

**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE  
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

**“Operations Other Than War: Send in the Reserves”**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.**

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## Abstract

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At the end of the Cold War, the United States conducted a drawdown of our military forces. Unfortunately, the pace of operations increased a great deal during the decade of the 1990's and then accelerated even further with the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. The strain that is currently being placed on the Army is bringing that organization dangerously close to its breaking point whereby it will no longer be capable of fulfilling all that the country asks of it. In short, we must either curb our country's appetite for conducting expeditions or increase the available troops for deployment. A third option that must be examined is the revamping of the Reserve and National Guard forces in order to use these assets more effectively and efficiently.

A change in the paradigm under which our Reserve Components were designed occurred with the fall of the Soviet Empire. However, the military was slow to realize this shift and adjust its force structure, training, and doctrine accordingly. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 served to invalidate the concept of deploying combat units from the Reserve and National Guard to conduct high-intensity combat operations. However, during the 1990's, the reserves proved more than capable of performing peacekeeping operations as well as humanitarian assistance missions.

With the Global War on Terrorism being the long war, it is time our nation begins to take a closer look at the current force structure of our National Guard and Reserves. These service members must be used in the most efficient means possible. The structure of the reserves has to be adjusted for the War on Terrorism. While high-intensity combat operations will still be conducted by our armed forces, the most significant demand on our manpower for the Global War on Terrorism will be operations other than war. High-intensity conflict is defined as operations other than humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement or stability and support/rebuilding.

Some military thinkers have suggested that the active component designate an Army unit to specialize in operations other than war. However, most agree that such a course of action would denigrate the ability of our armed forces to fight and win our nation's wars. **The recommendation of this paper is to pool the bulk of the assets within the Reserve and National Guard forces and transform them into a joint force designed, trained, and equipped to perform operations other than war.** Such an organization would be our nation's premier force in all stability and rebuilding operations. Additionally, the unit would be capable of performing natural disaster assistance for state governors, as well as homeland security and homeland defense missions for the United States Northern Command. This force structure would prove to be the most efficient use of our nation's reserves.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

With the end of the Cold War, our military found itself becoming ever smaller as the nation sought to enjoy the “peace dividend”. Unfortunately, demands on the force began to spiral ever higher. It seemed with the loss of the Soviet Union, the world became less stable. As a result, our armed forces were called upon to perform numerous peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines found themselves deployed all around the world at a much higher tempo than any similar period in history. The strain on the active component force was enormous. As a result, military commanders began to turn more and more to Reserve and National Guard units to help ease the burden. No longer were these units held back as a strategic reserve for the nation in the event of all out war. They were now shoulder to shoulder with their active counterparts conducting operations other than war around the world. However, due to the post-mobilization training these forces needed, they would have to be mobilized for twelve months in order to perform a six-month rotation. This meant that the Department of Defense was spending a year of reserve time and pay for six months of duty. Such an ineffectual system is unfortunately still in effect today.

With the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Global War on Terrorism began and the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the armed services grew exponentially. Immediately, Reserve and National Guard forces were mobilized and began performing security missions around the country. Within weeks, our military deployed into Afghanistan and the operational tempo has yet to slow down. The current demands placed upon our armed forces are immense both at home and abroad. With no foreseeable slowdown to come, it is imperative the nation utilizes all its forces in the most efficient manner

possible. Since all of the Department of Defense is transforming, the time is ripe to restructure the Reserve and National Guard forces of our country. **This paper will show that transforming the Reserve and National Guard forces of the United States into a joint force focused on conducting operations other than war will provide the Department of Defense with the capabilities to meet future expeditionary requirements while also meeting the nation's need for homeland defense/homeland security.**

As the world's only superpower, our country must continue to assist in stabilizing regions around the globe. Additionally, we must continue to fight the Global War on Terrorism which includes threats both foreign and domestic. Even with the currently projected transformed military, we will not be able to meet all the demands required of our armed forces. The deployment tempo is too high and our military is already beginning to show the strain. Transforming our Reserve and National Guard forces will provide us a deeper pool of the type units most needed, now and in the future. Drawing elements for this future force from all the different Reserve Components will provide both the numbers required, as well as the skill types needed.

Reserve component forces have limited training time available to remain proficient at their war-fighting skills. However, they also possess unique skills due to their civilian sector professions. Such factors make these personnel a good fit for forming a joint force whose primary mission would be operations other than war to include stability and rebuilding. The benefits to the nation from such a force would be immense. An organization created within the Department of Defense specifically for such missions could incorporate capabilities normally found in other agencies and departments yet have

them consolidated under a single military commander. This would allow our nation to perform stability missions more effectively with a decreased expenditure of time, manpower, and other resources. Additionally, not only would the unit be capable of performing the required missions overseas, but it could also serve as the Department of Defense's manpower source for responding to natural disasters or terrorists' attacks. This would make the organization very responsive to states' governors as well as Federal agencies.

By beginning to delineate operational responsibilities we can design forces better prepared to conduct the various types of missions required of the military. The active component will execute high-intensity conflict and always be the 'first-in,' while the Reserve and National Guard forces will conduct the stability and rebuilding operations to include humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. This would allow both components to better focus training, equipping and manning their forces. Two significant areas our country must improve upon are Homeland Defense and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. The formation of a Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding comprised of Reserve Component personnel will satisfy the requirements in both these areas.

For the purpose of this paper, when discussing reserve strength numbers, the Selected Reserve status is the standard. Therefore, this will exclude personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve, the Inactive National Guard, and those in the Standby Reserve, or Retired Reserve.

## **DEPLOYMENT TEMPO – “Legions Stretched Thin”**

### **Pre 9/11**

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States forecasted a significant decline in the requirements for its military. There was no peer competitor with our country on the global stage. As a result, government officials were quick to begin the reallocation of assets previously designated for defense spending. This included a significant drawdown of troops. “Throughout the Cold War, endstrength of the U.S. active duty force never dropped below 2.0 million personnel and peaked at other 3.5 million during the Korean and Vietnam wars. From 1989 to 1999, endstrength dropped steadily from 2.1 million to 1.4 million where it has remained.”<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, this hope of peace was not to be realized.

The Cold War bipolar world, with the squaring off of two global powers, had been able to keep tamped down regional, cultural, economic, religious and social crisis that would soon begin to bubble to the surface. The United States became obligated by both internal and external pressures to take a more assertive role in events going on around the globe. The country would take a lead role in many operations under the auspices NATO or UN actions. This resulted in a drastic increase in military deployments during the closing decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. From 1900 to 1990, the United States deployed troops on 90 major operations. By comparison, in the ten years following the Cold War, the military deployed 41 times.<sup>2</sup> This massive increase in deployments happened while the armed forces were downsizing. In a world that required our military to be in more places performing more missions, we found ourselves with fewer service members.

The strain on our active duty force was immense and quickly began to take a toll. In 1994, the Defense Science Board conducted a study that found “pockets of unreadiness” within the military due to the turbulence within the Armed forces. Additionally, in 1997, the House Armed Services Committee determined that our nation had lost its decisive military edge due to the post-Cold War drawdown and a high operational tempo. As a result, a law was passed whereby soldiers would be compensated for any day they were deployed beyond 180 days. Congress sought to curb the deployment rate of our armed forces. However, once the World Trade Center was attacked, this law would be waived and has yet to be re-implemented.<sup>3</sup>

With the extreme demand being placed on the active component, the Department of Defense began to turn more and more to the reserve component. In the previous 45 years during the Cold War, there had been a total of four involuntary activations of reserve forces. Since 1990, there have been six.<sup>4</sup> That is a 50% increase in a third of the time. These part-time soldiers saw duty all around the world and in a variety of operations during the 1990s. From humanitarian assistance in Haiti to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, a breaking of the paradigm was occurring. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated in 2000, “The role of our Reserve forces is changing in the United States. We have seen their traditional role, which was to serve as manpower replacements in the event of some cataclysmic crisis, utterly transformed. They are no longer serving as the force of last resort, but as vital contributors on a day-to-day basis around the world.”<sup>5</sup> This is even truer in light of the current War on Terrorism.

However, even with the Department of Defense triggering the use of the reserve component forces in a new and innovative manner, the work load was just too great. The

toll was particularly heavy on the Army and the Marine Corps. The very nature of these military operations other than war demanded a large number of ground forces. Even after a stunning display of air power in Kosovo by the Air Force, there was still a significant requirement for an occupation force that continues nearly a decade later. Our nation has found that the small, regional ‘brush fires’ demand an extensive amount of manpower. In July of 2001, then Secretary and Chief of Staff for the Army, the Honorable Thomas E. White and General Eric K. Shinseki, along with several congressional leaders to include Senator Ike Skelton, called for an endstrength increase for the Army of 40,000 to 60,000 soldiers.<sup>6</sup> Little did these men realize that just a few months later, the nation would find itself fighting another kind of war, one that has begun to be called the “long war” with no clear end in sight.

### **Post 9/11**

With the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the nation has gone to war on terrorism. This is a war of global magnitude calling for our military to stretch itself to the farthest reaches of the planet chasing an enemy who has proven to be both elusive and resilient. However, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the most pressing requirement would be to secure the homeland. Harking back to Pearl Harbor, an enemy had brought the fight on to our country’s soil and we had to protect ourselves from any further attack. Literally within days, both active and reserve military personnel found themselves guarding key infrastructure around the country to include flying interdiction missions along our nation’s borders. Within six months, 89,000 reserve

component personnel had been mobilized for active duty.<sup>7</sup> All this added to the demanding pace the services were already experiencing.

From September 11, 2001 until January 2005, there were 364,360 reserve component personnel mobilized in support of Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.<sup>8</sup> This was 43% of the total manpower from the selective reserve and did not account for the 50,000 plus reserve component personnel who had been mobilized more than once.<sup>9</sup> While the Global War on Terrorism could last for decades, the war in Iraq continues to be the primary stressor on the force. General George Casey, the commander of forces in Iraq, stated that the Army expected post-combat operations to reduce the number of required brigades needed from sixteen down to eleven. However, by January 2005 the requirement had reached twenty.<sup>10</sup> Operation Iraqi Freedom is consuming our nation's military.

The active component services have been deploying at an extremely high rate with the Army having 330,000 service members overseas in 120 countries around the world. It is significant that all thirty-three active duty brigades have deployed at least once since 9/11 in the Global War on Terrorism.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, as the war continued, Hurricane Katrina struck the United States Gulf Coast in the largest natural disaster this nation has ever experienced. As of Sept 22, 2005, over 55,000 service members were deployed to the region.<sup>12</sup> The demands on the Total Force continue to rise.

### **Signs of Strain**

There are many policy makers and personnel in uniform who have great concern for the pressure being placed on our military given the current deployment tempo. Many

people feel that the size of the force is too small to meet the current operational requirements and those expected in the future. Telling indicators support the view that our military is approaching its breaking point.

In order to keep up with operations, the Army has initiated a stop loss/stop move policy several times over the past four years. While being called a “back door draft,” this decision helps to stabilize a unit for its train-up, deployment, and post-deployment training, which creates a more cohesive and effective force. However, this policy forces many soldiers who would normally have separated from the service to remain in uniform. Such an experience can create very bad feelings for a retiree or a service member who already had college entrance or a job lined up outside of the military. Once released from the military, these personnel certainly do not help with recruiting. Additionally, a stop loss also affects service members that are expecting to move to a new duty station or to attend some schooling. They are now being forced to delay their professional development. These interruptions can have detrimental effects on a career.

Another indicator is that deployment periods have been extended. During the 1990s, most unit rotations were for six months, but now units are going for twelve months and beyond. Also in the past, certain types of units would never have deployed. These units were considered to be conducting such an essential function in training the Army that their normal assigned duties superseded their use in deployments. The opposing forces at both the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center have deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism. These opposing forces provide the high level of training at the nation’s training centers to ensure the rest of the military is prepared for deployment. The military’s training base is being thinned out as reflected in the

decreasing strength numbers for the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. Another example where the Army is being forced to reach deep for personnel to deploy is that of The Old Guard. This is the Army's ceremonial guard unit that performs high visibility functions to include funerals at Arlington National Cemetery. The Old Guard is now starting to deploy company size units in order to help the rest of the Army meet the increasing requirements.<sup>13</sup>

The Department of Defense is attempting to spread the impact over the services. Military planners are now calling on U.S. Air force and Navy personnel to deploy to Iraq to perform traditional Army jobs. As part of the effort, more than 3,000 Air force personnel are being assigned new roles to include serving as guards, interrogators, and truck drivers. Additionally, these personnel are being dispatched to combat zones for longer tours of duty — as much as 12 months rather than four which is normal for the Air force.<sup>14</sup> This is a striking change for the Air Force personnel involved.

Where there are not enough transferable skills from other services, the Army has begun to rapidly retrain its own soldiers into new military occupational specialties to meet demands. The most striking example of this is the conversion of some 5,000 field artillerymen into military police personnel.<sup>15</sup> This is another symptom that the nation has been scrambling to meet the demands of current operations.

In line with this retraining effort, the military is also attempting to conduct significant military to civilian conversion. The idea is that by paying Department of Defense civilian personnel to do jobs formerly performed by armed forces personnel, these service members will be freed up to perform the military essential jobs that our nation is in dire need of.<sup>16</sup> Of course there is increased cost and the service member must still be trained

for his new position. The Army has also promoted its transformation to a modular force as a way of lessening the burden since it will be increasing the number of deployable brigades. However, these new brigades will have nearly one-third less soldiers than a current brigade. Therefore, combat power cannot be equated between the two. This is particularly true for performing operations other than war where fire power is less an essential factor than the presence of forces. It is the interaction with the local population by service members that will normally lead to success in non-combat operations. It takes soldiers to win the hearts and minds of an indigenous population.

Also significant, is the increasing trend to use contractors all over the battlefield. While there have been several incidents involving hired personnel, there seems to be no downturn in their use. During the first Gulf War, United States forces employed one civilian contractor in Iraq for every 60 active duty personnel. At the start of the current Iraq War that figure was about one in 10.<sup>17</sup> These contractors are coming from around the world and they are conducting everything from security operations to resupply convoys. As a result, large amounts of money intended to go for rebuilding projects for the Iraqi people now have to pay the cost of contracting security personnel. Security costs have accounted for as much as 25% of reconstruction in Iraq, eating a substantial portion of an \$18.4-billion rebuilding package funded by the United States.<sup>18</sup> The impact of this is significant. One of the greatest concerns military and civilian leaders have expressed is the need to improve the Iraqi infrastructure. Building and repairing schools, hospitals and other projects provide tangible signs of an improved way of life for the citizens of Iraq. With monies that were originally promised for reconstruction being drained away in order to provide security, less improvement is being seen. This creates a

credibility gap in the eyes of Iraqis and therefore, feeds the insurgency. Security operations need to be performed by trained service members.

This strain on the force seems to be hitting the reserve component forces extremely hard. With the Pentagon projecting they will need to keep more than 100,000 reservists mobilized continuously for the next 3-5 years, General Casey stated that the Army is considering extending these personnel beyond the 24-month limit previously established.<sup>19</sup> This is an amazing course of action to even consider, given the incredible load the reserve component has already carried. As discussed earlier, the reserve component was already being strained by increased operational deployments between 1990 and 2001 contributing 13 million duty days. Contrast this with the 63 million duty days during the period 2001 to February 2005.<sup>20</sup> While the strain on the reserve components was significant before September 11<sup>th</sup>, it has increased nearly five times since. There is little wonder given such a statistic that senior leaders across the reserve forces are increasingly concerned.

It has become very apparent to uniformed personnel and the civilian leadership within the United States that the nation is facing a crisis within the military. Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, the Chief of the Army Reserve, has repeatedly cautioned that the reserve component is, “rapidly degenerating into a broken force.” Retired General Barry McCaffrey adds his voice by commenting on the nation’s ability to call upon the combat capability of the National Guard as, “reaching the bottom of the barrel.”<sup>21</sup> Operations have used this force up. This is conveyed in the fact that as of March 28, 2005, only 16% of the Army’s Selected Reserves were available for mobilization, yet the war goes on.<sup>22</sup>

The military is attempting to lessen the requirements for the reserve component by rebalancing the force. This has entailed the shifting of 50,000 skills sets over the past two years between the reserves and active duty for certain critical military occupational specialties. By the year 2011, an additional 100,000 positions are to be rebalanced which will further decrease the need for the reserve component.<sup>23</sup> While this rebalancing should push the need for the reserves in the initial stages of a war until later, the numbers required for the total force in any operation will not be affected and it involves no change in endstrength.

There is little doubt that without the reserve components, our country could never have maintained the operational tempo that has been going on since the end of the Cold War. Yet, there has been a significant shift in the morale of the reserves. Historically, during operations in the Balkans, the morale within the deployed forces of the reserves was higher than their counterparts in the active force. However, surveying personnel in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the opposite was true. Charles Moskos who conducted the study attributed this to several reasons. First of all, reserve personnel frequently serve longer deployments due to their required post-mobilization training that normally takes the service member away from his family. Meanwhile the service member's family has less of a support group from the military. Also, of note, is the perception that reservists are not as adequately trained or equipped as their active duty counterparts.<sup>24</sup> This is exacerbated when the length of deployment is a year "in-country" and casualty rates begin to climb. This strain has increased exponentially since 9/11 and is bringing the reserve components to their breaking point, as reflected in the recruiting numbers below. The only Reserve Component to make their goals for the year were the Marine and Air

Force Reserves. It must be noted that these two forces also had the lowest recruiting goal to achieve out of any of the components.

**Fiscal 2005 Reserve Component Enlisted Recruiting  
from Oct. 1, 2004-Sept. 30, 2005<sup>25</sup>**

|                             | <b>Accessions</b> | <b>Goal</b> | <b>Percent</b> |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|----------------|
| <b>Army National Guard</b>  | 50,219            | 63,002      | 80             |
| <b>Army Reserve</b>         | 23,859            | 28,485      | 84             |
| <b>Navy Reserve</b>         | 9,788             | 11,141      | 88             |
| <b>Marine Corps Reserve</b> | 8,350             | 8,180       | 102            |
| <b>Air National Guard</b>   | 8,859             | 10,272      | 86             |
| <b>Air force Reserve</b>    | 9,942             | 8,801       | 113            |

The difficulty in attracting and retaining quality soldiers is also seen within the active duty Army which made only 92% of its intended mission for the fiscal year 2005. As a result the Army has announced that it will lower its standard by accepting more soldiers that scored near the bottom of the military aptitude test increasing from an allowable 2% of the recruits to 4%. Additionally, the Army will lower its goal from 67% to 60% for signing recruits who scored in the top half on the aptitude test.<sup>26</sup> The demand for servicemen is showing no sign of abating, yet the military is having a more difficult time finding the requisite supply. This comes at a time when there has been widespread speculation that the military needs to increase the number of personnel in Iraq if the nation is to be successful at transitioning that country in to a democratic, stable nation.

This idea is not lost on Congressional leaders. Repeatedly they have prodded the Department of Defense to ensure that they have enough personnel. There have been several bills proposed in congress that called for an increase in military endstrength. The

largest one was a law that would have put an additional 83,700 personnel in uniform. Eventually, with the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense Authorization Bill there came an increase. The Army would grow by 20,000 and the Marine Corps by 6,000. While this debate waged in congress over the past couple years, the Army finally conceded to a 30,000 temporary increase on an emergency basis. Temporary was defined as the current emergency situation in Iraq or four years. All along the Department of Defense has consistently stated that they do not want a permanent increase in endstrength. They believe that the current strain is a temporary spike.<sup>27</sup> While concerns over budget constraints causes leaders to be remiss over increases to endstrength, it seems short sighted to think the high demand for troops will decrease significantly in the near future. The Global War on Terrorism, coming to be known as the “long war”, could last for generations.

The strain placed upon our nation by the ongoing operational tempo is overwhelming the current military force structure. Already, the nation is beginning to see symptoms of a crisis of the services on the horizon. Unfortunately, the ramifications of decisions made today will not be seen for three or four years later when there is the shocking realization that our defense has been weakened. It is imperative that the nation takes steps to ease this strain. Transforming the Reserve and National Guard into a stability and rebuilding force would help alleviate some of the burden by better utilizing all available forces. Operations other than war are the types of missions that are currently ongoing as well as those we will be performing in the future.

## **FUTURE FORCE REQUIREMENTS – So many bad guys...**

### **The THREAT**

There seems to be no end in sight for the high demand that is being placed on our military forces. The efforts in Iraq to stabilize and secure that country will continue to require large numbers of troops there for years to come. A quick historic glance at nation building tells planners that this can be no quick change over. The situation in Iraq is aggravated by the insurgency that has arisen which did not occur in post-war Germany or Japan. While there was some immediate resistance in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo) to United States occupation efforts, both these missions were, relatively speaking, quickly transitioned to a United Nations operation, though we still have troops in all of these areas. Senior leaders in our country believe our military will be capable of drawing down forces once Iraqi security forces are established. However, even once these forces are capable of maintaining peace within their own borders, it will still take a great deal more time to train and equip the Iraqi army to a point where it is able to defend that nation from external threats. A democratic country within the Middle East will certainly be perceived as a threat to many of the nations in that region. Even more demanding than operations in Iraq is the Global War on Terrorism. While Iraq is winnable within a decade, the War on Terrorism is generational.

Since the attacks on the World Trade Centers, terrorists have continued the fight. There have been attacks in London, Spain, and Indonesia to point out some of the more successful, higher profile attacks. Additionally, there have been numerous attacks that were thwarted both at home and abroad. The terrorists are still very active. In this war, our country has toppled two governments and fought insurrections in the Philippines,

Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, many leaders and members of Al Quada have been hunted down and killed or brought to justice. This has all proved to be very man-power intensive with occupation troops still fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Until recently, the national strategy has been to find, fix, and finish individual terrorists. While this “whack-a-mole” strategy keeps the Department of Defense very busy, it will never obtain true victory. Lasting success will only come as our nation begins to target the underlying causes and support structures for terrorists. Figure 1, “Cycle of Terrorism”, depicts this on the next page. This figure shows the United States Special Operations Command’s representation of the birth, growth and development of a terrorist organization. Unfortunately, to achieve the required effects, our military forces will face even greater demands than it is already experiencing. The “Cycle of Terrorism” portrays the growth of terrorist personnel out of a populace on the left side, follows it around as the organization finds support, and then begins conducting terrorist operations. Since Special Operations Command is the supported Combatant Command for conducting the Global War on Terrorism by the military, it is a good assumption that this view of the enemy is driving current methods of executing the war and will continue to do so in the future.

A hasty analysis of the system will cause a planner to develop lines of operation that target the lower portion of the cycle in order to achieve lasting success. Interdicting the cycle at the “Populace” and “Tacit/Active Support” level prevents the growth of a terrorist group before it can become a regional or global threat. Therefore, our military must be prepared to combat the “Underlying Conditions” that give birth to terrorism and the conditions that cause them to grow. This course of action will lead to the capabilities

requirement for conducting operations other than war. Providing a secure and stable environment is the foundational step for correcting and preventing the “Underlying Conditions” that ferment terrorism. People must feel safe if they are to express dissenting opinions in order to counter a radical ideology. The rule of law must be present to correct feelings of “Perceived social injustices” and “Religious persecution”. Additionally, fostering democracy, human rights and economic trade will prevent “Economic disparity”, as well as a “Lack of political voice”. Nation building, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations are all inroads for our military to begin the growth of institutions within other countries that will destroy and prevent the “Underlying Conditions” that cause terrorism.



Figure 1.<sup>28</sup>

## **High-intensity Conflict**

Often the military is chastised for preparing and building a force designed to fight the last war that the nation faced. Yet, without a clear crystal ball, this is usually the best starting point for designing force structure. As we look back across the last thirty years, there have been very few instances of large-scale, sustained high-intensity conflict (combat operations). For the fifteen years following the war in Vietnam, our Armed forces were called upon to fight two low-resistance, short duration actions in support of our interests in the Western Hemisphere, Grenada and Panama. Following the first Gulf War, our military conducted many deployments that were classified as “military operations other than war” and involved little open combat. While our involvement in Somalia had flash points of high-intensity conflict, these were on such a small scale as to involve relatively few ground troops.

Often when the prospect of ground combat seemed imminent, our country’s use of precision munitions and air dominance proved too much for the enemy as seen during Operations Desert Storm (liberate Kuwait), Allied Force (Kosovo campaign), and Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). This is not to discount the ground combat that occurred, but merely to offer that it has been very limited in scope. Operation Iraqi Freedom is another example of where our military’s technological edge overmatched our enemy. Within just a few weeks our armed forces had taken Iraq’s capital and disbanded the opposing army. While casualties have begun to mount over the past two years since then, wide-scale, high-intensity fighting has not been seen. There have been pockets of fierce combat, but the vast majority of casualties have been due to roadside bombings by an elusive insurgency.

The current fight for our country is the Global War on Terrorism. By most accounts this will continue for many years to come. The preponderance of this combat action involves small units hunting down individual and small cell terrorists. Additionally, as stated earlier, our nation must also work to stabilize and support countries resisting terrorist activity within their borders and counter some of the underlying causes for the birth of a terrorist. These type missions will involve great amounts of manpower and other resources, but little in the way of high-intensity conflict. Like Iraq and Afghanistan, military personnel will be required to perform many functions to include stability and rebuilding operations. This is proving to be one of the most manpower intensive missions for our military. The Secretary of Defense sees this requirement looming in the future and knows the high demand that will be placed on United States' forces:

This Department encourages Congress to support a Global Peace Operations Initiative, to be managed by the State Department that will help other, less developed countries train to send peacekeeping forces to potential crisis spots. And we ask Congress to allow the United States to offer more incentives and capabilities to friends and allies battling insurgents and who need help training and equipping their own forces.<sup>29</sup>

The Secretary is concerned about our country's ability to meet future and current demands for operations other than war. His call for other countries to begin developing this type force is indicative of our own shortfalls. However, our country cannot rely upon other nations to perform stabilizing operations where our country has a vital interest. In the Strategic Planning Guidance covering the period of Fiscal year 2006 to 2011, one of the goals for our military is "Enhancing stability operations capabilities."<sup>30</sup> The Department of Defense recognizes that these are the missions of the future. In order to improve our capabilities our military will have to build our defense structure accordingly.

This requirement to perform operations other than war is also reflected in significant changes being made to our military doctrine. The new draft version of the Joint Publication 3-0 that covers military operations across the services discusses the six-phase construct.<sup>31</sup> Within these six phases, there are three types of operations that our armed forces will perform. The joint publication identifies these three operations are offensive, defensive and stability. In four of the six phases, the preponderance of missions will fall under the category of stability. Perhaps even more significant is the idea behind Phase 0, Shape.

This Phase 0 is essentially an eternal phase where our nation, and specifically our military, is continually influencing other countries by our actions. This could include such activities as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance or some other form of presence. It could involve simple, low-level mil to mil training exchanges up to full scale foreign internal defense missions. The capability to conduct military operations other than war will certainly need to comprise a significant portion of our future military if it is to be effective during the Shaping Phase.

The argument presented here in this paper is not to discount the need for our country to be able to fight high-intensity combat, but merely to keep this requirement within the scope and scale that will be required in the future. The Global War on Terrorism is our immediate fight and will be for sometime to come. This war will entail a great deal of operations other than war if we are to be successful. Additionally, our advanced technology, to include precision guided munitions, will limit the size of any open ground combat that may occur in the future. Historical precedence and current operations lend credence that our country must be prepared for operations other than war. In order to

meet this demand while still having the capability to win at war, a Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding organization should be created from the Reserve and National Guard of the United States.

### Mission Creep

#### **Homeland Security / Homeland Defense**

*“No longer can we afford to view our foreign military requirements as distinct and separate from our Homeland Security requirements.”*

-Stephen Duncan, Director for the Institute for Homeland Security Studies<sup>32</sup>

Defending the country has always been a requirement for the military. However, after 9/11, this mission grew in its priority and in its demand upon the force. In this new age, the government saw terrorism changing the nature of conflict and began working to ensure our nation would be protected and prepared. As a result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centers, the United States created a cabinet-level position called the Department of Homeland Security. Its purpose was laid out in the National Security Act of 2002:

*Sec. 101. Executive Department; Mission.*

(a) Establishment. - "There is established a Department of Homeland Security, as an executive department of the United States within the meaning of title 5, United States Code.

(b) Mission. -

(1) In General. - The primary mission of the Department is to-

(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;

(B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and

(C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States."

- From H.R. 5005-8 the Homeland Security Act of 2002

In order to accomplish this mission, the Department of Homeland Security had several agencies placed under its control. The Department of Defense was not one of these. Additionally, the military department was keen to disassociate itself from Homeland Security trying to keep its focus on overseas threats. As a result, the Department of Defense coined a new term in the military lexicon --“Homeland Defense”-- differentiating external threats to the nation from internal threats (Homeland Security). This was to clarify the military’s roles and responsibilities from the civilian departments and agencies, Homeland Security.<sup>33</sup> However, very quickly following the attacks of 9/11, the Department of Defense realized the need for improvement within this area and thus created United States Northern Command, known as NORTHCOM. The Department of Defense quickly found itself increasing resources to defend the country at home. In August 2005, Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense explained why there was a need for this organization given the creation of the Department of Homeland Security stating:

DOD's capabilities had to be rolled into that, and so we recognize really for the first time since the days of George Washington that a single military officer leading a single combatant command had to be ultimately responsible to the Secretary of Defense, the President of the United States, and to ultimately the Constitution, for the military defense of the United States. And therefore, Secretary Rumsfeld modified the Unified Command Plan to create a new combatant command, NORTHCOM, United States Northern Command.<sup>34</sup>

The problem exists, however, in that NORTHCOM has no troops assigned to it. This Combatant Commander must request forces from outside the command in order to perform any type mission towards the goal of Homeland Defense. It is becoming very apparent to many that the bulk of these personnel will come from

the Reserve Component. Particularly well situated for this mission is the National Guard force. Under Operation Noble Eagle, these forces have flown interdiction missions over the country, as well as guarded key infrastructure facilities. It is their unique ability to do law-enforcement-type work within the borders of our own country that makes them so invaluable.

Due to the Posse Comitatus Act, Federal forces are limited in their ability to perform law enforcement missions within the United States. While there are certain ways to work around this issue, the law does not apply to National Guard forces working for state governors. This makes them an ideal force to perform military-type missions within the United States since guardsmen have the legal standing to make arrests and enforce the law when authorized. The Secretary of Defense tasked the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to adapt the guard to better support not only the war on terrorism, but also execute Homeland Defense and Homeland Security.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, the Congress has assisted in this transformation by amending Title 32 in October 2004 to authorize the use of Guard forces for Homeland Defense (a Federal mission) while under state control.<sup>36</sup> An example of this was when a single National Guard officer had command of all military security personnel to include state active duty, as well as Title 10, mobilized reserve component, and Title 32, active duty soldiers during not only the G-8 summit, but also the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. Memorandums of Agreement between the President and various state governors established this chain-of-command. Under such a structure, the commander could report either to a governor or to a combatant commander.<sup>37</sup>

Having the flexibility for the establishment of various methods of command depending upon a given situation is invaluable for Homeland Defense. This will provide NORTHCOM with troops that can act in a federal capacity or in a state capacity. If the service members remain in a Title 32 status, they will work for a state governor and thus be authorized to perform law-enforcement type missions since Posse Comitatus would not apply.

The value of these reserve component forces goes beyond their legal authorities. Representative Christopher Shay, Chairman for the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, stated in a May 11, 2004 hearing that summarizes the current view of the reserve component, that:

The policing skills many civilians bring to their military duties are in high demand on city streets from here to Baghdad. These units are no longer an extra element of the force package, but highly valuable and perishable assets that should be as well supported and judiciously deployed as their active duty counterparts.<sup>38</sup>

While military police officers do reside in the reserve component, the “policing skills” of full time professional law enforcement officers cannot be replicated by the military. The nation has realized that many reservists can fill this gap. So now the Reserve Component is being viewed as essential for both internal and external missions for the country.

While the strain on the reserve force is immense with the deployments experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are now also taking the lead for the Department of Defense for Homeland Defense / Security missions. These service members’ chain-of-command can be reporting either to NORTHCOM when federalized, or to a state governor.

One of the very first examples of the reserve component picking up the Homeland Defense / Security mission was within the area of reacting to weapons of mass

destruction. Currently, there are fifty-five Civil Support Teams on call around the country. These units are designed to respond to any type of weapons of mass destruction and all these personnel are taken from the Army and Air National Guards,<sup>39</sup> these are already joint units. Additionally, these service members are not constrained by Posse Comitatus and can therefore, perform law enforcement tasks if required while under the command of a state governor. Most importantly, they possess the requisite skills necessary for this specialized mission of dealing with weapons of mass destruction. These Civil Support teams are owned by the state governors, but are available to be federalized as needed. Therefore, these teams can report either to a military commander or to a state governor. As a result, with the realization that the reserve component has extensive capabilities for performing Homeland Defense activities, the nation is now putting money at the looming solution. It is time the Reserve Component be restructured to fully take on this role as well as other operations other than war.

The requirement to support the effort for homeland defense and homeland security has begun to tax the active component, as well. One thousand billets must be filled in Headquarters, United States Northern Command alone.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, there has been a significant increase in security around military installations as a result of the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centers on September 11, 2001. There is also the requirement to have active component units on short recall status to respond to incidences of national significance which now include acts of terrorism that occur within the borders of our nation.

## **Natural Disaster Response**

The United States military has assisted in natural disaster response throughout our history. This includes mud slides in the Philippines, earthquakes in Pakistan and tsunamis in Asia to name some of the more recent efforts. Additionally, the armed forces have assisted with countless natural disasters within the United States, as well. In 2003, the Department of Defense received 72 requests for assistance from more than 20 civil agencies, fielding 99 requests in 2004.<sup>41</sup> Some of these were active component forces that would be called in when the scope of the crisis grew too large for local organizations to handle. However, the majority of the time this military response involved National Guard personnel that were under the control of the state governor. Many governors rely upon this force during disaster season and recently grew concerned when they found a good portion of their state's National Guardsmen were deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism. As a result, in July 2005, LTG H. Steven Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, promised the country's governors that at least half of each state's guard force would stay home.<sup>42</sup> This would become critical less than two months after that announcement as one of the most devastating natural disasters to ever strike the continental United States would leave the Gulf Coast shattered.

On August 29, 2005 one of the largest hurricanes in history struck the Gulf Coast of the United States. Some fifty days later, the death toll would stand at 1, 281 spread across five states with more bodies still being found.<sup>43</sup> Hurricane Katrina made landfall after its strength decreased slightly from a Category 5 storm bringing the hurricane down to a Category 4 with 140 mile-an-hour winds.<sup>44</sup> The destruction, however, was overwhelming and the images that were repeated on television screens all across the

country would turn this storm in to a major political issue all the way up to the White House. The people of the United States and the world watched as the water rose all through New Orleans, Louisiana, leaving thousands stranded and struggling just to survive. The public outcry went up over why the Federal government did not act (or act sooner) to help those people in trouble. President Bush, addressing the nation two weeks after the storm, stated that, “the system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days.” The director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency would be fired and the cries for an investigation would be widespread.

However, the investigation would show that the armed forces performed extremely well, but the magnitude of the storm still produced widespread death and destruction. The week before the storm made land, the Department of Defense conducted an inventory of available capabilities, deployed senior representatives to the region in anticipation of support requests, and gave active duty forces advance notice of their impending use in response to the hurricane.<sup>45</sup> Everyone knew this was going to be a big one.

The Department of Defense response to Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest military deployment within the United States since the Civil War. It was immense, by any measure. There were 72,000 uniformed military personnel assisting Federal, state, and local authorities within ten days of the storm. Included were 21 ships, 76 fixed-wing aircraft, 346 helicopters, amphibious landing craft, space-based imagery, night vision capabilities, port and waterway surveillance, 13 mortuary teams, and large-scale construction support provided by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Seabees.<sup>46</sup>

Again, however, there was concern that the Federal government had not done enough. This was sharpened by calls of racism affecting the government response since it was predominantly poor black Americans that were seen on the news in video from New Orleans.<sup>47</sup> While there was a ground swell of support from across the country to help the victims of the hurricane, the military began conducting damage control attempting to bolster the public's waning opinion on our nation's ability to respond to catastrophic events within our borders. In truth, the Department of Defense had already begun to rebalance many skills between the active and reserve components in order to better meet the current needs of the nation. This realignment mirrors needed changes to facilitate a Natural Disaster Response. This was pointed out by Secretary Rumsfeld on September 20, 2005 in the Regular Briefing at the Pentagon. He stated that, "they're in the process of reducing the number of tank units and artillery units within the Guard, which are obviously of less use in the event of a domestic issue," when compared to units such as civil affairs, engineers, or seabees.<sup>48</sup> This transformation was being done due to the type of troops required for conducting operations other than war. However, it served as an opportunity to highlight that the Department of Defense was prepared to assist with disaster support, as well.

The effects of the military efforts in responding to Hurricane Katrina were awesome. No other organization in the United States could have performed such a feat. Approximately 15,000 residents were rescued and an additional 80,000 evacuated. Critical supplies were delivered to include 30 million meals ready-to-eat and some 10,000 truckloads of ice and water. There were 10,000 medical evacuations by ground and air, along with 5,000 patients treated by the military. The Department of Defense

made a wide range of contributions to include flying 17 mosquito abatement missions covering more than a million acres, as well as providing 3,000 beds in field hospitals, installations, and aboard ships.<sup>49</sup> With such a magnificent performance in a Herculean task, it is little wonder that within the swirl of political waters there came a call for the military to be the organization of choice for responding to disasters. In a discussion with the senior leaders who were handling the response to Hurricane Katrina, President Bush stated on September 25, 2005 in San Antonio:

The other question, of course, I asked, was, is there a circumstance in which the Department of Defense becomes the lead agency. Clearly, in the case of a terrorist attack, that would be the case, but is there a natural disaster which -- of a certain size that would then enable the Defense Department to become the lead agency in coordinating and leading the response effort. That's going to be a very important consideration for Congress to think about.<sup>50</sup>

For a military that is straining at the demands being placed upon it by the Global War on Terrorism, the idea of the department being given the additional responsibility for natural disasters could cripple the armed forces. As stated earlier, the use of military forces during significant storms is common in our nation's history. However, now people are looking to the Defense Department to take the lead. NORTHCOM's purpose is the military defense of the nation, not taking charge in the event of a hurricane. This would involve a significant shift in resources to have a deployable entity on-call to respond. Additionally, for the Department of Defense to be the lead agency there would have to be not only a change in policy, but the law, as well. Senator Warner who is the chairman for the Senate Armed Services Committee has called for a review of the legal framework for natural disaster response. This includes the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,

the insurrection statutes, and laws relating to military support of law enforcement agencies, as well as Federalizing the National Guard.<sup>51</sup>

The notion of relieving the legal constraints on the active component is extremely appealing to the planners at NORTHCOM. While this organization currently has very few forces under its control, the unit “is developing a proposal to organize a specially trained and equipped active duty force that could respond quickly to assist relief efforts in the event of overwhelming natural disasters, like major hurricanes, floods, or earthquakes.”<sup>52</sup> The idea grew out of the rapid response capability exercised when elements of an active duty unit quickly deployed to New Orleans from Fort Bragg, NC to assist in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This proposed force would keep hundreds of soldiers on short notice and be comprised of military communications technicians, logistics specialists, doctors and nurses, engineers and infantrymen.<sup>53</sup> This would be an additional drain to the already exhausted active component.

The idea for this natural disaster response force is that Federal, state, and local officials would create an agreement in advance for when Federal troops could be brought in. This agreement could include triggers such as storm strength from a hurricane, damage estimates for an earthquake, or casualty figures from any sort of cataclysmic event. In theory, such a standing contract would alleviate any sort of political bickering in the wake of a storm. Admiral Keating, commander of NORTHCOM, stated, “The success or failure of our effort won’t depend on the political dealings between the governors and the president. We’ll just get a mission and we’ll execute it.”<sup>54</sup> While this briefs well, there will be significant impacts upon an active duty unit in terms of being

available for other operational deployments, training, and simply giving service members time off.

With many people already beginning to point to the military as a force that is approaching its breaking point, it seems unlikely that the Department of Defense would want to take on an additional mission of providing a ready reserve for responding to natural disasters. However, if Congress determines that this department should have the lead on disaster response in some circumstances, it is likely such a requirement will come along with it. This natural disaster response could be showing up on the mission task list of units throughout the services before too long. It is advisable that the Department of Defense gets ahead of such an action and creates a robust and viable force from the Reserve Component to fulfill such a requirement. A Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding would be ideally suited.

### **Controlling a Pandemic**

In early October 2005, another possible operation that would add to the responsibilities of the military came to the surface. World-wide concern began over the possibility of a bird flu pandemic. While at that time, the strain of the flu was running rampant amongst fowl, it had still only shown up sparingly in humans. However, of the humans that came down with this disease, half of them did not survive it. With the disease spreading rapidly from Southeast Asia and into Central Europe to include Romania and Turkey, the United States and Western Europeans began scrambling to prepare. Amidst all this, President Bush stated that he would seek to use military forces in order to quarantine large cities if in fact contamination occurred on U.S. soil.<sup>55</sup> If the

strain remains only among birds then there will be little cause for concern. However, if it mutates into a version that can be easily transferred from one person to another, the loss of human life will be immense.

With predictions of death tolls as high as 250,000 in the United Kingdom,<sup>56</sup> it is little wonder that the President might consider using the Department of Defense in such a crisis. Citing concern that local and state law enforcement agencies would become overwhelmed, he asked Congress to give him the authority to employ Federal troops in the event of such a disaster. "The president ought to have all ... assets on the table to be able to deal with something this significant," [President] Bush said.<sup>57</sup> However, this can be seen as an increasing propensity to throw the Department of Defense at a problem. While this is not a new course of action for our nation, it is extremely foreboding given the current operational tempo being experienced by both the active and reserve component forces of the United States.

There are many areas that are going to place demands on our Armed forces. Clearly, Homeland Defense / Security is a huge factor in determining future force structure. Additionally, however, is the increasing call for the military to be responsive to any incident of national significance. This would include a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or pandemic. In order to best meet these demands while still maintaining a military capable of conducting war, the nation must transform its Reserve Component. A Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding would provide a flexible option for any crisis within the country and an ideal force for conducting operations other than war around the globe.

## Transforming the Reserve Component

### **The Call for Change**

*In short, today's systems are sufficient to employ a Guard and Reserve that is a blunt instrument appropriate for the Cold War but cannot meet the nuanced requirements of the War on Terrorism.*

- LTG Dennis McCarthy, Commander Marine forces Reserve<sup>58</sup>

The purpose of the reserve component of the United States military has changed. Historically and by legislation, this force was a strategic reserve only to be called upon in the event of an extreme national emergency. Today, this force is being used as an operational reserve serving to relieve the strain on the active component. The stated purpose of the reserve components was officially changed in 2004 when Congress voted to modify Title 10 of the United States' Code.<sup>59</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, reserve personnel have been called on with greater frequency than ever before and tasked to perform operations other than war. The reserve components are being mobilized in order to use unique skills and abilities required in these type missions. This Congressional change in 2004 was a reflection of the new manner in which the country has been employing these forces since 1991.

Simply changing their stated purpose in legal documents is not enough, however. There must be sweeping changes across the reserves if they are to be a viable force in the current and future security environment in which our country finds itself. This call for a transformation of the reserves has been heard from an array of military and academic individuals and organizations. Perhaps most significant, the Secretary of Defense has

demanded that these assets must be restructured. He has grave concern that reserve personnel are required in the beginning stages of any ground combat.

I have trouble seeing why we have to have a reserve call-up anytime we want to engage in conflict. It simply tips off the fact that that is what we are going to do months before we are able to do it. From the standpoint of strategic surprise, I think that is foolish.<sup>60</sup>

The Secretary's concern of having the ability to rapidly reach out with a force without tipping our hand and without conducting a mobilization is valid. This idea lends credibility to employing our reserve component personnel primarily for operations other than war. For these stability-type operations, the reserves would not be needed during the initial stages of combat operations.

Additionally, Secretary Rumsfeld has begun to voice great concern over the amount of strain that is being placed upon the Reserve and National Guard personnel. Many of the civilian and military leaders have misgivings on the ability of the reserve components to continue at the current operational tempo being asked of them, as well. It is clear that changes in the force have become imperative. To this end, as early as July of 2003, the Secretary of Defense stated he wanted to achieve some "principal objectives" in regards to the reserves. These are designed to "reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions," with the first one being to rebalance the force between the active and reserve components so that there are less mobilizations. The intent is to eliminate the need for reserve component personnel during the first fifteen days of a rapid response operation. Another goal for this restructuring is to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every six years.<sup>61</sup> While implementation of these specific policies is not complete, the Department of Defense and service components are working towards this end. These policies must serve as guiding

principles for the creation of a Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding from Reserve component personnel.

Our military is currently transforming while at war. Being at war means that there are resources and political energy available, that would not be present during peacetime. The timing is right for the nation to radically restructure the reserve components to form a Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding. As reserve units redeploy, they should be reorganized, reequipped and moved as needed. Additionally, with the vast majority of the Army Reserves and National Guard having recently redeployed, these personnel are not available for another rotation for several years to come. Therefore, this transformation would have minimal impact on the operational tempo currently being experienced by the armed forces.

### **Sharing the Load**

*Currently, the deployment burden is not shared equally among all the Reserve components, but focused on those specific capabilities and skills required for stabilization and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.*

- Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. April 13, 2005.<sup>62</sup>

### **- The Army Reserve and Army National Guard:**

This force would serve as the baseline for a Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding. The Army Reserve and National Guard has been the force of choice in conducting post-hostilities operation in Iraq and other operations other than war. In April 2004, over

150,000 Army Reservists had been called to active duty and these personnel made up 40% of the total force in Iraq.<sup>63</sup> Additionally, the Army National Guard had over 70,000 soldiers deployed for Federal missions as of October 2005 to include those deployed in support of natural disasters, particularly Hurricane Katrina.<sup>64</sup>

The Army Reserve and National Guard are already being trained and equipped to conduct operations other than war. The preponderance of specialty type units such as civil affairs and military police are in the Army Reserves. These unique skills are essential to performing operations other than war. Such capabilities would form the core competencies for creating organizations that focused on these type missions. The Army Reserves and National Guard have been essential for the current Global War on Terrorism and will continue to be in the future. With some organization and structure changes these forces would be the backbone of a Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding.

#### **- The Marine Corps Reserve:**

In addressing Congress on the Fiscal Year 2006 budget, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that there were currently 10,300 Marine Reservists serving on active duty.<sup>65</sup> While this contribution may seem small for one of the two land components, it must be remembered that the Marine Reserve only has about 39,600 personnel total.<sup>66</sup> Additionally, the Marine Corps has no National Guard, further limiting their manpower pool. In the Global War on Terrorism, the Marines have just about given all that they can. This force, like the Army, would continue to perform its current mission of stability and reconstruction if they were brought in under the joint force proposed in this paper.

### **- The Navy Reserve:**

Like the Marines Corp, the United States Navy has no National Guard. Its reserve component consists of 82,558 uniformed personnel.<sup>67</sup> Approximately 25% of these sailors have been mobilized in support of the Global War on Terrorism.<sup>68</sup> In spite of the relatively low burden it is currently facing, this organization failed to meet its recruiting goals for the Fiscal Year 2005. A significant change will be needed to make this a viable, relevant force for the Global War on Terrorism.

Even during Operation Desert Storm which employed vast numbers of our military into the Gulf Region, only 20,000 Navy Reserve personnel were mobilized.<sup>69</sup> This was less than 13% of their reserve component at the time. Never have the United States called upon our reserve forces more in the last fifty years than during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet since our country did not employ significant Navy Reserve personnel during these two conflicts, the time has come to better utilize these assets. The Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding could certainly use these personnel.

The Navy's contribution to the war effort is a concern for that service's leadership. While the Navy is struggling to maintain its relevance in the current Global War on Terrorism, the Navy Reserve appears to be the bill payer. In July 2003, the Secretary of Defense expressed concerns over the force balance between the active and reserve components and their ability to meet the future needs of the country. In response, the Chief of Naval Operations announced an effort to transform the Navy Reserve and create a more integrated total force in which Navy Reserve capabilities are tied directly to active units. The result of this study indicates the Navy will reduce their reserves by 16,000

personnel. Conversely, there will only be an increase of 880 active positions and 450 civilians.<sup>70</sup> This reduction would seem a telling indicator of the usefulness of the Navy Reserves. At a time when the nation is fighting a global war with multiple theaters, the Chief of Naval Operations is prepared to significantly reduce the reserves. This reduction of 19.4% of the Navy Reserves should not be allowed to slip away. These billets could produce two brigades worth of a stability and rebuilding force.

**- Air force:**

The United States Air force has a very robust reserve component being comprised of both the Air force Reserve and the Air National Guard. This Guard force has approximately 106,822 personnel and the Reserves add another 75,322.<sup>71</sup> Both organizations are manned and equipped similar to the active component force. While 39% of Air force reserve personnel have been mobilized since 9/11<sup>72</sup>, relatively few Air Guard personnel have been. As of June 2004, only two states have deployed at least 20% of their Air National Guard personnel.<sup>73</sup>

Surprisingly, 43% of all the combat coded aircraft within the Air force are within their reserve components.<sup>74</sup> This includes significant numbers of aircraft within the Air National Guard. There seems to be little justification for a state's governor having a militia comprised of fighter aircraft and/or tankers. Yet, 34% of the Air force's fighter aircraft and 36% of the tanker fleet are found within the Air National Guard.<sup>75</sup> These aircraft are of little use to a state governor and only serve to reduce the governor's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack within his area. These aircraft should be transferred to the active force and, if deemed essential, manned by active duty personnel. However, the airmen within the Guard and Reserve could be put to better use if they were

retrained and equipped to perform operations other than war. At this time in our nation's history and for the foreseeable future, we will be conducting these type operations all around the world. Manpower for these missions cannot be squandered in billets that are not value added to the nation and the individual states. This lack of value for the modern security environment is reflected in the announcement by the Department of Defense to reducing the force by 40,000 airmen over the next 6 years.<sup>76</sup> It is imperative, however, that the department not let this manpower disappear, but convert these billets to fill out a stability and rebuilding force.

### **The Abram's Doctrine**

*They're not taking us to war again without the Reserves!*

General Creighton Abrams, Secretary of the Army (1972-1974)<sup>77</sup>

During the war in Vietnam, the decision was made by President Lyndon Baines Johnson not to conduct large-scale mobilization of the reserve components. This came as a surprise to uniformed military personnel as well as to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. It was July of 1965 and the United States Army was looking to call-up 235,000 personnel to deploy to Southeast Asia in support of the South Vietnamese government.<sup>78</sup> The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Harold Johnson, protested vocally and considered resigning from the service. He predicted that the quality of the force would plummet and this quickly became true. By July of 1967, 40% of the officers and 70% of the enlisted force had less than two years in service. Additionally, not only did the reserves bear the insult of being left behind, but shortly, the reserve component became a safe haven for those people wanting to avoid the draft.<sup>79</sup> Arguably the most

grievous result of the decision to draft people rather than mobilize reserve units was the breakdown of national support for the war.

When General Abrams became the Army Chief of Staff in 1972 he planned to never allow the nation to go to war without the reserves again. As the service began to restructure the force, a deliberate effort was made to form a more Total Force. This Total Force concept meant revamping the manner in which the reserve component would be employed and integrating them into war plans. Such a structure created greater dependency on the country's citizen soldiers. This link to the essential public support that an American army would always need was further solidified by incorporating most or all of certain skills within the reserves. The force was focused on combat support and combat service support, which would be required for any significant combat operation.<sup>80</sup> The concept of the Abrams' doctrine views a Total Force with each component playing a critical role. An additional outcome is that it limits politicians from deploying only the active force.

Many people today believe that the structure of the Army reserve components is obsolete in the current Global War on Terrorism. The changes noted earlier that are desired by the Secretary of Defense are indicators of this idea. The slow mobilization and deployment process of the reserves makes them not responsive enough to be an initial entry type force. This idea is correct, but still does not invalidate the intent behind Abrams' Total Force. A recent poll showed that knowing someone serving in Iraq meant people were more likely to believe that the President had made the right decision to invade. The survey proffered that being familiar with a service member helps to provide a counter to the violence that is continually run in the main stream media.<sup>81</sup> With a war

that is already suspect in the minds of most Americans, the government needs all the support it can muster. This means keeping Reserve and National Guard personnel in the fight.

The nation must use all assets available in the most efficient means possible. This includes the reserve component. If we were to go back to utilizing these organizations as a strategic reserve, our active component force would not be capable of sustaining the current operational tempo nor meeting the future demands that will be placed upon our armed forces. However, the reserve components need a structure change to meet current and future requirements. The Army has a large portion of their high-intensity war-fighting capabilities in the National Guard. This includes 8 Divisions and 14 Enhanced Separate Brigades about half of which are heavy mechanized or armor. These elements cannot maintain the readiness and level of proficiency required for high-intensity combat with only 39 days of training per year. During Desert Storm when vast numbers from the reserve component deployed, very few of these combat units structured for high-intensity conflict were sent into theater.<sup>82</sup> For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military has had to mobilize these units and then spend months transitioning them to become motorized infantry in order to make capable to perform the mission set required. Simply put, the force structure is obsolete and not designed for the current and future requirements of the nation.

It is imperative to keep the reserve component structured so they will be relevant and engaged in the current War on Terrorism as well as the future security environment of our country. Therefore, the reserve components need to be transformed into a force focused on operations other than war. This would make them more efficient for missions

overseas, yet also make them better prepared for domestic response to incidences of national significance. Maintaining that deep connection to the American public will be even more critical in the future. There are 3,200 National Guard facilities in 2,700 communities around the United States. This infrastructure provides a deep connection to the public at large. Additionally, the average congressional district is home to 1,000 guardsmen which helps keep government leaders involved in any fight.<sup>83</sup> The reserve service members bring not only the patriotism and sense of duty that their active counterparts possess, but also a strong connection to the general populace and state / national leadership, as well. These characteristics make it essential to keep the reserves relevant and engaged in current and future operations.

### **Operations Other Than War**

#### **Lessons Learned**

During the Cold War, the United States averaged one major intervention every ten years. In the 1990's, this rate increased to one every two years.<sup>84</sup> Such a deployment pace seems to be carrying through into the 21<sup>st</sup> century and will be with us for decades to come. The issue is exacerbated by the demanding 'occupation' being conducted in Iraq against a powerful and elusive insurgency. The mission in Iraq is certainly the most demanding stabilization effort the nation has faced. With little end in sight for operations other than war, it seems important for us to examine some critical lessons learned particularly if we are to construct a force designed to perform such missions. Fortunately, there have been many such missions conducted by our military to provide historical learning.

Hans Binnendijk was senior editor of a book published in 2004 entitled, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. In this work, the authors examined several studies that had been done on various stability operations in the past to include Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. From this effort, there have come a series of lessons learned, some of which can assist senior military planners in developing a force structure for performing these type missions. This portion of this paper will examine some of these, the first of which is: “*Controllable factors for success are the level and duration of effort of the United States and its coalition partners as measured in terms of manpower, time, and money invested.*”<sup>85</sup> The implication is that the greater the amount of resources brought to bear, the higher the chance of having success. By contrast, when few forces are committed for a short duration, there is a good chance of little being accomplished as seen in Haiti and Somalia. Additionally, when there is a relatively high ratio of service members to the local population, United States casualties remain low, while the converse also applies. As for time, history suggests that a minimum of five years is needed for a successful transition to a democratic government.<sup>86</sup> So in terms of developing a stability and reconstruction force, we must build an organization that is large enough to dominate a small size country and yet be able to maintain it for a period of at least five years. In the event that the United States is intervening in a larger nation, the armed forces would have to call upon the use of our conventional forces and/or coalition partners. It is essential to maintain a high force ratio to facilitate success.

Any stability force must have some amount of war-fighting capability in order to handle any uprising or insurgency that might occur. While this seems obvious, the extent

of the need would be dependent upon the situation that existed in targeted nation. This idea derives from another lesson learned from previous case-studies and that is the fact that *a secure environment is a necessary precondition for successful nation-building*. Security must prevent or deter civil unrest, as well as the willingness or ability of an insurgency to continue fighting.<sup>87</sup> Clearly, safety must be provided for the people before any sort of government by the rule of law, economic growth, or infrastructure repair, can be achieved. Such a requirement means a Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding unit has to be capable of performing infantry-type battle drills and up to company-size operations.

People cannot begin to exercise any of the freedoms and benefits of a democratic society if they are living in fear for their lives. The preponderance of this type of security would best be provided by a military- police-type organization. This element must be capable of maintaining law and order to include crime scene investigation, processing prisoners/detainees, and handling/presenting evidence. An additional requirement that is often lacking when conventional military personnel perform such a function is what a standard 'beat cop' does on any police force. That is simply knowing the neighborhood and developing relationships with the locals to the point where they are comfortable reporting anything out of the ordinary. A portion of this is being able to question people informally in order to maintain situational awareness of the area. A unit designed to conduct operations other than war would train their personnel accordingly.

*Combat operations and stabilization and reconstruction operations must be planned concurrently and as interdependent elements within an overall strategy for winning the peace.*<sup>88</sup> This lesson is particularly important with the advent of rapid decisive operations

as an operational framework. The idea of deploying a small number of forces that achieve quick success is now at the heart of America's war fighting methodology. The idea of a swift victory has become possible by the lethality and precision that advances in technology have provided our military. Unfortunately, success can come without much warning, as when a regime and/or army unexpectedly collapse.<sup>89</sup> This catastrophic success occurred in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The ensuing chaos must be quickly controlled if a lasting peace is to be achieved. If such a contingency is not planned for in advance, a crisis occurs within the country that leaves military commanders in a reactionary mode. Incorporating a planning cell from a stability and rebuilding organization into the war fighting headquarters early in the process can ensure unexpected victory does not lead to defeat. An operational planning team would come as an augmentation to provide expertise to a war fighting headquarters, as well as ensure that deliberate effort was put into planning for phases 4 and 5 of an operation.

A final lesson we will examine is that *embedding civilians with reconstruction specialties into the war fighting force can facilitate planning and coordination.*<sup>90</sup> During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance along with the Coalition Provisional Authority were the two organizations tasked to lead the reconstruction effort. However, these organizations were relatively ineffective due to late planning and a lack of staffing and resources. In order to avoid this from occurring again, the civilian expertise should be a part of the military forces. Not simply as liaison officers, but as assigned military personnel in the unit. An organization designed for operations other than war will recruit and train its own experts. This would provide a military commander with the interagency and civilian expertise within his own unit.

There is a capabilities gap within our national strategy. Colonel Bryan Watson clearly demonstrates this by the figure below depicting it through an ends-ways-means picture.<sup>91</sup>



FIGURE 1. STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION AS AN ENDS-WAYS-MEANS GAP

If we view the “Oppressive Regimes” on the left as those that support terrorists then one of the “Means” for the United States Strategy should include the term ‘Regime Change’. This would certainly reinforce the capabilities gap for this model and is a better depiction for our country’s current policy. As Colonel Watson says himself, “regime change – has become the chief campaign objective of military intervention.”<sup>92</sup> The lack of reconstruction capabilities when combined with the model for fighting the Global War on Terrorism is alarming. The requirement to perform these operations other than war is not a passing fad, but is going to be an essential mission for the military for many years to come. It is imperative that our Department of Defense increase the military’s capability to perform such missions. If our country fails to develop this capability, then as we fight

this current war on terrorism, we will leave in our wake countries that are in chaos. These 'nations' will become power vacuums that will only serve to spawn the growth of more terrorists. Already we can see these type countries across the northern portion of the African continent where many leaders cannot effectively govern within their own borders and as a result, terrorism flourishes.

### **Capability Requirements**

Skills required of leaders conducting stability and rebuilding operations are often foreign to the core capabilities of military personnel. Rightfully so, the majority of education given to service members focuses on the skills and abilities designed for the primary mission of war fighting. Unfortunately, when a unit gets deployment orders to go and perform an operation other than war, they often come on short notice with only a minimal amount of time for any kind of additional training. This is an injustice to the people we are trying to help, as well as the service members the nation is sending to perform such missions. Because of this hasty training, these operations take longer than need be and are less effective than they should be.

In developing a Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding force, a training program can be tailored to best prepare a unit to perform operations other than war. The United States Institute of peace produced a special report in October 1999 that was a result of a conference held earlier that year discussing leadership traits required in a stability operations type environment. The following list provides a great starting point for understanding the leaders needed for these complex missions.

- War fighting skills

- Courage to take risks
- Confidence to delegate authority and the need for trust
- Confidence in crisis decision making and in doing things that have never been done
- Increased decision making skills
- Ability to adapt or adjust to a new environment
- Adherence to principle and the ability to maintain fairness and evenhandedness for all
- Vision of the politico-military environment
- Ability to interact with those outside the military and build consensus
- A broad intellectual background
- Interpersonal skills
- Understanding historical and cultural contexts<sup>93</sup>

Another skill that is essential to leaders in a stability and rebuilding operation is that of negotiation. In their traditional roles, military commanders normally operate from an authoritarian position. However, in a stability mission there will be numerous times where negotiations must occur. Whether co-opting a non-governmental organization for infrastructure improvement or leveraging a local leader for intelligence information, leaders will find themselves negotiating to ensure progress continues. While many of these skills will depend on the character of individual leaders, the military must make a concerted effort to develop such leadership traits. Those listed above will provide the cable that runs through the professional development program within a joint task force designed to focus on operations other than war.

In order to be successful in stabilizing and beginning the process of rebuilding a nation, the military must accomplish or facilitate four critical tasks. The first is security. This requires the ability to suppress, defeat, or destroy elements that resist the new society or seek anarchy. The second task is that of establishing law and order. Such a requirement shows the need for military and police units that are capable of performing crime scene work, handling evidence, and conducting other judicially related matters. This third task speaks to power sources, water supply, hospitals, and other systems critical to the local populace. In cases of emergency situations, the military must be able to perform repairs of critical infrastructure. The final task required is to rapidly establish an interim government from the host nation peoples. Not only does this add legitimacy to a foreign presence, but it also facilitates economic growth and self-rule.<sup>94</sup> As the military conducts a deeper study of these previous tasks described here, it will become apparent that there are many additional sub-tasks that go along with these.

In order to achieve these critical results, as well as, perform all the other duties that will be required in an operation other than war, the unit will have to be equipped with some very particular types of organizations. The following list is a starting point for discussing requirements:

- Military Police (Combat Support, Internment/Relocation Units and Criminal Investigators)
- Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations
- Medical
- Engineer (Combat Support and Construction)
- Training and Security assistance

- Intelligence and Surveillance
- Transport and Support Units
- Combat forces of all services
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal and De-mining units
- Weapons of Mass Destruction detection teams
- Sensitive Site Exploitation teams
- Mortuary affairs
- Logisticians<sup>95</sup>

While this list includes skills and capabilities that are already found within the Department of Defense, there are still others that need to be brought into the uniformed service. These include an economist that can advise local leaders as well as military commanders on the best methods for economic development and government experts that understand the process of building and structuring government offices from the local up through national level. These personnel would be in addition to other agency representatives. These other agency personnel would need to be permanently assigned to a stability and rebuilding force and therefore, incorporated into all training, planning, and deployments. This structure would place not only the responsibility for nation building, but also the capability, in the hands of the military commander.

## **Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding**

### **Operations and Missions**

*Today's guardmember, the 21<sup>st</sup> century minuteman, must be available to deploy at a moment's notice to defend America at home or abroad. The Nation should expect no less.*

LTG Steven H. Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau<sup>96</sup>

The Department of Defense needs to form an organization focused on performing operations other than war and responding to domestic incidences of national significance. Such a unit should be built from personnel within the Reserve Components. For the rest of this paper we will refer to the Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding as JTFSR. Creating such a force would make a more efficient use of our nation's reserves. Additionally, this would allow active units to better maintain their war fighting readiness. The JTFSR would be joint with associated interagency elements to facilitate its priority mission of performing operations other than war.

Operations other than war which the JTFSR would perform include stability and rebuilding, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. When performing these missions, this JTFSR would be deployed into theaters and placed under the control of a Joint Task Force commander. Additionally, when needed, the organization could function as a stand alone Joint Task Force reporting directly to a combatant commander.

The JTFSR would also function as the Department of Defense's manpower source for reacting to an incident of national significance. Such events would include natural disasters, riots or insurgencies, acts of terrorism to include weapons of mass destruction,


or a pandemic. Additionally, the JTFSR could provide security measures for large, public gatherings such as the Super Bowl or political conventions. A portion of the JTFSR would come out of the state's National Guard. This would provide the legal authorization for the task force to perform domestic, law-enforcement-type missions under the control of state governors as they currently do in accordance with Title 10. For missions involving Homeland Security or Homeland Defense, JTFSR could be placed under the control of the United States Northern Command. This flexible command structure, similar to the current National Guard force, makes the JTFSR an adaptive, multi-dimensional force capable of performing a wide range of missions.

The JTFSR would be capable of responding to a crisis on short notice. Much like active component forces, various units would be placed on a recall status. This would require the JTFSR to be assembled and available to either a state governor or the Northern Command in the event of a crisis. Within 96 hours, 30,000 troops were amassed to respond to Hurricane Katrina.<sup>97</sup> While this is exceptional, to be truly effective as a domestic response force, the JTFSR would need to be capable of providing an SR battalion of 900 personnel within a few hours. This unit would be the initial force responding to a natural disaster, a terrorist attack, or the threat of an attack.

### **Composition of a Brigade**

The idea of tailoring force packages is essential to the JTFSR concept. Since requirements for overseas and domestic missions can vary greatly, the organization needs to be modular. By being modular, the JTFSR has set pieces that can be added or reduced as mission analysis dictates; a Lego approach. The basic building block for any stability

and rebuilding operation would be the Stability and Rebuilding (SR) Brigade. This force would have the basic structure to perform the JTF SR core functions and would be comprised of approximately 5,000 personnel. The wire diagram below outlines the structure of the brigade. In addition to those units pictured, the normal J-staff would be included with the SR Brigade.



Within each SR Brigade there would be three stability force battalions. Each battalion would be comprised of approximately 900 personnel organized into companies and platoons. Most of the skill sets required for conducting operations other than war would already exist within each company. Those skills required to conduct the full range of military operations not requisite within a company would be assigned at the SR Brigade level. As depicted in the wire-diagram above, these would include psychological operations, civil affairs, intelligence, as well as several others. These personnel would be placed under the operational control of the various companies and battalions as required

by the mission. This composition would give company level commanders the ability to effect reconstruction in an assigned area with only minimal outside expertise having to be brought in. Of note, within the Reconnaissance Company for the Brigade would not only reside classical reconnaissance forces, but also tactical humint teams to facilitate intelligence collection.


### **Number of Brigades Required**

The country needs to develop a total of sixty SR brigades. This will allow for ten brigades to be employed at any time with no unit having to be re-tapped more than once every six years. This would be in keeping with the Secretary of Defense's policy on reserve mobilization. These brigades would be divided among four geographic regions of the United States. Within each region, at least ten of the brigades would be National Guard brigades with each state having at least one National Guard SR Battalion. The remainder of the brigades in a region would be designated reserve component. These four geographic regions will be discussed in detail later in this paper.

When including the staffing of four JTF SR Headquarters, the total personnel required would be approximately 325,000 service members. Since the SR brigades would often deploy underneath an active duty headquarters, there would only need to be four of the JTF SR Headquarters elements. The personnel for forming these SR brigades and headquarters would come from among all of the reserve components with the primary criteria of identifying the needed skill sets within desired geographic areas of the country. This selection of personnel would be done without consideration for branch of service. Clearly, this would take a massive restructuring of the reserves.


## Joint Task Force Headquarters

The SRJTF Headquarters could be deployed to serve as a JTF command element with the addition of assigned forces. It could also serve under a combatant commander, state governor, or other Federal official as needed. The JTFSR Headquarters would be commanded by an O-9 and could serve as the land component commander, if required. This commander and the preponderance of his staff would be active-guard reservists responsible for oversight of training SR Brigades. Additionally, this headquarters would be prepared to deploy around the world or within the United States to command and control a stability effort. The JTFSR Headquarters would be assigned to Joint Forces Command. The JTFSR Headquarters' organizational structure is shown below.



The Training Group and Support Group will each be addressed later in this paper. Within the J3 section of the JTFSR headquarters would reside staff sections with the expertise to perform functions that have not traditionally been considered military tasks.

These would include economic and governmental experts trained and prepared to facilitate the creation or reconstruction of national economies or governments. The J3 would also have staff sections prepared to support the creation of a judicial or educational system. Some members of the reserve components can already perform these traditionally non-military functions due to their civilian profession. Others would have to be recruited or trained. The implication of having this expertise within the JTFSR headquarters is that the initial work of creating or rebuilding a nation's infrastructure would be planned for beforehand and could commence as early as possible during an operation.



The military commander having the capability to perform traditionally non-military functions would have other benefits as well. For instance, transitioning responsibility from the military to other departments within the government at the end of hostilities would be greatly improved. An example of this would be the Political Staff Office. This section would be trained and equipped to assist a country in developing and building a

new government. It would also provide a conduit to the Department of State once the host nation is capable of beginning 'normal' diplomatic relations.

An area of the staff that should be explained is the Special Project section. This element would be designed to begin establishing contacts within the fledgling government that would be sympathetic to United States interests. Essentially, we would be growing spies. Early on this would serve no immediate benefit, but years or even decades later, these planted seeds would be invaluable to the Central Intelligence Agency. The reason for having such a capability within the military would be to facilitate the growth of Department of Defense human intelligence capabilities, as well as improve the nation's overall human collection capacity which has already been identified as a shortfall. The capacity of the Central Intelligence Agency is not at the level to be able to grow their contacts within every fledgling country where a stability force would be employed. The Department of Defense could provide additional capacity through the capabilities found with the JTFSR.


Additionally, within this SR Headquarters would be stationed members of certain governmental agencies. These would include the United States Agency for International Development and the Office of Management and Budget. The reach back of these departments cannot be replicated by experts in uniform since it is the money and resources of these organizations that are required. Not only would these personnel provide a great link to their parent organization, but they would also be required to serve as part of the planning staff and their title would be Agency Planners. By having these people embedded in the JTFSR, the process of stabilizing, rebuilding, and transitioning a

host nation would be greatly expedited. These Agency Planners would serve under the J5 for planning and then transition to the J3 once operations began.

Alongside these government personnel would work non-governmental liaison officers. These would be representatives from major organizations that work in areas around the world where JTFSR forces could be deployed. These would include organizations like the Red Cross/Crescent and Doctors without Borders. If required, a memorandum of agreement could be arranged to allow the Department of Defense to pay the salary of a member of either another governmental or non-governmental agency during their time on the JTFSR staff. This would allow the various agencies to grow additional personnel to fill these new billets without requiring the corresponding budget growth.

### **Additional Capabilities**

While the brigade would serve as the base unit for JTFSR, there would also be additional capabilities that would come out of the Support Group. This Support Group would fall under the JTFSR Headquarters and would attach capabilities to deploying stability and rebuilding units as required. This group would be commanded by an O-6 and have the requisite staff in addition to the various units shown below.



The capabilities found within these units are niche specific and would be added as needed depending on the operation for which a JTFSR was deploying. Several of these focused capabilities need to be addressed in order to provide an idea of their function within a JTFSR. One of these would be the Special Forces units. These organizations would provide the commander with the ability to conduct special reconnaissance, direct action missions, foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare. While these service members are invaluable to have when needed, they would clearly not be involved in all JTFSR missions. The skill set of these Special Forces operators is beyond the scope of the conventional stability force member who would be trained as an infantryman/military police officer.

Another of these units would be the ISR Company which would be comprised mainly of unmanned aerial vehicles and ground sensors. The Coastal Security Company would be utilized in rivers and littorals, while the WMD/E Company would be comprised of experts in chemical, radiological, biological, nuclear, and high explosives. These type forces already exist within the reserve component and would simply need to be restructured to conform to the JTFSR and aligned regionally with a joint task force headquarters.

### **Training Outline**

An additional unit that would reside underneath the JTFSR Headquarters would be Training Group. This organization would be commanded by an O-7 and would be responsible to ensure the training and readiness of the SR Brigades within the headquarters region. Within these units would be the subject matter experts on

operations other than war, as well as the institutional knowledge gained over time. In addition to maintaining readiness of the SR Brigades, the Training Group would also provide training to domestic organizations and partner nation forces whether military or civil.

While in a previous section we addressed the capabilities that the JTFSR would be required to perform its core function of operations other than war, the unique nature of the JTFSR force demands that it also be prepared for domestic missions. The majority of tasks a service member would need to be proficient at for homeland operations are the same as those required for performing stability missions. These skills include patrolling, crowd control, crime scene work, and handling large numbers of casualties. Training on some additional individual and collective tasks will ensure the unit is capable of meeting the needs of governors, as well as providing domestic defense under NORTHCOM. The additional skills would be determined by the region to which the SR Brigade was affiliated. For example, fire fighting would be trained for in the western area of the country that experiences large numbers of forest fires every year while mountaineering search and rescue would be practiced in the Rocky Mountain region. This training would only serve to make the JTFSR a more efficient organization being capable of successfully completing a wide range of missions.

### **Regional Affiliation**


Within the United States, the military should establish four JTFSR Headquarters that would report to the commander, United States Joint Forces Command on a day-to-day basis. These units would be regionally affiliated for global, as well as domestic,

deployments. The global affiliation would assist in focusing commanders on what areas of the world they would need to be experts on. Being focused on a specific geographic region of the world would drive language training, country study and cultural knowledge. Additionally, members of the JTFSR would work to develop relationships with regional combatant commanders, foreign officials, and non-governmental organizations that work in their particular region. While these JTFSR forces could be utilized outside of their regional affiliation, they would serve as a pool of expertise on a particular area of the world. The affiliation of these reserve component units by region would be done without regard to active duty domestic or overseas locations. Ideally, the JTFSR force would relieve the active component of any domestic response requirement and the majority of operations other than war.

Additionally, by having JTFSR forces affiliated with a certain region within the United States, our country would be able to provide a more capable force for governors in the event of an incident of national significance. Since JTFSR units would be located within their assigned region, these service members would have first hand knowledge of the area and close working ties with local officials. The unit would therefore, be capable of a rapid response time in the event of a crisis. Additionally, units within a particular region would conduct training based on the natural disasters or terrorists' attacks likely to occur in their area. These training events would include exercises in conjunction with local, state and Federal agencies. Again, these units would not be restricted from conducting operations in another region. For instance, in the event of a terrorist attack, Joint Forces Command could draw on forces available from anywhere within the country. State governors would also continue to have the ability to establish Memorandums of

Agreement with neighboring states in order to facilitate National Guard forces assisting one another. The map below provides a starting point for breaking down regional affiliation for Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding forces.

Red: PACOM   Green: CENTCOM   Yellow: EUCOM   Blue: SOUTHCOM



### **Additional Areas for Study**

This paper is not a complete analysis of a plan to transition reserve component forces into a JTFSR. It is presented as a conceptual overview of a proposal that will enable the Department of Defense to gain more efficiency out of the Reserve and National Guard, as well as better meet future needs. Additional areas offered for study include identifying what types of units should remain in the reserve components, the number of personnel required, skill set match, and which units would need to be closed, stood-up, or moved. A detailed analysis must also be done on the budgetary aspects of creating the JTFSR. Expenses will primarily be due to the changing out of equipment. Large amounts of

equipment would have to be purchased and some items sold off in order to properly equip the JTFSR.

The Department of Defense must also conduct an evaluation of the political environment and the feasibility of gaining the support of states' governors and congress for the establishment of the new JTFSR. Success in creating this JTFSR will be determined by the choices of the nation's leaders. The budget and legal standing for the unit will be two critical areas that will be impacted by decisions made in Congress. The scope of this paper is merely to offer a working concept to begin the process of better structuring the Reserve Component to meet the nation's needs. Much more detailed analysis and debate will have to occur before such an organization as JTFSR could become operational.

## **Conclusion**

The United States is currently fighting the Global War on Terrorism. It is a conflict that many believe will span generations. For the country to be successful, our armed forces must be trained, equipped and organized to meet the current demands that it is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. More importantly, the military must be structured to fulfill the requirements that the future security environment holds. The situation that the country will face in the decades ahead will find our military deploying more and more in order to conduct operations other than war.

In order to have lasting success against terrorists, the nation must attack not only the state sponsors of terrorism, but also the underlying factors that cause the birth and growth of a terrorist faction. The implications from such a course of action are immense. First,

regime change will continue to be a requirement in dealing with these state sponsors. This mission requires a tremendous amount of manpower in order to stabilize and secure a nation. Rebuilding a toppled government is a task that requires many skills normally not found within the armed forces, but for which the reserve components are uniquely suited. Additionally, this capability to rebuild and improve institutions and infrastructure is essential to defeating the root causes of terrorist activities. These factors include people feeling frustrated over their economic and political opportunities, as well as religious ideologies. Our nation's military must be trained, equipped and organized to perform those operations other than war which will alleviate terrorism at its source.

These operations other than war have been the preponderance of missions thrust upon our military forces since the end of the Cold War. Our nation has learned extensive lessons and methods for conducting these operations. The requisite skills required to perform operations other than war are less demanding to maintain than those skills for conducting combat operations. Since the Gulf War, the military has been able to use reserve component personnel to perform operations other than war. The reserve components should become the force of choice for performing operations other than war.

The current Global War on Terrorism is straining our all-volunteer military more than any other time in its history. The operational tempo has forced our nation to rely more and more on the reserve components. However, the nation must still find greater efficiencies in order to make this force a viable component for the long-term. These reserve component personnel should be structured as the primary military force for conducting operations other than war. A Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding

would be trained, equipped and organized to perform stability-type missions to include peace keeping and humanitarian assistance.

The Joint Task Force Stability and Rebuilding would be an organization comprised of personnel from all the reserve components. Its primary mission would be to perform operations other than war to include peace keeping, humanitarian assistance and stability and support operations. Additionally, the JTFSR would be prepared to respond to an incident of national significance within the United States. These could include, but not be limited to, a terrorist attack, natural disaster or a large public gathering requiring increased security for its protection. The wide range of mission capabilities would make the JTFSR invaluable to the Department of Defense, NORTHCOM, and state governors.

The benefits from creating such a force from the reserve components would be tremendous for the nation. In a time of constricting budgets, a JTFSR would be more efficient than active component personnel at performing operations other than war. The service members in the JTFSR would focus their education and training on stability operations. As a result, these type missions would be done quicker and cheaper, yet to a better standard. Additionally, the resident expertise that would develop within the JTFSR would be invaluable in training partner nations to perform operations other than war.

An additional benefit would be that the JTFSR would alleviate the preponderance of operations other than war from the active force. Preparing for and executing these missions on a rotational basis has consumed immense amount of training time for the active components. This takes away from their ability to prepare for their primary mission of conducting combat operations. JTFSR would relieve the active force of having to spend training time preparing for a mission other than high-intensity conflict.

A final benefit of the JTFSR is their multi-functionality. This force would not only be the Department of Defense's choice for operations other than war, but also for Homeland Defense. The JTFSR is uniquely suited to meet the troop requirements that NORTHCOM has for use in defense of the nation. Additionally, this JTFSR would be of immense value to state governors for responding to natural disasters. A force capable of fulfilling these various missions would provide for greater efficiency in the reserve components.

The JTFSR is a concept for restructuring the reserve components to make them viable and relevant in the current and future security environment of our nation. A force designed, equipped and trained to perform operations other than war would be a critical component for our nation's security strategy providing needed services both at home and abroad. The JTFSR will provide greater flexibility to the country's leaders in dealing with the uncertain world order we will face in the future.

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MAJ Scott Kelly, U.S. Army, completed this paper while assigned to the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) at Norfolk, VA as a partial requirement for a Masters of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. He earned his Bachelor of Science degree in management from the United States Military Academy in 1995.

Enlisting in the Army Infantry in 1989, MAJ Kelly completed his initial entry training at Fort Benning, GA and was assigned to the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division. After attending the United States' Military Academy, he went on to be commissioned a 2LT in 1995 to the branch of Infantry. Upon completion of the Infantry Officer's Basic Course, MAJ Kelly was assigned back to the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division where he served as rifle platoon leader, heavy weapons platoon leader, and company executive officer. In 1999, he graduated from the Infantry Officer's Advance Course and moved to Fort Bragg, NC where he was assigned to the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division. There he served as a Division G-3 readiness officer, assistant battalion S-3 and company commander. Following command, MAJ Kelly worked as an assistant brigade S-3 for the 4<sup>th</sup>/78<sup>th</sup> Division, training reserve component personnel. He was then assigned to the Army's Human Resources Command where he served as an assignment officer in the Infantry branch. His current assignment is at Fort Bragg, NC.

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