MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Could Lessons Learned in Somalia be beneficial to Africa Command (AFRICOM)?

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Executive Summary

Title: Somalia: Lessons Learned for Officer Professional Development.

Author: Major Curtis Wiley, United States Army

Thesis: Could Lessons Learned in Somalia be beneficial to Africa Command AFRICOM?

Discussion: From 8 December 1992 through 31 March 1994, the United States military executed a humanitarian mission that evolved into a Nation-building effort in the African country of Somalia. The United Nations initial intent was to stop the starvation that was killing thousands of Somali people. President George H.W. Bush approved the request from the United Nations for the U.S. to be the lead nation in the relief efforts. This effort known as Operation Restore Hope, under the direction of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) included the First Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF), commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston. UNITAF would include joint, combined and interagency personnel all to be under a single U.S. command versus a United Nation command.

At first the operation showed promise and relief efforts to feed the Somali people were successful. The fighting between rival Somali clans over the food supply subsided and negotiations started to gain ground. However, after five months of relative stability the U.S. decided to drawdown its forces and transfer responsibility over to the United Nations. UN leadership decided to move forward by passing Resolution 814, which considerably broadened its mandate to intervene in Somalia internal affairs. This ambitious mandate and the lack of military might to enforce it provided an opportunity for Somali clan leaders, mainly powerful warlord, Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aideed, to pursue his ambitions of ruling all of Somalia. Aideed would first need to rid the country of those that opposed him such as rival clan leaders, U.S. and UN leadership that provided the international support for intervention. His strategy of violence, directed toward coalition forces, would elevate the UN operations to offensive action against Aideed and his militia. The UN had inadvertently chosen a side in a civil war.

With U.S. support, the UN pursued Aideed. The situation caused American outrage due to a raid conducted by U.S. Special Forces on 3 October 1993 that resulted in U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and the images of dead Americans being televised world wide. In response, President Clinton announced the withdrawal of all U.S. forces by 31 March 1994. Analysts have since credited the initial success and ultimate failure to those who led the operation. From the UN and U.S. political leadership to the military leadership at both the operational and tactical level. This study from Somalia seeks to examine the lessons learned and how they can be used for professional development for staff officers that will soon man the new command of AFRICOM.

Conclusion: Operations in Africa will be as complex in the future as in the past; it is vital that the U.S. learn from military operations conducted in highly volatile, yet fragile, regions of the world, such as Somalia, to prevent further lost of American lives and preserve national interests.
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OF ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. experience in Somalia offers many lessons on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. With the newly established Africa command (AFRICOM) now in place, these valuable lessons need to be reexamined. AFRICOM is the result of an internal reorganization of the U.S. military command structure, creating one administrative headquarters that is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations with 53 African countries, including the islands of Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, and the Indian Ocean islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) will still maintain its traditional relationship with Egypt, but AFRICOM will coordinate with Egypt on issues relating to Africa security. Africa is growing in military, strategic, and economic importance in global affairs. However, many nations on the African continent continue to rely on the international community for assistance with security concerns. From the U.S. perspective, it makes strategic sense to help build the capability for African partners, and organizations such as the Africa Standby Force, to take the lead in establishing a secure environment. This security will, in turn, set the groundwork for increased political stability and economic growth. Although this case study of U.S. involvement in Somalia from 1992 through 1994 only focuses on one of the 53 nations in Africa, it illustrates the complexity of a military mission and the long-term political commitment that will be needed to bring about stability and security throughout the continent.

The case of Somalia has lessons that are important and may be used for professional development for future staff officers of AFRICOM. Some lessons are appropriate for general historical knowledge and situational awareness such as the complex command and control structure that was used, the use of psychological and civil affairs operations, and the policy that was implemented. Other lessons staffs for AFRICOM may be able to use are those of training
personnel, the employment of equipment, aspects of operational planning, negotiations and characteristics of the enemy that units may encounter throughout the AFRICOM area of operation. The Somalia operation will be the focus of this paper and the base of comparison for future military operations under AFRICOM.

In late 1991 Somalia, then engulfed in a bloody civil war, came into view as news agencies from around the world began to broadcast horrific footage of starving women and children. In answer to public outcries for action, the UN passed several resolutions in support of humanitarian operations designed to aid the victims of the Somali civil war. Even though a temporary cease fire had been agreed to prior to their deployment in early 1992, the UN peacekeepers committed in support of United Nations Operations Somalia I (UNOSOM I), were immediately confronted with armed resistance to their presence. As a result, the UN Secretary-General, supported by resolutions from the Security Council, decided to expand the original UNOSOM mandate to encompass increased security and offensive military operations. The greater emphasis on security was intended to facilitate the original mandate of delivering food and medical supplies to the Somali people.

This paper will address a few limited issues such as; command and control, training, equipment, operations, psychological and civil affairs operations, the enemy, negotiations and policy. The lessons learned from operations in Somalia can be applied through professional development and benefit those officers staffing AFRICOM. To understand U.S. involvement in Somalia we must first take a more in-depth look of the history and background.

**BACKGROUND**

U.S. interest in the Horn of Africa goes back to the cold war and the race with the Soviet Union to try to gain allies and influence throughout the world. While the U.S. established a
presence in Ethiopia by backing the traditional regime and constructing a communications
listening post, the Soviets focused on Somalia and supported the authoritative regime of Somali
strongman, Mohammed Siad Barre, who took power in 1969.\footnote{As the conditions in Somalia
continued to erode after the war against Ethiopia in 1977, Barre maintained his grip on power by
repressing his people using systematic kidnappings and murder of rival clan leaders. Somalis
began to riot against the Barre's bodyguards resulting in many civilians killed or seriously
wounded. This caused even more violence and riots which forced Siad Barre to flee the country
in 1991. (see Appendix A, Chronology of Events)}

Economic instability ensued with the collapse of the central government. Sectarian and
ethnic warfare engulfed the region and the struggle to provide food became the focus for warlords
to gain prestige and power. This power struggle, along with a drought in the region, brought
famine to thousands of Somalis.\footnote{International relief organizations tried to intervene, but the
massive amount of aid and the needed security to escort food supply to the needy was beyond
their capabilities. The misery and suffering of the Somali people coupled with the rise of clan
violence motivated President George H.W. Bush and the United Nations to act despite the risk of
intervening during a civil war.}

On 24 April 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 751, which
authorized a humanitarian relief effort in Somalia. UNOSOM dispatched small groups to the
area to evaluate the situation and get an understanding of the confusing power structure and
relationships among the various clans, armies and relief organizations. The obvious lack of
transportation assets and the needed security to accompany those assets while distributing the
food supply to the interior of the country became the main challenge for the UN. The United
States participation began 15 August 1992 by airlifting food to the interior of Somalia. Lawless
gangs throughout the interior began to seize the supplies and stockpile them to use as payment for loyalty from other clans and gangs.

As relief efforts continued to stall, the U.S. plan to intervene materialized as Operation Restore Hope. As a joint, combined, and interagency operation, Restore Hope began on 8 December 1992 under the direction of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston from the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). Lt. Gen. Johnston and Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, President Bush’s special envoy to Somalia, immediately established a plan to negotiate with the rival Somali factions. The UN, unable to handle such a complex mission, deferred to U.S. leadership to operate logistics, command and control and intelligence.

Executing this complex mission under UNITAF with I MEF came 10,000 soldiers from the United States Army this included, TF Mountain, from the 10th Mountain Division. Army troops from TF Mountain would be commanded by Major General Steven L. Arnold. Coalition forces from 23 different countries, adding up to 38,000 troops, also participated in Restore Hope. Representatives from 49 humanitarian relief agencies assisted throughout the operation.

In support of UNITAF, units from Joint Special Operations Forces Somalia (JSOFOR), a major subordinate unit under CENTCOM would fill a major role in military operations, to include the raid conducted by Task Force Ranger to capture notorious warlord Mohamed Farrah Aideed. Also in support was the Army’s only active duty civil affairs unit, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

Oppositional forces such as private armies, clans, sub-clans, gangs, bandits, and militias all contributed to the starvation and death of many innocent Somali civilians. Two warring sub-clans from the United Somalia Congress (USC) clan were responsible for most of the fighting in Mogadishu. The Habr Gidr sub-clan, led by Aideed, had an approximate strength of 5,000 -
10,000 men, while the Abgal sub-clan in North Mogadishu had an approximate strength of 5,000 - 6,000 men and was led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Aideed, also the leader of the Somali National Alliance had intentions of running the entire country. The weapons used by opposing forces came from around the world and were easily obtained by all. Many weapons left over from the Barre years ranged from the World War II era .30 caliber machine guns and rocket launchers to modern day U.S. made M-16s and Soviet made AK-47s. The use of other types of weapons included 60mm and 120mm mortars, SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, landmines, and (technical vehicles) trucks with heavy machine guns mounted in the bed. Those weapons were sold to anyone in open markets. One of these markets, the Bakara market in Mogadishu is depicted in the movie “Black Hawk Down”. This area was known for violence and was controlled by Aideed’s militia. Although Aideed’s militia was perceived by others as rebels and thugs, the command and control held over them by Aideed was absolute and clear, unlike the UN coalition forces.

**Command and Control**

Command and control in a military operation can not be optional or conditional; it must be established and understood by all participants. During Operation Restore Hope (UNOSOM I), led by I MEF, command and control was effective and successful, where as UNOSOM II, which started 4 May 93, command and control was ineffective. The reason for the difference was the lead elements ability to establish a clear chain of command that had experienced leadership and exercised the elements of unity of effort and unity of command. The U.S. and UNOSOM II command and control problems of committing combat forces to support UN operations proved detrimental. The U.S., as well as other nations, set conditions as to when and where their soldiers would participate in combat actions. The interference that occurred by national command authority’s miles from the confrontation frustrated force commanders and
obstructed the commander's initiative and flexibility needed in such a complex environment. In June 1993, the French and Moroccans both refused operational mission in Mogadishu, in July the Italians refused missions in Mogadishu as did India and Zimbabwe in September. In each instance the matter had to be referred to the UN in New York for diplomatic resolution through each country's national authority. Although many lessons can be drawn from UN command and control problems, I have chosen to focus specifically on U.S. involvement and how the U.S. can apply the lessons it learned to AFRICOM's capabilities. Unity of effort, avoiding parallel lines of authority and a clear consensus must be the foundation of future missions under AFRICOM.

First, policy makers and senior military leaders must ensure UN mandates and orders, U.S. terms of reference, memorandums of understanding, and both the political and commanders intent are clearly understood and are mutually supporting. Conflicting interpretations over these issues created friction and complicated command and control of U.S. forces in theater. Understandably, the situation may change and other orders, mandates or intent must be adopted or added throughout operation, but they must remain clear and mutually supported. Therefore, a thorough mission analysis by the interagency process and national command authorities must provide clear military goals and objectives consistent with the U.S. role and UN mandate. The national command authority may use the questions posed by the Powell Doctrine to ensure proper analysis. The Powell Doctrine, asks: Is a vital national security interest threatened? Do we have a clear attainable objective? Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? Is the action supported by the American people? Do we have genuine broad international support? These question's should be answered in the affirmative before undertaking military action.
Second, contradictions between command relationships must be eliminated as to not confuse subordinates and staff as to the lines of command and control of the supported unit or force. Command relationships that are published and those intended and practiced must be consistent. The command relationships that were published in the terms of reference (TOR) modified the standard command relationships as outlined in Joint Publication 1-02. Although, the command relationship actually practiced in Somalia was in line with Joint Pub 1-02, the contradiction between what was in writing (TOR) and what was executed clouded lines of control and created friction within the command. Therefore, standard command relationships for U.S. forces involved in coalition led Chapter VII operations (UN charter authorizing what measures may be implemented such as military force) are appropriate. Non-standard command relationships can lead to confusion and should be avoided. However, if they must be developed and published, then they must be followed in practice.10

Third, command and control structure for U.S. forces must be tailored, staffed and equipped to command and control the U.S. forces committed to Chapter VII operations. The U.S. Forces Command Somalia (USFORCOSM) staff committed to the operation was insufficient to effectively command and control all U.S. forces. The ad hoc staff resourced through CENTCOM in lieu of an appropriate sized Joint Task Force (JTF) staff to provide administrative and operational control of U.S. forces was intended for short duration and also to maintain a low U.S. signature. As a result, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from the Army 10th Mountain Division provided elements of the staff as well as the most effective fighting force. While this arrangement was initially adequate, it proved inefficient as troop strength increased and combat operations escalated. The QRF received direction from U.S. and UNOSOM II staff while receiving administrative support and oversight from the United Nations Logistical Support Command. Consequently, this command and control structure for U.S. forces blurred the lines...
of control. While it can be effective to dual hat the U.S. force commander, in this case MG Montgomery, as a key member on a coalition staff, it may be detrimental and ineffective to do the same for the staff. The U.S. force commander should have a separate staff, appropriately resourced, to effectively command and control U.S. forces committed to peace operations regardless of the size or signature of U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{11}

Fourth, the U.S. must hold key staff positions on UN-led peace enforcement operations where the U.S. participates with forces. U.S. forces were effectively employed in accordance with U.S. policy and objectives due to the key staff positions held by U.S. personnel on the UNOSOM II staff. The Deputy Force Commander (DFC) position provided the U.S. the opportunity to place a major general (MG Montgomery) in a senior command position within UNOSOM.\textsuperscript{12} The U.S. should continue to seek senior positions to ensure effective use of U.S. personnel and continue to be able to significantly influence military plans and their execution.

Although most senior leaders have experience working in a joint environment and in many cases working with coalition forces, their subordinate staffs may or may not have the needed experience to work in the joint or coalition arena. Inexperience, combined with personnel manning shortages like those we saw in UNOSOM II, only being filled to 33\% during the initial months after the transition from UNOSOM I can create internal friction. The U.S. can alleviate unwanted friction with proper and continuous training.

**TRAINING**

A key element of a successful operation is not only the training prior to any mission, but the continued training throughout the deployment. From squad level tactics to operational planning, conditions must facilitate current, realistic training. This continuous training appeared to be instituted with UNITAF and I MEF. The Marine units and coalition units had been together for some time and had a common understanding of expectations and standard operating
procedures. They understood the limits of their capabilities and assets within the forces deployed. However, working with the UN and the lack of experienced staff with employing military forces in a complex environment proved to be a new challenge for many officers in both UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II.

The first lesson to be learned from Somalia in regards to training would be to educate the officers and noncommissioned officers that have been identified to serve on UN staffs or to support UN missions. Those service members identified and assigned to UN staff positions should be familiar with UN procedures and organizations. Formal training and familiarization programs must be developed to ensure that personnel are trained prior to reporting to UN missions. Extensive training as a coalition staff prior to a UN mission would be ideal, but highly unlikely; therefore, selecting persons who have prior experience working with UN staff would be the most advantageous.

The second lesson in training is manning the JTF staff with quality personnel. This staff should have as its core trained and experienced joint personnel. Recent combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to the increased level of knowledge of U.S. military personnel. In recent years, military personnel have gained experience working on joint staffs and have become familiar with elements outside of their respective services. Training programs, such as Battle Command Training Programs (BCTPs), also help produce valuable experience for personnel who will be needed to fill future joint staffs such as those needed in AFRICOM.

The last lesson in regard to training U.S. forces for the inevitable, complex peace operations under AFRICOM is the use of the proper peace operation terminology. Terms such as peace keeping, peace enforcement and peace making were used interchangeably in documents and discussions among civilian and military leadership in both the UN and the U.S. Furthermore, interagency organizations and other nations may use terms differently from the
U.S. military. This creates confusion and misunderstandings that may result in internal and external friction among coalition forces communicating with U.S. personnel. Using doctrinal terminology such as that within the Joint Publication 3.07.3 for all U.S. members of a coalition would minimize the misuse of terms and ensure all parties concerned have base understanding of documents and discussions that address coalition issues of concern.14

Advantages of having properly trained military personnel in a complex cultural environment such as Africa can be invaluable and make the difference between mission success and failure. However, if those personnel are not properly equipped to execute the mission, the mission may also fail; therefore we must resource and equip U.S. personnel regardless of the U.S. footprint or international perceptions.

**EQUIPMENT**

When the decision is made to send military or civilian personnel into harm’s way the decision of choosing the right equipment needed to ensure that mission’s success should default to the commanders and staff. No military unit has ever failed a mission because it was over resourced. Political influence over the decision of what equipment to employ may cost lives.

Unlike traditional Unified Commands, AFRICOM will focus on war prevention rather than war-fighting. AFRICOM intends to work with African nations and organizations to build regional security and crisis-response capacity in support of U.S. government efforts. This focus alludes to a small military footprint. That could put Americans in danger as they were in Somalia. The equipment issue brought to question in Somalia through the Warner-Levin report (hereafter the Levin-Report) was the lack of the AC-130 gunship that was part of the standard package for Special Operation missions.15 This lack of fire support and the associated psychological edge may have changed the outcome of the Ranger raid conducted on 3 October in
Mogadishu. The tremendous psychological impact of the AC-130 gunship might have deterred the militia from continued attacks on coalition forces. Although armor was not requested by commanders on the ground, the Levin-Report also raised the point of why Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) were not used early during the extraction of enemy detainees and U.S. forces trapped in the city for 15 hours. The use of slow and vulnerable five ton trucks versus Blackhawk helicopters, to extract military personnel from the middle of a fire fight was even questioned by Specialist Mike Kurth, a radio operator with the TF Ranger. Why were APCs not used and why was the troop strength for the Rangers cut back? The only reason by Under Secretary Wisner is the desire for a small U.S. profile in Somalia. Lessons learned with lack of equipment in Somalia have brought about new technologies with armored vehicles that are sure to be used in operations conducted under AFRICOM. Although, we must keep in mind not to let the issue of a large U.S. profile drive the deployment of such vital combat equipment. For Operations Other Than War (OOTW), units should be provided a plus-up package of additional equipment, weapons, and the training that goes along with that equipment to ensure force protection.

OPERATIONS

Rules of engagement (ROE) must provide maximum flexibility to protect the force and allow the sensible use of power to accomplish the mission. The ROE established in UNOSOM II permitted soldiers to use deadly force to defend themselves and coalition forces against hostile acts or intent. It also allowed deadly force to be used against hostile elements attempting to prevent the force from accomplishing such duties as food distribution and disarmament of crew served weapons that may pose a threat to relief efforts. Deadly force was permitted to use against those posing a hostile threat to human life, Somali militia attacking Somali non-
combatants. It also required soldiers to apply only the force necessary to challenge suspected hostile personnel when practical. The flexibility of the ROE enabled soldiers to execute their mission with minimum risk to themselves or noncombatants. The UNOSOM II ROE should be adopted as a base model for future Chapter VII operations if it is within the intended scope of the UN mandate. (see Appendix B for text of the ROE)

Once the ROE is established, all coalition personnel must have a clear understanding and be able to apply them. Lack of situational training meant some units were not adequately prepared to apply the ROE. This was especially true regarding logistical units having to handle convoy operations and crowd control. Situational Training Exercises (STX) help soldiers identify potential trouble situations and situations where restraint should be used. Units deploying to theater should use realistic STX training.

In addition to establishing sound ROE and training all personnel to use them, another important element under operations are back briefings. Commanders and staff found that back briefings ensured coalition forces understood the mission intent. The need for back briefing increases as we move from joint to combined operations with other nations. Language barriers and cultural differences can contribute to misunderstandings of the intended mission and the commander's intent. As the message is passed through interpreters and liaison officers to coalition forces, some information may be filtered or lost. The way to avoid a mixed message and ensure key information is received is to use back briefings in a formal staff setting and during informal conversations.

During the mission in Somalia over 23 nations and all the U.S. military forces were used, therefore the language barrier added to different meanings for acronyms and jargon. This only contributed to the confusion of daily communications.
Another operation element we should address is the use of military jargon and the use of acronyms. Using such terms and acronyms can negatively affect mission performance when conducting joint or coalition operations. All involved should consciously avoid using jargon and acronyms in official communications. Communications through written orders can also cause internal friction when dealing with joint or combined operations. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps use “implied” and “specified” tasks through the orders process for subordinate units to follow. Implied tasks may not be specifically stated in the higher headquarters’ order, but they are performed to accomplish a specific task. Specified tasks are specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters. Any specified task that pertains to any element of the unit should be identified and recorded. While working with coalition forces, all tasks must be “specified” to ensure the implied tasks are not omitted by forces from other nations. This subject can also be addressed through the Professional Military Education process.

The Professional Military Education System should also address “consensus building” at the command and staff college level. Preparing plans for coalition forces during UNOSOM II the negotiation process proved frustrating but necessary. Each nation providing forces under the UN charter placed restrictions as to what those forces were permitted to do. These restrictions combined with different views of employment doctrine required UNOSOM II staff to seek consensus when planning military actions. Without consensus building it was hard to maintain an operational tempo and this on occasion resulted in minimum accomplishments by coalition units.

The Somalia mission confirmed another element of operations that should be sustained for future coalition operations that are likely to occur under AFRICOM. The contributions of the Special Forces Coalition Support Teams (CST) during the operations in Somalia proved to be valuable assets for U.S. Forces and UNOSOM II. Coalition Support integrates coalition units
into multinational military operations by training coalition partners on tactics and techniques and providing communications. Coalition Support teams often provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JFC command and control. Coordination conducted between the U.S. and other coalition forces by the CSTs validated the military need for these teams. The CSTs were used for both military and humanitarian missions and also conducted training for coalition forces. Their knowledge of the region, language capabilities, and cultural awareness kept the critical communication link open and instrumental. CSTs and liaison teams from the QRF also coordinated fire support for searches, raids and security operations. The technique of using these teams prevented fratricide and gained the confidence of the coalition forces to support U.S. forces in theater. The CSTs were also used to inform the local populace of the humanitarian support and operations being conducted in the area. To maximize the U.S. Commander’s capabilities to accomplish his mission, well trained, organized and experienced CSTs should be employed for future coalition mission in AFRICOM and throughout the globe. These teams should be linked up with coalition forces once the latter are incorporated in the command and used for the entire duration of the mission. Other small teams of significant importance that have operational influence are the Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) teams and the Civil Affairs (CA) teams. The proper integration of PSYOPS and CA operations can pay major dividends militarily and politically.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

A complete PSYOPs campaign was not planned for UNOSOM II but operations such as, leaflet drops and loud speaker teams contributed to the mission and illustrated the vital role of PSYOPs for like missions in the future. The UN civilian staff did not have the experienced
personnel to properly maximize the use of PSYOP tactics. However, the UN did operate a small newspaper and radio station mainly for media information not for psychological operations. To better maximize the psychological capabilities the UN, U.S. and other allied nations can create a more refined name other than PSYOPS, UN civilian aversion to use deception may attribute to the lack of use through the public diplomacy capability in New York. Requesting other allied nations to participate in UN led PSYOP training will increase the number of those available to support future UN peace type operations. Once PSYOP units are deployed they must actively and aggressively publish and announce regional success stories to illustrate the legitimacy of the UN mission.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

U.S. and coalitions forces should have Civil Affairs (CA) capability as an inherent part of the deploying force while conducting peace operations. CA units can help coalition forces by providing assistance and security to the local community and by preserving the image of a humanitarian mission versus the image of an occupying force. These units can also provide a sense of trust among the local populace and at the same time portray a military presence of support and stability. A CA asset at the tactical level could also provide operational commanders with situational awareness as regards to regional operations, in other words, “keeping a finger on the pulse”.

The importance of CA units and the lack of active duty personnel to fill this critical specialty were recognized by the Army the past few years. This resulted in the Civil Affairs Functional Area becoming its own branch. Prior to CA becoming a branch, the lack of personnel to fill this important billet drew attention during operations in Somalia from the CENTCOM Commander, General Hoar. The need for a more robust CA presence in Somalia was noted by General Hoar with his request of a selected presidential call-up of U.S. Army Reserve Civil
Affairs units. The response he received for this request influenced him to withdraw it recognizing the political will to call up reserves did not exist. This left the command with only one active duty CA battalion, to support the mission in Somalia.

UN planning of CA operations did not stress the importance of integrating military force and civilian capabilities. However, this gap did not stop coalition forces from recognizing the importance of integrating civic action projects with their military operations. Although the UN civilian staff gave little thought of combining capabilities, the military staff gave a good effort to synchronize their efforts with those of their civilian counterpart. However, the lack of resources restricted what could have been done. Lessons learned from operations in Somalia can be applied to future operations within AFRICOM. Missions may include working with the UN and coalition forces and should include a robust CA capability. It is not in our interest to continue to criticize the UN for its shortcomings. The U.S. interest should be to provide constructive leadership and support to encourage the UN to include a CA staff planning structure for peace type operations; this would be a more effective tool for world peace and stability. CA unit personnel were needed in Somalia like they will be for missions in AFRICOM. They are a vital link to integrate the military and humanitarian relief organizations (HROs).

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

HROs that provide aid during a crisis and hope for the future are a key element in peace operations. Military staff personnel should try to incorporate the HROs in their planning efforts and understand the HROs can be a valuable ally for future operations in Africa. Somalia proved how complex a civil-military relationship can be to plan.

Although the civil affairs officer was a familiar participant in many military operations, there was no Joint doctrine to cover a situation in which a country had descended into a state of
anarchy. Along the way, however, there was a rediscovery of the need to consider military, diplomatic, and humanitarian efforts as parts of a common whole. Although there was no longer a single government in Somalia, there were at least 49 different international agencies, including UN bodies, nongovernmental organizations, and HROs. Dealing effectively with those agencies became the primary challenge for civil-military operations in Somalia. This was an important function because the HROs not only provided many of the relief supplies that helped fight starvation, but agencies such as the Red Cross and Feed the Children were on the scene prior to the arrival of the U.S. forces.

One thing that affected relations in Somalia was the pattern of accommodation that the relief agencies had followed to ensure that they could work there effectively. This meant hiring local security forces often using the area’s dominant clan. When peacekeeping forces arrived to set up their own security arrangements, there were questions as to their authority. Once these issues were settled, it was also necessary to make exceptions to policy when weapons were confiscated from those people employed by the relief organizations as their security forces.

During the UNITAF phase of the operation there was an undeniable increase in both security and the amount of relief supplies being distributed. This period of relative peace allowed more relief agencies to enter the country, but it also underlined the need to ensure closer civil-military cooperation. Sometimes these cooperative efforts involved small but important things—such as allowing HRO representatives to fly “space available” on military aircraft. More substantial efforts took place when military forces during both Restore Hope and UNOSOM II worked side by side with relief agencies to dig wells, rebuild roads, repair schools. With the need to control access to key port areas and food distribution points, it also became essential to provide photo ID cards to the relief workers. This requirement in turn meant setting up procedures for verifying organization personnel. Some came to view the ID card as both
official UNITAF certification of a person’s role as a humanitarian worker and also as a gun permit. Finally, some agency had to issue the cards and to regulate what privileges, if any, these ID cards would convey. For these and similar reasons, one of the most important initiatives of the Somalia operation was the establishment of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). Set up in December 1992 during the early stages of UNITAF, CMOC became the key coordinating point between the task force and the HROs. Liaison officers from the major multinational contingents, together with the U.S. command, used this center as a means of coordinating their activities, such as providing military support for convoys and assigning pier space and port access to Mogadishu Harbor for the HROs. These duties also lent themselves to the broadening of contacts between the military and civilian components, including the creation of parallel CMOCs in each of the nine humanitarian Relief Sectors. Eventually, CMOC controlled the issue of ID cards and maintained the status of food relief supplies throughout the command’s area of operations. Equally important, however, was the fact that CMOC was able to work closely with the Humanitarian Operations Center run by the UN allowing a single point for relief agencies. While the civilian organizations knew the enemy they faced (starvation), the coalition forces faced a formidable thinking enemy.

**KNOW YOUR ENEMY**

Knowing your enemy is a simple and ancient lesson from the military theorist Sun Tsu. In this case U.S. forces simply underestimated the leadership and determination of the Somali militia. U.S. command believed the Somalis to be intellectually primitive, culturally shallow, and militarily craven. All three beliefs proved to be expensively incorrect. The weapons in Somalia were abundant from previous years of clan fighting and civil war. The officers under Aideed were trained extensively at the Soviet military academy in Odessa and Italy. Aideed had
been trained through French military schools and also had political influence over the population and was able to use that influence to rally the Somali people to form militias against the coalition forces. These factors made the Somali militia a formidable force. As officers look forward to other mission in AFRICOM they must not underestimate the bandits, clans, militia, and their leadership.

Although U.S. forces arrived in Somalia for a humanitarian mission, the military involvement in ethnic or sectarian conflict can create a volatile situation and place U.S. forces in a compromising position. Where the cause of strife is sectarian, tribal or ethnic differences, the inherent risk to any coalition force is multiplied by the number of factions fighting. Therefore, it is the civilian leadership’s responsibility to protect any troops committed to the region by anticipating any hostile forces they may encounter through the use of national intelligence resources. The U.S. and their allies should share intelligence when working together and limit the frustration commanders on both sides continue to endure. Collection methods, understandably, must remain secret but the information collected must be shared. The effective use of all national intelligence resources in conjunction with our cultural and regional subject matter experts such as Foreign Area Officers, Civil Affairs Officers, and Special Forces Officers, to name a few, should get a better common operating picture of the enemy and his environment, and therefore increase our chances to be able to defeat or neutralize him. The best way to get to know your enemy is to establish a relationship through negotiations.

NEGOTIATIONS

At all levels during Somalia operations, negotiating skills and techniques were essential to mission accomplishment. As Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni said, “Always consider negotiations as a great alternative to violence.” Joint Pub 3-07.3 notes that, in addition to the
qualities of patience and restraint, peacekeepers must combine an approachable, understanding, and tactful manner with fairness and firmness. A professional demeanor that stresses quiet diplomacy and reasoning will achieve more than arrogance, anger, disdain, coercion, or sarcasm. Personnel must be able to cope positively when each side seeks to press its position and then reacts vocally when stopped. These qualities are clearly part of an attitude adjustment from the reactions traditionally associated with military operations, but there should be no mistaking how important that adjustment is during peace operations.

One perspective was offered by MG Montgomery, who noted that “consensus building” was a critical part of the process of developing plans and preparing operations orders in any combined operation—not just those involving peace operations. During UNOSOM II, however, the specific terms of reference guiding the participation of each multinational contingent as well as their different views of employment doctrine meant that actions could not be taken without broad agreement. Finding those areas of consensus, building on them, and applying them to specific operations are inevitably complicated processes, and ones that are noticeably different from those that most military personnel are used to. However, MG Montgomery thought negotiating skills important enough to recommend that they be addressed at Army professional schools. The fundamental importance of maintaining this kind of a dialogue led to a key UNITAF innovation: a “Combined Security Committee” that allowed LTG Johnston and key members of his staff to meet frequently with Mohammed Aideed and other key clan leaders. This forum proved especially useful in gaining and even forcing cooperation with UNITAF mandates, such as weapons cantonment. As with Aideed and Ali Mahdi, you may not like the characters you have to deal with but you are better able to uncover their motives and intentions if you keep a communications link open.29
Although most policy lessons learned during operations in Somalia are above the Army or Marine Corps level, these services will provide the UN with personnel to plan operations, organize force structures, and establish manning requirements to participate in future operations. Personnel filling staff positions in AFRICOM may also benefit from understanding the policies that were used in UNITAF and UNOSOM II and how they affected the outcome of the operation.

When U.S. forces are deployed in any peace operation an Inter-agency crisis response cell must be established and manned through the duration of the mission. During the initial months of UNOSOM II, after the transition from UNITAF in May 1993 the U.S. did not have this capability. When the 5 June attacks mentioned earlier occurred on the coalition forces, the high-level U.S. crisis cell was not there to provide a full range of options. In contrast, during UNITAF, just such a cell was manned. A shift in U.S. priority became more apparent after 17 June as the Commander U.S. Forces Somalia found it increasingly difficult to employ U.S. resources as he believed were needed to respond to emergencies or to accomplish the U.S. and UN goals.

In any peace operation or nation building effort where U.S. forces are deployed and the potential for combat exists and U.S. lives could be lost, there must be an inter-agency response cell, a focal point, maintained throughout the life of the operation. If a transition of responsibility is required like the U.S led UNITAF to the UN led UNOSOM II, there should be several months built into the transition plan for U.S. government agencies to man crisis cells to ensure continuity and situational awareness.

In conclusion, we must use caution as we study historical cases for lessons learned. Although they are valuable, it is just a snap shot of a certain time and culture that continue to evolve. However, the Somalia case study is different. It is still one of the most unstable places
in Africa and as we plan for future operations through the new Africa Command we must heed the lessons learned and plan accordingly. The AFRICOM staff must also address broader issues as well, to include planning for multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand.30

2 Ibid., p. 4.

3 Ibid., p. 5.

4 Ibid., p. 5.

5 Ibid., p. 6.

6 Ibid., p. 6.


9 Ibid., p. 240.

10 Ibid., p. 241.

11 Ibid., p. 243.

12 Ibid., p. 243.

13 Ibid., p. 244.

14 Ibid., p. 245.


19 Ibid., p. 256.

20 Ibid., p. 257.


25 Ibid., p.50.


28 Ibid., p. 116.


**Selected Bibliography**


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Appendix A:
Chronology of Events and Operations

January 1991  Somalia's President, Siad Barre, was deposed and civil war and clan
infighting ensued, leading to famine and lawlessness throughout portions of
the country. (*Warner-Levin Report*)

24 April 1992  United Nations Security Council, after signing a cease-fire between the
warring Somalia factions, approved United Nations Operation in Somalia,
which has come to be referred to as UNOSOM I. (*W-L Report*)

18 August 1992  President H.W. Bush orders the airlift of 145,000 tons of food to Somalia in
Operation Provide Relief.

28 August 1992  The Security Council, in the face of sporadic outbreaks of hostilities in several
parts of Somalia, approved the deployment of an additional 3,000
peacekeepers to perform a traditional peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI
of the United Nations Charter to observe cease-fire agreements and provide
security to humanitarian relief efforts. The United States participation in
UNOSOM I, called Operation Provide Relief, involved the provision of
transportation to Pakistani troops, humanitarian aid workers and supplies. (*W-L Report*)

23 November 1992  *Tripoli* Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), carrying the 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) departs Singapore enroute to
the Persian Gulf.

25 November 1992  President Bush announces to the United Nations that the United States was
prepared to provide military forces to assist in the delivery of food and relief
supplies to Somalia.

27 November 1992  Commanding general of Central Command (CentCom) designates I Marine
Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as the headquarters of Joint Task Force (JTF)
Somalia.

29 November 1992  United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that the U.N.
Security Council would consider authorizing an operation by member states.

3 December 1992  As the security situation continued to deteriorate, the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in response to an offer by the United
States to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation,
authorized the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. That multilateral operation,
known as the Unified Task Force or UNITAF and as Operation Restore Hope,
included about 25,000 U.S. troops and 13,000 troops from twenty other
countries. The United States-led operation, however, did not involve the
disarmament of the various Somalia factions and did not extend throughout all of Somalia. *(W-L Report)*


4 December 1992 JTF Somalia headquarters established. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston briefs his concept of operations to component commanders.

7 December 1992 First trainload of Army equipment departs Fort Drum for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey.

9 December 1992 At 0330, landing vehicles carrying Marines and Navy Sea, Air, Land personnel (SEALs) are launched from the ARG for initial landings and arrive at Mogadishu at 0540. By 1145, the Mogadishu airport is declared secure and the first military aircraft lands. One company of the 2nd French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment joins the JTF in Mogadishu.

10 December 1992 General Johnston arrives in Mogadishu. Headquarters for Combined JTF Somalia is established in the United States Embassy compound. Unified task Force Somalia (UNITAF) decides to move up the deployment of Army forces originally scheduled to begin 19 December, by eight days.

12 December 1992 Three helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 are fired on by Somalis in two separate incidents. The helicopters destroy two "technicals" and damage one M113 armored personnel carrier. First Army unit, Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, arrives at Bale Dogle.

4 January 1993 First reconciliation conference begins at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 14 factions are represented.

6 January 1993 Commanding General issues guidance for the draw down and restructuring of the force. Members of General Aideed's faction fire on a UNITAF convoy traveling through Mogadishu. A plan is developed for the seizure of the weapons storage areas involved.

11 January 1993 Task Force Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Barkera arms market.

13 January 1993 Somali Security Committee in Mogadishu approaches UNITAF about the reestablishment of the Somali National Police Force.

30 January 1993 3,000 Somali auxiliary security force personnel are reported as prepared to start police duties.
8 February 1993  General Johnston and Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen send a joint letter to all signatories of the 8 January Accords calling on them to begin the disarmament process.

23 February 1993  Supporters of Aideed begin rioting in Mogadishu as a result of incidents in Kismayo.

24 February 1993  Rioting continues in Mogadishu, especially in the vicinity of the K-4 traffic circle.

25 February 1993  U.S. Marines and Botswana soldiers conduct clearing operations in the vicinity of the K-4 traffic circle. Calm returns to Mogadishu by the evening.

4 March 1993  Members of the Reconnaissance Platoon, Canadian Airborne Regiment, shoot two unarmed intruders in the engineer compound in Belet Weyne, killing one of them.

16 March 1993  Two Canadian soldiers torture and beat to death a Somali teenager caught infiltrating the Canadian compound in Belet Weyne.

26 March 1993  The Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II or UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II was also a Chapter VII operation and had an expanded mandate in that the Security Council specifically emphasized the “crucial importance of disarmament” and called for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia...in accordance with the recommendations contained in his (Secretary General’s) report of 3 March 1993.” The Secretary General’s recommendations referred to by the Security Council included the following military task: “maintain control of heavy weapons of organized factions and to seize small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and assist in the registration and security of such arms.”  (W-L Report)

4 May 1993  UNITAF turns over responsibility for operations in Somalia to the United Nations forces, under the command of Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, Turkish Army. The last of UNITAF headquarters staff departs Somalia.

5 May 1993  President William J. Clinton welcomes General Johnston and his staff back to the United States in a special ceremony on the White House lawn.

This time line above taken from Restoring Hope: In Somalia with Unified Task Force, 1992-1993 unless noted from the Warner-Levin Report

5 June 1993  A scheduled inventory by UNOSOM II of five weapons-storage sites belonging to Aideed’s faction, one of which was collocated with the radio transmission relay facility north of the city, with another at the radio broadcast
studio in the city itself. Prior written notice of the inspection had been given to the staff of General Aideed. Pakistani units returning from the inventory sites encountered a three-sided ambush and sustained 25 killed, 53 wounded, and 10 missing in action.

6 June 1993 The fifteen members of the Security Council voted (UNSCR #837) for arrest and prosecution effort for those responsible for the 5 June attack on peacekeepers.

17 June 1993 Ambassador Howe offers reward for Aideed’s capture.

23 June 1993 Congressional approval of a supplemental appropriation for DOD cost to continue operations in Somalia is passed.

13 July 1993 Senator Byrd (D-WV) alone suggested that the U.S. should withdraw from Somalia mission.

15 July 1993 Statement from Senator Byrd (D-WV): “Mr. President, this Senator and this Senate did note vote to send American forces to Somalia to go from house to house to disarm the participants in internecine battles between Somalian warlords...to chase down competing warlords...to confiscate weapons. I thought I voted to allow United States forces to go to Somalia and feed hungry people.”

2 August 1993 Statement by Senator McCain (R-AZ): “In the case of Somalia, the winds have blown us from a narrow well-defined humanitarian mission to taking sides in a prolonged hunt for a Somalia warlord. We have moved from a relief effort to peace enforcement to taking sides, and we now seem to be on the edge of moving towards nation building.”

24 August 1993 Approximately 450 Rangers and Special Operations personnel deploy to Somalia with the mission to capture Aideed and his principal lieutenants.

9 September 1993 Senate passes a non-binding resolution calling for the President to seek specific Congressional authorization by fifteen November for the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia.

25 September 1993 U.S. helicopter shot down by Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG)

27 September 1993 Statement by Rep. Hyde (R-IL): “Now, the mission has broadened dramatically. Instead of feeding the hungry, we are nation building.”

3-4 October 1993  Task Force Ranger conducts raid near the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu. 18 U.S. soldiers killed, 84 wounded. Approximately 500-1,000 Somalis killed and 22 captured.

7 October 1993  President Clinton announces deployment of JTF and 31 March 1994 withdrawal date for U.S. Forces.
APPENDIX B

(As seen in the actual order)

APPENDIX D
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

1. (U) Situation. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

2. (U) Mission. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

3. (U) Execution.
   1. (U) Concept of the Operation.
      1. (U) If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.
      2. (U) Nothing in these rules negates your inherent right to use reasonable force to defend yourself against dangerous personal attack.
      3. (U) These rules of self-protection and rules of engagement are not intended to infringe upon your right of self defense. These rules are intended to prevent indiscriminate use of force or other violations of law or regulation.
      4. (U) Commanders will instruct their personnel on their mission. This includes the importance of proper conduct and regard for the local population and the need to respect private property and public facilities. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply in an overseas area. Expect that all missions will have the inherent task of force security and protection.
      5. (U) ROE cards will be distributed to each deploying soldier (see Annex A to this appendix).
   2. (U) Rules of Self-Protection for all Soldiers.
      1. (U) US forces will protect themselves from threats of death or serious bodily harm. Deadly force may be used to defend your life, the life of another US soldier, or the life of persons in areas under US control. You are authorized to use deadly force in self-defense when--
         1. (U) You are fired upon.
         2. (U) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life.
         3. (U) There is a clear demonstration of hostile intent in your presence.
      2. (U) Hostile intent of opposing forces can be determined by unit leaders or individual soldiers if their leaders are not present. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against US forces or other persons in those areas under the control of US forces. Factors you may consider include--
         1. (U) Weapons: Are they present? What types?
         2. (U) Size of the opposing force.
         3. (U) If weapons are present, the manner in which they are displayed; that is, are they being aimed? Are the weapons part of a firing position?
         4. (U) How did the opposing force respond to the US forces?
         5. (U) How does the force act toward unarmed civilians?
         6. (U) Other aggressive actions.
      3. (U) You may detain persons threatening or using force which would cause death, serious bodily harm, or interference with mission accomplishment. You may detain persons who commit criminal acts in areas under US control. Detainees should be given to military police as soon as possible for evacuation to central collection points (see paragraph d below).
3. **(U) Rules of Engagement.** The relief property, foodstuffs, medical supplies, building materials, and other end items belong to the relief agencies distributing the supplies until they are actually distributed to the populace. Your mission includes safe transit of these materials to the populace. 

   1. **(U) Deadly force may be used only when**—

      (a) **(U) Fired upon.**

      (b) **(U) Clear evidence of hostile intent exists (see above for factors to consider to determine hostile intent).**

      (c) **(U) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life, sensitive equipment and aircraft, and open and free passage of relief supplies.**

   2. **(U) In situations where deadly force is not appropriate, use the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission.**

   3. **(U) Patrols are authorized to provide relief supplies, US forces, and other persons in those areas under the control of US forces. Patrols may use deadly force if fired upon or if they encounter opposing forces which evidence a hostile intent. Nondeadly force or a show of force should be used if the security of US forces is not compromised by doing so. A graduated show of force includes**—

      (a) **(U) An order to disband or disperse.**

      (b) **(U) Show of force/threat of force by US forces that is greater than the force threatened by the opposing force.**

      (c) **(U) Warning shots aimed to prevent harm to either innocent civilians or the opposing force.**

      (d) **(U) Other means of nondeadly force.**

      If this show of force does not cause the opposing force to abandon its hostile intent, consider if deadly force is appropriate.

   4. **(U) Use of barbed wire fences is authorized.**

   5. **(U) Unattended means of force (for example, mines, booby traps, trip guns) are not authorized.**

   6. **(U) If US forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces will use the minimum amount of force reasonably necessary to overcome the threat. A graduated response to unarmed hostile elements may be used. Such a response can include**—

      (a) **(U) Verbal warnings to demonstrators in their native language.**

      (b) **(U) Shows of force, including the use of riot control formations (see Annex A for information on using RCAs).**

      (c) **(U) Warning shots fired over the heads of the hostile elements.**

      (d) **(U) Other reasonable uses of force, to include deadly force when the element demonstrates a hostile intent, which are necessary and proportional to the threat.**

   7. **(U) All weapons systems may be employed throughout the area of operations unless otherwise prohibited. The use of weapons systems must be appropriate and proportional, considering the threat.**

   8. **(U) US forces will not endanger or exploit the property of the local population without their explicit approval. Use of civilian property usually be compensated by contract or other**
form of payment. Property that has been used for the purpose of hindering our mission will be confiscated. Weapons may be confiscated and demilitarized if they are used to interfere with the mission of US forces (see rule 10 below).

9. (U) Operations will not be conducted outside of the landmass, airspace, and territorial seas of Somalia. However, any USCENTCOM force conducting a search and rescue mission shall use force as necessary and intrude into the landmass, airspace, or territorial sea of any county necessary to recover friendly forces.

10. (U) Crew-served weapons are considered a threat to US forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons in their area of operations.

   (a) (U) If an armed individual or weapons crew demonstrates hostile intentions, they may be engaged with deadly force.

   (b) (U) If an armed individual or weapons crew commits criminal acts but does not demonstrate hostile intentions, US forces will use the minimum amount of necessary force to detain them.

   (c) (U) Crew-served weapons are any weapon system that requires more than one individual to operate. Crew-served weapons include, but are not limited to tanks, artillery pieces, antiaircraft guns, mortars, and machine guns.

11. (U) Within those areas under the control of US forces, armed individuals may be considered a threat to US forces and the relief effort, whether or not the individuals demonstrate hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarm and demilitarize groups or individuals in those areas under the control of US forces. Absent a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will be released after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.

4. (U) Use of riot control agents (RCAs). Use of RCAs requires the approval of CJTF. When authorized, RCAs may be used for purposes including, but not limited to--

   (1) (U) Riot control in the division area of operations, including the dispersal of civilians who obstruct roadways or otherwise impede distribution operations after lesser means have failed to result in dispersal.

   (2) (U) Riot control in detainee holding areas or camps in and around material distribution or storage areas.

   (3) (U) Protection of convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, or paramilitary groups.

5. (U) Detention of Personnel. Personnel who interfere with the accomplishment of the mission or who use or threaten deadly force against US forces, US or relief material distribution sites, or convoys may be detained. Persons who commit criminal acts in areas under the control of US forces may likewise be detained.

   (1) (U) Detained personnel will be treated with respect and dignity.

   (2) (U) Detained personnel will be evacuated to a designated location for turnover to military police.

   (3) (U) Troops should understand that any use of the feet in detaining, handling or searching Somali civilians is one of the most insulting forms of provocation.

4. (U) Service Support. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.
5. (U) Command and Signal. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit.

1. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.

2. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act.

3. When US forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.

4. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission.

5. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense.

Remember

- The United States is not at war.
- Treat all persons with dignity and respect.
- Use minimum force to carry out the mission.
- Always be prepared to act in self-defense.

Rules of Engagement for
Operation Provide Comfort (1)
(As Authorized by JCS [EUCOM Dir 55-47])

1. All military operations will be conducted in accordance with the laws of war.

2. The use of armed force will be utilized as a measure of last resort only.
3. Nothing in these rules negates or otherwise overrides a commander’s obligation to take all necessary and appropriate actions for his unit’s self-defense.

4. US forces will not fire unless fired upon unless there is clear evidence of hostile intent.

Hostile Intent - The threat of imminent use of force by an Iraqi force or other foreign force, terrorist group, or individuals against the United States, US forces, US citizens, or Kurdish or other refugees located above the 38th parallel or otherwise located within a US or allied safe haven refugee area. When the on-scene commander determines, based on convincing evidence, that hostile intent is present, the right exists to use proportional force to deter or neutralize the threat.

Hostile Act - Includes armed force directly to preclude or impede the missions and/or duties of US or allied forces.

5. Response to hostile fire directly threatening US or allied care shall be rapid and directed at the source of hostile fire using only the force necessary to eliminate the threat. Other foreign forces as (such as reconnaissance aircraft) that have shown an active integration with the attacking force may be engaged. Use the minimum amount of force necessary to control the situation.

6. You may fire into Iraqi territory in response to hostile fire.

7. You may fire into another nation’s territory in response to hostile fire only if the cognizant government is unable or unwilling to stop that force’s hostile acts effectively or promptly.

8. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel.

9. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft south of the 36th parallel only when they demonstrate hostile intent or commit hostile acts. Except in cases of self-defense, authorization for such engagements rests with the designated air defense commander. Warning bursts may be fired ahead of foreign aircraft to deter hostile acts.

10. In the event US forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, or rioters, the responsibility for the protection of US forces rests with the US commanding officer. The on-scene commander will employ the following measures to overcome the threat:

1. Warning to demonstrators.
2. Show of force, including the use of riot control formations.
3. Warning shots fired over the heads of hostile elements.
4. Other reasonable use of force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.

11. Use the following guidelines when applying these rules:

1. Use of force only to protect lives.
2. Use of minimum force necessary.
3. Pursuit will not be taken to retaliate; however, immediate pursuit may begin and continue for as long as there is an immediate threat to US forces. In the absence of JCS approval, US forces should not pursue any hostile force into another nation’s territory.
4. If necessary and proportional, use all available weapons to deter, neutralize, or destroy the threat as required.

1. These rules of engagement were extracted from the Rules of Engagement Card carried by all coalition soldiers.
Appendix C: UNITAF Organization
Canadian, National Defence, In the Line of Duty
UNITAF Organization – as of 1 March 1993

HQ UNITAF

NAVAL FORCES
HMCS PRESERVER
HMAS TOBRUK
INS SUKANYA
ITS GRECALE
ITS SA GIORGIO
ITS VESUVIO

MARINE FORCES

ARMY FORCES

AIR FORCES

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
UK-C130 DET
GERMANY-C160 DET
NEW ZEALAND-ANDOVER DET

CANADA-CDN AB REGT BG
FRANCE-BDE (-)
ITALY-BDE
SWEDEN-FD HOSP
TUNISIA-INF COY
AUSTRALIA-MECH INF BN
BELGIUM-AB BN
MORROCO-INF BN (+)

BOTSWANA-INF COY (+)
EGYPT-MECH INF BN
KUWAIT-INF COY
NIGERIA-INF BN
SAUDI ARADIA-INF BN
TURKEY-INF COY (+)
UAE-MECH INF BN
ZIMBABWE-INF COY