Australia's National Security

A Defence Update 2003

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A Defence Update
Foreword

This statement follows from the Government's consideration of Australia's strategic interests two years after the release of the Government's Defence White Paper, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. It recognises and sets out our responses to the salient features in our changing security environment: the emergence of new and more immediate threats from terrorism and increased concerns about the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This statement also addresses our continuing concerns about developments in our immediate region which have consequences for Australia's interests.

Senator the Hon Robert Hill
Minister for Defence

Since the horrific attacks of September 2001 and October 2002, the Government has taken steps to improve security, both domestically and internationally. These actions, which include increased funding to intelligence agencies, improved immigration controls, new Defence capabilities to combat terrorism and improvements in airline security, have quickly and effectively responded to some of the major threats which have emerged.

This statement reviews the implications for Australia's defence posture. It concludes that while the principles set out in the Defence White Paper remain sound, some rebalancing of capability and expenditure will be

necessary to take account of changes in Australia's strategic environment. This rebalancing will not fundamentally alter the size, structure and roles of the Defence Force, but it will inevitably result in increased emphasis on readiness and mobility, on interoperability, on the development and enhancement of important new capabilities and, where sensible and prudent, a reduced emphasis on capabilities of less importance.

Senator the Hon Robert Hill
Minister for Defence

Introduction

On releasing the 2000 Defence White Paper, the Government undertook to review our defence posture periodically to ensure Australia continues to have the appropriate mix of concepts, capabilities and forces to meet new challenges as they arise.

In just over two years since the Defence White Paper was released, we are in no doubt that the strategic landscape has changed. The question for Defence is whether the strategic tasks which have underpinned Defence planning and capability development - the defence of Australia, operations in the immediate neighbourhood, coalition operations further afield and peacetime national tasks - still provide a sufficiently firm but flexible foundation for planning and capability development, particularly when addressing today's threats.

What is already clear is that while the Defence White Paper focused on the development of capabilities for the Defence of Australia and its National Interests, two matters - terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, including to terrorists - have emerged to new prominence and create renewed strategic uncertainty. In addition, some adverse trends in our immediate neighbourhood have continued.

The changed strategic and security environment requires responses from a number of government agencies. This update considers mainly the challenges posed by these changes in our strategic environment and the implications for the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Tactical Assault Group

A Changed Strategic Environment

While strategic competition between nations has not gone away, major power relations have generally become more stable. The combination of US military and economic might and converging national priorities in eliminating terrorism have increased the focus of the major powers on cooperating to advance shared interests. Russia and the United States have put their Cold War confrontation fully behind them with a new framework for cooperation, based on shared security interests and reductions in their strategic nuclear capabilities. Russia's acceptance of NATO enlargement, and its improved relationships with the EU and other Western treaty organisations, bode well for continued stability across much of the European continent.

Despite tensions early in 2001, US-China relations have stabilised. But strategic competition between the US and China will continue over the next decade, and the possibility of miscalculation over Taiwan persists. While China's economic rise will pose challenges for some countries over the next decade,

Operation Slipper – on patrol in Afghanistan

notably Japan, the consequences for regional stability could be greater if growth stalled or there was social breakdown within China.

The potential for conventional military conflict remains in North Asia. Notwithstanding progress towards improved relations between North and South Korea over recent years, the Korean peninsula remains a potential flashpoint. Warning time of a conflict might be short, especially if North Korea's nuclear ambitions and brinkmanship keep tensions high. For the time being it seems likely that the issue will be managed through peaceful means.

Washington's strong international posture since September 2001 is evoking popular anti-Americanism, and not just in Muslim countries. So far, hostility is more a complication in US management of international relations than a major limitation on US primacy. Even if broad international support for the US declines, this will not prevent Washington pursuing a purposeful agenda against

serious terrorist, WMD or other threats.

Australia and the US continue to share many values and interests, and we jointly benefit from, and contribute towards,

Operation Slipper deployment in the Gulf

global stability and prosperity. Australia's defence capability is enhanced through access to US information and technology. Our relationship with the United States remains a national asset. The United States' current political, economic, and military dominance adds further weight to the alliance relationship. The alliance increases Australia's ability to contribute effectively to coalition operations.

As a result of a combination of factors including greater stability in major power relations and increased

US strategic dominance, the threat of direct military attack on Australia is less than it was in 2000. Paradoxically, however, in some other important ways, certainty and predictability have decreased because the strategic advantage offered by our geography does not protect Australia against rogue states armed with WMD and long-range ballistic missiles. Nor does it protect Australia from the scourge of terrorism. In some regions of high strategic significance to Australia, notably North Asia and the Middle East, it is still conceivable that conflict could occur, directly affecting Australia's interests.

Less strategic certainty means that our emphasis must be on having the flexibility and adaptability to answer the unexpected as much as the expected.

Global Terrorism

The Threat

The numerous recent terrorist attacks, both pre and post September 2001, demonstrate that terrorism is more than a transitory phenomenon and is likely to last for years. A critical strategic and security dimension for Australia is that militant extremists in Southeast Asia are prepared to take up the Al Qaida cause and that Australia has been identified as a target.

Twenty-first century international terrorism, as represented by Al Qaida and its regional offshoots and affiliates, differs from the terrorism of the seventies and eighties. The new terrorism is more strategically focused. Its objective is to roll back Western values, engagement and influence, and to weaken and ultimately supplant moderate Islamic governments.

In the past, terrorist attacks tended to focus on obtaining a symbolic or tactical advantage. Although this involved indiscriminate killing, large numbers of deaths were not in themselves the objective. By contrast, Al Qaida and its associated networks have

Australian Embassy East Timor

demonstrated both willingness and capability to inflict massive casualties on civilian targets as a strategic end.

It is not just increased lethality that sets Al Qaida apart, but that it draws on personnel, money and equipment organised across national borders. Since September 2001, the international community has made concerted efforts to trace international terror networks and identify the often-shifting alliances and associations between them. There is still much work to be done to find and destroy terrorist leaders and cells, but even though the main force of terrorist attacks will often be felt at the national or regional level, it is a global conflict. It may eventually be seen as the most violent phenomenon of the information age. Al Qaida cells or operatives have been identified in many countries across the Middle East, Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa and the United States, and it is almost certain that others have yet to be found.

While terrorists lack the resources of the nation state, particularly conventional military forces, they have discovered that

this is not a barrier to strategic effect. The reality is that terrorism has gained strategic advantage by turning the strengths of tolerant and open societies into weaknesses, and then striking at vulnerable points to devastating effect. For Australians, this reality was brought home in Bali. There remains a great risk that the mass casualties inflicted in recent attacks have set the terrorists' sights even higher, possibly including the acquisition and use of WMD.

Terrorism in Southeast Asia

The Bali attack confirmed that extremist organisations in Southeast Asia are no longer focused exclusively on local issues. Regional extremists target secular moderate Muslim and non-Islamic governments, as well as Western targets. And they receive inspiration, training, support and know-how from Al Qaida and Middle Eastern radical Islamist groups.

The Australian Government was aware of the existence in our region of extremist organisations before September 2001 and of the preparedness of some, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), to engage in acts of terrorism

Evacuation following the Bali bombing

against mainly local targets. We, with other regional governments, tended to see them as focused essentially on domestic issues. Working together we have now uncovered a much more worrying picture - that regional extremist networks are larger, more capable and more active than we had believed. The Bali attacks highlighted links between entrenched militant regional extremist groups and global islamist terrorism.

We now know that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has a well-established regional network which sometimes works with Al Qaida in support of its objectives. We also know that it has cells operating throughout Southeast Asia, with the stated goal of creating an Islamic state encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the southern Philippines. We know also that JI has planned and conducted attacks in a number of regional countries, including a foiled plot to bomb the Australian, US, UK and Israeli diplomatic missions in Singapore. There has been a significant effort to bring members of JI to justice in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, but JI continues to pose a threat. Recognising the threat, Australia took a lead in ensuring that JI was listed in the United Nations as a terrorist organisation linked to Al Qaida.

Australia's Response

The Australian Government's response to international terrorism acknowledges that the terrorist threat to Australians and Australian interests has increased, both domestically and overseas. The problem cannot be managed by one country alone - a targeted bilateral, regional and global approach is also needed.

Allowing the threat of terrorism to determine our alliance arrangements would be contrary to Australia's core principles and values. Our participation as a US ally in the War on Terror might attract some criticism. But a weaker or equivocal response to this threat would not serve Australia well, or decrease our vulnerability. And this would not reduce the prospect of US and other foreign interests being targeted in Australia, with the inevitable loss of Australian lives, or of Australians abroad being incidental victims of terrorism. Australia's security is affected if there are any regions in the world from which terrorists with Al Qaida's ambitions and capacity can operate internationally with impunity.

Operation Slipper patrol in Afghanistan

The coalition against terrorism - which includes over 60 countries - is not just about a shared sense of outrage, but also about a shared sense of threat. This was why the Australian Government invoked the ANZUS Treaty immediately after 11 September, for the first time in the treaty's 50-year history.

The Australian Government's contribution to the war has spanned diplomatic, legislative, police and intelligence cooperation, capacity-building, and financial and border controls, as well as direct military activities and broader Defence cooperation. This focus will be enduring and the ADF may well be called on to contribute to further efforts in the War on Terror.

The important role of military force in the War on Terror has been demonstrated in Afghanistan. The removal of the Taliban regime - Al Qaida's host - has eliminated one of the world's most oppressive governments and given the people of Afghanistan the chance of a better future. Information

gained has added to our understanding of terrorist networks and disrupted planned attacks. Importantly, Al Qaida has lost its unhindered access to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. But actions in disrupting Al Qaida's operations in Afghanistan are just the first step. Much remains to be done and some further resort to military force is likely to be needed.

The links between extremist organisations in Southeast Asia underline the need for improved cooperation within the region. During the last year, Australia entered into Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) on Combating International Terrorism with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and negotiations are under way with other governments. The significance of these arrangements was highlighted by the joint investigation into the Bali terrorist attacks, ably conducted by the Indonesian police with support from the Australian Federal Police.

The Australian Government is aware that the majority of Muslims hold moderate views and that they are no less victims than other religious, ethnic or national groups. Moderate Muslims face the challenge of theology and ideology thrown up by bin Laden in his attempt to capture the heart of one of the world's great religions.

Tactical Assault Group

The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction

There have been some post-Cold War achievements in arms reduction, notably to US and Russian nuclear stockpiles. Yet the threat of proliferation, especially among rogue states and terrorists, remains a significant security challenge.

The end of Soviet communism and the growth of globalisation created an environment in which the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons could flourish. WMD precursors, many of which are dual-use, are available on the world market, as is technical expertise. The increased flow of goods and information around the world, one of the results of globalisation, has made it easier to match WMD demand with potential suppliers. Biological and some chemical weapons can be manufactured largely with dual-use equipment and materials.

WMD are the ultimate asymmetric threat. WMD allow weak states prepared to defy international norms and non-state actors (like terrorist groups) to strike unilaterally. And these states are ambitious: North Korea, for example, which can already strike much of North

Inspecting weapons

Asia, is actively pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles and a developing nuclear weapon capability. Countries like Iraq and North Korea see WMD as a source of international leverage and domestic legitimacy. The prospect that Saddam Hussein might threaten to use WMD against his enemies in the region or supply WMD to terrorists reinforces the international community's efforts to ensure Iraq is disarmed. Since September 2001 the world community has become less tolerant of rogue states' WMD ambitions.

The strategic consequences of WMD proliferation are profound. If the international community's determination to combat proliferation were to wane and known rogue states were allowed such weapons programmes, others would try hard to emulate them.

Furthermore, it would be a strategic miscalculation to underestimate the resourcefulness, persistence or ambitions of dedicated terrorists. We know that they intend to inflict mass casualties and we know they are making every effort to acquire WMD

capability. In Afghanistan coalition forces found clear evidence that Al Qaida was actively pursuing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

A Layered Response

The international non-proliferation and export control frameworks remain an important first line of defence against WMD. But the frameworks are only credible and effective if they keep pace with international developments and are enforced. Australia is working hard internationally to ensure this happens but we recognise the aggressiveness of determined proliferators. Therefore we need a comprehensive response - a layered defence.

Diplomacy is at the forefront. Strengthening the various multi-lateral non-proliferation arrangements, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, financial and border controls is similarly important.

But diplomacy and international cooperation will not always succeed: the Australian Government may need to consider future requests to support coalition military operations to prevent the proliferation of WMD, including to rogue

Operation Slipper in the Gulf

states or terrorists, where peaceful efforts have failed.

Collective responsibility for meeting such threats to peace and security has already emerged as a test for the international community in the twenty-first century. In deciding whether to participate in such coalitions, the Government will look to Australia's national security and the extent of our global interests at stake.

For Australia, prevention of WMD proliferation is a high priority for our intelligence agencies and a specific focus of their cooperation with our intelligence partners. A focus of our intelligence efforts in the region is to monitor trade in dual-use technologies. The Australian Government is encouraging regional governments to strengthen their domestic and export control regimes and maintaining arrangements for monitoring trans-shipment points given the important role many countries in the region play in international trade.

In the worst case we need to be ready to respond to a WMD attack on Australian soil or against Australian interests. The

domestic layer of defence is a shared responsibility between the States and the Commonwealth and includes police, customs and other agencies, but the ADF has particular knowledge and skills to contribute. The Incident Response Regiment has an important role in supplementing State and Territory capabilities to respond to a nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological incident.

The events of September 2001, North Korea's current brinkmanship, and concerns over Iraq's capabilities have reinforced the resolve of the US to push ahead with establishing an effective missile defence system. Given the prospect of the ADF operating more often with our allies and friends in regions under threat of WMD delivered by ballistic missiles, Australia supports the development of effective missile defences to protect deployed military units.

In relation to strategic missile defence, the US is looking to involve its allies and this will be an increasingly important priority in the twenty-first century. We are continuing our close dialogue with the US on missile defence, particularly given our close cooperation on Ballistic Missile Early Warning.

A Troubled Region

The 2000 Defence White Paper acknowledged that countries in Australia's immediate region faced major economic, political, governance and social challenges. This applied particularly to Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea and other island states of the South Pacific. In addition, some of these countries have made little progress against the daunting economic, political and social challenges they faced in the year 2000.

As a consequence of globalisation, Australia's region is more exposed to world events, including security threats, than it was. The terrorist attacks in the US and Bali, and the arrests in Singapore, Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, demonstrate the reach of terrorism and show that our region is no longer immune.

Operation Citadel patrol in East Timor

Southeast Asia

By 2002, most Southeast Asian GDP levels had returned to those seen before the Asian financial crisis, but per capita incomes had not. Southeast Asian states that were struggling economically even before the extent of the terrorism problem became clear are being further weakened. Slow growth rates, insufficient employment opportunities and economic hardship reinforce popular disaffection with the West as well as their own governments. Existing political and leadership weaknesses, combined with declining governance standards, increase the vulnerability of some regional governments even before the additional challenges of dealing with terrorism and its economic effects. In some Southeast Asian countries, these economic factors combine with the misperception that the War on Terror targets Muslims to produce defensive, nationalistic reactions.

There is little evidence of aggressive development of military capability in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian nations are more focused on domestic issues and economic growth than on regional disputes.

But diverse internal and transnational problems are still likely to produce non-terrorist related security challenges. People smuggling, illegal fishing and money laundering feed off and exacerbate existing difficulties. Corruption, population and

environmental pressures add to the troubles. Together, these challenges leave our nearer neighbours vulnerable to transnational threats.

These are important concerns for Australia. The requirement to conduct operations in support of civilian agencies to protect Australia's borders and economic interests, including against people-smuggling and illegal fishing, continues unabated.

The Australian Government will continue to place a high priority on law enforcement and intelligence cooperation within the region, and to assist regional governments to enhance their financial and border controls.

But the need to combat terrorism puts additional political pressure on already stretched Southeast Asian governments. Terrorism apart, **I n d o n e s i a** continues to face issues of poverty, unemployment, democratisation, economic recovery, corruption, governance and legal reform. At the same time Indonesia confronts religious, ethnic and separatist challenges to its cohesion and stability. The Bali terrorist attacks and other attacks across the archipelago over the past two years threaten Indonesia's social

Operation Relex in Australian waters

cohesion, its political stability and its international reputation.

Indonesia remains of enduring strategic significance to Australia. The Australian Government attaches great importance to supporting the Indonesian Government and its people as it manages its many challenges. Indonesia's territorial integrity remains in Australia's national interests. Geography dictates that the success of reform in Indonesia - and its efforts to eradicate terrorism - are crucial to the future security of both nations. With its many small islands and extensive maritime boundaries, Indonesia's effectiveness in responding to transnational threats such as smuggling - whether of arms, drugs or people - and piracy will also require international cooperation.

For these reasons the Government is strongly committed to progressing a broad-based relationship with Indonesia. In the defence arena, we have made progress in identifying areas such as maritime surveillance and intelligence exchanges where we can cooperate in our mutual interest. The Government is also considering limited cooperation with the Indonesian

military forces on hostage recovery and hijack resolution - an area where, in an environment of heightened terrorist threat, Australian lives could rest on effective Indonesian capabilities and cooperation between the two defence forces. Effective cooperation is also occurring between police, immigration and intelligence organisations.

The people of **East Timor**, the world's newest nation, will need our support and assistance. East Timor faces daunting challenges, not least in establishing effective national institutions and a productive economy. These challenges will strain its capacity to address security challenges - which are largely internal. Australia is making a significant contribution to stability and development in East Timor through our

Operation Citadel East Timor

development assistance and defence cooperation programmes. We also provide approximately 25 per cent of the UN peacekeeping force, though our contribution will draw down over the next two years. Australia will continue to assist East Timor when the peacekeeping operation comes to an end.

The South Pacific

The 2000 Defence White Paper pointed to deep-seated social and political problems in the South Pacific.

These are exacerbated by the pressing national development problems facing small and isolated nations, and the limited capacities of their police forces and wider governance. Significant progress is still needed to dispel these concerns.

Given the South Pacific's economic and social decline, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Island Countries will continue to face serious transnational threats, such as crime and unauthorised people movements. Political, economic, and social crises that directly affect Australia, or in which Pacific countries seek Australian assistance, are likely to arise at short notice, and might require involvement, including swift deployment of the ADF. Military or civil assistance could be required to restore law and order, to evacuate Australians, or to help in humanitarian disasters. The strength of our national interests, and our prominent leadership role in the region, means that Australia could be called upon to provide assistance to the region in times of crisis, and will need to maintain the capability to respond effectively.

Papua New Guinea

The past two years have seen positive developments towards the resolution of

the Bougainville crisis with further steps towards peace under the Bougainville Peace Agreement. The unarmed ADF-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) has facilitated the peace process, and after ten years of costly rebellion there are better prospects for a peaceful future. We envisage that the PMG will be able to withdraw from around the middle of 2003, but in the meantime it will work hard to consolidate the peace.

Overall, however, Papua New Guinea's outlook is worrying. Domestically, the new Papua New Guinea Government needs to continue to work to reverse the negative trends - in particular a stagnant economy, inadequate levels of education and health care, and deteriorating law and order. Ill-discipline in the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) in 2001 and 2002 has further undermined confidence in this institution. The PNG government has recognised the need to downsize, reform and modernise the PNGDF. Although progress remains disappointing, we welcome Prime Minister Somare's renewed commitment to substantial PNGDF downsizing and reform made during his 2002 visit to Australia and will continue to support the PNG Government's defence reform process.

Operation Bel Isi II Bougainville

Other Pacific Island Countries

Solomon Islands continues to face major obstacles to achieving much-needed stability. The June 2000 coup led to the formation of an Australian-led International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) to support efforts to preserve peace between warring ethnic groups. The IPMT - which included Defence (civilian and ADF) participation - helped oversee an end to the inter-ethnic conflict and withdrew in June 2002. But ethnic conflict has been replaced by a breakdown in law and order. Violence is a serious problem, particularly on Guadalcanal and Malaita, the economy has been wrecked and internal authority and government legitimacy are often undermined. National institutions seem powerless to halt the slide, and there has been little attempt to galvanise civil society to restrain violence and corruption.

The Australian Government should not be expected to solve the problems of Solomon Islands, and anyway cannot do so. It is only the people and their leaders who can end the violence and give Solomon Islands the stability necessary to address its economic and political problems. Australia is, however, providing

substantial support to the Royal Solomon Islands Police through our aid and Defence Cooperation Programmes.

The **Fiji** Government has political, economic and social challenges to face. Despite recent internal problems, the Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF) remains an important national institution and continues to make an important contribution to peacekeeping around the world.

There is also cause for concern about developments in **Vanuatu** since the 2000 White Paper. Again the problems - such as conflict within the Vanuatu police force - are in part institutional and reflect a general decline in governance across this region.

Training exercise in New Caledonia

Implications for Defence

Compared to 2000, the significance of the global strategic and security environment for Australia's defence and security has become much more evident. The global reach of terrorism was demonstrated by the horrific attacks in September 2001 and October 2002. The strategic environment of 2003 is being shaped by the threat of terrorism and the determination to counter it. This determination extends as well to another major global threat - the proliferation of WMD. In these international endeavours, the US with its combination of economic and military might, is increasingly dominant. These are some of the ways in which Australia's strategic environment is different from what it was when the 2000 Defence White Paper was released

For the present, the prospect of a conventional military attack on Australian territory has diminished, because of the stabilising effect of US determination and willingness to act, the reduction in major power tensions and the increased deterrent effect of the US-Australia alliance flowing from US primacy. The implication is that for the near term there is less likely to be a need for ADF operations in defence of Australia.

Southeast Asia and the South Pacific face major challenges due to political weakness, decline in governance, difficulty in grappling with terrorism and the economic effects of terrorism. If these trends continue, there may be increased calls on the ADF for operations in Australia's immediate neighbourhood.

The changed global strategic environment, and the likelihood that Australian national interests could be affected by events outside of Australia's immediate neighbourhood mean that ADF involvement in coalition operations further afield is somewhat more likely than in the recent past. But involvement in coalition operations is likely to be of the type witnessed in

Operation Slipper

Afghanistan, and which the Government has considered in Iraq if necessary - that is, limited to the provision of important niche capabilities.

In 2000, the Defence White Paper set out a Defence posture for the times, and provided a framework for Defence to structure appropriately to meet the challenges facing Australia. But our strategic circumstances have changed and this has implications for the types of conflict in which Australia might become involved, the types of operations the ADF might have to conduct, and the capabilities it might require.

Incident Response Regiment

These new circumstances indicate a need for some rebalancing of capabilities and priorities to take account of the new strategic environment, changes which will ensure a more flexible and mobile force, with sufficient levels of readiness and sustainability to achieve outcomes in the national interest.

The Government has already decided to implement a number of measures as a result of the Australia's new strategic environment. These measures include increasing the size of our Special Forces, the establishment of a Special Operations Command, and enhancements to our Counter Terrorist capabilities, such as raising a new Tactical Assault Group, advancing some intelligence projects and purchasing additional, more capable troop lift helicopters, with an accelerated in-service date. In response to the threat of WMD, the Government has also directed an expansion of Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological and Explosive defence capabilities through establishment of the Incident Response Regiment.

For potential coalition contributions, we have improved communications systems with our allies, enhanced Electronic Warfare Self Protection measures, improved landmine protection, clearance and detection, and improved ballistic protection for some assets. In the longer term, Government decisions on the Joint Strike Fighter, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWACs) aircraft and the Collins class submarines will increase our ability to operate with the US and other potential partners.

Consideration of other Defence Capability Plan modifications will be ongoing.

Australia's strategic environment has changed. The threats of terrorism and WMD are real and immediate. For the foreseeable future, any ADF operations are likely to occur within the context of regional contingencies, the War on Terror, efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD or to otherwise enhance global security and stability.


Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft

Joint Strike Fighter

ADF Operations 2002-03

Operation Slipper

1 Husky
Sierra Leone
Contribution to the
International Military Advisory and Training Team

2 Osier
Bosnia
Contribution to UN mandated
Yugoslavia Security Force

3 Mazurka
Sinai
Contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers

4 Pomelo
Eritrea and Ethiopia
Contribution to the United Nations mission in
Eritrea and Ethiopia

5 Paladin
Middle East
Contribution to the
UN Truce Supervision Organisation

6 Slipper
Middle East
Contribution to the
International Coalition Against Terrorism

7 Southern Ocean
Assisting civil authorities to protect Australia's
territory from illegal fishing

Operation Bastille

11

Operation Citadel

8 Relex
North West Approaches
To deter suspect illegal entry vessels
from Australian waters

9 Citadel
East Timor
Contribution to the UN mission
in support of East Timor

10 Cranberry
Northern Australia sea and air approaches
Military surveillance to support civil agencies

11 Bel Isi II
Bougainville
Contribution to the
Peace Monitoring Group

12 Bali Assist
ADF support to Australia's response
to the Bali bombing

13 Bastille
Middle East
Forward deployment of personnel in
support of UN efforts to disarm Iraq