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Operation JUBILEE: The Allied Raid on Dieppe (1942) –
A Historical Analysis of a Planning Failure.

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**Operation JUBILEE: The Allied Raid on Dieppe (1942) A Historical Analysis of a Planning Failure.**

United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 22134-5068

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Executive Summary

Title: Operation JUBILEE: The Allied Raid on Dieppe (1942) – A Historical Analysis of a Planning Failure.

Author: Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Goodman, Canadian Forces

Thesis: It was not any single event that led to the catastrophe at Dieppe, but rather a cascading series of events which began with the drafting of the plan and ended in the failure of the mission.

Discussion: On 19 August 1942, over 6,000 soldiers waded ashore at Dieppe as part of Operation JUBILEE. The plan called for a raid-in-force by a closely coordinated joint attack of air, sea and land forces. Planners anticipated that the joint operation would take only 15 hours for successful execution and withdrawal. Unfortunately, within seven hours the raid on Dieppe ended in complete disaster. The losses were grim: 60 percent of the ground force killed, wounded or captured; 106 of 650 aircraft destroyed; 33 of 179 landing craft lost at sea or on the beaches; and one of eight destroyers sunk. The raid on Dieppe was conceived as a coordinated joint plan of air, sea, and land battles. However, as planning progressed, it devolved into a complex and inflexible script, in which synchronization was used to make up for operational shortfalls. Inevitably, Clausewitzian friction affected the battle, and the inability to achieve operational objectives within carefully prescribed timelines meant that the pre-conditions for successive steps were not met. It was not any single event that led to the catastrophe at Dieppe, but rather a cascading series of events which began with the drafting of the plan and ended in the failure of the mission.

Conclusion: Operation JUBILEE did not fail because of poor intelligence, a lack of preparation, or the loss of operational surprise. It failed because a plan that originally started out as a joint battle of air, land and sea forces, had devolved into an overly complex, scripted event that had no possible chance for success.
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Preface

While the Allied amphibious raid on Dieppe in 1942 (Operation JUBILEE) has been praised for its tactical lessons learned, it has also been classified as a disaster which could have been avoided. Although there have been many books and papers written on the Dieppe Raid, it still contains innumerable lessons to be learned.

Dieppe was a failure in planning. It started out as a joint, integrated attack by air, land and naval forces, and devolved down into a complex and inflexible script that was impossible to execute. In our current complex and uncertain environment, it is important to study how and why this happened in order to prevent the same mistake in the future.

The majority of this paper was derived from Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Reports concerning the Dieppe Raid. Each of these reports is a document written by C.P. Stacey (the officer in Canadian Military Headquarters responsible for the Canadian Army’s official history), in which he collected statements, facts, and documents relating to the raid. It is critical to note that, although one would think the reports written later would contain less accurate detail than those written closer to the raid, it is in fact the opposite. Colonel Stacey went to great lengths to interview returned prisoners of war, and to review captured documents as the war progressed and even after it ended. For that reason, the basis of this report is not the individual unit histories, but the primary source documents that Colonel Stacey created while serving with the CMHQ.

Through the use of the CMHQ reports, I will track the break down in planning from the moment of its conception in the Combined Operations Headquarters through to its execution. The execution portion of the paper will focus on tying the key incidents back to the failures in
planning that caused them. I will then finish with some lessons learned and an analysis of why it all went wrong. This paper will focus mainly on the military force, or more commonly referred to Landing Force, of the operation, and not the naval or air components. It will also not concentrate on tactical lessons learned, but more on the operational and planning lessons of the raid.

I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Donald Bittner, without whom this paper would have never reached fruition. His aide and guidance were appreciated throughout the research, writing, and revision of it. I would also like to thank Dr. Steve Harris at Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, in Ottawa, for his assistance in providing access to original documentation. In addition, I would like to thank the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and my peers in the class of 07/08. The professional attitude of both staff and students was outstanding at all times throughout the year.

Finally, I want to thank my wife, Lee, and our children, Emma and Chris. Without them this paper and year at Command and Staff College could not have been such a success.
**Introduction**

On 19 August 1942, over 6,000 soldiers waded ashore at Dieppe as part of Operation JUBILEE. The plan called for a raid-in-force by a closely coordinated joint attack of air, sea and land forces. In the air, it was envisioned that the Royal Air Force (RAF) would battle the Luftwaffe and quickly gain air superiority, thus protecting and supporting the ground forces with integral close air support. At sea, the Royal Navy would execute carefully phased landings, and provide naval and anti-aircraft gunfire support. Finally, the ground forces would conduct a **carefully synchronized surprise attack**, catching the small garrison of German defenders off-guard. The whole force would then withdraw before any major enemy reinforcement could arrive. Planners anticipated that the joint operation would take only 15 hours, or one full tide, for successful execution and withdrawal.

Unfortunately, within seven hours the raid on Dieppe ended in complete disaster. The losses were grim: 60 percent of the ground force killed, wounded or captured; 106 of 650 aircraft destroyed; 33 of 179 landing craft lost at sea or on the beaches; and one of eight destroyers sunk. Why did the landing fail to achieve its objectives? Many theories have been formulated, including: (1) the Germans were warned and surprise was lost; (2) intelligence estimates of enemy strengths and reinforcement response times were horribly incorrect; and, (3) the un-tried Canadian landing force was poorly trained and lacked experience.

While each of these theories may have some merit, on their own they cannot answer why the mission ended so catastrophically. The raid on Dieppe was conceived as a coordinated joint plan of air, sea, and land battles. As planning progressed and fateful decisions were made, the plan devolved into a **complex and inflexible script**, in which synchronization was used to make up for operational shortfalls. Inevitably, the Clausewitzian friction of war affected the battle, and
the inability to achieve operational objectives within carefully prescribed timelines meant that
the pre-conditions for successive steps were not met. This paper contends that it was not any
single event that led to the catastrophe at Dieppe, but rather a cascading series of events which
began with the drafting of the plan and ended in the failure of the mission.

**Background**

By the spring of 1942, the Allies were facing severe pressure in all of their theatres of
operation. Axis forces controlled much of Europe, the Russians were sustaining heavy losses on
the Eastern Front, Rommel continued to outmanoeuvre and outfight a much larger force in
Africa, and Japan had entered the war. In the Atlantic, over 700,000 tonnes of shipping were
being lost each month to Axis u-boats and raiders.\(^2\) The Soviet Premier, Josef Stalin, continued
to push the United States and Britain to open a second front to assist his beleaguered country.\(^3\)

To placate Stalin and to assist in the planning of future invasion operations, the Allies
examined the possibility of a landing in France in 1942 under the title Operation
SLEDGEHAMMER. The concept of SLEDGEHAMMER was to land a sizeable force in the
area of Cherbourg, with the hopes of drawing pressure off the Eastern Front and establishing a
toe-hold in France.\(^4\) RAF staff checks concluded that although it did not have the combat radius
to cover operations at Cherbourg, it could support a landing at a location closer to the RAF
airfields on the south coast of England.

When it also became clear that the Allies were not in a position to conduct a major
landing in 1942, the principal goal transitioned from strategic support to Russia to the
advancement of operational and tactical landing experience. Political and military pressure
mounted to conduct an operation at the division-level to examine the feasibility of seizing a port
on the coast of France, as it was believed that a port would be required to support an invasion on
the mainland. Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) in the United Kingdom began to examine ports that would meet the needs of army, navy, and air force planners, while excluding any locations that were possible future invasion sites. In the end, only one port met all of the requirements: Dieppe, a small town located on the north coast of France. On 4 April 1942, the Chief of COHQ, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, approved the commencement of planning for a raid-in-force under the codename Operation RUTTER.

The Plan

With guidance from Mountbatten and intelligence estimates that only one low-category battalion was defending Dieppe, COHQ quickly produced two possible courses of action. The first involved a pincer-like attack on the town from its flanks, with a strong floating reserve to reinforce success. This plan was strongly supported by the COHQ planning staff in that it avoided the strong beach defenses of the port itself; also, it protected the port from being damaged during the assault (a key factor if the port was to be used during an actual invasion). The second course of action was a frontal assault, with supporting flank attacks and airborne landings.

As the commander of the forces that would be used for the raid, both plans were reviewed by Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery, Commander of South Eastern Command, for his recommendation and support. His primary question was, "Is it intended to stay ashore 48-hours or longer?" When COHQ planning staff answered that the raid would span only one tide or 15 hours, Montgomery supported the frontal assault. This decision was based on his analysis that an envelopment of Dieppe from the flanks would be slow and complex, two factors to be avoided in a raid of such short duration. It was further highlighted that an enveloping attack
with tanks would need to seize bridges over the rivers Scie and Saane. No intelligence was available on one key point: could these bridges withstand the weight of a Churchill Tank?\textsuperscript{11}

Throughout the development of the Outline Plan, naval planners at the COHQ continually expressed doubts as to the success of a frontal assault. Army and Air Force Planners emphasized that the attack would be preceded by an aerial bombing of such intensity that, “the defence would be too confused by it and by subsequent attacks from low-flying aircraft to be in a position to offer stout or prolonged resistance.”\textsuperscript{12}

Naval planners still had their concerns, but in the end they were only advisors on the naval aspects of the plan. The lead naval planner, Capt John Hughes-Hallett, RN, therefore approached the Admiralty on the use of a capital ship to provide heavy naval gunfire support. In a fateful decision, naval authorities at the “highest levels” were so violently opposed to employing a capital ship in the channel that the Admiralty would not support a formal recommendation.\textsuperscript{13} Naval firepower would depend on the small, 4-inch guns of the eight supporting destroyers.

The outline plan for a frontal assault was submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 9 May 1942 and was approved on 13 May 1942. At this point, it is critical to highlight that the outline plan still included the preparatory aerial bombardment as a key element in the success of the frontal assault. It is also important to understand the chain of command that was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee for both planning and execution of the operation. For planning purposes, Chief of Combined Operations Lord Mountbatten was the approval authority for the force commander’s plans, although he would seek concurrence from Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery, Commander of South Eastern Command, and Admiral Sir William James, Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. During execution, Admiral James would be the naval
Commander-in-Chief responsible for: the decision to sail, naval passage to and from Dieppe, and Naval cover during the operation. However, as clarified in his guidance from the Chiefs of Staff, “he was not responsible for the expedition between the time of landing and of re-embarking.”

The responsibility for actions in and around Dieppe would rest co-equally with the Force Commanders themselves. Thus, a command and control issue surfaced.

The landing assault outline plan was therefore approved as a main frontal assault force landing in the area of Dieppe to seize the town and vicinity, with supporting flanking attacks to the east and west of the town to destroy key installations and block enemy reinforcements. The approved plan also included airborne and glider attacks on: flanking coastal guns, anti-aircraft batteries, and a possible Division Headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille. The raid had the following broad objectives:

a. destroy the enemy defences in the vicinity of Dieppe;

b. destroy the aerodrome installations at St. Aubin;

c. destroy Radio Direction Finding Stations, power stations, dock and rail facilities, and petrol dumps in the vicinity;

d. remove invasion barges for Allied use;

e. remove secret documents from the Divisional HQ at Arques-la-Bataille; and,

f. capture prisoners.

After receiving approval to proceed with detailed planning, the first step for the COHQ was to select the commanders for the air, sea and land forces. The following choices were made:

a. Military Force Commander (henceforth known as the Landing Force):

   Major-General John Hamilton Roberts, Canadian Army;

b. Air Force Commander: Air Vice Marshall Leigh-Mallory, RAF; and,
c. Naval Force Commander: Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman, RN.\textsuperscript{17}

Overall coordination for the operation would be maintained by COHQ, but as the component force commanders, these three individuals would play a critical role in shaping the plan and preparing the forces. Once appointed and briefed, they returned to their geographically separate headquarters to continue their planning. In effect, the force commanders planned in relative isolation from each other and the COHQ. Thus, rather than having a truly joint planning process, the planning was split into three parallel processes. It appears that from this moment on, decisions that were made by individual commanders were not sufficiently weighed against their cumulative impact on the overall plan. This was the start of the chain of events that would lead to the disaster at Dieppe.

Changes plagued RUTTER as planning progressed. In a meeting on 5 June 1942, the Air Force Commander proposed, and the members of the meeting agreed, “that air bombing of the Port itself during the night of the assault would not be the most profitable way of using bombers and might only result in putting everyone on the alert.” In addition, it was assessed that the massive aerial bombing could negatively impact the landing force, by destroying houses and blocking roads that would impede the mobility of the infantry and tank forces.\textsuperscript{18} As an alternative, the air commander proposed that close support bombing and strafing runs occur just before the landings, and that high-altitude aerial bombing instead focus on attacking diversionary targets to the east of Dieppe.\textsuperscript{19}

Since massive preparatory bombing was not a priority, and enemy opposition was expected to be light, the Air Force Commander was now able to pursue a more aggressive air operation. RUTTER would provide an ideal means to draw the Luftwaffe into a large fighter engagement at the time and place of the RAF’s choosing. As a result, Leigh-Mallory was given
67 squadrons for the attack, a force larger than any that had been committed by the RAF at any one time, even during the Battle of Britain.\textsuperscript{20}

With the knowledge that the preparatory bombardment had been cancelled, Baillie-Grohman approached Mountbatten on the use of capital ships to provide naval gunfire support to the landing force. Mountbatten reiterated what he had already said to Hughes-Hallett, that the Admiralty had turned down the previous request and that capital ship support was out of the question.\textsuperscript{21}

With the capital ship question answered, Baillie-Grohman finalized the naval support concept for the landing and re-embarkation. Planning estimates indicated that the landing zone would not allow the full naval force of 252 vessels to make the approach at the same time.\textsuperscript{22} This meant that the attack had to be phased in a manner that surprise could be maintained, but that forces could hit the beaches in the proper order to carry out the operation. It was decided between the force commanders that the supporting flank attacks would be carried out 30 minutes prior to the landing of the main force.

For the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Canadian Division, the landing force tasked to carry out the raid, little changed during the planning process. Two brigades would conduct the assault, with: two battalions attacking in the middle; three battalions attacking on the flanks; and, one battalion held in reserve. British airborne and glider forces would attack the enemy rear, conduct a link-up, and withdraw with the main force.

Meanwhile, training continued at a fast pace throughout May and June. Two confirmation exercises, Yukon I and II, were carried out on 13 and 23 June respectively, and the Chief of Combined Operations gave final approval that the operation could proceed any time after 24 June 1942. After careful deliberation, a launch date of 7 July 1942 was chosen.\textsuperscript{23}
On 5 July 1942, Operation RUTTER was abruptly cancelled in a conference held by the Chief of Combined Operations. Deteriorating weather conditions and narrowing tidal windows meant that the start of July was no longer a feasible period in which to conduct it. Ships were unloaded and it appeared the raid would be cancelled indefinitely. Commanders at all levels were concerned that with all of the preparations and final briefings that had been done for Operation RUTTER, the mission and its objective could be compromised. However, in COHQ, Capt(Navy) Hughes-Hallett argued that the mission could be re-mounted, since preliminary movements and brief-in would be minimal. After much debate, on 27 July 1942, the Chiefs of Staff Committee directed Mountbatten to recommence planning for a raid on Dieppe. The new operation was scheduled for the middle of August and named Operation JUBILEE. The final plan for JUBILEE was amended only slightly from RUTTER, with the airborne and glider landings being cancelled and replaced with seaborne commando raids. They would land concurrently with the flanking attacks, 30 minutes before the main assault.

Operation JUBILEE was scheduled for 19 August 1942. With the insertion of the commando landings, the plan was now less dependent on ideal aviation weather conditions. The commando targets would be the coastal battery near Berneval (landing beaches Yellow 1 and 2) to the east of Dieppe, and the coastal battery near Varengeville (landing beaches Orange 1 and 2) to the west. These two coastal batteries covered the approaches to Dieppe.

The Royal Regiment of Canada (R Regt C) would conduct a flanking attack to the east of Dieppe at the town of Puys (Blue Beach) to seize the headland to the east of Dieppe. On the western flank, the South Saskatchewan Regiment (S Sask R) and the Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (Camerons), would attack at Pourville (Green Beach). The S Sask R would land and seize a bridgehead and the headlands to the west of Dieppe, and then 30 minutes
later the Camerons would pass through their position to attack the aerodrome at Aubin and, if
time permitted, the Division Headquarters that intelligence placed in the area of Arques-la-
Bataille.27

The commando raids and flank attacks were all to occur at nautical twilight, 0450 hours,
in order to support the main landings at Dieppe 30 minutes later. The flanking landings were to be carried out concurrently, at six different beaches, and, as was noted in the Orders for Naval Supporting Fire, "surprise is the element upon which reliance is placed for the success of the landing on Green and Blue beaches and they will not be supported by gunfire from destroyers."28

The main assault by 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the center would be by the Essex Scottish in the east (Red Beach) and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) in the west (White Beach). The main assault would be supported by the tanks of the 14th Canadian Tank Regiment, with the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (Fus M.R.) infantry battalion held in reserve on the ships. The tanks were a crucial element of the landing, since no massed-aerial bombardment would occur. Although there would be a limited bombardment by Hurricanes and the Destroyers for ten minutes preceding the landing, the only integral fire support for the ground troops would come from the tanks.

The end state of the attack was two brigades in a hasty defense around the town of Dieppe. This would allow the engineers and infantry inside the perimeter to carry out their assigned demolition tasks. Once these were complete, all of the forces would then collapse inward onto the port for extraction, under the protection of Fus M.R. and Essex Scottish rearguard actions.

Examining the planning phase 65 years later, it is clear that on the eve of Operation JUBILEE the original intent for a coordinated joint attack of land, air, and naval forces, was
irrevocably split into three separate operations. The land component was focussed on a carefully synchronized frontal assault against a defended harbour, and the air component was fixated on a fighter engagement with the Luftwaffe. The naval component would support the assault force during the landing and extraction, but could provide only limited gunfire support while it was ashore.

Lacking a preparatory aerial bombardment, C.B. 04244 later acknowledged that overall success became contingent upon, “the correct and accurate timing of the successive phases of the operation by all Services taking part in it. Synchronization was, in fact, its keynote.” All 252 vessels had to navigate the channel and release their landing craft at exactly the right moment. The coastal batteries at Berneval and Varengeville had to be silenced on time. The attacks on the flanks counted on achieving surprise and maintaining their momentum. Finally, the main assault on the port of Dieppe itself depended on the headlands to the east and west being secured, and the timely arrival of tanks to support the infantry and engineers as they moved off of the beach and into the town.

With only one battalion held in reserve, the execution of the plan counted on two things: first, good communications so that the force commanders could coordinate higher level support and the commitment of the reserve, and second, the script going exactly as planned. As the time for the attack approached, none were aware that Clausewitzian friction and fog were about to have a disastrous impact on exactly these two things.

**Commando Raids at Orange and Yellow Beaches**

The commando raids at Orange and Yellow Beaches, for the most part, were extremely successful and achieved their objectives. The landings by 4 Cdo at Orange I and II were
executed in a text-book fashion, resulting in the destruction of the coastal battery to the west of Dieppe, at Varengeville, by 0650 hours.\textsuperscript{30} This kept it out of action during the landings.

The same success was not repeated east of Dieppe at Yellow I and II by 3 Cdo. A chance encounter with a German convoy at 0347 hours disrupted the landing of the force, and only small elements of 3 Cdo ever reached their designated landing areas. Although unable to destroy the coastal battery at Berneval, 3 Cdo’s sniping and harassing fire directed at the battery kept it out of action until after the landings were completed. No known fire from this battery affected the landing.\textsuperscript{31}

Again, although the raids were not executed entirely as planned, the actions of No 3 and 4 Cdo achieved their intent. With the coastal batteries otherwise engaged or destroyed, they did not interfere with the other flank landings and main assault on Dieppe. The first of the carefully scripted events of the operation had been successfully executed.

\textit{Blue Beach}

Simply stated, the assault on Blue Beach was a complete failure. No bombing preparation or naval gunfire support was planned for the flank attacks, as assumed success in their mission was predicated largely on the element of surprise. To achieve this surprise, the landing was to be done just as nautical twilight began. Forces would land under the cover of darkness, catching the defenders at a lower state of readiness. The landing at Blue Beach would occur simultaneously with the landings at Orange, Yellow, and Green, so that the other attacks would not precipitously alert the defenders.\textsuperscript{32}

Unfortunately, the R Regt C did not land as planned. Clausewitzian friction was once more at work, and a mix-up at sea delayed the landings until an estimated 0507 hours - 17 minutes late.\textsuperscript{33} That meant that the lead wave landing at Blue Beach was not under the cover
of darkness, and that it was out of synch with the other carefully scripted attacks occurring around Dieppe. With no preparatory bombardment and no naval gunfire support, the R Regt C was met with a hail of gunfire by the alerted defenders. Only 21 soldiers made it onto the headlands, all of which were shortly either killed or captured. The R Regt C was decimated, with only 65 of 554 members returning to the United Kingdom. For the personnel left behind, over 200 soldiers were killed in the landing and the remainder were taken prisoner.

Of the tasks given to the forces landing at Blue Beach, the most critical was the capture of the East Headlands overlooking the port of Dieppe. The inability of the R Regt C to seize the East Headlands left the landings of the Essex Scottish at Red Beach exposed to enfilade fire. Poor communications with forces ashore meant that news from the R Regt C did not reach the command ship, *HMS Calpe*, until 0830 hours. Even with good communications, General Roberts’ only option would have been to commit the Fus M.R. battalion, which could not have gone ashore in time to support the left flank of the main landings. The inflexible script had already generated its first failure.

**Green Beach**

The landings at Green Beach were initially a success. The S Sask R landed on time, and it appeared to have achieved local surprise. The battalion took few casualties in the landing as enemy fire commenced only after the battalion was ashore. The S Sask R quickly fanned out in an arc around Green Beach, captured their immediate objectives, and started to expand the bridgehead to support the landings 30 minutes later by the Camerons.

The critical objective for the landings at Green Beach was to capture the West Headland overlooking the port of Dieppe, and in the process linking-up at the Quatre-Vents Farm with elements of the RHLI landing at White Beach. As resistance grew, the advance of the S Sask R
slowed and local German counter-attacks began to grow. It was clear that the German forces in the area had well prepared defenses, overlapping arcs of fire, and dedicated mortars and artillery. Without naval gunfire support, integral artillery or tanks, the forward momentum of the S Sask R began to stall. At this moment, the injection of the Camerons into the fight may have made a difference, but another failure in synchronization was about to occur.

By the script, the Camerons were supposed to land exactly 30 minutes after the S Sask R. The timings were split so that the battalions could maintain momentum, but didn’t congest the beachhead. Unfortunately, the Camerons actually landed 60 minutes after the S Sask R, with their forces unintentionally split on either side of the River Scie. The extra 30 minute delay in landing meant that the enemy had already begun to recover from the landing of the S Sask R. As a result, the Camerons were met by growing resistance both on and off the beach, and the attack of both battalions lost momentum. After proceeding inland for approximately two miles and failing to link-up with their supporting tanks (they were still stuck on Red and White Beaches), the remaining elements of the Camerons fell back to reinforce the S Sask R in their efforts to secure the West Headland.\textsuperscript{35}

Despite their combined efforts, the two battalions could not secure the headland or push eastward to reach the main landings on Red and White Beaches. Without integral tank or artillery support, the two battalions were simply outmatched by an entrenched enemy in well defended positions. At 0900 hours, as the futility of their efforts was recognized, the S Sask R and the Camerons were ordered to withdraw to Green Beach for extraction at 1030 hours. This was subsequently changed to 1100 hours to allow the Camerons sufficient time to fall back and to coordinate air cover.\textsuperscript{36} As the Canadians withdrew towards the beach, the Germans rapidly retook the high ground overlooking the extraction site. Casualties mounted as the troops loading
on the landing craft were met by increasing crossfire from German machine guns, mortars, and artillery. At this point, several of the destroyers moved inshore towards Green Beach to aid with the extraction. Unfortunately, poor communications with forces ashore, the limited range and lethality of their 4-inch guns, and increased enemy air attacks, limited the support that the destroyers could provide. 57

In the end, having failed to complete their primary objective of seizing the West Headlands, the two battalions were extracted from Green Beach. In this final phase of withdrawal, the Camerons suffered heavier casualties than during any other phase of the operation. Only brave action by a sacrificial rear guard led by the Commanding Officer of the S Sask R, LCol Charles Merritt, and the heroic efforts of the landing craft operators, allowed any soldiers to be withdrawn. Of the 1026 soldiers that had embarked with the two battalions, 138 were killed, 256 became prisoners of war, and 269 were wounded in action. 38

Together, the losses at Blue and Green Beaches had been over 300 soldiers killed and over 500 captured. Neither of the headlands had been secured to support the main effort landings at Red and White Beaches. With poor communications plaguing the operation, nobody aboard HMS Calpe realized that the main assault force was about to land at Dieppe with both of its flanks unsecured and German reinforcements beginning to arrive. Despite the brave efforts of their fellow soldiers, the inability to seize the two headlands contributed to a cascading failure that could be traced back to the initial development of the inflexible and overly-scripted plan.

**Red and White Beaches**

In broad terms, the plan called for the landings at Red and White Beaches to be preceded by naval gunfire from four destroyers from 0510 to 0520 hours, and strafing runs by the RAF from 0515 to 0525 hours. The landings were to occur simultaneously at 0520 hours on Red and
White Beaches by the Essex Scottish and RHLI, respectively. The first nine tanks would land with the first wave at 0520 hours to provide integral direct fire support to the infantry and engineers on the beaches. Again, success in the attack depended on a very carefully synchronized script. First, the RHLI and Essex Scottish would push into the town while the defenders were still recovering from the naval and air attacks; thereby providing protection for the engineers clearing obstacles on the beach. Concurrently, the tanks would provide covering fire for the engineers against hardened bunkers, and then move into the town to provide the infantry with their fire support. Second, the battalions would advance outwards to form a secure perimeter around the town of Dieppe, link-up with elements from Green and Blue Beaches, and push on to subsequent objectives in depth. Third, engineers would destroy installations and equipment, the two Brigade Headquarters would be established, and the Fus M.R. would land so that they could act as the covering force for the withdrawal. Finally, all of the battalions would collapse back through Dieppe and re-embark from the port.

The first few minutes of the main beach landings were executed more or less according to plan. Air and naval attacks occurred in their assigned windows and provided some protection for the landing craft as they approached the beaches. Landing craft for the infantry touched down at between 0520 hours and 0523 hours. All was proceeding as planned, but resistance quickly grew as the air and naval supporting fires ceased.

The role of the first wave of tanks was critical, quite possibly the friendly tactical center of gravity for the entire landing. It was intended to provide the integral fire support to bridge the gap between the cessation of air and naval attacks, and the infantry pushing into the town. The air attacks lasted until at least 0525 hours and the naval gunfire ceased at 0520 hours as the first landing craft hit were supposed to hit the beach. Unfortunately, due to a navigational error, the
first Landing Craft Tank (LCT) did not land until 0535 hours. The lack of tanks for these critical 15 minutes meant that attempts by the engineers and infantry to breach the beach obstacles and push into the town were stalled. Although strafing attacks and naval gunfire had impacted on the defenders while they lasted, as this fire ceased, the defenders in their concrete bunkers quickly recovered and poured murderous fire onto the beach.\textsuperscript{41}

With the integral fire support of their Churchill Tanks still fifteen minutes out to sea, the infantry and engineers attempted to execute their tasks without it. At this moment the cascade effect of not having seized the two headlands to the flanks impacted directly on the main beach operations. Without the integral firepower of the tanks, the Canadians faced an enemy who was quickly recovering after the air and naval attacks, out flanked them, still retained the high ground, was protected by concrete bunkers and numerous obstacles, and, was in full possession of its indirect fire support. Succinctly stated, the landing force now confronted disaster.

For the RHLI on White Beach, the Dieppe Casino was a prominent building that fronted onto the beach. The enemy had fortified this significantly, which created havoc for the troops as they landed. However, the building also provided cover from other positions that would have otherwise been able to fire onto the beach.\textsuperscript{42} After heavy fighting, the RHLI were able to penetrate and clear the casino. For those who were not engaged inside the casino, the beach became a death trap. As the morning progressed, the beach increasingly came under direct and indirect fire, most seriously enfilade fire from the West Headland that the S Sask R had been unable to secure.

On Red Beach, the Essex Scottish had an even more difficult time. Without the physical protection of the Casino, Red Beach was swept by enemy fire, before, during, and after the landings. As the enemy quickly recovered from the air and naval attacks, direct and indirect fire
was increasingly brought to bear on the Essex Scottish. The soldiers were continuously engaged from the East Headlands (which the R Regt C had failed to capture at great cost), from the buildings facing the beach, from pillboxes on the esplanade wall, and, from snipers within the casino.

Planners were aware that Red Beach had three significant obstacles to breach. The first was a wire obstacle, breached with few losses while the RAF fighters were still strafing the defenders. The second, another wire obstacle, wreaked havoc on the Essex Scottish who had to assault without intimate tank support. It was finally breached, but at significant cost in lives. By 0545 hours, it was estimated by the Commanding Officer that 30 to 40% of his soldiers were either dead or wounded. The Essex Scottish then faced the third and last obstacle, the high sea-walled esplanade that ran along the beach. Three assaults were made on it; all failed. By 0630 hours, the Essex Scottish had suffered 75% casualties and the battalion was reduced to holding what little of the beach they controlled.

Only a small party of 12 soldiers from the Essex Scottish advanced past the esplanade and into the city. Although they were later surrounded and captured, their penetration had unintended consequences on the whole operation. At 0610 hours, a report was received stating that “Essex Scottish across the Beaches & in houses.” This report was to have a significant impact on the overall operation. This miscommunication was interpreted by General Roberts to mean that the conditions were set for the commitment of the reserve in support of the main landings. Due to poor communications with forces ashore, at 0630 hours he made the decision to land the reserve and reinforce the penetration into the town. The Fus M.R. landed under withering fire from the German defenders. This battalion suffered 50% casualties as the
survivors staggered up the beach and took shelter with the remains of the RHLI and Essex Scottish.

For the 14th Canadian Tank Regiment, 27 of the 30 tanks that had embarked in England made it ashore. Early reports from survivors were that none but three of these tanks ever made it off of the beach; however, it was later determined that 15 tanks made it across the seawall and onto the esplanade. Of these 15 tanks, none made it into the town of Dieppe. Instead, shortly after achieving the esplanade most ran into obstacles blocking their advance. Again, the cascading effect of the previous failures had ensured that when the headlands were not seized and the tanks arrived late, momentum was lost by the infantry and engineers that were supposed to advance into the town and breach these obstacles. The engineers were either dead, wounded, or pinned down and unable to carry out their initial tasks.

Withdrawal and Evacuation

By 0930 hours it became clear that the operation would not achieve its objectives. Hence, immediate withdrawal was required. An initial decision was made to withdraw at 1030 hours, but this was amended to 1100 hours. Very little has been written on the withdrawal of the Fus M.R.s, only that several times landing craft were sunk and that survivors were picked up in the water or transferred to other ships. For the RHLIs, an organized withdrawal from the casino was executed and most of the survivors made it back to the beach. For the 14th Tank Regiment, only one crewmember made it back onto a landing craft. Similarly, few of the Essex Scottish made it off the shore.

Throughout the extraction, the landing craft were heavily engaged by fire coming from the East and West Headlands (the area that was supposed to be captured by the R Regt C and S Sask R respectively). Only through aggressive RAF support and the use of smoke screens
could any landing craft make it ashore and back out to sea. Even with this support, many landing
craft were destroyed in the shallow water or sunk as they tried to move away from the beach. At
1250 hours, *HMS Calpe* made one last attempt to discern whether there were any other survivors
still ashore, but could see no landing craft or troop movement in the area of Red Beach. At
1308 hours, the last message from ashore was received indicating that the remaining elements
had surrendered. Of the forces at Red and White Beaches, only the following made it back to
the United Kingdom: RHLI – 50%; Essex Scottish – 10%; Fus M.R. – 20%; and Royal
Canadian Engineers – 10%.51

*Aftermath and Lessons Learned*

German forces pursued the convoys as they withdrew from Dieppe, and damaged
*HMS Berkeley* to the point that she had to be scuttled. Comments by the commanders and troops
ashore echoed each other: the naval and air forces had done everything in their power to support
the operation as planned. It was a credit to their bravery and sacrifice that any of the forces had
been able to withdraw.52

Of the 4963 soldiers of the Landing Force that had embarked in England, 3374 had been
killed, wounded or captured. Of these, 1838 were documented prisoners of war. All of the
Churchill Tanks that had landed had been destroyed or captured. At sea, 34 vessels had been
lost. In the air, the battle with the Luftwaffe had cost the RAF 106 fighters and bombers.53

As part of the Combined Operation Report on the Dieppe Raid, C.B. 04244, a detailed
*Lessons Learned* section was included.54 Several of the recommendations merit highlighting, as
they relate directly back to decisions that were made in the planning phase. The choice of a
frontal assault, the development of a parallel rather than joint planning process, the cancellation
of the aerial bombardment, the denial of a capital ship for naval gunfire, and the over-reliance on

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surprise, led to a plan that was overly scripted and impossible to execute. The Lessons Learned report emphasized:

a. the need for overwhelming fire support, including close support during the initial stages of the attack;

b. the necessity for planning a combined operation at a combined headquarters where the force commanders and their staff can work and live together;\(^{55}\)

c. the necessity for flexibility in the military plan and its execution;

d. allocation to the assault of the minimum force required for success and the retention of the maximum force as a reserve to exploit success where it is achieved;

e. the necessity for as accurate and comprehensive a system of control and communications as possible;

f. the necessity of fire support in any operation where it has not been possible to rely on the element of surprise; and,

g. unless means for the provision of overwhelming close support are available, assaults should be planned to develop round the flanks of a strongly defended locality rather than frontally against it.

The Germans produced their own Lessons Learned from the Dieppe Raid, aided in large part by the capture of a full copy of the orders for Operation JUBILEE. It is interesting to note one of the German conclusions from this report:

The Operation Order is very detailed (121 typewritten pages) and, therefore difficult to visualize as a whole. The many code words used make it difficult to grasp in its entirety, and even more so to use as a basis for issuing orders in battle. The planning down to the last detail limits the independence of action of the subordinate officer and leaves him no opportunity to make independent decisions in an altered situation.\(^{56}\)
Conclusion

Again, many theories have been formulated for why Operation JUBILEE failed. These include: the Germans were warned and surprise was lost, intelligence estimates of enemy strengths and reinforcement response times were horribly incorrect, and the un-tried Canadian landing force was poorly trained and lacked experience. While each of these theories may have some merit, on their own they cannot answer why the mission failed so catastrophically.

The initial concept for a raid on Dieppe was a joint battle of air, land, and naval forces. With the cancellation of aerial bombardment and the denial of capital ships for naval gunfire support, the force commanders and COHQ (all in separate geographical locations) allowed the planning to become parallel in nature, rather than joint. As planning progressed and fateful decisions were made, the plan devolved into a complex and inflexible script, in which synchronization was used to make up for operational shortfalls. With no overall joint force commander for the mission, the decisions made on these parallel lines were seemingly never weighed back against their impacts on the overall plan.

To achieve success, the landing plan depended on a naval fleet of 252 vessels crossing the channel undetected and delivering its combat troops onto the beaches at exact timings, commando and flank attacks occurring concurrently at six beaches, the seizure of the headlands to the east and west of Dieppe, and, finally, tanks landing at the exact moment that air and naval forces ceased their preliminary attacks. When Clausewitzian friction threw off this carefully planned script, the cascading failure to achieve operational objectives meant that the pre-conditions for successive steps were not met. With a small reserve, no flexibility in the plan, and poor communications with forces ashore, the commanders could only watch as the operation unraveled.
Operation JUBILEE did not fail because of poor intelligence, a lack of preparation, or the loss of operational surprise. It failed because a plan that originally started out as a joint battle of air, land and sea forces, had devolved into an overly complex, scripted event that had no possible chance for success.
Endnotes


5 Canadian Military Headquarters, CMHQ Report No. 159, *Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Additional Information on Planning*. Ottawa, Canada, 5 October 1946, Appendix A, para 11. (Hereafter cited as CMHQ 159)

6 See Appendix A for a detailed breakdown of the Operation RUTTER and JUBILEE planning and operational chains of command.

7 See Appendix B for a brief description of the port of Dieppe.

8 Robertson, p.35.


10 CMHQ 159, Appendix A, para 6. Montgomery was making this decision as the commander of South Eastern Command, the area from which the attack would be launched.


12 C.B. 04244, para 17.

13 No clarification is given as to who the “highest levels” of the Admiralty included. CMHQ 159, Appendix A, para 16.

14 C.B. 04244, paras 19a and 39.

15 See Appendix C for a detailed task organization of the Landing Force.

16 C.B. 04244, para 24.

17 Baillie-Grohman was away in the Middle East and did not start working on Operation RUTTER until 1 June 1942. Baillie-Grohman was later replaced by Captain (N) Hughes-Hallet after the cancellation of RUTTER and just prior to the execution of Operation JUBILEE.

18 C.B. 04244, para 27.
19 CMHQ 153, Appendix A, Appendix IV (44), para 3.


21 Robertson, 82.

22 CMHQ 159, Appendix A, para 18.

23 C.B. 04244, para 32-33.

24 CMHQ 159, para 12.

25 C.B. 04244, para 39.

26 For a detailed map of routes see Appendix D. (Government of Canada, Veterans Affairs, *Dieppe: Commemoration August 19, 1942* (Ottawa, Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1987).

27 For unit designation and key personnel see Appendix E. For detailed objectives see Appendix F.

28 C.B. 04244, attached copy of Operation JUBILEE Orders for Naval Supporting Fire, para 626.

29 C.B. 04244, para 42.


31 CMHQ 101, para 40.

32 CMHQ 101, para 4.

33 CMHQ 101, para 79.

34 CMHQ 101, para 141.

35 CMHQ 101, para 30.

36 CMHQ 101, para 211.

37 CMHQ 101, paras 232-236.


41 CMHQ 108, para 30.

42 CMHQ 108, para 37.
43 CMHQ 108, para 62.
44 CMHQ 108, para 68.
46 CMHQ 108, para 119.
48 CMHQ 108, para 225-228.
49 C.B. 04244, para 944.
50 CMHQ 108, para 262. A detailed timeline of planned versus actual timings is available in Appendix G.
51 CMHQ 108, paras 283-286.
52 CMHQ 108, para 278.
53 A detailed table of losses can be found at Appendix H.
54 A copy of the Lessons Learned from C.B. 04244 is attached as Appendix I.
55 It is interesting to note that this only went as far as the planning stages. There was no recommendation that there should be a joint commander for the overall execution of the raid.
LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A – Operation RUTTER and JUBILEE Chains of Command
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Appendix J – Biography of Col C.P. Stacey
ANOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

BR.1736(26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Raid on Dieppe (Naval Operations), 19th August 1942. Battle Summary No. 33, April 1959. Last accessed at http://www.warships1.com/index_history/HSIL_Dieppe.htm on 10 February 2008. Released in 1959, BR. 1736(26) is a Naval version of C.B. 04244. It provides good background on the planning, the execution and the aftermath, but focuses in on the naval aspects of the battle. For anyone studying Dieppe from a Navy perspective, it would be an excellent starting point for further investigation. For all others, it provides some good background information on the key role the Royal Navy played in the raid and the withdrawal.

Combined Operations Headquarters, C.B. 04244, Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid. London, England, October 1942. Copy on file at USMC archives. COHQ C.B. 04244 is the definitive document from the COHQ perspective on the planning and execution of Operation JUBILEE. It gives the background on the operation from its initial conception as Operation RUTTER through to its subsequent execution as Operation JUBILEE. The report contains the detailed orders that were issued to all of the forces, as well as, after action reports by the force commanders. These after action reports provide critical insights into the actual timings for the raid and what activities were executed. A critical appendix to this document is the Lessons Learnt Summary. It provides a list of lessons learned in both summary and detailed forms. This document, in conjunction with CMHQ Reports 100, 101 and 108, should form the basis for anyone that wishes to study Operation JUBILEE in depth. The one true shortfall of C.B. 04244 is that it is written immediately following the operation, almost as a justification for the failure.

Canadian Military Headquarters, CMHQ Report No. 83, Preliminary Report on Operation "JUBILEE" (The Raid on DIEPPE), 19 Aug 42. London, England, 19 September 1942. Hard and electronic copy available from Directorate of History and Heritage, Ottawa, Canada. A short synopsis of the action on 19 Aug 1942, containing initial thoughts on what went wrong and the actions of some of the units during the attack. It is critical to note, that this is a document that was revised and to a certain extent “cleansed” by Combined Operations Headquarters. It still contains valuable insights of the raid, from a perspective of one month after its execution. The report is broken down into the following sections: Objects and Preliminaries of the Operation; The Course of the Operations; Naval and Air Support; Conduct of the Troops; and, Results of the Operation.

Canadian Military Headquarters, CMHQ Report No. 89, The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42: Personal Stories of Participants. London, England, 31 December 1942. Hard and electronic copy available from Directorate of History and Heritage, Ottawa, Canada. CMHQ 89 contains the personal stories of nine participants of Operation JUBILEE. The following personnel were interviewed in the report: Capt G.A. Browne, RCA; Sgt P. Dubuc, Fus M.R.; P.S.M. L. Dumais, Fus M.R.; Cpl L.G. Ellis, R Regt C; Pte W.A. Haggard, S Sask R; L/Sgt G.A. Hickson, RCE; Maj A.T. Law, Camerons; Capt J. Runcie, Camerons; and, CSM J. Stewart, RHLI. All of the individuals, except Capt Browne (Royal Canadian Artillery), returned to England after the raid. Capt Browne's report is interesting, in that he is one of the few soldiers to have made it off of Blue Beach, although he was later captured. The report was drafted while he was still a POW. Capt Browne later escaped and provided significantly more detail in CMHQ Report 90. Each of the stories provides a snap-shot in time of what was happening at particular beaches; therefore, it is difficult to draw conclusions from just one perspective. Some of the statements made by individuals in CMHQ 89 are contested in later CMHQ reports on the Dieppe Raid, especially Fus M.R. Sgt Dubuc's story of his penetration into the town of Dieppe.

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Much like CMHQ Report 89, CMHQ 90 is the stories of seven more individuals: Capt G.A. Browne, RCA; Capt R.M. Campbell, Camerons; Pte J. Maier, Essex Scot; Lt A.A. Masson, Fus M.R.; and, Lt F. Royal; Photographic Officer, CMHQ. Capt G.A. Browne is the same officer whose report was received in CMHQ 89, but this is an updated report that was taken after his escape. Both reports by Capt G.A. Browne are outstanding, in that he was able to record detailed observations on the action at Blue Beach, as well as, some lessons learned.


CMHQ Report 100 is the definitive report of the CMHQ series on the preliminary planning and preparatory activities for Operation JUBILEE. The report covers: the background to the operation from its conception as Operation RUTTER; a description of the Dieppe area; planning activities at both COHQ and the Military Force HQ; training; preparations for and the subsequent cancellation of Operation RUTTER; and, the final planning and preparation for Operation JUBILEE. For certain aspects, it draws heavily on C.B. 04244, especially for aspects on planning. CMHQ 100 is an excellent summary of the activities leading up to the actual landing at Dieppe.


As a follow-on to CMHQ 100, CMHQ 101 covers the actual execution of the operation, but focuses specifically on the initial attacks on the flanks and the commando landings. It provides an excellent summary of the activities leading up the main landings at Red and White beaches. The report is roughly broken into the passage across the channel, the encounter of enemy vessels, the attack by 3 and 4 Cdo, the actions at Blue Beach, and, the actions at Green Beach.


As a continuation of CMHQ 89 and 90, CMHQ 107 provides further detailed personal accounts of the landings. Specifically, this report focuses on interviews of: Maj J.E. McRae, S Sask R; Maj C.E. Page, 14th Canadian Tank Battalion; and, on the accounts of personnel that have been repatriated from Germany. It contains new information on the actions of the 14th Canadian Tank Battalion and the Essex Scottish, most of who were captured during the attack. CMHQ 107 provides excellent information on the effectiveness of the Churchill Tank during the operation.


CMHQ Report 108 is the conclusion of the overall summary of the operation that started with CMHQ Report 100 (planning), and continued with CMHQ Report 101 (actions of the commandos and flank attacks at Blue and Green Beaches). It is an excellent summary of the assault on Red and White Beaches, with detailed timings and casualty statistics.

CMHQ Report 109 discusses some of the lessons learned that were captured as part of C.B. 04244, but also adds additional comment by General Roberts. It also provides General Roberts views on certain contentious decisions during the planning stages, including the choice of a frontal assault, the cancellation of the aerial bombing, and the flexibility of the overall Operation JUBILEE plan. This report serves as an excellent follow-up to CMHQ Report 100, which focussed on planning for the operation.


CMHQ Report 116 examines captured German documents on the Dieppe Raid. The reports include an intelligence report on the attack by British forces at Dieppe, a report on experiences gained, and comments by various headquarters on the Dieppe Raid. Some of the comments are extremely interesting, in that they review the captured landing plan for Operation JUBILEE and offer comments on the complexity of the overall operation and reasons for failure.


CMHQ 128 presents new information in two new categories: first, the influence of the Dieppe raid on the planning and execution of Operation OVERLORD; and second, additional information on the German defences at Dieppe following the capture of the port on 1 September 1944. This report would be extremely interesting to anyone drawing linkages between the failure of Dieppe and the planning of OVERLORD. It would also be interesting to anyone who was examining in detail attacks by ground forces during Operation JUBILEE. It highlights that the defences that were examined had certainly been strengthened and improved since the raid in 1942. The report also contains two further interviews, one with Lt Counsell who was repatriated to the United Kingdom from a POW camp for medical reasons, and the other a written report by LCol Labatt smuggled out by Lt Counsell.


CMHQ Report 142 is a summary of information received from newly released POWs. Col Stacey provides an excellent synopsis of some of the inaccuracies in the comments by POWs. Specifically, the soldiers captured in Dieppe did not have information that Col Stacey had analysed over the two years preceding their release. The report does provide an excellent summary of the "impression" of those captured as to how the battle went. Timings and casualties sustained by the forces tend to be different when compared to those that Col Stacey was able to produce from Army, Navy and Air Force records.


This document may be considered an addendum to CMHQ 100, as it represents the results of additional investigation into the planning stages of Operation JUBILEE. Its appendices include copies of original minutes from some of the first meetings on RUTTER and JUBILEE. It also includes an interview with Brigadier A.H. Head who was the Military Advisor, Combined Operations, at the time of the Dieppe operation, and was a member of the Joint Planning Staff.

Hard and electronic copy available from Directorate of History and Heritage, Ottawa, Canada. This report contains additional information on early planning and should be read in conjunction with CMHQ Reports 100 and 153. Of note, this report contains an excellent interview with Capt (Navy) John Hughes-Hallett. Hughes-Hallett was a key member of the COHQ naval planning staff during the early stages of RUTTER and JUBILEE, as well as, the Naval Force Commander for Operation JUBILEE. As an Appendix, the document also includes the minutes from the first meeting of the Combined Force Commanders on 21 July 1942.

**Secondary Sources**


An anecdotal summary of the raid on Dieppe. Told through the eyes of the soldiers on the ground, it emphasizes some of the challenges, and life and death struggles they faced. Excellent for getting an idea of what was happening from a soldier’s perspective, but due to its early release it does contain certain inaccuracies in the details of the overall operation.


Winston Churchill’s six volume series *The Second World War* was written by Churchill using his vast collection of personal and formal correspondence. For the Dieppe researcher, Churchill’s notes in Book One, Chapter 18, are particularly interesting with regards to the strategic pressure placed on himself and Roosevelt to open a second front.


*Dieppe Revisited* is book that takes advantage of the release of classified documents to non-official historians. The author focuses on several interesting areas: planning, security, and the relationship between JUBILEE and OVERLORD. It contains insight into documents available from both sides of the war, and contains information from documents that weren’t released until the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The author makes no apology for writing on a subject that has been covered at length, but does take a fresh approach to this recently released information.


John Edmondson was a Lieutenant in D Company, S Sask R, for the raid on Dieppe. His account focuses on D Company actions on the day of the invasion, but also includes some comments on the cancellation of RUTTER and training for the operation. It is a very good perspective of a tactical officer on the ground at the time of the landing.


If there is one book that gives a short overview of all aspects of Operation JUBILEE, this is it. Ken Ford starts with the origin of the operation, talks about the planning, execution, lessons learned, and ends with photos of Dieppe as it looks today. It also looks at not only the Allied side, but the German response as well. Full of pictures, timelines and excellent maps, *Dieppe 1942: Prelude to D-Day* would serve as an excellent guide during a visit to the battlefield.

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As indicated in its title, Norman Franks' book focuses on the air battle over Dieppe. It provides excellent information on not only the air battle itself, but the preparation and aftermath. The appendices are very helpful when looking for air specific details and statistics.


This pamphlet was released by Veterans Affairs Canada to mark the 45th Anniversary of the Dieppe Raid. Although it is short on detail, it does provide a good overview of the battle. Two items in this pamphlet are of specific interest: first, there is an excellent summary of casualties and embark/debark statistics; and second, there is a color map with excellent details on routes, objectives and unit breakdown. Appendix A is a scanned copy of this detailed map.


The Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia is a 24-volume series on World War II. It provides excellent background statistics for the period surrounding Operation JUBILEE and a short summary on Dieppe.


Cecil Law's account details the actions before, during, and after the attack on Green Beach by the S Sask R. It is an excellent account of the action as told through a series of quotations by the soldiers of the S Sask R.


Quentin Reynolds was a war correspondent who was invited to accompany the forces during the raid on Dieppe. It is an interesting book for its perspective. The author was aboard the *HMS Calpe* for the raid, therefore, he gives a detailed account of the actions aboard the command ship before, during, and after the operation.


*The Shame and the Glory* is an excellent account of the lead-up to and execution of the operation. It gives a very detailed breakdown of the changes in the plan from beginning to end, and then, through interviews, a very thorough examination of the operation itself. The book is divided into two sections: the first, titled *The Shame*, covers the planning leading up to the raid; and the second, *The Glory*, covers the execution for the raid. It is one of very few books on Dieppe that covers in very intricate detail the steps that led to the creation of the complex plan that would be executed by the soldiers on the ground.


*At Whatever Cost* briefly covers the planning for Operation JUBILEE, but then quickly moves on to the operation itself. It gives an excellent overview of the battle, but also follows that up with the ramifications and aftermath of the operation. The appendices give an excellent summary of the losses, key parts of the plan, and a good breakdown of the forces that were engaged in the fight.


*Unauthorized Action* focuses on the strategic motivation behind Operation JUBILEE. It is excellent in describing some of the pressures that were being exerted on Britain, Canada, and the United States for some form of action to aid Russia. It also goes into great detail on the role of Lord Louis Mountbatten in his position of Chief of Combined Operations.
APPENDIX A – CHAIN OF COMMAND

PLANNING

Chief of COHQ

- Comd SE Command
  - Advisor

Landing Force
Air Force
Naval Force

C-in-C Portsmouth
  - Advisor

EXECUTION

Chief of COHQ

- Comd SE Command
  - Advisor

C-in-C Portsmouth
  - Decision to Sail
  - Passage
  - Naval Cover

Landing Force
Air Force
Naval Force
APPENDIX B - DESCRIPTION OF THE PORT OF DIEPPE

1. The town of DIEPPE lies on the coast of Normandy some 67 miles from the port of Newhaven in Sussex, from which a line of cross-Channel steamers operates to it in peacetime, and which was one of the ports at which the raiding force embarked for the operation. Dieppe's population is given in the Blue Guide to Normandy (Second Edition, 1928) as 24,658, "including the garrison". The town is in normal times "a seaport, fishing harbour, and fashionable watering-place".

2. Dieppe is situated at the mouth of the River D'Arques, which flows into the Channel through a valley with a flat floor which in the region of Dieppe is something less than 1,000 yards wide. The mouth of this river has been improved by the construction of jetties and basins to provide a harbor described as "commodious and deep", which is well equipped with cranes. Railway lines radiate from Dieppe towards Le Havre, Rouen and Paris.

3. The coast in the Dieppe area consists in the main of steep cliffs generally unscalable by landing parties. Immediately to the west of the town these reach a height of 91 metres, and there is a similar though less lofty headland to the east. Although the only really large gap in the cliff barrier is that at Dieppe itself, where a distance of about 1,500 yards separates the east and west headlands, there is an accessible beach at Pourville, about 4,500 yards west of the harbour entrance, where the River Scie flows into the Channel through a flat-bottomed valley similar to that of the Arques though not so broad. At Puits, about 2,000 yards east of the harbour entrance, there is a much narrower gap in the cliffs, occasioned by a gully which extends inland for about three miles in a generally easterly direction. In peacetime both Pourville and Puits are fashionable resorts, each possessing a number of hotels.

4. The town of Dieppe itself is fronted by a broad Promenade, Esplanade or Plage, nearly 200 yards wide, and extending from the harbour entrance westward for more than 1,000 yards. At the western end of this Promenade, lying between the beach and the front of the town proper, is the large white Casino, lying close under the western cliff. On a step of this cliff to the south-west of the Casino is the old Castle. A prominent landmark on the front of the town roughly half way between the harbour entrance and the Casino is "the large Tobacco Factory" with its two tall chimneys. Behind the eastern half of the town lie the various basins of the harbour. Of these, one, the Bassin Berigny, has evidently in recent years been filled in and converted into a public park. On many maps it still appears in its former state. Both in the east headland, immediately above and to the east of the harbor entrance, and in the west headland immediately to the west of the Casino, there existed before the war certain caves called the Goves or Gobes, "inhabited by a few survivors of the cave-dwelling age" (Blue Guide, Normandy, p. 16). Most of DIEPPE's fashionable hotels stand in the street called the Boulevard de Verdun, which runs along the front of the town, and look out across the grassy Promenade and the beach beyond it to the sea. This Promenade and beach, once dedicated to idleness and pleasure, were the scene of desperate fighting on 19 Aug 42.

5: Forming the seaward edge of the Promenade or Esplanade is a wall which at most points rises not more than about two feet perpendicularly above the beach. The beach itself is composed of large "shingle", the stones being in some cases about the size of a man's fist. It is rough and irregular in contour. The slope, it appears, varies from about 1:7 to 1:4. (See the Report by Major B. Sucharov, RCE, dated 2 Sep 42: CMHQ file 55/OPS/41.)

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1 To be as accurate as possible to a description from the time of the battle, the following is from the Canadian Military Headquarters, CMHQ Report No. 100, Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42 Part I: The Preliminaries of the Operation. London, England, 16 July 1943, paras 17-22.
APPENDIX C– LANDING FORCE ORGANIZATION

Landing Force

4 Bde
- R Regt C
- RHLI
- Essex Scottish

Fus M.R. Reserve

6 Bde
- S Sask R
- Camerons

3 CDO (UK)
4 CDO (UK)

Under Command For Landing Only

14th Tank Bn
Appendix D – Detailed Map of Routes and Objectives

### APPENDIX E – UNIT DESIGNATIONS AND KEY PERSONNEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>COMMANDING OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined Operations Headquarters</td>
<td>COHQ</td>
<td>Lord Louis Mountbatten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Force Commander</td>
<td></td>
<td>MGEn John Hamilton Roberts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Canadian Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; CIB</td>
<td>BGen Sherwood Lett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Regiment of Canada</td>
<td>R Regt C</td>
<td>LCol Doug Catto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Hamilton Light Infantry</td>
<td>RHLI</td>
<td>LCol Robert Labatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex Scottish</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCol Fred Jasperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Canadian Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; CIB</td>
<td>BGen William Southam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Saskatchewan Regiment</td>
<td>S Sask R</td>
<td>LCol Charles Merritt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada</td>
<td>Camerons</td>
<td>LCol Alfred Gostling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusiliers Mont-Royal</td>
<td>Fus M.R.</td>
<td>LCol Dollard Menard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Canadian Tank Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCol John Andrews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Royal Marine Commando</td>
<td>3 Cdo</td>
<td>LCol John Durnford-Slater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Royal Marine Commando</td>
<td>4 Cdo</td>
<td>LCol The Lord Lovat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Force Commander</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Rear-Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H.T. Baillie-Grohman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Capt(N) John Hughes-Hallet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Commander</td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Vice-Marshall Trafford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leigh-Mallory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX F – DETAILED OBJECTIVES OPERATION JUBILEE\(^1\)

No. 3 Commando – land at beaches Yellow I and II, destroy coastal battery at Berneval grid reference 310719, withdraw back to beaches Yellow II for extraction.

No. 4 Commando – land at beaches Orange I and II, destroy coastal battery at Varengeville grid reference 152673, withdraw back to Orange I for extraction.

Royal Regiment of Canada – land at Blue Beach, destroy the light anti-aircraft guns at 258697, clear a barracks at Les Glycines Holiday Camp, destroy machine gun posts in the area of 268704, destroy the heavy anti-aircraft guns in the area of 243694, attack a five-gun battery at 258688, seize the gasworks at 243675 and destroy it with the aid of the Royal Canadian Engineers, act as the east flank of the Dieppe perimeter, and upon completion of all tasks become the 4th Canadian Brigade Reserve. The R Regt C also included a detachment of 4 Canadian Field Regiment. This detachment would also assist in capturing the gun battery and one of the anti-aircraft batteries, and if captured intact, bring two anti-aircraft guns back to the United Kingdom.

South Saskatchewan Regiment – land at Green Beach, destroy the anti-aircraft guns in the area of 212683, destroy the Radio Direction Finding Station at 208683, capture the Quatre-Vents Farm at 213675 where they would link up with the RHLI, capture anti-aircraft guns at 211678, destroy a machine gun post at 185678, occupy La Maison Blanche in Pourville, and act as the west flank of the Dieppe perimeter.

Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada – pass through the beachhead established by S Sask R, link up with tanks of 14th Tank Battalion from the main beach landings, capture the aerodrome west of Arques-la-Bataille, destroy light anti-aircraft guns at 224639, 234640, and 233635, be prepared to attack the 4-gun battery at 249645, be prepared to destroy the heavy anti-aircraft guns at 239653, and finally, be prepared to attack the headquarters of the 110th German Infantry Division which was believed to be located in the area of Arques-la-Bataille.

Essex Scottish – land at Red Beach, capture light anti-aircraft guns at 237688, seize the German armed trawlers quayside at 233687, secure the east bank of the harbor, capture light anti-aircraft guns at 239671, capture a battery at 235670, capture a light anti-aircraft gun position at 235661, make contact with the RHLI, secure the south perimeter of Dieppe, select and mark an emergency landing ground for the RAF in the area of the Racecourse, clear the east side of the harbor and the town of NEUVILLE, and would subsequently contact the Royal Regiment of Canada and consolidate to hold the east side of the harbor, and provide security for the Royal Canadian Engineer demolition party working on the cranes in the harbor.

Royal Hamilton Light Infantry – land at White Beach, capture two light anti-aircraft guns near 212683, make contact with the S Sask R, assist the S Sask R in the capture of Les Quatre-Vents Farm, capture the battery position at 220665, capture light anti-aircraft guns at 219660, capture a machine-gun post at 225673, control the RUE GAMBETTA as far as the southern edge of the town, and make contact with the Essex Scottish at the road junction at 236664.
Fusiliers Mont-Royal – act as the Military Force Reserve and, if the operation was a success, act as the rearguard on the west side of the harbor to cover re-embarkation.


### Appendix G – Detailed Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>PLANNED TIMING</th>
<th>ACTUAL EXECUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Demonstration off Boulogne</td>
<td>0330 - 0450 hrs</td>
<td>0330 - 0450 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships carrying 3 Cdo run into German Convoy</td>
<td></td>
<td>0347 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning of Nautical Twilight</td>
<td>0450 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 3 Cdo lands at YELLOW</td>
<td>0450 hrs</td>
<td>Yellow I - 0510 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 4 Cdo lands at ORANGE</td>
<td>0450 hrs</td>
<td>Orange I - 0453 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRC land at BLUE</td>
<td>0450 hrs</td>
<td>First wave - 0506 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Sask R land at GREEN</td>
<td>0450 hrs</td>
<td>Orange II - 0545 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval gunfire engages RED/WHITE and front of town</td>
<td>0510 hrs - 0520</td>
<td>0512 hrs - 0520 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF lays smoke over Eastern Headland</td>
<td>0510 hrs</td>
<td>0510 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF attacks RED/WHITE</td>
<td>0515 - 0525</td>
<td>0515 hrs - 0525 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camerons land at GREEN</td>
<td>0520 hrs</td>
<td>0550 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHLI land at WHITE</td>
<td>0520 hrs</td>
<td>0523 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex Scottish land at RED</td>
<td>0520 hrs</td>
<td>0520 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First nine tanks land at WHITE</td>
<td>0520 hrs</td>
<td>0535 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers engage East and West Headlands</td>
<td>0520 - 0535 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second nine tanks at WHITE</td>
<td>0535 hrs</td>
<td>0535 to 0540 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third wave of twelve Tanks at WHITE including HQ</td>
<td>0605 hrs</td>
<td>0605 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cdo mortar hits Coastal Battery at Varengeville putting it out of action</td>
<td></td>
<td>0607 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial word reaches <em>HMS Calpe</em> that YELLOW landings have failed</td>
<td></td>
<td>0610 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cdo attacks remaining guns and personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td>0620 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fus M.R. Reserve Comitted</td>
<td>0630 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Battery at Varengeville destroyed</td>
<td>0650 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fus M.R. land RED/WHITE</td>
<td>0704 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cdo withdraws from ORANGE</td>
<td>0730 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Cdo at YELLOW II withdraws</td>
<td>0810 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal ordered for GREEN</td>
<td>0900 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision made to withdraw from RED/WHITE</td>
<td>0930 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Timing for withdrawal</td>
<td>1030 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amended withdrawal timing</td>
<td>1100 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last attempt to evacuate from BLUE</td>
<td>1100 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation at RED/WHITE commences</td>
<td>1120 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMS Calpe closes on RED and sees no signs of movement</td>
<td>1250 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining forces at RED and WHITE surrender</td>
<td>1308 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Sources for the above information are:


### APPENDIX H - DETAILED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing (including believed killed)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Force</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing (including believed killed)</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POW</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commando Raid</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Force (Canadian)</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing (mostly killed)</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POW Dead</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POW</td>
<td>1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-Sea Rescue</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POW</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ Staff</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL LOSSES                  | 4384                           |

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EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Air:

88 Fighters
10 Army Co-op Tactical Recce Aircraft
8 Bombers
TOTAL: 106 Aircraft

Naval:

HMS Berkley, Hunt Class Destroyer
17 Landing Craft Assault
8 Landing Craft Personnel (Large)
5 Landing Craft Tank
1 Landing Craft Mechanized
1 Landing Craft Support
1 Landing Craft Flak
TOTAL: 34 Vessels

Military:

28 Churchill Tanks
7 Scout Cars
2 5-cwt Cars
1 Carrier
3 M/c’s Solo
THE LESSONS LEARNT*

I.—THE LESSONS IN SUMMARISED FORM

321. The need for overwhelming fire support, including close support during the initial stages of the attack.

325. The necessity for the formation of permanent naval assault forces with a coherence comparable to that of any other first line fighting formations. Army formations intended for amphibious assaults must without question be trained in close co-operation with such naval assault forces.

326. The necessity for planning a combined operation at a Combined Headquarters where the Force Commanders and their staff can work and live together.

327. The necessity to plan a raid so as to be independent of weather conditions in the greatest possible degree. A plan based on the assumption that weather conditions will be uniform is very likely to fail; therefore a plan which can be carried out even when they are indifferent or bad is essential.

328. The necessity for flexibility in the military plan and its execution.

To achieve this, the assault must be on the widest possible front limited only by the possibilities of control and the amount of naval and air support available.

329. The allocation to the assault of the minimum force required for success and the retention of the maximum forces as a reserve to exploit success where it is achieved.

330. The necessity for an accurate and comprehensive system of control and communications as it is possible to establish.

331. The dissemination of knowledge to officers and other ranks, each of whom should know the intention of his superior, the outline of the operation and the details of the task of his own unit and those on the flanks.

332. The value of special training, particularly in amphibious night operations. Such training must include rehearsals and the testing of inter-communication arrangements.

333. The necessity for fire support in any operation where it has not been possible to rely on the element of surprise. This fire support must be provided by heavy and medium Naval bombardment by air action, by special vessels or craft working close inshore, and by using the fire power of the assaulting troops while still afloat. Special close-support craft, which should be gun-boats or some form of mobile fort, do not exist and must be designed and constructed.

Support by the Royal Air Force is effective within the limits imposed by time and space.

334. Assaults must be carefully timed. Whether to assault in darkness, at dawn or dusk or in daylight, must depend on the nature of the raid, and on certain conditions, such as tide and distance, which will vary in every case.

335. Tanks should not be landed until the anti-tank defences have been destroyed or cleared. L.C.T. carrying tanks must not land on the beaches beyond the time required to disembark their loads.

336. Great and continuous attention must be paid to security problems and greater use made of subordinate officers who should be put partly into the picture, so that they can control the men under them. Only important extracts from Operation Orders should be taken ashore. These should be kept in manuscript form and have their official headings removed.

337. Briefing of the troops should take place as late as possible.

If airborne troops are used, arrangements must be made to increase the number of models available so as to cut down the time needed for briefing.

Airborne troops provide means of achieving surprise and should be used as often as possible subject to the limitations of the weather. It should be regarded, however, as exceptional for a plan to depend for success entirely on their use.

338. Unless means for the provision of overwhelming close support are available, assaults should be planned to develop round the flanks of a strongly defended locality rather than frontally against it.

339. A far higher standard of aircraft recognition is essential both in the Royal Navy and the Army. This should be achieved by means of lectures, photographs and silhouettes. If possible, personnel of the Royal Observer Corps should be carried in ships.

340. Beach Signal parties should not land complete with the first wave, but only when the beach has been secured.

341. The importance and necessity of using smoke cannot be over emphasized and larger quantities of smoke must be carried in any operation of the size of the assault on Dieppe.

342. Some form of light or self-propelled artillery must be provided once an assault has got across the landing place and is making progress inland.
II.—THE LESSONS IN DETAIL

343. GENERAL OBSERVATION.—Many lessons were learnt at Dieppe, not all of them new. The opportunity is taken of repeating and re-affirming the lessons learnt in previous operations as well.

344. NAVAL FIRE SUPPORT

The Lesson of Greatest Importance is the need for overwhelming fire support, including close support, during the initial stages of the attack. It is not too much to say that at present, no standard Naval vessel or craft has the necessary qualities or equipment to provide close unbroken support. Without such support any assault on the enemy-occupied coast of Europe is more likely to fail as the enemy's defences are extended and improved. Further remarks on close support vessels will be found in paragraph 362 (a) below.

345. THE FORMATION OF ASSAULT FORCES

(a) For any amphibious campaign involving assaults on strongly defended coasts held by a determined enemy it is essential that the landing ships and craft required for the assaults shall be organised well in advance into Naval assault forces. These must have a coherence and degree of permanence comparable to that of any first-line fighting formations. The need for discipline, morale, tactical integration and flexibility and professional competence are not disputed in the case of troops, war vessels and air formations. Precisely the same applies to assault ships and craft.

(b) The great importance of adhering to sound Naval procedure and organisation has been brought out not only at exercises, but also in operations. While it is one of the objects of the Navy to land troops on the beach in the formation the Army desires, this must not be attempted at the expense of sacrificing principles of sound seamanship or of sound flotilla procedure especially where a night landing is concerned. It is always the simplest form of organisation which has the best chance of success.

(c) It is also essential that Army formations intended for amphibious assaults against opposition should be trained in close co-operation with the Naval assault forces that will carry them to the attack. The ideal to be aimed at is that they should think and act as one.

346. THE NEED FOR A COMBINED HEADQUARTERS

(a) The Naval, Military and Air Force Commanders and the Supreme Commander or other responsible for launching the operation, will usually have their own headquarters many miles apart. In Combined Operation Headquarters a permanent set of adjacent offices is provided specially for the Naval, Military and Air Force Commanders and their staffs, for all operations mounted under the Chief of Combined Operations.

(b) The vital difference made to the planning of a Combined Operation when the outline plan is prepared by an experienced Inter-Service staff and the detailed plan by Force Commanders and their staffs working and living together, has been amply demonstrated in the Vagao, Bruneval and St. Nazaire raids, and was so again in the Dieppe operation.

(c) During an assault, it is, of course, essential that the Naval and Military Force Commanders should be absent a specially equipped Headquarters ship, and thus able to get close enough to the battle to be in a position to take and implement decisions immediately affecting the course of the action.

347. PERIOD DURING WHICH AN OPERATION CAN BE UNDERTAKEN

(a) The overriding factor of all operations against the enemy on the other side of the Channel is the weather. Weather conditions need not be the same for all types of operations. If a raid such as the assault on Dieppe is to be made, then the weather conditions under which it can be carried out differ from those which can be accepted in an operation involving a permanent landing on the enemy-occupied coast. The problem is further complicated by the fact that conditions required by the Royal Navy are not necessarily suitable for the Royal Air Force and vice versa.

(b) The Dieppe raid showed clearly that for a raid in which the Naval and land forces are given full air protection, good visibility is essential, and this overriding factor must be added to others equally indispensable. The operation against Dieppe could not prudently have taken place if the cloud had been more than four- to five-tenths at 4,000 ft, if the wind had been more than Force 3, or if there had been an appreciable swell. The sea had to be calm enough to make a withdrawal feasible. These conditions seldom, if ever, occurred during June, July and August, 1942. Furthermore, four previous operations had been postponed and subsequently cancelled because the weather conditions were worse than those required. Even on 19th August, conditions were not ideal, and the force was sailed by the Chief of Combined Operations on a forecast which was by no means as favourable as could have been desired. So much was this so that just before the actual
departure, the Naval Force Commander received a message warning him that the weather might deteriorate, but he nevertheless took the risk of continuing, a decision which was fully justified by events. It must also be borne in mind that the length of French coast within the advantageous fighter area is also open to prevailing westerly winds, which were one of the main causes for the postponement of the four previous operations. On the other hand, if Air co-operation can be dispensed with, then the number of days on which an operation can take place is increased, for calm days are often associated with fog and mist, conditions in which aircraft cannot operate with certainty, especially in the early morning.

(c) The conditions governing an expedition in which the troops will remain on shore are different from those which must prevail during a raid. If troops have not to be withdrawn they can be put ashore in much worse weather, with a wind of force 5 or 6 and considerable swell. Here, however, the limiting factors are their reinforcement and their maintenance. To supply troops on shore over open beaches requires weather conditions similar to those needed for a raid, unless the abandonment on the beach, should the weather deteriorate, of the supply carrying craft in over increasing numbers, can be accepted.

(d) The conclusion must, therefore, be that since it is unjustifiable to mount an operation which cannot, with certainty, take place in the average year, it follows that a raid must be so planned as to be independent of tidal conditions in the greatest possible degree. This was so in the Dieppe raid which could have been carried out on 12 days in any lunar month, thus making it virtually certain that it could take place during the summer months. An operation, however, involving the occupation of enemy-held territory calls for a succession of days in which the weather conditions are favourable on the landing beaches. They are principally dependent on the time required to capture a port or sheltered waters of suitable dimensions. Such a succession of days can never be relied on when operating on beaches which all face one way and are ice shores in prevailing winds. Consequently an assault made with the intention of remaining ashore should be planned to take place in an area capable of being supplied over beaches which face in different directions, or in an area where a port or sheltered anchorage is likely to fail into our hands at a very early stage. In other words, a plan based on the assumption that weather conditions will be uniform is very likely to fail and, therefore, a plan which can be carried out even when they are indifferent or bad is essential.

348. FLEXIBILITY

(a) The chances and opportunities of an assault landing are extremely difficult to gauge in advance. The military plan must, therefore, be flexible in order to enable the Commander to apply force where force has already succeeded.

(b) In the case of flexible plans, the axiom, normal in land warfare, that it is unprofitable to reinforce a hold-up, is even more strongly applicable in the assault phase of an opposed landing, because, in the latter type of operation a hold-up almost invariably means that there is little or no room for manoeuvre.

Thus, to put in more troops where the leading waves have not succeeded in penetrating the immediate defences, is likely to increase the target without increasing the prospects of success. This was again brought out at Dieppe.

(c) If the military plan is to be flexible, then certain basic requirements must be accepted and must be embodied in the general arrangements for the operation. These requirements are discussed in paragraphs 349 to 354.

(d) It must be recorded, however, that with the state of training of the landing craft crews which prevailed at the time of the Dieppe operation, a flexible military plan could not be carried out to the same extent as in later operations. As the formation of the permanent Naval forces, advocated in paragraph 345 (a) that the requisite standard of training can be achieved. The greater the number of experienced Royal Navy officers available, the shorter will be the period of training required by these forces.

349. THE WIDTH OF THE FRONT WHICH CAN BE ASSAULTED

(a) If flexibility is to be a true characteristic of the plan, then the initial assault must cover several landing places. If, to take an extreme case, the assault is made across only one beach, then there is clearly little the military commander can do to make his arrangements flexible, for he will be dependent on success in one area, and must either batten his way through or fail.

(b) It must be appreciated, however, that the following factors will qualify and limit the width of the front and the number of landing places which can be attacked with advantage:

(i) The frontage which can be controlled by the Headquarters organization which it is possible to set up on the spot and the number of physically suitable beaches within that frontage.

(ii) The amount and type of support from the Naval forces and the air which can be made available.

(iii) The size of the military force and the nature and composition of the Naval assault force which have been allotted to it and the organization and skill of that force.
350. STRENGTH OF THE ASSAULT IN RELATION TO THE FOLLOW-UP FORCE

(a) In a combined operation there are always present two strong, but natural, tendencies both of which militate against flexibility. The first is to allocate too great a strength to the assault in order to ensure success in this essential phase, while the second is to issue precise and comprehensive orders to the whole force in advance so that each unit and sub-unit shall know exactly what it is required to accomplish and how to do it.

(b) In a small scale raid, such an allocation of strength to the assault and such precision in the orders may be permissible, because the operation will, in all probability, depend upon immediate penetration in a certain area and upon the completion of definite tasks within a restricted time limit.

(c) In larger operations, however, it becomes more and more necessary to weigh the balance with care and judgment, bearing in mind that the greater the strength allotted to the assault, the weaker the force that can be held afloat—the more rigid the plan and the less the chance of switching landing craft and troops to areas where success has been attained and through which it should be exploited.

(d) From the military point of view, therefore, the aim must be to allocate to the assault the minimum force required for success and to retain afloat the maximum force ready to follow in and exploit success wherever it has been achieved.

(e) From the military point of view, however, there can be no objection if the support given by Naval vessels or Air forces to the assault is excessive and the criterion should be the maximum which can be made available rather than the minimum which might be adequate.

(f) The problem is, however, easier to state than to solve.

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351. CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

(a) The more flexible the plan and the greater the sub-division of the military force, the more essential it becomes that the control and communication arrangements should be of the highest standard.

(b) It will not, in fact, be possible to carry out a flexible plan successfully unless the Commanders receive a constant series of accurate pictures of the situation on shore and unless, when in possession of such information they are able to take rapid executive action.

(c) The following are the essential requirements:

(i) A joint organisation, in which the arrangements for each service fit in with those of other services, and are available for emergency use by all. This must be centred in an H.Q. Ship, which should be duplicated as far as possible to meet the risk of loss.

    Such a ship must include carefully laid-out arrangements for Command, Staff-work and communications, planned conjointly. These can only be satisfactory if the ship is properly fitted in permanent form.

(ii) Adequate Naval Signal organisation for the control of the numerous ships and landing craft engaged in the operation.

(iii) Alternative channels for the passing of information from shore to ship and vice versa.

    In this connection, it is to be noted that reliance must not be placed on a single method. For example, wireless links should be duplicated whenever possible and visual signals, loud-hailers and any other available means, should be fully exploited.

(iv) On Army channels of communication no effort must be spared to establish and exploit alternative channels by which information can, if necessary, be passed. The fact that the same intelligence may reach the Military Commander from various sources and at about the same time, is not in practice either a waste of effort or overinsurance. The essentials are that the information should be sent, that it should arrive and that links should be available by which it can be acted on with the minimum delay.

(v) In the Naval organisation, on the other hand, although duplication of channels must be practised as far as possible, the large number of units with limited equipment which it is generally necessary to keep under centralized control makes essential the most rigid discipline and economy of signalling, and the duplication of reports cannot be accepted. The originator of any signal must, therefore, first consider whether or not his signal is really necessary for the conduct of the operation.

(d) Good information and the power to act upon it are essential in all operations. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the need for such facilities is particularly apparent in the assault phase of a combined operation when a narrow stretch of water may, through lack of them form an impenetrable barrier.

(e) Much may depend upon the efficiency or otherwise of the communications between ground or ship and the aircraft supporting the operation.

* The Lessons Learned concerning Control and Communications are also dealt with in Annex 10, and Appendix, pp. 173 and 177.
352. KNOWLEDGE OF THE OPERATION AMONG ALL UNITS AND ALL RANKS

(a) The more flexible the plan the more important it is that every officer, N.C.O. and man should know the intention of his superior and the outline of the operation as a whole and the detail of the primary task allotted to his own unit and to those on his flanks. Without such knowledge, units and individuals faced by unexpected circumstances cannot be expected to know how best to take advantage of a particular situation or how to further the operation as a whole.

(b) Dissemination of knowledge to the extent contemplated in the preceding sub-paragraph requires time and access to certain facilities such as models, photographs and silhouettes. The use of such facilities is, of course, bound up with the difficult problem of security which is dealt with later. (See paragraph 357.)

353. REHEARSALS

(a) No combined operation should be launched until it has been adequately rehearsed.

(b) Rehearsals need not necessarily always be complete. For instance, the operation on land can be practised frequently without the actual disembarkation from landing craft being included. Similarly, the inter-communication system between ships, shore and air can be worked up without all sea, air and land forces being present.

(c) After partial rehearsals, rehearsals on a larger scale may be desirable. No general rule can be laid down and commanders must consider each case on its merits.

(d) It is particularly important that all sea-borne military headquarters should be given adequate opportunity for practice. They will, at any rate, during the initial stage of an operation be working in unfamiliar and probably cramped conditions. The best lay-out of the headquarters and the best placing of the inter-communication and intelligence staffs cannot be satisfactorily settled by discussions over a diagram. Such discussions must terminate in full-dress rehearsals with all shore headquarters fully represented.

354. VALUE OF SPECIAL TRAINING

(a) There is no doubt that units or sub-units allotted specific tasks require specialised training for that task. For instance, training for tasks which include street fighting or demolition work or attacks on pill-boxes or on battery positions should all be carried out over similar ground and distances and under conditions of light the same as those which may be expected in the operation itself. The more perfect the training the more perfect is the execution likely to be.

(b) It should be realized that the number of persons possessing night vision above the normal is very small and that there are many more who have night vision below the normal. It is, therefore, imperative that tests should be carried out with the object of selecting personnel for key positions in the assault whose night vision is adequate. Admiralty Fleet Order No. 3977/42 gives the details of a simple little instrument for carrying out these tests. Special training is also needed to develop and improve night vision.

(c) Without adequate sea training and opportunities of practice, military assault units will inevitably find themselves hampered and at a disadvantage. Though such training is necessary, it must however, come after that of the Naval formations taking part in the assault.

355. SUPPORT FOR THE ASSAULT

(a) Leaving out of consideration the long preparatory bombardments for the reduction of key major coast defences which would be a necessary feature of invasion plans but cannot, for obvious reasons, be a prelude to raids, the assault, in both raids and invasions, of a defended coast requires fire support while it is in progress, unless complete surprise can be obtained.

(b) Surprise is likely to become progressively more difficult with the passage of time, and support more necessary as the enemy increases his defences.

(c) If the assault is to take place under fire support, it must, in volume and effect, be comparable to that which would be available to a brigade attacking a strongly defended position in normal land warfare. The latter would, assuming a normal allocation of army field and medium artillery, amount to:

(i) Close support weapons-One 6-pdr. for each 100 yards of objective.

(ii) Neutralising weapons-One 25-pdr. for each 20 yards of objective.

(iii) Counter-battery weapons—5·5-in. and 7·2-in. Howitzer. Sufficient to engage each enemy battery covering the assault beaches with 30 rounds every 30 seconds, or a total of about:

140 guns on a brigade front of 2,000 yards.

This figure ignores the support of mortar fire which would be available to a brigade and the greater accuracy of guns on fixed platforms as compared with ship or craft-borne guns, and should then be regarded as a strict minimum.
356. THE FOUR TYPES OF SUPPORT

(a) Support for the assault can be most easily studied under four main headings:

(i) Support by heavy and medium naval bombardment (para. 357).

(ii) Support by air action (para. 358-361).

(iii) Support by special vessels or craft working close inshore (para. 362).

(iv) Military support during landing (para. 363).

(b) The bombardment of Manoy Island by H.M.S. "Kenya," a 6-in. cruiser, enabled landing craft to approach within 100 yards of the shore before it was considered necessary to cease. This was, no doubt, a special case, for the "Kenya" had been able to approach within point-blank range; but, in operations against the coast of France and it must be borne in mind that cruisers are very vulnerable. At Dieppe, no ship larger than a "Hunt" class destroyer could, with safety, have been used, unless recourse had been had to a capital ship. The effect produced by the broadsides of a battleship at close range can justly be described as devastating.

It may be recalled that on the 25th April, 1915, during the attack on Gallipoli, H.M.S. "Implacable" covered the landing at X beach from only 450 yards, firing 10 rounds of 12-in., 179 of 6-in. and 154 12-pdr. shells.

357. SUPPORT BY HEAVY AND MEDIUM NAVAL BOMBARDMENT

(a) At Dieppe, the central assault against the town itself were supported by a short bombardment carried out by destroyers. This bombardment did not prove effective support for the assault. It was neither heavy nor accurate enough to flatten strong defences, nor could destroyers follow the landing craft in close enough to support the actual assault at short range, by dealing directly with such elements of the enemy's defences as had survived.

(b) On the other hand, if larger ships could have been employed, and if they could have been supplied with bombardment charges and could either have observed their fire with accuracy or have observed it for them by aircraft, more satisfactory results would have been possible.

(c) Thus the conclusion drawn is that if Naval bombardment is to be an effective means of preparing for the assault and supporting it, the following requirements must be met:

(i) Cruisers, monitors or even larger ships must be available for support fire, and should preferably be capable of indirect bombardment with air spotting.

(ii) The position of the targets must be accurately ascertained beforehand.

(iii) Close support fire by special vessels or craft working close inshore with the assault craft is essential. Any smoke-screen laid must be laid clear of the line of close support fire which in its action must be direct.

358. SUPPORT BY AIR ACTION.—I. ACTION BY CANNON-FIGHTERS

(a) The attacks on the central beaches and the final assault on the Varengeville battery were both preceded by cannon-fighter attacks. The attack on the Varengeville battery was particularly effective because "B" and "F" troops of No. 4 Commando waited until the cannon Spittlers went in and shot up the position, before delivering their final assault.

(b) Such support has considerable moral results and is effective in that the enemy's attention is drawn away for a few invaluable minutes from the craft coming into land or the troops forming up to attack. At the same time, the enemy's attention cannot wholly be given to the cannon-fighters and experience showed that A.A. fire was much less intense than usual.

(c) It must be appreciated, however, that air action of this kind is essentially fleeting in its nature. For instance, it cannot be expected to keep the enemy's defences quiescent for sufficient time to allow the landing troops to disembark and cut their way through barbed wire, mines or other obstacles. Neither can cannon fighters be expected to put fixed defence to action. Furthermore, cannon-fighters cannot operate in close support under cover of darkness and their activities are thus restricted to daylight action.

(d) Lastly, it is particularly necessary for as large a number of close support squadrons of cannon fighters as possible to be available. These aircraft have only a limited range and can therefore normally participate in a programme capable of only limited variation when operating towards the limit of their endurance. Unless a change in the programme is notified sufficiently long in advance, the cannon-fighters may be unable to synchronize their attack with that of the assaulting infantry. Cancellation, however, is possible almost up to zero hour and a new attack can always be delivered within 30 to 40 minutes if provision has been made for an adequate number of aircraft.

*Note.—In the Channel or the North Sea it is very probable that the use of cruisers would not be justified, because of their vulnerability to air attack.
(c) In these circumstances, it is concluded that support by cannon-fighters should be regarded as a most valuable adjunct to an assault, but that when including them in the plan it must be borne in mind that the effect of their action is likely to be directive in character and of only very short duration. Cannon-fighters are rarely competent to silence a strongly protected position permanently.

359. II. SUPPORT BY HIGH LEVEL BOMBING

(a) The plans for Dieppe did not include high level bombing prior to the assault. Had suitable day bombers such as American Fortresses been available in sufficient numbers this decision might well have been different. In the circumstances, the main objections to support by night bombing were:

(i) Surprise would have been lost because the bombing would have had to take place some time before the assault in order to allow the bombers to get clear of the target area by dawn, and to have been effective, the weight of the attack would have had to be larger than it is in the normal periodic raids on French ports.

(ii) It would be wasteful effort in view of the inaccuracies which must be expected.

(iii) The rubble from damaged houses might fill the streets and prevent the movements of tanks.

(iv) High level bombing was unlikely to damage many of the sea-front positions from which heavy fire was brought to bear on the landing place.

(v) In order to enable H.M.S. "Loxust" and the cutting-out party to perform their tasks, it was necessary to avoid damage to the harbour installations and the power house.

(b) As against these points, however, it may be argued that:

(i) Surprise would not necessarily have been given away had the bombing been part of a programme of attacks on coastal ports, including perhaps one or two previous raids on Dieppe itself.

(ii) Inaccuracies might to some extent have been overcome by the use of a few expert "path-finders" who could have indicated the target by flares.

(iii) Rubble in the streets might not have proved a worse obstacle than the undamaged road blocks and obstruction walls which were encountered.

(iv) Though particular defence positions might not have been damaged the personnel might have been killed or wounded while on the way to man them.

(v) The moral effect of a heavy raid and the dislocation that it causes cannot be overlooked.

(c) The fair conclusion to draw seems to be that the question whether or not high level bombing should be included in the plan is an open one and that no hard and fast deduction should be drawn.

Each case must be judged on its merits having regard to the pros and cons mentioned above and to the possibility of diverting bomber effort from other and perhaps more important programmes.

(d) In connection with air support, generally, it is of obvious importance to note the recent developments in daylight bombing and to consider how they may affect the planning of an assault.

(e) It is only fair to add that large scale night bombing of towns in France is against the general policy of His Majesty's Government, although an exception might have been made in the case of Dieppe had the Force Commanders really wanted it.

360. III. AIR ATTACKS ON ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS

(a) Once an assault on any scale has been launched it will almost invariably be important to prevent or at least delay the move up of enemy reinforcements. If air action to this end is likely to be required, then it must be arranged for in the plan.

Probably the easiest way of doing this is to hold suitable squadrons at call for the purpose and to organise operations by intruder aircraft at night and Tactical Reconnaissance aircraft by day along the likely approaches so that early warning can be obtained that enemy forces are on the move. Tactical reconnaissance by aircraft proved adequate at Dieppe though the casualties suffered were heavier than those inflicted on aircraft employed on other tasks.

(b) There is little doubt that in a large scale operation, or when an assault is made in an area particularly suited to rapid reinforcement by the enemy, air action against enemy communication centres, barracks and camps will have to be undertaken as part of a set programme, which may have to be initiated some days or even weeks before the raid.

When summing-up the relative importance of retarding or preventing the moves of enemy reinforcements it should be borne in mind that though the coastal defences may be formidable, they are fixed in character.

Thus, once a breach has been made, the danger of serious counter-attack comes not so much from the garrisons of other fixed defences in the neighbourhood as from mobile reserves outside the immediate area of the assault. These reserves should be attacked from the air as and when opportunity offers.
In these circumstances, accurate intelligence data concerning the location of enemy formations is a necessity if the Commanders are to arrive at the proper decision regarding the allocation of aircraft as between this and other tasks. The ideal to be aimed at is over the presence of reinforcements to be detected by tactical reconnaissance aircraft and subsequently attacked.

361. IV. THE SCALE OF AIR SUPPORT AT DIEPPE IN RELATION TO THE SCALE OF THE LAND OPERATION

(a) It is of particular interest to note that at Dieppe 67 Squadrons were employed on various tasks directly concerned with the operation. This was not abnormally high in view of the anticipated scale of the enemy's air opposition and proved adequate to cover the operation. That opposition, however, would decrease:

(i) if operations on the same scale took place at several different points;

(ii) if they were continued over a longer period of time thus progressively reducing the enemy's air resources.

It is pointed out, however, that if more than one assault is delivered simultaneously at several different points, the enemy is free to concentrate all his air forces against any one of them, for it will scarcely be possible for the Royal Air Force, unless its strength is enormously increased, to give the scale of fighter cover provided at Dieppe to all of them at once. Landings must, therefore, take place with a sufficient interval of time between each to enable maximum fighter cover to be given to each landing in turn, or the enemy's strength in the air must have been reduced before the operation begins. If it is necessary for several landings to take place simultaneously, reliance must be placed on Intelligence and early warning R.D.F. Such information is normally sufficient indication to enable the Air Force Commander to divert fighter cover from the enemy's landing only, to intercept enemy air forces on their way to the landing. It is, however, emphasised that this method at the present moment cannot be depended upon, though further developments should increase the probability of its successful use.

(b) Enemy air attacks on ships were at times intensive but the volume of A.A. fire achieved by the close concentration of the ships greatly reduced the effectiveness of the enemy's low attacks. Such concentration of fire may make it possible for air cover to be reduced in its neighborhood and used for other purposes. But this, speaking ships and craft were only hit when detached. The moral is "Unity is Strength."

(c) The enemy failed at any time to develop serious air attacks against the troops on shore.

362. SUPPORT BY SPECIAL VESSELS OR CRAFT WORKING CLOSE INSHORE

(a) The assaults at Dieppe, particularly on the central beaches, show in the most clear fashion the need for overwhelming fire support during the initial stages of the attack. It is during these vital minutes while troops are disembarking, cutting or blasting their way through wire, clearing beach mines and finding routes over obstacles that the need for close support is at its greatest. At the same time it is during this very period that the troops are least able to support themselves because there has not been time to organise and deploy supporting arms. The support that is so necessary must, therefore, come from outside sources; for without it, the assault will almost inevitably lose momentum and may end in a stalemate with the troops pinned to the beaches, unable either to advance or to withdraw. Overwhelming support of the kind now envisaged should not only make the assault possible, but would also be of the greatest value in protecting the craft themselves from being disabled during the final closing on the beach and while beached.

(b) It is quite certain that the "Support Craft" which are now available do not meet the requirement envisaged in the preceding paragraph. They are too lightly armed and too lightly armoured for continued action against the type of defences which the enemy have erected at all important points on the occupied coast-line.

(c) It must be remembered that though an assault may take place to a flank of the main objective, it is in itself a frontal attack. Thus, once the assault is discovered, there is little room for surprise. The main necessity is to batter a way through in the shortest possible time.

(d) In order to achieve this object, it is considered that an entirely new type of support vessel is required, which might be described as a shallow-draught armoured gun-boat. There is all the technical possibility of a specially designed small mobile fort, constructed on land permitting it to be brought to the scene of action and there sunk in position for as long as may be needed, leaving only the gun turret above water. This, however, would, in the nature of things, be more for barrage and counter-battery work than suitable for direct close support against beach defences in the opening stage of the attack.

* Note: See also paragraph 371.
The attacking troops can add themselves to the volume of covering fire developed during the landing in various ways:

(i) Self-propelled mobile artillery provided that it is put ashore immediately will prove of great assistance in covering the initial assault. In addition to fire from specially designed and fitted support craft, such as the L.C.S. (M) and L.C.S. (L), much assistance can also be given by the troops from the actual landing craft. In each of these latter type of craft, one or two Bren guns and, whenever possible, a 2-in. mortar should be mounted ready for use. The Bren guns may be required against either land or air targets while the 2-in. mortar will be particularly valuable in providing smoke cover and in blanketing searchlights which may open up on the landing places.

(ii) It is to be noted that firing from landing craft requires a considerable amount of practice and that frequent opportunities for such practice must be arranged during the preparatory training period.

364. THE TIMING OF THE ASSAULT

(a) In the Dieppe operation the assaults which took place in the first faint light of dawn (i.e. a visibility of 200 yards) succeeded, whereas those that came in after dawn were unable to make so much progress. It would be very unwise however to draw any definite conclusions from these facts because the daylight assaults which were those against the town itself were faced by defences which were far stronger and by difficulties which did not exist on the flanks.

(b) Thus it is considered that the problem whether to land in darkness or in daylight is an open one and that each particular case must be judged in relation to the broad questions stated below:—

(i) Do the conditions of tide and moon, and the time which will be taken by the ships and craft on passage permit of a choice between a day and a night assault?

(ii) Do the circumstances of the operation indicate that a night assault will give a reasonable chance of tactical surprise? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then it is considered that a good many risks and disadvantages can profitably be accepted in order to gain surprise. In this connection, the importance of having vessels and craft of sufficient speed is to be emphasized for good speed will very often not only make an assault possible that otherwise would be impracticable, but in many cases will achieve the additional advantages of a tactical surprise.

(iii) If a daylight assault is thought best, can it be said that the available means of support (including smoke) will be sufficient to deal with enemy defences unhampered by darkness?

(iv) If a night assault is thought best, can the following questions be answered satisfactorily?

Is the Naval assault force capable of accurately conducting an approach in the area concerned and does it possess the latest navigational aids necessary to make an accurate landfall?

Is there sufficient time available for the specialised training required by the Naval and Military personnel taking part?

(c) All these questions are comprehensive and each one of them has many ramifications which must be examined by those who have to take the decision.

(d) Before reaching this decision there appears to be one further and fundamental question which the Commanders concerned should ask themselves; it is this—

"Will a night assault allow me to accomplish something which I do not think I can equally well accomplish by a daylight assault?"

365. THE LANDING OF TANKS IN THE ASSAULT

(a) At Dieppe the tanks, which were all landed in daylight with the leading waves in the face of defences which dominated the beach and against tank obstacles that had not been breached, found themselves in grave difficulties. The deduction to be drawn is that, unless overwhelming fire support is available, tanks should not be landed until defences have been captured and the obstacles cleared.
366. BEACH RECONNAISSANCE

As soon as it is known that a project involving a combined operation is under consideration, the question of beach reconnaissance in all its aspects must be investigated. In many cases, sufficient information can be obtained from existing publications and personal knowledge. As the project develops, the beach reconnaissance plan should also develop, not side by side but ahead of it, so that when the original planning stage is reached, the reconnaissance of the beach is complete in every detail with photographs, silhouettes and information concerning the nature and slope of the beach and the waters off it, whether tanks and track vehicles can land on it with or without the use of tracked laying devices, etc. Information concerning the beaches at Dieppe was very complete and much of it was obtained by the study of oblique and vertical air photographs. Naval reconnaissance methods should also be used but care must be taken that they remain undetected.

367. SECURITY

(a) One of the most difficult problems to solve in the mounting of a combined operation is that of security.

(b) The Dieppe operation was a particularly complex case as it had been mounted, postponed and cancelled before being re-mounted in the form in which it eventually took place. Thus many hundreds of people were aware of the objective and there was clearly a risk that security might have been jeopardised during the 41 days which intervened between the original cancellation and preliminary order to sail the expedition. Very special steps were therefore taken, and it is gratifying to note that all intelligence sources agreed that the landing came as a surprise and that no abnormal manning of defences or reinforcement of the area had taken place.

(c) The conditions of each operation will vary so much that it is impossible to lay down rigid and detailed rules for the maintenance of security. Common-sense and the particular circumstances of the operation must dictate the measures to be taken.

Attention is drawn to the following points:

(i) The maintenance of security among the Naval force is more difficult than in the case of the other Services since the relatively higher trained men who man the craft cannot be prevented from indulging in speculation when unusual preparatory steps are being taken. Such steps are usually necessary at a comparatively early stage. Although speculation may be wide of the mark it may easily focus the attention of a trained agent on the ships concerned and he will at once divine what is in the wind. The only person who can lay such speculation or direct it into harmless channels, are the Captain of the ships concerned. It must, therefore, be a cardinal principle for these officers to be put into the picture before any overt action is taken in connection with an operation.

(ii) The aim should be to disseminate intelligence at the earliest moment without divulging either the date or the place of the operation. Without naming date or place, much can be done to render training realistic by giving units the details of their tasks, the distances they will have to cover, the type of country and obstacles they will have to move over, and the time limit, if any, within which they must complete their tasks.

It will be necessary also to say whether they are to concentrate on day or night work and to indicate whether there will be other units operating in the flanks.

Armed with this information unit commanders will be able to relate their training to actual operational requirements and to concentrate on the subjects that really matter. It is inevitable that those of an inquiring mind will sense that an operation is being prepared but they will not know when or where.

(iii) In certain cases, it may be found possible, without endangering security, to issue maps, models and photographs which bear no names.

The preparation of such aids requires time and demands must be foreseen at an early stage in the planning if they are to be of real use.

(iv) It will be necessary throughout the preparatory stage to keep a careful record of all those who are aware of the operation. In this connection the issue of cards bearing the code name of the operation and the name and details of the holder has been found useful. Such cards, the issue of which should be severely restricted, authorise the holder to speak to another holder, but to no non-holder, regarding the operation.

(v) Throughout the preparatory stages, the "G" and "Q" staffs of all three Services must work closely together. If this is not the case, it may be found that the most carefully veiled arrangements by one branch are rendered entirely useless, through lack of knowledge on the part of the other.

(b) The L.C.T. offer a big target when used with the assaulting waves and must not be delayed at the beaches beyond the time required to disembark tactically their loads of tanks and other troops if these are carried. At Dieppe they drew most of the fire, and suffered heavily.
(vi) It goes without saying that the number of officers in each headquarters who know of the operation should be kept to the minimum.

(vii) The early production of a "cover" plan for the forces engaged including not only their training but their moves is an urgent necessity.

(viii) It must be realized that strategical surprise may be completely compromised and the constitution of the force given away by the use of wireless, particularly in a well-known operational training area, unless this problem is carefully thought out and regulated. The co-operation of units outside the force may be necessary to adjust or sustain traffic at the required level.

(ix) The administrative and movement aspects of the security problem are dealt with in Annex 12, but it may be said here that the issue of large quantities of stores, equipment and explosives to units, ships and craft is apt to provide much cause for speculation and rumour.

(d) The difficulties encountered in trying to select an area in the South of England which can be completely "sealed" appear to be insurmountable. For various reasons it proved impossible to get even an island like the Isle of Wight completely "sealed" before the operation. Much can be done, however, to offset this disadvantage by the imposition of postal and telegraphic censorship, monitoring of telephone lines and by the installation of plain-clothes police in hotels, public houses and places where gossip is likely to occur.

During the Dieppe operation, complete copies of the Military Force Commander's Operation Orders were taken ashore. It is not considered that there is any justification for such a step and that only important extracts such as code-words or time-tables need be landed. Even in these cases the numbers carried should be reduced to the minimum. Force Commanders, will, in most cases, be well advised to indicate in orders the portions which may be landed, and those who are authorised to carry them. To prevent the enemy knowing in a position to quote any of these portions which may be captured as being "official operation orders," these extracts should be copied in manuscript and have their official headings removed.

368. WHEN TO BRIEF TROOPS

(a) In the first mounting of the Dieppe operation troops were briefed and embarked on the first day and thereafter had to remain "sealed" for the whole of the five days during which the operation was kept mounted, waiting for the weather to improve. In some of the smaller ships, which were only intended to ferry soldiers across, the discomfort and lack of space and facilities decreased the efficiency of the troops day by day.

(b) It is therefore desirable to refrain, not only from briefing, but from embarking troops until a long range weather forecast shows some prospect of the weather becoming sufficiently settled to give really good chances of the operation coming off shortly after embarkation and briefing. This was done when the Dieppe operation was finally mounted.

(c) The briefing which has to be given to the aircrews and troops of the airborne division is of necessity much more complicated and, at present, the minimum time required is about four days for the aircrews and two days for the troops. Except in periods of set weather no weather forecast can extend to cover so long a period. It follows that briefing for the airborne division has to take place before there is any real prospect of knowing when the operation is coming off. Further, since the aircrews and troops are not embarked in ships but are scattered in camps, efficient "sealed" can only be done at the expense of focussing attention on the imminence of an operation. The time taken for briefing could probably be reduced to about twelve hours for airborne troops if facilities could be made available for the airborne Division to reproduce the requisite number of "models" for simultaneous briefing of all units concerned.

369. THE USE OF AIRBORNE TROOPS

(a) In the original plan for the Dieppe operation Airborne Troops were included to deal with certain important batteries.

In the final plan for the operation they were omitted.

The participation of Airborne Troops calls for certain weather conditions, especially as far as light is concerned, and in so doing increases the odds against a particular operation taking place within the favourable period for moon and tide.

In this respect the Dieppe report makes it clear that though the conditions on the day of the attack were satisfactory for ships and landing craft, they would not have permitted the use of Airborne Troops at the time required in the original plan. In fact, weather conditions suitable both for landing craft and Airborne Troops did not occur at all during the period. Thus, had the latter been included, the operation would have had to be cancelled.

(b) It should be observed, however, that technique, equipment and methods are continually improving and that conditions which would be considered hazardous or impossible today may become far from impracticable in a few months time.
(c) It is considered that the correct deductions to draw are the following:

(i) Airborne Troops provide a means of achieving surprise and of getting over difficulties both literally and figuratively which other arms do not possess. They should, therefore, be included in plans as often as possible.

(ii) However, so long as the present weather limitations apply, it is advisable that Airborne Troops should not be allotted to tasks of such importance as would entail the cancellation of the operation if adverse "airborne weather conditions" prevailed.

Thus, they should be employed on tasks which, though extremely helpful, are not vital to the plan as a whole. If so used, then their possible non-participation will not necessarily mean the cancellation of the entire operation. It should, however, be borne in mind that the tendency of recent inventions is to overcome the main obstacle—the necessity for suitable light conditions—to the use of Airborne Troops. The new navigational aid is now giving most satisfactory results and, provided one or more men can be landed before the operation, troops can be dropped accurately under almost any light conditions.

(iii) The question of briefing and "scaling" of Airborne Troops and their aircrews must be taken into consideration when deciding whether to employ them.

(iv) Close touch should be kept with Airborne formations so that those responsible for preparing plans are kept aware of all progress made and of the weather and light conditions in which improved methods and equipment may allow them to operate.

370. CHOICE OF ASSAULT LANDING PLACES

(c) The choice of assault landing places is limited principally by the tidal conditions at the time of the landing, the beach gradients, and the exits from the beaches. In addition, the time that can be allowed on shore has a direct bearing on the choice of landing places in raiding operations of comparatively short duration.

(b) It is considered, however, that whenever the conditions permit the assault should be planned to develop round the flanks of a strongly defended locality, such as a town, rather than frontally against it.

(c) It is recognised that the defences along the whole occupied coast are becoming formidable. But the intense difficulties caused at Dieppe by well-concealed and reinforced positions in houses, by road-blocks and obstruction walls are very evident from the report on the operation. The landing places at Dieppe were peculiarly difficult, for in addition to the frontal defences they were flanked by high cliffs from which coast defence guns and other arms maintained heavy enfilade fire. These defences could not be neutralised by the bombardment, bombing, or assault landings. What happened at Dieppe points to the wisdom of avoiding frontal attacks on such areas whenever possible.

Naturally, the situation would be radically altered if very powerful fire support was available during the early stages, or if the defences had been subdued by action before the assault, but in the absence of such support or preparatory action it will be wise to envelop a strongly defended locality rather than to make a frontal attack upon it.

This by no means excludes a frontal attack in order to fix the enemy's defences and perhaps his reserves as well. On the contrary, every form of feint deception and diversion should be practised in order to mislead and confuse him during the all-important period when the leading troops are being landed and are fighting to make good their bridgeheads.

371. AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION

(a) During the Dieppe operation, there were many cases of our own aircraft being engaged by our own guns. Such incidents are always likely to occur in the heat of an action, but every possible step must be taken to reduce them to an absolute minimum.

(b) The following measures are recommended:

(i) The early issue to all ships and units of photographs and silhouettes showing the types of aircraft which will be acting in support of the operation, and of enemy aircraft likely to be seen. Lectures should also be given as frequently as opportunity offers.

(ii) Arrangements to be made for aircraft of the various types to fly over ships and units during training and rehearsals. On such occasions personnel of the Royal Observer Corps should, whenever possible, be present so as to indicate the type and the distinctive features by which it may be recognised.

(iii) During the operation itself, it will be invaluable if specially trained personnel (possibly from the Observer Corps) can be allotted to ships and landing places so that they are available to distinguish friendly from hostile aircraft at the earliest moment.

(iv) Pilots to be instructed to avoid as far as possible flying straight at ships, as the guns' crews are bound to treat all aircraft flying straight at their ship as hostile.

(v) The greatest possible use should be made of the present schools for aircraft recognition established at the various ports.
372. LANDING OF BEACH ORGANISATION PERSONNEL

(a) Beach parties at Dieppe were put ashore as complete detachments in the first flights with the object of getting the landing places organised from the earliest moment.

(b) In practice, however, it was found that the landing of complete beach parties had two major disadvantages. The first was that their presence meant leaving out an equivalent number of the leading sub-units. The second that, if, as happened, the action did not proceed according to plan, the beach party was likely to become embroiled in the fighting ashore and as a result to suffer casualties which might be great enough to prevent it functioning as an organised body for some considerable time.

(c) It is recommended, therefore, that beach signal organisation personnel including beach parties should be distributed evenly between the escorting craft for each Group of landing craft and that it should be the Benchmaster himself, in one of these craft with the Beach Signal Officer, who should decide at what time the various elements of beach organisation personnel parties can safely be landed. Situation reports from reasonably close inshore could then be passed before they had landed.

373. PROTECTION DURING PASSAGE.

During its progress across the Channel, the force attacking Dieppe was very vulnerable to surface attack. None, in fact, developed, but it will be imprudent to assume that such a risk can again be taken with impunity. It is therefore necessary for a heavier Naval escort to be provided than was available for the operation against Dieppe.

374. THE USE OF SMOKE

(a) Given reasonable atmospheric conditions smoke properly used can be a very valuable aid to a combined operation.

It can, nevertheless, become a double edged weapon if its employment is not most carefully planned between the three Services.

(b) At Dieppe, for instance, it might have been helpful in order to cover the landing craft during the final stages of their approach, and the initial stages of the landing itself, to have ended the Naval bombardment of the central beaches with some salvos of a smoke shell or, alternatively, to have laid a curtain of smoke across the front of the town by aircraft. If, however, smoke had been put down by either of these methods, then the cannon and fighter aircraft could not have gone in to make their attacks just before the landing, and in the case of smoke laid by aircraft, bombarding ships would probably have lost sight of their targets too soon. The comparative advantages of a fighter attack and no smoke as against a smoke screen and no fighter attack had to be weighed and a decision reached. This isolated incident appears an excellent example of one of the numberless points directly affecting all three Services which inevitably crop up during the planning of a combined operation and which can only be settled by joint consideration and a joint decision on the part of the Force Commanders.

(c) The conditions for smoke during the Dieppe operation were excellent and the following methods were employed for producing it:

(i) by special smoke apparatus (Chloro-Sulphuric Acid) carried in certain ships and craft;
(ii) by smoke-floats carried by ships and craft;
(iii) by aircraft, some dropping phosphorus smoke-bombs and others laying smoke curtains with S.C.I.;
(iv) by 2-in. and 3-in. mortars.

(d) It is considered that attention should be drawn to the following points which indicate the periods during which smoke will probably be especially required and to certain qualifications which should be borne in mind:

(i) If the assault is carried out in daylight it is virtually certain that smoke will be required to cover the landing craft during the final stages of the approach. Similarly, if ships or craft are required to lie comparatively close to the shore during daylight hours, then they will require smoke to cover them from shore batteries and from air attack. Such screens may have to persist throughout the daylight hours. A long period of this kind entails the carrying and employment of very large quantities of smoke equipment which may require special provision,

(ii) The withdrawal from a combined operation, especially if the enemy is in close contact and can still bring fire to bear from fixed or mobile batteries, is bound to be a difficult undertaking and constitutes a phase of the operation during which smoke will without doubt play a big part. Experiences at Dieppe more than proved its value at a critical time of this sort.

(iii) The smoke laid to cover craft as they approach the landing places must follow and not precede action by fighter aircraft against these landing places, and the withdrawal of Naval raiding parties.
(iv) A screen of smoke lying between the Headquarters ship and the shore makes visual signalling impossible and signalling by pyrotechnics a doubtful means of intercommunication. If such conditions are likely to continue for any length of time, then it becomes all the more important to ensure that alternative wireless channels exist in order to replace any that may become for one reason or another, unworkable. (See Annex 10.)

(v) The blanketing of a battery by smoke just prior to an assault upon it is obviously possible and more often than not desirable, but the blanketing of a battery by smoke in order to prevent it shooting is very likely to prove disappointing. The former is an offensive use of smoke and is followed by immediate action at close quarters as in the case of the Varengeville battery. The latter is a defensive use of the weapon and though it may reduce the battery’s effort by making the local conditions unpleasant and inconvenient it is unlikely to prevent it shooting as the remote observation post which usually exists, will not necessarily have been effected.

(vi) Various actions at Dieppe showed the value of smoke to infantry. When a definite target, such as a defensive position or pill-box or battery, is the objective, it can be studied in precise detail from air photographs and the attack on it released under varying atmospheric conditions over ground which is similar.

(vii) The smoke plan, like the plan as a whole, should be flexible so that the arrangements can be accommodated to fit a change in the weather. Such flexibility will probably demand the provision and carriage of additional smoke stores so that a task which would have been undertaken by aircraft under certain conditions can, if necessary, be undertaken by another method. It took approximately two hours to change a squadron from smoke curtain installation to smoke-bombs or vice versa. Thus if it is uncertain whether smoke-bombs or S.C.I. will be used, it will be necessary to have some aircraft loaded with S.C.I. and some with smoke-bombs. This may be uneconomical in aircraft, but in order that the flexibility of the smoke plan may be retained the extra aircraft will be necessary.

Steps are now being taken with the object of discovering how far it is possible to reduce the time taken to load S.C.I.

(viii) Force Commanders will require frequent meteorological reports throughout the operation, and a meteorologist should be attached to their staff.

(ix) The Dieppe operations showed the necessity for a careful assessment during the planning stage of smoke requirements. These proved higher than were anticipated and there is evidence to show that a greater quantity, particularly of smoke-grenades, should have been carried.

375. Provision of Some Form of Light Artillery

(a) Once an assault has got across the landing place and is making progress inland, one of the main and urgent requirements will be adequate supporting fire so that momentum should not be lost and so that strongly defended areas can be assaulted without delay.

(b) It is considered that such support can only be provided rapidly by self-propelled artillery and by weapons which can be manhandled ashore because beach roadways will not have been laid and proper clearance of obstacles will still be incomplete. In such conditions equipment which is in any way cumbersome will not fulfil the requirements.

(c) In these circumstances it is suggested that the allocation of 3.7-in. howitzers and heavy mortars to assaulting units should be considered.
Colonel Charles Perry Stacey was born at Toronto, Ontario, Canada, in 1906. He was educated at the University of Toronto, where he received a B.A. in History in 1924, and at the Corpus Christi College of Oxford University, where he took a second Bachelor's degree in history in 1929. Graduate studies at Princeton University led to a doctorate in 1933. He was a member of the Department of History at Princeton, 1933-1940.

Colonel Stacey first joined the Canadian Corps of Signals in 1924. In November, 1940, he was promoted to Major and appointed Historical Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters in London, England. He served overseas until 1945, when he was appointed Director of the Historical Section of the General Staff. During his tenure, he won the Governor General's Awards for Literary Merit (1948).

He remained as Director until his retirement from the Army in 1959. Colonel Stacey was Professor of History at the University of Toronto, 1959-1975, and later Emeritus Professor at that University. In 1965-1966, he answered the call to return to the Department of National Defence in order to oversee the first year of operations of the integrated Directorate of History.

A fine historical craftsman, exhaustive researcher, and elegant stylist, Colonel Stacey was for decades Canada's foremost military historian. He wrote for Official volumes on the Second World War along with several other major contributions to Canadian History, and his memoirs, A Date with History. The Minister of National Defence said on the occasion of Colonel Stacey's eightieth birthday that "history, in no small measure because of years of achievements, continues to be a vital part of the Department of National Defence's commitment to Canada".