FACT SHEET ON THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS CONDUCTING IRRF-FUNDED RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES

FINAL REPORT
SIGIR-07-008
July 26, 2007
### Fact Sheet on the Roles and Responsibilities of U.S. Government Organizations Conducting IRRF-Funded Reconstruction Activities

**Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA, 22202**

**Approved for public release; distribution unlimited**

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- This Page: Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  

SUBJECT: Fact Sheet on the Roles and Responsibilities of U.S. Government Organizations Conducting IRRF-funded Reconstruction Activities (SIGIR-07-008)

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is providing this fact sheet for your information and use. Rebuilding Iraq is a U.S. national security and foreign policy priority; it is the largest U.S. assistance program since World War II. The Congress appropriated nearly $21 billion to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) through Public Law 108-11 and Public Law 108-106. Leadership of the reconstruction effort has changed several times, and many U.S. government organizations are currently participating under the overall responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense.

The leadership changes and myriad participants have contributed to complex organizational relationships that could potentially cause confusion. To provide context to the U.S. government organizations’ roles and responsibilities in Iraq reconstruction, I asked my staff to conduct a survey of each U.S. government agency with responsibility for at least one activity in Iraq. We identified at least 62 agencies or major sub-organizations within these agencies. The staff performed the survey from April 2006 through May 2007, capturing information in these areas: Authority/Mission, Roles/Responsibilities in Iraq, Organizational Structure, Policies/Procedures, Funding, Performance Reporting, and Mission Cessation/Transfer.

The survey was performed as “nonaudit services”, based on government auditing standards issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Therefore, this fact sheet does not verify, analyze, or evaluate the information provided by the U.S. government organizations, nor does it contain any conclusions, recommendations, or opinions on this information. The facts in this report were vetted with senior officials responsible for Iraq programs and funding; therefore, no formal response to this fact sheet is required or expected. An extended review period was provided from July 23 to July 25, 2007, on the consolidated Preliminary Final report to accept technical comments from impacted agencies. All comments received have been considered and addressed as appropriate in this final report.
This fact sheet was prepared and the survey was conducted under the direction of Mr. Joseph T. McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit. For the staff members who contributed to the fact sheet, see Appendix D. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff.

For additional information, please contact Mr. Glenn D. Furbish (glenn.furbish@sigir.mil / 703-428-1058).

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

cc: See Distribution
Lines of authority and significant, frequent organization interfaces, as reported by the organizations.
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Introduction

Background

From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was responsible for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the relief and reconstruction effort in Iraq. The Project Management Office (PMO) was established to prioritize and manage projects and provide contract support for U.S.-funded reconstruction projects.

In May 2004, to successfully meet the “new and formidable challenges” after the termination of the CPA and the reestablishment of a sovereign government in Iraq, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive-36 (NSPD-36). NSPD-36 stated that after the transition of sovereignty to the Iraqi government, the Department of State (DoS) would be responsible for all U.S. activities in Iraq through the Ambassador to Iraq. The Department of Defense (DoD) would be responsible for all U.S. efforts related to security and military operations. On June 28, 2004, when power transferred to the sovereign Iraqi Interim Government, the CPA was officially dissolved. The PMO split into two organizations: the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office was responsible for coordinating the reconstruction effort, and the Project and Contracting Office, assumed PMO’s project construction/execution responsibilities.

The presidential directive also established two temporary offices:

- The **Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)**, under DoS, facilitated and coordinated U.S. reconstruction efforts to Iraq. IRMO’s responsibilities included strategic planning, prioritizing requirements, monitoring spending, and coordinating with the military commander. On May 8, 2007, the President, by Executive Order 13431, created the Iraq Transition Assistance Office as the successor organization to IRMO. This fact sheet refers to IRMO’s tenure.

- The **Project and Contracting Office (PCO)**, under DoD, facilitated acquisition and project management support for U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. PCO’s responsibilities included contracting for and delivering infrastructure, related services, and supplies. On December 4, 2005, the positions of Director-PCO and Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region Division (GRD) merged to form the consolidated GRD/PCO organization, under the DoD Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)). At the end of fiscal year 2006, PCO in Baghdad stood down and the remaining elements of the organization became functional areas of GRD. On October 14, 2006, the mission of the PCO in Iraq officially ended and GRD was formally identified as the successor organization to PCO when it expired in May 2007. On May 11, 2007, the PCO-Washington office was closed. This fact sheet refers to PCO’s tenure.
In May 2005, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Defense Reconstruction Support Office (DRSO) to provide a single DoD focal point for coordinating operational support of reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this role, DRSO:

- represented DoD in interagency forums on operational matters
- provided support to senior officials in meetings, briefings, and testimony before the Congress
- prepared the quarterly report to the Congress required under Section 9010 of the DoD Appropriations Act for 20061 (the Section 9010 Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq)

In January 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy assumed DRSO’s functions, including:

- preparing the Section 9010 Report
- monitoring Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) activities through the United Nations International Advisory and Monitoring Board2
- providing support to Global War on Terror activities

U.S. Appropriated Funds

This report discusses the leadership and management of Iraq reconstruction projects funded by Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) appropriations in Public Law (P.L.) 108-11 and P.L. 108-106. We identified at least 62 U.S. Government agencies or major sub-organizations within these agencies that had responsibility for at least one activity in Iraq.

P.L. 108-11, The Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (April 16, 2003), appropriated $2.47 billion “for necessary expenses for humanitarian assistance in and around Iraq and to carry out the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Iraq.” Known as IRRF 1, the fund was designed to enable CPA, the transitional government in Iraq, and coalition partners to meet the needs of an expected humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom. For managing the expenses and overseeing the assistance effort, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) apportioned the funds directly to the organizations conducting Iraq reconstruction activities, including DoS, DoD, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury).

P.L. 108-106, The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan (November 6, 2003), appropriated $18.649 billion for relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, of which $18.439 billion was specifically for Iraq. These funds are known as IRRF 2. OMB

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1 Public Law 109-148.
apportioned the IRRF 2 funds directly to the organizations conducting Iraq reconstruction activities, including DoS, USAID, DoD, and Treasury.

Under IRRF 2, the Congress allocated funds to specific sectors of Iraqi governance and society. The President was permitted to reallocate these funds within certain bounds but was required to notify the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. The allocations changed many times, and these changes were reported quarterly in accordance with Section 2207 of P.L. 108-106\(^3\) (the *Section 2207 Report*). Table 1 shows the implementing organizations involved in each sector and their original IRRF 2 allocations.

**Table 1—IRRF 2 Funding by Sector, as of January 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Allocation (millions)</th>
<th>Implementing Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security/Law Enforcement</td>
<td>$3,243</td>
<td>Multi-National Force-Iraq&lt;br&gt;DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs&lt;br&gt;Department of Justice&lt;br&gt;Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>5,560</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division&lt;br&gt;U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources/Sanitation</td>
<td>4,332</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division&lt;br&gt;U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation/Telecommunications</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division&lt;br&gt;U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads/Bridges/Construction</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division&lt;br&gt;U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division&lt;br&gt;U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division&lt;br&gt;U.S. Agency for International Development&lt;br&gt;Overseas Private Investment Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$18,439</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Section 2207 Report, January 2004, congressional conference allocations.*

\(^3\) P.L. 108-106 requires a report to Congress each quarter on the proposed uses of all IRRF 2 funds on a project-by-project basis, including estimates of the costs required to complete each such project.
Objectives

The objective of this review was to determine the roles and responsibilities for each principal U.S. government organization with programmatic, operational, and/or financial stewardship for relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq. The review focused on these questions:

1. Which U.S. government organizations have been authorized to perform a role in Iraq relief and reconstruction activities?
2. What are the authorized roles and responsibilities of each organization and their relationship to other organizations?
3. How do these organizations coordinate policies, procedures, and activities with each other?
4. Which U.S. government organizations that did not have principal roles and responsibilities also provided staff to the Iraq relief and reconstruction activities?
5. What amount and type of funding was provided to each organization for what purpose?
6. What performance reporting does each organization produce, to whom, and how often?
7. What event triggers the cessation or transfer of each organization’s mission relating to Iraq relief and reconstruction activities?

The roles and responsibilities of the major government organizations participating in the Iraq effort are described in the individual summaries in this report. These summaries present how officials view their authority and responsibilities, as well as their coordination with other organizations. SIGIR did not validate those authorities, roles, and interface efforts: this was not in the scope of the review.

For a discussion of the scope and methodology, see Appendix A.

For the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix B.

For the report’s distribution, see Appendix C.

For the team members, see Appendix D.
Department of State

U.S. Mission-Iraq

Authority/Mission

The United States is represented in Iraq by the Ambassador to Iraq, also known as the Chief of Mission (CoM). Two national security presidential directives (NSPDs) assign responsibilities to the U.S. Mission-Iraq: NSPD-36 and NSPD-44.

NSPD-36 (May 11, 2004) addresses the transition of U.S. government operations in Iraq from the CPA to the U.S. Mission-Iraq. According to the NSPD, the CoM—on behalf of the President and under the guidance of the Secretary of State—is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. government employees, policies, and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of a U.S. military commander and employees seconded to international organizations. Executive agencies are required to keep the CoM fully and currently informed on all activities and operations of its employees in Iraq and to ensure that they comply fully with all applicable CoM directives.4

NSPD-44 (December 7, 2005) addresses coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The directive establishes these responsibilities of DoS through the U.S. Mission-Iraq:

- coordinating and strengthening U.S. government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple departments and agencies
- harmonizing such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations

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4 See the Foreign Service Act of 1980, Public Law 96-465, § 207.
Organizational Structure

Policies/Procedures

U.S. Mission-Iraq operations are guided by DoS standard operating procedures and regulations, as well as several Iraq-specific documents:

- **National Strategy for Victory in Iraq**
- **National Strategy for Supporting Iraq**
- **The Joint Campaign Plan**

Other Iraq-specific policies or procedures are identified in interagency agreements between the responsible DoS bureaus and the implementing U.S. government organizations.

Funding

Diplomatic and consular programs are funded through the annual DoS operating appropriation. Additionally, when the CPA was terminated, some IRRF 1 funding was used to facilitate the transition from a DoD to a DoS mission and organization.
Performance Reporting

The U.S. Mission-Iraq provides information to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) on its reconstruction and other activities, which is incorporated in NEA reports, according to the Staff Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Mission. The U.S. Mission-Iraq provides input to NEA for:

- The *Iraq Weekly Status Report*—which compiles information from a variety of sources—including USAID, and IRMO—and provides weekly updates on U.S. government policy on Iraq.
- The congressionally required *Section 1227 Report on Iraq (Section 1227 Report)*—which covers the current military, diplomatic, political, and economic measures that have been undertaken to complete the mission in Iraq; provides an assessment of the current situation; outlines goals; and measures political, economic, and security progress.
- The congressionally required *Section 2207 Report on Iraq Reconstruction (Section 2207 Report)*—which outlines the conditions, programs, and initiatives supported by the IRRF; provides performance metrics; and describes sector accomplishments for the previous quarter.

Mission Cessation/Transfer

There is no plan to end or transfer the activities of U.S. Mission-Iraq. A continuing diplomatic presence is envisioned.

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office

Authority/Mission

On May 11, 2004, NSPD-36 established IRMO as a temporary DoS organization to facilitate the transition in Iraq. On May 8, 2007, IRMO’s functions were assumed by the Iraq Transition Assistance Office. Until then, located at the U.S. Mission-Iraq, IRMO reported directly to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and was led by a director selected by the Secretary of State. IRMO’s staff included:

- personnel with relevant management experience detailed on a nonreimbursable basis from other U.S. government department and agencies
- senior and/or technical advisers
- personnel from coalition nations
- other personnel directed by the Secretary

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The IRMO staff worked alongside traditional U.S. Embassy sections and in conjunction with other U.S. government departments and agencies, including GRD, USAID, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), DoJ, DHS, Treasury, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and U.S. Institute of Peace.6

**Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq**

To achieve its mission to oversee the provisions of reconstruction assistance and to provide support (including security, medical, logistical, and administrative) to U.S. activities in Iraq, IRMO:7

- advised Iraqi ministries through IRMO’s senior consultants
- oversaw the use of funds to U.S. government departments and agencies executing assistance programs in Iraq (chiefly USAID, MNF-I, and GRD)
- provided information on U.S. government assistance programs in Iraq to DoS for reporting to the Congress and executive agencies
- worked to ensure that the U.S. Mission-Iraq team and MNF-I spoke with one voice on reconstruction issues
- respected the distinctive values and differing procedures of the executing agencies to achieve harmony among Iraq reconstruction programs8

IRMO’s organizational structure comprised the Executive Office, four IRMO divisions, and supporting staff offices, which had these operational responsibilities:

- **IRMO Executive Office.** The Executive Office supported the IRMO Director. As the primary U.S. government coordinator for Iraq reconstruction efforts, the Director reported to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.

- **IRMO Development Office.** IRMO senior consultants assigned to the Development Office worked directly with the Iraqi Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health, Planning and Development, Private Sector Development, Trade, and Industry and Minerals, providing technical assistance, coordinating reconstruction projects, and conducting capacity-development activities. IRMO senior consultants served as U.S. government liaisons to their respective Iraqi ministries and commissions. The Development Office also housed the Ministerial Coordination Team, which supported ministerial capacity development through the implementation of short-term initiatives in ten key ministries.

- **IRMO Finance Office.** The IRMO Chief Financial Officer oversaw financial, budgetary, and information management issues related to Iraq reconstruction.

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6 NSPD-36, May 11, 2004; IRMO Executive Office memo, April 15, 2005.
7 IRMO mission statement, April 15, 2005.
8 IRMO mission statement, January 1, 2005.
• **IRMO Operations Office.** IRMO senior consultants assigned to the Operations Office worked directly with the Iraqi Ministries of Communications, Electricity, Justice, Oil, Transportation, Water Resources, Municipalities and Public Works, and Environment, providing technical assistance, coordinating reconstruction projects, and conducting capacity-development activities. The IRMO Director of Operations also served as IRMO’s primary liaison to MNF-I.⁹

• **Civil/Military Regional Operations Office.** The IRMO Civil/Military Operations Office comprised the National Coordination Team, the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), and liaisons to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior. The National Coordination Team supported personnel assigned to the PRTs who live and work outside Baghdad. The PRTs lead capacity building and coordinate reconstruction efforts in the governorates.

**Organizational Structure**

**Iraq Reconstruction Management Office**


**Policies/Procedures**

IRMO did not have direct authority over organizations conducting reconstruction activities; NSPD 36 set up IRMO to facilitate. According to the IRMO Chief of Staff, IRMO strived to achieve harmony among the various organizations while respecting the distinctive values and differing procedures of each.

⁹ IRMO provided expertise and operational assistance to the Ministries of Defense and Interior until October 1, 2005, when these responsibilities were transferred to MNSTC-I to ensure that the development of pivotal ministerial functions was synchronized with the development of the Iraqi Security Forces.
To coordinate reconstruction activities, IRMO conducted programmatic reviews,\(^{10}\) including:

- monthly sector reviews with INL, USAID, USACE GRD, MNSTC-I, and IRMO senior consultants (bi-monthly reviews for essential services—oil, water, electricity, communications, and transportation)
- weekly reviews of funds moved and projects initiated and completed
- periodic subsector financial reviews, usually monthly, including construction gap and cost-to-complete analysis
- a review and approval process for all program changes and cancellations
- daily interaction with Iraqi ministries through senior consultants
- weekly meetings of the Deputy Prime Minister and IRMO Director on strategic issues regarding reconstruction
- three reviews of commitments and obligations of funds each year

IRMO had also issued several memorandums to exercise its responsibility to control IRRF funds, including:

- a policy and procedure for deobligating, reprogramming, and obligating IRRF 2 funds
- a policy and procedure for using expired IRRF 2 funds
- a procedure for reporting and obtaining approval for project scope changes

**Funding**

IRMO’s operating expenses were funded through the DoS operating budget. However, when the CPA was terminated, some IRRF 1 funding was used to facilitate the transition from a DoD to DoS mission and organization. As authorized in the fiscal year 2004 Supplemental Appropriations Act and as recorded in the July 2004 *Section 2207 Report*, $105.75 million from IRRF 1 was transferred to the U.S. Mission-Iraq, although not all costs were attributable to IRMO.\(^{11}\)

**Performance Reporting**

IRMO collected all reconstruction data from the IRRF participants and consolidated the details to help prepare the *Section 2207 Report*.\(^{12}\)

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\(^{10}\) See the April 2005 *Section 2207 Report*, executive summary.

\(^{11}\) IRMO Chief Financial Officer, February 2007.

\(^{12}\) Ibid.
**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

IRMO was created as a temporary DoS organization. By law, temporary organizations can use the hiring flexibilities provided under 5 U.S.C. 3161 only for up to three years, but such employees may be retained for up to five years. IRMO, as scheduled, terminated in May 2007. On May 8, 2007, the President, by Executive Order 13431, created the Iraq Transition Assistance Office as the successor organization to IRMO.

**Iraq Transition Assistance Office**

The President established the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) as a temporary organization within DoS, “to perform the specific project of supporting executive departments and agencies in concluding remaining large infrastructure projects expeditiously in Iraq, in facilitating Iraq’s transition to self-sufficiency, and in maintaining an effective diplomatic presence in Iraq”. The functions assigned to IRMO were assumed by ITAO. For the full text of Executive Order 13431, see Exhibit 1.

**Departmental Support to the U.S. Mission-Iraq**

Headed by the Secretary of State, DoS is the cabinet-level foreign affairs agency of the U.S. government. Its mission is to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community. The Secretary of State is the chief executive officer of the department and answers directly to the President. These DoS organizations provide departmental level support to the U.S. Mission-Iraq:

Five DoS bureaus are involved in IRRF-funded Iraq reconstruction:
- Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
- Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
- Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
- Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

The five bureaus are overseen by three DoS under secretaries:
- Under Secretary for Political Affairs
- Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs
- Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs

Several attachés also serve under the U.S. Mission-Iraq:
- Department of Justice Attaché
- Department of Homeland Security Attaché
- Department of the Treasury Attaché
- Department of Transportation Attaché
- Department of Agriculture Attaché

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13 IRMO Chief of Staff, March 2007.
USAID also maintains a mission in Iraq (USAID/Iraq) under the direction of the Secretary of State.

**Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs**

*Authority/Mission*

The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) deals with U.S. foreign policy and U.S. diplomatic relations with Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

*Roles and Responsibilities*

Within NEA, the Office of Iraq Affairs (NEA/I) supports the mission in Baghdad. The NEA/I Deputy Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, is responsible for providing leadership and coordination for the Department of State and other U.S. government agencies in Iraq. The Deputy Assistant Secretary ensures that the needs of the Chief of Mission are served and the mission is properly supported in terms of policy, operations, and administration, as well as developing support contacts, channels of communications, and mechanisms for interagency leadership.

The FY 2007 Bureau Performance Plan shows that NEA/I is working within the interagency context to execute the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* by working to develop efforts in the governance, reconstruction, and security areas. NEA/I is also working to develop international engagement in support of Iraq and assisting in the President’s January 2007 *New Way Forward in Iraq Strategy*.

*Organizational Structure*

Policies/Procedures

NEA/I’s operations in Iraq are guided by DoS standard operating procedures and regulations, as well as several Iraq-specific documents, including:

- National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
- National Strategy for Supporting Iraq
- The Joint Campaign Plan

Funding

NEA/I’s operating expenses are funded by the DoS operating budget.

NEA/I has entered into a number of interagency agreements using IRRF funds totaling $12.5 million, as of March 7, 2007. These include:

- An agreement with the Department of Energy, Office of Policy and International Affairs, to provide technical assistance to the Iraqi government to create a legal and regulatory environment conducive to domestic and foreign investment in the energy sector.

- An agreement with the Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, to support a two year program to assist the Iraqi agricultural extension system; and to identify, select, and manage a consortium of Land Grant Universities to provide training programs to Iraqi educators and ministry staff.

- An agreement with the Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service, to provide mineral management training personnel to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.

- An agreement with the Department of Commerce, Commercial Law Development Program, to conduct a one-year program to assist in creating a legal and tax environment conducive to domestic and foreign investment in the oil and gas sectors.

Performance Reporting

NEA/I issues three external, recurring reports, according to the Iraq Congressional Affairs Liaison:

- The Iraq Weekly Status Report compiles information from a variety of sources—including other DoS bureaus, USAID, and IRMO—and provides weekly updates on U.S. government policy on Iraq.

- The congressionally required Section 1227 Report on Iraq (Section 1227 Report) covers the current military, diplomatic, political, and economic measures that have been undertaken to complete the mission in Iraq; provides an assessment of
the current situation; outlines goals; and measures political, economic, and security progress.

- The congressionally required Section 2207 Report on Iraq Reconstruction (Section 2207 Report) outlines the conditions, programs, and initiatives supported by the IRRF; provides performance metrics; and describes sector accomplishments for the previous quarter.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

There is no plan for ending or transferring NEA/I’s mission in Iraq.

**Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs**

**Authority/Mission**

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is the primary focal point in DoS for all international narcotics and international crime matters; its role is both diplomatic and programmatic and includes international narcotics control, international crime control, and rule of law.

INL derives its authority from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which authorizes the Secretary of State to assist in promoting political, civil, and economic changes in the community of nations. Additionally, Presidential Decision Directive 71 directs DoS to strengthen criminal justice systems in support of U.S. peace operations and other complex contingencies.

**Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq**

The INL office at the U.S. Mission-Iraq primarily conducts criminal-related projects in three areas: police, rule of law, and corrections.

- **Police:** INL supports the U.S. military in training and equipping the Iraqi Police Service. It funds the recruitment of international police trainers through the Department of Justice (DoJ), as well as through a separate contract for international police liaison officers. INL also developed curricula to train new and existing Iraqi police and corrections personnel, reestablished a police academy in Baghdad, and funded the development of the Jordan International Police Training Center in Amman, which trains Iraqi police.

- **Rule of Law:** INL helps the Iraqi judiciary draft legislation, provides rule-of-law coordinators for provincial reconstruction teams throughout Iraq, and funds a variety of justice programs to strengthen the Iraqi criminal justice system, including: the Iraqi Justice Integration Project, the Major Crimes Task Force, the

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Courthouse Security Upgrade Project, and training for anticorruption and judicial investigators.

- **Corrections**: INL funds programs to increase Iraq’s capacity to house and guard prisoners, advises and trains the Iraqi Corrections Service, and manages projects to build additional prison bed space.

**Policies/Procedures**

INL’s activities are guided by DoS standard operating procedures and regulations, as well as several Iraq-specific documents, including:

- *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*
- *National Strategy for Supporting Iraq*
- *The Joint Campaign Plan*

Other INL policies or procedures are identified in interagency agreements with U.S. government organizations that implement INL projects, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DoJ, and Treasury, which have attachés working in Iraq under the chief of mission.

**Funding**

INL’s operating expenses are funded by the DoS operating budget. From FY 2003 through FY 2006, funding for INL’s Iraq efforts was provided from DoS Supplemental Appropriation apportionments and DoD funding transfers.

INL received $2.2 billion in funding for Iraq-related activities from FY 2003 through FY 2007 (as of the second quarter of FY 2007). The largest portion came from the IRRF ($1.2 billion), which included funds originally provided to DoD and then transferred to INL. The second-largest amount came from the Iraq Security Forces Fund ($762 million), which was originally provided to DoD and then transferred to INL.

In executing its mission, INL established interagency agreements with DoJ, DHS, and Treasury. INL transferred IRRF funds to these agencies to fund programs executed for Iraq.

**Performance Reporting**

INL reports its accomplishments quarterly to the Congress in the *Section 2207 Report*. Additionally, each organization that performs functions under an interagency agreement is required to submit an annual progress report.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

There is no plan for INL to cease or transfer its activities in Iraq.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Authority/Mission

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) conducts U.S. foreign policy efforts in civil, political, and human rights. According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, the mission of DRL includes:

- overseeing initiatives and policies that promote and strengthen democratic institutions, civil societies, and respect for human rights and worker rights
- ensuring that human rights and labor conditions in foreign countries are taken into account in U.S. policy-making
- preparing annual reports to the Congress on human rights practices and religious freedom in countries around the world
- overseeing the Human Rights and Democracy Fund, which addresses human rights and democratization emergencies

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

The DRL offices responsible for Iraq are the Office of Near East and South Central Asia and the Program Unit. These offices are responsible for:

- developing and implementing policy on human rights and democracy
- providing policy guidance to regional bureaus and U.S. embassies
- monitoring worldwide observance of human rights, democracy, and fundamental freedom
- providing guidance and policy recommendations to other bureaus

Policies/Procedures

DRL’s activities are guided by DoS standard operating procedures and regulations, as well as several Iraq-specific documents:

- National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
- National Strategy for Supporting Iraq
- The Joint Campaign Plan

According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, DRL has not issued Iraq-specific policies and procedures. However, DRL grants are also reviewed by NEA/I and USAID’s Iraq Program Office to coordinate project and policy priorities as well as avoid duplication of effort.

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16 DRL Deputy Assistant Secretary, March 9, 2007.
Funding

DRL’s operating expenses are funded by the DoS operating budget. Additionally, as of April 2007, DRL has received $97.1 million from the IRRF 2 appropriation for its various projects—for example, National Endowment for Democracy, Women’s Democracy Initiatives, and Human Rights. All of DRL’s projects are in the education, refugees, human rights, democracy, and governance sector.

Performance Reporting

DRL reports its accomplishments quarterly to the Congress in the Section 2207 Report.

Mission Cessation/Transfer

There is no plan for DRL to cease or transfer its activities in Iraq.

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Authority/Mission

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PMA) is the principal link between DoS and DoD to facilitate U.S./coalition military operations. PMA’s mission is to use diplomacy and military power to foster a stable and secure international environment receptive to American values and interests, according to the FY 2007 Bureau Performance Plan.

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

PMA’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement is responsible for providing assistance in the removal of landmines and unexploded ordnance in war-torn countries, such as Iraq. The program’s objective is to reduce civilian casualties and create a safe atmosphere, allowing refugees to return to their homes.17

Policies/Procedures

PMA’s activities are guided by DoS standard operating procedures and regulations, as well as several Iraq-specific documents:

- National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
- National Strategy for Supporting Iraq
- The Joint Campaign Plan

PMA has not issued specific policies or procedures for Iraq, according to the Director of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.

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Funding

PMA’s operating expenses are funded by the DoS operating budget. PMA also received Iraq-specific funding for its mine removal and unexploded ordnance projects—$12.3 million from IRRF 1 and $84.8 million from IRRF 2, as of March 8, 2007. PMA’s projects are in the justice, public safety, infrastructure, and civil society sector.

Performance Reporting

PMA reports its accomplishments quarterly to the Congress in the Section 2207 Report.

Mission Cessation/Transfer

The Director of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement stated that the mission to support the removal of landmines and unexploded ordnance in Iraq will continue until Iraq is considered free of mine/ordnance or has the capacity to become so on its own.

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

Authority/Mission

The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has primary responsibility for formulating policies on population, refugees, and migration, and for administering U.S. refugee assistance and admissions programs. PRM’s principal authorities are derived from statutes, including the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 and the Refugee Act of 1980. Substantial provisions of these laws are based in international conventions to which the U.S. is a party, most notably the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.

In carrying out its mission, PRM pays particular attention to promoting women’s equal access to resources and participation in management of those resources—especially the distribution of food and other relief items—as well as meeting the special needs of refugee and returnee children.

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

The PRM mission in Iraq is to provide protection, assistance, and sustainable solutions for refugees and conflict victims while enhancing U.S. population/migration policies, as stated in the FY 2006 Guidelines for Nongovernmental Organization Projects for Assistance to Iraqi Refugees and Returnees.

PRM provides support to Iraqi communities where refugees have returned, including building the capacity of those communities to absorb additional refugees, according to the PRM Director. Assistance to Iraqi returnees and non-Iraqi refugees includes shelter, water and sanitation, health care, and primary education. Protection underpins all of PRM’s policy and programming. PRM also supports care and maintenance programs for
refugees and other vulnerable Iraqis in neighboring countries who are unable to return to Iraq.

**Policies/Procedures**

PRM’s activities are guided by DoS standard operating procedures and regulations, as well as several Iraq-specific documents:

- *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*
- *National Strategy for Supporting Iraq*
- *The Joint Campaign Plan*

The Director of the Office of Policy and Resources Planning stated that PRM has not issued any Iraq-specific policies and procedures, but it works closely with USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance concerning internally displaced persons.

**Funding**

PRM’s operating expenses are funded by the DoS operating budget. Additionally, as of March 2007, PRM has received $27 million in IRRF 1 and $119 million in IRRF 2 funding. Of the IRRF 2 funds, $16 million was returned for reprogramming. Programs supporting internally displaced Iraqi refugees received the bulk of the IRRF 2 funds, about $75 million; the balance was used to provide support to Iraq refugees in other countries in the region. The PRM Director stated that most Iraq funding is distributed to international organizations; the remainder is provided to nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations.

**Performance Reporting**

PRM reports its accomplishments quarterly to the Congress in the *Section 2207 Report*.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

PRM will continue to play a critical role in Iraq as long as its primary implementing partners—including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Committee of the Red Cross, and International Organization for Migration—provide assistance and protection to refugees, returnees, and other conflict victims in Iraq and neighboring countries.

**Department of Justice Attaché in Iraq**

**Authority/Mission**

In late 2004, DoS and DoJ signed an interagency agreement to support security, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction programs in Iraq. As a result, the Attorney General appointed a Justice Attaché to the U.S. Mission-Iraq to oversee the activities of the various participating DoJ components:
• U.S. Marshals Service
• Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training
• International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
• Regime Crimes Liaison’s Office
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
• Drug Enforcement Administration
• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

Policies/Procedures

The Justice Attaché reported that the activities of DoJ components in Iraq are carried out subject to the policy direction of the CoM.

Funding

According to an official in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, INL has entered into a number of interagency agreements with DoJ organizations to support security, training, and development assistance programs in Iraq:

• Drug Enforcement Administration
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
• Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training
• International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
• Regime Crimes Liaison’s Office
• U.S. Marshals Service

Through interagency agreements, INL has provided DoJ with $383.5 million from IRRF as of May 4, 2007, and the Iraq Security Forces Fund for a variety of efforts. The largest ($244.7 million) is the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.

Performance Reporting

Information on DoJ-supported projects is included in the Section 2207 Report. Also, the DoS and DoJ interagency agreements require quarterly progress reports and financial reports, according to an official from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

Mission Cessation/Transfer

DoJ is involved in interagency efforts for continued support of the Government of Iraq (GOI) in the context of the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq, with particular focus on expanding rule-of-law support to provincial governments through the PRTs, according to an official from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. On March 24, 2006, the Secretary of State requested additional personnel to assist through 2008, and DoJ is working with DoS and the U.S. Mission-Iraq to coordinate that support.
Department of Homeland Security Attaché in Iraq

Authority/Mission

In response to NSPD-36, DHS has provided services in Iraq to assess operations and security for borders and ports-of-entry (land, sea, and air), and provided point-of-entry infrastructure protection, terrorist financing investigations, and naturalization services to U.S. military members. These services are provided by numerous directorates, bureaus and agencies within DHS such as:

- Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- Customs and Border Protection
- Transportation Security Administration
- U.S. Secret Service
- Citizenship and Immigration Services
- U.S. Coast Guard

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

Operating under the DHS Attaché in the U.S. Mission-Iraq, DHS personnel provide a range of services, including border/port-of-entry operations and security (land, sea, and air), point-of-entry infrastructure protection, terrorist financing investigations, and naturalization services to U.S. military members.

Customs and Border Protection personnel work with MNSTC-I to provide specific border and port-of-entry services, under an April 24, 2006 memorandum between DHS, the Deputy Chief of Mission, IRMO, and MNSTC-I. On May 30, 2006, the DHS Attaché defined these support services:

- Provide oversight, mentoring, and training of Iraqi personnel in ports-of-entry operations (land, sea, and airports), related to immigration processing, customs procedures, and commercial cargo operations and associated security processes.
- Act as subject-matter experts and advise coalition commanders on point-of-entry responsibilities, national academy curriculum-development responsibilities, and train-the-trainer responsibilities.
- Serve as policy advisers to MNSTC-I’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team and the Ministry of Interior to develop statutes, regulations, and policy on border and point-of-entry operations, security, customs, immigration, and associated security operations, laws, and procedures.

Policies/Procedures

The DHS Attaché advises the Chief of Mission on operational and security matters related to the various DHS missions. The DHS Attaché has not issued any Iraq-specific policy.
**Funding**

The DHS Attaché position is a yearly rotation that is funded from the DHS Office of International Affairs operating budget. The operating budgets of the various DHS component agencies fund the specific missions in Iraq. The basic salaries of the Customs and Border Protection personnel are supported by the DHS office’s operating budget. MNSTC-I, however, uses IRRF funding to cover the support costs associated with travel, per diem, security, overtime, premium pay, predeployment training, and/or other expenses of the Customs and Border Protection personnel while serving in Iraq.

**Performance Reporting**

According to the DHS Attaché, individual agents prepare these performance reports:

- weekly summary reports issued to MNSTC-I, U.S. Central Command, and DHS
- site assessments issued to MNSTC-I
- monthly summary reports issued to MNSTC-I

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

There is no cessation or transfer plan for the DHS Attaché, although preliminary discussions have been held with DoS, IRMO, and MNSTC-I on the future of the DHS Attaché and the strategic engagement of its assets.

**Department of the Treasury Attaché in Iraq**

**Authority/Mission**

NSPD-36 gave the Secretary of State the authority to task other departments and agencies to provide personnel and reconstruction support for Iraq reconstruction. In response, the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) was tasked to provide advisory services that focused on establishing modern central bank functions and a nationwide payment system among local banks and the central bank. Located in Washington, D.C., the OTA has been administering the banking sector establishment program by awarding contracts and conducting activities under six major functions:

- budget policy and management
- finance enforcement
- banking and financial services
- government debt issuance and management
- tax policy and administration
- operations
**Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq**

To assist in the establishment of central bank functions, Treasury’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa and the Middle East created an Attaché office in Iraq, who coordinates Treasury activities with the CoM. The OTA Director stated that although OTA is the only Treasury office funded by IRRF, other Treasury entities provide assistance for Iraq reconstruction, including:

- Office of International Affairs
- Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
- Financial Management Service
- Internal Revenue Service
- Office of the General Counsel

In addition, the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis have had activities in Iraq that are not directly related to reconstruction activities.

**Policies/Procedures**

Treasury has not issued any Iraq-specific policies or procedures.

**Funding**

According to the OTA Director, as of February 2007, Treasury has received $6 million of IRRF 1 funds and $40 million of IRRF 2 funds.

- **IRRF 1**: The $6 million funded technical assistance operations.

- **IRRF 2**: Of the $40 million, $30 million funded technical assistance operations and associated procurements, and $10 million was passed through to the International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group, for loans to micro-, small-, and medium-sized businesses. (The $30 million for technical assistance included support of senior advisors and consultants, establishment of a National Payment System, bank physical security upgrades, check processing equipment, and program management expenses.)

Treasury returned $900,000 of the $30 million to OMB.

The OTA Director also stated that the Treasury Attaché to Iraq was supported with Treasury operating funds.

**Performance Reporting**

The OTA Director stated that Treasury provides input to the *Section 2207 Report*. Treasury also provides IRMO with weekly and monthly financial reports on funds obligations and disbursements.
Mission Cessation/Transfer

Treasury has not developed a cessation or transfer plan, according to the OTA Director. Treasury and the Attaché in Iraq will continue to support the reconstruction effort in Iraq as long as reconstruction remains a U.S. priority and the requisite funds are available.

Department of Transportation Attaché in Iraq

Mission

As provided by the Department of Transportation (DOT) Attaché, this office is in direct support of the U.S. Embassy mission to support the GOI in rebuilding the nation’s transportation systems and related institutions to provide the citizens of Iraq with safe and secure public transportation. As the representative of DOT, it also serves the Ambassador and coalition partners in matters pertaining to U.S. policy and procedures regarding transportation matters.

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

The primary role of the DOT Attaché Office is to provide the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation and its modal agencies and state owned enterprises with technical assistance and consultation in the rebuilding of its aviation, rail, ports, and roads and bridges infrastructure and to provide capacity and institutional building to the GOI to achieve and sustain a level of capability that meets international regulatory and technical standards. The DOT Attaché is responsible for promoting U.S. standards and recommended practices in the development and implementation of transportation systems in Iraq. As the DOT representative, the Attaché is responsible for providing technical assistance to U.S. and coalition partners in carrying out their missions in Iraq, without negatively impacting the Iraq rebuilding process by harmonizing competing requirements between the key stakeholders.

Policies/Procedures

DOT Attaché is involved in developing travel advisories for Iraq, as well as weighing in on use of transportation modes for CoM personnel within Iraq. DOT Attaché staff also provide technical advice and expertise to the Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of Transportation as they develop their transportation policies for the country.

Funding

Since 2005, the U.S. Government has spent approximately $32 million in IRRF on construction activities at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), as well as training of relevant personnel. Major projects include the critical rehabilitation of BIAP facilities from electrical to water and sewer, installation of visual aids for aircraft traffic, powering the new radar system, street lighting, bringing BIAP into compliance with international navigational aid standards. The U.S. also provided operations and maintenance training for personnel using the air traffic control system; flight safety training and certification for flight safety inspectors; tools for critical communication redundancy; air traffic
control training; and English language training. Moreover, the U.S. funded and facilitated the Air Navigation Systems Commissioning Flight Inspection, which will allow flights to land and depart from BIAP with less than visual flight conditions.

Prior to 2005, USAID reportedly spent approximately $20 million in IRRF funds on BIAP infrastructure work including the rehabilitation of the Air Traffic Control Tower; repair of Terminal C and administration offices; construction of security checkpoints and a 240-car parking lot; installation of VSAT communications system and 6.5 megawatt power generators; repair of perimeter security fence; and the restoration of substation transformers and generators.

Performance Reporting

The DOT Attaché Office provides input to the Section 2207 Report and submits weekly reports on progress within each of the sector modes to ITAO.

Mission Cessation/Transfer

DOT has not developed a cessation or transfer plan, as of yet. DOT and the Attaché will continue to support the reconstruction and capacity building effort in Iraq as long as this remains a U.S. priority and the requisite funds are available. Critical handover points involve the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority meeting the recommended standards and practices of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Department of Agriculture Attaché in Iraq

According to the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Embassy representative, the Attaché activities in Iraq include the USDA-funded Iraq Agricultural Extension Revitalization program. The primary focus of this program is to work with extension specialists and university professors to improve farming techniques and to make Iraqi farmers more efficient. Iraq is also interested in increasing the opportunities for training farmers abroad and training of countryside women and youth.

USDA is also working with the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Agriculture to consolidate statistical information management under one roof, apply modern statistical manipulation tools, and make information available in a useful form to agriculturalists. This project is funded by USDA via the Cochran Fellowship Program.
U.S. Agency for International Development

**Authority/Mission**

USAID was created by a Presidential Executive Order in 1961 under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act. To execute its mission in Iraq, the USAID Mission office was established in Iraq. USAID/Iraq falls under the authority of the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Asia and the Near East (ANE). The ANE Bureau works closely with the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) who has provided humanitarian and other support. USAID/Iraq coordinates all of its Iraq activities through the CoM.

**Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq**

Initially, USAID/Iraq implemented programs in four strategic areas: restoring essential infrastructure, supporting essential health and education, expanding economic opportunity, and improving efficiency and accountability of government. USAID/Iraq’s *Transition Strategy Plan, 2006-2008*, (March 2006) realigned USAID’s strategy with the *National Strategy* and established three objectives that call for an expanded role in supporting focused stabilization, establishing the foundation for economic growth, and building national capacity. USAID/Iraq is also playing a key role in manning and establishing provincial reconstruction teams.

ANE is responsible for setting up USAID/Iraq and supporting mission efforts to implement programs that support the objectives identified above, as well as providing representation and coordination with other U.S. government agencies in Washington, D.C. To provide support for the Iraq mission, the USAID Administrator created an office within ANE—the Office of Iraq Reconstruction—which provides guidance and support, including:

- providing support to the ANE Assistant Administrator and others at USAID
- coordinating and leading the review and approval of proposed USAID assistance
- assisting USAID/Iraq with the development of the USAID/Iraq strategy
- performing follow-up on the implementation of the Iraq Strategy
- conducting annual report reviews
- coordinating USAID congressional activities
- responding to public and government requests for information
- participating in and representing USAID at multilateral meetings
- assisting with coordination and planning of USAID programs with the National Security Council, DoD, DoS, Treasury, and other U.S. federal departments, agencies, and embassies
DCHA provides technical support and expertise in coordinating USAID’s democracy programs, international disaster assistance, emergency and developmental food aid, aid to manage and mitigate conflict, and volunteer programs.\textsuperscript{18}

**Organizational Structure**


**Note:** USAID offices not directly related to the Iraq effort are shaded gray.

In addition, on June 7, 2003, USAID entered into an interagency agreement with USACE for architectural and engineering technical services for USAID’s Iraq reconstruction contract. USACE provides construction oversight of reconstruction contracts, including technical assistance, quality control monitoring, database management, and reporting. The interagency agreement identifies the specific services to be rendered, establishes schedules, and determines funding. The interagency agreement was extended to May 2007.

\textsuperscript{18} USAID, “Agency Programs and Functions Statement,” February 1, 2006.
**Policies/Procedures**

The Deputy Director of the Office of Iraq Reconstruction identified these policies and procedures, current as of March 19, 2007:

- USAID programs and activities are implemented under applicable laws, including the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, and guidelines issued by IRMO for IRRF 1 and IRRF 2. Additionally, Iraq-related programs are implemented in accordance with USAID regulations, policies, and procedures.

- USAID has also prepared a USAID Transition Strategy for Iraq that provides a focused approach to essential issues, addressing the root causes of instability and building the foundation for a prosperous Iraq. The strategy bridges the transition from the short-term provision of essential services to long-term, integrated, and Iraqi-led development.

**Funding**

USAID received $2.1 billion for Iraq reconstruction projects from IRRF 1 and $3.0 billion from IRRF 2, as of March 13, 2007, according to the USAID Audit Liaison.

**Performance Reporting**

USAID provides information on its individual projects quarterly to NEA/I for the *Section 2207 Report*. In addition, the Office of Iraq Reconstruction prepares a biweekly status report on the USAID Iraq reconstruction effort. The status report includes a narrative description of projects and a program financial summary.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

On March 19, 2007, the Deputy Director of the Office of Iraq Reconstruction stated that USAID’s support for Iraq will not end with the final expenditure of IRRF monies, and that USAID/Iraq will not be transferred. However, some efforts within DCHA have ended, such as the Office of Food for Peace and the Office of Transition Initiatives.
Department of Defense

Multi-National Force-Iraq

Authority/Mission

Before the transfer of power to the sovereign Iraqi Interim Government in late June 2004, CENTCOM’s Baghdad-based Combined Joint Task Force-7—which had been responsible for executing security and military operations in Iraq—became a multinational coalition forces headquarters, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).

MNF-I and the U.S. Mission-Iraq work in partnership with the GOI to accomplish these goals:

- Create an environment in which Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people.
- Create the conditions for the rule of law.
- Defeat terrorists and irreconcilable groups.
- Bring the remainder into the political process.
- Reduce sectarian tensions.
- Deny Iraq as a safe haven for terror.

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

As of April 2007, MNF-I has more than 144,400 U.S. troops from all branches of service, plus an additional 12,700 service members from 26 coalition countries. These are MNF-I’s major subordinate commands:

- Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (USACE GRD)
- Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)
- Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A)
- Task Force 134

MNC-I is responsible for command and control of military operations in Iraq and provides assessments of the Iraqi Security Forces to determine the degree to which they can perform combat operations and their missions independent of MNF-I units. Task Force 134 is responsible for coalition detention, interrogation, and legal referral and detainee operations above division level. It also coordinates with the GOI, DoD, coalition forces, DoS, interagency organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

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19 The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is the combatant command responsible for Iraq.
Organizational Structure

Multi-National Force-Iraq

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

Iraqi Government

Multi-National Force - Iraq

MNF-I relies on its subordinate commands to coordinate contracting policies, procedures, and overall customer support with major customers involved in reconstruction projects.

Funding

MNF-I did not directly receive Iraq reconstruction funds. Reconstruction activities were carried out by its subordinate command, MNSTC-I, through GRD, which managed $4.2 billion in IRRF projects for MNSTC-I.

Performance Reporting

MNF-I is responsible for command and control of military operations in Iraq. Subordinate commands report on performance on Iraq reconstruction through the Section 2207 Report. MNF-I also contributes to the Section 9010 Report on measuring stability and security in Iraq. The reports include specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) authorizes MNF-I to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. The resolution stipulated that the mandate for MNF-I shall:

- be reviewed at the request of the GOI or twelve months from the date of this resolution
- expire upon the completion of the political process for Iraq’s transition to democratic government
- terminate earlier if requested by the GOI

On November 8, 2005, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1637, which extended the coalition’s military mandate to December 31, 2006, unless the GOI requests otherwise. UN Security Council Resolution 1723 (November 28, 2006) further extended the mandate to December 31, 2007.

**Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq**

**Authority/Mission**

According to UN Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004), MNF-I was to help build the capability of Iraqi Security Forces and institutions through a program of recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring. On June 28, 2004, MNSTC-I was established as a subordinate MNF-I organization to execute this mission.

MNSTC-I’s mission is to help the GOI develop, organize, train, equip, and sustain the Iraqi Security Forces and ministries so they are capable of defeating terrorism and providing a stable environment in which representative government, individual freedom, the rule of law, and free market economy can evolve, according to the MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan. The success of the mission will contribute to Iraq’s external security and the security of the Gulf region.

**Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq**

MNSTC-I accomplishes its mission along four operational lines:

- building and sustaining the institutional capability of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior
- generating capable Iraqi security forces
- developing professional Iraqi security forces
- transitioning and transforming its mission into a traditional embassy office of security cooperation
MNSTC-I is comprised of five subordinate transition teams:

- The **Coalition Military Assistance Training Team** supports the Ministry of Defense and Joint Headquarters Transition Team as they recruit, train, equip, base, and sustain Army, Air Force, and Navy units throughout Iraq. This support will continue until they achieve operational readiness to support the MNSTC-I and MNF-I missions—building a unified, stable, and democratic Iraq.

- The **Joint Headquarters Transition Team** helps develop Iraq’s Joint Headquarters in the Ministry of Defense to effectively command and control the Iraqi joint forces directed by the Ministry of Defense.

- The **Coalition Air Force Transition Team** assists in the development of Iraq’s military air capability and the progressive transition of counter-insurgency operations for the GOI in accordance with Iraq’s *National Security Strategy and Defense Policy*.

- The **Civilian Police Assistance Training Team** is responsible for training, equipping, organizing, mentoring, and developing the Ministry of Interior forces, which include the Iraqi Police Service, National Police forces, Emergency Response Unit, Department of Border Enforcement, and Dignitary Protection. In conducting these activities, MNSTC-I works with INL, DoJ, and IRMO.

- The **Ministry of the Interior Transition Team** helps develop Iraq’s law-enforcement capacity and its ability to lead and resource the Iraqi police.

**Organizational Structure**

![Organizational Structure Diagram](image)

*Source: MNSTC-I Comptroller, April 2007.*
Policies/Procedures

MNF-I has published policies and procedures in the form of smart books (e.g., *Money as a Weapon System*), which are distributed to its subordinate commands, including MNSTC-I. These publications guide commanders and resource managers on the availability and use of money as a non-lethal weapon system.

To enhance coordination, in 2005, MNSTC-I signed a memorandum of agreement with the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) for support services on a reimbursable basis, including planning, design, upgrade, renovation, repair, and construction of facilities.

Funding

According to the GRD/PCO Director of Finance, MNSTC-I received about $4.2 billion in IRRF 2 funds for training and construction-assistance services.

Performance Reporting

MNSTC-I reports on IRRF-funded projects in the *Section 2207 Report* and also contributes to the *Section 9010 Report* on measuring stability and security in Iraq. The reports include specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq.

Mission Cessation/Transfer

UN Security Council Resolution 1723 (November 28, 2006) extended the mandate for MNF-I until December 31, 2007. During this period, MNSTC-I is transitioning and transforming its mission into a traditional embassy office of security cooperation.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division

Authority/Mission

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region Division (GRD) provides quality, sustainable, responsive, full-spectrum engineering and logistical services in support of civil/military construction in Iraq.

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

USACE has been involved in Iraq reconstruction since March 2003, providing contingency engineering support through the deployment of field engineering teams and electricity/oil restoration task forces. To consolidate its Iraq operations under a single general officer and to provide long-term engineering support for military operations, USACE activated GRD in January 2004. Some months later, through NSPD 36, the President created a temporary Army organization, the Project and Contracting Office
(PCO), to lead the reconstruction of the Iraq infrastructure by providing U.S. Mission-Iraq the required support for acquisition/project management. For efficiency, GRD and PCO merged on December 4, 2005. On October 14, 2006, the mission of the PCO in Iraq officially ended and GRD was formally identified as the successor organization to PCO upon its expiration in May 2007. On May 11, 2007, the PCO-Washington office was closed.

Throughout Iraq, GRD is responsible for executing a wide variety of infrastructure reconstruction projects at its Baghdad headquarters and three districts—Gulf Region North, Central, and South. GRD also provides services to MNF-I and the GOI. To keep GRD’s size to an essential minimum, the Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center (CETAC) provides support—administration services, contracting, design and technical assistance, and other capabilities—on a cost-reimbursable basis.

GRD also receives other day-to-day operational advice and services:

- The USACE Finance Center in Millington, Tennessee, which maintains the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS), provides finance and accounting support.
- The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology provides contracting support.

**Organizational Structure**

**U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division**

Source: GRD Chief of Staff, April 8, 2007.
Policies/Procedures

USACE regulations and policies are applied in all USACE divisions and activities and are adjusted as required to support delivery of the varied Iraq mission, according to the GRD Program Transfer Director.

Funding

GRD received $12.89 billion in IRRF 2 funding, as of March 2007, according to the GRD Finance Director/Comptroller.

Performance Reporting

Various construction status reports are generated by GRD that focus on the number of projects started, the progress or lack of progress on the projects, and the number of projects completed. GRD provides information on its projects quarterly to DoS in the Section 2207 Report. The GRD Commander conducts bi-weekly program review board meetings with JCC-I/A, Iraq Transition Assistance Office, and other senior level principals on the status of projects. GRD submits a monthly cost-to-complete projects report to IRMO. GRD also submits weekly situation reports, as required, to CENTCOM, ASA(ALT), and DoS.

Mission Cessation/Transfer

USACE GRD is to complete its primary Iraq mission—infrastructure reconstruction, military construction, and contract and fiscal closeouts—and position itself to support potential future missions, according to the GRD Strategic Plan issued March 30, 2006. GRD officials explained that as GRD moves from program execution to closeout, support from CETAC and ASA(ALT) will become increasingly important. As of April 2007, the IRRF construction program is scheduled for completion in 2007 although some projects may run into 2008.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Headquarters and the Transatlantic Programs Center

Authority/Mission

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provides engineering services and construction capabilities in peace and war environments. Within USACE-Headquarters, the Directorate of Military Programs is responsible for coordinating Iraq and Afghanistan efforts. This directorate supports USACE GRD’s Iraq programs by providing assistance for construction, real estate, contingency operations, environmental management products and services, and other needs. USACE also supports USAID’s Iraq mission through an interagency agreement.

The Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center (CETAC) in Winchester, Virginia, is a subordinate element of USACE that reports to USACE-Headquarters. CETAC provides engineering, construction, and related technical services to support the
USACE mission in the CENTCOM area of operation, which includes the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. CETAC provides direct support to the Afghanistan Engineer District in Kabul, Afghanistan, and to GRD in Baghdad, Iraq.

**Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq**

On October 4, 2004, CETAC and GRD established a memorandum of agreement that outlined the support services to be provided in the Iraq effort. Under the agreement, which was updated on March 8, 2006, CETAC is to provide support for:

- engineering
- program and project support
- contracting
- resource management (including financial, budget, payroll liaison)
- security and intelligence
- information management and communications
- plans and operations

On June 7, 2003, USACE established a General Agreement with USAID, which provides for USACE to supply technical services to USAID and its partners. The agreement was extended to May 2007. USACE provides construction oversight of reconstruction contracts, including technical assistance, quality control monitoring, database management, and reporting. The agreement states that specific services were to be acquired though an interagency agreement between the two agencies, and the interagency agreement would identify the services to be rendered, establish schedules, and determine funding.

**Organizational Structure**

**USACE Headquarters and CETAC**

Some other USACE-Headquarters directorates and CETAC functions are not shown in the organizational chart because they provide only general support to the Iraq effort. These include Human Resources, Research and Development, Logistics, Office of Chief Counsel, and Internal Review.

**Policies/Procedures**

Neither USACE-Headquarters nor CETAC has issued Iraq-specific policies or procedures requiring coordination, according to a program manager in the USACE-Headquarters, Gulf Region Integration and Security Assistance Branch. Existing regulations and policies apply to all USACE activities, including GRD.

**Funding**

USACE-Headquarters support for the Iraq effort is derived from its operating budget. However, USACE signed a participating agency service agreement with USAID to have USACE provide construction oversight. USACE received $24.1 million for these services as of January 8, 2007.

The GRD-CETAC memorandum of agreement states that CETAC may provide reimbursable services of an estimated 56 employees at $9.5 million per year for service to GRD.

**Performance Reporting**

Financial reports provide the status of funds; other reports provide the number of USACE personnel in Iraq. In addition, the USACE Commander is briefed quarterly on performance metrics as part of the Command Management Review.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

Neither USACE nor CETAC have cessation or transfer plans, according to USACE-Headquarters and CETAC officials. The military departments and other U.S. government organizations will determine the degree of support they will continue to provide in Iraq. In FY 2008, USACE Headquarters will consider transitioning GRD’s responsibilities to CETAC when GRD’s workload begins to draw down. CETAC will also provide long-term storage of GRD’s contracting and construction records.

**Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan**

**Authority/Mission**

On November 12, 2004, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) was created to provide contracting services in support of Iraq relief and reconstruction, by Fragmentary
Order 09-668, Contracting and Organizational Changes. On July 6, 2005, the mission was expanded to include Afghanistan, and JCC-I became Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A).

Administratively, JCC-I/A operates under ASA(ALT) for contracting authority, but reports to MNF-I for overall command and control.

The mission of JCC-I/A in Iraq is to provide responsive and effective contracting support of vital supplies, services, and construction to the CoM and MNF-I.

**Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq**

JCC-I/A supports the direct mission of operational coalition forces in the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. JCC-I/A also drives capacity building and economic self-sufficiency within the ministries to build and sustain self-sufficient security forces and help promote economic self-sufficiency for Iraq. According to JCC-I/A, in FY 2006 and through March 31, 2007, JCC-I/A obligated $6,327.7 million in Iraq.

**Organizational Structure**

![Organizational Structure Diagram]

Source: JCC-I/A, Director of Iraq Operations, April 17, 2007.

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21 The mission was expanded in Fragmentary Order 09-270, Contracting and Organizational Changes, July 6, 2005.
Policies/Procedures

The Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting focuses on policy, assessment, and oversight of contracting operations in Iraq. JCC-I/A coordinates overall customer support and contracting policies and procedures. On support and contracting issues, JCC-I/A coordinates contracting policies with the Office of the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement-Iraq/Afghanistan (ADASA P&P-I/A).

Funding

JCC-I/A is funded from DoD operations and maintenance and military personnel accounts.

Performance Reporting

JCC-I/A does not provide external performance reporting, according to the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting. JCC-I/A submits an internal performance report bimonthly in the Commander’s Operation Brief.

Mission Cessation/Transfer

JCC-I/A will remain in Iraq and provide support to U.S. forces until CENTCOM provides new direction, according to JCC-I/A officials.

Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence

Authority/Mission

The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE)22 provides the Air Force with a complete range of technical and professional services in environmental and installation planning, construction, engineering, and military housing construction and privatization.

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

In a December 7, 2003 memorandum to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, CPA Ambassador Paul Bremer requested approval to use AFCEE’s contracting authority and support personnel to quickly begin restoration and construction efforts in Iraq. AFCEE believed that its Iraq involvement would be limited to a few initial projects, allowing the CPA to establish its own management functions and contracts, according to AFCEE documentation on January 7, 2004.

22 On June 1, 2007, the name of this organization was changed to the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment.
In September 2004, the MNSTC-I Commander asked for two more years of AFCEE services—FY 2005 and FY 2006—and for an increased AFCEE presence to assist in reconstruction. On September 23, 2004, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics approved the request. On June 3, 2005, AFCEE and MNSTC-I established a memorandum of agreement requiring AFCEE to provide for the planning, design, upgrade, renovation, repair, and construction of facilities designated by MNSTC-I.
Organizational Structure

Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence

Source: Chief, Atlantic Division, March 2, 2007.
Note: AFCEE offices not directly related to the Iraq effort have been shaded gray.

Policies/Procedures

AFCEE has not issued any unique Iraq policies and procedures, and the policies and procedures being followed on construction management and contracting are typical of any construction and contracting effort, according to AFCEE’s Director for Major Command and Installation Support Worldwide. The “Blue Team” of the worldwide command serves the Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Air Forces Europe, and non-Air Force customers.
**Funding**

As of February 28, 2007, AFCEE has received $3.4 billion for construction and project management support in Iraq, as reported by the Atlantic Division Chief. Of this amount, MNSTC-I provided $3.1 billion, and the remaining $300 million was provided by other organizations, including USACE, CENTCOM, and MNF-I. The funding came from a variety of appropriations, including IRRF 2, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, individual service operations and maintenance funds, the Quick Response Fund, and the Development Fund for Iraq.

**Performance Reporting**

AFCEE issued no external Iraq reports, according to the Director for Major Command and Installation Support Worldwide. AFCEE reports twice a week to MNSTC-I on projects, including a project summary by contractor and by location, and new contract awards.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

The Director for Major Command and Installation Support Worldwide reported no official cessation or mission transfer plans. AFCEE plans to continue supporting MNSTC-I as long as the funding is available and as directed by the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics.

**Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology**

**Authority/Mission**

On May 11, 2004, NSPD-36 authorized the Secretary of Defense to establish the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) as a temporary organization to provide acquisition and project management support to activities in Iraq, as needed. PCO had two components—PCO-Iraq and PCO-Washington. The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Army to serve as Executive Agent for the Iraq effort, providing administrative, logistics, and contracting support. In executing those responsibilities, the Department of the Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) established in his headquarters office a Principal Deputy/Director of Iraq Reconstruction and Program Management to support management efforts with the PCO-Washington.

The ASA(ALT) directed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement to provide contracting oversight for the Iraq effort. In response, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement established the Office of the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement-Iraq/Afghanistan (ADASA-P&P I/A). PCO-Washington and the ADASA-P&P I/A offices were co-located in Washington to provide program management support and contracting support to personnel in Iraq.
On December 4, 2005, the positions of Director-PCO and Commanding General, USACE GRD merged to form the consolidated GRD/PCO organization, under the ASA(ALT). At the end of fiscal year 2006, PCO in Baghdad stood down and the remaining elements of the organization became functional areas of GRD. The organization known as PCO expired in May 2007. The results in this fact sheet refer to PCO’s tenure, according to ASA(ALT) officials.

**Project and Contracting Office-Washington.** PCO-Washington provided coordination and communication with the Department of Army, DoD, the Congress, DoS, and OMB. PCO-Washington performed these and other functions:

- Provided support to USACE GRD in Iraq for administration, interagency liaison, and strategic planning.
- Provided strategic planning support to GRD, including the development of frameworks and plans for policy initiatives, such as project partnership agreements and capacity development. The project partnership agreements were grant agreements between PCO-Iraq and the Iraqi ministries to provide contracting and management for agreed-on construction projects. The capacity-development initiative involved training Iraqis to operate and maintain completed projects. The training focused on plant-level or facility-level training, with some management-level training for the ministries. The training function transferred to USACE Headquarters in May 2007.
- Served as ASA(ALT) staff for strategic planning, policy, and reporting.
- Provided support to GRD as required, including development of metrics and analysis. This three-year effort focused on developing a range of metric issues and other analytical requirements, including earned value management, and on defining reporting needs. This support function transferred to USACE Headquarters in May 2007.
- Provided liaison with the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with GRD.

**Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement (Iraq/Afghanistan).** ADASA-P&P I/A provides administrative and contracting support to DoS, CoM, PCO in Baghdad, MNF-I, JCC-I/A, PCO-Washington, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and U.S.-based contracting agencies.
Organizational Structure

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology

Assistant Secretary Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)

Principal Deputy Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology & Director, Iraq Reconstruction and Program Management

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy & Procurement)

Director, Project and Contracting Office - Washington

Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy & Procurement) Iraq/AF

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, March 19, 2007.

Policies/Procedures

According to ASA(ALT) officials, no Iraq-specific policies or procedures have been issued. However, the officials stated that general guidance issued on the use of contractor personnel accompanying military forces in a conflict environment applies to the Iraq effort.

Funding

ASA(ALT) officials stated that neither PCO-Washington nor ADASA-P&P I/A received any money from the IRRF appropriations. Both offices used U.S. Army operations and maintenance (O&M) funds.

Performance Reporting

PCO-Washington and ADASA-P&P I/A produced a combined weekly activity report for the ASA(ALT), which focused on the activities of the two offices. PCO-Washington also prepared the monthly update on Iraq reconstruction for the Secretary’s “Smart Card” report and provided input to other recurring reports (e.g., the Iraq Weekly Status Report, Section 2207 Report, and Section 1206 Report23).

Mission Cessation/Transfer

The continued operations of the ADASA-P&P I/A depends on CENTCOM’s demobilization plan and the continued need for in-country contract support. NSPD-36 established PCO-Washington as a temporary organization, which under law could exist only for up to three years (Title 5, United States Code, § 3161). On October 14, 2006, the mission of the PCO in Iraq officially ended and GRD was formally identified as the successor organization to PCO upon its expiration in May 2007. On May 11, 2007, the PCO-Washington office was closed.
Other Agencies

Two smaller federal agencies received IRRF funding: the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). OPIC focuses on stimulating economic development in Iraq by sponsoring the availability of loans and promoting the establishment of private-sector financial institutions. USIP focuses on peace-building efforts by preventing, managing, and resolving international conflict.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Authority/Mission

Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, OPIC is authorized to facilitate U.S. private-sector participation in the economic and social development of less-developed countries and countries in transition to a market-based economy. OPIC offers political risk insurance, investment guarantees, and direct loans to promote U.S. investment, according to the 2005 annual financial statement.

Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq

Under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State, OPIC operates in Iraq through the Iraq Middle Market Development Foundation. The foundation is a lending facility that provides loans to credit-worthy middle-market businesses and Iraqi private-sector financial institutions.

Organizational Structure

Source: OPIC Deputy General Counsel, March 5, 2007.
Note: OPIC offices not directly involved in Iraq reconstruction are shaded gray.
**Policies/Procedures**

OPIC has not issued any Iraq-specific policies or procedures that required coordination with other U.S. organizations, according to the Deputy General Counsel.

**Funding**

On June 24, 2004, USAID entered into an agreement with OPIC to support economic development and employment growth in Iraq; subsequently, $25.9 million in IRRF funds was transferred to establish the Iraq Middle Market Development Foundation.

In September 2006, OPIC received almost $9.2 million of IRRF funding from IRMO to augment the funds available to the foundation. OPIC program officials stated that the foundation had loan commitments of about $6.9 million, as of January 31, 2007.

**Performance Reporting**

The Deputy General Counsel stated that OPIC receives a monthly loan report from the Development Foundation, which identifies the recipient, purpose, amount, loan period, and risk factor for each loan.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

OPIC will continue to facilitate U.S. private investment in Iraq by offering political risk insurance, investment guarantees, and direct loans, according to the Deputy General Counsel.

**United States Institute of Peace**

**Authority/Mission**

USIP is an independent federal institution established under the United States Institute of Peace Act (1985). It has overall mission is to help prevent, manage, and resolve international conflicts by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in peace-building efforts. USIP conducts its mission with a combination of nonpartisan research, program development, and hands-on support, relying on staff, grantees, fellows, and governmental and nongovernmental partners.

**Roles and Responsibilities in Iraq**

Pursuant to P.L. 108-106, the institute received funding from the *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan* for activities supporting peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building.

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Within the USIP, the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations is the lead center for all USIP work in Iraq.

Organizational Structure

United States Institute of Peace

Policies/Procedures

The Iraq Program Officer, Office of the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability, stated that no special policies or procedures for the Iraq effort were issued that required coordination with other U.S. organizations. The Iraq Program Officer also stated that USIP has developed and issued a security manual for its Iraq activities, providing procedures for securely transferring funds to Iraqi grantees and contractors, as well as for maintaining funds accountability.
**Funding**

USIP received almost $16.0 million in Iraq-related funding. P.L. 108-106 provided USIP with $10.0 million of IRRF 2 funds for activities supporting peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace building. In addition, USIP received almost $6.0 million from the DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor for constitution support and for global international women’s issues.

**Performance Reporting**

USIP is required to issue a report to the Congress and the President detailing the progress that USIP has made in the preceding two-year period (Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, Title XVII, P.L. 98-525, Section 1712). The report includes USIP’s accomplishments in Iraq.

The Iraq Program Officer stated that USIP did not issue Iraq-specific external reports on its accomplishments. USIP reports its programs quarterly to NEA/I for the *Section 2207 Report*. In addition, USIP reports its Iraq activities in its annual budget request to the Congress, most recently in March 2007.

**Mission Cessation/Transfer**

According to the Iraq Program Officer, USIP’s Iraq effort will continue as long as the board of directors determines that it should continue and sufficient funding is available to support its peace-building and conflict-mitigation mission.
Executive Order 13431 of May 8, 2007

Establishment of Temporary Organization To Facilitate United States Government Assistance for Transition in Iraq

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 202 of the Revised Statutes (22 U.S.C. 2056) and section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established within the Department of State, in accordance with section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, a temporary organization to be known as the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO).

Sec. 2. Purpose of the Temporary Organization. The purpose of the ITAO shall be to perform the specific project of supporting executive departments and agencies in concluding remaining large infrastructure projects expeditiously in Iraq, in facilitating Iraq's transition to self-sufficiency, and in maintaining an effective diplomatic presence in Iraq.

Sec. 3. Functions of the Temporary Organization. In carrying out its purpose set forth in section 2, the ITAO shall:

(a) support executive departments and agencies in Iraq in their implementation of United States Government foreign assistance in Iraq;

(b) continue coordination, oversight, and reporting concerning remaining Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) monies;

(c) assume the functions assigned to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) remaining as of the date of this order; and

(d) perform such other functions related to the specific project set forth in section 2 as the Secretary of State (Secretary) may assign.

Sec. 4. Personnel and Administration. (a) The ITAO shall be headed by a Director selected by the Secretary.

(b) The Secretary shall transfer from the IRMO to the ITAO the personnel, assets, liabilities, and records of the IRMO.

Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) This order shall be implemented in accordance with applicable law, subject to the availability of appropriations, and consistent with presidential guidance.

(b) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
(c) The ITAC shall terminate at the end of the maximum period permitted by section 3161(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, unless sooner terminated by the Secretary.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

[FR Doc. 07–2357
Filed 5–10–07; 8:46 am]
Filing code 2195–01–P
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated this review on March 1, 2006 (Project 6012); to identify and report on the roles and responsibilities for each principal U.S. Government organization that has programmatic, operational, and/or financial stewardship of activities funded to support relief and reconstruction in Iraq. SIGIR interviewed management officials for the various organizations; examined mission charters, functional statements, and organization charts, manuals, plans, and interagency agreements; and reviewed supporting funding documents.

Many organizations of the U.S. government participate in the Iraq effort. The individual summaries depict how officials view their authority and responsibilities, as well as their coordination with other organizations. The validation of those authorities, roles, and interface efforts was not in the scope of this review and, therefore, was not conducted.

SIGIR conducted this survey from April 2006 to May 2007, as “nonaudit services”, based on government auditing standards issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Therefore, this fact sheet does not verify, analyze, or evaluate the information provided by the U.S. government organizations, nor does it contain any conclusions, recommendations, or opinions on this information. The facts in this report were vetted with senior officials responsible for Iraq programs and funding.
## Appendix B—Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADASA P&amp;P-I/A</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement-Iraq/Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFCEE</td>
<td>Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASA(ALT)</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology</td>
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<td>BIAP</td>
<td>Baghdad International Airport</td>
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<td>CEFMS</td>
<td>Corps of Engineers Financial Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CETAC</td>
<td>Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Program Center</td>
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<td>CoM</td>
<td>Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>DCHA</td>
<td>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>DFI</td>
<td>Development Fund for Iraq</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<td>DRL</td>
<td>Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
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<td>DRSO</td>
<td>Defense Reconstruction Support Office</td>
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<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
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<td>GRD</td>
<td>Gulf Region Division</td>
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<td>INL</td>
<td>Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
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<td>IRMO</td>
<td>Iraq Reconstruction Management Office</td>
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<td>IRRF</td>
<td>Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund</td>
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<td>ITAO</td>
<td>Iraq Transition Assistance Office</td>
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<td>Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Force-Iraq</td>
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<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
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<td>NEA/I</td>
<td>Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/Office of Iraq Affairs</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPIC</td>
<td>Overseas Private Investment Corporation</td>
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<td>OTA</td>
<td>Office of Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>P.L.</td>
<td>Public Law</td>
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<td>PCO</td>
<td>Procurement and Contracting Office</td>
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<td>PMA</td>
<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
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<td>PRM</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
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<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>U.S. Institute of Peace</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C—Report Distribution

Department of State
Secretary of State
   Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq
   Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for
   International Development
   Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction
   Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer,
   Bureau of Resource Management
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
   Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office
   Coordinator, Office of Provincial Affairs
   Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development
Inspector General, Department of State
   Regional Inspector General-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development

Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
   Deputy Chief Financial Officer
   Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International
   Security Affairs
Inspector General, Department of Defense
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Director, Defense Contract Management Agency

Department of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
   Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
   Logistics, and Technology
   Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)
   Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
   Commanding General, Gulf Region Division
   Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Auditor General of the Army

U.S. Central Command
Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq
   Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq
   Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central
Other Federal Government Organizations
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Comptroller General of the United States
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General, Department of Commerce
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services
President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
President, U.S. Institute for Peace

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations
  Subcommittee on Defense
  Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
  Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection
  Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and Human Rights
  Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
  Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
  Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

U.S. House of Representatives

House Committee on Appropriations
  Subcommittee on Defense
  Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
  Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement
  Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
  Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight
  Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Appendix D—Team Members

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