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
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Executive Summary

Title: THE ROLE CULTURE PLAYS IN CHINA'S ILLICIT DRUG/CHEMICAL FOREIGN POLICY

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Thesis: Chinese culture plays a major role in the formation of China's policies regarding its exportation of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals.

Discussion: China is a major producer of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals. The trafficking of illicit drugs is a transnational crime that affects the United States (U.S.), China, and ultimately the world. The Chinese have been slow to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement officers regarding the trafficking of these chemicals that include acetic anhydride, ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, and steroids. To better understand China's lack of cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies, we must look at Chinese culture to better understand the foundation of their policies. There are numerous variables one can consider in determining how China formulates its policies. Confucianism, the "Century of Shame," and Mao Zedong have been extremely influential in laying the groundwork of Chinese decision-making. In addition to cultural influences, corruption's role in China's relations with U.S. law enforcement authorities must be addressed. Recognizing the cultural elements within China helps drug law enforcement investigators understand China's reluctance to cooperate with the U.S. in efforts to combat transnational drug trafficking originating in China.

Conclusion: Understanding Chinese cultural factors, along with corruption, allow United States law enforcement agencies to better understand Chinese reactions to requests for cooperation. It might also assist the United States in devising policies to circumvent any initial Chinese resistance. In turn, U.S. law enforcement officials may experience better cooperation and more success in their attempts to stymie the illicit Chinese chemicals entering the United States.

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**THE ROLE CULTURE PLAYS IN CHINA'S ILLICIT DRUG/CHEMICAL FOREIGN
POLICY**

The People's Republic of China (China) and the United States have numerous shared non-traditional security threats. One of the major non-traditional security threats affecting both countries is transnational drug trafficking. It is universally agreed that drug trafficking is bad for the United States, China, and the world. However, much of the blame for this transnational crime lay firmly on the Chinese as China exports large amounts of illicit drugs and essential chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs. There has been some cooperation between the United States (U.S.) and Chinese law enforcement agencies, but friction or lack of action on the part of the Chinese prevails. If the two countries agree that drug trafficking is a security threat, why has there been a lack of progress in this arena? There are many factors that have caused this disconnect between China and U.S. law enforcement. In order to find the roots of China's lack of cooperation with the U.S., one must look at Chinese culture. Factors that affect China's decision to either cooperate, or not to cooperate, with the U.S. deal primarily with Confucian ideals, the "Century of Shame," and the influence of Mao Zedong. Corruption, a non-cultural factor, should also be addressed when analyzing Chinese decision-making.

This paper will address the extent that cultural factors play in China's lack of international cooperation on illegal drug trafficking. With the very complex field of international relations, there are numerous variables that cause friction between countries. This paper recognizes this, but attempts to dig deeper to find the foundation of the Chinese mindset when China's law enforcement agencies interact with U.S. law enforcement agencies. Initially, this paper will deal with China's exportation of precursor chemicals and illicit drugs. After discussing Chinese drug exportation, cultural issues that shape Chinese foreign policy will be

tackled. These Chinese cultural issues are Confucius' ideals role in society, the Century of Shame, and Mao's stimulation of Chinese nationalism. Finally, the part official corruption plays within the foreign policy equation will be addressed. In order to determine a strategy and better conduct relationships with Chinese law enforcement officials, U.S. officials need to understand Chinese culture and history as it pertains to non-traditional security threats. By understanding Confucius' role in society, the Century of Shame, and Mao's stimulation of Chinese nationalism, U.S. officials will have a better understanding of Chinese officials' decision-making basis.

CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRADE

China is a major factor in the international drug market. China has an extremely large and developed chemical industry and has become one of the largest producers of precursor chemicals. A drug precursor is a chemical that is essential to the production of a controlled substance and for which no substitution can be made. China is a major producer of licit ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. Both drugs are used as precursors to manufacture methamphetamine. In addition to exported ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, Chinese chemical companies export other drugs and precursor chemicals used to manufacture cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, steroids, and other controlled substance analogues.¹ In other words, China is exporting chemicals that are essential to the production of a controlled substances (i.e. methamphetamine), and without these essential chemicals, the drugs could not be manufactured.

China shares a 2,000 kilometer border with Burma and smaller borders with Laos and Vietnam. This area adjacent to China is known as the "Golden Triangle," and is notorious for its heroin production. According to a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 2004 China Drug Intelligence Brief, Chinese officials state that the majority of heroin entering China comes across their border with Burma. The heroin coming from this region is labeled Southeast Asian heroin.

The heroin then passes through southern coastal areas of China, and then onto international markets. Heroin also passes through northwestern China from a region known as the “Golden Crescent.” This heroin originates from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan and represents about 20 percent of the heroin that enters northwestern China.² (See Map in Appendix A)

ACETIC ANHYDRIDE PRODUCTION

With the two major manufacturing regions using China as a conduit to transport heroin into the international market, Chinese companies facilitate the manufacturing of heroin by producing the chemical reagent acetic anhydride. A reagent is a chemical that reacts with a precursor causing it to chemically change. Acetic anhydride is used to synthesize morphine base into heroin. Reports indicate that acetic anhydride gets exported from China to morphine and heroin manufacturing laboratories in the “Golden Triangle.” In 2004, Chinese chemical companies produced over 100,000 metric tons of acetic anhydride.³ Seizures of acetic anhydride in Afghanistan, arguably the biggest exporter of heroin, confirmed the availability of this substance in that country. Acetic anhydride is not produced in Afghanistan; it can be assumed that the chemical was trafficked in. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007 World Drug Report stated that none of the countries bordering Afghanistan, with the exception of China, reported seizures of acetic anhydride during 2005 and 2006.⁴ The lack of seizures indicates that either the countries bordering Afghanistan are not exporting large amounts of the chemical, or that they are not interdicting the acetic anhydride being exported. It should be noted that illicit cultivation of the opium poppy is insignificant within China. The small number of illicit opium poppies that are grown in China are grown in the remote northwest frontier and consumed by ethnic minority groups without the poppies being converted into heroin.⁵

CHINESE EPHEDRINE AND PSEUDOEPHEDRINE EXPORTS

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are the precursors to amphetamine type stimulants, specifically methamphetamine. Amphetamines affect the body similarly to cocaine, but their onset is slower and their duration is much longer. While the body quickly metabolizes and removes cocaine from the brain, methamphetamine remains in the central nervous system longer, producing prolonged stimulant effects. Chronic abuse of amphetamines can produce a schizophrenic type of psychosis.⁶ In the United States, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are mainly converted into methamphetamine by the use of several methods to include the Birch method (reagent: anhydrous ammonia) and the red phosphorous method. Approximately 25 million people use amphetamines globally making this market larger than the cocaine and heroin markets. Between 15 and 16 million of these persons are believed to consume methamphetamine.⁷

According to the U.S. Department of State 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, China is one of the top three exporters of bulk ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in the world. In their legitimate form, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are used in treating bronchial problems associated with colds and asthma. For this reason many cold and flu products contain ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. Information on the worldwide production of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine is not available because the major producers will not release them publicly for commercial, proprietary reasons. The U.S. government unsuccessfully sought this data, as well as production data on pharmaceutical preparations containing these chemicals, from the major producers at a February 2006 DEA organized meeting in Hong Kong but were unable to obtain the requested information. However, the Department of State report cited data from the Global Trade Atlas regarding countries that export ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. The reports noted

China exported 177,907 kilograms of pseudoephedrine in 2004, and 107,914 kilograms in 2005. The U.S. exported 55,540 kilograms of pseudoephedrine in 2004, and 28,895 kilograms in 2005. China exported a lesser amount of ephedrine during that time period in the amounts of 12,893 kilograms in 2004 and 8,955 kilograms in 2005. The U.S. exported 4,388 kilograms of ephedrine in 2004, and 5,542 in 2005.⁸

The Department of State report went further to address the major importers of Chinese ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. The principal markets for Chinese pseudoephedrine between 2001 and 2005 were: Switzerland, the U.S., Pakistan, and Mexico. The principal markets for Chinese ephedrine during that same time period were: Canada, Pakistan, Hong Kong, and Mexico. It should also be noted that of the top five importers of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine, Mexico is the only importer that is a known major methamphetamine producer.⁹ The data did not list the U.S. or Canada as “major” methamphetamine producers. The 2007 National Drug Assessment prepared by the National Drug Intelligence Center noted as intelligence gaps:

The extent of precursor chemical diversion from sources of supply in Asia is unclear. Intelligence and law enforcement reporting confirms the shipment of wholesale (multiple ton) quantities of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine – often repackaged with vague labeling and disguised as legitimate business transactions – to Mexico from source areas in Asia, particularly Hong Kong and China. However, there are relatively few data available to measure such activity, thereby impeding a full and accurate assessment of the situation.¹⁰

As previously noted, China is a major producer of licit ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. It is believed among law enforcement agencies throughout the world that large scale methamphetamine producers are using Chinese ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. Diverted Chinese precursor chemicals sustain synthetic drug production in other countries to include Mexico, Belgium, and the Netherlands. China has failed to adequately monitor its large chemical industry to effectively ensure that precursor chemicals are not used to make illicit drugs either domestically or abroad. In November 2005, China enacted stronger precursor chemical

control laws and appears to be engaged in efforts to stop diversion from its chemical production facilities.¹¹

STEROIDS – Operation Gear Grinder

On September 24, 2007, the DEA announced that they had been conducting an investigation into illegal steroid distribution within the U.S. As the investigation progressed, it drew attention to China's lack of law enforcement cooperation with others in this field. The DEA steroid investigation grew out of a 2005 operation targeting eight Mexican clandestine laboratories that were responsible for 80 percent of the U.S.'s underground steroid trafficking. Investigators from the DEA were able to conduct law enforcement operations jointly with the Mexican authorities to further the case. During the course of the investigation, DEA learned that several large Chinese factories had been supplying the Mexican laboratories with bulk material. After DEA and Mexican law enforcement officials had enough evidence to make arrests and shut down the clandestine steroid laboratories, the price of steroids in the U.S. went up and steroids were more difficult to obtain.¹²

Essentially, by arresting the people running the Mexican steroid laboratories, DEA took out the "middle man" from the flow of steroids into the U.S. Due to the arrests in Mexico, the Chinese chemical companies could no longer ship their steroids to Mexico with their ultimate destination being the U.S. A short while after the arrests in Mexico, DEA noticed that the price of steroids fell back to pre-arrest prices and that they were becoming more prevalent within the U.S. DEA began to see data indicating the Chinese companies that were once supplying the Mexican laboratories had adapted their tactics by exporting steroids directly into the U.S.¹³

In order to complete the investigation and identify the individuals responsible for trafficking steroids into the U.S., the DEA worked with drug agents from Mexico, Belgium,

Germany, Denmark, and Thailand in what was to be labeled "Operation Gear Grinder." The agents from these countries set-up shell companies to order raw materials. The agents also focused on the makers of kits that help clandestine drug manufacturers turn raw materials into sellable drugs. In the end, DEA agents were able to shut down 26 clandestine steroid laboratories and make more than 50 arrests. The DEA also identified 37 Chinese chemical factories that supplied the raw materials for making the steroids.¹⁴

In February 2007, DEA agents working on Operation Gear Grinder traveled to Beijing to meet with their Chinese law enforcement counterparts. During the meetings, the Chinese asked the DEA Agents for information obtained during the course of the steroid investigation and added that they would continue to investigate and prosecute illegal activity in China. The agents advised their Chinese counterparts about the factories that had been identified as sources for steroids. According to an article written by Shaun Assael for *ESPN The Magazine*, seven months after the February meeting, DEA was notified that only one of the factories had been closed. Assael quoted another DEA official that had worked on the investigation stating, "China has been very on-again, off-again about its cooperation. You have to remember, its people make a lot of money selling this stuff."¹⁵

Washington Post reporters Maureen Fan and Amy Shipley wrote an article following-up on Operation Gear Grinder to determine whether the Chinese were moving forward with promises to curb illegal steroid production and exportation. They attempted to contact the 37 Chinese chemical companies that DEA identified as supplying steroids. Many of the chemical companies were unable to be reached, while ten of the companies that were contacted stated that they no longer sold steroids or no longer exported them. Four of the companies told the reporter they could sell the steroids. One company looked as if it terminated its operations in one

province only to reopen in another. One firm targeted by the DEA said Chinese companies continued to export illicit drugs to developing countries in Africa and Asia. Other companies told the reporters that there was no problem distributing steroids within China or to countries other than the U.S.¹⁶

Fan and Shipley stated that part of the problem in China was that steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs have legitimate uses in pharmaceuticals. Differentiating between suppliers who legitimately distributed steroids to licensed customers and companies that sold to bodybuilders or athletes can be challenging. The Chinese Food and Drug Administration required pharmaceutical companies that sold steroids to obtain drug approval codes and sell the substances only to licensed customers. However, chemical factories that only produce raw materials do not need to meet those requirements. This loophole has allowed steroids to be shipped internationally without being regulated by Chinese authorities. Additionally, representatives of chemical companies advised the reporters that customs declarations for their products could be altered to avoid detection. Chen Xianshuan, chief of the customs inspection station in Taizhou City, told the reporters that differentiating between shipments that are considered medicine and shipments that are illicit drugs is complicated. Chen stated, "We only care if you have completed all the procedures or obtain the licenses you need" when exporting a product.¹⁷

Richard Pound, the outgoing chairman of the World Anti-Doping Agency, had requested action by China regarding steroid distribution more than a year before the announcement of the DEA investigation. A day after the DEA announced their investigation into the Chinese steroid distribution; Pound was in China and was assured by Chinese authorities that they were cooperating with the DEA. However, Chinese authorities questioned whether or not the steroid

distributors identified by DEA were physically located in China. Pound added that he was not clear whether the U.S. was receiving “full cooperation, as opposed to merely nominal or apparent cooperation” from the Chinese.¹⁸

A statement made by Yan Juangying reflects China’s resolve when it comes to exporting precursor chemicals and illicit drugs, specifically steroids. Yan, a spokeswoman for China’s Food and Drug Administration, noted that China would not change their policies based on pressure from other countries. Yan stated, “Strengthening the supervision and administration of steroids is a persistent policy of the Chinese government, which will not be changed by any influence from the outside.” Yan believed that China’s steroid policy and regulations were clear.¹⁹

The experience of Operation Gear Grinder demonstrates that the Chinese are not necessarily making every effort to fully cooperate with U.S. authorities when it comes to influencing their precursor and chemical exports. After reviewing several official U.S. drug intelligence reports regarding China’s cooperation in this arena, it was very difficult to find anything overtly critical of the Chinese. For example, in a document published by the U.S. Department of State entitled “U.S. Relations With the People’s Republic of China (2007),” it noted that the Chinese provided the DEA on a “case-by-case” basis with samples of drugs seized within China that had been destined for the U.S. markets. Furthermore, the report identified one of China’s “biggest successes in 2005/2006” was in cooperation with the DEA in the dismantling of a Colombian drug trafficking organization. The Colombian drug trafficking organization was transporting cocaine from Colombia to China.²⁰ The U.S. report noted the cooperation between China and the DEA, but what stood out in the example used by the Department of State was that China was the ultimate destination of the Colombian cocaine. This report highlighted that China

was willing to cooperate when the illegal drugs were flowing into China and had a huge domestic impact. When the destination, or target, of illicit drugs or precursor chemicals is not China, Chinese cooperation appears to decline.

FOUNDATION OF CHINA'S MINDSET – Culture and Corruption

If the U.S. and China can be partners in non-traditional security threats such as drug trafficking, U.S. officials need to understand the major role culture plays in China's motivation and decision-making. Culture can be defined various ways ranging from "learned behavior," "ideas in the mind," to "a logical construct." Gerald Chan, in his book *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations*, defines culture in a general sense as being "the customs, civilization, and achievements of a particular time or people."²¹ In the case of China, Confucianism, the Century of Shame (humiliation), and Mao Zedong have influenced China's reactions to Western requests for cooperation.

CONFUCIANISM – International Hierarchical Position and Saving Face

The influence of Confucianism and its contrasts with Western thought cannot be over-emphasized in understanding what motivates Chinese policy. Confucius lived from 551 to 479 B.C. and was a religious leader and an ethical philosopher. Confucius focused many of his teachings on the proper relations between people, which in his system were hierarchical and strictly recognized. Each member of the important relationship pairs (husband-wife, country-state, etc.) had clear obligations toward the other. Confucianism stresses economic well-being and education. Within the Confucian mindset, the individual works for the betterment of the family or society instead of for individual gain.²²

The Confucian approach to foreign policy and the perception of threats are paradigms of strategic culture. Confucianism approaches order and statecraft through morality, positive

examples, and non-violent means. Those that follow Confucian teachings view the world as harmonious, orderly, and hierarchically structured. In *The Analects of Confucius*, Confucius stated, “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.”²³ This quote reflects Confucianism’s ideal that everything has its place in order for there to be harmony. Conflicts are regarded as deviant isolated events rather than the nature of things and should be managed through other means.²⁴ The teachings of Confucius have ordered Chinese society. The fundamental Confucian political unit is society itself. Thus, social stability is perceived as the greatest public good and the ultimate human right, and its protection is seen as the highest duty of government. The family, with its rigid seniority relationships and role responsibilities, is the organizational model for all levels of social and political structure.²⁵

It is ingrained within Chinese culture to maintain one’s honor and not become humiliated in public. The preservation of a person’s, or a country’s, honor is called “saving face.” The pressures put on the Chinese due to its Confucian cultural foundation to “save face” and to preserve China’s role in the world hierarchy are immeasurable. Due to these pressures, one of the Chinese styles of managing social and international affairs is to adopt a firm stand on principles while taking a more flexible stand on the use of tactics to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Sticking to their principles gives the Chinese a national pride due to their ability to stand on moral high ground. This gives the Chinese the ability to exert their influence without fear or hesitation. Flexibility in their tactics gives the Chinese alternative ways and policies to move forward in order to achieve their ultimate goals. The various tactical or policy changes can be subtle, but over a period of time the Chinese believe they will prevail and achieve their intended end-state.²⁶

Confucianism may be a one of the underlying reasons why China has failed to clamp down on its precursor and illicit drug producing chemical industries. As a nation, China sees itself rising to become the center of a social and economic global position that it has historically occupied. China's quest to become free of Western colonial pressures, and economically active within the global market, would restore the country's place in the global hierarchy, a position very important to the Confucian mindset. In order to achieve this social and economic position, the Chinese have not stopped the exportation of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, as this would have a direct effect on the Chinese economy. A lack of monetary input from chemical and drug sales is one factor that would stymie the forward momentum of the Chinese economy and delay or halt their progress in fulfilling China's global hierarchical position.

“CENTURY OF SHAME” – An Issue of Sovereignty and International Balance

The Chinese consider their culture to be at least 5,000 years old. At one time, China was considered to be the hub of civilization and according to Chinese Army Lieutenant General Li Jijun, “China is the only uninterrupted civilization in history.”²⁷ With its rich culture and prolonged history, China had a strong sense of national unity until they were significantly affected by Western colonialism and Japan. The period from 1849 to 1949 is viewed by the Chinese as the “Century of Shame,” when Western powers and later the Japanese imposed colonial domination over China. The Century of Shame has had a profound effect on China's self image. Up until then, China's self-image had long been one of cultural, technological, and moral superiority. Among other things, the Century of Shame experience laid the foundation for a dynamic leader to unify the country and then dedicate itself to maintaining its territorial integrity and sovereignty.²⁸

The issue of maintaining Chinese sovereignty has been fundamental when reflecting back on the Century of Shame and then looking forward to relations with the United States. Chinese foreign policy officials view the U.S. global strategy as being hegemonic, and just another manifestation of colonialism. To the Chinese, a hegemonic country is one that uses its instruments of national power to control or contain another country or region. This controlling or containing ultimately interferes with the other country's internal affairs and violates that country's sovereignty. *Webster's Dictionary* defines the word "hegemony" as dominance of one nation over others. From China's perspective, hegemonism is to blame for China's Century of Shame. The Chinese distaste for hegemony has a foundation deep in their historical experience and national psyche.²⁹

Susan Craig noted the depiction of the U.S. as a hegemonic country dominates Chinese perceptions about America. Due to this characterization, Chinese policy makers draw two conclusions about the United States. First, the Chinese conclude that the U.S. feels threatened by countries that challenge the U.S.'s hegemonic status, and that the U.S. will take action to contain any country that does so. China rising in economic power and influence is one of those threats and in response the U.S. will act to contain China. The second conclusion drawn from a hegemonic U.S. is that the U.S. desires to continue to expand and solidify its supremacy in the global community. By maintaining international supremacy, the U.S. would preserve an America-centric world order.³⁰

Many of the Chinese international relations scholars focus their attention on American military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the U.S.'s emphasis on spreading democracy, as its attempt to solidify its hegemony. There is a lot of debate amongst Chinese politicians and scholars as to whether or not they should be worried about a U.S. military invasion. However,

these same politicians and scholars agree that U.S.'s policies threaten the international order, which in turn disrupts the Confucian ideals regarding China's hierarchical position in the world. From the Chinese perspective, the international order is governed by international institutions that provide all countries with an indisputable right to sovereignty.³¹

In trying to look at world events from the U.S. perspective, Chinese politicians and scholars believe that the U.S. fails to sign international treaties, mechanisms, and security arrangements because they get in the way of the U.S.'s right to act unilaterally. While U.S.'s policies promoting democracy, unilateralism, preemption, and the war on terror are not policies directed against China, from a Chinese perspective they are still a threat. From China's position, the U.S. national security doctrine confirms the U.S.'s hegemonic intent. U.S. national security doctrine also threatens the international balance of power on which China's continued stability, growth, and rising international stature depend.³²

The Century of Shame has scarred the Chinese to the point that they are sensitive to any outside power infringing upon China's sovereignty. The Chinese see the U.S.'s position on precursor chemicals and illicit drugs as a potential attack on Chinese sovereignty and their ability to control their own domestic industries. By asking the Chinese to assist with the global containment of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, along with other precursor chemicals and steroids, the Chinese could see this as one of many attempts by the U.S. to slow down China's rise in economic standing and solidify the U.S.'s international hegemonic position.

MAO ZEDONG – The Chinese People Have Stood Up

Prior to the Century of Shame, the Chinese had an enormous sense of national pride, so much so that they referred to China as the "Middle Kingdom." During the Century of Shame this Chinese national pride was greatly diminished. The Chinese people began to look to the

Western Colonial powers and Japan for their culture, economic means, and social structure. Towards the end of the Century of Shame, Mao Zedong stepped into the forefront of Chinese politics and became one of the most influential Chinese leaders in history. Mao Zedong led the Chinese Communist Party to a victory over Chinese Nationalists in 1949 and then presided over China for over thirty years. Mao grew up in rural China during the Century of Shame and felt that China should stop the cultural onslaught and begin to unify the country. Under Mao's leadership, China developed a national pride that has proven to be one pillar of its foreign policy.³³ This nationalism, instilled by Mao, permeates Chinese culture and China's interaction with U.S. law enforcement officials when dealing with each other.

Mao was born in 1893, during a time when China's Qing dynasty was losing power. In his childhood, Mao not only observed China lose a major war with Japan, but he ultimately watched the collapse of the Chinese empire in 1911. Mao was the eldest son of a prosperous and extremely disciplined farmer. As did other children in China, Mao studied Confucianism, but was drawn to new writings of Chinese reformers and anarchists. During Mao's childhood, a dispute between Mao and his father drastically affected the way Mao viewed domestic and international relations. When Mao was thirteen years old, an altercation broke out between Mao and his father during a large party at their home. In the course of the altercation, and in view of the party attendees, Mao's father denounced Mao and called him lazy. Infuriated by his father's actions, Mao ran out of the house while his mother followed begging him to return. Mao's father eventually joined his wife and attempted to get Mao to return home. Sick of his father's harsh and abusive treatment, Mao threatened to jump into a nearby pond and commit suicide. Faced with Mao's resistance, Mao's father agreed to stop beating Mao if he would obey him. Mao later stated, "Thus the war ended and from it I learned that when I defended my rights by open

rebellion my father relented, but when I remained meek and submissive he only cursed and beat me more.” Mao remembered the incident between him and his father and drew from it throughout his political career.³⁴

Based on Chinese history and his political ideology, Mao set the principle of “self reliance” or “regeneration through one’s own efforts” as a major component of his foreign policy. Mao referred to his policy of self reliance as *zili gensheng*. This idea of *zili gensheng* was derived from Mao’s premise that China was a “semi-colony” during the Century of Shame, when foreign ideas shaped the mentality of the Chinese people. Mao felt that China could only become an independent nation if it relied on its own resources and reinforced its sense of national pride, ultimately purging the country of foreign intellectual and political influences. Thus, *zili gengshen* was the nucleus of Mao’s policy to instill pride in the Chinese people. In Mao’s eyes it was an obvious policy to move China toward nationalism due to the country’s identification of Western and Japanese imperialism as the enemy that caused China to be victimized during the Century of Shame. The Chinese pride, or self reliance, that Mao instilled into their culture went further than just a pride in one’s country. Mao recognized the intellectual impact of Western imperialism on Chinese self-esteem. Mao understood that true independence would come only when the Chinese people had internal unity motivating them to mobilize nationally with the confidence to look inward for political, economic, and military strength. It should be noted that Mao’s *zili gengshen* foreign policy was geared mainly for what he viewed as Western imperialist countries (most notably the U.S. after 1950). Due to an ideological kinship, Mao displayed an internationalism relationship with the Soviet Union based on their mutual communist beliefs. Even with their common ideology, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union eventually became adversarial.³⁵

Around September 1949, after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had clearly defeated the Guomindang, or the Chinese People's Party (GMD), the People's Republic of China was established under Mao's leadership. In a speech to the Chinese People's Consultative Congress (a body that brought together other political parties in China willing to work with the new CCP government) on September 21, 1949, Mao stated his position on Chinese nationalism and marked China's new prestige as the nation succeeded in driving off the imperialists. The Chinese people saw Mao as the savior who reinstated China's sovereignty and global status. The speech inspired the Chinese people by noting the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) triumph over the American supported GMD forces. Mao also noted the struggles over foreign and domestic oppressors and the mobilization of the Chinese people during the "people's liberation war."³⁶ Mao continued to inspire patriotism in the Chinese people:

...Our forefathers enjoined us to carry out their unfulfilled will. And we have acted accordingly. We have closed our ranks and defeated both domestic and foreign oppressors through the People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution, and now we are proclaiming the founding of the People's Republic of China. From now on our nation will belong to the community of the peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world and work courageously and industriously to foster its own civilization and well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and freedom. Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up. Our revolution has won the sympathy and acclaim of the people of all countries. We have friends all over the world.³⁷

The aforementioned section of Mao's speech embodied Mao's position toward international affairs. When Mao stated, "We have stood up," he inspired the nationalistic views that have carried on into contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Furthermore, the quote encompassed historical aspects that had affected China domestically up to that point, and that have significantly influenced modern Chinese decision-making. Specific influences include Confucianism's part in placing China within its global position, China's humiliation during the

Century of Shame, and Mao's ability to lift China's nationalism. (For the full text of the speech see Appendix B)

CORRUPTION – Role in International Law Enforcement Cooperation

One issue that seems to stand out from the previously noted cultural phenomenon is the role corruption plays within China. Even if the aforementioned cultural barriers did not exist, corruption may still affect the relationship between U.S. law enforcement and Chinese authorities. Numerous government and non-government sources indicate that corruption in China has had a huge impact on China's ability to move forward with international relations, including cooperating with U.S. law enforcement efforts to control illicit drugs and precursor chemicals exported from China. While most corruption activities in China involve the abuse of power, embezzlement, and misappropriation of government funds, there are big payoffs for officials to "look the other way" during questionable commercial activities. According to the U.S. Department of State's 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, China's Ministry of Public Safety (MPS) has enacted an anticorruption campaign that has led to the arrests of numerous lower-level government personnel and some more senior-level officials. Most of the MPS's investigations appear to have involved low level district and county officials. There has been no specific evidence indicating any senior-level corruption in drug trafficking. However, the Department of State report suggested that due to the amount of drugs trafficked within China, a suspicion must be raised that official corruption has been a factor in drug trafficking within provinces bordering drug producing regions where narcotics trafficking and other types of transnational crimes are widespread. It is interesting, however, to see the same U.S. Department of State report that specifically identified corruption as a very serious problem contradicts itself. After addressing the disturbing level of corruption, the report noted,

“Narcotics related corruption does not appear to have adversely affected ongoing law enforcement cases in which United States agencies have been involved.”³⁸

Some of the main offenders in China’s contribution to transnational drug trafficking are the Chinese crime organizations. Chinese crime organizations have affiliates in many countries to include the U.S. and Europe. Growing ties between Chinese government officials and members of China’s organized crime syndicates have many in the law enforcement community concerned. Corrupt Chinese officials make it easier for Chinese crime organizations to commit transnational crimes, including narcotics and human trafficking. Additionally, the corrupt Chinese officials facilitate safe-havens for members of the criminal organizations to elude law enforcement, acquire illicit drugs along with weapons or other material that could be obtained by terrorists. Anny Wong argues that official corruption and abuse are the major source of discontent within China.³⁹

It would be hard to argue that under Mao’s leadership that China was free of corruption. However, it could be argued that corruption in the post-Mao era, beginning in the late 1970s, has risen to unprecedented levels. The rapid Chinese economic development and modernizing of China’s government in the post-Mao era has considerably influenced the nation’s public administration. While Mao was still influential and leading China, China was closely guided by the CCP’s ideology. There was no friction between the bureaucratic and the political elites under Mao’s leadership. The communist government made efforts to curb the exercise of bureaucratic power and ensure the government’s responsiveness to political controls. CCP oversight allocated positions of power within the Chinese government through an individual’s political behavior as opposed to their economic interests. The CCP under Mao used motivational techniques such as coercion, ideology, money and increased rank in managing government

officials. Financial incentive, however, was seldom emphasized. The CCP made every effort under communist values to stress a concept of simple life and hard work, or *Jianku Pusu, Qinjin Jieyue* (hard work, plain living, and thrift) within the Chinese culture.⁴⁰

After the departure of Mao from China's political arena in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping became the leader of China and the head of the CCP. Deng, while giving homage to the legacy of Mao, began to modernize China. Under Deng's leadership, the government emphasized China's economic development and depoliticized parts of the system. Deng did not have the same strong beliefs in ideology and politics as Mao, and ultimately depreciated their role in China's future by encouraging economic reforms. In the post-Mao era, the relationship between political and bureaucratic elites was no longer that of control and compliance. With the lack of emphasis on political behavior, more people were hired or placed in positions of power based on their credentials rather than their political leanings. As positive as obtaining positions based on credentials sounds, the newly recruited officials had less respect for the CCP and did not feel they owed their position to the Communist Party. These officials, loosely supervised and more concerned about their own interests transformed the political culture, making it increasingly individualistic and materialistic. Management and authority in public organizations have today become highly sought after positions based on their potential ability to gain personal wealth. Chinese law enforcement has not been immune to this change in culture and has become no less corrupt. In comparing data between 1994 and 1995, although somewhat dated, there was an almost a 40 percent increase in the number of law enforcement officials under investigation for corruption during that period of time.⁴¹ The government's culture of corruption has disrupted the harmony between the Chinese people and the government. One cannot find a more poignant example of this disruption of harmony than the 1989 student demonstrations in Tiananmen

Square. A major goal in the Tiananmen student demonstrations was to eliminate official corruption.⁴²

CONCLUSION

Military theorist Sun Tzu states in *The Art of War*, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."⁴³ This statement is applicable when preparing a strategy to interact with Chinese foreign policy officials. Part of understanding, or knowing the enemy, is studying their culture. Once one has a grasp of basic Chinese culture, it is easier to understand the Chinese position on certain topics including the exportation of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals. Understanding Chinese culture allows strategic planners the ability to loosely predict China's reactions to U.S. law enforcement proposals for cooperation and courses of action. The capacity to foresee potential Chinese reactions gives U.S. officials a better perspective for formulating strategies for approaching and working with the Chinese to attain specific goals. Without minimizing the very complex Chinese culture, one could look at Confucianism, the Century of Shame, and Mao Zedong as major influences in modern Chinese policies. Official corruption is another source of friction regarding the lack of Chinese law enforcement cooperation. Recognizing the cultural elements within China help drug law enforcement investigators understand China's reluctance to cooperate with the U.S. in the fight to control China's exportation of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals. Understanding these factors allows us to understand the Chinese reaction, but it might also allow us to craft policies to circumvent any initial Chinese resistance.

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
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APPENDIX A



APPENDIX B

THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE STOOD UP!

September 21, 1949

[Opening address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference.]

Fellow Delegates,

The Political Consultative Conference so eagerly awaited by the whole nation is herewith inaugurated.

Our conference is composed of more than six hundred delegates, representing all the democratic parties and people's organizations of China, the People's Liberation Army, the various regions and nationalities of the country and the overseas Chinese. This shows that ours is a conference embodying the great unity of the people of the whole country.

It is because we have defeated the reactionary Kuomintang government backed by U.S. imperialism that this great unity of the whole people has been achieved. In a little more than three years the heroic Chinese People's Liberation Army, an army such as the world has seldom seen, crushed all the offensives launched by the several million troops of the U.S.-supported reactionary Kuomintang government and turned to the counter-offensive and the offensive. At present the field armies of the People's Liberation Army, several million strong, have pushed the war to areas near Taiwan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan and Sinkiang, and the great majority of the Chinese people have won liberation. In a little more than three years the people of the whole country have closed their ranks, rallied to support the People's Liberation Army, fought the enemy and won basic victory. And it is on this foundation that the present People's Political Consultative Conference is convened.

Our conference is called the Political Consultative Conference because some three years ago we held a Political Consultative Conference with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang.[1] The results of that conference were sabotaged by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and its accomplices; nevertheless the conference left an indelible impression on the people. It showed that nothing in the interest of the people could be accomplished together with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, the running dog of imperialism, and its accomplices. Even when resolutions were reluctantly adopted, it was of no avail, for as soon as the time was ripe, they tore them up and started a ruthless war against the people. The only gain from that conference was the profound lesson it taught the people that there is absolutely no room for compromise with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, the running dog of imperialism, and its accomplices -- overthrow these enemies or be oppressed and slaughtered by them, either one or the other, there is no other choice. In a little more than three years the Chinese people, led by the Chinese Communist Party, have quickly awakened and organized themselves into a nation-wide united front against imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and their general representative, the reactionary Kuomintang government, supported the People's War of Liberation, basically defeated the reactionary Kuomintang government, overthrown the rule of imperialism in China and restored the Political Consultative Conference.

The present Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is convened on an entirely new foundation; it is representative of the people of the whole country and enjoys their trust and support. Therefore, the conference proclaims that it will exercise the functions and powers of a National People's Congress. In accordance with its agenda, the conference will enact the Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; it will elect the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China; it will adopt the national flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China; and it will decide on the seat of the capital of the People's Republic of China and adopt the chronological system in use in most countries of the world.

Fellow Delegates, we are all convinced that our work will go down in the history of mankind, demonstrating that the Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, have now stood up. The Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is only in modern times that they have fallen behind. And that was due entirely to oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments. For over a century our forefathers never stopped waging unyielding struggles against domestic and foreign oppressors, including the Revolution of 1911 led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, our great forerunner in the Chinese revolution. Our forefathers enjoined us to carry

out their unfulfilled will. And we have acted accordingly. We have closed our ranks and defeated both domestic and foreign oppressors through the People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution, and now we are proclaiming the founding of the People's Republic of China. From now on our nation will belong to the community of the peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world and work courageously and industriously to foster its own civilization and well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and freedom. Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up. Our revolution has won the sympathy and acclaim of the people of all countries. We have friends all over the world.

Our revolutionary work is not completed, the People's War of Liberation and the people's revolutionary movement are still forging ahead and we must keep up our efforts. The imperialists and the domestic reactionaries will certainly not take their defeat lying down; they will fight to the last ditch. After there is peace and order throughout the country, they are sure to engage in sabotage and create disturbances by one means or another and every day and every minute they will try to stage a come-back. This is inevitable and beyond all doubt, and under no circumstances must we relax our vigilance.

Our state system, the people's democratic dictatorship, is a powerful weapon for safeguarding the fruits of victory of the people's revolution and for thwarting the plots of domestic and foreign enemies for restoration, and this weapon we must firmly grasp. Internationally, we must unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples, and first of all with the Soviet Union and the New Democracies, so that we shall not stand alone in our struggle to safeguard these fruits of victory and to thwart the plots of domestic and foreign enemies for restoration. As long as we persist in the people's democratic dictatorship and unite with our foreign friends, we shall always be victorious.

The people's democratic dictatorship and solidarity with our foreign friends will enable us to accomplish our work of construction rapidly. We are already confronted with the task of nation-wide economic construction. We have very favourable conditions: a population of 475 million people and a territory of 9,600,000 square kilometres. There are indeed difficulties ahead, and a great many too. But we firmly believe that by heroic struggle the people of the country will surmount them all. The Chinese people have rich experience in overcoming difficulties. If our forefathers, and we also, could weather long years of extreme difficulty and defeat powerful domestic and foreign reactionaries, why can't we now, after victory, build a prosperous and flourishing country? As long as we keep to our style of plain living and hard struggle, as long as we stand united and as long as we persist in the people's democratic dictatorship and unite with our foreign friends, we shall be able to win speedy victory on the economic front.

An upsurge in economic construction is bound to be followed by an upsurge of construction in the cultural sphere. The era in which the Chinese people were regarded as uncivilized is now ended. We shall emerge in the world as a nation with an advanced culture.

Our national defence will be consolidated and no imperialists will ever again be allowed to invade our land. Our people's armed forces must be maintained and developed with the heroic and steeled People's Liberation Army as the foundation. We will have not only a powerful army but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy.

Let the domestic and foreign reactionaries tremble before us! Let them say we are no good at this and no good at that. By our own indomitable efforts we the Chinese people will unswervingly reach our goal.

The heroes of the people who laid down their lives in the People's War of Liberation and the people's revolution shall live for ever in our memory!

Hail the victory of the People's War of Liberation and the people's revolution!

Hail the founding of the People's Republic of China!

Hail the triumph of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference!

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