MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UTILIZATION OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

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Executive Summary

Title: Department of Defense Utilization of the Incident Command System

Author: Lieutenant Commander Spencer T. Schoen, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy

Thesis: The commonality between the Incident Command System and the military staff structure is so close that Department of Defense does not need to utilize the incident command system during defense support to civil authority operations.

Discussion: The US military staff structure finds its roots in the Prussian, French, and British systems, but primarily in the Prussian General Staff system. The Prussian system dates back to the 1700s. The French and British date back to around the same time but appear to find their roots in the Prussian system. The staff structure was designed to accommodate growing armies that could maneuver over large geographic areas as separated units. These armies and growing fields of battle were simply too large for one leader to coordinate alone. Thus, the growth and development of military staffs occurred as a reflection of the growth of armies, and the staff’s development into functional areas was honed by need. The Incident Command System (ICS) was developed in the mid 1970s and early 1980s out of a need to develop a common command and control system for large scale fires that required multi-agency, multiple resource response. The system was developed initially to fight fires, then modified for all hazards, and after acceptance by the Southern California fire services, achieved national acceptance and soon found its way into other emergency response arenas as well. After the events of September 11, 2001 and the standup of the US Department of Homeland Security, ICS became the national model for interagency response. The Department of Defense (DoD) is expected to utilize ICS during defense support to civil authorities operations. However, the use of ICS by DoD is contradictory to the very reason ICS was developed and is likely to decrease the speed and efficiency of DoD response. Therefore, the issue of whether or not DoD must truly use ICS to remain in compliance with federal policy requiring its use, must be examined.

Conclusion: The Department of Defense does not and should not utilize the Incident Command System in execution of defense support to civilian authorities operations and can still operate within the requirements of the National Incident Management System.
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FORGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

The idea for this paper was conceived as a result of the experience, education, and training I’ve received over a number of years. I spent eight years working as a paramedic in New York City during the 1990s, where I responded to a myriad of jobs at all levels, including multiple mass casualty and high profile events. During my paramedic training I learned how to operate under and implement an incident management system called the Incident Command System (ICS). As a street medic I didn’t learn the details of the system, just the basics. As I completed my graduate education and began to move into hospital administration, I was introduced to the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) which was an incident management system for hospitals based on ICS. The idea behind this system was to allow hospitals to not only survive and continue functioning through their own internal disasters (fires, floods, power failures, etc), but to make them better able to communicate with and work with field responders (fire, police, emergency medical services [EMS]) during a community or regional disaster. HEICS was a success, as was its model, ICS.

I became a paramedic in 1990 and ICS was already well established and a part of my original training curriculum – a standard part of prehospital emergency care. I gave the system no thought at all. When I moved into the in-hospital environment and was introduced to HEICS, I accepted it as the standard; it made sense in terms of what I’d experienced in the field and fit well. I gave it little additional thought.

Later, serving as the Emergency Management Officer for US Naval Hospital Naples, Italy, I introduced HEICS there. Over the course of almost two years, I taught most of the hospital staff, made necessary preparations, gained approval for the command to utilize HEICS as their emergency management system, and implemented the system there.

After Naples, I was assigned to a fellowship at the US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Disaster Management System (NDMS) Section. There, every national event we dealt with, whether planning or responding was done strictly within the framework of ICS. It was during this tour (2003-2004), that I truly came to understand the full depth of the system and see it work in the interagency arena.

Following this fellowship, I was assigned to the Navy Medicine Office of Homeland Security in the US Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. During this assignment, one of my focuses was to bring HEICS to all facilities within Navy Medicine. As luck would have it, during this assignment, the California Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA), the originators of HEICS decided it was time to update the current version of HEICS, but with the adoption of ICS at the national level and the events of September 11th behind them, saw greater value in forming an interdisciplinary committee of healthcare and emergency management personnel from across the nation. I was fortunate enough to be selected for this working group and received the full support and approval of Navy Medicine to represent their interests and opinions. This two and a half year endeavor culminated with the publication of the Hospital Incident Command System (HICS), no longer loosely based on ICS, but strictly based on ICS. It was developed with support from the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Department of Health and Human Services and other national level health care groups. It is considered to be compliant with all relative regulatory standards and is more flexible than ever before. I learned more about ICS during this time than I ever could have imagined.

While working on the HICS project, I also attended the US Naval War College Fleet Seminar program where I learned, from an academic perspective, about the US military staff structure. I was vaguely aware of it as I’d had very little contact with it while working in health care facilities within
Navy Medicine (vice assigned to the operational forces). I noticed, the structure was similar to ICS and therefore, it just made sense to me.

During this time, the US military began looking very seriously at how to operate within the scope of ICS. There was no choice in the matter. Then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was a signatory to the National Incident Management System. An interagency system that required all federal agencies to use ICS when responding together or with state, local, or tribal agencies.

This brings me to my point; the mix of experience, education, and training that developed the idea of this paper. One day, while at work, a military staff structure organizational chart ended up next to my ICS organizational chart. Side by side, I realized, they were almost identical! How could two systems with vastly different histories and purposes have evolved so similarly? Could this really be coincidence? I had my doubts. Whether it was a coincidence or not, why should the military be forced to use ICS when, essentially, it already was? I decided then that I wanted to tackle this topic—I wanted to research it, write about it, and share my thoughts and conclusions. As much as I wanted to tackle this project, it was hard to find the time with so many other things going on in my life. Then, in 2007, I was fortunate enough to be assigned to Command and Staff College at Marine Corps University at Quantico, Virginia. In partial fulfillment of the Master of Military Studies degree, I had to conduct original analytical research. This was my opportunity to write on something that I was interested in, passionate about, and in which I could see a clear connection between my military service, my in-hospital experience, and my years as a paramedic.

As I embark on this research project, I want to give special thanks to some experts in the field of fire and emergency management who provided priceless assistance. Without them, I could not have developed this paper so thoroughly. Their bios are included in the appendices of this paper. They are Robert L. Irwin, Terence P. Haney, and Frank W. Borden. These gentlemen each played a key role in the development of ICS and still remain experts in their field.

I’d also like to thank Dan Svihra, the emergency manager for Navy Medicine National Capital Area. He is a trusted professional colleague with years of experience who helped to give this paper a reality check. When I asked for his assistance he readily agreed, even though he disagreed with my initial thesis. He also asked me if I really wanted to take on this topic, especially considering the political ramifications. Yes, Dan… I do want to take on this topic and your initial disagreement with my thesis makes your opinion even more valuable!

I can’t forget to thank my children. Though they are too young to understand how much it means to me, they do know that Daddy couldn’t always play with them when they wanted because he was studying or working. Kaleigh and Matthew— one day you’ll understand that I’m passionate about my work not just because I like it, but because I believe it will help to make your world better, safer, and of course, more fun!

Most importantly, I want to thank my lovely bride, Cheryl. She has been by my side, behind me kicking my you know what, and often the person who paid the biggest price for my hair-brained ideas, career changes, two previous masters degrees, military moves, and... need I say more. She was there for me in 1994 when I wrote my first master’s thesis and yet she married me anyway—and she’s still here now. That is love… that is support… that is someone worth living for!
Command and control is essential to the successful execution of any large scale event, be it a military operation, a large fire spread throughout a large region, a devastating earthquake, or category 5 hurricane making landfall over a large population. It is command and control (C2) that is key to successfully organizing, coordinating, directing, and supporting forces or personnel in a sensible manner to best achieve the tactical objective; winning a battle, saving life and property, recovering to some degree of normalcy. However, it is this coordinated C2 that is often the most difficult thing to achieve. After action reports from exercise and live events consistently call for more robust communication, better organization and unity of command. American history has seen the development of two such C2 structures that bring coordination and unity of effort to the table. Two systems that are proven – not to say that either is without fault – but each has demonstrated a level of efficacy such that the systems are tweaked over time but continue to function. Those systems include the staff structure utilized by the US military and the Incident Command System (ICS) utilized by civilian response agencies. Recent events have provided strong justification for the military to utilize ICS when responding with civilian agencies. The commonality of the ICS to the military staff structure is so close that Department of Defense does not need to utilize the incident command system during defense support to civil authority operations.

Methodology and Purpose

This paper will trace the history of the military staff structure and the incident command system. Tracing the history of the military staff structure is relatively easy as there is abundant material on the matter, both in the form of texts and past research. The history of ICS, while only about ten percent as long was more complex as there is less study or literature on the matter. Interviews were conducted with some of the key personnel and subject matter experts involved in the initial development, support and distribution of the program. The paper will then compare and contrast the two systems demonstrating the developmental and operational relationships and through this, demonstrate why it would be
counterproductive for the DoD to adopt the incident command system. Further, it will provide recommendation of a potential course of action DoD may want to consider for use in DSCA operations in order to assure successful execution of assigned missions and maintaining the 'spirit of the NIMS'.

Background

On September 11, 2001, enemies of the United States successfully executed attacks on American soil, killing nearly 3000 people, mostly innocent civilians and civilian responders. While the attack dealt a devastating blow to America, in retrospect, it was more symbolic than truly strategically effective – as our enemy has become the hunted. However, the US government was forced to re-evaluate its methods of planning and response. An entire cabinet level department was conceived and planning and response systems at all levels were evaluated. Command and control issues and resource management came to the forefront as they always do in large scale events. It was then that the Incident Command System (ICS) truly received national level attention. It was a system that was developed in the 1970’s by a group of highly experienced fire-rescue personnel after a devastating national disaster in their own jurisdictions lead them to see that while they were excellent at what they did, they could not easily come together with the type of synergy necessary. The idea for the initial development of ICS was a command and control system to deal with the highly complex, resource intensive needs of wildfire fighting. However, the initial system designers believed very strongly in developing one system that could be utilized for all hazards; one that could meet the operational, planning, logistical, and financial management needs that an incident commander would require in highly complex, rapidly changing situations. The ICS gives the incident commander the scope of control and flexibility to deal with simple or complex emergencies or disasters – much like a combatant commander in war. ICS caught the attention of response agencies across the US and internationally. There were healthcare and law enforcement offshoots as well as variations from agency to agency. Of course, these variations worked against what the system was created to do.
Current Requirements

One key initiative adopted by the newly formed Department of Homeland Security was the issuance of a document called the National Incident Management System (NIMS) on 1 March 2004. The NIMS was developed with input from all cabinet level departments in the US government plus state, local, and tribal agencies throughout the US. The NIMS document brings together the ICS, resource management and describes how the nation will work together at all levels (federal, state, tribal, local, and private) in responding to significant incidents. It states ICS will be the command and control structure used to manage these incidents and mandates federal departments to utilize it. All cabinet level agencies have signed the document. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the signatory for the US Department of Defense (DoD), thus indicating DoD concurrence with the stated concepts. Further, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 requires all federal agencies to adopt NIMS.

In light of the requirement for DoD departments and agencies to utilize ICS during Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations, DoD now has to figure out how. This means determining how 2.5 million uniformed service members and countless civilian and contract support personnel will learn to break from the military staff structure they are accustomed to, and respond, during a time of crisis, under a new system. The task of developing a program to do this went to the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia.

The US military command structure is based around a staff system. Each service varies slightly by nomenclature, but essentially each service follows the structure closely enough that when working jointly, they smoothly fall in with each other. Further, the system is used in combined and multi-national operations as well. This allows US forces to work with other nations with little confusion of basic command and control. The system draws its strength from its flexibility and scalability from the smallest of single service or unit operations to largest of multi-national combat operations. Throughout the Department
of Defense, the system is used during peace time in garrison for planning and exercising, as well as in the
field during exercises and war. As such, military personnel are very adept at moving from one command or
operation to the next and understanding where the pieces fit together. Military personnel use the system
every day; they are used to it, well versed in it, and better able to execute assigned missions.

HISTORY OF THE MILITARY STAFF STRUCTURE

Pre-Modern / Ancient Military Staff

The staff structure used currently by the US military found its current form in the past sixty years. It began to take its current shape during World War II and has been incrementally honed to its current status. However, the history behind the structure can be traced far further than that. In fact history finds evidence of early staffs dating back to Egypt in about 2000 BC where the Pharaohs appeared to have used them for intelligence and logistics functions. Early European precursors began to appear in the 1500s and became very evident in Sweden in the 1630s. Military staffs in early history consisted primarily of a very small group that served primarily as aides-de-camp, scribes to draw maps or document orders and a few trusted advisors or friends. The key relationship such small early staffs had to today’s staffs lies in their primary function - to assist and serve the Commander in administrative and logistical needs. As armies grew, so too, did their staffs. Armies in the past served a single leader, usually the king or emperor, and advanced on a single front. One leader and a small staff was all that was needed. As armies grew, and multiple fronts opened up with movements in multiple locations at an increased operational tempo, the need for multiple, larger, and more diverse staffs evolved.
Early European Staff Development

While the origins of the modern general staff structure is most often attributed to the Prussian Army, it is important to realize glimpses of such staffs were seen as far back as ancient Greece. Additionally, while the Prussian model appears to have been the most efficient model, there seems to have been an almost parallel development, albeit along different lines, in France which deserves historical attention as well. Cardinal Richelieu established an ‘intendant system’ in the French Army in the 1600s. This ‘Intendant’ was responsible for all administrative functions within the French Army. The Intendant appears to be similar to the Quartermaster General of the Prussian system. In 1766, France created what could be viewed as its first general staff and in 1793 a National Convention created a “Chief of Staff for the Army” with four adjutants general to assist. During the Napoleonic Wars, the intendant remained in the rear providing logistical as well as administrative support.

Napoleon expanded his staff in such a way that he could control larger and larger forces. He customized the existing functionally organized staff system to his own needs. This worked well for him, however, with his departure, the customized system no longer functioned efficiently. In 1818, the French established a military training school for its officers and rotated their brightest officers between staff and line assignments to round their officers and keep them in touch with the realities of the field. In 1833, an inefficient change saw the French Army revert to a system of separating officers into line or staff career paths. This weakened the French Army but remained in place until World War II.

Early Prussian staffs can be traced to the Quartermaster General, responsible for intelligence gathering. Historical documents from the German General Staff indicate the initial functions of the Prussian quartermaster staff and the general staff appear equivalent. The Prussians (later the Germans) instituted professional education and training and an organized general staff in the early 1800’s. With time to evolve and modifications for efficiency over many years, this staff structure became the envy of all
European armies. In fact, by the late 1800s and early 1900’s similar systems had been adopted by many other European countries.

The French defeat of the Prussian Army at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 is often viewed as the pinnacle event that spurred the Prussian creation of the general staff. This served as the genesis of the current military staff structure seen in the US and Europe. The Prussian staff was based on talent and ability vis-à-vis social status as had been the norm of the past. Officers were rewarded for their intelligence and ability. Staff officers were selected from among the best young officers, then educated and trained. Their education included fine arts as well as sciences. Those officers selected to the General Staff would replace older generals as they retired, thus increasing clarity and uniformity amongst the Prussian leadership. Further, the General Staff was organized along the lines of plans, intelligence, personnel, and supply, hauntingly familiar to the current US structure.

One thing was always clear to the Prussian staff – it was subservient to the monarch [civilian leadership] – something else reflective of today’s US military staff. This clear line or chain of command served multiple purposes. First, the monarch did not require an in depth understanding of military workings as he could always look to his General Staff for Generalship of his forces. Second, success or (to the advantage of the General Staff) failures of the military were attributable to the primacy of the civilian leadership or policy. The General Staff maintained responsibility for planning, supplying, and coordinating military activities down to the corps and division levels. Planning included preparations for contingencies and wars against all potential adversaries.

Under the leadership of Helmut Von Moltke, the Prussian system proved itself in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and other smaller conflicts. In each of these conflicts, force size, capabilities, and experience of the soldiers were somewhat similar – but the speed and precision with which the Prussians could plan, re-supply, coordinate maneuver (all attributable to General
Staff leadership) appeared to be the weighting factor. This Prussian/German system existed much in the same manner until World War II. Most European powers eventually adopted a similar system as a result of going to war against or observing the system in action. Russia (and after 1917 the Soviet Red Army) were based on the Prussian and Swedish systems and always under tight civilian control. Austria-Hungary adopted the Prussian like model after the defeat of the Austro-Prussian War. Most notably, the French began to develop a Prussian modeled system after their defeat in 1870 and passed many legal and internal Army reforms between 1873 and 1891. Britain and the US remained the only major powers that did not adopt a Prussian based system.

Early Development of the US Military Staff

Congress and the American people were reluctant to allow major change to the military organizational structure. This was true since colonial times due to fear of tyranny and oppression – a concern anchored in the behavior of British forces interacting with early colonists. Need for change was realized in the aftermath of the American Civil War. But the clumsiness with which the US defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898 was the impetus upon which Congress finally opened its eyes to the poor organization of the military. Despite the obvious need for a better organized and efficient military, issues of power and control within Congress prevented true reform until after World War II.

In 1789, Congress confirmed the War Department under the leadership of a politically appointed Secretary of War. The President, in accordance with the Constitution, served as the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary was his direct and executive agent. In most cases, neither the President nor Secretary were educated or experienced in military affairs. This structure assured strict civilian control over the military. However, the lack of organization and limited power of the most senior generals caused great disharmony that was to continue for more than 100 years. The next major change did not occur until the War of 1812 – at which time, Congress realized the Secretary of War’s 1809 assessment that the, “business
of War Department had increased beyond the department’s capacity.\textsuperscript{37} This caused Secretary John C. Calhoun to reorganize the Army under a system of administrative bureaus and field commanders in order to centralize authority.\textsuperscript{38} This system, as inefficient as it was, remained largely unchanged until about 1880.

Each Bureau had control over its function and reported only to the Secretary of War and the various Congressional Committees concerned with that function. This served two purposes; it kept Congress’ hand firmly in control of the military and prevented the Commanding General (CG) from gaining control over these functions – effectively violating the very concept of command and control given to the CG by regulation.\textsuperscript{39} Even the Secretary had little control as the bureau chiefs were appointed by congress for life.\textsuperscript{40}

Though he did not live to see the implementation of his ideas, Emory Upton is often viewed as one of the greatest reformers of the US military. He was an 1861 graduate of West Point and an unequaled field commander during the Civil War where he eventually served as Commanding General of a Cavalry Division.\textsuperscript{41} His analysis of the military after the Civil War lead him to very solid conclusions that aggressive reforms were necessary. He traveled to Prussia where he observed and was impressed by the Prussian Army system. His concepts of reform were based on the Prussian model. So aggressive were his reforms that he recommended completely abandoning the current staff system and remodeling it upon the Prussian/German system. His reforms were packaged into what was known as the Burnside Bill. It was defeated in Congress in 1879.\textsuperscript{42} It appears the loss of Republican seats in Congress was one of the greatest causes of defeat for him. The Democrats saw the bill as hard line “Germanizing” of the US Army.\textsuperscript{43} Unfortunately, Upton’s lack of understanding of, “the interrelationship between politics and war in a democratic state prevented him from convincing others to accept his reforms.”\textsuperscript{44}

US military reform was essentially non-existent until after the Spanish-American War. This is not to say Presidents and Secretaries of War during this period were not blind to the need and attempts were not made. In 1888, General John M. Schofield became the Army Commanding General and with the trust of
President Andrew Johnson made attempts at change. Schofield believed any change had to focus on two important concepts: the primacy of civilian control and military knowledge and judgment. Schofield made clear his policy of not issuing any order that the President and Secretary were not aware of — this assured civilian authorities always knew what military authority was doing. This also effectively placed the President back into his rightful position as Commander-in-Chief.

After the Spanish-American War of 1898, tabloids publicized the scandals within the Army bureaus and the sloppy performance of the military. Congress and the American public realized change had to occur. Bureaucracy, parochialism, and tradition could no longer resist change as the country was finally ready. In 1899, President McKinley appointed Elihu Root, a Republican lawyer from New York, as the Secretary of War. It was under Root that true reform began to occur. Root's focused efforts resulted in the creation of a General Staff, the fruit of Root's work. Root appointed Major General Grenville M. Dodge to study the problems inside the US Army. That study would later be known as the Dodge Commission. Root was provided with a copy of Upton's work which, when combined with the Dodge Commission findings, formed the core of his reforms. Upton also broke his traditional ties with the bureau chiefs and realigned his relationships with line officers, working to gain their trust and support and create unity of command.

Root's focused efforts resulted in the creation of a General Staff, the fruit of Root's work. Though he met many challenges in Congress and from within the Army, in 1903 he saw success; on 14 February 1903, Congress voted to create a Chief of Staff and stand up of a General Staff on 15 August 1903. The General Staff was broken into three divisions: Administration, planning, and military intelligence. Unfortunately, Root resigned early in 1904 and his successor had neither the will nor the ability to continue his work. This resulted in reversion back to the bureau system.

On 15 July 1910, Major General Leonard Wood became the new Army Chief of Staff. He was determined to reform the Army organization despite all opposition. To his advantage was the fact that President back into his rightful position as Commander-in-Chief. After the Spanish-American War of 1898, tabloids publicized the scandals within the Army bureaus and the sloppy performance of the military. Congress and the American public realized change had to occur. Bureaucracy, parochialism, and tradition could no longer resist change as the country was finally ready. In 1899, President McKinley appointed Elihu Root, a Republican lawyer from New York, as the Secretary of War. It was under Root that true reform finally began to occur. Concurrently, the President appointed Major General Grenville M. Dodge to study the problems inside the US Army. That study would later be known as the Dodge Commission. Root was provided with a copy of Upton's work which, when combined with the Dodge Commission findings, formed the core of his reforms. Upton also broke his traditional ties with the bureau chiefs and realigned his relationships with line officers, working to gain their trust and support and create unity of command.

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On 15 July 1910, Major General Leonard Wood became the new Army Chief of Staff. He was determined to reform the Army organization despite all opposition. To his advantage was the fact that...
Root's reforms, though not fully implemented, were law. Wood's uphill battle leveled off with a new Secretary of War – Henry L. Stimson in 1911. Stimson was supportive of Wood's changes, and together they fought what was sometimes a difficult battle to complete Root's work. Eventually, the General Staff developed to the point that it was able to prove its abilities even to the staunchest of opposition.

The work was not yet complete before the US would once again be forced to take a huge step backwards. The military build up prior to entering World War I saw a reversal of fortune when Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916 virtually decimating the General Staff. However, this was rapidly reversed in 1917 after the US declared war on Germany. The war provided an opportunity for the General Staff to prove itself in war, and it did. After the war, Congress again reverted to the bureau system out of fear for what this German type model could potentially do if it gained power. This time, however, Congress left the General Staff in place with approximately equal power to the bureaus. There was very little additional change until 1947.

During World War I, while political wrangling continued to occur back home, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) Europe, under the command of General John Joseph "Black Jack" Pershing, looked for an effective staff model in Europe. During the summer of 1917, AEF examined the French and British models and adopted a mix of the two. These models are also the origins of the "G" code system. The numbering system takes its roots from the French bureaux of a field Army's staff; the "First Bureau" was personnel, the "Second Bureau" was intelligence, the "Third Bureau" was operations, and the "Fourth Bureau" was troops and services. While this seems to be the source of the 'numbers' for modern staff section, the reference of "G’s" seems to be a slang that originated from interaction of the US personnel at the Army Staff College. The British and French would refer to them as "General Staff 1" or "General Staff 2." It was shortened at the suggestion of Brigadier General Alfred W. Bjornstad to "G-1", "G-2."
Current US Military Staff Structure

The American staff system of today has taken its roots in the British, French, and Prussian systems, with its greatest influence from the Prussian system. Those origins had great influence through the entire process. The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments established the Department of Defense with a Secretary and positioned the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as co-equals under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The intent was assure military operations on land, air, and sea were coordinated. It also established military control, a joint staff of up to 100 officers and clarified the reporting relationship between the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was very much the result of the last fifty years of attempts at reform with the experiences of World War II as the culminating point.

The next major change was not for nearly forty years with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Goldwater-Nichols created a very close model to the German General Staff model and also relieved the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the responsibility to reach a consensus of the Joint Chiefs in his recommendations to the President of the US. Further, Goldwater-Nichols clarified the Secretary of Defense’s relationship with the President and elevated his status above that of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. There exists some belief that Congress had to yield control of the military for these changes to occur and concern that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs may have too much influence over the warfighting combatant commanders, but US history, tradition and the Constitution have protected against this and is expected to continue to do so.

The current staff structure has existed, with little change, since 1986 and continues to serve the US well today.
HISTORY OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)

A Single Event Proved the Need

The Southern California wildfire season of 1970 saw multiple extremely large wildfires nearly simultaneously over a thirteen day period. The results were devastating; over 500,000 acres were burned, nearly 700 homes were destroyed, and sixteen lives were lost. In the wake of the devastation numerous problems within and among the response agencies were highlighted. Despite the very best efforts from each agency, their individual and certainly collective effectiveness was hampered by many problems with communication, resource management, and command and control between all responders.

Increases in population and urban development meant an increase in the urban-rural interface creating more suburban population. This resulted in a greater number of response departments over many jurisdictions leading to a greater need for coordination that was simply not in place in 1970. A wildfire easily crosses jurisdictions rapidly. This coupled with the need for one agency to request mutual aid from other agencies increased need for coordination. The summer of 1970 brought this all to light. The greatest problems identified included the number of people reporting to given supervisors, differing organizational structures, confusion over communications as different agencies used different terminology and nomenclature, different voice radio communication frequencies, difficult information operations, unclear lines of authority, lack of planning and response structure, and unclear or unspecified incident objectives.

Reaction, Funding, and FIRESCOPE

The reaction was immediate at all levels of response and government from the local jurisdictions to the federal level. In the words of the FIRESCOPE Program Manager, Congress, "got a screaming wake-up call from 27 members of the CA Congressional Delegation and both CA Senators that said, 'Do Something!'" The Watershed Council of Southern California (a political force of retired fire chiefs, foresters, and citizens) demanded legislation, the aerospace industry began making unsolicited proposals for
civilian application of their products, and the US Forest Services (USFS) stood up and stated they could fix the problem.

It took two years, but the 92nd Congress finally appropriated funds in FY72 to the USFS to develop a Command and Control System \(^7\) and work with the fire services in Southern California to review research, development and applications. They also chartered the Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRES COPE) project the same year and directed USFS. \(^79\) FIRES COPE was the organization that would take on the task. USFS managed the program and after causing a mess with an inappropriate appointee, finally designated Robert “Bob” Irwin, a highly experienced wildland fire manager as the FIRES COPE Program Manager. \(^80\) In addition to the USFS, the original partner agencies in FIRES COPE were: California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF), California Office of Emergency Services (OES), Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD), Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACFD), Ventura County Fire Department (VCFD), and Santa Barbara County Fire Department (SBFD). The FIRES COPE charter charged the participants to develop a system that would, “Make a quantum jump in the capabilities of Southern California wildland fire protection agencies to effectively coordinate interagency action and to allocate suppression resources in dynamic, multiple-fire situations.” \(^81\) History will show Congress got more for their money than was ever expected; FIRES COPE was an overwhelming success, not only for California fire fighting, but eventually, for all emergency response situations nationwide.

**FIRES COPE Dares to Challenge Tradition**

The successes and products from FIRES COPE are a matter of documented history. What is not documented is the incredible internal and inter-agency obstacles FIRES COPE had to overcome in order to produce what it did. As with any inter-agency organization, group dynamics, traditions, service rivalry and parochialism had to be overcome before forward progress could be realized. \(^82\) The early stages of
FIRESCOPE were difficult as agencies that were never designed to work together were forced to do so. A consulting organization was brought in to assist and facilitate the process in 1973. From this point a Technical Team made up of assigned Battalion Chiefs from the various departments was formed. This group met weekly in order to develop work product, later sending their work to an Operations Group (made up of Assistant Chiefs from the participating departments) for review and approval.

Each service came to the table with their response organizations and from these organizations, bits and pieces were taken and modified to better fit the mission. The USFS used a system called the Large Fire Organization (LFO). Large pieces of FIRESCOPE's final product came from the LFO; perhaps as much as forty percent of the resulting system is based on the LFO. Most of the city and county departments historically paid little attention to finances as part of their response organization. Thus, this was unfamiliar ground to them. However, USFS was quite adept at financial planning during responses. As such nearly the entire finance section of what the system to be developed came from LFO.

By 1973, the task force had focused its work on two major products; the Incident Command System (ICS) and the Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS). ICS was a command and control system and MACS was a system for typing, identifying and utilizing resources.

Consensus and a Functioning Product

Each piece of the FIRESCOPE product had to be approved internally to the organizations involved before it could be approved by all. By 1974, this process was getting smoother. The Task Force members knew each other well and were becoming familiar with the workings and needs of each organization. The Task Force tackled the resource issues first and completed that portion of the project in 1975. The hardest task was still ahead, agreeing to common terminology and developing a functional ICS model.

In 1976, all participating agencies agreed to common terminology and the basic ICS model. ICS was tested in several phases using dry runs and mock-ups. Parts of the system were improved as
weaknesses were found. In 1975, the LAFD tested parts of ICS with good results and by 1978 approved and implemented the system city wide. A “Transfer Training” was conducted for all agencies within FIRESCOPE in 1978 and ICS was utilized during the Pacoima Fire in the Angeles National Forest that summer. It was a multi-agency fire with all the complexities of a conflagration found in structural and wildland fires. After this event, interviews and many written analyses revealed weaknesses and points of improvement. The group continued to work to iron out these issues. In 1979 a major fire outburst required bringing in over 10,000 firefighters from outside of the region. Transfer training occurred on the fly at southern California airports as these firefighters arrived. After action reports were excellent, though still showed room for improvement. Again the group continued to work to improve the system.

The ‘hot’ test truly occurred during the summer of 1980. The fires that season rivaled those of 1970 and, “ALL of the FIRESCOPE implemented products performed to save lives, structures and acres of watershed.”

ICS, An Idea Whose Time Had Come

1980 was a landmark year for FIRESCOPE. While the project continued, that year CDF and OES, and all the partner agencies formally adopted ICS. Training programs were developed for state-wide implementation and the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) began an analysis of the program in consideration of national application. Approval came in 1981, and in 1982 a revision in ICS terminology was made to meet the standards of the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS). Having been approved by NWCG and added to NIIMS, all national and large forest fire services eventually implemented ICS.

Nevada, Colorado, Washington, and Florida state foresters had visited the Operations Coordination Center that had been established under FIRESCOPE and were eager to bring ICS to their services. Cities and counties in Southern California and the entire state adopted ICS and, in time, the system spread
nationwide to various fire and emergency response agencies. Fire agencies adopted the system very quickly, while law enforcement agencies were interested but initially hesitant.

**National Level Acceptance and Mandate**

While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was initially hesitant to adopt ICS, the USFS, US Park Service (USPS), US Coast Guard (USCG), Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Bureau of Land Management all adopted the system. FEMA eventually adopted ICS and later became one of its most staunchest supporters. However, it was not until 2004, more than 20 years after development, that ICS was not only accepted nationally, but mandated.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US Department of Homeland Security was created. The Department is tasked to provide all aspects of homeland security mitigation, planning, response, and recovery from attacks or disasters on US soil whether intentional, accidental, or natural disaster, under one roof. Part of executing this broad mission is acceptance of a single system of command and control and management of resources. In assuring this mission, the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System were implemented (and at the time of this paper was written were under revision). They call for the use if ICS by federal, state, tribal, and local agencies. There is no stronger evidence of the efficacy of this system than acceptance at this level. ICS as directed in these policies is essentially the product created by FIRESCOPE from 1972 – 1980.

**COMPARISON OF THE MILITARY STAFF STRUCTURE AND ICS**

**General Description of the Military Staff Structure**

The standard military staff structure, depicted in figure 1, is a chart of a typical joint staff organization. It exemplifies the common structure by which all branches of the military function on a day to day basis in peacetime and in war. Individual commands utilize this structure, generally from the
battalion or squadron level or above. The organization keeps functions neatly aligned and allows for common terminology across commands and when coming together for joint or combined operations. In this

\[ A \text{ Joint Staff Organization} \]

\[ \text{Figure 1}^{100} \]

example, each directorate is titled as “J-1”, “J-2”, etc. This would indicate it is a “joint” organization or an organization made up of personnel from two or more services. An Army or Marine Corps organization would normally use an “S” code if the unit commander was a colonel or below, and a “G” code if the commander is a General Officer. The Navy normally uses an “N” code regardless of the rank of the commander. However, the number associated with the code always relates to the same function: 1-Personnel, 2-Intelligence, 3-Operations, 4-Logistics, Plans & Policy, 6-Command, Control, Communications, & Computer Systems.
The commander has personal staff group that reports directly to him and serves in functions that require close personal control by the commander. Additionally, the special staff reports directly to the Chief of Staff or Principal Staff Officer. They assist the commander and the entire joint staff in technical, administrative, or tactical matters as needed. This small staff of subject matter experts can usually be found within major subordinate commands or within the joint staff divisions.

The entire organization is very large as shown but is scaleable depending on the need of the commander. The Commander also has the ability to modify the staff to his needs and choose what sections to or not to stand up as needed. For a detailed review of the functions of each section, see Appendix C.

General Description of the Incident Command System

ICS – Incident Organization Chart

Figure 2
The chart above depicts a common incident command system organizational chart with the major branches. The Incident Commander (IC) takes charge then activates each section or position as needed depending on the size and scope of the incident. Generally, the incident commander for the first responding agency within a jurisdiction will take charge and all other responders from that agency or mutual aid agencies will fall into the chain of command as necessary. In a small single response incident, the IC may choose to use an Operations Section only, whereas an incident is larger and will take more time to contain, the IC may see the need to activate a Planning Section with only a few of its sub-units. The concept behind ICS allows the IC to activate only what is needed or all sections and to create additional strike teams, task forces or units as needed. However, the hierarchical approach seeks to assure no more than seven individuals report to any single supervisor at any level. This controls the scope authority and responsibility to maintain a reasonable level of manageability for each supervisor.

The IC also has the liberty to have technical specialists assigned directly to him or her. For instance in a biologic agent spill event, the IC may choose to have a microbiologist or infectious disease physician assigned as his direct advisor exclusive of the medical unit already assigned to the Logistics Section. It is this flexibility that allows ICS to fit any situation.
Comparison of General Concepts of Each System

It is the general concepts of the military staff structure and ICS which emphasize their relationships. A drill down into the organizational charts and position descriptions within each varies significantly. It is the core of each organization that holds the relationship. Additionally, the mission or primary concern of the sections is nearly identical. The military staff structure includes a greater number of directorates than
the ICS. However, the military staff structure is also a structure that is built to be used for peacetime operations and planning as well as war and operations other than war.

Figure 3, depicts the typical military staff structure connected to the ICS structure. A careful examination of both structures together brings out the relationship. Part of the structure is taken directly and other parts of the structure are separated and moved into a different part of the ICS structure. The numbering system used in the military is not used in ICS – this one of the concepts of ICS; utilization of plain language to avoid confusion or the possibility that different agencies may use different numbers or codes. The parts compare as follows:

There is no Chief of Staff under ICS. There is an Incident Commander. For the purpose of this example, assume the Commander is the political leadership or Fire Commissioner back at headquarters (offsite) that the Incident Commander reports to thus making the Chief of Staff the equivalent to the Incident Commander (Figure 4).
The G-3 Operations Section is replicated in ICS as the section that must solve the current problem or prosecute action against a tactical objective (Figure 5).

The G-5 Plans & Policy section is replicated in ICS as the Planning Section and has the responsibility of tracking current operations and preparing for the future. In a military operation, the G-5 would plan for the future and transition the plan to the G-3 for execution. In ICS, the Planning Section plans the details of the next phase or operational period of the incident at hand and transitions it to the Operations Section for execution (Figure 6).
The G-4 provides support for all aspects of the military staff structure; equipment, food, medical support, or resources of any kind. The Logistics Section of ICS provides an equivalent function, tracking and providing resources as needed to other sections with immediate emphasis on what is directed by the Incident Commander and the needs of the Operations Section (Figure 7).

![Diagram of the military staff structure and Incident Command System structure.]

The military staff structure does not have a numbered code equivalent to the Finance/Risk Management Section of the ICS. The military comptroller is part of the Special Staff assigned to the Chief of Staff (see figures 1 and 3).

Other differences are in the placement of what the military calls Special Staff or Special Assistants. Within the ICS structure, most of those duties move into appropriate Sections below the Incident Commander. However, depending on the event, the Incident Commander has the ability to take part of theses staff units and move them up to serve as Technical Specialists reporting directly to him.

The graphical depictions and accompanying descriptions herein assist in clarifying the close relationship between the military staff structure and the Incident Command System structure. An examination of the histories does not necessarily relate the systems, but the physical structure and descriptive similarities strongly suggest the developers of ICS were influenced by the military staff. The history of the military staff is far richer both in time, controversy, and experimentation. However, by the
mid 1900's the system was already beginning to take shape as it is seen today. In comparison, the ICS development began in 1972 – long after the military staff structure was in place. The agencies that came to the table at FIRESCOPE each came with their own systems, some of which had similarities to the military staff structure.\textsuperscript{105} The Large Fire Organization (LFO) had great influence on the final system\textsuperscript{106} and an examination of the historical development of that system may indicate a direct developmental relationship to the military staff structure. However, regardless of whether or not there is a direct link between the military structure and ICS, the systems are functionally and structurally extremely similar.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

\textit{DoD Use of ICS is Resource Intensive and Redundant}

The Department of Defense and the military services utilize the military staff structure in almost everything they do from peacetime planning to humanitarian operations all the way through full scope of the largest and most violent kinetic military operations and everything in between. The total number of uniformed personnel in the active and reserve components numbers nearly 2.5 million men and women and that does not begin to account for the vast numbers of civilian government and contract employees who work with and deploy with the uniformed services every day. ICS, while similar to the military staff structure has its limitations. It is meant to command and control emergency response operations over a reasonably short term period and is not a robust enough organization, as is, to completely replace the current military staff structure. Ergo, ICS could not be utilized for day to day military operations.

Further, a transition such as that would require legislation and reorganization of the DoD – something akin to moving a mountain and extremely time consuming. It took over 200 years to develop the system that is in use today; a system that has now proven itself repeatedly in peace and in war – and in the execution of defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) operations.
Due to the great complexity of completely moving the DoD to ICS, it would make more sense to consider utilizing ICS solely for DSCA operations. This too is an extremely resource intensive endeavor. First, DoD would need to determine who to train and at what point in their career path. Second, the DoD would need to exercise with ICS in order to assure the appropriate personnel were expert enough in its structure and intricacies to assure smooth execution. Third, DoD would need to establish a means of reaching those personnel identified to be trained in ICS and pair that with a means of tracking the training and upkeep of skills. Assuming DoD could identify the right mix of personnel and the current school houses added the training to standard databases, the Service personnel branches tracked it and the DoD simply adopted the FEMA training programs already in use, it would still need to fund the training or travel in terms of dollars and time. The DoD budget is stretched to the point of breaking; equipment development and replacement costs, personnel costs, and benefit costs are growing annually, but Congress is not increasing base funding. Additionally, current operating tempo is extreme. Further, that same operational tempo often prevents units from training in their core competencies. If they do not have the time to train in their core competencies, they certainly don’t have the time to train for a contingency that, fortunately, most will never take part in. Without time and resources for training, DoD would be unable to properly utilize the ICS.

**Recommendation: Alternative to DoD Use of ICS**

DoD and its subordinate commands should continue using the current military staff structure they are accustomed to. This assures DoD resources brought to bear during a DSCA operation will be capable of mobilizing, deploying, executing the mission, and redeploying efficiently and with little confusion. DoD forces do not transfer control of any units to civilian authority at any time. That is to say a Marine Corps infantry battalion assisting a municipal police department during large scale riots does not transfer command authority to the municipal police chief or any line supervisor. The Marines would continue to
execute orders from their chain of command. US Navy Seabees or Riverine Patrol Squadrons would not
transfer command authority to a flooded community’s mayor in the aftermath of a hurricane. They
maintain their chain of command. However, at some level the military must be a part of the Unified
Command cell directing operations, and that Unified Command will be functioning under ICS. So how
does DoD speak the language in order to participate effectively and efficiently bring to bare its assets in a
coordinated manner?

The answer lies within the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).

USNORTHCOM has been charged with the responsibility for all military operations within the continental
US, its territories, and territorial waters. The USNORTHCOM staff includes liaison officers that already
work with communities on a regular basis as well as Defense Coordinating Officers assigned to each state.
If the appropriate USNORTHCOM staff and resources are trained as part of their command indoctrination
training, they would then be able to successfully (and with little effort) serve as the liaison to assure proper
communication and execution of all DSCA missions. They already shoulder the responsibility for directing
and coordinating DoD in execution of these missions. If the training is limited to those personnel, it would
assure the units in execution of the mission could execute their responsibilities in a familiar manner and
receive their orders in that manner while those receiving requests for forces and capabilities from civilian
authorities would speak the language of our civilian counterparts. This method is cost effective in terms of
time and dollars spent. It would also assure DoD remains connected to the civilians supported and provide
‘virtual’ us of the ICS – thus acting in the spirit of compliance with the NIMS and HSPD-5.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense does not and should not utilize the Incident Command System in
execution of defense support to civilian authorities operations and can still operate within the requirements
of the National Incident Management System. This is due to the great commonality of the ICS to the
military staff structure, the fact that US military forces will never report directly to any civilian authority and the requirements that would be levied upon DoD in order to effectively operate under ICS make the requirement unrealistic. The existence of the US Northern Command as a coordinator for all DSCA operations serves to alleviate the need for assigned forces to utilize ICS since they will simply execute tactical missions in support of the USNORTHCOM Commander whose staff should have experience, training, and exercising with civilian authorities and the use of ICS.
Appendix A - Military Staff Structure Historical Timeline

This timeline summarizes information that is documented within the body of this document.

2000 BC ..........Signs of early staffs exist in Egypt. Pharaohs used them for intelligence and logistics functions. 107

1500 ...............Early staffs appear in Europe. 108

1600s .............Cardinal Richelieu established the ‘intendant system’ to deal with administrative functions in the French Army. 109

1630s ..............Evidence of staffs forming in Sweden. 110

1766 ..............France created what appears to have been its first General Staff. 111

1789 ..............US Congress confirmed the War Department under the direction of a politically appointed Secretary of War. The President was to serve as the Commander-in-Chief. 112

1793 ..............French national convention created a Chief of Staff of the Army and four adjutants to assist. 113

1806 ..............French defeat the Prussians at Jena-Auerstadt – seen as pinnacle event in the start of the Prussian staff system. 114

1809 ..............US Secretary of War realizes the business of the War Department has expanded beyond the department’s capabilities. 115

1800s .............Prussians established officer education and training systems and an early general staff system. 116

1812 ..............US Army reorganizes under a system of bureaus. 117

1818 ..............French establish a military training school for officers. 118

1833 ..............French revert to an inefficient system of dealing with officer career paths. 119

1866 ..............Prussian general staff system proven in Austro-Prussian War. This resulted in Austria-Hungary adopting the Prussian system. 120

1870 ..............Prussian general staff system proven in Franco-Prussian War. This resulted in the French adopting the Prussian system. 121

1879 ..............Emory Upton submits recommend changes to the army leadership structure to Congress and they are defeated (Burnside Bill). 122

28
1800s (late)......General staff systems similar to Prussian system begin to appear in Europe.\textsuperscript{125}

1888.................General John M. Scholfield appointed Commanding General of the US Army and makes aggressive attempts at changing the system.\textsuperscript{126}

1898.................US sees the need for change after the difficulties that occurred with managing the military during the Spanish-American War.\textsuperscript{127}

1899.................US President McKinley appoints Elihu Root as Secretary of War\textsuperscript{128} and appoint Major General Grenville Dodge to study the problems inside the Army.\textsuperscript{129}

1903...............Root submits his suggestions for change (based on Emory Upton’s writings and the Dodge Commission report). Congress votes to create a Chief of Staff and stand up a General Staff on 15 August.\textsuperscript{130}

1904...............Elihu Root resigns as Secretary of War for personal reasons. His successor does not follow through with the changes Root worked so hard for.\textsuperscript{131}

1910.................19 July, Major General Leonard Wood appointed Chief of Staff of the US Army and attempts to fully implement Root's reforms.\textsuperscript{132}

1911...............Henry L. Stimson appointed Secretary of War and is very supportive my MG Wood’s work to implement Root’s reforms.\textsuperscript{133}

1914...............US military buildup in preparation for WWI.\textsuperscript{134}

1916...............Congress passes National Defense Act of 1916, virtually decimating the General Staff.\textsuperscript{135}

1917...............Congress reverses the National Defense Act of 1916 after War is declared on Germany.\textsuperscript{136}

American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) Europe under General John Joseph “Black Jack” Pershing looks for an effective staff model in Europe. Examined French and British models and adopted a mix of the two.\textsuperscript{137} These models are the origin of the “G” code system,\textsuperscript{138} however, not referred immediately. The reference to the “G” codes came at the suggestion of Brigadier General Alfred W. Bjornstead at the Army War College.\textsuperscript{139}

Soviet Red Army staff system based on the Prussian and Swedish systems.\textsuperscript{140}

1919...............Congress revertes the Army back to the bureau system but leaves the General Staff in place with approximately equal authority to the bureaus.\textsuperscript{141}
1947 National Defense Act of 1947 and amendments established the Department of Defense with a Secretary and positioned the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as co-equals under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{142}

1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created a staff structure very similar to that of the German General Staff model\textsuperscript{143}, relieved the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the responsibility to reach a consensus among the joint chiefs in his recommendations to the President.\textsuperscript{144} Additionally, the Secretary of Defense's relationship to the President was clarified and elevated above that of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.\textsuperscript{145}
Appendix B - Incident Command System Historical Timeline

This timeline summarizes information that is documented within the body of this document.

1970.............Multiple, near simultaneous wildfires in Southern California in a 13 day period resulting destroyed thirteen homes, burned over 500,000 acres, and resulted in 16 deaths.\textsuperscript{146} Multiple agencies responded but were hindered by incompatible command and control and equipment resources.\textsuperscript{147}

1971.............The 92\textsuperscript{nd} U.S. Congress Approved FY72 funding to develop a system that will, "Make a quantum jump in the capabilities of Southern California wildland fire protection agencies to effectively coordinate interagency action and to allocate suppression resources in dynamic, multiple-fire situation."\textsuperscript{148}

1972.............The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF), California Office of Emergency Services (OES), Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD), Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACFD), Ventura County Fire Department (VCFD), and Santa Barbara County Fire Department (SBFD) formed FIRESCOPE under the leadership of the US Forest Service.\textsuperscript{149}

1973.............The first FIRESCOPE technical team made up of battalion chiefs from each of the participating departments\textsuperscript{150} was formed and focused on two major products that would become known as the Incident Command System (ICS) and Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS).\textsuperscript{151}

1974.............FIRESCOPE’s work was becoming smoother as the team members were becoming familiar with each other and respective agencies.\textsuperscript{152}

1975.............FIRESCOPE tackled the resources issue first, MACS.\textsuperscript{153} The hardest task was still ahead – agreeing to common terminology and developing an ICS model. LAFD tested parts of ICS with great success.\textsuperscript{154}

1976.............All agencies agreed to ICS terminology and a basic model.\textsuperscript{155} ICS was tested in phases using dry runs and mockups. As weaknesses were identified, improvements were made.\textsuperscript{156}

1978............."Transfer Training" was conducted for all agencies within FIRESCOPE and the ICS was utilized during the Pacoima Fire in the Angeles National Forest.\textsuperscript{157} The system was applied to urban systems as well. In 1978, LAFD approved ICS for use citywide.\textsuperscript{158}

1979.............A major fire outburst in Southern California necessitated the response of multiple agencies from outside the area. A transfer training was conducted at southern California airports and ICS was utilized. After action reports and interviews were excellent, but showed room for improvement. The FIRESCOPE team continued working to improve the system.\textsuperscript{159}
1980.................A landmark year for FIRESCOPE:
...........................- All partner agencies formally accepted ICS.\textsuperscript{160}
...........................- Training programs were developed for the entire state of California.\textsuperscript{161}
...........................- The National Wildfire Coordination Group (NWCG) initiated analysis of the system.\textsuperscript{162}
...........................- A ‘hot’ test occurred during the summer; the fires rivaled those of the 1970 season.
                         “All FIRESCOPE implemented products performed to save lives, structures and acres of watershed.”\textsuperscript{163}

1981.................NCWG approved of ICS.\textsuperscript{164}

1982.................FIRESCOPE terminology is revised to National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) standards and added to NIIMS.\textsuperscript{165} With NWCG and NIIMS approval, all national and large forest fire services eventually adopted ICS.\textsuperscript{166}

1982 – 2000.......ICS is adopted by federal, state, tribal, and local response agencies nationwide and internationally. Healthcare, law enforcement and other response agencies develop related programs that better fit their needs.\textsuperscript{167}

2001.................September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attack occurred in the US.

2003.................The federal government recognizes the need for a single, nationwide emergency management structure. HSPD-5 mandates all federal agencies to utilize the National Incident Management System (NIMS) when two or more federal agencies respond together or when assisting state, tribal, or local agencies.\textsuperscript{168}

2005.................March 1\textsuperscript{st} – The National Incident Management System is published.\textsuperscript{169}
Appendix C - Section 111 of the Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, (JFSC PUB 1)

111. JOINT STAFFS

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

a. Introduction. Joint force commanders are furnished staffs to assist them in the decisionmaking and execution process. The joint staff is an extension of the JFC; its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander.

b. Definition. A joint staff is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one military department), which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force.

c. Principles. Joint Pub 0-2 outlines the principles and basic doctrine that govern the organization, activities, and performance of a joint force staff.

   (1) A joint force commander (JFC) is authorized to organize the staff as deemed necessary to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions.

   (2) Members of the joint staff are responsible to the joint force commander.

   (3) The joint force commander should ensure that the recommendations of any member of the staff receive consideration.

   (4) Authority to act in the name of the commander must be specifically prescribed by the commander.

   (5) Orders and directives to subordinate units are issued in the name of the commander and, generally, to the next subordinate command, rather than directly to elements of that subordinate command.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS</strong></th>
<th><strong>Unified Combatant Command</strong></th>
<th><strong>Subordinate Unified Command</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Establishing Authority</strong></td>
<td>President through the Secretary of Defense with advice &amp; assistance of OJCS</td>
<td>Unified commander, when authorized by OJCS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Mission Criteria**               | Any combination of the following, with significant forces of two or more military departments involved:  
  - A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force  
  - A large geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein  
  - Common utilization of limited logistic means |  
  - Conduct operations on a continuing basis per criteria of a unified command |
| **Commander's Responsibilities**   |  
  - Plan and conduct military operations in response to crises, including the security of the command and protection of the United States, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion  
  - Maintain the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command  
  - Carry out assigned missions, tasks, responsibilities  
  - Assign tasks to, and direct coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions  
  - Communicate directly with the Chiefs of the Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and subordinate elements  
  - Keep the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly advised of significant events and incidents that occur in the functional or geographic area of responsibility, particularly incidents that could create national or international repercussions |  
  - Responsibilities similar to the unified commander's |
| **Forces**                         | Significant forces of two or more military departments | Significant assigned or attached forces of two or more Services |
| **Authority of the Commander**     | Combatant command (command authority), i.e.,  
  - Authoritative direction for logistical/strategic training  
  - Prescribe chain of command; select commanders & staff  
  - Organize commands/forces; employ forces  
  - Assign command functions  
  - Coordinate/approve admin & support  
  - In the event of a major emergency in the AOR requiring the use of all available forces, may assume temporary GFCON of all forces in the assigned AOR  
  - In unusual situation, may exercise GFCOM directly of subordinate elements |  
  - Similar to unified command within the assigned area of responsibility, except authorized only operational control |
| **Notes**                          |  
  - Combatant command (command authority) through components, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, attaching elements of one force to another, and directly to specific operational forces  
  - Commander's staff: key staff positions represented by Services assigned, balanced by composition of forces & character of operations | Exercises: Operational Control through  
  - components  
  - joint task forces  
  - attaching elements of one force to another  
  - directly to specific operational forces |

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAFC

Figure 1-27

34
## SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS (cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishing Authority</th>
<th>Combatant Commander's Service Component Command</th>
<th>Functional Component Command</th>
<th>Joint Task Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Committed commanders and commanders of subunified commands and JTFs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subordinate unified command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Existing JTF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Specific limited objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not require centralization of control of logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Requires close integration of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Requires coordination of local defense of subordinate areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander's Responsibilities</td>
<td>* Recommend proper employment of forces*</td>
<td>* Recommend proper employment of forces*</td>
<td>* Recommend proper employment of assigned forces*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Accomplish operational missions*</td>
<td>* Accomplish assigned operational missions*</td>
<td>* Accomplish assigned operational missions*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Select units for assignment to subordinated forces*</td>
<td>* Conduct joint training*</td>
<td>* Conduct joint training*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Conduct joint training*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Inform COM of proposed changes in logistics support*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Under crisis action or wartime, implement COM's logistics directives*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Develop program and budget requests that comply with COM's guidance*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Inform COM of program and budget decisions that affect planning*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* General functions: Internal administration and discipline, training, logistics functions, intelligence*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Furnish force data to support assigned missions*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces</td>
<td>* All Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organization, and installations under the command assigned to the unified command*</td>
<td>* Normally, but not necessarily, forces of two or more military departments*</td>
<td>* Assigned forces of two or more military departments on a significant scale*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Assigned by establishing authority*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority of the Commander</td>
<td>* Internal administration and discipline*</td>
<td>* As determined by the designating commander*</td>
<td>* Exercises OPCON over assigned &amp; normally over attached forces*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Training of Service forces*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Logistics, except as otherwise directed by the COM*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Service intelligence matters*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>* Commander is senior officer of Service assigned to a combatant command and qualified for command*</td>
<td>* Performs operational missions of long or short duration*</td>
<td>* JTF is dissolved when purpose has been achieved*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Commander designated by establishing authority may be Service component commander with concurrence of JFO*</td>
<td>* Commander may be a component commander selected with concurrence of COM*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 1-28

35
(6) Authorization is generally given to communicate directly between appropriate staff officers of other commands to expedite execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands.

(7) Each staff division must coordinate its action and planning with the other staff divisions.

(8) The staff channel is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only.

d. Staffing. The establishing authority of a joint organization provides for the furnishing of necessary staff personnel. As on any staff, the number of people should be kept to the minimum and matched to the assigned task. Staff members should be detailed for sufficiently long periods to gain and use the required experience. The officers on the joint staff must be competent to advise the commander in areas concerning their respective Services.

e. Organization. Figure 1-29 illustrates the broad functional subdivisions of a typical joint staff organization that are outlined in Joint Pub 0-2. The commander’s staff is broadly categorized into personal staff, special staff, and general or joint staff divisions.

(1) The chief of staff (COS) is the principal staff officer, assistant, and adviser to the JFC. The COS coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. For internal administrative matters, the COS may be assisted by a secretary of the joint staff. In addition, some staffs have deputy chiefs of staff to assist the COS.

(2) The personal staff group is directly responsible to the commander. It includes any assistants needed to handle matters requiring close personal control by the commander. The commander’s aide or aide-de-camp, legal adviser, public affairs adviser, inspector general, and political adviser are generally on the commander’s personal staff.

(3) The special staff group assists the commander and the joint staff with technical, administrative, or tactical matters, e.g., comptroller, facility engineering, medical, weather, quartermaster, and transportation affairs. The special staff is usually small, with experts found on the component command staffs or within the joint staff divisions.
(4) The principal functional divisions or directorates of the JFC's staff are known as the joint staff group. The function of the joint staff is to execute the responsibilities of the commander, e.g., developing policy, preparing and coordinating plans, and overseeing all functions assigned to the commander. Depending on the staff, the staff subdivision may be headed by an assistant chief of staff or director. Joint force commanders have the authority and latitude to establish the staff organization required to fulfill the command's responsibilities.

- **Manpower and personnel division (J-1).** This division manages personnel and administration, develops personnel policies, administers military and civilian personnel within the command, and administers prisoners of war.

- **Intelligence division (J-2).** The J-2 division's function is to ensure the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warnings on the characteristics of the area of operations and the location, activities, and capabilities of the enemy.
J-2 emphasis is on the enemy. Activities may include HUMINT and counterintelligence, target identification and selection, and electronic intelligence gathering and analysis.

- Operations division (J-3). The operations division assists the JFC in the direction and control of operations. Its work begins with the initial planning and extends through the integration and coordination of joint operations.

- Logistics division (J-4). The division develops logistics plans and coordinates and supervises supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics activities. Responsibilities may include weapons safety, civil engineering support, transportation management, etc. Because logistics support is primarily a Service responsibility, the thrust of joint logistics operations may be to coordinate Service programs and integrate them with the joint commander’s concept of support. Knowledge of Service policies and doctrine is essential.

- Plans and policy division (J-5). This division does the long-range planning. It prepares campaign, concept, and operation plans, and the associated Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. Often, the J-5 is responsible for special weapons planning. In commands without a separate J-5 division, the function is performed by the operations division.

- Command, control, communications, and computer systems division (J-6). This division may be found with a variety of names and designators: Command, Control, Communications Systems; Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems Division; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Division; etc. It uses organizational codes such as J-6, C3, C4, C4I, C3S, etc. The functions of the division include handling command responsibilities for communications and frequency control, tactical communications planning and execution, and management and development of electronics and automatic information systems.

A more detailed description of the basic functions of the principal joint staff divisions is shown in Figure 1-30.

Nontraditional divisions are also found in many commands.

- Security assistance division. The mission of supporting military and economic aid to countries within a joint commander’s area of operations is complex and vitally important to U.S. foreign policy. This function may be found in a separate division or as a part of the logistics division.
# Functions of Joint Staff Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directorate or Division</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Manpower and Personnel (J-1)** | * Manage manpower  
  * Formulate personnel policies  
  * Supervise administration of personnel, including civilians and prisoners of war |
| **Intelligence (J-2)** | * Ensure availability of sound intelligence on area and enemy locations, activities, and capabilities  
  * Direct intelligence efforts on proper enemy items of interest  
  * Ensure adequate intelligence coverage and response  
  * Disclose enemy capabilities and intentions |
| **Operations (J-3)** | * Assist in direction and control of operations  
  * Plan, coordinate, and integrate operations |
| **Logistics (J-4)** | * Formulate logistics plans  
  * Coordinate and supervise supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics matters  
  * Ensure effective logistics support for all forces in the command |
| **Plans and Policy (J-5)** | * Assist commander in long-range or future planning  
  * Prepare campaign and operation plans  
  * Prepare estimates of the situation  
  * Functions may be included in operations directorate |
| **Command, Control, Communications, and Computers or Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems (J-6)** | * Assist commander with responsibilities for communications-electronics and automated data systems  
  * Prepare communications and data systems plans to support operational and strategic concepts  
  * Furnish communications to exercise command in mission execution  
  * Functions may be included in operations directorate or in the special staff |
| **Special Staff** | * Give technical, administrative, and tactical advice  
  * Prepare parts of plans, estimates, and orders  
  * Coordinate and supervise staff activities  
  * Special staff may be included as branches of directorates |
| **Personal Staff** | * Responsible directly to the commander  
  * Special matters over which the commander chooses to exercise close personal control  
  * Usually includes the political adviser |

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAN  
Figure 1-30
• Interoperability division. The responsibility for joint planning, plans evaluation and analysis, development of joint doctrine, coordinating joint education and training, and the conduct of joint training exercises may be separate from the other divisions.

• Force structure, resources, and assessment division. The Reorganization Act of 1986 brought added responsibility to combatant commanders for critical involvement in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The specialized nature of this work and the coordination required with component commands has created a need for dedicated staff support.

f. Variations in joint staff divisions. The commander may organize the staff as necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities. Many combatant commands have taken advantage of this flexibility. For example, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM have consolidated the security assistance function with J-4; TRANSCOM and STRATCOM have consolidated the J-3 and J-4 functions.

g. Terminology. Joint Pub 1-02, The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, uses the term “general staff” to describe the divisions explained above. While there is consistency in the functional subdivisions of a staff into personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, etc., the staff designations vary between Services and with the size of organization supported. The Army and Marine Corps may use G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 to identify personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics staff divisions; the Navy may use N-1, N-2, N-3, etc.; and the Air Force uses letter designations. Figure 1-31 illustrates just some of the possible staff designations.

h. History. Joint staffs are organized on the conventional staff model. The advent of extensive joint operations during World War II and the institution of the unified command structure after the war posed the question of which type of staff organization would be best suited to such commands. For a variety of reasons, the general staff organization adapted by General Pershing from the French in World War I and developed by the Army and Marine Corps evolved as the model for the U.S. joint staff. This is reasonable, because joint operations nearly always include ground forces, and a majority of the joint staff will be familiar with the concept. The term joint staff or conventional staff is used in lieu of general staff to avoid confusion with the General Staff, a unique organizational concept. The General Staff is a senior, professional military staff with command authority used in some foreign military organizations. Such an arrangement was expressly forbidden in the creation of the U.S. military establishment in 1947 and has been excluded in every legislative change since.
## U.S. STAFF DESIGNATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Logistics</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Communications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY COMPONENT HQ</td>
<td>DCS Personnel</td>
<td>DCS Intelligence</td>
<td>DCS Operations and Plans</td>
<td>DCS Logistics</td>
<td>DCS Communications - Electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY DIVISION HQ</td>
<td>ACOS Personnel (G2)</td>
<td>ACOS Intelligence (G2)</td>
<td>ACOS Operations (G3)</td>
<td>ACOS Logistics (G4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE COMPONENT HQ</td>
<td>DCS Personnel (DP)</td>
<td>DCS Intelligence (APS)</td>
<td>DCS Operations (DC)</td>
<td>DCS Logistics (LG)</td>
<td>DCS Plans (XP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE WING</td>
<td>Included in Support Group (SPTGP) &amp; MSG/MSF</td>
<td>Included in Operations Group (DPC)</td>
<td>Logistics Group (LG)</td>
<td>Included in DCO &amp; LG as DCS, LGX, ACG, XP in ACC, CG as OBSO, DOD &amp; LG as LGB/LGX</td>
<td>Communications Group (CG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY COMPONENT HQ</td>
<td>ACOS Administration (H4)</td>
<td>ACOS Intelligence (N3)</td>
<td>ACOS Operations (N3)</td>
<td>ACOS Logistics (N4)</td>
<td>ACOS Communications (N3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ABBREVIATIONS:**
- **DCS** - DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
- **ACOS** - ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

**References:**
- ARMY FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations
- AIR FORCE Publication 65-41, USAF Staff Organization Chartbook
- NAVY NWP 11, Naval Operational Planning Figure 1-30
Appendix D – Excerpts from “The Incident Command System (ICS)” by Robert L. Irwin

“The Incident Command System (ICS) discussed in this chapter was developed after a series of wildland fires caused death, damage, and destruction in southern California in 1970. Federal, state, and local fire services involved in the fire siege recognized hundreds of problems with their response and coordination during the fires. Most of the problems were quite similar to those described throughout this book. The fire services joined together in the FIRESCOPE Program to resolve those problems. The ICS was a major product of their joint effort. ICS is a management system, developed around specific design criteria and modern management concepts. There are five functions in the System, designed with a clarity that improves effectiveness, accountability and communications. ICS uses an incident action planning process that is systematic and comprehensive; multiple agencies and emergency response disciplines can be integrated into a common organization using the process. The unified command concept used in ICS provides the most effective means of coordinating and directing multiple disciplines on major civilian emergencies.”

“OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM

There are 36 basic positions in the complete ICS organization (Fig. 7-1). The Command, Branch Director, Division Supervisor, Task Force Leader, Team Leader, and some other positions may be duplicated (following span-of-control guidelines) if necessary to expand the organization. With all positions filled,

ICS can manage up to 5,200 people. It is rare that they all win be activated; only a major and very complex incident would require the full organization.

A basic rule of the organization is that the duties of any position not filled will be assumed by the next higher position. Thus, for moderately complex incidents where only perhaps one-third of the positions are activated, the complete range of duties and responsibilities would still be assigned to a specific person. For instance, if Command decides not to activate the Finance or Logistics sections, then Command must still be responsible for these functions. Or, if the Logistics Section Chief (or OIC) has only a moderate workload, a decision not to activate the Service and Support Branch Director positions may be made. In such case, the Logistics Section Chief/OIC would assume the duties of the
positions not filled. This basic rule of delegation increases accountability and tends to encourage a stronger managerial perspective from Command and Section Chiefs. The 36 positions are arranged to perform five functions: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance.

**Command**

Command responsibilities are **executive** in nature (see Fig. 7-2). They are designed to develop, direct, and maintain a viable organization and to keep that organization coordinated with other agencies, elected officials, and the public. Command responsibilities include:

- organizing to meet the needs of the incident,
- establishing incident control objectives,
- setting priorities for work accomplishment,
- assuring development of Command-approved Action Plans,
- approval of resource orders and releases,
- approval of public information outputs, and
- coordination with public officials and other agencies.

A key point about the command function is that the executive responsibilities cannot be ignored. Even though there may be only five or six responders on an incident and the Incident Commander may be quite involved in the actual "doing" work, the command function requires attention to organizing and managing.

The Incident Commander is supported by a Public Information Officer, Safety Officer, and a Liaison Officer as needed. These positions report directly to Command and assist in fulfilling the duties of coordination with others and the overall safety of the organization's members.

**Figure 7-2. Command section.**
Figure 7-3. Operations section

Operations
The Operations Section responsibilities are of line nature (see Fig. 7-3). Operations is the "doer" in the organization, where the real work of incident control is accomplished. Operations is charged with carrying out Command direction. Responsibilities include:

- achieving command objectives,
- directing tactical operations,
- participating in the planning process,
- modifying Action Plans to meet contingencies
- providing intelligence to Planning and Command,
- maintaining discipline and accountability

The most important observation that can be made about the disaster management failures documented in this book is that most disaster response organizations start and stop with the "doing" work. Earlier examples cite numerous instances where overall management has not been maintained, and only massive "doing" chores constitute the emergency actions. In ICS, the Operations Section activities-while certainly important-are integrated into a total managed System, and not a means unto themselves to the exclusion of all other chores that must be done.

Planning
Planning Section responsibilities are of staff nature (see Fig. 7-4). They are support of Command and Operations, and designed to provide past, present, and future information about the incident. This information includes both resource and situation status on a real-time basis. Responsibilities include:

- maintaining accurate resource status,
- gathering and analyzing situation data,
- providing displays of situation status,
- estimating future probabilities,
- preparing alternative strategies,
- conducting planning meetings, and
- compiling and distributing approved Action Plans.

The Planning Section includes a position for "Technical Specialists." The position(s) may be filled by any qualified advisor(s) to provide Planning with technical data that are critical to incident management. In a flood situation, for instance, it may be necessary to consider public health and sanitation issues. A public health officer could be assigned as a Technical Specialist to provide professional advice. In the case of a building collapse, a construction engineer or the local building permit inspector might be used to advise Planning. The purpose of the position is to assure that plans are complete and realistic, regardless of the nature of the problem.

Logistics
Logistics Section responsibilities are also of staff nature (see Fig. 7-5). Logistics provides all of the
personnel, equipment, and services required to manage the incident. Following the "functional clarity" concept of ICS, Logistics is responsible for two subfunctions: Service and Support.

- **The Service Branch** is responsible for those tasks that "keep the organization going," such as communications, food services, and medical care for the incident (not public) personnel.
- **The Support Branch** assures that all parts of the organization can function; they provide adequate facilities, obtain supplies and resources, and service equipment.

It is important to note that once human, technical, and mechanical resources are obtained by Logistics, the management of those resources is turned over to Planning and Operations.

**Figure 7-4. Planning section.**

**Figure 7-5. Logistics section.**

**Finance**
Finance is also a **staff** function (see Fig. 7-6). The Section is responsible for financial management and accountability on the incident. In keeping with the functional clarity concept, Finance authorizes expenditures in accordance with agency policies, but does not actually order or purchase anything. The Logistics Section obtains all needs after approval by Finance.
Finance uses the Incident Action Planning process, the resource-status tracking, and the Logistics acquisition records to accomplish its accounting tasks. In addition to incident record keeping, the Section performs four other critical functions:

- **Disaster Relief Records** are used to coordinate with state and federal (FEMA) representatives and to assure that cost and damage records are prepared in proper format to assure reimbursement of private and public costs.

- **Contracting** is arranged with vendors for all services not available through involved agencies. This function assures legal preparation of contracts, sets cost rates, inspects equipment both before and after use, keeps use time on equipment and other contracted services (e.g., food caterers, portable toilets) and assures that services are delivered appropriately.

- **Agreements with other Agencies** are necessary during complex, multi-agency incidents when it is frequently quite cost-effective to share, or trade, resources. The classic example of this is in wildland fire suppression where one involved agency may have aircraft but lacks some kind of other resource, and one or more other agencies have specialized ground resources, but not aircraft. In these cases (and they happen frequently) the agencies' Finance Section Chiefs will agree that the aircraft use during the entire incident will be paid by the "owning" agency, and the specialized resources will also be used without regard to jurisdictional boundaries, and paid by the other agencies. Such agreements are also applicable to flood, hazardous materials, earthquake, and other types of incidents.

- **Injury and Damage Documentation** is prepared by the Compensation or Claims Unit, responsible for prompt recording of all injuries to incident personnel. This duty may be expanded to include civilian victims of the incident if the Incident Commander so directs. The unit is also charged with preliminary documentation and investigation of events that may lead to claims against any of the responding agencies. Such events might include damage to private property, personal injury, or any other kind of loss that could be construed to be a result of incident management activity. Documenting events when they occur, instead of weeks or months later, is a major task of the Finance Section.

In both ICS and LEICS, there are two checklists for the supervisory and subordinate positions of each of the five functional areas. There are general checklists showing the tasks all positions are accountable for on all incidents, and a specific checklist for detailing performance of each individual
position. The checklists and other information about the system are included in pocket-sized "Field Operations Guides" (State of California, 1982) that can be provided to emergency response personnel as training tools and as reminders or references during actual incidents."
Office (DCO) is assigned to the FCO and serves as a direct liaison to the DOR. The Department of Defense would not be asked to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities.

Emergency Support Functions
- #1. Transportation
- #2. Communications
- #3. Public Works & Engineering
- #4. Firefighting
- #5. Information & Planning
- #6. Mass Care
- #7. Urban Search & Rescue
- #8. Public Health & Medical Services
- #9. Hazardous Materials
- #10. Energy
- #11. Housing
- #12. Economic & Mitigation
- #13. Public Safety
- #14. Environmental Damage Assessment
- #15. Communications
- #16. Transport

Internal Support Functions
- #17. Information Technology
- #18. Training & Exercises
- #20. Human Resource Management
- #21. Acquisition Management
- #22. Risk Management
- #23. Facilities Management
- #24. Procurement Management
- #25. Legal
- #26. Public Affairs
- #27. Policy

Appendix E - National Response Plan "Response Duties"
Appendix F - Biography of Robert L. Irwin

Robert L. “Bob” Irwin
RETIRED USFS FIRES COPE Program Manager (Retired)
(Submitted 2/17/08)

1947-49: Started with the USFS as fire crew member on the Eldorado National Forest. (lowest pay grade that then existed in Federal Service, SP-3). Worked during High School summer vacations.


1953-56: Fire Control duties on the Eldorado NF. Sent to fires on other forests as well.

1957-59: Oregon State College (now University) School of Forestry, Corvallis. Graduated 1959 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Forest Management. Graduate project was the Preparation of a Fire Management Plan for the nation of Chile.

1959-64: Professional positions of increasing responsibility on the Lassen and Six Rivers National Forests in California. Each position called for stronger abilities in natural resource management and in fire protection. I became qualified as a Class I Fire Boss in 1959.**

1964-68: GS-12 District Ranger, Gasquet District, Six Rivers NF. Responsible for resource management and protection on 350,000 acres. Became one of five Fire Team Leaders in California.

1969-73: GS-13 Forest Fire Management Officer on 1.1 million-acre Sequoia National Forest. Responsible for all fire planning, detection, prevention, and suppression on this forest that ranked 15th in fire workload (out of 180 in the nation). Recognized and honored by Forest Service Chief (Washington D.C.) for air attack and suppression accomplishments. Graduated from the USFS Management Behavior training and became an “Internal Facilitator,” assigned to resolve management/personnel problems on western NFs. Did that job on a part-time basis for 12 years.

1974-75: GS-13 and 14 Liaison Forester to the FS Research Branch, Riverside Fire Laboratory, CA. My chore was to “translate” what field fire managers wanted into concepts that researchers could simulate in the first-ever computer fire planning tool. Traveled nation-wide on this assignment.

1975-82: GS-14 and 15 FIRES COPE Program Manager. A new kind of program in a new era. Over time and many struggles we re-formed a group of disparate fire agencies from local, state, and federal levels into one, powerful and effective force. Products from that effort are now national and international. Homeland Security, including FEMA and the US Coast Guard, and a host of other emergency managers have adopted FIRES COPE products.
Appendix G - Biography of Terence P. Haney

Terence P. Haney
West Hills, California

Terry Haney was a principal consultant to the FIRESCOPE program from 1973 – 1982. He worked in support of all aspects of the program, however his principal activity was to work with the FIRESCOPE Task Force in the development, testing and implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS). At the conclusion of this effort he performed a comparative analysis of the FIRESCOPE ICS and the Federal Large Fire Organization for the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG). Upon approval by NWCG to incorporate ICS for the Federal land management agencies he then prepared a seventeen module National Training Curriculum based on the use of ICS. This development program became known as the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS). NIIMS is the system upon which the current National Incident Management System (NIMS) is based.

At the completion of the NIIMS development activity for NWCG, he adapted the NIIMS training modules into the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). A principal component of SEMS is the use of the Incident Command System by all public safety agencies and disciplines in California. He has most recently been a consultant to the California Office of Emergency Services Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) in conducting inter ICS training.
Mr. Borden retired from the Los Angeles City Fire Department as an Assistant Chief with over 36 years of service and became a consultant and instructor in emergency preparedness and emergency management with Borden/Lee Consulting. He has commanded a multitude of major emergency incidents and directed operations during the many disasters in the City, which involved both field response and EOC operations. He has an extensive background in emergency plans, preparedness, and training throughout his career with the fire department and as a consultant. As a member of the City’s Emergency Operations Organization, he has directed several citywide full-scale response exercises, developed comprehensive all hazard response plans, and conducted emergency management training and exercises for all City departments and other agencies.

He is widely known for developing numerous innovative and nationally recognized programs including the development and implementation of the Community Emergency Response Team Program (CERT) in 1986; As a LAFD Task Force and Operations Team member from 1976 to 1996 worked in the FIRESCOPE Program on the development of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS); as a member of the FEMA Advisory Committee and Chairman of the California OES Advisory Committee worked on the development of the National and State Urban Search and Rescue Programs. He has conducted many post-disaster investigations and evaluations throughout the world including the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake, the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, the 1993 Southern California Firestorms, the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, and the 1995 Kobe Japan Earthquake. He has been the author of many publications, reports, and papers dealing with emergency response and preparedness. He is a certified instructor for the National Fire Academy in ICS for Structural Collapse (a course he developed) and Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management, and Olympic Venue Operations. He also is an instructor for the California Specialized Training Institute in the ICS and EOC operations, and the International Assoc. of Chiefs of Police in Multi-Agency Incident Management. He has taught courses for government and the private sector from basic ICS to advanced (100 through 400) and specialized focused courses in command and incident action planning.

In the field of counter-terrorism, he has experience in threat and vulnerability assessments, developing response plans and exercises, and instructs classes in the management of terrorist incidents. He was involved in response planning for fire, rescue and EMS for the
1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics. He was worked with the Park City, Utah Fire department in planning and training for response and contingency operations with special considerations for terrorist attack that involved local, state, and federal agencies. For the duration of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games he was the Operations Section Chief of the Incident Management Team for the Park City Utah Fire Department.

He is a graduate of the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program and holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Human Relations and Organizational Management from the University of San Francisco. He has completed numerous professional courses, including the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program. Frank is a member of the Advisory Board of the National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue and is the Director of Operations of the Los Angeles Fire Department Historical Society. He is a member of many organizations and associations including the International Association of Emergency Managers, California Emergency Services Association, International Association of Fire Chiefs, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute and the Business and Industry Council for Emergency Planning and Preparedness. Prior to becoming a firefighter, Frank was a Los Angeles City Beach Lifeguard and is a current member of the LA County Lifeguard Association.

As a consultant, he has developed emergency plans, training programs and exercises for numerous companies, agencies and organizations in both the private and public sectors and on a national and international basis. Frank has had the unique experience of having been in command of all types of emergency incidents, researching the response, developing preparedness plans and emergency response plans, and training the people involved in implementing the plans over a period of more than 40 years.

Incident Command System Experience

Frank was assigned to a full time Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) position on the FIRES COPE (Fire Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies) Task Force in 1976. The concept of ICS and a multi-agency coordination system (MACS) was originally developed to assist fire agencies in Southern California to improve effectiveness in response to wildland fires. This multi-agency organization was in the process of developing the Incident Command System for the fire service. As the project grew our department was instrumental in making it a system for all hazards and all agencies to use.

Frank worked as a Task Force Member and later became a charter member of the Operations Team in 1980. He held this position as well as a representative to the Incident Management Consortium until his retirement in 1996.

Frank assisted in the implementation of ICS on the LAFD in 1977 by developing operational plans and teaching all the Chief Officers on the department. Through the years he assisted in developing the system for mass casualty, hazardous materials, urban search & rescue, and large-scale incident management incidents, including city-wide earthquake response. He co-chaired the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Organization committee that managed the conversion of all city departments to the use of the ICS in 1995.
He has been an ICS instructor from basic to advanced courses and teaches for the State of California Specialized Training Institute, and the National Fire Academy. He has taught the “SEMS” and now “NIMS” ICS courses all over the state for many years and he has taught ICS nationally and internationally for the International Association of Fire Chiefs and International Association of Chiefs of Police. He has taught a special ICS unified command course for all LA City fire chief officers and LAPD officers lieutenant and above including members from other jurisdictions and agencies.

Not only has he assisted in the development of ICS, but he has also used the system at hundreds of emergencies from large to small and gained valuable experience which has been beneficial as an instructor, and in current system advancements. Frank had the opportunity of being appointed to the position of Operations Chief for the Park City, Utah Fire Department during the 2002 Winter Olympics.

He has written numerous papers on ICS and developed ICS courses including one for the National Fire Academy on “ICS for Structural Collapse Incidents”.

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Endnotes

4 This number represents all U.S. military personnel; active duty, reserve, and national guard components.
7 Eisel, 1.
8 Eisel, 5.
9 Eisel, 1.
10 Lofgren, 3.
11 Lofgren, 3.
13 Eisel, 11.
14 Eisel, 11.
15 Eisel, 11.
16 Lofgren, 3.
17 Eisel, 1.
18 Lofgren, 3.
19 Eisel, 5.
20 Eisel, 8.
21 Eisel, 9.
22 Lofgren, 4.
23 Eisel, 9.
24 Eisel, 9-10.
25 Eisel, 9-10.
26 Eisel, 16-17.
27 Eisel, 17.
28 Eisel, 10.
29 Eisel, 13-14.
30 Lofgren, 4.
31 Eisel, 15.
32 Eisel, 22.
34 The Secretary of War is now known as the Secretary of the Army. There was also a Secretary of the Navy who held (and does today) similar authorities of the Navy as the Secretary of War had over the Army. However, there exists little documented history of the current military staff structure within documented history of the Navy. Most of the relevant historical information relates to the Army.
35 Brickman, 2.
36 Brickman, 2-3.
37 Brickman, 3.
38 Brickman, 3.
39 Brickman, 3-4
40 Brickman, 3-4.
41 Brickman, 5-6.
42 Brickman, 5-8.
43 Brickman, 8.
44 Brickman, 9.


Groening, 79.

JFSC Pub 1, 1-22.

Groening, 79-80.


“The Incident Command System (ICS) – Then and Now,” 1.


JFSC Pub 1, 1-49.

JFSC Pub 1, 1-48.

JFSC Pub 1, 1-49.

JFSC Pub 1, 1-45 - 1-53.

http://www.ci.springfield.or.us/FLS/EMP/Chart%20-%20Incident%20Organization.pdf


Eisel, 1.

Lofgren, 2.

Lofgren, 3.

Lofgren, 2.

Lofgren, 3.

Brickman, 2.

Lofgren, 3.

Lofgren, 3.

Brickman, 3.

Eisel, 1.

Brickman, 3-4.

Eisel, 11.

Eisel, 11.

Eisel, 16-17.

Eisel, 10.

Eisel, 16-17.

Lofgren, 4.

Brickman, 5-8.

Eisel, 1.

Brickman, 10-11.

Lofgren, 8.

Eisel, 13.

Lofgren, 12.

Brickman, 16.

Brickman, 17.

Brickman, 18-19.

Brickman, 18-19.

Brickman, 20-22.

Brickman, 20-22.

Brickman, 22.

Lofgren, 10-11.

Lofgren, 10-11.

Lofgren, 11-12.

Eisel, 13-14.

Lofgren, 9-10.

JFSC Pub 1, 1-5 - 1-7.

Groening, 79.

JFSC Pub 1, 1-22.

JFSC Pub 1, 1-6.


Some Highlights of the Evolution of the Incident Command System as Developed by FIRESCOPE,” 1.


Irwin, 134.

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