign services, analysis, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and covert action. Three chapters are devoted to the management of these functions, focusing on the changes required since 9/11, with perceptive emphasis on the value of key personnel.

Some definitional errors should be noted. In a discussion of the French FAREWELL case, Richelson describes the KGB officer involved as a “defector-in-place,” an oxymoronic term no longer in use; FAREWELL was just an agent. In the same section, a mole is defined as “someone recruited prior to their entry into the service, such as Kim Philby.” (398) In fact, moles can be recruited while in the service of another intelligence organization, as in the case of Oleg Penkovskiy, for example. As to the definition of counterintelligence itself, Richelson mentions Executive Order 12333 but elects to use “the traditional notion of counterintelligence” (394), which is less specific.
Overall, the fifth edition of *The US Intelligence Community* is well organized and written to make a complex topic understandable. It is a valuable reference work.

**Historical**


John Larson, the first policeman in the country with a Ph.D., and Leonarde Keeler, his assistant and amateur magician, were the Gilbert and Sullivan of polygraphy. Their patron was August Vollmer, the chief of police in Berkeley, California. The device they built was quickly dubbed by the press, a “lie detector.” The interrogation technique they applied was developed by a Harvard Ph.D. in psychology, William Marston, who would later create the comic strip Wonder Woman. The objective of their work in 1921 was to provide a scientific approach that would replace subjective techniques for determining the truth, as for example, the British practice of detecting the “liar’s blush,” the Indian practice of observing suspects for “curling toes,” and the American use of “the third degree.” But the device was not the “foolproof” method claimed by the media and the resulting controversies led to the breakup of the partnership.

Northwestern University history professor, Ken Adler, tells their story and describes the initial applications by the government, law enforcement, and industry. In the process he examines the technical development of the polygraph equipment, cites some questionable successes and concentrates on its vulnerabilities. Adler argues—incorrectly—that the United States is the only country to make use of the device to any significant degree. And, using only anecdotal evidence, he accuses the CIA and others of misusing the technique. As one example, he characterizes then-Congressman Richard Nixon’s request that Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss submit to the polygraph (Chambers agreed; Hiss declined) as “political theater.” (219)

In the end, Adler cites a number of scientific studies that judge the polygraph “does not pass scientific muster,” but he ignores contrary evidence of its current reliability and benefits when used properly.\(^4\) He concludes that when people are used as specimens with their careers and even liberty at stake, “we create monsters like Frankenstein’s.” (267) Interesting background, biased analysis.


He fooled them all: journalists David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan, CIA officers William Colby, Lou Conein and Edward Lansdale; the South Vietnamese military intelligence service; and his employers, Reuters and Time magazine. For 20 years, American-educated Pham Xuan An was a “South Vietnamese journalist” and North Vietnamese intelligence agent with important contacts that gave him details of US policy and operations that he passed to his masters, including General Giap, who joked, “We are now in the US war room.” (14) Ironically, though he was never caught or even suspected of being a North Vietnamese agent, many colleagues in the South thought he was working for the CIA. University of California (Davis) professor Larry Berman tells a remarkable story based on access to his diaries and hours of interviews with An and those that knew him.

An’s career as an agent began in 1957 with his selection to study at Orange Coast College, near Sacramento, California, to learn about America and its culture. Talented and charming, he made many friends and worked on the college paper, eventually becoming its editor. Later he went to work for the Sacramento Bee. He also served an internship at the United Nations, driving across country to get there. After graduation, he was offered jobs in the States, but decided to return, as intended, in September 1959.

Although An had help establishing his cover, and arrangements were made for getting his reports out of Saigon, North Vietnam had no school for spies. He learned aspects of the business on the job and others from a book by Ronald Seth, The Anatomy of Spying: The Spy and His Techniques from Ancient Rome to the U-2 (New York: 1963) given him by Saigon correspondent, David Halberstam.5 (122) An showed his oft-read copy to professor Berman in 2002. Why did journalist Halberstam select this book? “So that An could improve his reporting skills,” Berman says. But An had already been a reporter as long as Halberstam. Halberstam died before this issue could be resolved.

Most of Perfect Spy tells of An’s role in South Vietnam from the days of President Diem to the end in 1975. An described his mission as collecting “strategic intelligence,” adding that he “was a student of Sherman Kent, and my job was to explain and analyze information.”6 (124) After the war, An insisted his friendship with Americans was genuine and not a matter of betrayal, although he admitted providing his masters with classified US materials. (17) It is true, and paradoxical, that professor Berman found no one who thought ill of An, even when they learned his true role.

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5 Seth was a British author and WWII intelligence officer thought to have been a German double agent, although he was cleared after the war.

After the war, An was promoted to general, made a Hero of the People’s Army, and served as interpreter for President George W. Bush during his 2006 visit. But he was never completely trusted. The implicit question was, how had he spied on the Americans for 20 years without being caught or recruited? The answer escapes Berman and perhaps the North Vietnamese as well. Even though he became an official adviser to the government, all his requests to travel abroad were denied. Professor Berman has given us a sympathetic but engrossing biography that also says a great deal about North Vietnamese and American intelligence. It is very worth reading.


The assassination of President Kennedy is a wearily familiar topic to those who frequent America’s bookstalls or Amazon.com. Hundreds of books have advanced as many conspiracy theories claiming to reveal what really happened—all numbingly speculative and inconclusive. Why then, should any attention be paid to one more? Criminal lawyer Vincent Bugliosi answers that question in *Reclaiming History*. After 21 years researching and writing, Bugliosi demolishes with evidence and analysis the “unprincipled frauds” perpetrated by the conspiracy theorists. He names them and their books while citing detailed examples of their faulty reasoning. His conclusion, that the Warren Commission was right, is supported by overwhelming evidence in the text and among the 954 endnotes (provided on a CD with the book). Historian Max Holland wrote that the main contribution of the book is the focus on “what did not happen” as he got “to the bottom of so many stories encrusted as they are by decades of falsehoods, misrepresentation and outright hoaxes.” It is here that the frequent charges that the FBI and CIA played roles in the assassination are disproved and those who allege otherwise are exposed. Though the book went to press before Howard Hunt’s *American SPY* appeared, there is little doubt but that Bugliosi would have consigned it to the shredder. *Reclaiming History* is a valuable reference and should diminish, if not end, what Holland calls “conspiracy-mongering with superficially profound observations.”


Thomas Edward Lawrence (of Arabia) was an eccentric student, archeologist, intelligence officer, author and ascetic historian who declined a knighthood before a motorcycle accident ended his life at age 47. While studying history at Oxford in 1907 he seldom attended classes. His knowledge was acquired by traveling alone in the Middle East, studying crusader fortifications, military history, and learning the language and customs of the Arab tribes—an ideal background for an intelligence officer. He passed his exams with honors. When WW I broke out in 1914, Lawrence, too short (about 5 feet 4 inches) for

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the combat arms, was commissioned and assigned to the intelligence element in Cairo, the so-called Arab Bureau. There, his analyses displayed insights far beyond those expected of a second lieutenant. In 1916, when the Ottoman Empire entered the war on Germany's side, the sultan called for an Islamic jihad against all non-Muslims except Germans. In response, Britain decided to support an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire to counter the German-Turkish threat. Because of his knowledge of the region and the tribal customs, Lawrence was tasked with contacting the Arab leaders and gaining their cooperation. Setting the Desert On Fire tells how he accomplished this mission and how this inexperienced army officer became a major military player in what became known as the Arab Revolt.

Lawrence's life story has been told many times before. A bibliography of his own writings and those about him consumes 894 pages. James Barr has taken a narrow approach, concentrating on Lawrence's role in the Arab Revolt. He describes Lawrence's development, application and impact of guerrilla warfare tactics, which had not been part of British military doctrine. He also emphasizes Lawrence's role in the political consequences of victory sorted out in London and Paris. Barr also examines the consequences—lasting until the present—of the violation of promises to the Arabs when Britain and France dictated the postwar creation of the Arab states in the Middle East. But, unlike other accounts, Barr puts Lawrence's contribution in perspective by including the very significant role of other players, often overshadowed by the legend of Lawrence of Arabia.

Barr concludes that the Arab Revolt and Britain's failure to honor its initial promises created "a reservoir of deep resentment," or as Osama bin Laden stated in 2001, "Our nation has been tasting humiliation and contempt for more than eighty years." The legacy of the Arab revolt, Barr argues, "remains unforgotten, and largely unforgiven." Setting the Desert On Fire provides a valuable perspective for those concerned with the Middle East.


In this short but well written memoir, retired CIA officer Carlos Luria acquaints the reader with his early life in prewar Germany, his wartime experiences at school in England, his emigration to the United States, and his "sailing years" after retirement. In between, we learn of his career in the CIA. His first assignment was in Germany, where he served both under nonofficial and official cover. He describes his adventures working in Berlin with defectors, handling East German agents, and his role in the Berlin Tunnel operation. On his return to the States, he was assigned to the Technical Services Division (TSD, forerunner of today's Office of Technical Service) as executive

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officer, a position he held until his retirement in 1980. As one of the few case officers in TSD, he tells of his role in some important cases—Oleg Penkovskiy, Ryszard Kuklinski, and A.G. Tolkachev, to name three.

Writing from memory, Luria gets a few details wrong. For example, the first operational meeting with Penkovskiy was in London, not Paris. (57) And Edward Howard was fired, not hired, in 1983 (69). Luria was also concerned with the events surrounding the Church Committee hearings and, for reasons not explained, employs “fictitious” testimony to comment on the domestic mail opening operation.

Sprinkled among his stories are comments on TSD’s technical and tradecraft advancements and his humorous account of the “dead rat-dead drop” briefing to a Senate subcommittee. Luria concludes his chronicle with some reflections on the “crucial contributors to the 9/11 failures…none of which will be affected by legislation or organizational changes.” (72) Skating On The Edge is a balanced, honest, firsthand account of CIA life definitely worth reading.

Intelligence Services Abroad

James Sanders, Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service (London: John Murray, 2006), 539 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Graham Greene’s novel The Human Factor⁹ tells the story of MI6 officer Maurice Castle, recently returned from service in South Africa. His assignment had required extensive contacts with BOSS, that nation’s intelligence service, which Castle describes as unscrupulous and often brutal. Readers wonder, was it really as bad as Castle said or did Greene exaggerate his description of BOSS for literary purposes? James Sander’s book leaves no doubt that, if anything, Greene understated the South African intelligence reality under BOSS.

Apartheid’s Friends recounts the origins of South Africa’s domestic and foreign intelligence services after WWII. Sir Percy Sillitoe, then-director general of Britain’s Security Service (MI5) helped the country in forming Republican Intelligence (RI), a domestic security organization that mirrored Britain’s MI5. In August 1968, the then-politically independent nation reformed the RI into the Bureau for State Security. The media promptly replaced the “for” with “of,” and the service has been known as BOSS ever since. BOSS was given responsibility for foreign intelligence while retaining the domestic security mission. In 1979, BOSS became the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and later the South African Secret Service (SASS) under the post-apartheid regime. Domestic security was separated from the NIS in the 1980s and placed in a new organization, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA)—it retains that title today. Under the current government, additional intelligence elements were formed to create South Africa’s own intelligence community.

Sanders, who describes himself sparsely as an “academic and journalist,” uses case studies, official documents, academic journals, and press accounts in his comprehensive review of the evolution of the South African intelligence services. It is the story of constant and intense internal organizational and bureaucratic conflict, clandestine operations including the “Z Squads,” which conducted assassinations, and the often testy relations with military intelligence, all shaped by the politics of apartheid. Dealing with these events was complicated by the attempts of friendly foreign nations to influence South African policies. Although MI6 and MI5 are prominently featured, the CIA gets detailed though balanced attention. The most controversial topic in this connection addresses the accusation that the CIA is to blame for the arrest of Nelson Mandela in 1962. Sanders looks at all sides and cites his sources. Also mentioned is the South African support of the CIA in Angola and the case of KGB illegal Yuri Loginov, who was arrested by the RI and interrogated intensively without confessing to spying against South Africa. The one new detail Sanders adds to the Loginov case is that the West German intelligence service not the CIA, as was reported by Tom Mangold in his biography of James Angleton, suggested Loginov be traded to the Soviet Union for agents in its custody. Sanders also provides an interesting version of the pressures applied to South Africa to give up its nuclear program—which it eventually did.

Although several individual accounts of South African intelligence operations have appeared previously, Apartheid’s Friends provides the most detailed and best documented treatment of the evolution of intelligence in South Africa.


German journalist Michael Mueller begins his biography of Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Nazi’s foreign intelligence service, the Abwehr, by noting that after 60 years and several other biographies, the real Canaris eludes the printed word. One reason for this, he suggests, is the perpetuation of errors accepted as fact. Another is that “the wealth of archival material” that must be examined “is so enormous that little of it has yet been assessed.” This book, he admits, “neither answers all the questions, nor resolves all the contradictions.” (xv) Quite right he is. Moreover, the book does not correct or even identify previous errors or erroneous impressions. Second, he omits at least one important and well documented operation—the case of Madame Szymanska, one of Canaris’s voices to the West through MI6 and OSS. And third, Mueller’s description of Canaris’s life and career—especially his role in the resistance to Hitler that cost him his life—though interesting, adds nothing new. Finally,
the mission and structure of the Abwehr, which varies from book to book, is not clarified by Mueller; an appendix on this point would have helped greatly. In sum, the real Canaris still eludes the printed word.


Alexander Litvinenko joined the KGB domestic security directorate in the 1980s and remained in its successor organization, the FSB, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In November 2000, with the help of American Alexander Goldfarb, he defected to Britain and settled there with his wife Marina and their children. Six years later he was poisoned in London with polonium-210. In a dramatic final statement from his deathbed, Litvinenko charged his former Russian employers with responsibility for his murder. He died on 23 November 2006. The subsequent investigation identified several foreign suspects but never explained the source of the extremely hard-to-get polonium-210. These events and the unanswered questions left in their wake have been well covered in the world media.** Publication of a book by two participants in the case gave hope of learning new details—it didn’t happen. Marina Litvinenko adds little beyond her name. Goldfarb, a sometime employee of anti-Putin oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, himself a major player and Litvinenko supporter, raises only more speculation in the final chapter, in which he asks: where did the polonium come from? A fair but not a new question that he cannot answer. As to why the polonium was detected in several places in London and in Europe, he suggests that it was an “operation...that went wrong.” (341) In a final speculation, Goldfarb sees a connection between the poisoning of former Russian prime minister Yegor Gaidar in Dublin and Litvinenko’s attack in London a few days earlier. But he doesn’t know what the connection is and leaves the reader wondering too. Death Of A Dissident, unburdened by answers, broods on coincidence and implies the return of the KGB when what is needed is a rigorous scholarly treatment of this unusual case.


At first General Singh was adamant: changing the title of his book was unthinkable. But when his publisher Googled The RAW Experience and got more than 36 million hits like “loving food.com,” “Gourmet RAW.com,” “down and dirty...,” etc., the general surrendered. The story he tells does not reveal the origins of this less-than-intuitive official designation of India’s foreign intelligence service (R&AW).** General Singh is concerned with larger issues, as for example, moles, procurement mismanagement, politicization of intelligence, oversight, leadership and accountability.

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**13** See for example, Martin Sixsmith, *The Litvinenko File: The True Story of a Death Foretold* (New York: Macmillan, 2007)

**14** R&AW has been reduced to RAW by the Indian Press. One of the first books about RAW, Asoka Raina, *Inside RAW: the Story of India’s Secret Service* (New Delhi, 1981), 12, mentions the “search for a name” but adds only that R&AW was selected from a long list.
He begins with a summary of his career in government, 35 years of which were spent in the Army Signal Corps. His twilight tour assignment was a rotational to R&AW, where he headed the Telecom Division for four years. As an outsider, he found deficiencies in many of the existing R&AW administrative and operational communication practices, and he is candid in describing the corrections he implemented. He also devotes a chapter to a suspected penetration of the service by a high-level mole and “the chinks” that were exposed “in the counterintelligence apparatus of the country’s external intelligence agency.” (143ff) The final two chapters are devoted to more general and unresolved problems—interservice rivalries, mission ambiguity, lack of accountability and the absence of a suitable supervisory mechanism. The solutions in these areas, he argues, are too important “to be left to spies.” (175)

General Singh has given us insightful views of India’s intelligence community that are worthy of serious attention and have much in common with the services of other democratic nations.


Ralph Sawyer’s first book on the history of Chinese intelligence, The Tao of Spycraft, was written to help correct what he perceived to be a general “lack of interest in China’s achievements in the thorny field of intelligence.” He adds that a detailed historical treatment is needed for two reasons. First, “no nation has practiced the craft of intelligence or theorized about it more extensively than China.” Second, the current government in China employs the ancient precedents and practices that have proved successful for thousands of years.15 The result was a very detailed account of the techniques employed long before the Christian era by Chinese warring states. These methods were informed by the principles elucidated in Sun Tzu’s Art of War and concentrated on the theory of agents, evaluating men, and the importance of terrain. In The Tao of Deception, or the way of the unorthodox,16 Sawyer extends his approach to espionage, surprise and deception in warfare.

Since Chinese warfare is and has been guided by fundamentally different principles—with the emphasis on the unorthodox—from those applied by European military tacticians, Westerners must learn the oriental approach, and Sawyer provides examples drawn from events throughout the dynastic periods (2853 BCE–1911). Sawyer acknowledges the use of deception in the West, but he contends it is not yet as integrated into military thinking and planning as it is in China. The final chapter discusses deception’s applicability to intelligence operations in today’s Peoples Republic of China, including their impli-

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15 Ralph D. Sawyer, The Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence Theory and Practice in Traditional China, xiii.
16 Sawyer uses the word tao (pronounced dow as in DowJ ones), the general meaning of which is the “way” or “guiding principle,” as the essential or guiding principles of the craft of espionage and deception.
cations for possible future conflict. The book is extensively documented with both Chinese and English sources, many of the latter translations from Chinese.

Neither of Sawyer’s volumes is easy reading—they are not introductory texts. And for readers unfamiliar with Chinese history and language, the task is doubly difficult. The names and relationships require considerable concentration. Nevertheless, for those who are concerned about China’s historic and contemporary approaches to intelligence and deception operations, it is worth the effort.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

Books Reviewed in Studies in Intelligence 2007

Current Topics and Issues

Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning by Cynthia M. Grabo (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Counterdeception: Principles and Applications for National Security by Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz (51 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Educing Information Interrogation: Science and Art by Intelligence Science Board (51 1 [March]. Loch K. Johnson)

Enemies: How America’s Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets and How We Let It Happen by Bill Gertz (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying by James M. Olson (51 1 [March]. David Robarge)

FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas E. Ricks (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Handbook of Intelligence Studies by Loch Johnson (ed.) (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War by Michael Isikoff and David Corn (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al-Qaeda: A Spy’s Story by Omar Nasiri (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Intelligence in an Insecure World by Peter Gill and Peter Phythian (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)


Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 by Lawrence Wright (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

On the Brink: How the White House Has Compromised American Intelligence by Tyler Drumheller (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Safe For Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA by John Prados (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to be Done to Get It Right by Richard L. Russell (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Shopping For Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Kahn Network by Gordon Corera (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Special Agent, Vietnam: A Naval Intelligence Memoir by Douglass L. Hubbard. (51 2 [June]. Michael J. Sulick)

Terrorism and Espionage in the Middle East: Deception, Displacement, and Denial by H.H.A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 by Ron Susskind (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Triple Cross: How Bin Laden’s Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI—and Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him by Peter Lance (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process by John W. Bodnar (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Following book titles and author names are the Studies in Intelligence issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All Bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.
Books Reviewed, 2007

General Intelligence

Nation of Secrets: The Threat to Democracy and the American Way of Life by Ted Gup (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union by Ofira Seliktar (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

STRATAGEM: Deception and Surprise in War by Barton Whaley (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)


The US Intelligence Community: Fifth Edition by Jeffrey T. Richelson (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Privacy, History and Applications by J. K. Petersen (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)


Words of Intelligence: A Dictionary by Jan Goldman (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Historical

A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence by Raymond L. Garthoff (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Agent ZIGZAG: The True Wartime Story of Eddie Chapman—Lover, Betrayer, Hero, Spy by Ben Macintyre (51 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Alliance of Enemies: The Untold Story of the Secret American and German Collaboration to End World War II by Agostino von Hassell and Sigrid MacRae (51 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate & Beyond by E. Howard Hunt (51 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service by James Sanders (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Brainwash: The Secret History of Mind Control by Dominic Streatfeild (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Capturing Jonathan Pollard: How One of the Most Notorious Spies in American History Was Brought to Justice by Ronald J. Olive (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence by Gill Bennett (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Dances In Deep Shadows: Britain's Clandestine War in Russia by Michael Occleshaw (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, ULTRA, and the End of Secure Ciphers by R. A. Ratcliff (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

The Detonators: The Secret Plot to Destroy America and an Epic Hunt for Justice by Chad Millman (51 1 [March]. Thomas Boghardt)

Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials That Shaped American Politics by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr (51 2 [June]. John Erhman)

The Enemy Within: A History of Espionage by Terry Crowdy (51 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Flawed Patriot: The Rise and Fall of CIA Legend Bill Harvey by Bayard Stockton (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence by Nigel West (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence by Nigel West (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of Russian & Soviet Intelligence: Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, No. 5 by Robert W. Pringle (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

James Tiptree Jr.: The Double Life of Alice B. Sheldon by Julie Phillips (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

GATEKEEPER: Memoirs of a CIA Polygraph Examiner by John Sullivan (51 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Legacy of Ashes: The History of CIA by Tim Weiner (51 3 [September]. Nicholas Dujmovic)

The Lie Detectors: The History of an American Obsession by Ken Alder (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a Colossal Fraud by Brian Garfield (51 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

My Father’s Secret War: A Memoir by Linda Franks (51 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence by Raymond J. Batvinis (51 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

The Need To Know: The Clandestine History of a CIA Family by Harold Lloyd Goodall Jr. (51 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent by Larry Berman (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)


Reclaiming History: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy by Vincent Bugliosi (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia 1916-1918 by James Barr (51 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

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Comment on a Long-standing Error

From Dean S. Bird

Mr. Bird wrote in October 2007 to correct errors contained in the Studies in Intelligence Winter 1998–1999 Unclassified Edition article by P.K. Rose “Valuable Sources—The Civil War: Black American Contributions to Union Intelligence” (pp. 73–80). The article can be found at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-ksi/docs/v42i5a06p.htm. Mr. Bird is a retired history teacher and Civil War reenactor at Fort Clinch, in Fernandina, Florida, a location erroneously connected to a historic figure mentioned in the Rose article, Robert Smalls.

Robert Smalls was a popular Civil War hero of the times. He was a slave and a ship pilot in Charleston, South Carolina, who in May 1862 with 16 people on board, including his wife, brother, and their children sailed the ship on which he worked (The Planter) past the Confederate-occupied Fort Sumter, and surrendered it to the blockading Union navy. He also delivered important information about Confederate dispositions in and around Charleston Harbor. Smalls would go on to serve as a pilot for both the navy and the army during the remainder of the war. After the war, he was elected to the US House of Representatives multiple times. In September 2007, a ship named in honor of Smalls was commissioned. Fittingly, it is an Army vessel, the logistic support ship Major General Robert Smalls (LSV-8). After Smalls handed The Planter to the navy, it was turned over to the Union army because it was a wood-burning ship—in 1862 the US Navy had committed itself to the use of coal.

While Mr. Rose’s summary of the Planter story, as it was told by Benjamin Quarles in The Negro in the Civil War is generally correct—Smalls did sail the ship to the US Navy, but he was not, as described, “a free black American,” nor did he receive a share of the value of the ship the month he delivered it (the payment was only authorized that quickly)—he misses most seriously by wrongly attributing to Smalls an earlier event off Fernandina involving an unnamed slave described by Quarles. In March 1862, when Union navy flag officer Samuel Francis DuPont and his fleet of 27 ships approached Fernandina, this slave rowed a small boat out to the fleet and informed DuPont that the Confederates had evacuated Fort Clinch. Most sources do not name this slave—some have named him “Louis Napoleon”—and extant descriptions of him do not match descriptions of Smalls. In addition, at least one source has Smalls becoming the Planter’s pilot in Charleston the day before the incident in Fernandina, more than 200 miles to the south.