

AU/ACSC/STUDENT#25-3569/2004-05

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

THE INDIRECT APPROACH: THE ROLE OF AVIATION  
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE IN COMBATING TERRORISM  
IN WEAK AND FAILING STATES

by

Robert D. Segraves, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Instructor: Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth C. Coons

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2005

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>APR 2005</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>THE INDIRECT APPROACH: THE ROLE OF AVIATION FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE IN COMBATING TERRORISM IN WEAK AND FAILING STATES</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Air University Press (AUL/LP), 131 W Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, AL, 36112-6615</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>The intent of this paper is to explain the significant contribution of aviation foreign internal defense in combating terrorism in weak states. This study begins by identifying the national security threat posed by weak states and their attractiveness as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations. This study then examines how states respond to internal threats such as terrorism by implementing internal defense and development programs that are designed to address the underlying causes of internal instability. Next, the role of US foreign internal defense is examined and how it is used to support the internal development efforts of friendly nations. The study then explains the importance of airpower in combating terrorists, noting, however, that airpower capabilities in most developing nations are inadequate to the task. Finally, the study shows how the aviation component of foreign internal defense can address airpower capability gaps in weak states and how this strengthens the government's indigenous capability to combat terrorists.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>45</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

## **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

## *Table of Contents*

DISCLAIMER .....	ii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
INTRODUCTION .....	1
Purpose .....	2
Methodology.....	2
WEAK AND FAILING STATES AND THE THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY .....	4
How Weak and Failing States Threaten US Strategic Interests .....	5
Underlying Characteristics of Weak and Failing States .....	7
Specific Regional Vulnerabilities .....	9
ASSISTING WEAK AND FAILING STATES: THE ROLE OF FID .....	14
Host Nation Internal Defense and Development .....	14
US FID Support and its Relationship to Host Nation IDAD Efforts.....	17
FID Strategy and Implementation .....	18
AVIATION FID: CLOSING AIRPOWER CAPABILITY GAPS IN WEAK STATES .....	24
Airpower in the Fight Against Insurgents and Terrorists .....	24
Airpower Capability in Weak States .....	30
Aviation FID Operations .....	31
Aviation FID Activities Conducted Under Indirect Support.....	33
CONCLUSION.....	37
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	39

*Abstract*

The intent of this paper is to explain the significant contribution of aviation foreign internal defense in combating terrorism in weak states. This study begins by identifying the national security threat posed by weak states and their attractiveness as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations. This study then examines how states respond to internal threats such as terrorism by implementing internal defense and development programs that are designed to address the underlying causes of internal instability. Next, the role of US foreign internal defense is examined and how it is used to support the internal development efforts of friendly nations. The study then explains the importance of airpower in combating terrorists, noting, however, that airpower capabilities in most developing nations are inadequate to the task. Finally, the study shows how the aviation component of foreign internal defense can address airpower capability gaps in weak states and how this strengthens the government's indigenous capability to combat terrorists.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.*

—President George W. Bush  
*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*

As spelled out in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, weak and failing states offer international terrorist groups a sanctuary where they can organize, plan, and carry out operations.<sup>1</sup> The most recent and best-known example of this is Al-Qaeda's emergence in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989.<sup>2</sup> The attacks of September 11, 2001 made it painfully clear that the US and other nations can ignore weak and failing states only at their peril.

One way the US can prevent weak and failing states from becoming havens for terrorists is to undertake efforts aimed at improving the host nation's (HN's) ability to secure its borders and strengthen internal security.<sup>3</sup> As part of a comprehensive strategy involving the integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power, foreign internal defense (FID) is a key component in US efforts to bolster HN internal security and facilitate the HN's program of internal defense and development (IDAD). Geographic combatant commanders

can use FID programs as part of a long-term theater security strategy aimed at helping weak states “help themselves” with their own internal security, preventing exploitation of their territory by terrorists and insurgents seeking sanctuary within their borders.<sup>4</sup>

With the current high operational tempo straining the capabilities of the US military, FID offers the combatant commander a low-footprint, low-risk method to assist weak states in providing for their own internal security. As an alternative to direct counterforce engagement of terrorists and insurgents by US forces, successful FID programs enable the HN to take the lead, strengthening the government’s ability to secure its own borders and eliminating the need to deploy large numbers of US forces.<sup>5</sup>

## **Purpose**

The overarching purpose of this paper is to explain how the aviation component of FID, conducted in support of the HN’s IDAD program, is essential for strengthening indigenous airpower capabilities in weak and failing states in order to combat terrorism. A complete examination of the US military’s role as part of an overarching FID strategy aimed at combating terrorism deserves a much more extensive study than the space of this paper allows. As such, the scope of this paper is limited to the airpower aspect of FID in combating terrorism.

## **Methodology**

This study of the role of aviation FID in combating terrorism begins by first outlining the national security problem posed by weak states. This is followed by an examination of the underlying characteristics that classify states as “weak” or “failing.” The paper will then identify key regional vulnerabilities where acute state weakness has created environments

particularly susceptible to terrorist exploitation. The discussion will then delve into HN IDAD strategies and the FID operational framework, explaining how FID programs are a key component in the US' overarching efforts to assist and support other nations with their IDAD programs. The paper then briefly examines airpower's role as an essential force multiplier in combating terrorism in weak states, as well as highlighting the generally poor state of airpower in most of the developing world where the threat of terrorism is greatest. Finally, the paper will examine how the aviation component of FID can be used to strengthen HN airpower capabilities and enhance the government's indigenous ability to combat terrorists.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 23.

<sup>2</sup> US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003* (Washington, D.C: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2004), 131-32.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 20-21.

<sup>4</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, 30 April 2004, III-4-III-5.

<sup>5</sup> Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*, 10 May 2004, 2.

## Chapter 2

### Weak and Failing States and the Threat to National Security

*In the twentieth century, strategists focused on the world's great industrial heartlands. In the twenty-first, the focus is in the opposite direction, toward remote regions and failing states....*

*Every policy decision we make needs to be seen through this lens.*

—The 9/11 Commission Report

The prevalence of state weakness and failure in the post-Cold War international environment presents a clear threat to US interests and national security. This is affirmed in various strategic level documents issued since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, issued in September 2002, clearly recognizes the threat of state failure, stating plainly that the US “is now threatened less by conquering states than...by failing ones.”<sup>6</sup> Published five months later, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* further attests to the threat posed by weak and failing states: “weak states and failed ones are a source of international instability...Often, these states may become a sanctuary for terrorists.”<sup>7</sup> More recently, the *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* reiterates the threat posed by weak and failing states. Released in March 2005, it states that:

The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many states are unable, and in some cases unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation.

Our experience in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our military capabilities to contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.<sup>8</sup>

### **How Weak and Failing States Threaten US Strategic Interests**

The Center for Global Development (CGD), a nonpartisan Washington, D.C. think tank that studies globalization issues and development in poor countries, sponsored a 30-member bipartisan commission to study the impact of weak states on US national security.<sup>9</sup> The commission's report, issued in June 2004, identified five ways in which weak and failing states threaten US strategic interests: spillover effects, illicit transnational networks, regional insecurity, negative global economic effects, and a devaluation of American values and "soft" power.<sup>10</sup> Two of these effects, *spillover* and *illicit transnational networks*, are particularly damaging to US national security and deserve further explanation.

**Spillover Effects.** Spillover refers to the various negative effects suffered by governments and peoples resulting from weakness or failure of a neighboring state.<sup>11</sup> A significant spillover effect is massive refugee flows; as of 2000, it is estimated that 1 in 207 people worldwide are fleeing from some real or perceived threat.<sup>12</sup> Refugee inflows place an incredible burden on adjacent states that may be ill equipped to handle the massive influx of refugees and cope with the associated problems of lawlessness and disease. The strain caused by refugee inflows can be severe enough to jeopardize the security of an otherwise healthy state.<sup>13</sup> Another major spillover effect is increased regional violence. State failure and weakness can spawn wider regional conflicts, threatening the stability of an entire region.<sup>14</sup> A recent example of this is Liberia under the rule of ousted President Charles Taylor. According to the report issued by the CGD,

Charles Taylor took advantage of a power vacuum not merely to install an authoritarian regime, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and

dismantling the economy in the process, but to incite a decade-long civil war in neighboring Sierra Leone, finance rebels in Côte d'Ivoire, and support opposition figures in Guinea. By the time the United States and the international community removed Taylor, three civil wars had been sparked, and the stability of West Africa as a whole had been severely compromised.<sup>15</sup>

Epidemics such as AIDS represent yet another distressing spillover effect.<sup>16</sup> Because weak states usually lack the ability and resources to combat the spread of AIDS and other infectious diseases among their own populace, they threaten to burden neighboring states with overwhelming health crises.<sup>17</sup> In fact, the severity of the African AIDS problem has been cited as “potentially the greatest, future single source of state collapse and lawlessness in Africa.”<sup>18</sup>

**Illicit Transnational Networks.** The second major threat to US strategic interests posed by state weakness is that weak states provide an environment where illicit transnational networks can take root and thrive.<sup>19</sup> Weak states are commonly characterized by a combination of remote and inaccessible regions, porous borders, and inadequate law enforcement.<sup>20</sup> Collectively, these attributes make weak states ideal sanctuaries for terrorists, allowing them to conduct their activities beneath the “noise level” of the surrounding disorder and facilitating the easy movement of money, people, drugs, and weapons.<sup>21</sup> This was highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Report, which stated that “to find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world.”<sup>22</sup>

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*—substantially revised in May 2004 to reflect the emerging security challenges of the post-Cold War strategic environment—further highlights the threat posed by the spread of terrorism and other illicit networks to weak states:

At the opening of the 21st century the most dangerous form of violence threatening the internal security of free nations is terrorism of regional origin expanded into insurgency of global scope and implication. Global terrorism extends the threat of internal violence to virtually every country in the world, threatening internal security through lawlessness and subversion linked to insurgent goals.

The classic imperatives of insurgency are at full play in this arena. Political mobilization and legitimacy are totally engaged, promoted on a global scale by terrorist operatives. The scene shifts from governments fighting field-worn guerrillas and political cadres roaming the country side winning hearts and minds to international networks of financiers, investors, promoters, recruiters, weapons trainers, forgery experts, communications specialists, electronics technicians, spies, bombers, and shooters deeply imbedded in every country of the industrial and nonindustrial worlds. Insurgency prosecuted as terrorism has global impact and now includes global reach capabilities.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there may be an increase of terrorist operations within countries whose governments are vulnerable to insurgency and who do not have effective control over their population or territory. After the 11 September 2001 attack, the fight against Al Qaeda was extended beyond Afghanistan to the remote islands of the Philippines. The threat has now extended from nations hostile to the United States to nations who are unable to effectively prevent or eliminate the terrorist threat.<sup>23</sup>

Having thus described the strategic threat posed by weak and failing states, it is necessary to next examine the characteristics ascribed to state weakness in order to frame the subsequent discussion of airpower's role in combating terrorism and the contribution of aviation FID.

### **Underlying Characteristics of Weak and Failing States**

According to the aforementioned CGD report, state weakness is attributable to a substantial lack of capacity in carrying out three essential functions that effective governments must perform: ensuring security, meeting basic public needs, and maintaining legitimacy.<sup>24</sup> State weakness may be due to lack of capacity in one of these functions or all of these functions. The key implication for US FID efforts is that each nation's security and development situation is unique, requiring a unique solution involving the integrated application of all instruments of national power.<sup>25</sup>

**Security.** Security is the state’s most fundamental and important function; without security, the state’s ability to fulfill other basic functions is jeopardized.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, as the state’s ability to provide security erodes, so does its capacity to meet the basic needs of its citizens and its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the public.<sup>27</sup> To have effective security, a state must have a monopoly over the use of force and the ability to exercise it anywhere within its borders.

Without a secure environment, internal development efforts are put at risk and the government’s legitimacy is jeopardized. As the state’s ability to ensure internal security deteriorates, the state becomes increasingly susceptible to the emergence of alternative power bases that seek to fill the security gap left by the state.<sup>28</sup> These alternative power bases can take the form of insurgents, warlords, terrorist organizations, or organized crime groups. As stated in the CGD report, the inability of weak states “to effectively control and manage their territories makes them particularly susceptible to incursions by terrorist groups, illicit trafficking, crime, and the spread of disease.”<sup>29</sup>

**Meeting Basic Needs.** The state must also meet the basic needs of the public. Basic infrastructure such as roads, schools, and hospitals are essential for the proper functioning of society and the state. The state must also promote the development of institutions and structures—such as a stable financial system, reliable communications, and adequate power generation and distribution—that facilitate progress and stimulate growth.<sup>30</sup> When a state is either unable or unwilling to address the basic needs of its citizens, this can create negative public attitudes towards the government. Worse yet, the state’s inability to meet the public’s basic needs may create the conditions for “suffering, epidemics, humanitarian crisis, loss of public confidence, and potential political upheaval.”<sup>31</sup>

**Maintaining Legitimacy.** The legitimacy of the state is closely tied to its ability to ensure internal security and provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Another key determinant of the state's legitimacy is the imagined or actual degree of government corruption perceived by the public.<sup>32</sup> To preserve its legitimacy and maintain the confidence of its citizens, the state must ensure internal security and the rule of law, foster public participation in the political process, meet the basic needs of the public, and maintain institutions that protect basic human rights.<sup>33</sup>

When the political and legal mechanisms of the state are unable or unwilling to protect the basic rights and privileges of the public, large segments of the population may suffer significant sociopolitical alienation and disenfranchisement. This in turn can foster considerable negative social attitudes against the government and can foment widespread political unrest, thus encouraging the emergence of subversive elements that can threaten the state's ability to govern.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, failure of the state in preserving its legitimacy serves to reinforce existing negative public attitudes towards the military and civilian law enforcement agencies as symbols of government repression.<sup>35</sup>

### **Specific Regional Vulnerabilities**

Suffering from one or more of the factors that produce state weakness—inability to provide internal security, failure to meet basic public needs, and government illegitimacy—weak states in three regions of the world are especially susceptible to exploitation by terrorists seeking sanctuary. Most worrisome is Africa, particularly the nations adjoining the Middle East that comprise the Horn of Africa region, namely, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan.<sup>36</sup> With its patchwork quilt of troubled states, this region has a

long history as a base of operations for Islamist terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda and sympathizers such as the Somali-based group Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya.<sup>37</sup>

Islamist terrorist activity on the African continent is not limited solely to those nations bordering on the Arab world. In January 2004, Nigerian authorities put down an armed uprising in the country's mainly Muslim north by the Al Sunna Wal Jamma group, whose aim is to establish a "Taliban-style Muslim state" in the country's northern region.<sup>38</sup> This is particularly troubling considering since 2000, 12 states in northern Nigeria have adopted the strict Islamic law known as Shari'ah, which is advocated by Islamist extremists.<sup>39</sup> Additionally, the countries of the trans-Saharan region of Africa known as the Sahel have recently become the focus of US security assistance efforts under the auspices of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI).<sup>40</sup> Currently in the planning stages, the TSCTI is a follow-on to the 2002 Pan Sahel Initiative and is designed to "assist governments in [the] region to better control their territory and to prevent huge tracts of largely deserted African territory from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups."<sup>41</sup> Emphasizing the TSCTI's importance in combating terrorism in Africa, the Director of European Plans and Operations Center for US European Command underscored the vulnerability of the Sahel region and its susceptibility to terrorist exploitation in testimony before Congress:

The Trans-Sahara region...is an area of acute vulnerability due to vast expanses of desert and porous borders. With a long history of being a center through which arms and other illicit trade flow, it is becoming increasingly important as terrorists now seek to use these routes for logistical support, recruiting grounds, and safe haven. We have indications of extremist groups with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq operating in the Sahel. Islamist terrorist organizations in the countries that border the Sahara, like the al-Para faction of the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) that held 32 Europeans hostage in 2003, continue to pose a threat to the stability of an already vulnerable region.<sup>42</sup>

A second region of concern is Southeast Asia and the Philippines, which the US State Department characterized in its 2003 annual terrorism report to Congress as “an attractive theater of support and logistics for al-Qaida” and other regional and transnational groups.<sup>43</sup> Also in the report, the State Department highlighted the link between regional terrorist groups in Asia and al-Qaeda and the resultant implications for the region:

Many leaders of Southeast Asian [terrorist] groups fought or claim to have fought in Afghanistan in the “Jihad” and brought back critical skills and contacts....The relationships formed in Afghanistan developed into a widening network in which local extremists were able to tap into international terrorist networks for operational support, training and/or funds, and vice versa.. The net effect of the influence of such groups is to decrease the likelihood of peaceful and long-term solutions to separatist movements/ethnic conflicts, to exacerbate current regional terrorism, and to foster an environment conducive to terrorism’s continued growth.<sup>44</sup>

One of the most notable and dangerous Southeast Asian terrorist groups is Jemaah Islamiya, an Islamic extremist group which has logistical and financial links to the Middle East, South Asia, and Al-Qaeda.<sup>45</sup> An equally dangerous and violent group also having strong ties to Al-Qaeda is Abu Sayyaf, a Philippine-based Muslim separatist organization that was the target of a vigorous and largely successful Philippine eradication effort following the attacks of 9/11.<sup>46</sup> This group has recently reemerged, prompting the Philippine national security advisor to assert in August 2004 that Abu Sayyaf is “by far the most dangerous group in the country today.”<sup>47</sup>

The third troublesome area of weak states is Central Asia, consisting of the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.<sup>48</sup> Here, central government authority is weak, poverty is widespread, and control of the more remote mountainous regions is tenuous, at best.<sup>49</sup> Taking full advantage of this weakness is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda, which has taken root in the region.<sup>50</sup>

## Notes

<sup>6</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1.

<sup>7</sup> *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 23.

<sup>8</sup> US Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2005), 3.

<sup>9</sup> Center for Global Development, *On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security*, report by the Commission on Weak States and US National Security, 8 June 2004), vi, on-line, Internet, 24 February 2005, available from [http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full\\_Report.pdf](http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full_Report.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Paul Kan. “Weak and Failing States,” lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 23 August 2004.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Center for Global Development, *On the Brink*, 9.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Kan.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Greg Mills, “Africa’s New Strategic Significance,” *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 167.

<sup>19</sup> Center for Global Development, *On the Brink*, 10.

<sup>20</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 366.

<sup>21</sup> Mills, 161.

<sup>22</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 366.

<sup>23</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 8.

<sup>24</sup> Center for Global Development, *On the Brink*, 13.

<sup>25</sup> JP 3-07.1, III-1.

<sup>26</sup> Center for Global Development, *On the Brink*, 14.

<sup>27</sup> Kan.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Center for Global Development, *On the Brink*, 24.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>32</sup> Kan.

<sup>33</sup> Center for Global Development, *On the Brink*, 15-16.

<sup>34</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 10.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> United States Institute of Peace, *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, USIP Special Report 113 (Washington, D.C.: USIP, January 2004), 1-2.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-11.

<sup>38</sup> “Nigeria: Muslim Fundamentalist Uprising Raises Fears of Terrorism,” *Integrated Regional Information Networks—UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*,

## Notes

25 January 2004, n.p., on-line, Internet, 26 February 2005, available from [http://www.irinnews.org/S\\_report.asp?ReportID=39110&SelectRegion=West\\_Africa](http://www.irinnews.org/S_report.asp?ReportID=39110&SelectRegion=West_Africa).

<sup>39</sup> Ted Dagne, *Africa and the War on Terrorism*, Congressional Research Service Report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 17 January 2002), 20-21.

<sup>40</sup> Statement of Rear Adm Hamlin B. Tallent, in House, *Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations*, 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 10 March 2005. The TSCTI envisions providing assistance to ten countries: Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, and Libya “possibly to follow later if relations improve.”

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 16.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 16-19, 123-24.

<sup>46</sup> Simon Elegant, “The Return of Abu Sayyaf,” *Time Asia* 164, no. 9, 30 August 2004, n.p., on-line, Internet, 19 January 2005, available from <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/0,13674,501040830,00.html>.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Charles Fairbanks, “Being There,” *National Interest* 68 (Summer 2002): 47-48.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>50</sup> Igor Rotar, “Terrorism in Uzbekistan: A Self-made Crisis,” *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 8 (22 April 2004): 6-7.

## Chapter 3

### Assisting Weak and Failing States: The Role of FID

*Drying up [terrorist] sanctuaries, wherever they may exist, is the lynchpin of a successful strategy....*

*...one key to success in eliminating sanctuaries is building local capacity to shore up US friends and to extend governance and security into ungoverned areas. Unconventional warfare, civil affairs, and foreign internal defense activities are essential to build local capacity—the indirect approach.*

—Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz  
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 10 August 2004

### Host Nation Internal Defense and Development

To recap, state weakness results from the state's inability to perform one or more of the three essential state functions: ensuring internal security, meeting the basic needs of the public, and maintaining government legitimacy. To contend with these shortcomings, many governments establish internal defense and development programs. HN IDAD programs are aimed at creating viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that meet the public's basic needs. The goal of these efforts is to prevent an insurgency or other form of lawlessness or subversion from taking root by addressing the underlying conditions that generate internal instability and state weakness. IDAD programs therefore reflect a preemptive strategy aimed at preventing the emergence of internal threats. However, if an

insurgency, terrorist, or other internal threat develops, HN IDAD efforts form the basis of an active strategy designed to counter the threat.<sup>51</sup>

To prevent or counter internal threats, effective HN IDAD programs combine four interdependent functions: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.<sup>52</sup> Each function is an essential component in the HN's overall IDAD strategy and requires equal effort to ensure success in preventing or countering internal threats.

**Balanced Development.** Balanced development attempts to prevent or eliminate internal threats through political, social, and economic programs.<sup>53</sup> It allows all citizens to share in the benefits of growth and development, thus alleviating social alienation, political disenfranchisement, and general public frustration. In addition, balanced development addresses legitimate grievances that internal subversive elements may attempt to exploit to gain advantage over the HN. To be successful, it is vital that the HN recognizes and acknowledges the underlying conditions that contribute to the internal threat in order to enact appropriate preventive measures. Therefore, enduring solutions to prevent and counter internal threats must focus on correcting the inherent conditions that make the society vulnerable in the first place.

**Security.** The IDAD function of security refers to those HN activities designed to protect the populace from internal threats and provide a secure environment for the conduct of other HN development efforts. Protecting the public and critical national resources from internal threats is a vital element of the HN's IDAD effort, allowing development efforts to take hold. Additionally, effective internal security and territorial control denies internal subversive groups access to popular support.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, the ability of HN security forces to maintain law and order has a large influence on public attitudes regarding the legitimacy of

the government.<sup>55</sup> The task of ensuring security falls mainly to the HN's military, paramilitary, and police forces.

**Neutralization.** The IDAD function of neutralization focuses on achieving the “physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the population.”<sup>56</sup> Neutralization comprises all lawful activities undertaken by the HN to “disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat” the insurgent or terrorist organization, while excluding otherwise legal activities that could damage the government’s legitimacy.<sup>57</sup> In situations characterized by minimal unrest with little political violence, neutralization efforts by the HN may simply involve public exposure and discrediting of insurgent or terrorist leaders. When laws have been broken, neutralization may involve arrest and prosecution. However, escalation to open combat may be required when insurgent or terrorist violence intensifies.<sup>58</sup> Finally, in conducting neutralization activities, it is imperative for HN security forces to act lawfully at all times. This is as much for humanitarian reasons as it is to reinforce the government’s legitimacy and deny the adversary an exploitable issue.<sup>59</sup>

**Mobilization.** The final IDAD function, mobilization, focuses on providing “organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government.”<sup>60</sup> Moreover, mobilization facilitates the government’s ability to strengthen existing institutions, allows the development of new ones to respond to changing demands, and reinforces the government’s legitimacy. Successful mobilization efforts maximize the manpower and other resources available to the government while at the same time minimize those available to insurgents or terrorists.<sup>61</sup> Informational measures are essential for promoting HN mobilization efforts by encouraging public confidence in the government and reducing public unease over internal security initiatives.<sup>62</sup>

## **US FID Support and its Relationship to Host Nation IDAD Efforts**

Recalling the earlier discussion, it is evident that the vulnerability of weak states to terrorist exploitation poses a clear threat to US national security. Where US interests are important enough to warrant assistance, the US may choose to initiate a FID support program to assist the HN in carrying out its IDAD efforts. As defined in Joint Publication 1-02, FID is

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.<sup>63</sup>

In accordance with US policy goals, the focus of US FID efforts is to *assist the HN in anticipating, precluding, and, if necessary, countering internal threats* in support of the HN's IDAD program.<sup>64</sup> FID offers the US an effective means to bolster the security and stability of friendly nations so that internal development programs can be carried out in a secure environment. Successful FID programs are focused and tailored to the specific situation of the HN, taking into full account the underlying factors contributing to weakness and internal instability in the HN.<sup>65</sup>

It is important to note that US FID efforts are always *in support of* the HN's IDAD program: the US does not take the lead in conducting the IDAD program for the HN, as this risks undermining HN sovereignty and legitimacy and potentially sabotaging the entire FID effort.<sup>66</sup> As noted in *Airpower in Small Wars*,

The legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people is the most important factor in an insurgency. Even with the best of intentions, if another state intervenes to take over the fight against an indigenous insurgency, a majority of the population will come to resent the intervening power and the legitimacy of the government will erode....

On the other hand, helping a friendly nation to combat insurgents and terrorists by providing equipment, training, intelligence, and economic and other aid does not delegitimize the central government.<sup>67</sup>

This principle of FID—that the HN is ultimately responsible for its own defense—traces its origins to the Nixon Doctrine, itself an outgrowth of the US’ flawed assistance and intervention efforts during the war in Vietnam.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, the underlying principle of FID is that it fosters *internal* solutions and assists the HN in implementing its own IDAD program, for which it has ultimate responsibility and control.<sup>69</sup> Air Force FID doctrine emphasizes this point, stating that FID efforts are successful if they promote HN self-sufficiency in eradicating lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency while at the same time “[precluding] the need to deploy large numbers of United States military personnel and equipment.”<sup>70</sup>

FID provides the United States with an important tool to assist weak nations in strengthening their internal security. This is attested to in the *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, which states that “one of our military’s most effective tools in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism is to help train indigenous forces.”<sup>71</sup> Because FID focuses on helping the HN in anticipating and precluding internal threats from insurgency and terrorism *before* these disruptive elements take root, early US FID support may prove to be the most effective and efficient long-term strategy in combating terrorism in weak states.

## **FID Strategy and Implementation**

Assistance to weak states, whether in the form of FID or other security assistance programs, must be guided by a comprehensive strategy that is focused on achieving a specific political end state. Devoid of an overarching strategy to guide assistance efforts, FID support to the HN will most certainly lack the proper unity of effort, seriously

jeopardizing the chances for success. The US defeat in Vietnam illustrates the consequences of having an incomplete strategy that fails to consider the political goals behind military assistance and intervention. In *Makers of Modern Strategy*, John Shy and Thomas Collier point out that

American technicians and military advisors with the South Vietnamese armed forces accepted their mission in good conscience, but assumed that political matters—the heart of revolutionary war—were not their responsibility. Although the fighting effectiveness of the South Vietnamese improved markedly with American tutelage and support, nothing was done to confront the political appeal of [Ho Chi Minh's] national stature, the problems of South Vietnamese society, and the taint of a regime dependent on foreign assistance.<sup>72</sup>

In addition to informed and thorough strategic guidance, successful FID support to weak states must involve the coordinated and synchronized application of all instruments of US national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.<sup>73</sup> This is because it is vital for FID programs to address the underlying causes of state weakness, be it economic, societal, political, or some other factor. Pointing to the successful Philippine counterinsurgency against the Huks (1946-56), the British success in the Malayan insurgency (1948-60), and successful US assistance efforts in support of the counterinsurgency in El Salvador (1980-92), the authors of *Airpower in Small Wars* stress the need to utilize all instruments of national power when fighting insurgents:

In successful counterinsurgency campaigns, military operations have been conducted in coordination with government reforms, education and propaganda campaigns, and economic programs that addressed the needs of the population.<sup>74</sup>

Consequently, FID requires the combined resources and expertise of several agencies throughout the US government. FID programs therefore rely heavily on interagency coordination in order to ensure effective support to the HN's IDAD program.

**FID at the Strategic Level.** The US decision to provide FID support to a nation is subject to three criteria: (1) the existing or potential internal disorder within the nation threatens US national strategic interests; (2) the threatened nation is capable of effectively utilizing US support; and (3) the nation requests US assistance.<sup>75</sup> The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, selects those nations the US will support through FID programs; Congress appropriates the necessary funding.<sup>76</sup> Once the decision is made to provide FID support to a nation, the National Security Council develops the strategic level FID planning guidance. The Department of State (DOS) is normally the lead federal agency for FID program execution, and the Department of Defense (DOD) provides the personnel, equipment, and services necessary to meet FID program objectives.<sup>77</sup>

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has an important role in providing strategic guidance to combatant commanders regarding military support to FID programs in their geographic area of responsibility (AOR).<sup>78</sup> This guidance is promulgated primarily via the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).<sup>79</sup> Based on the guidance and available resources laid out in the JSCP, geographic combatant commanders develop their operation plans and concept plans to support FID efforts in their respective theaters.<sup>80</sup>

**FID at the Operational/Theater Level.** Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for planning, executing, and monitoring military operations in support of US FID efforts within their theater.<sup>81</sup> Because of their familiarity with the security and development needs of the friendly nations in their AOR, geographic combatant commanders are accorded wide leeway in managing and coordinating military operations in support of FID.<sup>82</sup> Based on

higher-level strategic guidance in the JSCP and the NMS, combatant commanders outline the theater guidance for coordinating military FID activities in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP).<sup>83</sup> The TSCP is the combatant commander's deliberate plan for the conduct of all military activities involving other nations that are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime; FID is an integral part of this strategy.<sup>84</sup>

**The Role of Special Operations Forces in FID.** Special operations forces (SOF) play a significant role in FID. This stems primarily from Title 10 of the United States Code, which designates United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the sole combatant command with FID as a legislatively mandated core activity.<sup>85</sup> Specifically, SOF's role in FID is to “*train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces [emphasis added]*” as part of the HN's IDAD program.<sup>86</sup> To fulfill its Title 10 responsibility, USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips forces to conduct FID – specifically, US Army Special Forces (SF), certain civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP) units, certain elements of the US Navy's sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, and the combat aviation advisors of the 6<sup>th</sup> Special Operation Squadron (SOS) in Air Force Special Operations Command. USSOCOM provides these forces to the combatant commander, who exercises combatant command of them through the theater special operations command (TSOC).<sup>87</sup> In turn, the TSOC exercises operational control of all SOF in the theater and has the primary responsibility to plan and execute SOF operations in support of FID.<sup>88</sup> As such, the TSOC is an essential component of the combatant commander's theater-wide FID efforts.

The other main reason for SOF's close association with FID has to do with the funding source for FID activities. In most cases, the training of foreign forces by the US is governed by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and is managed and funded by the DOS under the

authority of Title 22 of the United States Code.<sup>89</sup> Unfortunately, security assistance (SA) activities conducted under the authority of the FAA, to include FID, are saddled with an array of complex restrictions and prohibitions. In fact, a group of senior international policy analysts who advocate a complete overhaul of the FAA describes it as “one of the most Byzantine pieces of legislation on the books today” and that its “overlapping mandates and patchwork of restrictions render it complex and confusing.”<sup>90</sup> Fortunately, SOF are granted an exception to the constraints of Title 22 because certain SOF units (e.g., SF and the 6<sup>th</sup> SOS) have as one of their primary missions the training of foreign forces.<sup>91</sup> A provision in Title 10, commonly referred to as the “SOF exception,” authorizes combatant commanders to spend DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) monies to fund SOF training activities with the forces of friendly foreign countries.<sup>92</sup> The upshot of the SOF exception is greater flexibility for the combatant commander to conduct FID using SOF, with funding sourced from in-house DOD O&M monies instead of DOS-managed Title 22 SA monies.<sup>93</sup>

### Notes

<sup>51</sup> JP 3-07.1, B-1.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., B-2.

<sup>55</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 53.

<sup>56</sup> JP 3-07.1, B-3.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 53.

<sup>63</sup> JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 30 November 2004), 212.

<sup>64</sup> JP 3-07.1, I-1, III-1.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., III-2.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., III-1.

## Notes

<sup>67</sup> James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 437.

<sup>68</sup> Maj Greg E. Metzgar, “Unconventional Warfare: A Mission Metamorphosis for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 2000), 56-62.

<sup>69</sup> JP 3-07.1, I-3.

<sup>70</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 2.

<sup>71</sup> US Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States*, 15.

<sup>72</sup> John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 855-56.

<sup>73</sup> JP 3-07.1, I-3-I-5.

<sup>74</sup> Corum and Johnson, 426.

<sup>75</sup> JP 3-07.1, II-1-II-2.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, II-1.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, II-3-II-4.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, II-6.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, III-3.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, II-6.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, II-7.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, III-4-III-5.

<sup>85</sup> *Armed Forces, US Code*, Title 10, sec. 167 (2000).

<sup>86</sup> JP 3-07.1, V-4.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, II-9-II-10.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, II-9.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, A-2-A-4.

<sup>90</sup> Stuart E. Eizenstat, John E. Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 143.

<sup>91</sup> JP 3-07.1, A-7.

<sup>92</sup> *Armed Forces, US Code*, Title 10, sec. 2011 (2000).

<sup>93</sup> Lt Col Wray R. Johnson, “Whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense?” *Airpower Journal* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 78.

## Chapter 4

### **Aviation FID: Closing Airpower Capability Gaps in Weak States**

*A modern, autonomous, and thoroughly trained Air Force in being at all times will not alone be sufficient, but without it there can be no national security.*

—General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold

Thus far, this paper has examined the vulnerability of weak states to terrorist exploitation and how states develop and implement IDAD strategies to respond to this threat. Furthermore, it was shown how US assistance via FID is used to facilitate the advancement of the HN’s IDAD efforts. This final section focuses on the aviation component of FID and how it is an integral part of US efforts to combat terrorism in weak states. Before delving into the specific contributions that aviation FID can make in the war on terrorism, however, it is first necessary to examine the role of airpower in combating insurgents and terrorists.

#### **Airpower in the Fight Against Insurgents and Terrorists**

The employment of US airpower in fighting insurgents and terrorists is complicated by two factors. First, fighting insurgents and terrorists differs markedly from conventional warfare, on which the Air Force has spent the vast preponderance of its time, effort, and resources preparing for and for which it is eminently capable of conducting. In conventional state-on-state conflicts, the belligerents possess capitals, industrial and economic infrastructure, and regular armed forces, all of which are potentially legitimate targets for

attack. Moreover, given the advancements in targeting and aerial munitions in the last twenty years, attacking these targets from the air has become a comparatively straightforward endeavor.

Contrastingly, insurgents and terrorists rarely present such easily identifiable and locatable targets. Insurgent and terrorist groups do not have capitals, possess little in the way of infrastructure, and often hide among the populace or in remote and inaccessible regions outside of major urban areas. Furthermore, these groups rarely operate in the open in large groups, employing instead in small units to capitalize on the advantages of surprise, speed, and mobility to survive and operate.<sup>94</sup> This leaves few uses for the lethal employment of airpower, and as noted in a 2004 “Quick-Look” by the College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, “as long as the insurgents do not make the mistake of massing forces to confront friendly ground forces, lethal air attacks will probably bolster the insurgents’ cause.”<sup>95</sup>

The second impediment to US airpower employment against insurgents and terrorists is doctrinal. The long historical attachment of the Air Force to strategic attack and the de-emphasis of airpower’s supporting functions have contributed to a doctrinal void regarding airpower’s role in counterinsurgency.<sup>96</sup> Airpower theorists past and present have advocated airpower’s ability to directly attack an enemy’s centers of gravity to achieve decisive effects. From the early writings of Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and the “Bomber Mafia” at the Air Corps Tactical School, to the more recent theories of Col John Warden, emphasis has been placed on achieving strategic results by properly identifying and attacking the enemy’s decisive points via air bombardment.<sup>97</sup> A common thread running through these theories is the primacy of strategic airpower operating freely as an independent arm, rather than in a

supporting role to surface forces. The institutional mindset for much of the Air Force is grounded in these strategic and conventionally minded concepts. Indeed, as one airpower historian and theorist attested,

A significant number of military officers—many of them very senior—believed for one reason or another that special attention to such “unconventional” strategies was ill advised and perhaps counterproductive. For example, in the mid-1980’s a very senior Air Force general officer told me that the Air Force should not be distracted by “those kinds of wars” (insurgencies) since we can always just “muddle through.” Rather, we should concentrate on wars “that can eat our bacon.”<sup>98</sup>

It is not the objective here to debate the merits of strategic airpower theory or to dispute the Air Force’s justifiable need to prepare for conventional war. However, it is critical to point out that conventional Air Force doctrine, with its heavy emphasis on strategic attack and offensive air action, is completely unsuited to fighting insurgents and terrorists.<sup>99</sup> Instead, airpower’s *supporting and non-lethal role* is usually the most important and effective method of combating insurgents and terrorists.<sup>100</sup>

Four airpower functions define the broad scope of airpower’s role in fighting insurgents and terrorists—*air mobility; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); information operations (IO); and counterland*. In varying degrees, each of these functions facilitates the previously mentioned IDAD tasks of balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.

**Air Mobility.** Air mobility is perhaps the most important airpower function in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. First, air mobility facilitates HN mobilization efforts in remote areas of the country where government influence is weakest and most susceptible to insurgent and terrorist infiltration. This is achieved by extending the reach of government public information programs to inform and influence the populace.<sup>101</sup>

Second, air mobility can advance HN development efforts in outlying areas. Air mobility can transport specialists and technicians to remote areas in order to provide on-site training and assistance in areas such as public services management, medical care, sanitation and hygiene, agriculture, and school administration.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, air mobility can be used to transport construction equipment, supplies, and personnel to remote areas in support of public works programs such as housing construction, power generation, and transportation infrastructure improvements.<sup>103</sup> In addition, air mobility can address political alienation and disenfranchisement by extending the electoral process to outlying areas.<sup>104</sup>

Third, air mobility greatly enhances IDAD security and neutralization tasks, enabling the rapid transportation and resupply of government security forces to and from remote areas.<sup>105</sup> Air mobility operations in support of security and neutralization span a broad range of mission areas, to include air assault operations, medical evacuation, emergency extraction of security forces, noncombatant evacuation, movement of security forces, and resupply.<sup>106</sup> During the Malayan emergency, for example, the British Royal Air Force made extensive use of helicopters and fixed-wing transports to insert light infantry and Special Air Service units deep into the jungle, keeping them supplied by air for extended periods. These “deep-penetration” patrols were a key factor in defeating the insurgent forces of the Malayan Races Liberation Army in the more remote areas of the country.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, regarding the 1980-1992 insurgency in El Salvador, a Salvadoran Air Force helicopter medical evacuation unit was assessed as being the “most effective single air unit in the war” by contributing significantly to the morale and fighting ability of the army.<sup>108</sup>

**ISR.** In furtherance of the IDAD tasks of security and neutralization, on-the-ground human intelligence (HUMINT) is traditionally considered the best means to obtain accurate

information about the enemy.<sup>109</sup> However, airpower can supplement HUMINT with airborne and space-based signals intelligence and imagery intelligence to assess insurgent and terrorist infrastructure and identify operational patterns and trends. In addition, airpower can be used to accelerate HUMINT activities by infiltrating ground reconnaissance and surveillance teams into areas not readily accessible via surface transportation.<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, airborne reconnaissance and surveillance can be used to monitor critical surface lines of communication and isolated regions to detect and track enemy forces in remote areas.<sup>111</sup> This was the case in the Philippine counterinsurgency against the Huks following World War II, where the Philippine army made extensive use of their Stinson L-5s to locate and track Huk bands; this enabled ground commanders to move their forces into position more efficiently to engage and destroy Huk forces.<sup>112</sup>

**IO.** IO, particularly PSYOP, can enhance all four IDAD tasks. In conducting IO, airpower can be used to deliver information via television and radio broadcast, leaflet drops, or loudspeaker. By closing the “information gap” that exists in the more remote areas of weak states, airpower IO efforts facilitate government efforts to get out their “message.” This serves to mobilize public support, neutralizes the influence of insurgent propaganda, and further isolates insurgents from the population.<sup>113</sup>

In addition, air transport of government officials to remote areas can be used to improve HN information dissemination efforts and to provide a strong symbol of government legitimacy and resolve. For instance, the Philippine secretary of defense during the Huk rebellion, Ramon Magsaysay, frequently traveled by air to visit remote barrios and frontline units to boost morale and inform the public of new government reform policies.<sup>114</sup> His frequent spot visits, made possible by air transport, convinced the population that the

government was improving and fostered the public's trust and support; this in turn eroded popular support for the Huk insurgents and contributed to their defeat.<sup>115</sup>

**Counterland.** In support of IDAD security and neutralization efforts, the counterland function of airpower gains greater importance as the conflict becomes more conventional.<sup>116</sup> When insurgent or terrorist forces concentrate in larger formations and attempt positional warfare, they become particularly susceptible to aerial attack. This was the case in the both the Greek civil war and the Huk insurgency in the Philippines immediately after World War II, where insurgents transitioned to conventional combat against government forces and subsequently suffered heavy losses due to air strikes.<sup>117</sup>

Comprising one half of the counterland function, close air support (CAS) plays an important part in IDAD security and neutralization efforts by protecting friendly ground forces, defending operating bases, and providing convoy escort.<sup>118</sup> In contrast, air interdiction (AI)—the other half of counterland—is normally conducted independently of friendly ground forces. Without ground forces to put “eyes on” the target for verification, AI carries additional risks associated with target misidentification and collateral damage.<sup>119</sup> For AI, as well as CAS, the lethal application of airpower must be tempered by the political and psychological ramifications of aerial attack and the potentially negative consequences of even one errant bomb.<sup>120</sup> As pointed out in *Airpower in Small Wars*,

In many parts of the world, as terrorism is seen as the unique weapon of the poor and fanatic, airpower is seen as the symbolic weapon of the West—the means by which the wealthy and advanced countries can bully the poor and weak countries. Thus, bombing is automatically viewed in the Third World as cruel and heavy-handed....While airpower is often the most effective means to strike at insurgent and terrorists, its use will immediately provoke outcry and protest in many quarters of Western society and throughout most of the Third World. In short, there is a political price to pay when airpower in the form of air strikes is used.<sup>121</sup>

In summary, airpower's proper role in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is defined mainly by its support functions. Used synergistically, the functions of air mobility, ISR, IO, and counterland provide the HN with the flexibility, initiative, and surprise that is normally the advantage of the insurgent and terrorist.<sup>122</sup> Furthermore, airpower allows the HN to quickly extend its operational reach and influence to remote regions of the country to carry out development, security, neutralization, or mobilization tasks. Moreover, it is important to note that airpower is most effective in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations when it is part of an integrated joint force and its use is carefully coordinated with ground forces—this includes not only military ground forces but HN paramilitary and police forces, as well. Airpower is least effective when employed unilaterally or as a substitute for ground forces.<sup>123</sup>

### **Airpower Capability in Weak States**

It is clear that airpower has an important role in fighting insurgents and terrorists. Unfortunately, weak states in the developing world that happen to be the most vulnerable to terrorism and insurgency typically possess only rudimentary airpower capabilities. HN military aviation forces are generally equipped with older generation aircraft with varying levels of reliability and maintainability.<sup>124</sup> Furthermore, these nations typically have limited ability to conduct aircraft maintenance much beyond routine repairs. Additionally, training for aircrew and maintenance personnel is usually inadequate in terms of funding, training resources, depth of instruction, and student throughput.<sup>125</sup> A significant deficiency in the training of HN aircrews and ground forces is the lack of instruction in joint air-ground operations, which has been demonstrated as an absolute necessity for effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations.<sup>126</sup>

Aviation operations in lesser-developed states are typically controlled and coordinated by means of outdated air-ground and air-air communication equipment. Air request networks, if they exist at all, may not extend into the more remote regions of the country.<sup>127</sup> Furthermore, HN aviation forces generally lack any sense for communications security procedures. Combined, these communication shortcomings impose serious constraints on the responsiveness, flexibility, and command and control of HN aviation forces, as well as inhibiting effective air-ground coordination in support of ground forces.

Aviation infrastructure is also lacking in most of the developing world. Outside major cities, there are typically few civil and military airfields; those that do exist usually consist of unimproved strips with minimal support facilities.<sup>128</sup> This may limit the operational reach of airpower, allowing the more remote regions of the countryside to remain outside of government influence and control. In addition, there may be few ground-based navigational aids other than nondirectional beacons, and terminal approach aids may exist only at international airports.<sup>129</sup> These deficiencies may substantially limit flight operations during marginal weather or at night.

### **Aviation FID Operations**

Addressing these airpower capability gaps is the purpose of aviation FID. Aviation FID operations are focused primarily on developing and sustaining HN airpower capabilities.<sup>130</sup> To maximize its effectiveness, aviation FID assistance should function not in isolation, but as part of an overall joint and interagency FID effort that is guided by a comprehensive strategy and clear policy guidance.<sup>131</sup> US policy guidance, together with the HN's IDAD strategy, serves as the basis for determining the nature and scope of US aviation FID assistance

efforts. As such, aviation FID assistance will vary from one nation to another according to US policy and each government's specific needs.

Aviation FID operations fall into three broad categories: *indirect support*, *direct support not involving combat*, and *combat operations*. Conducted during peacetime, indirect support activities focus on promoting HN self-sufficiency and legitimacy by using economic and military assistance to build HN military capabilities.<sup>132</sup> Indirect support is comprised of security assistance, joint and combined exercises, and exchange programs. Of these programs, SA represents the primary Air Force contribution to indirect FID support.<sup>133</sup> SA involves the sale, grant, lease, or loan of military equipment, services, and training to the HN with the intent of helping the government field an indigenous self-defense capability. The principal objective of SA in FID is to establish a secure environment in which the HN can pursue social, economic, and political development initiatives to address the needs of the public and to prevent insurgent or terrorist organizations from establishing a safe haven.<sup>134</sup> Specific aviation FID activities conducted under the umbrella of indirect support include assessments, training, and advising; these activities are discussed in more detail in the next section.

When authorized and directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the Air Force can perform direct support activities that stops short of committing US forces to combat. This form of FID support is normally required when circumstances prevent HN forces from achieving self-sufficiency in time to counter a threat.<sup>135</sup> Non-combat direct support activities are intended as temporary measures until HN forces attain self-sufficiency via formal security assistance mechanisms.<sup>136</sup> These support activities can include Air Force ISR support to HN intelligence collection programs; communications support to HN security

forces; civil-military operations to promote HN development efforts; intertheater and intratheater air mobility and logistics; and aerial photography and cartography.<sup>137</sup>

Combat operations lie at the high end of direct FID support to the HN. Air Force FID involvement during combat operations may include planning and directing HN air force resupply, combat search and rescue, or CAS operations.<sup>138</sup> Air Force aviation advisors might also perform aircrew duties alongside their foreign counterparts during certain missions. Air Force maintenance advisors might assist refueling, rearming, and repair operations at forward bases.<sup>139</sup> In extreme situations, the US may commit conventional combat forces to defend the HN. In this case, Air Force aviation advisors can help senior commanders integrate US airpower with HN air forces.<sup>140</sup>

### **Aviation FID Activities Conducted Under Indirect Support**

Aviation FID activities conducted during indirect support to the HN include *aviation assessments*, *aviation training*, and *aviation advising*.<sup>141</sup> Aviation assessments are normally carried out in support of the geographic combatant commander or other agencies within the US government. The purpose of these assessments is to gauge HN military aviation capabilities in order to provide direction or policy recommendations for future FID support aimed at improving HN airpower employment and sustainment.<sup>142</sup> Aviation assessments provide the combatant commander with “ground truth” regarding HN aviation capabilities and limitations. Aviation assessments typically examine HN aircrew skill and safety, aircraft airworthiness, sustainability, and operational potential.<sup>143</sup>

Based on previous aviation assessments, tailored aviation training enables HN aviation units to accomplish a variety of missions and skills in order to address inherent airpower capability gaps. Training covers a wide variety of operational tactics, techniques, and

procedures in such areas as combat search and rescue; air-ground operations; aerial insertion, extraction, and resupply; ISR; CAS; and airdrop operations.<sup>144</sup> Training assistance in the aviation support function includes aircraft maintenance and supply; logistics; aircraft munitions; ground safety; life support; personal survival; air base defense; communications, and command and control.<sup>145</sup> Aviation training assistance will be tailored to the specific needs of the HN, in accordance with the HN IDAD plan and US policy. Moreover, it is important to note that aviation training provides a “procedural foundation” for military operations and is not directed towards countering a specific threat to the HN or a real-world employment scenario: this falls under the purview of aviation advisory assistance.<sup>146</sup>

Aviation advisory assistance goes a step beyond aviation training in that it instructs HN aviation forces on how to employ airpower in specific operational situations in the HN. Aviation advisory assistance covers the proper use of airpower doctrine; mission planning; aircraft basing; operational sustainment methods; tactical employment; communication; and command and control for specific times, places, and situations.<sup>147</sup> Coupled with aviation training, Air Force advisory assistance helps HN military forces and government agencies generate and sustain airpower in support of their IDAD programs.<sup>148</sup>

### Notes

<sup>94</sup> Corum and Johnson, 7-8.

<sup>95</sup> Col Anthony C. Cain, *Perspective: Airpower in Counterinsurgency Operations*, College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) Quick-Look 04-5. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 2.

<sup>96</sup> Corum and Johnson, 4-5.

<sup>97</sup> David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 629-635.

<sup>98</sup> Dennis M. Drew, “Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to Confusion,” in *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*, ed. Col Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 345-46.

## Notes

- <sup>99</sup> Maj Richard D. Newton, *Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring Air Forces for Foreign Internal Defense*, CADRE Paper Special Series Report AU-ARI-CPSS-91-1 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 1991), 7-8.
- <sup>100</sup> Corum and Johnson, 427. See also MacIsaac, 644.
- <sup>101</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 17.
- <sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 17-18.
- <sup>103</sup> Maj John R. Moulton II, *Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense*, CADRE Paper Special Series Report AU-ARI-CPSS-91-3 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1991), 8.
- <sup>104</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 17-18.
- <sup>105</sup> Moulton, 8-9.
- <sup>106</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 17-18.
- <sup>107</sup> Corum and Johnson, 195-97.
- <sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 348.
- <sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 434.
- <sup>110</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 19.
- <sup>111</sup> Moulton, 9.
- <sup>112</sup> Corum and Johnson, 129-30.
- <sup>113</sup> Moulton, 11.
- <sup>114</sup> Corum and Johnson, 132.
- <sup>115</sup> D. Todd Reed, Jr. and Adrian A. Donahoe, "The Tao of Special Forces: An Analysis of Counterinsurgency Doctrine" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2004), 47.
- <sup>116</sup> Corum and Johnson, 427.
- <sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 135-36.
- <sup>118</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 18.
- <sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>120</sup> Newton, 16.
- <sup>121</sup> Corum and Johnson, 429-30.
- <sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 434-35.
- <sup>123</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 16.
- <sup>124</sup> Newton, 14.
- <sup>125</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 12.
- <sup>126</sup> Corum and Johnson, 433.
- <sup>127</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 13.
- <sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.
- <sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.
- <sup>132</sup> Lt Col Norman J. Brozenick Jr., "Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation Advisory Operations" (unpublished paper, Air University Air Force Fellows Program, June 2002), 23.
- <sup>133</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 25.

## Notes

- <sup>134</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>135</sup> Brozenick, 25
- <sup>136</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>137</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 27-29.
- <sup>138</sup> Brozenick, 26.
- <sup>139</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>140</sup> Ibid., 26-27.
- <sup>141</sup> “6<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron Combat Aviation Advisors: Mission, Concepts, and Capabilities” (staff paper, Hurlburt Field, FL, n.d.), 2.
- <sup>142</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 4.
- <sup>143</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>144</sup> “6<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron,” 5.
- <sup>145</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 4.
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid., 43.
- <sup>147</sup> “6<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron,” 5.
- <sup>148</sup> AFDD 2-3.1, 4.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Conclusion**

This study has shown the clear threat posed by weak and failing states and their susceptibility to terrorist exploitation. The combination of porous borders, lawlessness, and poor internal security make these nations attractive sanctuaries for transnational terrorists. Evidence of significant terrorist activity in several troubled countries in Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia highlights the global nature of state weakness and the spread of terrorism. This presents the US with a serious security problem.

To prevent or counter internal threats from insurgency and terrorism, many nations initiate IDAD programs. These programs promote internal security and development in order to address the underlying causes of state weakness and instability. Many states in the developing world require outside assistance in carrying out their IDAD plans. Direct US military intervention on behalf of these governments is normally ruled out because of more pressing security commitments elsewhere and because US intervention will likely erode the indigenous population's confidence in the government and harm its legitimacy. US support via FID provides the solution. FID assistance, because it calls upon the HN to take the lead in security and development efforts, provides friendly governments with the benefits of US assistance without jeopardizing their legitimacy or sovereignty. US FID efforts are

successful if they preclude the need to deploy significant numbers of US personnel to the HN.

This study has also demonstrated how airpower supports the overall US FID effort by facilitating the IDAD tasks of balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization. Historical experience in small wars has shown that the supporting airpower functions—air mobility, ISR, IO, and counterland—are the most important contributors to the overall FID effort. Best employed as part of an integrated joint force, airpower provides the flexibility, surprise, and initiative that is normally the advantage of the insurgent. In addition, airpower acts as a force multiplier by increasing the effectiveness and survivability of ground forces. Airpower also demonstrates that the legitimate government is in control.

This study also pointed out the poor state of airpower among weak states. Possessing only rudimentary airpower capabilities, nations in the developing world are unable to take full advantage of airpower's unique contributions to further their IDAD efforts. This is where aviation FID steps in. By conducting aviation assessments, training, and advisory assistance, aviation FID strengthens HN airpower capabilities and closes capability gaps. The ultimate goal of aviation FID is to foster the development of a self-sufficient and effective airpower capability in the HN. By strengthening indigenous airpower capability in the developing world, aviation FID is an important tool in combating terrorism in weak states.

## ***Bibliography***

### **Books**

- Chinnery, Philip D. *Air Commando*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
- Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson. *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
- Drew, Dennis M. "Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to Confusion." In *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*. Edited by Col Phillip S. Meilinger. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997.
- MacIsaac, David. "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Edited by Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Shy, John, and Thomas W. Collier. "Revolutionary War." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Edited by Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Walker, Greg. *At the Hurricane's Eye: US Special Operations Forces from Vietnam to Desert Storm*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1994.

### **Periodicals**

- Eizenstat, Stuart E.; John E. Porter; and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 134-46.
- Fairbanks, Charles. "Being There." *National Interest* 68 (Summer 2002): 39-53.
- Johnson, Lt Col Wray R. "Whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense?" *Airpower Journal* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 66-86.
- Mills, Greg. "Africa's New Strategic Significance." *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 157-69.
- Rotar, Igor. "Terrorism in Uzbekistan: A Self-made Crisis." *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 8 (22 April 2004): 6-7.

### **Manuals and Publications**

- Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1. *Foreign Internal Defense*, 10 May 2004.
- Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 30 November 2004.
- JP 3-07.1. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, 30 April 2004.

Navy Marine Corps (NAVMC) 2890. *Small Wars Manual*, 1940. Reprint, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1987.

### **Public Documents**

*Armed Forces*. US Code. Title 10, sec. 167 (2000).

*Armed Forces*. US Code. Title 10, sec. 2011 (2000).

*National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003.

*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.

US Department of Defense. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2005.

US Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2004.

US House. *Denying Terrorists Sanctuary: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services*. Statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 10 August 2004.

US House. *Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations*. Statement of Rear Adm Hamlin B. Tallent. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 10 March 2005.

### **Reports**

Cain, Col Anthony C. *Perspective: Airpower in Counterinsurgency Operations*. College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) Quick-Look 04-5. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004.

Dagne, Ted. *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. Congressional Research Service Report. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 17 January 2002.

Koster, Maj Michael C. *Foreign Internal Defense: Does Air Force Special Operations Have What it Takes?* Airpower Research Institute Report AU-ARI-93-2. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, December 1993.

Moulton, Maj John R., II. *Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense*. CADRE Paper Special Series Report AU-ARI-CPSS-91-3. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1991.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004.

Newton, Maj Richard D. *Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring Air Forces for Foreign Internal Defense*. CADRE Paper Special Series Report AU-ARI-CPSS-91-1. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 1991.

Searle, Thomas R. *Counterinsurgency Warfare for Airmen*. CADRE Military Defense Analysis Quick-Look 2003-01. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2003.

United States Institute of Peace. *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. USIP Special Report 113. Washington, D.C.: USIP, January 2004.

## Unpublished Papers

- Abernathy, Robert K. "The 'Propeller Versus Jet' Controversy and the 'Appropriate Technology' Dilemma." Master's thesis, School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 2000.
- Brozenick, Lt Col Norman J. Jr. "Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation Advisory Operations." Unpublished paper, Air University Air Force Fellows Program, June 2002.
- Metzgar, Maj Greg E. "Unconventional Warfare: A Mission Metamorphosis for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?" Master's thesis, School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 2000.
- Reed, D. Todd Jr., and Adrian A. Donahoe. "The Tao of Special Forces: An Analysis of Counterinsurgency Doctrine." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2004.
- Smith, Jeffrey A. "Counterinsurgency in Uzbekistan: An Adapted FID Strategy for Policy Consideration." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2002.

## Lectures

- Kan, Paul. "Weak and Failing States." Lecture. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 23 August 2004.

## Electronic Publications

- Center for Global Development. *On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security*. Report by the Commission on Weak States and US National Security, 8 June 2004, 76. On-line. Internet, 24 February 2005. Available from [http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full\\_Report.pdf](http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full_Report.pdf).
- Elegant, Simon. "The Return of Abu Sayyaf." *Time Asia* 164, no. 9, 30 August 2004, n.p. On-line. Internet, 19 January 2005. Available from <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/0,13674,501040830,00.html>.
- "Nigeria: Muslim Fundamentalist Uprising Raises Fears of Terrorism." *Integrated Regional Information Networks—UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, 25 January 2004, n.p. On-line. Internet, 26 February 2005. Available from [http://www.irinnews.org/S\\_report.asp?ReportID=39110&SelectRegion=West\\_Africa](http://www.irinnews.org/S_report.asp?ReportID=39110&SelectRegion=West_Africa).

## Miscellaneous

- Staff paper. 6<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron. "6<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron Combat Aviation Advisors: Mission, Concepts, and Capabilities." n.d.