

# **The Army's Military Decision Making: Adequate or Update and Expand?**

**A Monograph**

**by**

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## **Abstract**

THE ARMY'S MILITARY DECISION MAKING: ADEQUATE OR UPDATE AND EXPAND? by MAJ Bradley J. Herman, Jr., U.S. Army, 41 pages.

The United States Army largely missed the signs that a new threat was approaching, after the end of the Cold War, and was slow to understand and adequately plan for the changes that have since come to fruition. So how does the U.S. Army improve? The Army improves by transforming itself in order to more effectively deal with the increased complexity of the current and future operating environment(s). In order for the U.S. Army to be better equipped to formulate an excellent plan for the right problem I believe that it is necessary for us to expand the current military problem solving and planning process.

It is my contention that the United States Army's military decision making process, which has changed little since its debut in the 1930s, is no longer viable given the current, and future, operating environment(s) and must be updated and/or expanded in order to better affect the current and future environments. The U.S. Army must adopt measures at all levels of the planning process to better understand the complexities of the environment within which they are operating. The U.S. Army must better communicate its plan and not just to other military members, but also to other governmental agencies (OGA), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and multi-national and coalition partners. And as an area warranting further research, I will discuss why the U.S. Army should consider expanding its current force structure to more adequately address the complex situations faced.

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## INTRODUCTION

On December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2006 the former Chief of Staff, United States Army, General Schoomaker said, “We are now five years removed from 9/11; the Army continues fighting this long war with high levels of force deployment, while preparing for an uncertain and complex future”.<sup>1</sup> His words are indeed correct as the security environment for the military practitioner has changed significantly. In order to better prepare for and stay ahead of the new, and highly complex, security environment the U.S. Army must transform how it attempts to understand, plan, and communicate.

The United States, on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, was confronted with an adversary that had been approaching since the end of the Cold War. During the previous 40 years, nations, groups, and even individuals had been virtually forced to choose sides with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. As the Berlin Wall fell, the will of the world was no longer shaped by the competing ideologies of Western Democracy and Eastern Communism. While many in the West perceived the fall of Communism to be a triumphant win with perpetual peace among the great powers being finally in hand, others understood it to be an opening through which to proffer their own ideology.<sup>2</sup> This was an ideology that did not require a State through which to gain legitimacy. This ideology was spurned on, in large part, by globalization. Globalization, defined by Thomas Barnett in his book Blueprint for Action as, “[t]he worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people” has changed the security environment.<sup>3</sup> Globalization has exponentially increased the threats to health and human security, as demonstrated during the

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<sup>1</sup> General Peter Schoomaker, “Statement by General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff United States Army, before the Commission on National Guard and Reserves”. *Army.mil*, December 14, 2006, under “Institution,” <http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2006/12/14/989-statement-by-general-peter-schoomaker-chief-of-staff-united-states-army-before-the-commission-on-national-guard-and-reserves/index.html> (accessed 4 July 2007).

<sup>2</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (New York, New York. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2001), 1.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating. (New York, New York. Penguin Group, 2005), xvi.

summer of 2007 when worry over the spread of tuberculosis by an American determined to attend his wedding and honeymoon in Greece gripped the nation.<sup>4</sup> Further, ideas can be exchanged anonymously over the internet allowing for an increase in recruitment of potential new terrorists from areas that were once before either unknown or too difficult to reach. Another effect globalization has had on the security environment has been a disaffected population that is increasingly able to understand that there are others who are living better via the capabilities of wireless technology. These disaffected were, and still are, being targeted by those seeking to promote their own ideals. As is often the case, those people who have been left behind, whether through the ineptness of their state or because of a lack of education, become attracted to an alternative, and religiously based transnational terrorist organizations have been largely effective in providing that alternative.<sup>5</sup>

Why the United States Army largely missed the signs that a new threat was approaching and was slow to understand and adequately plan for this change is what is of primary interest in this monograph. It is my contention that the United States Army's military decision making process, which has changed little since its debut in the 1932 version of FM 101-5, is no longer viable given the current, and future, operating environment(s) and must be updated and/or expanded in order to better affect the current and future environments.<sup>6</sup> The U.S. Army must adopt measures at all levels of the planning process to better understand the complexities of the environment within which they are operating. The U.S. Army must better communicate its plan

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<sup>4</sup> Anahd O'Connor and John Holusha, "TB Patient is Related to C.D.C. Expert on Disease," *The New York Times*, May 31, 2007, under "Health," [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/health/31cnd-tb.html?\\_r=1&oref=login](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/health/31cnd-tb.html?_r=1&oref=login) (accessed September 20, 2007).

<sup>5</sup> According to a guide for teachers regarding globalization, "There are some who link the negative aspects of globalization to terrorism. To put a complicated discussion in simple terms, they argue that exploitative or declining conditions contribute to the lure of informal "extremist" networks that commit criminal or terrorist acts internationally." Social Science Research Council, "Teaching Guide for Globalization Essays," [http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/teaching\\_resource/tr\\_globalization.htm](http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/teaching_resource/tr_globalization.htm) (accessed 25 August 07).

<sup>6</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production*. (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, January 2005), vii.

and not just to other military members, but also to other governmental agencies (OGA), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and multi-national and coalition partners. And as an area warranting further research, I will discuss why the U.S. Army should consider expanding its current force structure to more adequately address the complex situations faced.

Shortly after the end of World War II, the United States Army focused the majority of its effort on protecting the West from the spread of Communism. The Army, recognizing the value of a large and powerful fighting force as demonstrated in World War II and later in Korea, focused its efforts on building, training, and maintaining an Army that could repel Communist aggression. Armor, artillery, and infantry Divisions were placed along strategic borders around the world in show of force deterrent capacities. The enemy was studied and his tactics were largely understood. The National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) were established in order to hone the requisite skills to defeat any large scale opposition. These training centers, which focused at Brigade level and below, as well as the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) which focused on Division and higher level operations, were developed in order to ensure that the United States Army was ready to rapidly defeat this well understood opposing force. Concurrently, the Army's decision making process, as written into FM 101-5, focused decision making on the mission, opposing forces, enemy and friendly situations, and the decision (or the when, where, and why of what was to be accomplished). This doctrine solidified how Army planning, training, and execution was carried out.

With the end of the Cold War the United States Army still remained focused almost exclusively on fighting a Cold War like opposition, whether that was a resurgent Russia or a strengthening China. Little additional thought was given to how to plan operations in an environment where force on force engagement was, or is, not the main avenue through which to defeat, or force change, upon the opposition. And yet with ever increasing frequency, peacekeeping, nation building, humanitarian relief, and since 9/11, counterinsurgency operations have become the Army's primary efforts. Even though both the NTC and the JRTC have evolved

from modeling just Cold War adversaries and are now assisting soldier training by focusing on non-kinetic means to pacify insurgencies, we still have been largely unable to overcome the complexity inherent in these non-warfighting situations.<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, dated November 28, 2005, states in section 4.1 that “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning”.<sup>8</sup> Clearly, the old days of maintaining a military solely to fight and win our nation’s wars has passed. Stability operations are just one of the new mission areas that require military leaders and planners to think non-linearly. Simplified, nonlinear problems are problems that are difficult to predict because they respond differently to varying inputs.<sup>9</sup> That the Army has largely stuck by its military decision making process, much like it has remained predominantly focused on fighting a large-scale enemy, for planning these other types of operations, has demonstrated a failure to acknowledge the complexities of the operational environment. Over the past five or so years, largely due to our current operations as part of OIF and OEF, new models for problem framing and understanding, such as Systemic Operational Design (SOD) and Effects Based Approach (EBA), have been experimented with but Army doctrine has been slow to embrace these endeavors.

One of the challenges that the Army faces is how to effectively plan for its warfighting missions while at the same time being able to understand and plan for the non-force on force mission sets. The U.S. Army has clearly demonstrated its capability, both historically and in recent years, to plan for and execute combat operations. Unfortunately the Army has fallen short

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<sup>7</sup> David Axe, “Military Training Goes Hollywood,” *World Politics Review* (August 2006), <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articlePrint.aspx?ID=131> (accessed August 28, 2007).

<sup>8</sup> Department of Defense, Directive Number 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. (Washington, DC. DoD, November 2005), 2.

when taking on non-warfighting tasks. So how does the U.S. Army improve? The Army improves by transforming itself in order to more effectively deal with the increased complexity of the current and future operating environment(s). Complexity resides on the battlefield in varying degrees, as in any situation that involves struggles between opposing human wills, but the Army's planning process was designed around providing solutions to problems that are largely understood from the beginning.<sup>10</sup> The U.S. Army is staffed with both uniformed and civilian professionals who plan operations, often against a known opponent, ensuring that the right people and equipment are at the right place and at the right time to inflict the desired effect. The Army is further able to hone its skills at NTC and JRTC, and other training venues because the problem sets practiced are essentially well defined, i.e. destroy the Third Motorized Infantry Brigade or conduct cordon and search operations during an insurgency. The Army's problem solving and planning process is less capable of dealing with problems of greater ambiguity.

In situations where complexity is high, being able to comprehend the problem early allows for an enhanced ability to minimize the effects that the complexity adds to the situation. The complexity of non-warfighting tasks is significant because it often includes multiple actors often working with their own agendas, even for the same goal. These are situations where a single overarching and unifying goal remains ill-defined and yet various actors and activities are still attempting to provide the solution. Gary Klein in his book, Sources of Power, studied how people make decisions in challenging situations and argues, like many others, that "we are attracted to the standard advice of following the stages from problem definition to option generation and evaluation. Yet in dealing with an ill-defined goal, the advice is sure to fail. The first step, define the goal, can never be completed if the goal is ill defined, and that means the

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<sup>9</sup> William T. Sorrells, Glen R. Downing, Paul J. Blakesley, David W. Pendall, Jason K. Walk, and Richard D. Wallwork, *Systemic Operational Design: An Introduction* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SAMS, USACGSC, AY 04-05), 63.

<sup>10</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, January 2005), 1-1.

problem solver is not supposed to go further”.<sup>11</sup> It is in the arena of non-warfighting tasks where the Army most often is forced to operate with ill-defined goals. Furthermore, it is difficult to recreate the complexity found in stability, and other non-warfighting mission sets, in the same effective ways that the Army is able to simulate the complexity of battle at NTC and JRTC rotations.

The Army continues to utilize FM 5-0 in non-warfighting mission planning even though the complexities in many of the situations we now face are problems which are largely unsolvable. The Army does have a doctrinal manual, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, which assists in planning and understanding those missions performed outside of offensive and defensive operations. However, FM 3-07 still does not address how to effectively frame or understand problems when dealing with increased complexity in these types of mission sets. FM 3-07 states that, “Commanders plan for stability operations and support operations in a manner like they plan for the offense and defense. The mission analysis and command estimate processes outlined in FM 5-0 are equally as important in all type of operations.”<sup>12</sup> According to an article written by Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege, “Our doctrine predisposes us to formulate an excellent plan for the wrong problem”.<sup>13</sup>

In order for the U.S. Army to be better equipped to formulate an excellent plan for the right problem I believe that it is necessary for us to expand the current military problem solving and planning process. In this monograph I will provide information that should help to increase the reader’s understanding of the security environment. The security environment that we should be focusing on requires leaders and planners to understand considerably more than simply how best to deploy and engage the opposition. I will then discuss the Army’s military decision

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<sup>11</sup> Gary Klein. *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England. MIT Press, 1999), 129.

<sup>12</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, February 2003), 2-1.

making and problem solving as it relates to an expanded understanding of the security environment including how the new tools of Systemic Operational Design (SOD) and Effects Based Approach (EBA) can be utilized. Third, I will describe how and why we need to more effectively communicate our goals in order to affect lasting and positive change in a complex environment. Fourth, I will discuss a topic for further research, an idea that will likely be contentious to readers from the military services, by discussing why we should expand our military population beyond its current makeup. Finally, I will conclude with a summation of the information provided in this monograph.

## **Our Security Environment**

By utilizing the knowledge, provided in part by expert researchers and in part through personal experiences, military leaders and planners should be better equipped to understand the complexity of current and emerging security dilemmas. This concept however is often easier to acknowledge than to apply. Based upon our cold war experiences and the resultant title of lone superpower, policy makers, academicians, and the average citizen alike, were left feeling almost invulnerable. Facing down the communist threat for some 40 years and coming out on top seemed to mean that a large military with sophisticated weapon systems, supported by democratic ideals and a free market economy was the recipe for success. What we failed to notice, at least collectively, was that by removing the Soviet structure, conflict would spread to states that had once been under at least tacit control of the former Soviet Union or the United States. Essentially people in many parts of the world were left to figure things out for themselves. Power struggles ensued as both individuals and groups who had been forced to set aside their own desires or identities attempted to regain what they once had. Many attempted to capitalize on these new opportunities as a means for enhanced wealth and growth. Our own historical experiences told us that these experiences were a part of the growth process.

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<sup>13</sup> BG Huba Wass de Czege, Unified Quest 07 Postscript 2 (June 29,2007): On Inserting Systemic

This was also an opportunity for American influence to expand. We pushed democratic ideals as a way to achieve happiness and success. New opportunities for U.S. growth and investment were vigorously pursued. While the “American dream” was being achieved by some, others were becoming frustrated. Patience began to wear thin and many came to see the lone superpower as simply a world imperialist as the military was being deployed regularly to quell violence around the globe.<sup>14</sup> American corporate institutions were now in almost every corner of the globe. Some groups felt threatened by the global expansion of the United States in both ideal and institution. Yet our experience told us that our wealth and power would provide for our security and thus these new upheavals and limited terrorist attacks were meaningless. Our current experience in the wake of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, has brought about a new understanding. Sadly, throughout the years between the Cold War and 9/11 there had been many bodies of knowledge available that could have foretold of these future difficulties. However, experience without knowledge is meaningless. By combining our experiences with our collective knowledge we can, at a minimum, account for our shortcomings and in many cases avert potential disasters.

The security environment, as understood by the Army, must be expanded beyond simply how to fight and win our nation’s wars. As Jessica Tuchman-Mathews pointed out in a 1989 article in *Foreign Affairs*, “Global developments now suggest the need for another broadening definition of national security.”<sup>15</sup> Little has changed to invalidate her statement nearly twenty years later. Army planners must consider how a broad array of topics such as democratic peace, environmental security, global health and human security, terrorism, and weapons proliferation are impacting the operating environment. The U.S. Army can no longer afford to focus its impressive and expansive capabilities on force on force engagements. The Army must expand its understanding of the various security issues to better deal with all of the potential threats to our

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Operational (SOD) Derived Ideas Into US Army Doctrine.

<sup>14</sup> Bruce, Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 289.

national security. Security issues are not easily categorized. Their causes or effects have many linkages which may or may not hold true in all circumstances. This is not to say that attempting to gain a better understanding of the various security issues is an unworthy endeavor. Instead, one must accept that individual and/or collective security operates in a complex setting which does not readily provide for simple causal relationships. I will now provide some potential areas of security concern to demonstrate the complex nature of security.

Over the last two U.S. presidencies there has been a strong tendency to push the nation's foreign policy toward a democratic peace, and for good reason. With the exception of India and Pakistan, the democratic peace theory, which holds that democracies almost never go to war with each other, has held true. What is often overlooked, however, is that states progressing toward democracy are often some of the most dangerous. For democracy to work, a majority of the population must support the transition, and power seekers must desire consensus over personal gain. Furthermore, a United States led democratic peace generally insists that representative democracy, law and organization, and commerce and free trade, which can be traced to Immanuel Kant's essay *Perpetual Peace*, are part of the package.<sup>16</sup> As has been demonstrated in Iraq, getting a democratic peace to take hold is easier visualized than accomplished.

For the United States to wish to enforce the democratic peace option, it must be understood that the removal of a current head of state will be insufficient. "A country with only four percent of the world's population cannot indefinitely act unilaterally with impunity."<sup>17</sup> If the onus continues to fall primarily on the Army as the largest military component, and it probably will based upon the numbers of personnel and variety of resources inherent, it becomes incumbent on Army leaders and planners to be ready and not just for enforcing a democratic peace.

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<sup>15</sup> Jessica Tuchman-Matthews, "Redefining Security". (*Foreign Affairs* 68:2. 1989), 162.

<sup>16</sup> Bruce Russett and John R. O Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2001), 29.

Simon Dalby in his article, "Conflict, Ecology, and the Politics of Environmental Security", analyzed the relationship between the environment and conflict, concluding that environmental scarcity can be a primary source for conflict.<sup>18</sup> As a source, environmental scarcity creates conditions that lead to security dilemmas primarily in the realms of economics, politics, and law. Therefore, military planners must be able to understand how correct management of the environment, through these other various realms, serves as a potential means to create the desired security. Military leaders and planners must be prepared to assist state structures in providing measures with which to control environmental related issues so as to avoid economic, political, and legal dysfunction.

Another perspective for understanding environmental security is that environmental threats may be caused by both individual and state organized attempts to increase personal wealth and power. "According to Paul Collier of the World Bank, civil wars are primarily caused by the feasibility of economic predation and the rational pursuit of economic self-interest, while having no relation to objective grievances."<sup>19</sup> Natural resources provide a readily available source of income during conflict via both theft and taxation, depending on who is doing the taking.

While far from gaining definitive knowledge on how the environment can affect security, we can now postulate at least two conditions which affect security in general and environmental security specifically: environmental scarcity and therefore the reactions of economics, politics, and law as one potential factor; and wealth and power related conflict which has been a cause of environmental degradation as another. I will now provide some background on human security and global health.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 304.

<sup>18</sup> Simon Dalby, "Conflict, Ecology, and the Politics of Environmental Security". (*Global Environmental Politics* 2:4, Nov 2002), 125-130.

<sup>19</sup> Paul Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 143-162.

The linkage between human health and security is broad. Its linkage covers such ground as the impacts of violence and conflict on individuals and societies, global infectious diseases, and poverty and inequity. The challenge for many in the military will be in accepting that health problems are related to a security concern that would require military involvement. An example is the affect that AIDS has had in many African nations. “While the average age of life expectancy in the United States is now 77 years, it is less than 50 years in most of Africa, and less than 40 years in some of the AIDS-ravaged countries.”<sup>20</sup> Security has been directly impacted by decreased life expectancy which, over time, lowers the pool of potential leaders and innovators. Incapable leadership and innovation, over time, will serve to decrease internal, and even external, stability.<sup>21</sup> A military deployed to restore civil services within an area of operations that no longer has a viable leadership base, above the age of 40, could find itself in a protracted deployment.

The rapid transmission of diseases due to increased eases in travel in expansive global markets provides additional validity to the argument of a need for a focus on global health and human security.<sup>22</sup> Disease can play a significant role in weakening a nation as was evident in the influenza epidemic of 1918 in which an estimated 50 million people died. In the U.S., the flu afflicted over 25 percent of the population, dropping the United States average life expectancy in one year by 12 years.<sup>23</sup> This happened during a time when extensive contact between individuals was much more difficult than it is today. The affects of disease and rapid travel were felt more recently over the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) scare in 2002. Besides the health

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<sup>20</sup> Jeffrey D. Sachs, “A Rich Nation, A Poor Continent,” *The New York Times*, July 9, 2003, under “Health,” <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00E4D8153DF93AA35754C0A9659C8B63&scp=1&sq=Jeffrey+D.+Sachs+July+9%2C+2003+A+Rich+Nation%2C+A+Poor+Continent> (accessed September 22, 2007).

<sup>21</sup> Lincoln Chen, Jennifer Leaning, and Vasant Narasimhan, eds., Global Health Challenges for Human Security. (Cambridge, MA: Global Equity Initiative Asia Center Harvard University, 2003), 106.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.

related problems of SARS there was also an economic impact. Effects were felt from the tourism industry to banking as travel declined and the trading markets slowed.<sup>24</sup> While the U.S. Army has already taken proactive measures to prevent the transmission of disease among its personnel, through a substantial inoculation program, there still remains a significant portion of the worldwide population that remains unprepared. Army planners must be ready to deal with the impacts of another disease pandemic, not just those affecting U.S. personnel but worldwide reactions as well.

The goal of a health and human security approach should be to minimize or negate the impact of violence and conflict, disease, and inequity in order to enhance our collective and individual existence.<sup>25</sup> The arguments for achieving such a lofty goal are many considering the advancements made in such areas as medicine and technology and the corresponding impacts of globalization. However, the practicality of all human and health security endeavors must also consider the potential policy and operational implications. The information provided here regarding human and health security is just a small portion of what must be considered.

Terrorism, like environmental and health and human security, can be a relatively difficult concept to wrap the proverbial hands around, even though the United States has been actively involved in the Global War of Terror since 2001. The phrase terrorism itself has become a common part of our daily lexicon yet it assumes more than one simple meaning and is often applied almost haphazardly to any event which frightens us. While terrorism has been in practice for hundreds of years, with the word itself achieving popular use during the French Revolution, it has essentially become known to mean, “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through

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<sup>23</sup> National Archives and Record Administration, “The Deadly Virus: The Influenza Epidemic of 1918,” *The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration*, <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/influenza-epidemic/> (accessed September 24, 2007).

<sup>24</sup> Colin Campbell, “The SARS Epidemic; Economic Impact of New Disease, From Near Outbreak to Far Away” *The New York Times*, May 18, 2003, under “U.S.,” <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9805E2DC153EF93BA25756C0A9659C8B63&scp=3&sq=SARS&st=nyt> (accessed September 22, 2007).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of political change”, the key of course being the pursuit of political change.<sup>26</sup> This helps us to separate terrorism from other violent acts such as criminal behavior. An attempt at definition, however, is just part of the necessary knowledge.

We must also come to understand the terrorist’s motivation. While the pursuit of political change is the endstate, it is critical to understand whether the terrorist action is most likely following a left-wing, right-wing, ethno-nationalist/separatist, or a religious agenda. Each has shown a differing propensity for violence with the religious terrorist being the most dangerous as well as the most current threat facing the United States. Audrey Kurth Cronin in his article "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism" gave five reasons why religious terrorists may be especially dangerous to international security:

“[R]eligious terrorists often feel engaged in a Manichaeian struggle of good against evil, implying an open-ended set of human targets, meaning that anyone who is not a member of their religion or religious sect may be “evil” and thus fair game; religious terrorists engage in violent behavior directly or indirectly to please the perceived commands of a deity; religious terrorists consider themselves to be unconstrained by secular values or laws; religious terrorists often display a complete sense of alienation from the existing social system; and religious terrorism is especially worrisome because of its dispersed popular support in civil society.”<sup>27</sup>

Terrorists, who operate outside of the international, state based, system have benefited from the rise of the internet. Although their desire to achieve political change requires that their actions be noticed, their ability to plan and carry out attacks requires anonymity. Utilizing information technology, terrorists have been increasingly successful in sharing critical information, enhancing their recruitment efforts, and publicizing their actions. Certainly it is clear that enhanced knowledge of the various ideologies and desires that influence terrorist actions is critical for improving security. Another area which has been a cause for concern is weapons proliferation and the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.

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<sup>26</sup> Hoffman, Bruce, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40.

<sup>27</sup> Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism". (*International Security* 27:3, Winter 2002), 41-42.

Depending upon who is asked, there are both pros and cons of increased nuclear proliferation.<sup>28</sup> Proliferation considerations include such items as the potential impacts of reducing access to dangerous pathogens as part of a counterterrorism effort, and the effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in containing the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery via ballistic missiles. While chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons pose a significant risk, their value and abilities to harm vary greatly. Nuclear weaponization is an extremely complex task that is nearly impossible to achieve covertly and has been generally controlled through the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There are those who argue that a state which has nuclear weapons is unlikely to go to war with other nuclear armed states, at least to the point where the conflict cannot be contained, and thus a controlled proliferation is in the best interest of all.<sup>29</sup> The counter, of course, is that just because nothing significant has happened before, does not mean that nothing will in the future.<sup>30</sup> This has become especially acute with the increased terrorist activity since the 1990's.

The threat of a biological and chemical attack has also received enhanced scrutiny, predominantly due to increased terrorist activities. While nuclear weaponization is relatively difficult to mask, chemical and biological weaponization is not. Additionally, obtaining the desired pathogen has been relatively easy and since chemical and biological weapons can be used with little to no prior indication, as seen in the Tokyo subway attacks or the anthrax letter scare in the U.S., while still achieving devastating results they are an obvious choice for any actor dedicated to inflicting mass physical and psychological casualties.

Finally, attempts to control ballistic missile proliferation remains an important consideration, as states that are incapable of achieving a nuclear capability can arm a ballistic

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<sup>28</sup> Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2003.

<sup>29</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "More May Be Better," in Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2003), 3-45.

missile warhead with chemical or biological agents to serve as a sort of poor man's nuclear deterrent. "North Korea and Iran have extensive military links and, after both Russia and China reduced the flow of technology, Pyongyang became the main source of Teheran's ballistic missile technology and components."<sup>31</sup> Ballistic missile proliferation will remain a significant concern for U.S. military planners for the foreseeable future.

In all of the above cases, the knowledge of the effectiveness of deterrence must be clearly understood so as not to hamper other related security initiatives such as the deterrent attributes of a nuclear weapons capability or the benefits which can be derived from nuclear power; chemical and biological research that enables defense related vaccinations; and the ability to operate missile warning satellites.

Expanding the breadth of knowledge of security related issues better enables military practitioners to sift through the complexity of today's security environment. While there is obviously a considerable degree of variation in what exactly constitutes a security issue, knowledge enables us to unlock the meaning of our experiences, thus opening the door of our ability to better comprehend the complexities that exist. Defining security is a complex process which includes an almost unending set of actors that influence that process. This complexity was first noted in the discussion of expanding the democratic peace. Determining whether scarcity or conflict played the bigger role in environmental security was left up to debate. Global health and human security brought forth a whole new level of understanding by examining the challenges faced by decreasing mortality rates in AIDS ravaged Africa. Terrorism, of significant interest and focus in the current efforts of the U.S. in the Global War on Terrorism, demonstrated the difficulties in clearly defining the subject, let alone overcoming its affects given the extreme measures that a religious terrorist is likely to employ. Finally, weapons proliferation called into

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<sup>30</sup> Scott D. Sagan, "More Will Be Worse," in Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2003), 46-87.

question the varying challenges faced in proliferation. In some cases WMD proliferation is undesirable and even unavoidable and in others it may well be a means to enhanced security. In the end, what is certain is that the study of security related issues is essential if we are to someday achieve freedom from danger or worry. By first obtaining a base of knowledge, we are better postured to understand our experiences and thus focus our abilities on achieving real and lasting security.

## **Problem Solving and Decision Making**

Keeping in mind the immense security landscape, and complex environment, that is in front of today's military leaders and planners, the commander driven, military decision making process as currently designed in FM 5-0 is insufficient for planning operations. MDMP, as a planning tool, helps commanders make decisions by establishing procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action, against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or order.<sup>32</sup> Based upon its doctrinal history and the hierarchical structure of the military, this process has been largely successful when utilized for well defined linear problems. A linear problem is one that, with perfect information, can be predicted.<sup>33</sup> According to FM 5-0, the Army uses three different, but related, processes to guide planning activities. These guides to planning include the Army problem solving process, the military decision making process (MDMP), and troop leading procedures (TLP).<sup>34</sup> FM 5-0 lays out in detail how these processes work and complement each other as the doctrinal source for problem solving. The problem with FM 5-0 is that it assumes that problems can be identified and then solved. This line of reasoning may work well in

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<sup>31</sup> Gerald M. Steinberg, "North Korea and Iran: Will Any Lessons Be Learned?" *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, (October 11, 2006), <http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief006-12.htm> (accessed August 23, 2007).

<sup>32</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, January 2005), 3-1.

<sup>33</sup> Sorrells, Downing, Blakesley, Pendall, Walk, and Wallwork, *Systemic Operational Design: An Introduction*, 63.

situations where there are specific known variables but are less likely to work when the situation is more ambiguous. Let me provide an example of what I mean using the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) exercise LION I.

The LION series of exercises are designed to allow SAMS students to put into practice the theory and doctrine learned through study and seminar discussion. The focus for LION I was a notional request for US military assistance to a country in Africa and was created largely to determine the students understanding and ability to utilize the MDMP. From the notional higher commander's intent, the purpose was to ensure that territorial integrity and governmental authority of the requesting nation were maintained. The notional higher headquarters endstate was for U.S. forces to establish a defensive capability within the requesting nation's territory in order to deter outside aggression, and support a peaceful resolution to any territorial disputes. Provided this higher guidance, along with the more specific Warning Order, the students went to work utilizing the tenants of FM 5-0. From the beginning there was never any attempt made to try and gain any further appreciation for the problem(s) of the nation requesting support. Rather the problem became how to best deploy the forces necessary to achieve the desired defensive capability. The plan was completed following the MDMP and notional forces were deployed to the area in accordance with the guidance and with an effort to put the host nation forces in the lead role as much as possible.

Acting as the Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) the students further refined the endstate to read, "A strong and stable host nation government, supported both by the international community and their own people, and whose inherent military forces and police organizations are capable of sustaining that success by identifying and defeating terrorist threats

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<sup>34</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, January 2005), 1-2.

and deterring aggression on the part of their neighbors”.<sup>35</sup> I would argue that if an attempt had been made from the very beginning to understand the nature of the problem facing the host nation then a deployment of forces in a defensive role might not have been the right answer from the start. As demonstrated by the impact of environmental security, earlier in the monograph, it likely would have been useful to understand the role that natural resources played in the territorial dispute. It is quite possible that one of the problems which initiated the request for a U.S. military defensive capability were due to a mismanagement of the environment. It may have been discovered that deploying U.S. forces would only exasperate the problem. The Army’s planning process as currently written, however, does not allow for understanding the problem, instead FM 5-0 states, “A problem exists when there is a difference between the current state or condition and a desired state or condition. Army leaders identify problems from a variety of sources. These include-Higher headquarters directives or guidance; Decision maker guidance; Subordinates; [and] Personal observations”.<sup>36</sup>

This was a situation of inadequate goal definition from the very beginning. “Because of the way the goal had been defined, all effort had gone toward treating a symptom and none toward solving the underlying problem.”<sup>37</sup> If there had been a greater degree of knowledge about the various interrelations between the country requesting assistance and its neighbors, the students would have likely been better able to understand what was important based upon the immediate request and how those actions would have affected the future. Moving forward with a defensive course of action almost required a large force package to ensure that, if needed, U.S. forces had overwhelming firepower to defeat opposition forces that threatened the host nation’s territorial integrity. And although there was never any intent to provide a long term deployment

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<sup>35</sup> Endstate taken from Seminar 2, School for Advanced Military Studies, AY 07-08 exercise LION I mission analysis briefing.

<sup>36</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, January 2005), 2-7.

of U.S. forces to the host nation in the end it probably would have been required. If not, where would it leave the host nation when U.S. forces redeployed? There would certainly be a short term gain in defensive capability by the host nation, and possibly short term regional stability. But it is also likely the host nation's neighbors would just wait until a later time to threaten the host nation's sovereignty. There is also a possibility, similar to Napoleon's reaction to Prussia's buildup of forces along the Prussian Western front in 1806 that the host nation's neighbors may view the deployment of U.S. forces into the host nation as a prelude to war.<sup>38</sup>

I am not advocating that subordinate organizations within the military consistently challenge the guidance of a higher headquarters. However, if the planning staff has little to no knowledge of the area of operations, the planning staff must make attempts to better understand the general nature of the problem which has forced U.S. military involvement. This is different than planning for operations against a known enemy. However, if the purpose of an operation is to ensure that territorial integrity and governmental authority of the requesting nation are maintained, as it was in the LION I scenario, and the endstate is for U.S. forces to establish a defensive capability within the requesting nation's territory in order to deter outside aggression, and support a peaceful resolution to any territorial disputes, I would insist that the subordinate headquarters' planning staff take the time necessary to first understand the nature of the problem. If an alternate understanding of the problem has been realized, then it becomes essential to question the guidance of the higher headquarters in order to increase the likelihood that success can and will be achieved at all levels.

FM 5-0, Chapter 2, discusses Army problem solving as a prelude to the MDMP and briefly discusses problems as being well-structured, medium-structured, or ill-structured. The

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<sup>37</sup> Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right*. (New York, New York: Metropolitan Books, 1989), 72.

<sup>38</sup> David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*. (New York, New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1966), 462.

Army's Seven Step Problem-Solving Model as presented in FM 5-0, and seen below, presents the reader with how problem solving should be conducted.




Figure 2-1. Seven Step Problem-Solving Model

Army problem solving leads the reader to believe that the problems the military will face are solvable. However, my contention is that while the Army's Seven Step Problem-Solving Model can be a useful tool, its systematic approach can actually limit problem understanding for operations that are outside the traditional military force on force engagement planning. Ultimately, a system that relies primarily on a commander's knowledge, experience, and personality to drive the problem solving and planning process, planning will be commander centric and not problem focused.

The value of including a means to better understand the problem and its complexity to the military planning and problem solving process should by now be apparent. According to Dietrich Dorner,

"To deal effectively with a system: We need to know on what other variables the goal variables we want to influence depend. We need to understand, in other words, how the

casual relationships among the variables in a system work together in that system; we need to know how the individual components of a system fit into the hierarchy of broad and narrow concepts. This can help us fill in by analogy those parts of a structure unfamiliar to us; and we need to know the component parts into which the elements of a system can be broken and the larger complexes in which those elements are embedded. We need to know this so that we can propose hypotheses about previously unrecognized interactions between variables”.<sup>39</sup>

This could be done by utilizing Systemic Operational Design (SOD) and Effects Based Approach (EBA) as part of the process. It is important to note that while both SOD and EBA are primarily focused on campaign design and planning, there is potentially value added to Army planning, at all levels, given the complex nature of events as well as the degree to which coordination and general problem solving must include organizations outside of the Army.

Systemic operational design, created by Shimon Naveh, was developed to assist military leaders in achieving a better understanding of a more complex operating environment. SOD attempts to cause practitioners to focus on the unique problem(s) faced without using a prescribed template. A hallmark of SOD is the discourse among the design team and extended involvement by the commander in the process. While SOD is still being reviewed and exercised to determine its value it certainly has strengths which should be utilized before moving headlong into the current MDMP.

Army planning, without SOD, is essentially a linear approach to problem solving that attempts to achieve a level of certainty and control through a decision procedure. In taking a linear approach, Army planning assumes that perfect information can be found that will lead to a perfect solution. Traditionally, Blue forces utilizing the Joint Operation Planning or Military Decision Making Processes, along with the elements of operational design, produce a product that allows the commander to shape the battlefield in such a way as to cause the defeat of the Red forces. The concept of SOD argues that this may be a faulty approach especially in a non-linear environment. In a nonlinear system all variables are interdependent, the systems are sensitive to

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<sup>39</sup> Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them*

initial conditions, the system output and input are not proportional, and nonlinear systems divide into multiple states.<sup>40</sup> SOD questions the system instead of making assumptions. SOD accepts that there is uncertainty and makes attempts at managing the uncertainty instead of eliminating it. The philosophical approach of SOD prescribes a period of design that precedes planning and expects that there will be discourse among the various stakeholders rather than directionally oriented guidance.

Understanding requires flexibility and an acceptance that a solution may be impossible to reach. On a philosophical level SOD accepts that one can never understand the whole system within which one operates, and even if that were possible, it would be impossible to know that this had been achieved.<sup>41</sup> This is a concept that is difficult for military personnel to truly grasp. There are few organizations staffed with personnel determined to provide solutions as is the U.S. Army and its service members.

EBA is intended to support an integrated approach to current decision making processes, at the operational and higher levels, and is already part of joint doctrine. EBA, when taken in conjunction with the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), adds a System of System Analysis (SoSA) to Mission Analysis and then based upon a better understanding of the system(s) attempts to define the required effects, nodes, actions, and resources (ENAR) that can be utilized as part of course of action (COA) development to achieve the desired effect(s).<sup>42</sup> Unlike SOD, EBA has a greater degree of structure and more attention is paid to affecting interactions within the system. Currently the Army has decided to move away from EBA as part of its doctrine.

EBA can have application beyond the JOPP and campaign level planning given the complex operating environment that the U.S. Army finds itself operating within today. EBA

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Right. (New York, New York: Metropolitan Books, 1989), 79.

<sup>40</sup> William T. Sorrells, Glen R. Downing, Paul J. Blakesley, David W. Pendall, Jason K. Walk, and Richard D. Wallwork, *Systemic Operational Design: An Introduction* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SAMS, USACGSC, AY 04-05), 63-64.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

attempts to allow military leaders and planners to obtain a broader and deeper understanding of the operational environment. EBA is a comprehensive approach to integrating the military with all of the instruments of power (diplomatic/political, information, military, economic, and cultural). Where EBA and SOD differ is that while SOD frames the problem, not necessarily identifying an endstate, EBA is endstate focused. EBA attempts to positively direct all effects toward attainment of the objective while minimizing unwanted effects.

Whether SOD, EBA, or both, the point is that Army planning must be expanded to gain a greater appreciation for what the problem really is and how that problem relates to the desired endstate. Both are, however, thought processes that can assist military leaders and planners to maneuver more effectively through the complex and non-linear.

## **Communication and Organization**

Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War wrote, “Attempting to ingest a wide-ranging literature in one gulp, I became puzzled by the contrasting views of authors who, while ostensibly dealing with the same subject matter, arrived at different and often contradictory conclusions”.<sup>43</sup> Kenneth Waltz was trying to come to grips with an equally complex undertaking to that of the military practitioner, he was trying to discern the ever elusive concept of power in international relations. Clearly the United States Army does not act alone and often works hand in hand with other governmental agencies (OGA), non-governmental agencies (NGO), and multi-national and coalition partners. While the goal of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, to be intellectually, operationally, doctrinally, and technically joint, has been largely realized, the realities of the current, and future, operating environments of the United States Army demands that the ideas of Goldwater-Nichols be expanded to an even larger

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<sup>42</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, “Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations.” (Suffolk, VA: JWFC, February 2006), II-2 – II-3.

<sup>43</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), viii.

spectrum across both U.S. and non-U.S. agencies, organizations, and individuals.<sup>44</sup> “Success in operations can depend on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively.”<sup>45</sup> One way for the Army to do this more effectively is by expanding its vernacular to ensure that the right messages are reaching the intended audience. A good starting point is to look at how effective the Army’s MDMP is in communicating the desired effect or response.

I think that the reason the U.S. Army is struggling in the war of strategic communication is because it is being fought by a group of likeminded individuals. Being of the same mind has some benefits but it is and should be limited. One reason to have likeminded individuals is in order to successfully conduct operations under force of arms. The last thing anyone needs when the bullets are flying is for questions to arise. Having everyone thinking alike allows for the countless hours of training to kick in without hesitation. Clearly a likeminded organization can be of benefit. One area where this reasoning begins to falter is when trying to fight an ideology or information war. Another is when trying to effectively enunciate an understanding of the problem in a complex environment with others outside of the speaker’s organization. It is not uncommon for military personnel to provide a briefing or lead a discussion and later be told by a non-military participant that the information was hard to follow because of the sheer number of acronyms used. It becomes critical when the briefing requires a decision by a non-military member and that individual has difficulty in following or is inadvertently misled by how the language is utilized.

FM 5-0 states that commanders should use doctrinal approved tasks found in combined arms field manuals or mission training plans in the mission statement.<sup>46</sup> The problem with

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
<sup>44</sup> National Defense University Library, *Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. <http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html>

<sup>45</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, February 2003), A-0.

<sup>46</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, January 2005), 3-25.

providing a relatively narrow set of mission task definitions, many of which differ from their more common dictionary definitions, is that there is a tendency to stick with what those in the Army already know. This concept is not entirely without use, for in providing doctrinal definitions the military community can easily communicate concepts that would have likely been misunderstood otherwise. Rather, the problem is when military members use doctrinal words and definitions when addressing non-military audiences even though alternate wording would be appropriate.

The sample mission tasks listed for actions by friendly force and for effects on enemy forces, as provided in Figure 3.7 below, are narrow in scope describing essentially force on force actions and are not necessarily useful for peacekeeping, nation building, or humanitarian relief efforts.



**Figure 3-7. Mission Tasks**

Referring back to FM 3-07, it is stated that commanders plan for stability operations and support operations in a manner like they plan for the offense and defense. FM 3-07 even references FM

7-15, The Army Universal Task List, as being helpful in focusing the planning effort.<sup>47</sup> The purpose of FM 7-15 is to provide a standard, doctrinal foundation for the Army's tactical collective tasks and thus includes a whole host of tasks that are to be accomplished across the spectrum of conflict. A task that has become of primary focus for forces operating in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters is ART 6.14.6, Establish Temporary Civil Administration (Friendly, Allied, and Occupied Enemy Territory).<sup>48</sup> The task is further broken down into 25 measures and has an additional 18 subtasks, each with their own measures. No list is meant to be entirely inclusive, and the possibilities from ART 6.14.6 are impressive, the problem is in being able to move beyond what is provided and those which can be readily applicable to other organizations. While there is certainly value in allowing doctrine to identify and clearly define meanings to specific mission tasks, it should also be clear that utilizing other words, as long as their meaning is clearly defined and accepted, outside of military doctrinal sources is also acceptable.

Even if there are doctrinally defined meanings available, that does not always equate to understanding. As a matter of fact, in a study conducted at the National Training Center, by William Crain in 1990, found that "only about 19 percent of the Commander's Intent statements said anything about the purpose of the mission and that communication of intent was mediocre".<sup>49</sup> Critical in effective communication is causing understanding. And while prescribing where mission task statements should be derived from may be useful in limited settings, it is more important to present information that the receiver can utilize in understanding. According to Gary Klein, there are seven types of information that will help in accomplishing this: the purpose of the task (higher level goals); the objective of the task (an image of the desired

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<sup>47</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, February 2003), 2-1.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, 6-120.

<sup>49</sup> Gary Klein. *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England. MIT Press, 1999), 225.

outcome); the sequence of steps in the plan; the rationale for the plan; the key decisions that may have to be made; antigoes (unwanted outcomes); and constraints and other considerations".<sup>50</sup>

To determine whether the Army decision making process is effective without considering the implications for outside organizations would be to overlook a major requirement for achieving success. Coordination is an essential communicative component for all organizations, especially those with a high degree of task differentiation and varying degrees of loyalty within organizational subsets. Coordination and communication cannot take place, however, if there is a lack of understanding of organizational structure. According to Mary Jo Hatch, "the term 'fit' defines a successful strategy as one that brings what the organization can do (its competencies) into alignment with the needs and demands of its environment".<sup>51</sup> Success in a complex environment demands that Army leaders and planners have a clear understanding of the different group structures in order to maximize effectiveness.

Groups have varying structures that are used to shape the individual behavior of its members. Some key structures that should be taken into account by Army personnel working with members not normally associated with the organization are roles, norms, status, cohesiveness, size, and composition. Roles can be defined as the expected behavior patterns which can be attributed to occupying a given position in a social unit.<sup>52</sup> Probably the single most important thing to remember about roles is that all individuals identify and play a number of roles depending on the situation. To be able to develop an effective work team, it is important to understand what group the various personnel are identifying with and what behaviors are expected in the role the personnel have assumed.

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 225.

<sup>51</sup> Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 103.

<sup>52</sup> S.P.Robbins, Essentials of Organizational Behavior (8<sup>th</sup> ed.). (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2004), 103.

Norms are those behavior statements that have become accepted and shared by a group's members. Group norms can and do have a significant impact on individual behaviors as they are associated with the group. Two studies, the Hawthorne and Asch, have provided evidence that conformity to group norms can and do cause individuals to alter their behaviors to achieve conformity.<sup>53</sup> It is important for Army personnel to have an understanding of the different group norms in order to positively affect the overall work of the group. Norms may vary greatly between military members and civilian organizations.

Status permeates every society and can be defined as the position or rank given to both individuals and groups. There are several keys to understand about status as they relate to the building of an effective working team. The first can be explained by the status characteristics theory. Status generally is derived from three sources; the power a person wields over others; a person's ability to contribute to a group's goals; and an individual's personal characteristics.<sup>54</sup> Generally people perceived as high status individuals are better able to resist pressure to conform and are better able to deviate from other group norms. Also important to remember is that group interaction tends to be influenced by status and high status individuals tend to be more assertive within the group. This is especially important for Army personnel who operate daily in an environment where rank plays a key role. Generally, group members will perform better when they perceive an equitable status hierarchy. It is important to note that status perceptions vary by culture and must be taken into consideration when appropriate. Status is a way of life in the Army but may not be as well understood by other organizations with which Army personnel may operate.

Cohesiveness, a trademark of Army organizations, represents how well individual members perform as part of, and remain committed to, the group. Cohesiveness relates directly to a group's ability to produce. General factors for success include keeping group size small,

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 104.

encouragements of group agreement, increased time together, increasing group status, competition with other groups, rewarding the group instead of the individual, and isolating the group.<sup>55</sup> Certainly not all of these factors for success will apply for Army personnel attempting to increase the cohesiveness of non-military organizations in all situations, but should be kept in mind from the outset of heterogeneous organizational formation.

The size of the group can and does also affect group behavior. Generally smaller groups complete tasks more rapidly and larger groups are better at problem solving. It is important to keep in mind the tendency for individuals to expend less effort when acting as a member of a group. This tendency even has its own label, social loafing.<sup>56</sup> In developing an effective team it is important to have a mechanism in place to monitor individual contributions to overcome this attribute. This can become especially prevalent when one part of the group develops a feeling of alienation from another. Army personnel should remain aware of this tendency especially given the general take charge attitude of military members.

Finally, the composition of the group will have an impact on developing an effective team. In tasks that have a substantial amount of complexity, heterogeneous groups are more likely to have the right mix of abilities and information to be more effective than homogenous groups.<sup>57</sup> Even though an expanded composition can be initially challenging to develop, expanding beyond the typical Army composition then can go a long way in gaining a better understanding of the complex environments in which forces are likely to be found operating.

In the end, expanding the organization make-up can go a long way in positively influencing efficiency and productivity. Although the speed with which decisions are made is generally increased in a smaller group, larger structures are typically able to generate more complete information, offer an increased diversity of views, and therefore are able to develop

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 110.

higher quality decisions.<sup>58</sup> Unfortunately, misunderstandings often arise in diverse group settings when there is either a lack of desire or because the groups have not been able to work and grow together for a long enough period of time. Understanding group structure will help in overcoming these misunderstandings.

In my own experience, I witnessed misunderstandings on several occasions between American Embassy and military personnel during meetings regarding non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) while serving in the Directorate for Operations, J3, Headquarters, United States Forces Japan. These misunderstandings came about because of failures to appreciate how the other side conducted business on a day to day basis. The problems were caused primarily by communicative and organizational awareness deficiencies. The embassy personnel generally conducted meetings to postulate ideas, while the military personnel generally conducted meetings to reach a decision. This organizational misunderstanding, coupled with sometimes incompatible phraseology, were the cause of many frustrating sessions. The Army can and should do all that is required to overcome communicative deficiencies. Military personnel often assume the leadership role and must therefore be willing to demonstrate flexibility and appreciation for how others conduct business. Dictating how things will be done without further consideration will get there too, but it may lead to unacceptable consequences in the long run.

### **Expand the Personnel, Expand Problem Solving**

Having an enhanced appreciation for a security environment that goes beyond a purely military understanding; expanding the Army's problem solving and planning process to embrace such concepts as Systemic Operational Design and Effects Based Approach; and having an increased awareness about how the message is communicated outside of the typical Army organization will certainly go a long way in improving the Army's ability to operate in a more complex operating environment. However, there should be further research conducted

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 111.

concerning the impact of how an expanded Army personnel structure would be able to expand the Army's problem solving capability.

The United States Army is an organization that has achieved considerable success in its 232 year history largely because of its homogeneity. Considerable effort is placed on minimizing the individual in order to create greater value in the organization. Homogeneous groups are able to make decisions faster, with clearer accountability, and generally with more consistent values.<sup>59</sup> However, as demonstrated in the previous section, there can also be tremendous value in heterogeneity, especially with regards to group problem solving. Another advantage is escaping the trappings, which can occur in a more homogeneous organization such as the Army, of groupthink. Groupthink, occurs when members feel so strongly that they need to adhere to generally accepted organizational views that the realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action and a full acceptance of deviant, minority, or unpopular views are no longer accepted or appreciated.<sup>60</sup> The commander driven military decision making process because of wide acceptance within the Army can be a source of groupthink even though that is not its intention. Stephen Robbins presented four characteristics of groupthink in his book, Essentials of Organizational Behavior: group members rationalize any resistance to the assumptions made; members pressure any doubters to support the majority decision; doubters often keep silent and even attempt to minimize the importance of their misgivings; and the group interprets silence as acceptance to majority desires.<sup>61</sup> Studies have demonstrated that events such as the unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the escalation of the Vietnam War, and the failed Iran hostage rescue in 1980 were preceded by symptoms of groupthink.<sup>62</sup> Expanding the soldier base

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 114.

to include, among the ranks, a less typical soldier performing the mission of alternative thought could conceivably help to overcome the problems associated with groupthink.

The world has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Non-state actors have gain in importance as globalization has evolved. This change has left the military facing a new reality. Will these actors/influencers feel motivated to change because of the traditional military threat? Or do other sources of power, i.e. soft power, play a more significant role? The fact has become that virtually anyone, with or without State backing, can challenge the security landscape. “Defeating such enemies presents a huge challenge to the Army and Marine Corps. Meeting it requires creative efforts by every Soldier and Marine.”<sup>63</sup> Expanding the soldier base would allow for greater creativity in order to better deal with the complexity of the modern operational environment.

American success has been and must continue to be its varied citizenship. American history is replete with examples of the contributions made by the outcast, dispossessed, and refugees from other nations. Sergy Brin was born in the USSR and is co-founder and the president of Google. Andy Grove was born in Hungary and was part of the team that founded Intel in 1968. Carlos M. Gutierrez was born in Cuba was the former Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Kellogg Company and is now serving as the 35<sup>th</sup> Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Pierre Omidyar, the founder and Chairman of the Board of eBay, was born in France. Madeline Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State was born in Czechoslovakia. Zbigniew Brzezinski was born in Poland and served as a National Security Advisor from 1977-1981. Nils Diaz, Cuban born, was a former Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Tom Lantos, a Holocaust survivor born in Hungary, served as a member of the U.S. House of

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<sup>63</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*. (Washington, DC. HQ, DA, 2006), ix.

Representatives in California's 12<sup>th</sup> Congressional District from 1981-2008.<sup>64</sup> General John M. Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993-1997, was born in Poland. Enrico Fermi who was born in Italy, built the first experimental nuclear reactor and was one of the leaders of the team of physicists on the Manhattan Project. And of course Albert Einstein made immeasurable contributions to the success of the United States after his arrival from his birth country of Germany. A recent study found that immigrant children account for an astounding sixty percent of all top science students in the United States and sixty-five percent of all top math students.<sup>65</sup> Tom Ridge, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, was quoted in April of 2003 as saying, "(A)s we secure America from terrorists, we do not want to risk losing the next Enrico Fermi or Albert Einstein... We would be a far poorer nation in many, many ways".<sup>66</sup> The United States became, and is, the lone super-power because of our ability to leverage our number one capability, the United States citizenry. Clearly immigrants have and do provide the United States a capability unmatched throughout the world.

Through a more complete acceptance of the various talents and capabilities of naturally born citizens, allowing some to maintain a greater degree of individuality, the United States Army would achieve heterogeneity in its problem solving and decision making processes. The complexity of modern battlefields demand much more than merely a shift in thinking by way of incorporating such tools as Systemic Operational Design or Effects Based Approaches. These tools do represent a tremendous step in the right direction but will remain limited without an expansion of the Army's thought base across the entire population spectrum. The shedding of individual identity in order to become a soldier, sailor, airman, or marine should not be necessary

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<sup>64</sup> David M. Herszenhorn, "Tom Lantos, 80, Is Dead; Longtime Congressman." *New York Times*, February 12, 2008, under "U.S.", <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/washington/12lantos.html?scp=2&sq=war+dead&st=nyt> (accessed February 13, 2008).

<sup>65</sup> Stuart Anderson, "The Multiplier Effect". (*International Educator*, Summer 2004), 15.

<sup>66</sup> Information regarding foreign born citizen contributions was found at the website The Alliance for a Competitive Workforce, "Passport to Prosperity – All-Stars for America". *Compete America*, <http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=12142> (accessed November 11, 2007).

for all who want to serve. Taking away some individuality is much more necessary for the warrior class of soldier, someone willing to kill and/or die for his or her country. These warriors are the bedrock of the Armed Forces. However, with the onset of globalization there has arrived a need for much more than simply a highly trained warrior, the Army needs those who can think in the non-linear, complex, and uncertain environments that now exist. This is about the future of America and it requires all Americans.

A commonly uttered phrase among military members is that the military is at war, not the nation. Military members can point fingers all day long about where the responsibility lies for this gap. The reality remains that in order to achieve success in the long war the military must generate and accept more than just citizen support of the soldier. The citizen must become an integral part of the effort, something the Army has been unable to overcome at this point. But how does the Army generate more direct civilian support? Tear down the barriers that currently exist between the military and the civilian population. Allow gays to openly serve, allow gothic dressed individuals to serve in their gothic style regalia. Move away from the relative isolation of the military bases and expand into the entire country. The Army needs to embrace the wealth of the nation, its people, all of them, in order to truly understand the future of warfare. Lethal engagement is just one tool to defeat the enemy. Others do not necessarily require the same organization of soldiers. The Army must expand its thinking, work smarter not harder. Will this be hard? Yes. However, the military has done it before with racial segregation serving as just one example. In July of 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981 and ended the policy of racially segregating units.<sup>67</sup> A month earlier, of the same year, Congress

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<sup>67</sup> Harry S. Truman, Library and Museum online, *Executive Order 9981*. Found at: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/9981.htm>. "On July 26, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 establishing equality of treatment and opportunity in the Armed Services."

passed the Women's Armed Forces Integration Act.<sup>68</sup> By 1997, minorities had accounted for nearly half of the U.S. military fighting force.<sup>69</sup> It is likely that without integration the United States would not have been able to become the world's most admired military. It may be time to address the capability gap that currently exists in overcoming complex problems and expand the military population base.

A temporary expansion can be seen in the decision by the U.S. Army to implement Human Terrain Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was done largely because of an essay co-authored by an anthropologist by the name of Montgomery McFate.<sup>70</sup> The Army asked for assistance from the anthropologist community precisely because there was an understanding that the military organization had a weaknesses that could be better addressed by experts. It would seem that a better approach to overcoming this weakness would be to incorporate the almost limitless capabilities of our entire citizen base in the military directly. Getting anthropological support only for specific problem sets is like trying to plug the proverbial dike; this is, while certainly useful, a shortsighted approach. Army Strong is about the people, not the equipment. Army recruitment efforts should be redesigned from taking whatever the service can get to taking all that is needed. The vast majority of the nation's population wants to be a part of something special. People want to help solve the big problems and the Army needs as many of them as it can get. The key is in understanding that the organization doesn't necessarily have to like gays or those who prefer gothic style dress. What is important is that the desired endstate is the same, the continued success of America and its inherent freedoms. It is likely that the Army is losing a

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<sup>68</sup> Alicia K. Borlik, "DoD Marks 50<sup>th</sup> Year of Military Women's Integration," *U.S. Department of Defense*, June 17, 1998, under "News," <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=41380> (accessed November 11, 2007).

<sup>69</sup> Department of Defense, "Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1997." *24<sup>th</sup> Annual DoD Report on Social Representation in the U.S. Military Services*, (November 1998), Appendix A.

<sup>70</sup> Matthew B. Stannard, "Montgomery McFate's Mission: Can an anthropologist possibly steer the course in Iraq?". *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 29, 2007, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/04/29/CMGHQP19VD1.DTL&type=printable> (accessed October 29, 2007).

significant capability by the mere perception that to be a soldier means giving up the very freedoms that American's covet. The question of course is how the military can overcome these deficiencies?

I believe that to achieve the initial stage of success would be to create a segment of soldier telecommuters. Allow into the force all segments of the population as they are. Gay, goth, and the overweight all have a potential role. Accept the risk that the military can remain the envy of the world. Loosen the traditional rigidity and find out if such a move can result in an enhanced capability. There will certainly be some failures as no change is perfect, but be willing to accept it. If the Army is truly looking to overcome the ideology of the latest enemy the Army must be willing to accept monumental changes and their inherent risks. The Army requires strategic and operational thinkers who have tremendous mental agility. Instructors of the Command and General Staff School impress upon their students the need for Army planners and designers who have the capability to incorporate breadth and depth into their thinking. This is especially important when dealing with complex problems. By expanding the thinking base, the Army can expand the breadth and depth into areas currently unreachable. Telecommuting allows for several potential benefits.

One of the greatest potential benefits in the soldier telecommuting concept lies in the expansion of the soldier populace into places not traditionally known as military communities. Long gone are the days when everyone knows someone in the military. With a military population of less than one percent of the overall American population we are becoming increasingly isolated from the very people the military has been asked to serve. This trend must be reversed. Telecommuting allows for optimum networking. Previously marginalized individuals would be allowed to become an integral part of the team of soldiers. Doing so should

strengthen not only the military's capability but strengthen the Nation as well. America and its Army are only as strong as the people.

Another potential benefit would be decreased costs associated with basing. There will always remain a requirement for a training and maintenance infrastructure that exists in the Army's current basing arrangements. However, as costs continue to rise and requirements to minimize infrastructure continue, the military does not have to sacrifice its capability, the people. Allow the warriors to occupy the base complexes and leverage technology to capitalize on the capability of the thinkers.

Army leaders must recognize that their experiences can also be one of their primary liabilities. The current military hierarchical structure depends on the experiences of its senior leaders for decision making. However, this closed group mentality can, and does, limit organizational progress. Individual experiences, regardless of age, rank, status, etc., taken collectively, and if large enough will exponentially expand the organizations ability to solve complex problems. The intent is not to get more information but rather a broader perspective or even greater specialized knowledge. Information itself is not power. Power is maximizing the ability to share information in the era of globalization.

Success in the future demands that all ideas, from all walks of life, are valuable. This concept equates to enhanced empowerment for the individual, the military, and the Nation. The Army must do a better job of becoming inclusive versus exclusive. America's most powerful asset is its diversity. Homogeneity or cultural exclusion is what defines the preponderance of the rest of the world's nations. This proclivity to exclude has also been a significant source of conflict and stagnant economic growth for these same nations. See the backyard of the United States for countless examples.<sup>71</sup> Numerous Latin American countries are still stuck on a concept of whiteness, a preference for those of Spanish ancestry which purportedly equates to superiority,

which has caused a persistent marginalization of their indigenous base.<sup>72</sup> Conflict and poverty remain the norm. Countless stories abound with regards to being too quick to judge and yet the military remains such an organization. The Army must overcome our exclusivity and embrace inclusivity to win the long war.

## Conclusion

America remains the envy of the world. America's political institution is admired for its openness and fairness. Thousands of individuals come to America every year to study at our renowned colleges and universities. Individual Americans have achieved a level of personal wealth that is only a dream for most other individuals in most other nations. The word freedom is synonymous with America. The choices American's have for where they live, what they eat, the types of entertainment they enjoy, the material possessions they accumulate, etc. are almost innumerable. Yet for all of the nation's accomplishments there seems to be almost, a sense of immunity from the trials and tribulations that others experience.

American's are a product of their experiences. Generally they depend on the past as a way to efficiently guide current and future efforts. However, either because of a change to the environment by which past experiences are no longer able to serve as a useful guide; or because the confronted situation is so complex it is rendered as unrecognizable, there must be attempts to understand outside of the individual and collective experience base. To do so is to challenge the very assumptions that experiences have taught are valid and are crucial for attempting to understand the complexities of the environment. According to John Gaddis, one of the reasons for America's unpreparedness on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 was, "a widespread sense in the academic and policy communities during the 1990s that the international system had become so benign that

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<sup>71</sup> Steven E. Lobell, and Philip Mauceri, eds., Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation. (New York, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 95.

<sup>72</sup> Brooke Larson, Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 76.

the United States no longer faced serious security threats of any kind”.<sup>73</sup> The military community, regardless of the direction that academic and policy communities take, can never afford to become lax about the security environment.

Today there are countless pages of literature demonstrating the plethora of security issues that currently face America and those that may be just over the horizon. “Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; it must be met with short-term military action, informed by in-depth, long-term, sophisticated analysis.”<sup>74</sup> People will be what enables the nation to collectively overcome the current challenge faced by terrorism. Collective abilities will also enable the nation to overcome the challenges to environmental security, global health and human security, and weapons proliferation. Abilities, however, must be reevaluated from time to time in order to ensure that they are being maximized. Plans that promote democracy must also include security, economics, law, and other programs and services. “If the world is to escape the sword hanging over it, the United States will need not just the approval but the active support of the allies that stood with it during the cold war as well as those that can be brought into the Kantian community in the future.”<sup>75</sup> The current abilities of the U.S. Army are not being maximized and therefore a transformation must take place for real security to be achieved.

The transformation that I have discussed requires an update to the Army’s military decision making process. “The modern world is made up of innumerable interrelated subsystems, and we need to think in terms of these interrelations.”<sup>76</sup> MDMP, as currently written in doctrine, is a useful tool for linear, well defined, problems. However, it is essential that when dealing with

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<sup>73</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 75-76.

<sup>74</sup> Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism". (*International Security* 27:3, Winter 2002), 55.

<sup>75</sup> Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2001), 304.

<sup>76</sup> Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right. (New York, New York: Metropolitan Books, 1989), 5.

those problems that have ill-defined goals, time is taken to gain a better appreciation of the problem, before progressing to the problem solving process, at the operational level.

In order to get and maintain the initiative, it is imperative that the Army understand the complex environment in which the plan will be executed. “To the ignorant, the world looks simple. If we pretty much dispense with gathering information, it is easy for us to form a clear picture of reality and come to clear decisions based on that picture.”<sup>77</sup> As Clausewitz has demonstrated, war is an extension of policy by other means.<sup>78</sup> For many this equates to an understanding that the military should wait for the policy makers to make a decision and then design a plan to execute the policy makers will. This would be assuming that the world is simple and the environment is already understood. I would argue that to assume that the environment, as presented, should be accepted without further thought is a false assumption. There is no one single system, but many systems that must be observed and understood separately, and as part of their interaction within the larger system. In some instances it may be possible to affect change among multiple systems by targeting one, as is the purpose behind an Effects Based Approach. In other cases, targeting only one part of the system will at best achieve some change in that system and at worse change nothing, which can be better understood by utilizing Systemic Operational Design.

Once an adequate understanding of the problem has been achieved, planners must then be able to effectively articulate the nature of the problem. This cannot be done successfully if the message cannot be understood outside of the military organization and if there is a lack of understanding regarding how other organizations are structured. A hierarchical structure where what the commander says goes and everything and everyone else merely obeys, is

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<sup>77</sup> Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right*. (New York, New York: Metropolitan Books, 1989), 99.

<sup>78</sup> Michael Howard, *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 36..

counterproductive. Of course, this may be the exception and it is certainly largely dependent on personality, but when allowed to exist, both effective and critical thought will be squashed.

For the military to be truly able to mitigate the complexity that exists in the current and future operating environments there must be consideration of potential benefits from expanding the eligibility of who can become a soldier. Since operations in Iraq have been extended, there has been a realization that the number of active duty forces should be increased. But where the Army gets these recruits from and how they will be utilized is a different matter. “And since September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the number of immigrants in uniform who have become U.S. citizens has increased from 750 in 2001 to almost 4,600 [in 2005].”<sup>79</sup>

The complexity of the current operating environment has led the Army, and the nation, to this point where transformation is required. The transformation that I am advocating consists of several levels. Expand the Army’s military decision making process to include SOD or EBA like concepts in order for decision makers to better understand the problem(s) and how the desired endstate relates to the problem(s). The formation of organizations and communication with non-U.S. Army partners must be reconsidered. The Army cannot afford to be the cause of misunderstanding simply because it prefers a hierarchical structure or expounds a doctrinal concept that is not readily understood outside of the organization. Finally, the Army must be willing to alter its hiring practices. The Army cannot afford to accept a 17-24 year old male populace base in which only 28% are fully qualified for recruitment. If 35%, of potential recruits, are morally or physically disqualified then maybe it is time for the Army to readjust its practice.<sup>80</sup> To better prepare for and stay ahead of the new, and highly complex, security environment the U.S. Army must transform how it understands, plans, and communicates.

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<sup>79</sup> Bryan Bender, “Military Considers Recruiting Foreigners: Expedited Citizenship Would be an Incentive,” *The Boston Globe*, December 26, 2006, under “News,” [http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/12/26/military\\_considers\\_recruiting\\_foreigners/](http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/12/26/military_considers_recruiting_foreigners/) (accessed January 2, 2008)

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<sup>80</sup> Data taken from a briefing titled, "Man the Force – America's Report Card" presented to the SAMS on January 9, 2008.

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