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Preface

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. conventional military capability has been unrivaled by any other potential adversary. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military can expect be employed in irregular warfare operations involving stability and peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and counterinsurgency (COIN). The U.S. military is currently mired in COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with no clear end in sight. In spite of countless historical examples, U.S. military leaders continue to struggle with fully understanding the policing nature of security operations in COIN. To successfully put down an indigenous rebellion, security must first be established. Criminals and guerrilla leaders, often indiscernible, must be patiently identified and dealt with so that native populations can come to know justice. This effort can only be accomplished by working closely with the local population, ensuring they have a stake in the successful outcome of COIN operations. Only after an acceptable level of security has been established will the legitimacy of a U.S.-backed government be accepted by the local population; only then will U.S. military forces be able to return to garrison victorious. In short, law and order must be realized through the primacy of the indigenous local, state, and national police forces. For the U.S. military to establish police primacy in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, aptly trained professionals from within the ranks must be called upon to lead the way. There will be little or no direct civilian or interagency support for this complex effort. The Department of Defense must turn to its own organic law enforcement agencies for leadership of security operations in COIN.
I. INTRODUCTION

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), each service is assigned military police officers, special investigators, and special agents charged with countering every kind of criminal activity. These personnel are highly skilled in obtaining evidence (i.e. actionable intelligence) to disrupt and neutralize criminals and their illicit networks. It is precisely this skill set that when applied to an insurgency simplifies the process of targeting and neutralizing insurgent leaders, subsequently leading to overall more effective security operations. Using current cultural training and linguist support, this DoD capability could be organized immediately and assigned to jurisdictions (i.e. battle space, province, or theater level) in a given occupied country. By adopting a military government and law enforcement (LE) command and control (C2) structure, military forces would be able to focus on restoring security and justice to occupied areas using police techniques. Organized within a proper military government C2 structure, security operations could be kept in lock-step with local, provincial and theater-level counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. With no interagency support available for the foreseeable future, the DoD must turn to its own organic capabilities immediately and organize appropriately to support the functions needed to maintain security while properly identifying and neutralizing insurgent leaders and groups.

Background

In order for the U.S. to succeed in current and future counterinsurgencies, the use of organic DoD LE capabilities must be leveraged in every facet of COIN security operations. A manhunt entails the use of complex police tactics, special investigative techniques, and the recruitment and cultivation of indigenous sources to locate and
neutralize rebel leaders. The goal of a manhunt within a COIN campaign is the successful capture of enemy operatives with minimal disruption to the local civilian population. This remains among the most complex of irregular warfare (IW) tasks. These investigations are highly dependent upon proper overall security procedures so an organizational solution for one is directly linked to the other. Therefore, both manhunt and overall security (i.e. peacekeeping) operations will be discussed throughout this paper with emphasis on special investigative operations and the use of indigenous people in pursuit of the enemy. Organic DoD LE organizations possess both peacekeeping and special investigation capabilities.

Throughout history conventional military forces have faced insurrections by indigenous populations across the globe just as the U.S. currently faces rebel forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Beginning in the 19th century, key theorists and doctrine emerged from various IW experiences from British and French colonies in Africa to the U.S. in Vietnam. Pioneering theorists and practitioners laid a foundation for how to succeed in what the current Commander of Multinational Forces - Iraq, General David Petraeus refers to as, “war at the graduate level”.

A counterinsurgent must always take into account the effect an action will have on the local population. No two insurgencies are exactly alike but in every case victory is defined the same way: the people must choose the counterinsurgent’s cause over that of the insurgents. This end is invariably dependent on the government’s ability to organize forces to provide a foundation of security and stability. Only then can the necessary social and economic reform programs thrive. This cannot be achieved while COIN forces are not properly organized and insurgent leaders remain elusive. Large
conventional military organizations often use excessive force to neutralize one insurgent leader or group. Such large operations have a limited success rate and often have a negative effect on civilian populations. This negative effect is then used as enemy propaganda in the ever-present struggle between rebels and counterinsurgents to win the support of the people. COIN forces must organize themselves for successful security operations that will enhance manhunt capabilities, minimizing disruption to incidental civilians.

The U.S. generally uses conventional chains of command to conduct IW in Afghanistan and Iraq and lacks a standard construct for investigative operations. Ad-hoc organizations have been established with varying degrees of success but they remain largely compartmentalized either within Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or as part of service specific efforts like those of the Department of the Air Force, Office of Special Investigations (OSI). Some organizations include the use of U.S. State and Justice Department personnel along with other civilian governmental organizations to bolster investigative capabilities. These interagency initiatives are not nearly robust enough to address the countrywide needs for standardized security and investigations. It is more likely that, as the former commander of Multinational Forces, Iraq, Lt Gen Peter Chiarelli stated “the interagency will be broken for our lifetime.” Therefore, a single construct must be established to place the properly trained military personnel in the right organizational construct to conduct peacekeeping missions and manhunt operations as part of a greater COIN campaign.
II. IRREGULAR WARFARE THEORY AND DOCTRINE

To understand why police operations and manhunt capabilities are necessary and how it is employed as part of COIN, theory as documented by successful practitioners must be examined. Lessons learned from French, British, and U.S. counterinsurgents resulted in some baseline theory, books and publications, and doctrine that can be applied for successful contemporary campaigns.

French Theorists

Three COIN experts and theorists evolved from the French colonial experiences. Marshals Thomas Bugeaud (1784-1849), Joseph Gallieni (1849-1916), and Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) are considered fathers of French IW theory whose experiences and subsequent teaching had a lasting impact on IW students and practitioners. Their basic theory can be summarized by understanding the challenge of irregular war in the following way: “The problem is not so much ‘to defeat the enemy in the most decisive manner’ as to subordinate him at the lowest cost and in a way to guarantee permanent pacification.” Therefore, occupation forces existed to secure and support the social and economic reconstruction programs and “military operations and the use of force were consigned to the background.” Strong emphasis on working with local populations and transforming enemy insurgents into allies was a critical element of this theory.

Also inherent within French theory is revolutionary thinking and organizational flexibility within military and civilian systems in order to achieve political objectives. Considered the most brilliant of the three French theorists, Lyautey believed success depended on placing the right person in the right place at the right time. He felt a true COIN leader “must have an open mind on everything that honors mankind.” Lyautey
preached patience and faith in closely screened and selected leadership. The organisations and methods created and employed by French COIN pioneers and their pupils became a blueprint for success in irregular wars globally.

British Theorists

The theme of flexibility continues with Small Wars author and British COIN theorist, Colonel C.E. Callwell. According to Callwell, “irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different from the stereotyped system. The art of war, as generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case”. Callwell differed significantly from the French theorists in his belief that the objective of COIN operations was a decisive defeat of the enemy by whatever means necessary which could include the destruction of the people and land if necessary. While a “decisive defeat” approach is not germane to 21st Century IW, Callwell’s research regarding the tracking and neutralization of insurgents remains relevant. He gives considerable attention to the need to gain trustworthy intelligence from natives and cautions COIN operators against misinformation that can be used to exploit and attack friendly forces.

Inherent within French IW theory and covered in some detail by Callwell is the specific need for reliable intelligence. This theme is prevalent among many 20th century and contemporary theorists as well. In his book Defeating Communist Terrorism, British COIN theorist Sir Robert Thompson stated: “It is not the aim of the intelligence organization merely to penetrate the insurgent movement. Its aim...must be the total eradication of the threat”. He further states that while the Army is one of the main consumers of information in an insurgency, “it should not be a collector except in so far
as its units obtain tactical intelligence through their operations". There should be one single organization responsible for security intelligence and the best organization for that mission is the special branch of the police force.

**U.S. Doctrine**

U.S. theory and IW doctrine stems from experiences dating back to the first colonial confrontation with the indigenous tribes. Following the Civil War, there was no direct threat posed to the existence of the U.S. and “neither Army officers nor government officials found it necessary to work out comprehensive doctrines to be used in dealing with Indians”. As a result, several years of IW lessons were not captured in policy or doctrine. The U.S. Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual*, first published in 1940, and the U.S. Army *Counterinsurgency manual* have gained popularity since the U.S. invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. These doctrinal works have been produced and/or reissued in an attempt to refocus efforts and to apply lessons learned from previous wars. These documents combine elements of British and French theory.

Currently, there is no clear protocol in either document for gathering evidence and conducting effective manhunt operations. In spite of the specific recommendations from men like Thompson regarding the use of police special branch personnel for this mission, present U.S. doctrine calls for conventional military intelligence capabilities and/or SOCOM to accomplish this COIN task. Strict DoD policies govern the recruitment and cultivation of an informant for operational purposes making the process constraining and arduous. The difficulty in the process subsequently drives leadership to come up with work-arounds or to be all together risk averse. Unfortunately, U.S. doctrine remains
extremely conventional and generally vague regarding the proper employment of native informants.

**21st Century Theory**

Of late, students and practitioners of IW have expanded and adapted colonial-era and anti-communist COIN lessons of the early theorists to the now globalized, post cold-war environment. In *Parameters*, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly (Winter 2007-08), Dr. Steven Metz makes the following argument:

> Contemporary insurgencies are less like traditional war where the combatants seek strategic victory, they are more like a violent, fluid, and competitive market. This circumstance is the result of globalization, the decline of the overt state sponsorship of insurgency, the continuing importance of informal outside sponsorship, and the nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure.\(^\text{19}\)

Metz’s goes on to explain that pre-21st Century insurgencies are less complex than today’s insurgencies, which are caused by communal conflicts and usually involve various armed militias and organized criminal elements.

These changes in the character of IW identified by Metz illuminate several shortfalls in current U.S. IW doctrine. Metz argues that contemporary enemies are now organized more along the lines of criminal networks under new leadership with potentially selfish financial ambitions. These criminally opportunistic motivations often supersede any traditional insurgency desire to overthrow or replace the targeted regime. Criminal networks must be countered using arduous policing protocols at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war in order to gather evidence against illicit networks to be presented within publicly sanctioned judicial systems. Current U.S. doctrine fails to mention any direct use of traditional LE capabilities against IW networks.
Nineteenth century, French, British, and American IW theories and doctrine have some elements that can still be applied to modern COIN operations. French theorist views on flexibility, leadership, and a respect for persons and property remain critical to successful contemporary campaigns. While Callwell’s decisive victory at any cost may not apply anymore, his thoughts on the use of indigenous scouts and informants later expanded upon by Thompson, remains extremely relevant. U.S. doctrine regarding the use of native sources and subsequent policy remains conventional and vague. Metz’ observations about the evolution of 21st Century insurgency highlight the unique organized crime aspects of today’s wars. These complex criminal-like networks highlight the need for COIN operators to gather relevant and credible evidence. British theory suggests the use of special police branch capabilities, a suggestion not considered or addressed at all in U.S. IW doctrine. With today’s widespread media coverage, the pressure on counterinsurgents to act justly and prove their actions both in local judicial proceedings and in the court of public opinion has increased exponentially. In fact, the process by which evidence is gathered could serve to prove or disprove the U.S. legitimacy in future irregular wars. COIN theory and doctrine must be updated to reflect the change in character of post-cold war insurgencies and the impact U.S. operations have when viewed by a global audience.

III. EXAMPLES OF IRREGULAR WARFARE OPERATIONS

Throughout history, several organizations have been designed to identify and neutralize insurgent leaders in COIN campaigns. The following manhunt programs and their organizations will be analyzed and compared: (1) Pseudo-gangs operations in Kenya (1955-1956). (2) Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) operations in Vietnam.
(3) Selous Scouts operations in Rhodesia (1978). (4) Joint Task Force Balad (JTFB) operations in Iraq (2006-2007). Each example is unique to a specific time and conflict. Many resulted only in tactical victories whose strategic effects were never fully realized due to a lack of overall COIN campaign leadership. The programs employed in these IW campaigns can provide insight into (1) the proper employment of indigenous scouts and informants and (2) the appropriate organization and structure of forces for future conflicts.

Kenya

By 1954, the British government had declared a state of emergency in Kenya as the Mau Mau extremist group continued its violent insurgency against white-European rule. Using primarily conventional military and local security forces to that point, the local government had achieved enough stability to begin necessary social and economic reform programs. However, the Mau Mau were able to maintain freedom of movement throughout the vast jungles surrounding Mount Kenya and therefore were capable of carrying out violent attacks on the local population and undermining government legitimacy. Conventional military forces had reached a culminating point in their capabilities and another method was needed to gain access to native extremists.

In 1954, British Army Major P.M. Slane of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers made the following observation: “Certain police units have lately been working in the forest and within a battalion area it is not unusual for one rifle company to be stationed in the reserves, well back from the forest, so that they can assist the Police and Home Guard”. As time went on, the Army became almost entirely dependent on the police for up-to-date intelligence and eventually became a supporting effort for what is referred to as pseudo-
gang operations. Pseudo-gangs were captured insurgents that agreed to work under the control of counterinsurgents and were organized into gangs trained to identify and neutralize insurgent groups. Pseudo-gangs operations were placed under civilian control via the Kenyan Police special branch so that police special agents could directly handle key informants. Police operations were coordinated via civil-military operations centers to fuse efforts. Overall C2 resided with General Sir Gerald Lathbury who controlled all military and civilian security operations for the campaign. He created a Special Forces police section specifically to enhance pseudo-gang operations and guarantee full military and civilian police support. This tactic when used by the local police force "proved probably the most successful of all methods employed". By creating a separate, focused special police branch and coordinating operations in a civil-military fusion cell, British civilian and military efforts could be coordinated in order to ensure full support of the manhunt effort while de-conflicting operations with on-going military, social and economic reform programs.

Vietnam

In 1967, CIA officers working with provincial leaders throughout Vietnam recognized the need for a localized capability to hunt down enemy guerrilla leaders and groups. Local Vietnamese leaders complained that "the formal military units in their areas were either not under their command or were ill armed and poorly trained for aggressive operations". Local leaders took note of CIA's flexibility and welcomed their aid. In response, a number of provinces developed Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), comprised of tough local militia paid by the CIA. The CIA screened and hand-picked U.S. military officers to command the PRUs. These units were capable of
gathering their own intelligence and conducting their own direct action operations and therefore constituted, as was recommended by Sir Robert Thompson, a single organization able to both “penetrate” the insurgency and “eradicate” threats. PRU teams were designed to fall under the direct control of the local provincial leader allowing him to effectively campaign against the insurgency within a specific area. The PRUs became extremely effective as a localized initiative working within the dispersed villages and populations.23

PRUs were designed to complement and enhance other local police capabilities with all efforts synchronized via district intelligence operations coordination cells (DIOCC). While DIOCCs were aptly positioned and organized to fuse operations, they were rarely universally embraced. Former Tay Ninh province PRU commander Col (Ret) Andrew R. Finlayson (USMC) explained that the single most frustrating aspect of PRU operations was the bureaucratic barriers and competitive infighting that existed between similarly capable local entities: “Petty jealousies between the Vietnamese National Police, the Vietnamese Special Branch Police, and district chiefs often prevented the transmission of good operational leads to the PRU.”24 The benefits of working together were often overcome by competitive personalities that preferred stove-piped operations to the risk of having another organization potentially steal credit for a successful operation. Downward-directed national level policy eventually reduced the amount of friction between the various offices but institutional synergy via the DIOCC was never fully achieved.25

The creation of the PRU came at a time when the CIA was struggling to convince conventional military leadership of the importance rural populations played in supporting
or countering the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI or shadow government) that existed in southern Vietnam. Operating within southern Vietnam, PRUs were careful to employ police protocols and use judicial processes to properly discriminate and validate targets for neutralization. Coalition police and military units were simultaneously furnished with a plethora of current intelligence and threat information. The success of PRUs was eventually recognized at the national level and led to the establishment of the infamous Phuong Hoang (Phoenix) program. This national affiliation was quickly exploited by enemy propaganda both within the U.S. and in Vietnam that deceitfully advertised PRUs as assassination squads. In reality most PRU operations ended in the successful capture and prosecution of VCI personnel with just “14 percent” killed in skirmishes or as a result of resisting arrest. In fact, PRUs were so effective that by the time the communists laid siege to Tay Ninh during their 1975 invasion, just six VCI members could be mustered from an entire province. Nonetheless, effective enemy-backed IO campaigns pushed widespread misinformation about PRUs and the U.S. in turn terminated support for the program. As with many COIN programs, local initiatives like PRUs are often misunderstood and subsequently terminated in spite of their significant strategic effects for provincial and theater-level COIN campaigns.

Rhodesia

In the 1970s in Southern Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe), the Selous Scouts were formed from the Rhodesian special forces to counter the black nationalist guerilla forces who were conducting effective raids into Southern Rhodesia from safe havens in the now seceded neighboring states of Zambia and Mozambique. Rhodesia was a country independent of direct British rule, but was still governed by a small white
population that imposed oppressive laws on the predominately black indigenous peoples.²⁹

Faced with a growing movement against the government and equipped with a small, overworked military force, the Selous Scouts were formed to hunt down guerilla groups in the toughest terrain and across recognized enemy borders. They were comprised of 1000 men with a large majority of blacks and some mercenaries. The Selous Scouts were largely local peoples and masters of the terrain. Using their hunting skills, Selous Scouts would often track groups of guerillas through the jungles for up to a week at a time. A typical Selous Scout team was comprised of six personnel. The makeup of the team included a white controller and a turned guerilla operating as a scout under the direct control of the team.³⁰ Selous Scouts were capable of disguising as guerrillas and entering enemy encampments to gather information and neutralize guerrilla groups. The Selous Scouts were widely viewed by those who supported the Rhodesian regime as "a group of experts providing the eyes and ears of the main body of security forces".³¹

The Selous Scouts were a function of the Rhodesian Special Forces, which included other elements like the Special Air Service and Grey's Scouts (a horse mounted 200-man dragoon unit). However, the complexity and political risk associated with Selous Scout operations required close civilian oversight and C2. For this reason, the C2 of Selous Scouts fell within the Special Branch of the British South African Police chain of command that, like in Kenya, utilized joint operations centers for coordination of civil and military COIN efforts.³²
Joint Task Force Balad (JTFB) was first established in 2004 and based out of Balad Airbase in central Iraq. The task force was designed to provide enhanced freedom of movement and security to OSI augmented by U.S. Army counterintelligence and human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) personnel for the conduct of information gathering missions for base defense. In the fall of 2005 the task force was shut down and later reinstituted in May of 2006. In June 2006, in accordance with Air Force Mission Directive 39 (AFMD 39 – OSI Mission, signed 3 January 2006), JTFB expanded its mission to include counter-threat operations (CTO). As defined in AFMD 39, a CTO includes both the identification and neutralization of threats. JTFB relied on the experience of OSI special agents trained in counterintelligence and criminal investigations as well as U.S. Army National Guard personnel with civilian law enforcement experience. In accordance with the base leadership’s priorities, JTFB launched a yearlong campaign to identify and neutralize insurgents and the support networks responsible for indirect fire (IDF) attacks on the base.

The specific methods and operational details of JTFB cannot be discussed due to sensitivity and classification but the results can be closely examined. The refocus of JTFB resulted in a 312 percent increase in intelligence reporting and the neutralization of 53 insurgent leaders and operatives (a 221 percent increase from the year prior). IDF attacks hitting the base were reduced by 50 percent over a 12-month period including a four month period from November 2006 to February 2007 with a 78 percent reduction. JTFB precision targeting of only the most capable insurgents and networks conducting IDF drove the percentage of accurate enemy attacks down from 64 to 31 (a 53 percent
reduction). JTFB also initiated a process whereby the Coalition Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) in Baghdad reviewed investigative target packages for legitimacy within the COIN campaign prior to any kinetic action being taken. JTFB was a highly effective organization that was also greatly enhanced by other base defense initiatives.

JTFB was the beneficiary of a unique, state-of-the-art joint defense operations center (JDOC) at Balad Airbase. The JDOC was supported by both Army and Air Force leadership and served as a single center for coordination of all local base defense assets, ground and air. Through the JDOC, JTFB missions were coordinated with other maneuver units operating in the areas surrounding the airbase to minimize the risk of fratricide. The JDOC was serviced by a joint intelligence center (JIC) that assisted JTFB in fusing all-source intelligence for target packages. The overall success of JTFB was directly linked to this unique fusion of local base defense capabilities that supported and enhanced investigative operations.

JTFB was a local initiative chartered by local base leadership but was not embraced within in a single battle space or provincial COIN campaign. Unfortunately, as an ad-hoc organization without a sanctioned C2 structure, many of the efforts of JTFB were not incorporated into specific information operation (IO) plans as part of an overall COIN strategy. Additionally, JTFB operations represented redundant capabilities on base that never fully integrated or fully shared information due in part to the same challenges faced by PRUs in Vietnam. Nonetheless, JTFB experienced tactical success in neutralizing enemy cells and disrupting lines of logistics for carrying out attacks against the base and was even named the DoD Antiterrorism Program of the Year (base-level category, 2006-2007). Still, while not employed strategically within a provincial COIN
campaign, in lock step with other similar capabilities, JTFB's long-term contributions to a strategic victory in Iraq remain undetermined.

JTFB faced another common challenge in IW: the conventional military's traditional disdain for unconventional programs. Faced with tremendous bureaucratic barriers and unprotected by any SOCOM-like organization, JTFB had to struggle to maintain freedom of movement across battle space boundaries in pursuit of enemy networks. JTFB leadership, strongly backed by local Air Force senior leaders, had to regularly justify the task force's existence to the Army base bureaucracy. Army base senior leadership routinely prioritized other defensive programs and struggled to accept the risks associated with crossing battle-space boundaries in pursuit of the enemy. This conservative approach to COIN security operations often resulted in restraints on the Army members of JTFB.

The organization itself was ad-hoc and did not last. JTFB ran on a handshake agreement between the Army base security battalion and the OSI detachment. C2 of actual source operations remained within OSI channels while C2 over the Army security element remained with the base security battalion. This worked primarily as a result of enlightened leadership on the part of the Army battalion commander responsible for supporting JTFB. Still, a small number of Army officers assigned to provide security for JTFB struggled to understand this COIN initiative and grew increasingly frustrated with supporting JTFB missions. This is a theme present throughout IW operations where specialized units work with and around conventional military forces. JTFB eventually faced the same dilemma as the Selous Scouts who met significant resistance from conventional Rhodesian forces 30 years prior: "Inevitably, because of the tight security
that surrounded [their] operations, members of the regular forces, already resentful of
their 'special' treatment and casual dress, began to question their worth.\textsuperscript{36} In spite of
hard data, measurable successes against the enemy, and rare DoD-level recognition, local
commitment to JTFB withered and with the rotation of OSI and Army personnel, the task
force as a joint entity stood down operations in June 2007.

Examples from wars past and present raise critical items for consideration. First,
placing the unique scout and confidential informant operations capability within the
special police branch, as was done in both Kenya and Rhodesia, leverages the special
investigation skill set within a proper C2 structure supported by the military. The civil-
military cells used in Kenya and Rhodesia, the DIOCC initiative in Vietnam, and the
JDOC/JIC in Iraq were well designed to support and fuse special-branch operations with
other kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of the COIN campaign. By defining CTO and
assigning this mission to OSI, Air Force leadership took an unprecedented step toward
understanding the threat environment and aptly employing security capabilities in 21\textsuperscript{st}
Century IW operations.\textsuperscript{37} This Air Force doctrinal initiative enabled both Army and Air
Force field-level leadership to create JTFB, a special police/PRU-like branch, in spite of
other insufficient DoD doctrine. Nonetheless, specialized security initiatives like JTFB,
PRUs, or Selous Scouts are consistently misunderstood, poorly supported, and/or
terminated throughout history when they should be enhanced. These examples illustrate
key points that must be addressed for future COIN success.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE U.S. OPERATIONS

Military Governance

There is one gaping problem in current U.S. COIN operations, perhaps the most salient of our shortfalls, that must be addressed before moving on to any others. The problem is the selection process for battle space ownership (military governance). This report admittedly cannot cover the details of how to select and structure a military government yet most certainly any attempted change in U.S. operations would be largely ineffective without a better process for picking and organizing battle space owners. The process must include a formal, in-depth review of whether or not the individual is fit for military governance in a complex COIN environment.

A process is needed that, as Lyautey would say, identifies leaders with “an open mind on everything that honors mankind”.38 I would recommend a constabulary39 force aligned in a military governing chain of command. Military governors should be selected from the entire DoD (military guard, reserve, and DoD civilian) with emphasis on picking the best-qualified person for the job regardless of career field or rank. Selectees could be brevetted to the proper rank when necessary. Attachés, Foreign Area Officers, and Special Forces personnel should be given special consideration due to their specific exposure to other cultures. Reservists should be closely screened for pertinent civilian professional experience. Through proper screening and selection, a pool of individuals could be indentified that is better equipped to understand cultural nuances and the effects of political decisions on local populations.

Additionally, this force should be organized into an autonomous governing chain of command with authority over all military assets within each assigned jurisdiction.
Battle space owners must manage their military assets as mayors or governors within the U.S. assume responsibility for the actions of local and state police, medical, fire department, and other public service organizations. Under the current construct, battle space owners are tied too closely to their kinetic forces resulting in their overuse while limited civil-military capabilities atrophy. This autonomous military governing structure would assign a mayor to each battle space who reports to one of several provincial governors (depending on the size of the theater), who in turn reports directly to the country (or theater) level commanding general. The various national level assets, organizations, and other government compartmentalized initiatives would no longer exist unless adapted to support the new governing structure. While this thesis does not include a detailed solution to the problem of selection and structure of military governance, like every aspect of COIN operations, it is absolutely dependent on one being established.

**Personnel**

In order to maximize the efficacy of security operations within a COIN campaign, all DoD police capabilities must be placed in the frontline of IW operations. All military police trained personnel should be dispersed among line units when possible to train and promote police protocols throughout all COIN forces. These units should be organized into battle space security forces (BSF) and assigned to battle space areas. Adopting the above discussed concept of military governance, the BSF commander would report to the military mayor (i.e. battle space owner). Trained military police investigators augmented by counterintelligence and human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) officers should be formulated into special police branches and assigned by battle space to work with the BSF and indigenous police forces to investigate and resolve insurgent criminal activity.
DoD capabilities can also be employed to provide provincial and theater-level special investigations and advanced tactics. While in the case of Vietnam, the CIA chose highly trained military officers from conventional units and Special Forces to manage their PRUs, the learning curve faced by these line troops when asked to fulfill a police investigations mission was extremely steep. It was this same dilemma in Kenya and Rhodesia that eventually influenced COIN leadership to align the specialized manhunt mission under police leadership within the special branch. Therefore, DoD special agents (again augmented by CI/HUMINT personnel) from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Division (CID), Naval Criminal Investigations Service (NCIS), and OSI should be organized into provincial and theater-level special police branches. This higher-level organization would investigate trans-provincial felony level insurgent activity and theater level targets. As with every police organization, hostage rescue units (HRU) and special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams are needed to support advanced operations. SOCOM would assume the HRU and SWAT missions as well as providing various other advanced capabilities as needed. Provincial and theater-level special investigative offices with advanced tactics support could be employed theater-wide as needed to enhance COIN security operations.

COIN success ultimately requires building effective local and federal level police capabilities. Col Michael Page of the British Royal Marines, and a veteran of COIN operations in Northern Ireland, made the following statement during a COIN leadership panel at the United States Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA: “Establishing police primacy is the military exit strategy.” Therefore, training of indigenous police forces must occur simultaneously within the proposed construct as follows: (1) BSF units train
local police within each battle space; (2) special police branch investigators train local investigators in each battle space; (3) provincial and theater special police branches train the indigenous state and federal special agents respectively; (4) SOCOM train HRU, SWAT, and other necessary capabilities. This construct would also greatly simplify interagency support as the construct mirrors closely stateside police and government structures.44 In this way DoD law enforcement (LE) and SOCOM trained personnel can be employed to rebuild and train indigenous LE capabilities.

The training and rebuilding process must occur contiguously with on-going security and investigations, until such time as the locals are ready to operate independently. Plugging in to local national police source networks enhances special police branch operations. This system would encourage special police branch investigators and special agents to leverage indigenous police informant networks to develop effective COIN manhunt operations. The desired end state for COIN security forces is to work themselves out of a job by eventually handing off all missions to independent, fully operational indigenous police forces. Currently, if organized properly, DoD possesses the capabilities necessary for success.

Basic military LE missions must still be completed. The following suggestions attempt to address some of the issues that would arise following the assignment of COIN security operations to military policemen. Conventional line soldiers must be tasked to accomplish the current deployed military police (MP) duties in order to free up MPs to work COIN security operations. Memorandums of agreement and contracts must be established to cover traditional LE and security missions when and where possible. The forward deployment of nearly all MP capabilities will have a significant effect on the
resolution of crime within the ranks. Therefore, formal agreements at all stateside locations must be reached to allow local, state, and/or federal police agencies to assume security and investigative jurisdiction on military facilities. Contracts should be pursued for all overseas locations. While this presents a significant challenge, it is not uncommon even today to have military bases under local civilian jurisdiction complimented by contract security services. Additionally, more misdemeanor crimes must be solved within the ranks via command directed inquiries. While the military would suffer with organic LE assets employed elsewhere, the solutions to cover for this capability are viable.

**Command and Control**

C2 must be organized along police lines as well. When possible and appropriate, field grade officers (FGO) of joint police disciplines should be granted tactical control (TACON)\textsuperscript{45} of the BSF within the provinces. The BSF commander should report directly to the military mayor (i.e. battle space owner). This in effect delegates the day-to-day kinetic and maneuver capability to a police-minded FGO allowing the battle space owner to focus on the political, social, and economic COIN programs within a particular area.

The local, provincial, and theater special police branches should operate under the priorities and guidance of their assigned military mayor, governor, or theater commander. Special police branches should be manned with trained military investigators at the local level and CID, NCIS, or OSI special agents at the province and theater levels. Special police branches should be augmented by CI/HUMINT, SOCOM, and psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel to support on-going operations. PSYOP personnel must
ensure all special police branch personnel are cognizant and responsive to the existing IO programs of the local and theater-wide leaders’ COIN campaigns.46

Supported and supporting relationships between the various disciplines assigned within the special police branch should be codified in joint doctrine to eliminate confusion. Actual TACON, however, when possible should remain within the respective specialized C2 chains with all military assets ultimately aligning under the theater COIN commander. This C2 construct would use authoritative doctrine to empower military mayors and provincial governors to prioritize special police branch activities and targets without disrupting proper supervision and employment of these unique capabilities. As did General Lathbury in Kenya, SOCOM assets should be organized to support special police branch operations both locally and nationally as needed. Understanding supported and supporting functions and the proper oversight and TACON of specialized capabilities is critical to their successful employment.

From his experiences as a PRU commander in Vietnam, Col (Ret.) Finlayson felt the single most important element that must be included in future COIN C2 constructs is an effective and doctrinally sanctioned intelligence operations coordination cell. Under this proposal, the coordination cells should be co-located with each special branch. These coordination cells must fuse all-source intelligence for targeting and manage kinetic and non-kinetic COIN operations as part of local, provincial, and theater COIN campaigns. The coordination cells should include judicial representatives from the local military governance office. The judicial representatives must review each target package and obtain authorization for actionable targets from the appropriate military mayor. Military mayors and governors should also use the coordination cell to examine second
and third order effects of all COIN operations. Effective coordination cells to fuse police and military, kinetic and non-kinetic operations are absolutely critical to the success of this proposed model.47

When DoD assets are organized within an LE C2 construct, indigenous forces working with the U.S. need only mirror each capability and office to build their own respective local, state, and federal police organizations. This model once employed by the COIN security forces would serve as the blueprint from which indigenous forces can build their own security infrastructure and achieve police primacy. By harnessing special investigative, conventional and SOCOM capabilities within a LE-like construct, military mayors and governors would have the control needed to conduct an effective COIN campaign.

V. CONCLUSION

Guerilla wars cannot be won without first capturing the hearts and minds of the people. That's not done through a show of conventional force. Small units must track down and arrest perpetrators of any civil disobedience, much as policemen would. That takes more skill than U.S. line squads now possess. Those squads need specially trained point men, mantrackers, and forward observers. All must be well versed in police protocol.48

Effective security operations in IW depend on military forces using police protocols to promote justice and legitimize the counterinsurgents cause. The term “hearts and minds”, as Lost Victory author William Colby felt, implies “pleasing the population as an almost inert audience rather than engaging its participation in a common effort,” and I tend to agree. Successful COIN campaigns require more than just winning “hearts and minds.” Still, without digressing on the semantics therewith, the desired end state
can be surmised within the context of both authors' works. The local population must come to know justice and have a stake in the outcome of that justice.

IW success depends on solid security operations and policed-based protocols. U.S. forces cannot achieve success in IW through traditional CI/HUMINT-based operations and continued excessive use of conventional military force. Current DoD doctrine and policy encourages an approach to COIN that is supposed to function within existing conventional military structures with help from SOCOM. The result has thus far been a continued emphasis on large scale operations where the risk to U.S. forces is minimal. Meanwhile the indigenous people our forces were sent to liberate and protect continue to suffer. U.S. forces are supposed to see to the safety and security of the people in places like Iraq and Afghanistan just as policemen do here in the U.S. and, "if American policemen could so easily resort to bombs, no bystander would be safe".

Properly employing military policing capabilities will require nothing short of a revolution in military affairs and, "the most profound changes require significant bureaucratic acceptance and institutional change." A complete psychological shift in how our U.S. military leadership and line units think and act is required for 21st Century irregular wars. Soldiers traditionally trained to identify and destroy the enemy must adopt the policeman’s paradigm of self-defense and the gradual escalation of force. The pursuit of truth and justice within a governing judicial system is the policeman’s purpose. The recruitment, development, protection and lawful employment of confidential informants are the vehicles used by special agents to proactively track down the perpetrators of violent acts and felony crime. These traditional DoD LE methods limit the impact of kinetic operations on innocent citizens and when organized properly will
directly support COIN leaders' overall campaigns. BSFs and DoD special police branches should be implemented and organized within an autonomous military governing C2 structure immediately. There will be no interagency solution to this complex challenge in our lifetime. The Department of Defense must place organic police capabilities traditionally used for stability and internal preservation of order and discipline at the forefront of 21st Century COIN operations.

1 neutralize - 1. As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable. 2. To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation. 3. To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps. 4. To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent. (Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, amended through 17 October 2007. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp_1_02.pdf)

2 A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. (Pincus, Walter. "Irregular Warfare, Both Future and Present." Washington Post 7 Apr. 2008: A15)

3 Proper security procedures include basic LE and peacekeeping missions within indigenous populations. Done correctly, security procedures should enhance good order and discipline, respond to criminal activity, and promote equality and justice in a town or village just as police forces due within the United States.

4 USMC Command and Staff College, Syllabus AY2007-08, 205.

5 Australian Federal Police (AFP) may be the interagency model for the future (http://www.afp.gov.au/home.html). Recent operations in support of unrest in the Solomon Islands provide a contemporary example of deployable DoJ-like assets.

6 Stated while addressing students at the Marine Corps University on January 3, 2008,


11 (see Annex A, French and Brit Theorist Paper).


20 P.M. Slane, "Tactical Problems in Kenya." *(The Army Quarterly* LXIX (1954), 48. See also Annex C.
25 Obtained during an informal interview of Col (Ret) Finlayson, 26 Mar 08.
26 neutralize - 1. As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable. 2. To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation. 3. To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps. 4. To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent. (Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, amended through 17 October 2007. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf)
30 Information provided during 25 Sep 07 address to USMC Command and Staff College students by Dr. Charles D. Melson of the U.S. Marine Corps History Division.
33 Maj Matthew R. Modarelli is a special agent with the OSI. He served as the first OSI commander in Baghdad, Iraq, moving from a classified location on the border forward with joint U.S. forces to Baghdad establishing OSI operations in April 2003. In the Spring of 2005, he served at Headquarters, United States Air Force, as the Air Staff Counterintelligence (CI) Policy representative. He was on the planning team for and was the principle scribe of Air Force Mission Directive 39 (See Annex D) and was the USAF CI representative during the rewrite of Joint Publication 2-01.2 (DoD CI/HUMINT Operations). Most recently he served as the OSI commander at Balad Airbase, Iraq from Jun 2006 — Jun 2007. Priority Intelligence Requirements (also provided by local Air Force and Army base leadership), additional security platoons, route mission planning, and general risk assessment for JTFB day-to-day missions was provided by elements of the 1-167 Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisitions Squadron under the command of LTC Martin Apprich (U.S. Army National Guard). Unless otherwise documented, observations within this section are firsthand accounts of Maj Modarelli.
34 Attack data collected and maintained by the Joint Intelligence Center, Balad Airbase, and provided to Maj Modarelli on 24 May 07. Data can be accessed via the Special Investigations Branch, Secretary of the Air Force Inspector Generals Staff, Pentagon. Intelligence collection data provided by 24th Expeditionary Field Investigators Squadron (AFOSI), Qatar. Percentages determined as compared to the same time frame the year prior (May 05-Apr 06 vs. May 06-Apr07) unless otherwise noted. Comparison by calendar year or calendar months vs. the same timeframe the year prior takes into account similar weather conditions that may have had an impact on the enemy’s ability to use terrain, etc.
35 May 05-Apr 06 (64%). May 06-Apr 07 (31%).
36 http://selousscouts.tripod.com/home_page.htm
37 Col Kevin Jacobsen served as the senior special agent and OSI squadron commander for all detachments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf Coast Countries (GCC) and provided the vision and expertise behind the employment of OSI forces during the invasion of Iraq and at the onset of stability operations. He was later
assigned as the OSI region commander responsible for all Air Combat Command OSI units and AFMD 39 was the result of his leadership, experience and vision. Col Frank Malafarina was the OSI squadron commander responsible for all Iraq, Afghanistan, and GCC OSI detachments from May 2006 to May 2007. He was the first OSI squadron commander to fully implement CTO for the Air Force. Col Malafarina is a Middle East area expert and Desert Storm veteran whose expertise was essential to the management and execution of OSI operations during his tour. Col Kevin Jacobsen currently serves as the senior Air staff OSI representative to the Inspector General of the Air Force. Col Malafarina replaced Col Jacobsen as the OSI region commander responsible for all Air Combat Command OSI units.


39 The use of this specific term was suggested by a U.S. Army Special Forces colonel during an informal interview on 29 Jan 08.

40 CI/HUMINT officers in this construct would be responsible for producing the high level of intelligence (via Intelligence Information Reports (IIR)) gained while assisting LE officers during the course of investigative activities.

41 Col (ret) Finlayson interview, 26 Mar 08.

42 Informal interviews were conducted with two field grade officers (FGO) from the U.S. Navy SEALs and one FGO from U.S. Army Special Forces regarding current SOCOM operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and/or the proposals within this paper. No specific concerns regarding the intended employment of SOCOM capabilities in support of the special police branch were noted.

43 Stated during a leadership panel on COIN operations and the roles of police and military, Feb 08.

44 An informal interview was conducted on military governance and the creation of special police branches with Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) MaryJo Thomas, GS-15, FBI, on 11 Mar 08. SSA Thomas, in addition to her supervisory position within the Science and Technology Branch (STB) of the FBI, is the principal FBI Military Liaison Officer to the DoD for the FBI STB. She has served multiple tours in Iraq for the FBI in support of SOCOM operations. The current role of forward-deployed FBI special agents is to act as liaison officers (LNO) to DoD personnel providing them with limited investigative support. Commonly, the SOCOM soldiers and marines that interface with FBI LNOs have no criminal investigations experience and are unfamiliar with LE investigative techniques. As a result, the FBI is often asked to provide specific technical capabilities to support DoD operations with no clear explanation of how the DoD intends to use it effectively. The lack of continuity, case experience and scope of non investigator personnel inhibits the ability to effectively identify and dismantle targets. The current system does not leverage the expertise of the FBI agent to evaluate specific cases and recommend proper technical support. Under the construct proposed in this paper, SSA Thomas felt FBI assistance would be greatly enhanced by linking FBI agents directly with CID, NCIS, or OSI case agents to discern what FBI support will best enhance DoD operations. By linking DoD federal agents with DoJ federal agents, there is little or no need for a formal LNO as the DoD has its own federal agents.

45 Tactical control — Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority); operational control. (Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, amended through 17 October 2007. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf)

46 Philippine Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay had psychological warfare officers that reported directly to his staff attached to each battalion responsible for Force-X COIN operations during the Huk Rebellion following WWII. For details, see Lawrence M. Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection (United States Army Center Of Military History, DC). See also Annex B.

47 Col (ret) Finlayson interview, 26 Mar 08.


50 CMD James R. Fitzsimonds and CMD Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” (Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994), 215. CMD James R. Fitzsimonds and CMD Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” (Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994), 214-215. Fitzsimmonds and Van Tol described the following preconditions necessary for the full realization of revolution in military affairs: (1) technological development: not merely the technology itself but the system of systems used to employ it effectively. (2) doctrinal innovation: To fully exploit the potential of new systems, operational concepts incorporating and integrating the new technologies must be developed into coherent doctrines. (3) Organizational Adaptation: The most profound changes require significant bureaucratic acceptance and institutional change.
ANNEX A

Bullet Background Paper

Colonial Warfare, Callwell and the French Theorists

BACKGROUND

Beginning in the early 19th century, England and France endeavored each to increase wealth and global influence through African colonization. This experience produced subject matter experts on both sides. This bullet background paper provides a summary and analysis of the theories of Charles E. Callwell (British) and Thomas Bugeaud, Joseph Gallieni, and Hubert Lyautey (French) and concludes with an opinion on which is the more relevant for today.

DISCUSSION

- Callwell believed the key objective was a decisive defeat of the enemy by whatever means necessary including the destruction of the people and land if necessary.

- Callwell used the following three broad categories to describe small wars with a caveat emptor that each individual conflict, regardless of category, is unique and unpredictable.

  -- (1) Campaigns of annexation, (2) suppression of insurrections, and (3) those in response to an insult, to avenge a wrong or overthrow a dangerous enemy.

  -- The origin and cause of each small war determines the nature of the operations to follow and may even cause the regular forces to conform to savage methods of battle.

- French theorists believed rather in subordinating the enemy “at the lowest cost in a way to guarantee permanent pacification.”

  -- Outright destruction of people and property should be avoided for two reasons.

    --- Starving and disaffected populations demand support, reconstruction, and/or pacification.

    --- Destroyed land cannot produce wealth for the Empire or supplies for the expedition.

- French theorists therefore focused more on the destruction of the enemy’s organization and not necessarily its people so as to minimize collateral damage of profitable resources.

CONCLUSION

French theories on colonization are more relevant to U.S. operations globally, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recognition of the value of people and property to the overall success
of the mission cannot be overstated. Use of force should be restrained in order to preserve the end-state of political and economic integration.
ANNEX B

This essay will analyze how counterinsurgents quelled the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) and the Hukbalahap (Huk) Rebellion (1946-1955). It will compare and contrast each conflict using the following government response and evaluative criteria categories from Brad E. O'Niell’s book *Insurgency and Terrorism*: environment, popular support, organization and cohesion, and external support. The environment refers to both topographic and demographic features unique to the Philippines. The popular support section will focus on the unique issues that effected public opinion and support for or against the insurgency. How the counterinsurgents responded to the unique environment and eventually influenced popular support will be discussed in the organization and cohesion section. Lastly, the influence of external support from the United States (US) will be addressed. In both cases, key leaders were able to neutralize insurgent activity by evolving and adapting their governing organizations to support a balanced campaign of civil reform and military operations.

*Environment.* The physical environment of the Philippines remained basically unchanged from the turn of the 20th century to 1946. Comprised of over 7,000 islands and an area of over 500,000 square miles, the Philippine archipelago was an incredibly large area of operations (Linn 1989). Topographic features included heavy jungles, mountainous terrain, and poor roads. The climate was prone to monsoons and sweltering heat. Terrain features and extreme weather made this archipelago a physically inhospitable environment.

The archipelago was also demographically complex with a unique history of rebellion. A single island in the Philippines could be home to many tribes speaking multiple languages and warring amongst themselves. Beginning in 1556, Spanish colonization of the Philippines disenfranchised landowners and peasant workers placing them under the authority of
foreigners. This resulted in the first of many revolts dating back to 1583 (Greenberg 1995). Summarily, the social environment while diverse in culture shared a common disposition for rebellion against ruling establishments.

**Popular Support.** Both insurgents and counterinsurgents had to win the popular support of the masses to secure victory. At the onset of the Philippine Insurrection, US President William McKinley’s orders were to, “win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines,” further stating that the mission was, “one of benevolent assimilation” (Linn 1989, 9). Nonetheless, the US found itself, “in the midst of yet another indigenous peoples’ rebellion” (Shibuya 2007, 8). Likewise, in 1946 the newly independent Philippine government was suffering from violence and uprisings as rebels attempted to gain power in a new political environment free of direct foreign control. Issues surrounding the governments handling of land tenure remained the chief concern for the general population during both rebellions. Popular support both in 1899 and 1946 belonged to the insurgents and the US and Philippine government eventually developed campaigns to win it back.

**Organization and Cohesion.** To win popular support during both rebellions the governing bodies had to organize for cohesive operations balancing economic and social reform with kinetic military action. Enlightened leadership from Filipino national defense secretary and future president Ramon Magsaysay working closely with US advisor Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale reorganized the Philippine government and military forces during the Huk Rebellion. The reorganization gave Magsaysay visibility and control over military operations as well as efforts in the area of social reform and land tenure. Magsaysay created land ownership opportunities for peasants specifically from areas loyal to the rebellion while at the same time employing unconventional military tactics to hunt down key insurgents
threatening to derail his programs. Magsaysay’s civil and military operations successfully proselytized the greater part of the population and eventually led to the isolation and neutralization of the Huk Rebellion (Greenberg 1995).

In 1901, the US forces adopted a counterinsurgency strategy based on McKinley’s orders to win over the population. Under the leadership of US major generals Elwell Otis and later Arthur MacArthur, the military placed considerable military, social, and economic pressure on the insurgency. US forces were increased, reorganized and dispersed throughout the archipelago resulting in more troop interaction with local citizens and an increased ability to address local issues at the grassroots level. The strategy included the establishment of municipal governments consisting of a local mayor, town council, and police force where the local citizens had increased local control and an economic stake in the success of the US cause. The US Army simultaneously launched projects to improve roads and schools throughout the country. While not directly attempting to address land-tenure until 1903, the efficacy of stability operations by US forces resulted in a general trust and support of the local population.

*External Support.* External support for the Philippine Insurrection and the Huk Rebellion came from the US. US troop levels reached over 70,000 in 1901 allowing US forces to field a force large enough to conduct and fund a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. Working behind the scenes during the Huk Rebellion, the US created the Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG). The JUSMAG managed efforts to train and outfit local forces and permitted US military advisors to accompany local troops in the field. The Philippines also received over $90 million in non-military economic aid allowing Magsaysay
to fund not only military operations but economic reform as well. US external support in both cases was paramount to the overall success of each campaign.

The counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines from 1899-1902 and 1946-1952 were successful in securing a relative peace and acceptable popular confidence of the people. The physical characteristics of the land and climate combined with the complexity of a dispersed, ethnically diverse population prone to revolt meant the Philippines was an environment ripe for insurgency. Both the US military and the Filipino government were forced to reorganize in order to manage a cohesive multidimensional campaign aimed at winning public support. Extensive US military and economic support was essential throughout for victory. In conclusion, success in quelling both rebellions was achieved by key leaders structuring their organizations to conduct balanced civil and military campaigns directed at winning the popular support of the people.
Works Cited


Executive Summary


Author: Major Matthew R. Modarelli, United States Air Force

Thesis: The ability of British leadership to coordinate and fuse administrative, police, army, and air force operations resulted in the successful tracking and eventual capture and execution of Dedan Kimathi in October of 1956. While remnants of the insurgency would remain until 1960, the neutralization of Kimathi effectively ended the Mau Mau movement in Kenya.

Discussion: A military campaign analysis commonly refers to a study of conventional operations like HUSKY or OVERLORD. However, with the United States currently fighting irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I have taken a similar analytical approach to British counterinsurgency operations in Kenya from 1952-1960, focusing primarily on the manhunt for Dedan Kimathi from 1955-1956. In 1954, British Army Major P.M. Slane of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers wrote a report on the tactical problems in Kenya. Slane stated, “the Administration, Police, Army, and R.A.F., who together are termed the Security Forces, are so closely linked that all must be affected by any change, however small, in tactics.” Slane understood well what “security forces” means when facing unconventional threats and irregular war. I will use these functional areas identified by Slane to organize this campaign analysis and evaluate salient points in each area that directly led to the suppression of the Mau Mau movement, giving considerable attention to the capture of Kimathi which marked the end of Mau Mau resistance.

Conclusion: A single focus and absolute fusion of civil and military capabilities at all levels is paramount for a successful overall counterinsurgency campaign. In studying a successful insurgent leader manhunt as its own campaign within the overall effort, clarity concerning the interrelation and interdependence of all civil and military functions is achieved. Hence, in studying the success of the Kimathi hunt, the success of the entire counterinsurgency effort is realized. British leadership was able to coordinate and adapt to the changing threat environment and by 1955 was able to put their best foot forward by backing the Kenyan Police special branch with all civil and military capabilities in the hunt for Kimathi. Until the United States achieves at least a modicum of the civil-military fusion and flexibility achieved by the British in 1955, we can expect the insurgent movements we now face to maintain or gain momentum, and their key leadership to remain at large.
INTRODUCTION

Tracking and neutralizing an indigenous insurgent leader is among the most complex and brutal tasks of any counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Such was the case in the manhunt for Dedan Kimathi, leader of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya. The origins of the Mau Mau insurgency (1952-1960) against British colonial rule were not unlike revolts of roughly the same time period in places like colonial Africa and the Philippines. The indigenous Kenyan population began to react violently to the suppressive colonial rule, which meant unequal distribution of wealth, mismanagement of land-tenure, unfair treatment of native citizens, and religious tensions. The result was an environment ripe for exploitation by militant leaders with extreme ideologies, paving the way for the ascent of Dedan Kimathi as the militant leader of the Mau Mau. By the end of 1954, the British had declared a state of emergency in Kenya and were poised to launch a campaign (1955-1956) to target and neutralize Kimathi whose capture "virtually ended Mau Mau resistance" (Asprey, 886). This campaign analysis will use the following categories to examine how each functional area organized and supported the other resulting in civil-military fusion, the successful capture of Dedan Kimathi, and the end of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya: Administration, Police, Army, Air Force.

BACKGROUND

In October of 1952, the British Empire declared a state of emergency in Kenya as a result of increased criminal activity and violence in and around Nairobi. Events culminated in the murder of Kikuyu, tribal leader and British ally, Senior Chief Waruhiu. The majority of the Mau Mau were from the Kikuyu tribe or sub tribes related to the Kikuyu and the revolt was primarily a tribal uprising. By 1952, the Kikuyu tribe had developed specific grievances against colonial rule and the death of Waruhiu, a British sympathizer, was intended by the Mau Mau to send a
clear message to the government concerning the changing popular opinion of the Kikuyu masses. (Thompson, 108-109)

Several factors contributed to the unrest of Kikuyu and supporting tribes in and around Nairobi, Kenya. Prior to 1945, the agricultural working conditions were generally favorable for local workers. This changed in the time leading up to 1952. Working conditions worsened for local employees of white European owned farms. An increase in demand on labor without proper compensation occurred largely as a result of an increase in white settlers following World War II. This also led to the disenfranchisement of many Kikuyu peoples from their own small farms. Additionally, a large number of Kikuyu began to migrate to the population centers of Nairobi and Mombasa or were placed in native reserves (see Appendix A), resulting in increased poverty and crime. This led to cramping and a reduction in the overall standard of living creating an environment that was ripe for the recruitment of insurgents who by 1952 numbered some 12,500. (Thompson, 108-109)

At the heart of the Mau Mau movement was the hatred of colonial rule fueled by tribal fundamentalist ideology that over time sought to counter all western influence. “Some Mau Mau leaders wanted to destroy the white man; others wanted to uproot every vestige of European civilization” (Henderson, 4). Elements from both these extreme schools of thought combined to create the Mau Mau movement. Eventually the intelligentsia, who dominated the movement at its origins, were killed or captured and the extremist replacements called for the total rejection of everything western. Thus, the theoretical origins of the movement were anti-white; however, their violent activities and increasing extremist views resulted in nearly one hundred times more Africans killed as the Mau Mau targeted all who assisted COIN efforts.
Successful COIN operations began with an increase in military forces in 1952 and the appointment of Sir George Erskine in 1953 as the senior general in command of all military and police aspects of the COIN campaign. Until his appointment, "there was a lack of central direction" (Bennett, 146). Civil control remained with the colonial governor and Erskine was able to work well with the local civilian leadership. Erskine organized a campaign that successfully isolated the Mau Mau, denying them unfettered access to Kikuyu native reserves and Nairobi population centers. Mau Mau critical requirements such as information and intelligence support, food, weapons, munitions, recruits, and basic logistics supply chains were almost entirely cut off. The Mau Mau gangs under the control of Kimathi were forced to operate in the forests surrounding the base of Mt. Kenya (see Appendix A) devolving the group from a strong insurgency to a limited, but still lethal terrorist movement. However, within the forest the enemy maintained freedom of movement and the remaining gangs were comprised of the most capable and extreme members. They maintained a limited, but nonetheless psychologically effective ability to carry out violent attacks against Kikuyu and white settlers outside the forest. As long as Kimathi remained at large, the Mau Mau movement remained (see Appendix B for Kimathi biographical information).

ADMINISTRATION

For purposes of this campaign analysis, administration refers to the programs under civilian direction aimed at social and economic reform. Administrative COIN efforts began in 1952. Social and economic reform initiatives were aimed at addressing the grievances of the masses and countering the origins of the Mau Mau movement. One goal was to reeducate captured insurgents and sympathizers on the benefits of colonial rule with the goal of reintroducing them back into society. This information and education campaign focused on
undermining the Mau Mau movement to each individual Kikuyu in custody. As the numbers of captured former Mau Mau supporters increased, the more robust the administrative process for reeducation had to be. The government established a pipeline, which upon successful completion meant a Kikuyu detainee could be released as a member of society again. This pipeline addressed and countermanded each aspect of the Mau Mau ideology and in effect, gave former Mau Mau the opportunity to be unbound from their insurgent oaths and return to society. (McConnell, 29)

Religious reform and education reform went hand-in-hand. The Mau Mau, particularly under the leadership of Kimathi, had effectively exploited all aspects of the Kikuyu religious practices and superstitions, as well as Christian and Biblical traditions, in order to divinely rule over their members. Kikuyu members that had sworn allegiance to the Mau Mau were terrified of breaking their oaths. Social and religious conflicts between Christian Missionaries and native Kikuyu teachers affected the rhetoric used in the classrooms regarding colonial government rule and Christianity. This had resulted in a generation of Kikuyu citizens educated in a system that polarized the conflict between white Europeans and Kikuyu natives. Education reform specifically addressed this religiously motivated rift. Compromises among religious leaders resulted in both sides agreeing to emphasize similarities vice differences between the Christian faith and Kikuyu tribal traditions, easing classroom tensions.

Issues surrounding land tenure were addressed by the administration as well. Opportunities were created for Kikuyu “squatters” (i.e. those who lived and worked on white European owned farms) to own their own homes in Kikuyu communities and eventually work toward the purchase of their own land. Land laborers previously given fixed pay regardless of increased hours or inflation were offered incentives in the form of increased payment for the
quality and amount of crops they produced. The government also carried out a resettlement program which moved nearly one million dispersed natives into reserves where security could be provided by Home Guard (Asprey, 884, Erskine, 15-16). While no single program remedied all the problems created by colonization and foreign ownership of land, initiatives introduced by the administration succeeded in increasing the stake that local citizens had in the success of the economy and reduced the number of Kikuyu wanting to join or support the Mau Mau. (McConnell, 29-35)

The local government succeeded in countering the tenets that birthed the Mau Mau movement and directly supported effective police, army, and air force operations. Programs like the pipeline gave insurgents a way out and produced a valuable crop of potential informants, many of whom were vetted, trained, and employed by police special investigators for future operations. Additionally, the administration organized several thousand willing Kikuyu tribal members (many of whom were women) who had been the victims of Mau Mau violence to support the police in sweeping parties covering large areas of the forest during the Kimathi hunt (Asprey, 886). These administrative programs addressed the core grievances of the people and laid the foundation upon which the successful manhunt campaign was built and launched against Kimathi in 1955.

POLICE

COIN operations are inherently policing actions. Large, conventional military capabilities must be ready to respond at a moment’s notice to the will of the civilian leadership and police officials. “Certain police units have lately been working in the forest and within a battalion area it is not unusual for one rifle company to be stationed in the reserves, well back from the forest, so that they can assist the Police and Home Guard” (Slane, 48). Up until 1954,
the Army used specially trained and equipped units to penetrate and patrol the forest leaving police operations to focus on population centers. This changed in 1955 when the Army realized they could not effectively control such a vast area. They needed local police familiar with the terrain to use local informants and trackers to surreptitiously target enemy gangs. As a result, the need for police operations, specifically the Kenyan Police special branch provided the answer. (Henderson, 28) (Erskine, 17-18)

The tactic used to successfully penetrate the Mau Mau gangs in the mid-1950s was called the pseudo-gang tactic. Frank Kitson, a young British regular officer is credited with introducing this form of tradecraft to Kenya in 1954. The British previously employed pseudo-gangs in Malaya. Pseudo-gangs are gangs comprised of captured insurgents that are converted, reorganized into gangs, and released under the close control of counterinsurgents. Pesudo-gangs are instructed to target and infiltrate enemy gangs, gather intelligence, and assist in neutralization. Neutralization meant one of the following outcomes for the enemy: (1) surrender and agree to assist counterinsurgents or be imprisoned and face trial; (2) be captured and agree to assist counterinsurgents or be imprisoned and face trial; or (3) be killed. (Henderson) (Asprey, 885) The number of converted gang members operating in pseudo-gangs eventually surpassed the number still loyal to Kimathi. This tactic was effective against the cell-gang structure of Kimathi's thugs and the fruits of the pseudo-gang operations were quickly recognized. British Army battalions quickly became "almost entirely dependent on the Police or Home Guard for their intelligence and up-to-date information" (Slane, 48). While Kitson may have introduced the concept, it was best employed in the hunt for Kimathi by Ian Henderson and Philip Goodhart of the Kenyan police special branch. General Sir Gerald Lathbury (Erskine's successor) created a police section called Special Forces, which was designed to support and expand pseudo-gang
operations. This policing tactic of hunting down insurgents, "proved probably the most successful of all methods employed" (Asprey, 886) and became the main effort supported by all other COIN capabilities in the final stages of the Kimathi hunt.

ARMY

The Army had been successful in clearing Nairobi and other population centers of Mau Mau in late 1954 but had reached a transition point in the forests around Mt. Kenya. By January 1955, the Army had launched a number of large, manpower intensive operations in the forests culminating in "Operation Hammer" – a division-sized sweep of the Aberdares (see western forest areas in Appendix A) all of which had netted "meager" results (Asprey, 885). The forest was a physically tough and unforgiving environment for soldiers to work in and the Mau Mau maintained the initiative, being native to the terrain. Sir General Erskine described this challenge during a lecture given in 1955. "The soldier's job in the forest was not easy. It required special training, special equipment, and high class junior leadership" (Erskine, 17). Erskine's understanding of the physical challenges presented by the terrain and the needs of his forces to adapt in order to sustain operations proved to be critical to the overall success of the campaign against Kimathi.

By 1955, the Army was well trained and equipped to support Henderson and Goodhart's pseudo-gang operations targeting Kimathi. Slane's description in 1954 of Army units acting in reserve and support of police operations became the standard in the 1955-1956 manhunt campaign. The Army continued to successfully deny Mau Mau lines of communications and logistics and maintained an ability to penetrate the forest when necessary for direct action or specific terrain denial missions in support of pseudo-gang operations. Erskine created an Army
force that shaped the battle space and was prepared to support subsequent police operations that led to the eventual capture of Kimathi.

AIR FORCE

Military and civilian air support played a pivotal role in the COIN campaign and the hunt for Kimathi. "All the Army effort must be concentrated on the gangs in the forest...gangs must be forced to move by persistent harassing fire from all available supporting arms, including the R.A.F." (Slane, 52). Slane knew in 1954 that it would take air support to neutralize the gangs in the forest. A joint operations room was established at Erskine's headquarters to coordinate land and air operations. Starting as early as 1953, bombing, supply drops, and aerial photography by R.A.F. aircraft of safe havens used by the Mau Mau in the forest helped shape the battlespace for pseudo-gang operations that would begin in 1955. (Erskine 17) In addition to kinetic air support, extensive psychological operations were conducted using air based loud-speaker systems aimed at breaking the morale of the remaining Mau Mau in the forest. R.A.F. forces were eventually complimented by the Kenya police air forces during the mid-to-late 1950s. What began as primarily military air support was soon complimented by civilian volunteer pilots and aircraft, and eventually became a Kenyan police air force directly supporting pseudo-gang operations.5

Available Kenyan military and civilian aircraft directly supported the police pseudo-gang operations in many unique ways. Having exhausted all leads and lost all informant access to the enemy by the end of 1955, the special police branch decided on a way to initiate contact. Three letters with covert contact and meeting instructions were placed in remote locations of the forest. Then low flying aircraft fitted with loud speaker systems announced throughout the vast area of the forest where the letters were located. The announcement was crafted to appeal to the
curiosity of Kimathi gang leaders. The operation eventually led to the retrieval of a letter by the enemy. Henderson was able to develop a new contact with access to Kimathi and subsequent pseudo-gang operations led to his capture. (Henderson, 32-37)

CONCLUSION

As the supreme leader and visionary of the Mau Mau, Dedan Kimathi became a center of gravity and had to be neutralized in order to end the Mau Mau insurgency. This was accomplished through a comprehensive campaign involving education and social reform combined with military and police operations. Successful administrative efforts focusing on winning the popular support of the Kikuyu masses denied Kimathi key logistical and manpower support. This created a favorable environment for police investigators to recruit and employ informants as part of the pseudo-gang operations. Large scale Army operations succeeded in shaping the battlespace for the manhunt. Closely coordinated air force missions resulted in key kinetic shaping operations to disrupt insurgent strongholds, and focused non-kinetic operations directly supported pseudo-gang activities. The ability of British leadership to fuse, focus and coordinate administrative, police, army, and air force operations resulted in the successful tracking and eventual capture and execution of Dedan Kimathi in October of 1956. While remnants of the insurgency would remain until 1960, the neutralization of Kimathi effectively ended the Mau Mau movement in Kenya.

The United States is currently facing insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and the timeliness of this campaign study goes without saying. Unless we develop the same type of civil-military fusion created by the British in Kenya, we can expect the extremist causes of our enemies to endure and their militant leaders to remain illusive. It is unlikely that pseudo-gang operations as they were employed in colonial Kenya would be acceptable by today’s United
States, Iraqi, or Afghani legal standards. Still, offensive operations using converted informants like pseudo-gangs are merely a type of advanced police tradecraft. Skilled U.S. Department of Defense, federal, state, and local police investigators have already conducted successful manhunt campaigns, within legal boundaries, targeting well-organized insurgent elements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sadly, thus far this use of police investigators for COIN manhunts has been mostly ad hoc. It should be captured doctrinally by the U.S. as an irregular war strategy. Still, the ability to hunt down an insurgent gang or leader is useless unless employed as part of a greater COIN campaign to win the popular support of the people. The British succeeded in Kenya because they fused their civil and military efforts using the right capabilities in the right places as part of a single campaign to prove the legitimacy of their governance to the people, and so must we in Iraq and Afghanistan.

1 Areas established by COIN leaders to bring dispersed Kikuyu families into centrally controlled areas for security and accountability.
2 Concept briefed by Dr. Wray Johnson during 27 Nov 07 lecture on “Introduction to Irregular Warfare”.
3 The Home Guard was comprised of units formed by Kikuyu tribesman loyal to the colonial government. Home Guard operated under the control of the local government. Erskine provided a colonel as advisor. (Erskine, 15).
4 Royal Air Force.
5 http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/kenya%20police%20airwing.asp; (Erskine, 17).
APPENDIX A

(McConnell, 2)
APPENDIX B

It is important to study and gain some understanding of the man Dedan Kimathi in order to appreciate his role in the insurgency and why his capture is considered the end of the Mau Mau resistance. "If the Kikuyu are the Germans of tribal Kenya, Kimathi was their Hitler" (Henderson, 10). As with Hitler, Kimathi’s ascent to power was made possible by his place in history and the circumstances of his surrounding environment. He was as an intelligent, stubborn and strong willed youth prone to misconduct and deviance both in school and in the workplace. He attended several different academic institutions demonstrating an exceptional capacity for learning. The school system was strongly influenced by religion in Kenya and at the time was divided principally over the practice of female circumcision and other Kikuyu tribal practices forbidden by Christian missionaries. This resulted in the creation of independent Kikuyu schools that preached extreme anti-white, anti-government, and anti-Christian ideology. Kimathi, a baptized Christian, attended one of these Kikuyu schools and it had a lasting impression on him. He lived out his adolescent years in a Kenya awakening from years of oppressive colonial rule. As time went on he held various jobs teaching and working for the government. In nearly every case Kimathi quit or was fired under bad circumstances either having stolen some item of value from his employer or offended, harassed, accosted, or raped a co-worker, classmate, teacher, or pupil. At the time of his ascent, he was well educated as compared to his contemporaries. He had a basic understanding of the English language, western culture, Christianity, and traditional Kikuyu tribal customs. He used his place in history, unique experiences and exposure to cultures and religion to control and manipulate thousands of Kikuyu insurgents as the militant leader of the Mau Mau.
Kimathi’s miscreant lifestyle kept him on the move, evading authorities and set the stage for his assumption of the Mau Mau leadership. As a result, he traveled often and became quite influential and popular among the uneducated members of the tribe scattered across the outlying tribal areas. Subsequently, he was able to employ an “outside-in” strategy winning over the rural populations first with his charisma and fearlessness that eventually gained momentum in populated areas as well. In 1952, Kimathi’s popularity and extremist ideology led to his appointment as a Mau Mau oath administrator. He organized mass oath ceremonies to recruit for the Mau Mau and was subsequently identified and imprisoned. While in jail he struck a deal with a Mau Mau sympathizer and escaped to the Aberdare range where at the age of 32 he began his rise to the leadership of the Mau Mau through a campaign of fear, manipulation, and brutality.

By the mid-1950s, Kimathi was the strategist, visionary and undisputed leader of the Mau Mau. He organized the Mau Mau into an invertebrate band of sub gangs and appointed leaders to operate in specific areas. Each Mau Mau cell (or gang) had operational and tactical control over their own gangs within their designated areas – Kimathi provided the strategy and policy. This meant that Kimathi’s tactical and operational control over other gangs was loose at best making him hard to track and locate – a fact that would later shape how COIN forces would eventually hunt him down. In an effort to strengthen his strategic and ideological power, he created two councils, one to create policy and appoint leaders for the gangs, the other to train and prepare new recruits. Adding to this, Kimathi wrote his own vision and strategy for the movement and implemented grotesque oath ceremonies playing on the religious and superstitious fears of recruits. Kimathi’s written vision was the sole Mau Mau document, an
extremely rare written manifesto, and it served to secure his position of authority across the vast area of operations. (Henderson, 10-23)
Bibliography


This directive states the mission of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), communicates responsibilities of the AFOSI, and explains the organizational relationship between the AFOSI, the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), and The Inspector General of the Air Force.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This directive updates the AFOSI mission and addresses AFOSI's mission capabilities in hostile, uncertain, and permissive environments globally. It acknowledges AFOSI's use of military and civilian special agents and clarifies AFOSI's relationship to the SECAF.

1. MISSION. AFOSI is a field operating agency, accountable to the SECAF, under the direction and guidance of The Inspector General of the Air Force (SAF/IG). It is a combat-ready military organization that provides the Air Force a wartime capability to conduct, in hostile and uncertain environments, counter-threat operations to find, fix, track, and neutralize enemy threats. It is the Air Force's focal point for working with U.S. and foreign nation law enforcement and security services in order to provide timely and accurate threat information in all environments. It also performs as a federal law enforcement agency with responsibility for conducting criminal investigations, counterintelligence and specialized investigative activities, protective service operations, and integrated force protection for the Air Force.

2. COMMAND. The AFOSI Commander:

   2.1. Is directly responsible to the SECAF for criminal investigative authority.

   2.1.1. Will notify the SECAF in writing of any instance in which a commander, or any other Air Force official, attempts to impede an investigation or limit the use of investigative techniques through the use of that commander's or official's authority.

   2.2. Reports to SAF/IG.

   2.3. Exercises command authority over all assigned personnel, facilities, property, and funds, and is delegated the independent authority within the Air Force to initiate criminal investigations and to conduct counterintelligence activities in accordance with AFPD 71-1, Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence.

   2.4. Provides combat-ready military and deployment-ready civilian forces to combatant commanders
through the Air Force component.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES. AFOSI:

3.1. Organizes, trains, equips, and assesses performance of all AFOSI field units.

3.2. Outside of established foreign base perimeters and in accordance with any applicable international agreement, is the Air Force lead for:

3.2.1. Locating and tracking enemy and terrorist operatives threatening U.S. and allied personnel and resources through focused, proactive investigative operations.

3.3. Coordinates and conducts neutralization of enemy and terrorist threats with appropriate U.S. and allied forces.

3.4. Within its investigative jurisdiction, identifies and investigates crimes against people, crimes against private and U.S. Government property, fraud, technology transfer violations, environmental violations, terrorism, and desertion.

3.5. Conducts counterintelligence collections and is the Air Force's sole agency for conducting counterintelligence investigations, and offensive counterintelligence operations.

3.6. Investigates intrusions and intentional sabotage of Department of Defense (DoD) computer systems and augments the Air Force information warfare mission.

3.7. Executes the DoD Counterdrug Strategy within the Air Force by detecting, interdicting, suppressing and monitoring the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. via Air Force channels. Proactively detects and investigates the use, possession, and sale of illegal drugs by U.S. Air Force members and employees.

3.8. Is the Air Force single point of contact for protective service operations protecting senior US, DoD, Air Force, and Allied officials.

3.9. Provides specialized security policy and management support for special access programs.

3.10. Employs specialized investigative techniques to include forensic and behavioral sciences and hypnosis.


3.14. Maintains liaison and is the Air Force single point of contact with federal, state, local, and foreign nation law enforcement, counterintelligence, and security agencies for matters falling within the AFOSI mission.

3.15. Serves as the DoD Executive Agent for the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3).
3.16. Collects, analyzes, and disseminates threat information.

STEVEN R. POLK
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General
Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFI — Air Force Instruction

AFOSI — Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFPD — Air Force Policy Directive

TSCM — Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Program
Bibliography


