MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AN ANALYSIS OF NEPALESE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (1996-2006)

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APF: Armed Police Force
CCOMPOSA: Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia
COIN: Counter Insurgency
CPN: Communist Party of Nepal
CPN (M): Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPN (UML): Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist)
DIME: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic instruments
IDAD: Internal Defense and Development
ISDP: Internal Security and Development Program
NA: Nepalese Army (formerly known as Royal Nepalese Army-RNA)
NC: Nepali Congress Party
NID: National Investigation Department
NGO: Non Governmental Organization
NP: Nepal Police
RIM: Revolutionary Internationalist Movement
RPP: Rastriya Prajatantra Party (National Democratic Party)
SF: Security Forces
SPA: Seven Political Parties Alliance
UPF: United People’s Front
Executive Summary

Title: AN ANALYSIS OF NEPALESE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTER NSURGENCY OPERATIONS (1996-2006).

Author: Major Purna B Khatri, Nepalese Army

Thesis: Due to frequently changing unstable government’s inappropriate response, Maoists insurgency developed and lasted for more than a decade, despite of an unfavorable international environment.

Discussion: Post 1990 parliamentary practice not only led into inefficiency and instability, but also developed myopic rivalry among various constitutional political forces, which they never reached into a workable agreement. Nepal experimented formation and collapse of 15 different governments from 1990 to 2005 including collapse of parliamentary system in 2002. Contrary to international, the internal situation became insurgent friendly. Various governments responded to the insurgency ranging from law and order measures to full-fledged military/security COIN operations, but government lacked developing an integrated approach by coordinating all instruments of national power. Security forces operations were able to contain and keeping pressure over insurgents, but fell short of achieving political end state due to lack of viable socio-economic and political strategy. Newly established democratic government’s institutional, doctrinal, and leadership weaknesses were badly exposed, while dealing a radical insurgency.

Conclusion: Nevertheless, security forces operations were able to prevent Maoists from achieving their revolutionary objective, but overall government response was inconsistent and inappropriate.
Map of Nepal
INTRODUCTION

The Nepalese people had a positive, but to a large extent unrealistic, expectation with the new political establishment of 1990, which had restored a democratic system of government in the country. The new government’s performance was not matching people’s expectations. Mid-term parliamentary elections of November, 1994 resulted in a hung parliament that further led to a power-centric rivalry of various political parties while they preoccupied with their own political survival. Maoists, a radical fraction of Nepalese communists, whose ultimate goal was to establish a communist republic through armed struggle, found the prevailing environment most appropriate for triggering a long wanted armed struggle (see Annex-A for chronological events). The Maoists started an armed insurgency amidst political instability with their rudimentary tools from the western remote hills, yet slowly they expanded and emerged as a threat to Nepal’s transitional democracy. The Nepalese government, in its various capacities, fought the Maoist insurgency. Nevertheless, the government was able to contain a growing insurgency, but had not been able to achieve the desired political end state within the existing constitutional framework.

The Maoist insurgency endured in Nepal for more than a decade and posed a formidable threat to national security because the unstable Nepalese government’s response was inappropriate. The government failed to anticipate and diagnose the problem properly in the first place and a frequently changing government could not effectively employ the instruments of national power by devising a coherent and coordinated national strategy. Ultimately, the government relied on security/military measures without formulating a viable and broader political and socio-economic strategy. The government’s response to the Maoist challenge in general was reactive, inconsistent, and far from effective. The extreme friction and division
within the ruling circles prevented the state from articulating a clear, consistent, and convincing response during the most critical phase of democratic transition in Nepalese history.⁴

The conflict resolution and long-term stability in Nepal is still uncertain, yet the conflict settlement process has started after more than a decade long conflict. Had there been a better understanding of the insurgency from the beginning, conflict would have been less costly. The government and parliament (until its dissolve in June 2002) both remained divided and undecided on fundamental issues of counter insurgency policy and measures from the beginning. Of course, the Maoist insurgency had its own dynamics, but it was an ideological and political offensive waged in the form of a violent armed insurgency against the existing political system.⁵

Research Questions

The primary question: Were the Nepalese government’s counter insurgency measures applied against the Maoist insurgency effective, and if not, why not? The secondary question: Was the Nepalese government using the correct combination of the instruments of national power as a means to defeat the insurgency, and if not, why not?

Background of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

The start of armed insurgency was not only the result of an opportunistic response to the emerging political instability after 1990 but also the product of a rational and deliberate calculation. Radical elements of the leftist movement in Nepal have always believed in armed insurgency. A generation of radical cadres thought for violent measures to seize state power but their aspirations were never fulfilled. Despite an unfavorable international environment, the Maoists discerned the weaknesses of domestic system and saw a moment of opportunity to wage armed insurgency.⁶
The root of the communist movement in Nepal goes back to the birth of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1949. The CPN had secured four seats out of 104 in the first ever parliamentary election conducted in 1959. The CPN was split on the question of supporting a royal takeover in December 1960. This party was further split along Sino-Soviet lines. Towards the latter half of the 1960s and 1970s, the communist movement in Nepal had also developed its radical factions which were influenced by the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Naxalites movement of India. Following in the footsteps of Naxalites, CPN (Marxist-Leninist) carried out killings of local land owners in eastern Jhapa district of Nepal during the early 1970s, also known as Jhapa Uprising. This uprising was immediately suppressed by the then Panchyat government, a party-less government system under direct rule of the monarch.

The Nepalese communists were generally divided into two groups until the end of the Panchayat system. One group was ready to follow democratic system and another believed in seizure of power through armed insurgency. CPN (Maoist), who started the armed insurgency in February 1996, was in favor of armed insurgency. The Nepali Congress (NC), a liberal Democratic Party and United front of liberal and radical communist parties, led the movement of 1990 for democratic restoration and won parliamentary elections afterwards. The radical communist faction participated in the first election of 1991, but soon resorted to armed insurgency against the parliamentary government. Maoists, through their open political front, forwarded a 40 point demand to the government in February 1996, as an ultimatum otherwise to begin an armed insurgency; however, the Maoists started the armed insurgency even before reaching the deadline (see Annex-D for list of demands).
Government of Nepal

Nepal emerged as a unified nation in 1768-1775 after the unification campaign of late King Prithivi Narayan Shah, the founder of modern Nepal. The Monarchy has remained as the socio-political institution of Nepal for nearly two and half centuries. Active executive power of the monarch was reduced only after the 1990s political change. Nepal has experienced 15 different governments from 1990 to April 2006. Political instability made democratic transition difficult and prevented the government from acting appropriately against the insurgency. The people’s movement of 1990 ended in an agreement between the monarch and the major political parties so the new constitution came as a document of agreement. The major opposition party (CPN-UML) gave conditional consent for a new constitution whereas radical leftists condemned the agreement by saying the constitution was incomplete and clung to their ultimate goal.

Some of the constitutional agreements reached in the 1990 constitution were troublingly vague and poorly defined, such as control of the armed forces and role of the monarch in a crisis situation. Longer democratic practice would have resolved the differences between the monarch and the parliament under smooth political transition, but emerging insurgency and inter/intra party wrangling denied that opportunity. Ultimately, constitutional practice developed two political power centers in Nepal- the Palace and the parliamentary government. Mutual mistrust, contradictory interests, and constitutional ambiguity were some of the detrimental factors for both the transition and efforts to counter the emerging insurgency. The parliamentary government faced serious challenges from the Maoists and from within the parliament which largely helped to overlook the burning socio-economic and security issues. Institutional friction overshadowed the broader issues of national security and exposed the underlying institutional weaknesses of the newly established parliamentary system.
Unfortunately, the parliamentary government collapsed in October 2002 against internal dispute while facing a growing insurgency. Dissolution of parliament and local bodies in June 2003 by the Prime Minister and eventually his removal resulted in a power vacuum from the village to parliament. Government's failure to conduct timely elections created a constitutional crisis. Subsequent governments formed under royal ordinance; however, under controversial interpretation of article 127 of the constitution of 1990, which gives the King power to act in time of necessity, became politically controversial. Controversial interpretation of article 127 of the constitution resulted in a sharp constitutional debate, which raised undesirable questions in counter insurgency. The government's constitutional legitimacy was also questioned. This constitutional dispute became a tool for the Maoists to undermine the constitutional legitimacy of the government. Before sorting out differences between palace and political parties, Maoists emerged as a third force and started playing one against another. Nepalese conflict turned into a triangular rivalry among the palace, political parties, and the Maoists.

Limitations

This paper will analyze the effectiveness of government's counter insurgency measures from 1996 to April, 2006, and the employment of the instruments of national power against the Maoist insurgency. This paper will not discuss causes of the insurgency and developments that have taken place in Nepal after April 2006.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This paper uses an analytical single case study approach. Bard E. O'Neill's framework analysis has been modified and applied to analyze insurgent and government response. In any case, the intent of this paper is neither to criticize nor to defend Nepalese government/security forces performance during counter insurgency, but rather to analyze the measures taken to deal insurgency at the operational and strategic level. COIN measures are divided into four broad categories: initial security operations, security/military operations with developmental programs, peace negotiation, and security/military operations without developmental programs. The writer's personal experience at operational and tactical level, observation, and interaction throughout the period at various levels are the primary source of information for this paper. Various reports--official and unofficial--library books, and newspapers, are the secondary sources used in this paper.

Bard E. O'Neil's modified model of framework analysis is divided into the following seven steps (see figure 2 below). Step one to six provided an analysis of Maoists insurgency in Nepal. Step seven covered the Nepalese government's response to the insurgency.

One: Types of insurgency in Nepal.
Two: Assessing insurgent's strategic approach.
Three: Assessing the environment under which Maoists were operating.
Four: Assessing the popular support of the Nepalese people.
Five: Assessing the organization and unity of the Nepalese Maoist insurgents.
Six: Assessing foreign and external support.
Seven: The Nepalese government's response.
O’Neill’s Framework as applied to analyze the Nepalese Conflict

Step One: Define Type of Insurgency
1. Anarchist
2. Egalitarian
3. Traditionalist
4. Pluralist
5. Secessionist
6. Reformist
7. Preservationist

Forms of Warfare used by Maoist
1. Terrorism
2. Guerrilla
3. Conventional

Step Two: Define Strategic Approach
1. Conspiratorial
2. Protracted People’s War
3. Military Focused
4. Urban Warfare

Step Three: Define Nepalese Environment
- Physical Environment
  1. Terrain
  2. Climate
- Human Environment
  1. Ethnic/social
  2. Political
  3. Economic

Step Four: Define Popular Support in Nepal
- Passive and Active
- Intellectuals and Masses
- Techniques for gaining popular support

Step Five: Define Organization and Unity of Nepalese Maoist Insurgents
1. Complexity
2. Scope
3. Cohesion

Step Six: Define External Support
- Types of support (Moral, Political, Material, and Sanctuary)
- Military Focused
- Urban Warfare

Step Seven: Analyze Government’s Response
Instruments
1. Political/Diplomatic
2. Military
3. Economic
4. Informational
Response
1. Initial Security Measures
2. Security/Military Measures with Developmental Programs
3. Security/Military Measures without Developmental Program
4. Peace Negotiation

Figure 2: Bard E. O’Neill’s Modified Model

ANALYSIS OF THE INSURGENCY

Step One: Definition of the types of insurgency in Nepal

The types of insurgents that O’Neill outlines are: anarchists, egalitarian, traditionalists, pluralists, secessionists, preservationist, and reformists. An assessment has done whether or not Nepalese government defined insurgency correctly. There are possible barriers that make identification of type of insurgency and their method of warfare unclear. As per O’Neill, these barriers are goal transformation, goal conflict, misleading rhetoric, and goal ambiguity.

Nepalese Maoists: An Egalitarian Insurgent Organization

The primary difference between the Maoists and the government was the existing political and socio-economic system. Maoist rhetoric viewed the existing political system, as semi-feudal and also serving “foreign expansionist and imperialist” policies. They viewed that the government did not address the needs of poor people. Therefore, the Maoists remedy was to radically transform the political system and to establish an equality based society. In this sense, Maoists were egalitarian, with an objective to establish a “proletariat dictatorship” and to develop equality based society through equal distribution of production and distribution means.

It was wishful thinking to think that egalitarian Marxists were evaporating after the collapse of former Soviet Union, but it was also dangerous to assume that an insurgency would not occur, particularly in the third world where political instability, bad governance, socio-economic disparities, and poverty were rampant. The post 1990 Nepalese government simply over looked the possibilities of an armed insurgency in Nepal. Maoist radical demands were not amenable in nature, so they offered strong resistance from authorities. In order for Maoists to succeed, they had to mobilize greater popular support and prepare for a sustained commitment.
The Maoists' misleading rhetoric and conflicting demands helped to mislead the government. The government's poor leadership and lack of expertise and experience in COIN were also weaknesses. The initial forty point demands were reformist in nature, whereas declaration of a protracted people's war, which led to the establishment of a communist regime, clearly defined the egalitarian nature of insurgency.

Types of Warfare

Understanding the forms of warfare of insurgents is essential because of the requirements and problems it caused for the government and security forces. Maoists used both political resources and instruments of violence against the government. The nature of the Maoist organization was mobilizational in marshalling and utilizing resources. The Maoist insurgency was political in nature, but at the same time, the use of violence was as important as politics; so it was not a matter of choice.

The violent aspect of the Maoist insurgency was manifested in a combination of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Maoists used deliberate terrorism for short, mid-term, and long-term purposes. Some obvious examples of terrorism against innocent victims and targets were the hanging of school teacher in front of students, torturing family members of security forces, assassination of local opposition leaders, and killing captives. Due to lack of success in guerrilla warfare and political actions, terrorism had become a cheap alternative for insurgents. Terrorism and coercion were the dominant tools used to gain and maintain limited public support in government semi-controlled areas.

Step Two: Assessing Insurgent's Strategic Approach

The Maoists strategic approach is analyzed to determine if it had any chance of success against the Nepalese government. Before assessing the strengths and the weaknesses of Maoists,
it is important to look at the strategy they formulated. How does insurgent leadership visualize attainment of goals through means, using appropriate strategy? How does the defined strategy integrate and orchestrate available means such as political, military, economic, and informational instruments of power? According to O’Neill, the four major popular approaches of strategy applied by major insurgent groups around the world are protracted people’s war, conspiratorial, military focus, and urban warfare.\textsuperscript{18} He says environment, which consists of the physical and human dimension, and government response play a vital role in choosing an insurgent’s strategy.

The Nepalese Maoists divided the protracted people’s war into three phases as per Mao’s playbook: strategic defense, strategic stalemate/equilibrium, and strategic counter offensive.\textsuperscript{19} By nature, the protracted people’s war strategy stresses political primacy, mass organization, and gradual escalation of violence. The Maoists thoughtfully escalated violence, which helped them to develop military strength at the beginning, without confronting the government’s main force. Their emphasis on fast development of military strength in the first stage of insurgency might have invited questions of survival. However, lack of air and surface transportation in hill and mountain regions provided the insurgents enough time and space to protect themselves against security forces. The insurgents optimally exploited open border with southern neighbor took refuge in India.

The Maoists protracted people’s war strategy was flexible in execution, but firm in the strategic goals. The political strategy was fully integrated with military strategy and then often used a combination of multiple strategies. The purpose of Maoists’ military strategy was to serve a political strategy for attainment of political goals. Maoists were very cautious about escalation of violence and developing the mass organization simultaneously. Thomas A. Marks, in his framework of analysis, has divided the Nepalese Maoist people’s war into five key elements--
mass line, united front, military, political warfare, and international solidarity as a five-pronged approach.  

Step Three: Human and Physical Environment of the Nepalese Maoists

Nepal’s physical and human environment is diverse in regards to caste and ethnicity, politics, economy, terrain, international borders, weather, infrastructure, and regional dimensions. All of these factors are unique, and some, such as caste and ethnicity, open borders, infrastructure, politics, and economy were key factors that directly attributed to the conflict. Other factors, such as terrain, weather, and regional issues, were secondary, but also assisted in keeping conflict ongoing.

Physical Environment

The complex strategic location of Nepal and its physical environment were significant factors for both the insurgents and the government. Nepal is divided into three geographical regions spreading east to west: the southern plain called Terai, a middle hilly region called Pahad, and the northern mountain region called Himalayas. Mountain and hill ranges go east-west but are bisected in several places by north-south rivers. The southern plain and capital area has a good road network, but otherwise the hill region has very few roads, and the mountain region has almost none. These regions have scattered settlements and are covered by forest. The timber line in mountain region remains between 11,000 to 13,000 feet. Underdeveloped areas are suitable for small size irregular forces but difficult for large regular forces. Nepal has four main seasons: spring (March-May), summer (June-August), autumn (September-November), and winter (December-February). Summer and winter affects military operations, whereas spring and autumn are pleasant. Summer receives heavy monsoon rain. Monsoon season is difficult for
military operations because it affects ground and air transportation. The rebels recuperate during the monsoon season.

Nepal’s radio, telephone, and television transmission is based on a terrestrial repeater transmission system. The majority of hill and mountain regions do not have a national electricity supply grid. Since the beginning of the insurgency, the Maoists systematically destroyed terrestrial transmission towers and hydro-electric projects, so a large part of these regions had been denied national TV, radio, and telecommunications.

**Human Environment**

Nepalese human dimensions are complex and might be one of the primary causes of conflict. The complexity of the human dimension and underlying grievances were overlooked for a long time. To understand the human dimension in Nepal, a brief analysis is conducted on caste and ethnicity, regional, economic, and political composition.

Nepal has 27.3 million people (2006 est.) competing for a livelihood in a country equal to the size of North Carolina in the U.S. Only 17% of the land is cultivable and rest is either hilly or mountainous. Almost 80% of the total population is rural. As per World Bank data, more than 21% of Nepalese people live below the line of poverty. Considering only economic matters, Nepal would be a candidate for serious dislocation. Exacerbating the situation further are social parameters: issues of caste, ethnicity, and regional imbalance. There are 60 ethnic and caste groups; only slightly more than half the population (56.4%) is actually embraced by the caste system. The hierarchical caste system has divided people horizontally, whereas ethnicity has divided vertically. More than one-third (35.5%) is classified as ethnic and indigenous groups. Although the caste based discrimination was abolished by the government during mid 1960s, it was remaining largely in the rural areas. The ethnic minority, untouchables (lower strata of caste
hierarchy), and Madhesi (people living in Terai-part of southern plain) had perceived structural discrimination. These people were vulnerable targets of the insurgents.

Economic indicators of Nepal were gloomier than social parameters. Nepal is one of the few land locked nations in the world. It is surrounded by India on three sides and China in the north. External trade is severely restricted by landlockedness and this country had been struggling for easy access to the sea for a long time. Nepal’s economy is primarily agrarian. Tourism, cottage industries, and the garment industry flourished for three decades, but became a victim of the conflict. 90% of Nepal’s trade is with India; however, Nepal exported very few goods to India due to Indian protectionist economic policy. There is always a huge trade deficit in favor of India.

Monarchy, liberal democratic parties, and liberal communists were major internal political forces in Nepal. A radical communist fraction was slowly emerging after 1990. India as an external actor is more deeply involved in Nepalese internal affairs than any other nation. The U.S., U.K., China, and EU are other major external stakeholders. The U.S. government particularly remained a staunch supporter of COIN in Nepal for a long time. The “transitional democracy” of 1990, was immediately confronted with institutional weaknesses, corruption, ideological degradation, internal division, and lack of functional inefficiency. Media and political awareness helped to expose rural youths with the outer world against their medieval subsistence agriculture economy. The rural youths were not necessarily supporting insurgency, but were looking to facilitate positive changes in Nepal.
Step Four: Assessing the Popular Support for the Insurgents

Popular support for the insurgency in Nepal will be discussed in terms of active and passive support, the role of Nepalese intellectual elite, and techniques for gaining and maintaining support.

At the initial stage, insurgents had a small group of active supporters consisting of cadres belonging to the United People's Front (UPF), which was an open political front of radical communists operating in open politics. Insurgents' techniques were directed to make people neutral in order to neutralize government's support. As insurgency and counter insurgency progressed, insurgents forcefully intimidated the rural population to support them by threatening serious punishment. Insurgents increased their passive supporters during ceasefire periods through expansion of an overt and covert front organization. Maoist affiliated student and trade unions remained openly active in organizing anti-government protests and organizational expansion. The government's inconsistent counter insurgency policies helped Maoists to expand and to retain limited popular support; however, a large portion of the Nepalese people neither supported the Maoists nor actively backed frequently changing governments. The frequent collapse of governments exposed structural weaknesses and incompetent leadership of the government to the people.

The Maoists used the violence and coercion to gain and retain support in government semi-control areas. However, coercion did not develop volunteer support but instead terrorized people who were not able to support the government either. The local people used to remain neutral when the government approached, but supported rebels to avoid harsh punishment in the absence of government.
The Nepalese intellectual circle was divided into leftist and liberal democratic camps. These intellectuals were the product of long anti-government movements in the past. The liberal intellectuals were often critical of the government policy. Therefore, the combined opposition of these intellectuals and left dominated media was a huge obstacle for the government in counter insurgency operations. The Maoists used various techniques of terrorism, appeals, provocation, intimidation, and coercion to exercise control over population in rural areas. The substantial numbers of liberal communist party supporters in rural Nepal were vulnerable from radical communist propaganda.

Step Five: Organization and Unity of Maoist

The main problem with estimating scope, complexity, and cohesion of Maoists or any insurgency is its clandestine nature. Maoist, being an under ground organization, never publish data regularly. The Maoist organization, leadership, fighting strength, weapons, casualties, and internal relationships remained unclear for a long time. Public eyes were on the free press but the press itself was not independent and fair due to Maoist intimidation and division along partisan politics. Government estimation of Maoist strength was always less and Maoist projection was always high.

Complexity of insurgency refers to the relationship between the military wing and the political wing and their conflicting goals. There were very few facts coming out. A major division between leadership surfaced in 2005 (between the party president and his deputy) but soon was reconciled. Political and military wings were both headed by a single individual at the center. Responsibility also interchanged and both wings were well integrated. There had been divisions but they rarely became public. The government missed opportunities to exploit
weaknesses of insurgents due to the lack of intelligence about the internal dynamics of insurgent organization.

**Step Six: External Support to Maoist**

External support can be classified into the following areas: political, moral, material, and sanctuary. Insurgency started in Nepal after the 1990s changes in Eastern Europe and fall of the former Soviet Union, so super powers' or regional rivalries were not significant in developing foreign support for the Maoists. However, the global umbrella organization of radical communist (RIM), radical organizations operating in South Asia and in other countries, and leftist sympathizers around the world were a source of external support for Maoists. Maoist radical fractions operating in India were a source of material, moral, political, and training support. The long sanctuary enjoyed by Maoist leadership on Indian soil, whether provided by non-state actors or the state is debatable. There was not a single country that openly provided support to the Maoists. Some Europe based organizations (mainly related to leftist parties in the European parliaments) were providing political and technological support (lobbying European governments to stop supporting the Nepalese government, hosting Maoist web sites, and providing satellite communication etc). These organizations played equal roles to defame the Nepalese government's action by claiming it undemocratic and against the standard of human rights. They lobbied various European governments to deny support to the Nepalese government. This lobby became successful after the royal take over of February 2005. The Nepalese government's diplomatic instrument failed to secure support from Indian and other governments in counter insurgency operations after February 2005. India suspended all support to Nepalese government and pursued a unilateral policy in order to consolidate its position in changing
power dynamics inside Nepal, but ultimate beneficiary of Indian policy has become the Maoists not the democratic parties.

Step Seven: Analysis of Nepalese Government's Response

Various governments have endeavored to respond to insurgency with a range of policy instruments during their respective tenure. Weak administrative infrastructure, frequent changes in government, hung parliaments, lack of determined leadership, diverse interest and different views of major political forces towards insurgency contributed to reactive, inconsistent, and sometimes counterproductive response. Maoists completed preparation of the armed insurgency by keeping the government unaware, in order to avoid government repression. As an initial response, the government preferred to use police forces without anticipating the long term consequences. Police operations engaged the Maoists, but never controlled the local population. These repressive and heavy handed law and order measures further alienated the local populace, which ultimately benefited the insurgents for organizational expansion. Only with the November 2001 offensive by the Maoists, did the government become more serious. After initial setbacks, the government decided to take a pacification approach to address grievances at the local level. It was conceived as the Internal Security and Development Program (ISDP). Increased Maoist violence prevented the government from running such types of programs together with combat operations in the insurgency infested areas. The government was forced to back out most of its development related pacification work.

Nepalese government counter insurgency measures from 1996 to 2006 are broadly divided into the following four categories:

(a) Initial Police/administrative measures
(b) Security/military measures with developmental programs
(c) Security/military measures without developmental program

(d) Peace Talks

Initial Police/Administrative Response

Maoists used violence against major political parties to eradicate and displace local political opposition from the mid-western region well before they declared an armed insurgency. The government mobilized police and took legal actions against those who were involved in violence. After the initial police action, Maoists went underground but the government did not give much attention. The government’s assessment was that Maoists could be dealt with by law enforcement agencies at any time. The important point is that there was a lack of overall understanding and assessment of a protracted nature of the insurgency. Neither government nor parliament took this issue seriously. When the Maoists activities increased in rural areas and local government bodies were slowly displaced, the government again decided to launch another large scale police operation in mid-western region in 1998. Up to this point, the Maoist organization had been expanded since 1996. These police operations were conducted through an ad hoc concentration of police units from various parts of the country. They were not trained for counter insurgency (Nepal Police was largely an unarmed organization up to this time). Police conducted heavy handed search and arrest operations, killed and captured some insurgents, but alienated the large part of public through harsh and repressive measures, also resulting in some civilian deaths. Insurgents took police operations as a starting point for their struggle against the government.

Before and during police operations, there was debate about whether or not to use the Army along with other security agencies under a broader framework of counterinsurgency operation. Then the government decided not to use the Army because the differences between
the Palace and political parties helped to develop mistrust between the government and army. Governments changed in Kathmandu at least every year and their views were divided about the Maoists. The Maoists were expanding like prairie fires in rural areas, whereas the government presence was slowly shrinking to the district headquarters and urban areas. Therefore, the initial response of the government was misguided by inexperience and short sighted by self interest, rivalry, and a false assumption of threat, which ultimately benefitted the insurgents. The Police force was badly defeated in the countryside and was slowly vacating large parts country side. The Government was not ready for the next step, whereas Maoists were enjoying gains against the police forces in rural areas.

Security/Military Measures with Developmental Programs

Until 1999, it had been clear that the law and order approach to deal Maoists had failed. Maoist influence was increasing day by day. The government had to vacate most of the police posts from the countryside, which gave the Maoists a free run. This period remained politically unstable in Nepal. Six different governments formed and collapsed between 1994 and 1999. The hung parliament failed to provide a stable government. Police operations at least engaged Maoists for a short period and gave enough preparation and reaction time for the government, but that was not utilized due to instability. There were contrasting views among various political parties from the far right to the far left in parliament about dealing with the Maoist insurgency. There were mutually exclusive ideas about employing multiple instruments of national power.

Finally, the government came up with an idea of executing the Internal Security and Development Program (ISDP). The ISDP was largely an army initiated program, which is why it was not well accepted in partisan politics. The concept of ISDP was generally misunderstood and did not reach various governmental agencies. The centerpiece of the government security
strategy had been a program to introduce security and development simultaneously through the ISDP, which differs from peacetime military involvement in development in the sense that it is combined with a counterinsurgency campaign. This integrated approach was also viewed as a mechanism to undercut socio-economic grievances that insurgents utilize to recruit and increase their support base. However, at the beginning, the Army was involved only in developmental works, not in combat operations. ISDP seeks to facilitate a relatively broad based community and economic development programs to restore popular confidence in the government’s ability to deliver basic services. The ISDP was formally unveiled in August 2001 with a pre-trial run in some western district including as a pilot project in Gorkha district. The conceptual framework of ISDP is in annex-B.

After the following break out of 2001 ceasefire, the ISDP initially launched in mid-western districts, namely Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Jajarkot, Kalikot, and Pyuthan could not be continued. The ISDP program was never introduced in other potentially identified districts due to the security forces’ commitment to combat operations. However, despite being an effective program to win the hearts and minds of local population, the government faced troop shortages to continue the ISDP. The government imposed a state of emergency and enacted a special security act to clamp down on violence. Maoists diversified their attacks, so the Army had to conduct combat operations rather than involve itself in ISDP. Other agencies were not able to operate these programs because of the Maoist threat to civilian workers and contractors. ISDP in the Gorkha district and a few other national level Army run projects were continued, but the rest of the programs at the local level came to a halt.

An ISDP type program is better suited at the beginning of an insurgency or after the situation has been stabilized and the level of violence becomes low. Insurgency in Nepal had
already matured and the situation was not stabilized; rather, it was gradually escalating. There was a difficulty in conducting development activities with a shortage of troops in Maoist infested districts because insurgents were determined to destroy everything that the government built. In practical terms, it was impossible to safeguard each and every inch of developmental work along with the individuals involved in it. No local security forces existed for that purpose and the terrorized public was unable to safeguard infrastructures that were built for them. For this purpose, the government would require a high security presence and combat mobility, which government had neither. The average area of operation for an infantry battalion was approximately 2000 square miles without adequate surface and air transportation means and infrastructure. In various cases, contractors and NGOs associated any program with ISDP became as a source of income for insurgents through extortion.

There were several factors that created difficulties for ISDP. First, the Maoist strategy to make ISDP a failed program is important to understand. When the government launched ISDP, Maoists declared a ceasefire and agreed for peace talks. Maoists demanded a recall of ISDP from districts where they used to claim their influence. The government did not recall ISDP, but halted operations and engaged in peace talks. Maoists broke a three month long ceasefire in November 2001 and declared that they had completed their first stage of the insurgency. Immediately, Maoists attacked wide ranges of military and civilian targets nationwide and obstructed major lines of communication. The government was compelled to divert the Army from ISDP to urban areas, lines of communication, and vital installations. The police force was not able to do these tasks without Army backing. So, finally the government had to mobilize the Army in counterinsurgency combat operations.
Another factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of ISDP, was government’s hearts and minds approach through a development program that did not have any sort of obligatory public participation. The ISDP associated development projects were completely conducted by government resources. The local public was only the end user. The public never felt obliged to protect these projects at the risk of rebel action. When security forces left from rural areas, insurgents applied extreme coercion and intimidation techniques, so people were forced to do what they were told by the insurgents. The government failed to establish control over the local population and to provide regular security, which became default benefit for insurgents.

From the inter agency perspective, there was nothing present other than the government’s military/security instrument. The local administration was limited to district headquarters and was not able to function in rural areas due to violence. The post 1990 judicial system of Nepal was based on the principle of “separation of power.” There was no judicial/legal infrastructure existing below the district headquarters level. The judicial branch was operating independently of the government’s executive and was showing indifference to counterinsurgency operations. There were very few cases that went to court, but judges when threatened often were reluctant to conduct a detailed trial. The government passed legislation and formed special courts for terrorist related cases, but was harshly criticized by national and international human rights organizations and became less effective. A dysfunctional legal/judicial system helped to increase allegations of extrajudicial captivity. High dependency over Army in pacification programs and counter insurgency combat operations, shortage of human and material resources, and lack of firm political will at the center, were some of the problems of COIN. Security forces were able to exercise control over limited population, whereas large part of rural areas were covered by security force mobile operations only. Security force limited forward operating bases were not
enough to provide security in largely vast underdeveloped rural areas, so the effectiveness of pacification program severely affected.

Military/Security Operations without Development Programs

The major portion of security forces were engaged in counterinsurgency operations without developmental packages from 2001 to 2006. Security forces operations were conducted under a framework of unified command that checked and kept Maoists on the run and stopped them from achieving their desired goal. The military instrument of power was often the primary and occasionally the sole instrument used by the government, but it had limitations on defeating insurgency. It was not an easy job for security forces to conduct counter insurgency operations under frequently collapsing governments, lack of resources, flip flopping political backing, and a lack of consistency in policy. Had Maoists violence not been checked by military/security means, Maoists would have achieved an easy victory. Security operations were effective against the Maoists but there was a lack of integrated socio-economic and political strategy. Political infighting in the government side never ended. The government's socio-economic agendas were largely aiming to maintain the status quo of the pre-insurgency period, whereas political agenda was always in sharp debate. These policies were not bold enough to address and undercut Maoist appeals. The differences between Palace and major political parties and dispute within and between political parties made every government weak in political battle against insurgents and portrayed wrong image of the government to the general publics.

Mobilization of the Army against the Maoist insurgency had unfortunately become the most disputed issue in Nepal. Confidence building measures were never practiced enough between the palace and political parties after 1990 when they agreed to share power. Historical mistrust between these two forces persisted after the 1990 agreement. It ultimately helped to
develop two political decision making centers. The provision of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, provision of military mobilization (article 118), Army Act 1959, and Act on rights and duty of Commander-in-Chief (1969) were some examples of source of dispute in power sharing. These constraints; however, should not be an excuse, but became constitutional/institutional constraints that created dispute and mistrust during the entire counterinsurgency operation, which was exploited by the Maoists. Lack of a clear cut functional chain of command had initiated a power sharing debate between the palace and parliamentary government.

Up to 2001, police were demoralized and exhausted and intelligence was not effective. The Army was in a process of increasing its manpower, arranging logistics, and increasing its combat mobility. Previous governments perceived the defense sector as non-productive; hence they did not prioritize for sufficient funding in time. Governments from 1990 to 2001 largely exercised control over the Army through controlled budgetary appropriation (see Annex-E for budget appropriation). Army leadership also failed to convince and win confidence of the government about emerging threat for national security from emerging insurgency within existing difficult civil military relationship. Counter insurgency experts can argue whether or not the military should have been used along with the police at beginning, but even though police were used at beginning, other security agencies, particularly Army and other instruments of national power, should have been ready. Even if those instruments were not used at beginning, there should have been an integrated broad approach from the start. In the Nepalese case, denying the necessary budget needed to increase strength and arrange logistics for the Army, allowing the police to be completely exhausted and demoralized, and not willing to mobilize the Army until the last hour were fundamental policy mistakes. On top of that, the government consumed its limited resources to raise an Armed Police Force (APF) as a separate security
agency from scratch, at the middle of the insurgency as an alternative force. It takes a longtime to develop a separate security agency and to become operational. These faulty policies offered insurgents time, space, resources, and experience before facing the Army. It took a long time for Nepalese police force to recover from their past losses and to operate jointly with the Army after 2001.

Counterinsurgency operations were primarily divided into Intelligence operations, psychological operations, civil affairs, population & resources control, and tactical operations. Classical techniques such as winning hearts and minds, population and resource control, pacification through local security and economic development, amnesty and rehabilitation were conducted. National census was not effectively conducted and earlier issued citizen identification cards were not updated. Use of large combat units and lethal weapons were avoided as much as possible. The concept of organizing local self defense forces failed before being executed due to lack of political will at the face of wide criticism from international human rights groups. Relocation of the population for protection was never conceived due to a deep rooted attachment of the Nepalese people to their paternal lands. Nepalese demographic settlement in terms of ethnic groups is mixed throughout the country and the Maoist organization was spread across all ethnic groups, so there was difficulty in screening and identification of insurgents.

The Maoists weapons and numerical size was not a big problem. Their ideological support base was weak among intellectuals and urban society. However, frequently collapsing government was biggest advantage for Maoists propaganda and information campaign. Wide use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by Maoists on mountainous roads and trails caused the biggest delays and casualty factors for tactical ground operations. The open border with India, lack of workable intelligence, and lack of combat mobility were some of major problems in
tactical operations. On top of that, the chronic political instability and a frequently changing government at the center used to reverse tactical successes.

Counterinsurgency operations under non parliamentary government were more consistent and firm at the beginning, but lacked support of the major political parties. The government’s socio-economic and political policies were focused towards maintaining the status quo, which was not enough to address the insurgents’ appeals. In addition to this, major political parties accused the government of being illegitimate and undemocratic. The insurgents were exploiting differences between the political parties and the government. The Maoists concede that the Army is the major barrier to their victory along with the U.S., UK, Chinese, and Indian government’s support to the Nepalese government during the counter insurgency. However, when isolated, security/military led counterinsurgency measures had severe limitations.

Major political parties did not support the government, which was working under direct royal ordinance after October, 2002. The government was losing popular support day by day and economic growth was going down (GDP growth in 2005 was negative). There was a political and administrative vacuum below the district headquarters. A large part of the rural area was becoming out of control of the government. Maoists were desperately using extreme tools of ethnicity and regional divide to make the government weaker. The government’s information operation (IO) became ineffective because of inconsistent media policy. Initially, the government applied strict control over the media, but it gave up everything when it could not longer sustain the growing pressure. The media became completely antagonistic to the government. They widely criticized the royal take over of February 2005 and never supported the government. Actually, the failure of parliamentary government and a worsening security situation led to an assumption of executive power by the monarch in February 2005; however, it further widened the rivalry between the
Palace and the marginalized political parties. This resulted in a unique alliance between the major political parties at the end of 2005, who were a counterinsurgent force for almost a decade against the Maoists, and Maoists against a monarch led government. This alliance forced the monarch to step down and negotiation process began for conflict resolution.

Peace Talks

The government conducted two (Peace negotiation after April 2006 is not the scope of this paper) negotiations with Maoists -one by the parliamentary and another by the non-parliamentary government. Both negotiations were followed by ceasefires. The first ceasefire lasted for four months (23rd July to 23rd November 2001). The first peace talk took place during this period. Both sides had irreconcilable demands so, there was no agreement. The insurgents were able to win several concessions and were also able to give a false impression to a strategically less astute government that they were really committed to peace negotiations.

The Maoists used the peace talks as a strategy by learning lessons from past insurgencies particularly from Peru but the government still believed in negotiated settlement. The Maoists expanded their organizational network and prepared for further violence. They surprisingly broke the ceasefire and struck on unprepared government who believed that the rebels were sincere in their negotiated settlement. The government learned lessons, but paid a high price. The next ceasefire was followed by second peace talk and it lasted for more than six months (29 January to 29 August, 2003). This time the government was better prepared for the negotiation, but lacked popular support.

On the other side, the Maoists wanted to take advantage of the government’s vulnerabilities and prepare a support base in urban area for the next stage of the insurgency (what they called the counter offensive). This time the major political parties were neither in
government nor were part of the peace process. So, the government lacked popular backing in negotiation. Both peace talks again served as a pause in the conflict. Ceasefire and talks were deliberately used for the strategic purpose of rearming and reconstitution of loss, but not for negotiated settlement by the insurgents. The government conducted both negotiations out of fear and not from the position of strength. The Maoists were assuming that they were negotiating from a position of strength, so that the government would be ready to concede for their terms. Both sides' non-compromising demands became an excuse for the breakdown of talks.
CONCLUSION

The Nepalese government's counter insurgency measures were largely effective in containing insurgents through military/security measures. It was so because of the existing chronic political instability caused by weak leadership and pursuit of self interest resulting in frequent changes in government, which contributed for inconsistent and inappropriate counter insurgency policy throughout. Being a developing nation, there were shortages of resources; shortages could have been augmented and mobilized judiciously given a government's stability, political vision, and common approach. The initial counterinsurgency approach was an ad hoc law and order, which was late and incorrect against the protracted insurgency. The law and order approach lacked consideration of military/security, political, and socio-economic aspects of insurgency. When the government decided to begin ISDP along with counter insurgency combat/security operations, the insurgency was already mature. To implement ISDP program effectively, the government would require adequate financial and human resource, as well as viable socio-economic and political strategy. Security force operations were effective to put pressure on the insurgents, but when political instability occurred they lacked popular support, momentum, and strategic guidance. Analysis of the insurgency, effectiveness of government counterinsurgency measures, and use of instruments of national power has been briefly analyzed in following paragraphs:

Analysis of Insurgency

There was a lack of understanding of the nature of Maoist insurgency from the beginning. The post 1990 international environment, acceptance of the parliamentary system by the major communist party of Nepal and even by radical communist faction for the time being, misleading rhetoric of the Maoist, lack of counter insurgency experience among policy makers, and chronic
disunity among ruling circles were some of the major factors which contributed in misunderstanding the nature of the insurgency. This misunderstanding ultimately attributed to inconsistency and reactive counterinsurgency measures. By analyzing the insurgent’s activities and decisions from 1996 to 2005, we could reach a conclusion that it was an egalitarian and revolutionary insurgency. Maoists were not reformist. However, their decision to participate in peace negotiations after April 2006 and agreement for negotiated settlement contradict with their previous position. The post-April 2006 activities and decisions of Maoists show that an egalitarian revolutionary insurgency, in rare cases, may be ready for reformist settlement if they are prevented from achieving their revolutionary goals. The Maoists’ reformist settlement will largely depend on the ability of the government to maintain formidable pressure against the Maoists throughout the process. In the Nepalese conflict, it is too early to conclude that the Maoists will transform into a democratic force soon. Maoists’ rhetoric still says that they are determined to seize state power by violent means if they become unable to do so by other means.

**Effectiveness of Counter Insurgency Measures**

In over all assessment, there were obvious shortcomings of COIN measures in addressing insurgency comprehensively; however, the security force operations were able to deny Maoists from achieving their ultimate goal. The important reasons for the ineffectiveness of COIN measures were political instability and policy inconsistency. Despite various difficulties, Nepalese security forces endured hardship and forced the Maoist to run. They denied Maoists from taking over the state. Security force losses are considerably high given the short duration of mobilization. The sacrifices made and hardships endured by families of the security forces by the insurgents’ deliberate intimidation and coercion, unfortunately went unnoticed in the eyes of
human rights NGOs and the biased media. Some of the important lessons to be learned from Nepalese COIN operations are:

(a) Efforts must be directed towards early identification of possible insurgency and neutralization during incipient stage of an insurgency;

(b) Without political stability and firm political leadership, broad-based COIN operation is difficult to conduct;

(c) Internal dispute within counterinsurgent forces (political forces) undermines counterinsurgency operations;

(c) Political and socio-economic policies of COIN which aims at maintaining the status quo are not enough to undercut the causes of insurgency, they must reach beyond;

(d) There are obvious limitations of military/security measures in defeating an insurgency in the absence of integrated employment of other instruments of national power;

(e) The developing nation’s institutional shortcomings during transitional period and lack of internal conflict management mechanism create a huge friction in government machinery;

(f) Border management and the role of neighboring nations are important.

Employment of Instruments of National Power

The concept of instruments of national power is new for many of the policy makers of countries like Nepal. Nepal lacks an institutional and doctrinal framework for jointly executing various instruments of national power in COIN. The primary and dominant instrument in COIN for Nepal was its security/military instrument and local administrative/judicial setup. Other instruments were either not developed as an independent entity, or were used in an ad hoc basis. The security instrument was organized under the concept of unified command and was
functioning fairly well, despite various functional difficulties. The focus was in unity of command in order to produce unity of effort, but there had a problem in achieving unity of command itself. A conceptual framework was developed during ISDP planning, but due to political instability, the employment of the instruments of national power was far from being understood and coordinated. Parliament (until its dissolve in June 2002) and judiciary were not on board with the Nepalese government's executive branch. The government was trying to coordinate its instruments and branches, but the ultimate effort was not a problem free due to institutional, doctrinal, and human factors.
Annex-A

Major Chronological Events

1768-1769: King Prithivi Narayan Shah of Gorkha (a small principality west of Kathmandu) unified Nepal (Nepal was divided into more than 46 small principalities).

1814-1816: Nepal fought war with British East India Company. Nepal lost approximately two-third of her territory and war was stopped after agreed for Sugauli treaty. 1846- Janga Bahadur Rana (an ambitious nobleman) seized power after a bloody coup. He imposed family rule and adopted hereditary premier system which remained until 1951. King remained powerless during Rana family rule.

1951- Democratic movement (King and political parties) overthrown Rana rule and practiced democratic system.


1959- First parliamentary held. Nepali Congress, a liberal democratic party won election and formed government.

1960- Late King Mahendra dissolved parliamentary system and introduced single party Panchyat system, which remained until 1990.

Apr, 1990- End of three decades long Panchyat system (single party system under King’s direct rule) after a popular movement and forming up of all party interim government. Mr K.P. Bhattarai, a Nepali Congress leader becomes PM.

Nov, 1990- Promulgation of new constitution of parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy (this constitution was drafted by a commission of appointed experts and to be ratified by first parliament after election).

May, 1991- First parliamentary election held. Nepali Congress (a liberal democratic party) wins majority (110 seats out of 205) and forms government. Mr G.P Koirala became PM. CPN-UML (a liberal communist party) becomes parliamentary opposition (69 seats). United People’s Front (a front organization of radical communists which latter on develops as Maoist party) wins 9 seats in parliament. Rest 17 seats were won by small parties.

May, 1993- Madan Bhandari, general secretary of CPN-UML, a charismatic leader, dies in a road accident along with his chief deputy. Leadership in liberal communist camp becomes weak. The benefit goes to radical camp. The relationship between ruling party and opposition remains tense and no compromise reaches on any national issue including initial policy against underground development of radical left.

Jul, 1994- Nepali Congress government’s program fails to secure majority in the parliament due to its own internal party dispute. Prime Minister (PM) dissolves parliament and sets for mid-term poll.

Nov, 1994- Mid-term poll ends with hung parliament. CPN-UML wins 88, Nepali Congress wins 83, National Democratic Party-NDP(formed by politicians related to pre-1990 political system) wins 20, 14 seats goes to small parties, and radical communists fails to secure single seat(although radical communists were divided up to this point on the issue whether to take part in parliamentary election or start armed struggle). CPN-UML forms minority government but supported by NDP. Mr Manamohan Adhikari became PM.
Mar, 1995- Radical fractions form Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). CPN-Maoist Calls all radical fractions to boycott parliamentary practice and appeal to join armed struggle.

May, 1995- CPN-UML government fails to win no-confidence motion in a special session of parliament. PM dissolve parliament and appeals to join armed struggle. But, Supreme Court rules out PM’s prerogative of dissolving parliament in September 1995 after four months of confusion. CPN-UML, a Liberal communist party rules Nepal for nine months.

Sept, 1995- Nepali Congress forms government with support of NDP and other small parties. Mr Sher B Deuwa became PM.

Oct, 1995- CPN-Maoist and its open front (United People’s Front) launches SIJA campaign in mid-western region precisely in Rolpa district.

Nov, 1995- Government decided and mobilize police force against Maoist in mid-western region where Maoist’s were practicing pre-run of “people’s war.”

January, 1996- CPN-Maoist central committee met and set date for formal beginning of “people’s war” from February, 1996.

4 Feb, 1996- United People’s Front, a front organization of Maoist, handed over a memorandum of 40 points demand (see Annex-D) with ultimatum date of 1st February, 1996, otherwise to start “people’s war.” PM went on official tour to India after receiving memorandum. Between 4 to 13 February, Maoist conducted demonstration in various places and warned launching of “people’s war” if demands are not met.

13 Feb, 1996- Maoist attacked three police post (two in mid western region and one in eastern region), looted a rural development office in Gorkha district and bombed Pepsi bottling factory in a sub-urban area of Kathmandu. Declared “people’s war” thru media, wall painting and leaflets nationwide. Maoist developed first plan of people’s war and slogan was “March along the path of people’s war to smash the reactionary state and establish a new democratic state.”

Oct, 1996- Maoist developed their second plan. The slogan for this was “Planned development of guerrilla warfare to prepare grounds to convert specific areas into guerrilla zones in the near future.”

1 SIJA is an acronym of SISNE-JALJALA, two different mountains in Rolpa district. The Rolpa district lies between these two mountains. Maoist Party cadres marched from SISNE to JALJALA by organizing protest, displacing other party members; using mixture of violence and intimidation and consolidating own party’s organization. This was a trial run to provoke government’s over reaction before setting date for formal beginning of “peoples war.” The government over reacted with police operation as rebel anticipated. They became able to attract sizeable numbers of people on their side. Although this area was their strong hold already but this event stimulated them to rally behind Maoist. CPN-Maoist termed it as a success and central committee met to set date for beginning of “people’s war.”

2 The first phase of “people’s war” was divided into six sub-phases/stages from February 1996 to February 2001. Maoist’s used to call plan for stages. These six stages generally covered the first incipient phase of insurgency before they attacked Nepalese Army in November 2001, what Maoist called “strategic defence.”
Mar, 1997- Nepali Congress Party government collapsed again by internal dispute. National Democratic Party (NDP), formed by politicians related to pre-1990 system, formed government with the support of CPN-UML. Lokendra B Chand, who was the last PM of Panchyat system, became PM.

Apr, 1997- Government formed a commission under chairmanship of member of parliament Prem Sign Dhami of CPN-UML to study Maoist and recommend measures. He submitted report on August, 1997 and recommended for political measures.

Aug, 1997- Maoist developed their third plan. The slogan was “Develop guerrilla warfare to new heights.”

Oct, 1997- The NDP led government collapsed when NDP split into two. New government was formed under the leadership of splinter of NDP supported by Nepali congress. Surya B Thapa, a long time PM of Nepal during Panchyat time became PM.

Apr, 1998- NDP led government collapsed when Nepali Congress withdrew support in the parliament. Nepali Congress formed government supported by CPN-UML. Mr G.P Koirala became PM.

May, 1998- The government launched large scale police operations (Operation Kilo Serra-II) after initiation of Maoist’s “people’s war” in insurgency infested areas. Government conducted local election, election for districts, municipalities, and village development committees. Maoist partially disturbed election in some of the villages in mid-western region.

Aug-October, 1998- Maoist developed their fourth plan. The slogan was “Advance in the great direction of creating base area.”

May, 1999- The third general election after 1990 was held. Maoist partially disturbed election in some of the villages of mid-western region. Nepali congress won majority and formed government. Mr K P Bhattarai became PM.

October, 1999- Maoist began fifth plan and it lasted up to June, 2000.

Dec, 1999- Government formed high level committee under chairmanship of Sher B Deuwa to study and recommend measures against Maoist. This committee submitted report on November, 2000, almost a year. It suggested both administrative/security and political measures (talks).

Mar, 2000- Nepali congress government collapsed due to internal debate. But again Nepali Congress formed government under different leadership. Mr G.P. Koirala became PM.

Jun, 2000- Maoist developed their sixth plan. The focus was in strengthening their base areas. This stage ended with Maoist Party’s second national conference in February, 2001. Now they decided to fight with Nepalese Army and achieve “strategic balance.”

Dec, 2000- Maoist claimed establishment of their first district people’s government in mid-western Rukum district. It did not have permanent location but was functional underground.

Feb, 2001- Maoist held second national conference (first after beginning of armed struggle. First national conference was held in May 1994. Party elected Prachanda as chairman. Party passed the paper presented by Prachanda titled “A great leap forward: The inevitable necessity of history.” He emphasized the importance of mass line strategy and fusion of armed and mass line strategy. He
also proposed Prachandapath- claimed to be developed as a thought in future but a set of ideas, along with Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism. The first slogan was “Consolidate and expand base areas and local people’s power.” The second slogan was “March forward to the direction of building central people’s government.”

1 Jun, 2001- Royal Palace massacre took place. His Majesty King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya along with other seven senior royal family members killed. Alleged Crown Prince Dipendra committed suicide same time. Country engulfed into chaos among parliamentary infighting, royal massacre and Maoist violence.

3 Jun, 2001- Prince Gyanendra, brother of late king Birendra , became King of Nepal (he was third in throne after two sons of Late king Birendra, both sons-one killed and another committed suicide, another younger brother of late King Birendra was also killed in same massacre).

2001- Government decided to raise Armed Police Force (APF) to fight Maoist amidst debate of Army mobilization.

Jul, 2001- The regional organization of Maoist parties in South Asia (Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia - CCOMPOSA) was formed under active role of Nepalese Maoist.

Jul, 2001- Nepali Congress government again collapse due to its internal fighting. Another leader of Nepali Congress, a former PM Sher B Deuwa formed new government.

23 Jul, 2001- Maoist called for ceasefire. Government reciprocated. Peace talks conducted between government and Maoist. Maoist’s major demands were - forming up of an interim government, round table conference and holding up of election of constituent assembly to write new constitution of Nepal. Obviously it was a republic but whether democratic or communist was not clear. Government was ready to discuss issues but insisting democratic system and constitutional monarchy. No agreements were reached.

Aug, 2001- Government announced Internal Security and Development Program (ISDP). Pursue development and security together. Initial deployment of Army for ISDP.

Sept, 2001- Maoist changed name of their “people’s army” to “people’s liberation army” and announced forming up of general headquarters.

21 Nov, 2001- Maoist broke ceasefire by blaming government for not addressing their demands.

23 Nov, 2001- Maoist launched attack against Army and other targets nationwide. Government was completely surprised.

26 Nov, 2001- Government declared state of emergency and enacted anti-terrorist ordinance. Army along with other security agencies was mobilized. Major Maoist attacks were foiled.

Jan, 2002- US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Nepal and pledged full support.

17 Feb, 2002- Maoist launched a large scale attack in Achham district Headquarter. It was also poorly defended administrative center.

22 May, 2002- Prime Minister dissolved the parliament when he failed to pass the bill to extend emergency for another six months. He called for fresh poll in November but that never happened. Actually a fraction of his party led by G.P. Koirala did not support him. PM extended emergency for another 3 months. Party President G.P. Koirala expelled Sher B Deuba from party when he was PM. The Nepali
Congress party formally divided between Deuba and Koirala. Deuba forms separate party.

9 Sept, 2002- Maoist launched a large scale attack in Arghakhanchi district headquarter (a poorly defended district administrative center). It was quickly recaptured by Army but most of the infrastructures burned.

4 Oct, 2002- King removed PM for his “incompetence” of not holding election and worsening law and order. King invited Mr Lokendra B Chand, a known royalist, to form a caretaker government.

26 Jan, 2003- Maoist assassinated Chief of newly formed Armed Police Force along his wife and body guard in Kathmandu during morning walk.

29 Jan, 2003- Government and Maoist announced ceasefire just three days after assassination of Police Force chief. This ceasefire lasted up to 23 August 2003. Second peace talk conducted between Maoist and King appointed government.

30 May, 2003- King replaces government of Lokendra B Chanda with another royalist Surya B Thapa as PM.

23 Aug, 2003- Maoist broke ceasefire and conducted assassination of senior army officer. Another fatally survived. Few attempts were failed.

Jan, 2004- Maoist announced to divide country into different autonomous regions based on ethnicity and region.


2 Jun, 2004- PM Surya B Thapa stepped down on 7 May, 2004. King reappointed Sher B Deuba as PM after 20 months of his removal. CPN-UML, NDP and regional Sadabhwana party gave support.

1 Feb, 2005- PM Deuba was removed from office. King assumed full executive power and formed government under his chairmanship. International community repeated emphasis on unity of political parties and palace, which never happened.

Nov, 2005- Agitating Seven Political Parties and Maoist forged an alliance in Indian capital Delhi to fight against government.

1 Feb, 2006- King addressed to the nation defending his step and claiming progress. He also offered political parties for reconciliation. But political parties disregarded the appeal.

1 Feb, 2006- Night before king’s address, Maoist launched a large scale attack in one district headquarter-Tansen, western Nepal. They destroyed an important archeological site, burned down almost all government offices. Army could not reinforce during night but recapture next morning.

Feb-Apr, 2006- Maoist concentrated their armed cadres in the vicinity of major urban areas, particularly around Kathmandu, the national capital. Their armed and unarmed cadres participated in urban demonstration (although arms were not displayed openly). Maoist wanted to declare republic from the street and led the movement.

Mar-Apr, 2006- Anti-king demonstration organized by seven political parties and Maoist affects national life in major cities throughout the country.

Apr, 2006- Nepalese Army suggested king to reconcile with political parties before situation goes out of control. Up to this time Army was not mobilized. Police forces were dealing demonstration. Situation could have gone beyond the control and Maoist
Annex-B

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF INTEGRATED SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

NATIONAL OBJECTIVE
PREVENT/ELIMINATE INSURGENCY

GRAND STRATEGY
INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
SECURITY NEUTRALIZATION MOVILIZATION BALANCED DEVELOPMENT

PRINCIPLES
UNITY OF EFFORT MAX INTELLIGENCE MINIMUM VIOLENCE RESPONSIVE GOVT

POLITICAL
INFORMATIONAL
MILITARY
ECONOMIC

MILITARY STRATEGY
DEVELOP/DEPLOY/EMPLOY MILITARY RESOURCES TO ASSIST SECURITY, NEUTRALIZATION, BALANCED DEVELOPMENT AND MOBILIZATION

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY
(SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS)
CONSOLIDATION OPS STRIKE OPS

INT OPS PRC OPS PSY OPS CA OPS TAC OPS

would be benefited from the chaos. King's announcement of stepping down defused the bad situation from being worse. 

Apr, 2006- King reinstated dissolved parliament and he stepped down. Mr G.P. Koirala became interim PM and formed interim government. Newly formed government and Maoists signed comprehensive peace agreement to end conflict.
Annex-C

DEVELOPMENT MODEL UNDER ISDP

Maoists 40 Points Demand before Beginning Armed Insurgency

1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be abrogated.

2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January, 1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal's water resources.

3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and systematised. All vehicles with Indian licence plates should be banned from Nepal.

4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centres should be closed. Nepali citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country.

5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A 'work permit' system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the country.

6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should be stopped.

7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant.

8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed.

9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.

10. A new constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the establishment of a people's democratic system.

11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished.

12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under people's control.

13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed.

14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kabhre, Sindhupalchowk, Dhanusa, Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases should be immediately withdrawn.

15. The operation of armed police, repression and state-sponsored terror should be immediately stopped.

16. The whereabouts of citizens, who disappeared in police custody at different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and others, should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly compensated.

17. All those killed during the People's Movement should be declared martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice.

18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation.

19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property.

20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their own autonomous governments.

21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped. The system of untouchability should be eliminated.
22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be guaranteed.
23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely autonomous.
24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and cultural workers should be guaranteed.
25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the tarai should be eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas should be treated at par.
26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped.
27. Land should be belonging to 'tenants'. Land under the control of the feudal system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless.
28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and nationalised. Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote industrialisation.
29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be provided.
30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed and strictly implemented.
31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be 'relocated until alternative infrastructure is guaranteed.
32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small farmers from the Agricultural Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for small farmers.
33. Fertiliser and seeds should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their produce.
34. People in flood and drought-affected areas should be provided with appropriate relief materials.
35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The commercialisation of education should be stopped.
36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to inflation. Essential goods should be cheaply and easily available to everyone.
37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers.
38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted.
39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery, and the practices of middlemen and so on should be eliminated.
40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly honoured and protected.

Annex-E

Budget Appropriation to Defense (Army) and Home Ministry (Police)

Figure 1. Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, His Majesty's Government of Nepal, 1990-2004

Notes

1 After a popular movement (Jana Andolan), Nepal restored a multiparty democratic system after ending three decades long single party Panchayat System in 1990. The new constitution of 1990 was supposed to lead country towards liberal democratic system but quickly it faced instability and armed insurgency.

2 Various governments between 1996 to February 2005 had stressed solving Maoist problem within constitutional framework of constitution of 1990 i.e. within framework of parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy. Government objective (political and military) was to eliminate insurgency. The political end state of counter insurgency operation was to force Maoist to seek political resolution within framework of constitution of 1990. Issues, other than parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy, such as socio-economic, were negotiable.


6 Prakash Nepali and Phanindra Subba, “Civil Military Relations and Maoist Insurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 16, Number 1 (March 2005), 84.

7 Late King Mahendra (Father of late king Birendra) dismissed parliamentary system in December 1960 and introduced single party Panchayat system under his direct rule by banning democratic political parties. Panchayat system lasted until 1990.

8 The term comes from Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal, close proximity from Nepalse border, where a section of Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal led a violent uprising in 1967, trying to develop a "revolutionary opposition" in opposition to the official CPI(M) leadership. This movement was crushed by Government of India. The present days Maoists in India are subsequent development of the Naxlites movement.

9 One of the leading radical communist fractions in Nepal during 1970s. This fraction ultimately developed into a major Communist Party in Nepal during 1990s and adopted democratic system after 1990 and now known as CPN(UML). In 1995, a group of radical cadres from various communist fractions joined together and formed CPN (Maoist) that waged armed insurgency from 1996.

10 The Partyless political system established after 1960. The new constitution established a "partyless" system of Panchayats (councils) which late King Mahendra considered to be a democratic form of government closer to Nepalese traditions. As a pyramidal structure progressing from village assemblies to a Rastriya Panchayat (Unicameral National Parliament), the Panchayat system enshrined the absolute power of the monarchy and kept the King as head of state with sole authority over all governmental institutions, including the Cabinet (Council of Ministers) and the Parliament. It had party less periodic election from village to national parliament and it used to be called as ‘Panchayati Democracy’.

11 The radical leftist’s alliance won 9 seats out of 205 in 1991 parliamentary election. It was third largest party in parliament. Those who represented radical left as parliament member were in second tier of leadership in their party
hierarchy. There are contradicting views about why this group took part in 1991 election and boycotted afterwards and started armed insurgency in 1996. Was that a trial of parliamentary system or just to conceal preparation of armed insurgency against government’s crackdown? This question is yet to be unanswered.

12 Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, a leader of then ruling Nepali Congress, dissolved parliament before termination of term at the face of disapproval of his counter insurgency policy by a faction of his own party. He further dissolved local bodies. As per Nepalese constitution of 1990, parliamentary election must take place within six months of dissolution of parliament but that could not happen. He supposed to resign but he did not do so, then he was removed by the King. There was neither parliament nor new election. King formed caretaker government. It developed constitutional dispute. King worked under ‘controversial’ clause 127 of constitution 1990 from October 2003 to February 2005 then he assumed full executive power up to April 2006, a clause kept to convene constitutional difficulties, but the major political parties interpreted the clause 127 differently.

13 The major political parties and the Maoists formed an alliance in order to force to step down the monarch from power in April 2006. After that, Maoists have been given legitimacy and comprehensive peace agreement has been signed. The previous counterinsurgency operations had ended when the monarch stepped down. The rest of the process would be appropriate to term as “conflict management and resolution” rather than counterinsurgency. The Maoists problem now is being dealt through political accommodation and reconciliation.


15 CPN (Maoist) Party manifesto. Maoist labels India and US as expansionist and imperialist respectively.


17 Maoist systematically and widely used terror, intimidation and coercion to deny public support to government and force to follow Maoist decree. Maiming those who oppose them at local level, punish by hanging in front of mass those who do not support them or support government, deliberately bombing public/private transport that defy their strike or ignore to transport Maoist cadres, were common. Hanging school teacher in Tanahu district, bombing and burning passenger bus in Chitwan district were some examples. Most of the captives did not survive in Maoist ‘Gulag’ so called ‘people’s prison.’ They were tortured and ‘safaya’ (Maoist terminology for execution of captives).

18 Bard E. O’Neill, 45.


22 Satellite telephone and television had reached most of the rural parts after 1990 before Maoists destroy them while beginning their insurgency. The rural youths were exposed to outer world through those media but they found
themselves in subsistence agriculture economy which helped to develop frustration against government. Maoists well cashed this sentiments and blamed government for their evil.


24 After breaking cease fire and peace talk, Maoist started general offensive against government in November, 2001. Up to now Maoists were attacking police posts and rural administrative installations.

25 Gorkha has always symbolic meaning in Nepalese history and politics. The origin of term Gurkha/Gorkha is also related to this place. Gorkha was a small hill principality from early 17th century to mid 18th century which lies approximately 50 miles west of Kathmandu. Prithivi Narayan Shah, the King of Gorkha and founder of modern Nepal, in mid eighteenth century, had unified Nepal and relocated capital to Kathmandu. His major instrument of national unification was Gorkha Army (the Army of Kingdom of Gorkha), the founding organization of present day Nepalese Army, so the Army and those who took part during unification were known as Gorkhali. After Sugauli Treaty of 1816 A.D. between Nepal and then British East India Company, the latter had also started raising similar types of light infantry regiments in then British India from same ethnic community and named Gorkha Regiment(GR) as a colonial force, then the term Gurkha/Gorkha became known to outside. The tradition of Gorkha/Gurkha Regiment still exists in British and Indian army where as Nepalese National Army is known as “Nepalese Army”. The legal terms of these Gorkha/Gurkha Regiments and people (most of them are Nepalese citizen when they enroll), who serve either in British or Indian army, are guided by tri-party treaty of 1947 among Nepal, United Kingdom, and independent India. The issue of Gurkha recruitment for British or Indian Army has been debatable in Nepalese politics.

26 Nepal’s administrative divisions: Nepal is divided into five regional administrations. Five regional administrative divisions are divided into total 14 zones. 14 zones are divided into total 75 districts. Districts are divided into Village Development Committee and Municipalities. The lowest government body is village development committee in rural area and municipality in urban area.

27 Government suspended special security acts, removed terrorist tag on insurgent organization, removed red corner notice from INTERPOL against individual rebel leader, released Maoist prisoners, and halted all security operations without Maoist compromising anything.

28 Unified command was a functional framework to work coordinately among different security agencies i.e. Nepalese Army, Nepal Police, Armed Police, and NID. Army was in lead. There were joint committees from center to the district represented by all security agencies. It used to coordinate and execute counter insurgency operations. It was more effective at sharing and analyzing information than executing combat operations. The regional and district security committees were headed by senior civilian administrators. Major combat operations were led by Army. This inter agency framework was not immune from problems such as command control, logistics, sharing responsibilities etc but it was best available option to counter threat at that time. This mechanism was more effective during direct royal rule than previous governments; however, this government lost popular support because major political parties were not in the government.

29 Prakash Nepali and Phanindra Subba, 91.
Governments were not in a position to discuss about the position of monarchy. Government’s bottom line was constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. Up to this point Maoists were not ready to accept government’s stand on these issues. There were differences in socio-economic policies too. After royal take over of February 2005, major political parties became neutral (some advocated republic) about position of monarchy and international communities were also on similar line about monarchy. This position indirectly benefited Maoist cause of establishing republic. The increasing republic opinion undermined counter insurgency efforts led by royal government.

Interview of Prachand, the rebel chief, by BBC reporter Charles Haviland, 13th February, 2006. www.bbcnews/South Asia/Prachanda interview.htm


Maoist had three straight forward demands during both talks-(a) interim government(probably led by Maoists ?), (b) round table conference of various stake holders(like legislative assembly), and (c) election for members of constitutional assembly to draft new republican(which types of republic-communist or democratic was not clear) constitution. Government’s bottom line was also clear that it would not compromise on the issues of constitutional monarchy and liberal democracy but was ready to discuss any other issues.

In Maoists synthesis, one of the reasons of Shining Path’s failure in Peru was their rejection of talks with government. Nepalese Maoists believed that ceasefire and talks were part of strategy. They used ceasefire and talks as per their convenience.

This was first non parliamentary government formed by the King after dissolution of parliamentary government. This government blamed previous governments for failing to deliver peace and solve Maoist problem. So, this government’s priority was to hold talk with Maoist at any cost in order to offer at least temporary peace and consolidate internally for its future purpose(probably further consolidate royal power) but the time was not favorable because of increased violence and Maoists assassination of Armed Police Force Chief; however, government accepted ceasefire by fear of loosing opportunity. Maoists obviously took it as government’s weakness just after high level assassination instead Maoists were expecting government’s heavy offensive against them.

Each new coming government’s offer for conflict weary people was holding peace talk with Maoists. Each new coming government used to blame their predecessor for failing to deliver peace and solving conflict. So, peace talk had been rationale for coming to power which was optimally exploited by Maoist before and after agreeing for ceasefire.

See chronological events. Maoists had declared ceasefire after their tactical success in both cases. And more importantly after collapse of ruling government which was pursuing strong counter insurgency measures. Maoists were ready for peace talks only with the succeeding government which was weak and offering ceasefire and peace to the people, does not matter how. This was Maoists intention to maintain political instability in the government and get relieved from government’s counter insurgency pressure.
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