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**THESIS**

**THE VOLATILE SITUATION OF BALOCHISTAN -  
OPTIONS TO BRING IT INTO STREAMLINE**

by

Abid Hussain Shah

September 2007

Thesis Advisor:  
Second Advisor:

Robert O'Connell  
Steven Iatrou

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**THE VOLATILE SITUATION OF BALOCHISTAN- OPTIONS TO BRING IT  
INTO STREAMLINE**

Abid Hussain Shah  
Major, Pakistan Army  
B.Sc. Pakistan Military Academy 1992  
BESE (Bachelor of Electrical and Software Engineering), National University of  
Science and Technology (NUST), 2002  
MSc. (Hons.) Balochistan University 2004

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
September 2007**

Author: Abid Hussain Shah

Approved by: Robert O'Connell  
Thesis Advisor

Steven Iatrou  
Thesis Advisor

Dan C. Boger  
Chairman, Department of Information Sciences

Gordon McCormick  
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

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## **ABSTRACT**

While most of the world's media remains focused on insurgent attacks on coalition forces, oil facilities and Shia and Sunni sectarian attacks in Iraq, Pakistan is experiencing a rising tide of violence in the country's volatile Balochistan province, where the majority of the energy-starved country's natural gas facilities are located. Pakistan, currently engaged in a drawn-out conflict against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants in its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), is slowly descending into conflict with anti-government forces in Balochistan province, raising the unsettling prospect of a rising second internal front against militants. A second internal front would drain resources from Pakistan's ability to maintain effective, smooth and stable control over the law and order situation in the country and its campaign against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants in the NWFP and the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA).

Under the prevailing situation conventional means to bring about peace and encouraging environments for political and economic stability seem to be elusive. In this thesis an effort will be made to uncover the root causes, historical perspective and genesis of socio cultural setup in Balochistan, so that the modern techniques and tools of IO/IW can be used to recommend useful options to deal with the situation by the Pakistan government.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Balochistan contains 44 percent of Pakistan's total land mass and is the largest of the country's four provinces. The province is strategically vital as it borders Iran, Afghanistan, FATA and the Arabian Sea. The capital city of Quetta lies near the border of Afghanistan and has road connections to Kandahar to the northwest. Islamabad also sees the province as essential to its future prosperity, building a \$1.1 billion deepwater commercial and naval port at Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. China contributed about \$200 million toward the construction cost of Gwadar's first phase, which was completed in April 2004. China seems to have interests extending far beyond Gwadar.

India is also interested in Balochistan province as a transit point for a projected \$4.5 billion Iran-India natural gas pipeline expected to be operational by 2010. India also discussed with Pakistan plans by both countries to import gas from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and from Qatar (balochistan.org, March 4, 2007). Balochistan's natural gas production is critical to Pakistan's economy. The Sui natural gas field in Balochistan's Bugti tribal area produces approximately 45 percent of the country's total gas production, with Pakistan Petroleum Limited producing 720-750 million cubic feet of gas daily from more than eighty wells in the field (*Business Recorder*, July 30, 2004). A safe estimate reveals that the province of Balochistan has nineteen trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves and six billion barrels of oil reserves on-and off-shore (*Business Recorder*, May 14, 2004).

Despite the province's wealth of natural resources, Balochistan is Pakistan's poorest province, with 45 percent of the population living below the poverty line. There is rising resentment in the province that despite the fact that its natural gas generates \$1.4 billion annually in revenue, the government remits only \$116 million in royalties back to the province (*Dawn*, February 6). After the U.S. campaign against the Taliban began in November 2001, Balochistan

became a critical escape route for al-Qaeda and International Islamic Front refugees attempting to flee via Karachi to Yemen. After U.S. operations against Iraq began in March 2003, Balochistan became an increasingly important theater of operations for al-Qaeda and International Islamic Front guerrillas in their efforts to attack U.S. economic interests in Pakistan in retaliation for the U.S. campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq (South Asia Analysis Group, January 24, 2003).

In 2003, resentment among Baloch chiefs boiled over into intermittent armed conflict with the Pakistani Army. By July 2004 the rising violence in Balochistan forced a U.S. company involved in offshore drilling to abandon its two test wells between Gwadar and Pasni because of security concerns for a loss of nearly \$26 million (*Business Recorder*, July 30, 2004). On January 18, 2005, a major attack disrupted Sui's output. In the aftermath of the attack, the government rushed hundreds of troops to the area. At least eight people died in the violence, which caused a production loss of more than 43,000 tons of urea and caused a daily electricity shortfall of about 470 megawatts (BBC, January 18, 2005). Balochistan's turbulent year of 2005 ended with an attack on the head of state. On December 14, Balochistan Liberation Army militants launched six rockets, three of them landing near a paramilitary camp in Kohlu that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was visiting 135 miles east of Quetta. Pakistan government described the attack as an assassination attempt and three days later launched a full-fledged army operation in Kohlu district's Marri-Bugti areas against local "miscreants" and "saboteurs." Besides the militant tribal Balochistan Liberation Army, some analysts believe that Taliban and al-Qaeda guerrillas have also been using Balochistan to move back and forth between Pakistan and southern Afghanistan (Voice of America, March 2).

While it seems that al-Qaeda and the Taliban remain focused on their campaign against ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and U.S. forces in Afghanistan's eastern provinces and Pakistani Army units in the NWFP, the possibility exists that they could move southeastwards to take advantage of

Balochistan's growing unrest, linking up with militants operating out of Karachi. If the pressure on Islamist militants in the NWFP becomes too severe, then the distinct possibility exists that rather than face the ISAF troops in Afghanistan, they could migrate to Balochistan and pressure the Pakistan government by threatening the critical infrastructure.

An escalating conflict in Balochistan can only drain resources from Pakistan's war on terrorism on its border with Afghanistan and frighten the foreign investment community away from the province, which will be a key player in Pakistan's future prosperity and stability.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Balochistan, a land of lofty mountains and vast barren wastelands and lush green valleys, is the largest province of Pakistan. It is bordered in the west and northwest by Iran and Afghanistan, in the north by the provinces of Punjab and NWFP, in the east by the province of Sind and in the south by the Arabian Sea. It has common borders of 832 kilometers (km) with Iran and 1,160 km with Afghanistan, while it has 560 km of coast commanding the Arabian Sea. It guards the Gulf and is the western-most part of South Asia. Thus, its geographical location makes it a strategic area of immense importance. However, the history of the province after the independence is marked by a volatile environment and point of concern for the nationalists' politicians and the federal government alike. Figure 1 shows a map of the Balochistan province.



Figure 1. Map of Balochistan Province<sup>1</sup>

The history of Balochistan has imprints of the reluctance by the Khan of Kalat to join Pakistan, the insurgencies of 1958 and 1973 beside the recent low level uprising in many parts of the province.<sup>2</sup> The issues reflected by the nationalist elements such as exploitation of resources of the province by the non-Balochi's, unemployment, demographic changes in the province in the name of development, demand of autonomy, the sense of deprivation and the issue of gas royalty have dominated the political landscape.<sup>3</sup> The involvement of the regional powers for their vested interests has also been fueling the political scene. Above all these factors, the most dominant one remains the exploitation

<sup>1</sup> Wikipedia, Balochistan (Pakistan), [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan\\_\(Pakistan\)#\\_ref-0](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_(Pakistan)#_ref-0) (accessed July 14, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> Syed Iqbal Ahmed, *Balochistan, its strategic importance* (2002), 2.

<sup>3</sup> Balochistan: Political Landscape, <http://www.balochvoice.com/>, (accessed August 17, 2006).

of human resources through an age-old “Sardari System” which is the negation of development and prosperity in the region as well as a reflection of the bad governance in our society.

When the government of Pakistan realized the mistake committed by the governments one after another to ignore the development process in Balochistan and initiated a series of mega projects, it faced resistance from the Maliks and Sardars who feared that their age-old control and hegemony over the locals would be at stake in the process. The miscreants and rebels exploited the sentiments of resentment of the people who always felt that they are not in pace with the other parts of the country for socio-economic development. The development of mega projects and the keen interest of China in these mega projects also attracted foreign governments, regionally and globally, to safeguard their own interests and also to exploit the situation to their own benefit. The turmoil in Balochistan has been further compounded due to the prevailing situation in neighboring Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan’s resolve against the al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants in the Northwest Frontier province and adjoining tribal areas. For bringing the so-called left-out province of Balochistan in line with the developmental course of the rest of the country, a need is therefore felt to unchain the people and politics of the province from the rule of feudal, the known “Sardars,” and apply some modern tools and techniques of information warfare by espousing a wholesome response to settle on the concern. This thesis has been divided into following chapters.

- Chapter I provides an introduction to the thesis and it’s contents.
- Chapter II discusses Balochistan’s History and Demography.
- Chapter III deals with the tribal structure and the genesis of the Sardari System.
- Chapter IV provides analysis of the impacts of the Sardari System on the socio-politico make up of Balochistan.
- Chapter V discusses the internal dynamics of Balochistan and the 1973 insurgency.

- Chapter VI deals with the current turmoil, mega projects and foreign involvement in the region.
- Chapter VII discusses the IO domain, methods and options available to deal with a situation like the one in Balochistan, and the U.S. perspective.
- Chapter VIII discusses whether or not IO can diffuse the situation in Balochistan, as well as the applicability of IO capabilities in Balochistan.
- Chapter IX provides lessons and recommendations.

## II. BALOCHISTAN'S HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHY

### A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In spite of the intrinsic hostility of its landscape and climate, archaeological discoveries have confirmed that Balochistan was already inhabited in the Stone Age, and the important site at Mehrgarh is the earliest (7000-3000 B.C.) on the subcontinent.<sup>4</sup> Until its overthrow by Alexander the Great, Balochistan was part of the Persian Empire, whose records refer to it as "Maka." In 325 B.C. Alexander led part of his army back from his Indus campaign to Babylon across the Makran Desert at the cost of terrible suffering and high casualties. Thereafter, Balochistan lay for centuries on the shadowy borderlands of the Zoroastrian rulers of Iran and the local Buddhist and Hindu dynasties of the northwestern subcontinent.

Islam was brought to Balochistan in A.D. 711 when Muhammad bin Qasim led the army which was to conquer Sindh across the Makran route, but the area was always too remote for firm control to be exerted by any of the later local dynasties.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, it receives only very passing mention in the court histories of the time. The inland areas were variously connected with Iran, Afghanistan and India, where those of coastal Makran were across the Arabian Sea with Oman and the Gulf. The name "Balochistan" only came into existence later with the arrival from Iran of the tribes called Baloch (usually pronounced "Baloch" in Pakistan). Just how and when they arrived remains a matter of hot debate, since the traditional legends of their Middle Eastern origins, supposed to have been in the Aleppo region of Syria, have been further confused by theories

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<sup>4</sup> Mansoor Akbar Kundi, "Tribalism in Balochistan: A Comparative Study," in *Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute and Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2005), 23.

<sup>5</sup> M. Longworth Dames, "Balochi Folklore," *Folklore* 13, no. 3 (September 29, 1902): 252-74; *Ibn Aseer* 3: 17; *Tarikh al Khulfa* 1: 214-15, 229.

either that, like the Pathans, they may descend from the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, or that they originated from Babylon, since "Baloch" is phonetically similar to the names of the God Baal or the Babylonian ruler Belos.

Better evidence is suggested by the Balochi language which belongs to the same Iranian group of Indo-European as Persian and Kurdish.<sup>6</sup> This suggests that the Baloch originated from the area of the Caspian Sea, making their way gradually across Iran to reach their present homeland in around A.D. 1000, when they are mentioned with the equally warlike Kuch tribes in Firdausi's great Persian epic, the *Book of Kings*: Heroic Balochs and Kuches we saw, like battling rams all determined on war. The history of the Baloch has certainly always been warlike. As the last to arrive of the major ethnic groups of Pakistan they were faced with the need to displace the peoples already settled in Balochistan. Some of them were, more or less, successfully subjugated or assimilated, like the Meds of Makran and other now subordinate groups. From others they faced a greater challenge, notably from the Brohi tribes occupying the hills around Kalat.

The origins of the Brohi tribes are even more puzzling than those of the Baloch, for their language is not Indo-European at all, but belongs to the same Dravidian family as Tamil and the other languages of south India spoken over a thousand miles away.<sup>7</sup> One theory has it that the Brohis are the last northern survivors of a Dravidian-speaking population which perhaps created the Indus Valley Harappan civilization; but it seems more likely that they, too, arrived as the result of a long tribal migration at some earlier date from peninsular India.

As they moved eastwards, the Baloch were initially successful in overcoming the Brohis. Under Mir Chakar, who established his capital at Sibi in 1487, a great Baloch kingdom briefly came into existence before being destroyed by the civil war between Mir Chakar's Rind tribe and the rival Lasharis, whose

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<sup>6</sup> Qazi Azher Mubarek Puri, *Rashidun Caliphate and Hind* (Takhliqat: Lahore Pakistan).

<sup>7</sup> Akhtar Husain Siddiqi, *Baluchistan (Pakistan): Its Society Resources and Development* (University Press of America, 1991), 21-3.

battles are still celebrated in heroic ballads. Although the Baloch moved forward into Punjab and Sindh, the authority of the Moguls stopped them from establishing permanent kingdoms there; although the names of Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in NWFP (North Western Frontier Province) are still reminders of the Baloch chiefs who conquered these lands in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The Baloch who settled in the plains gradually became largely detribalized, forgetting their native language and becoming increasingly assimilated to the local population, with their tribal origins remaining little more than a proud memory.

In Balochistan itself, which came only briefly under the authority of the Moghuls, the tables were turned on the Baloch by the Brohis who succeeded in re-establishing their power in Kalat. Throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Khans of Kalat were the dominant local power, with the Baloch tribes settled to the west and to the east of them being forced to acknowledge their suzerainty. The greatest of the Khans was Mir Nasir Khan (1749-1817), whose military success owed much to the regular organization of his army, with its separate divisions recruited from the Sarawan and Jhalawan areas which constitute the northern and southern parts of the Brahui homeland.<sup>8</sup> The Khanate of Kalat became the nearest thing there has ever been to an independent Balochistan. This extended beyond the modern boundaries, since Mir Nasir Khan's authority ran as far as the then insignificant town of Karachi. Although dominated by the Brohis, they themselves became increasingly "Balochified."

With the British expansion into the northwestern subcontinent and their disastrous first Afghan War (1839-1841), internal power struggles within Kalat prompted the first British military interference, and the signing of a treaty in 1841.<sup>9</sup> The British annexation of Sindh in 1843 from the Talpur Mirs, themselves a dynasty of Baloch descent, and the subsequent annexation of Punjab meant

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<sup>8</sup> Balochistan History, <http://www.baloch2000.org/history/baloch.htm> (accessed July 2007).

<sup>9</sup> Syed Iqbal Ahmed, *Balochistan, its Strategic Importance*, (2002), 47.

that Kalat and the other regions of Balochistan were now part of the sensitive western borderlands of British India, where the possibility of Russian interference induced a permanent state of imperial neurosis. Although the eastern Baloch tribes were partially pacified by the efforts of Sir Robert Sandeman, it was thought easiest to leave the Khan and his subordinate chiefs in control of most of the rest of Balochistan. A further treaty was signed in 1876, which forced the Khan to 'lease' the strategic Quetta region to the British but left him in control of the rest of his territories with the aid of a British minister. Granted the rank of a 19-gun salute to mark the size if not the wealth of Kalat, the Khans were for a while content to pursue the eccentric lifestyle characteristic of so many south Asian princes of the time. One Khan became legendary as a passionate collector of shoes, and made sure no pair would ever be stolen by locking up all the left shoes in a dungeon below the Fort at Kalat.

With the last ruler of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1902-79), the Khanate again briefly entered the political arena. Exploiting the opaque clauses of the 1876 treaty, which left some doubt as to just how independent Kalat was supposed to be, he hesitated to join Pakistan in 1947. The brief independence of Kalat finally ended in 1948, when the Khan signed the necessary merger documents, followed by his formal removal from power and the abolition of the state's boundaries in 1955. The present shape of Balochistan was finally rounded out in 1958 when the Sultan of Oman sold Gwadar, given to one of his ancestors by the Khan of Kalat, back to Pakistan. To understand the present situation, however, it is necessary to look more closely at Balochistan's history, and in particular the role played by the British in the region.

## **B. THE BRITISH INVOLVEMENT**

In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the British had established their supremacy in the subcontinent, Russia was advancing southward into Central Asia. The British government in London was perturbed and considered it an imminent threat to the security and tranquility of the British Indian Empire and asked their

government in India to checkmate the Russians.<sup>10</sup> Thus began the British involvement in this region. Up until that point the area now forming Pakistan (i.e., Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province) and the tribal belt were practically independent.

Accordingly, in 1838, Auckland, the British Governor General of India, decided to dispatch his forces to Afghanistan through Sindh and Balochistan but was disastrously defeated in Afghanistan. To rehabilitate British prestige and control the region, the English occupied Sindh in 1843 and Punjab in 1849 and established their hold in Balochistan from 1854-76. The British were able to consolidate themselves in Balochistan with relative ease as compared to the tribal belt in the NWFP. The reason was that Balochs would normally follow their chiefs or 'Maliks' known as Tumandars. They had a common overall head, the Khan of Kalat. In 1854 an agreement was concluded between the British and the Khan who promised not to have relations with any foreign power without the approval of the English; to receive British troops when necessary; to protect merchants passing through his territory; and to prevent his followers from raiding British territory. In return for all of this he was to receive an annual subsidy of 150,000 Rupees. Thus a system of subsidy was introduced to purchase the loyalty of the Khan. As the control exerted by the Khan was not very strict, these arrangements ultimately did not suit the British.

With a view to further consolidate their hold, further negotiations were conducted with the Khan of Kalat and a fresh treaty was signed at Jacobabad in 1876. The British succeeded in getting Quetta and the surrounding area together with Bolan Pass on lease. The agreement required the area to remain under nominal sovereignty of Kalat but to be administered by the British. A British Indian force was stationed at Quetta and Sir Robert Sandeman was appointed the first Agent to the Governor General in Balochistan. He tactfully established

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<sup>10</sup> Ansar Abbasi "What Balochistan Deserves," *The News International*, (Islamabad, September 7, 2006).

contacts with the tribal chiefs and succeeded in maintaining peace in the area. The arrangement is known as the Sandamen System and also as the Khasadar System.

It rested on the occupation of central points in Kalat and the tribal territory in considerable force, linking them together by fair-weather roads, and leaving the tribes to manage their own affairs according to their own customs and working through their own chiefs and Maliks. The Maliks were required to enlist levies paid by the government but were regarded as tribal servants. The British achieved the objective of their own protection, keeping roads open and in case of trouble, locating the troublemakers. They would give monetary benefits to the tribesmen under the supervision of the Maliks in return for maintaining order in the tribe. For this cooperation, the Maliks also received large subsidies.

After independence in 1947, the princely states of Lasbela, Mekran and Kharan, as well as Kalat, acceded to Pakistan. Pakistan continued to follow the British policy of administering Balochistan through their Maliks/Sardars. The government under Iskander Mirza purchased Gwadar from the Emirate of Oman and made it a part of Balochistan, which was then made a full-fledged province under President Yahya Khan in 1970.

### **C. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN BALOCHISTAN**

The current situation has many dimensions - political, economic, and social, along with the element of foreign involvement, in particular the situation in Afghanistan in context of the GWOT (Global War on Terrorism). There is also the problem of security of national and public assets. Politically, Balochistan remained at a disadvantage for a long time. It did not enjoy the status of a province for a quarter of a century after independence.<sup>11</sup> Its first provincial assembly was elected as a consequence of the 1970 elections conducted under

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<sup>11</sup> Abbasi, "What Balochistan Desrves."

Yahya's<sup>12</sup> government. During the government of the Pakistan People's Party under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it was alleged that some of Baloch Sardars were activated by foreign powers, mainly Soviet Russia, and arms coming for them from Iraq were captured at the Islamabad airport. Soon, a situation of confrontation between the provincial government of Balochistan and the federal government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto developed as a result of the latter's plans for social and political reforms in the province. The government of Balochistan was sacked and military action was initiated in 1973. This was a setback to the democratic political process. During the government of Zia ul Haq there was a return to the old policy of reconciliation with Sardars and peace was restored in the province. Under Zia ul Haq, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, Balochistan experienced more or less the same political evolution as the rest of the country except that under Benazir, the Balochistan assembly was dissolved in 1988 but was revived under orders of the High Court. Nevertheless, the dissolution of provincial assembly created a lot of resentment against the centre.

Now the federal government seems determined to develop Balochistan and about 130 billion rupees worth of projects have been sanctioned. The most prestigious project is that of Gwadar Port.

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<sup>12</sup> General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was born at Chakwal in February 1917. After completing his studies from the Punjab University, Yahya Khan joined the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. He was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1938. His early postings were in the North West Frontier Province. During World War II, he performed his duties in North Africa, Iraq and Italy. After Independence, Yahya Khan played a major role in setting up the Pakistan Staff College at Quetta. During the war of 1965, he commanded an infantry division. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army in 1966 with the rank of General.

When, in 1969, countrywide agitation rendered the situation out of control, Ayub Khan decided to hand over power to the Army Chief, General Yahya Khan. Immediately after coming to power, Yahya Khan declared Martial Law in the country on March 25, 1969, and assumed the title of Chief Martial Law Administrator. He terminated the Constitution and dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies. On March 31, he also became President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Immediately after taking charge of the country, he started looking for options through which he could hand over power to the elected representatives. On March 29, 1970, through an Ordinance, he presented an interim Constitution, the Legal Framework Order. It was actually a formula according to which the forthcoming elections were to be organized. It goes to the credit of Yahya Khan that the first general elections in the history of Pakistan were held during his regime in December 1970.

#### **D. DEMOGRAPHY**

The province of Balochistan is unique in its geo-political significance. It has a total area of 34,056 square kilometers which forms 44% of Pakistan's land mass and has a 770 km long coast line.. It consists of arid basins and various hill ranges, sharply marked off from the Indus plain by the Kirther and Sulaiman ramparts. It exhibits a great variety of physical features, consisting of vast rocky desert with extremes of climate and very low rainfall. In the northeast, the Zhob – Loralai basin is surrounded by mountains on all sides. The Quetta basin is also surrounded by mountains, namely Zarghun, Takatu, Khilafat, Chiltan and Murdar Ghar. In the north and northwest, the lobe is bordered by the Toba Kakar Range.

The general terrain of northwestern Balochistan comprises a series of low-lying plateaus, some of which are separated by mountain ranges. Southern Balochistan includes the Sarawan area in the north and a vast wilderness of ranges in the south. The Balochistan plateau extends westward and averages 263 meters high, with many ridges running across it from northeast to southwest. It is separated from the Indus plain by the Sulaiman and Kirther ranges. It consists of dry valleys, saline lakes and a vast area of desert with dry hills, generally running across the plateau from the northeast to southwest.

Economically, its vast rangelands, large number of livestock, rich mineral and gas deposits, and quality deciduous fruits are of significant value although there is relatively little industrialization in the province. Balochistan's arid but diverse climatic zones have contributed to a rich animal and plants biodiversity while building a definitive cultural heritage that has allowed survival in this rugged and harsh landscape.

#### **E. BALOCHISTAN AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE**

Balochistan occupies a special strategic position in the geography of Pakistan. An area of 0.35 million square kilometers inhabited by only 6.6 million

people with a population density of about 19 persons per square kilometer.<sup>13</sup> More than 20 percent of its population is concentrated in urban areas. Balochistan for a long time oscillated between obscurity and prominence, but its geo-strategic importance never slackened. Its enduring importance lies in the fact that it is close to the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Balochistan lies in a commanding position vis-à-vis the Straits of Hormuz, one of the choke points of the Indian Ocean and the World. Its trijunctional border in the northwest links Seistan (Iran) and Helmund (Afghanistan) with Chagai (Pakistan), overlooking the Mashad-Zahedan-Chabahar Highway. In the northeast, the inland constrictions like the Khojak and Bolan Passes (opposite Kandahar) are some of the most important bottlenecks in the region from the geo-strategic point of view. They were important for Czarist Russia and Victorian England in the past, and they remain so today.

Balochistan's political boundaries do not conform to its ethnic orientation; instead they vary widely. From a population perspective, it encompasses a large chunk of Iran, Afghanistan and parts of Sindh, Punjab and NWFP of Pakistan. The Encyclopedia of Islam describes Balochistan by stating that, "It includes the whole country over which Baloch race is spread without regard to political boundaries." According to ethnic configuration, the Baloch inhabit parts of Helmund, Nemroz and many other parts of Afghanistan, Balochistan under the Iranian occupation, and Seistan (Iran), Sindh, Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan under Pakistan. Due to its relief, or physical features, the Greek historian Herodotus had divided Balochistan into three distinct parts, which by and large conform to the description given by the Encyclopedia of Islam. They were:

- Aracosia comprising Kandahar and the Quetta Region.
- Drangiana, including Helmund, Seistan and Chagai.
- Gedrosia comprising (currently under Pakistani and Iranian occupied) Makran Coast.

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<sup>13</sup> Amir-ul-Mulk Mengal, "Study in Balochistan," (group research paper, 2004), 3.

The fact is that large chunks of Eastern Iran, Southern Afghanistan and Pakistani Balochistan are so identical in geography and ecology that they form one natural region. According to Sir Denys Bray, "Together they appear more Central Asian than Indian."

### III. TRIBAL STRUCTURE AND THE GENESIS OF THE SARDARI SYSTEM

#### A. TRIBAL STRUCTURE

The population of Balochistan is sub-divided into various tribes and sub-tribes. These tribes are independent and are vehemently against any outside influence. Tribal Sardars enjoy complete authority over the lives and property of their tribes.<sup>14</sup>The traditions and customs of one tribe differ with the customs and traditions of other tribes. In a number of cases the customs of other tribes are taken as major abuse within a particular tribe. The some of the details about major races are described in the following paragraphs.

##### 1. Baloch Tribes<sup>15</sup>

The Balochs are traditionally nomadic tribes which migrated from the Euphrates and Tigris river areas of Iraq. The Baloch tribes are further divided into twenty-one sub-tribes, each having distinct tribal traditions. The major sub-tribes of Baloch tribes are listed below.

##### a. *Bugti*

The Bugtis are one of the largest and important Baloch tribes. Like others, they are comprised by a mixture of many other Baloch tribes. The majority of them, however, are of Rind lineage. They occupy the southeastern portion of the Sibi District.

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<sup>14</sup> M. Sardar Khan Baloch, *History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan* (Karachi: Process Pakistan, 1958).

<sup>15</sup> Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1974), 319.

**b. Bungulzai**

The Bungulzai are an important Baloch tribe of Rind extraction. They are to be found in Mastung, Quetta, Dasht, Sibi and Kachi. The tribe is bilingual, speaking both Balochi and Brohi.

**c. Jamali**

This tribe is a clan of the Rinds. The main body of the tribe lives in Nasirabad, in the neighborhoods of Khosa, Buledi and Jakhran tribes. At present, they are said to be good agriculturists and cultivators who no more report to nomadic life.

**d. Kaisarani**

Karisaranis are said to have been founded by a Rind named Kaisar. They are settled in Dera Ismail Khan in NWFP and in Punjab, while they dwell among the Bijarani clan of the Marri tribe in Balochistan.

**e. Marri**

This is the largest and one of the most important Baloch tribes. They are of Rind extraction. This tribe was founded by Mir Bijar Puzh Rind, son of Mir Perosh, who was killed in the Rind-Lashari battle at Nali along with Mir Bibrak, Mirhan and other Rind warriors. The tribe is divided into three main divisions, namely Bijarani, Gazeni and Loharani.

**f. Mazari**

Like the Laigharis, it is one of the major organized Baloch tribes in Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab. Most of the tribe is said to be of Rind origin. A clan of Kurds also forms a part of this tribe. The tribe is thus a combination of several other Baloch tribes.

## **2. Brohvi Tribes**

Brohvi is from a Persian word “Barohi” means a hillman. They are excellent mountaineers and sharp shooters. Some important Brahvi tribes are listed below.

### **a. Bizinjo**

This tribe claims to be a division of the Rind Baloches. When Mir Chakar Rind had moved to the Sibi and Kachi regions, this tribe, along with the Mengals, remained in the Jhalwan mountains in the regions of Nal and Ihaljao.

### **b. Mengal**

This tribe consists of three factions called Shahizai, Zagar and Samalani. Shahizai Mengals live at Wadh in the Jhalwan mountains of the Kalat District, while Zagar Mengals dwell in the Chagai District Samalanis, being nomads, keep moving in search of fresh pastures in the Kachi, Khara and Chagai Districts.

### **c. Mohammad Hassani**

They are recorded as Persian-speaking, and hence Baloches. Like the Haroonis, they claim to have migrated from the province of Faras in Iran.

### **d. Rinds**

Among the Balochs, the Rinds need no introduction because it was under the leadership of Mir Jalalhan Rind that forty-four different Baloch tribes migrated from Seistan to Makran, and then spread out in Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab and Gujrat.

**e. Zehri (Moosiani)**

They claim to be Baloches. At one time, they were a dominant tribe in the Jhalwan region of the Kalat District, until it was replaced by the Zarakzai faction of the Zehris.

**3. Pakhtun Tribes<sup>16</sup>**

The Pathans form approximately 28 percent of the Balochistan population, but occupy only one-fifth of the area in the northern and northeastern parts of the province. They are a dominant community in terms of literacy, economy and share in the government services, and have almost monopolized the trade. Even in the field of agriculture, the main produce of Balochistan comes from Pathan areas. Their further distribution in the major tribes is described below.

**a. Kakars**

This is the biggest tribe of Pathans, inhabiting Quetta and Zhob Division and the Ljoralai, Pishin and Musa Khel Districts. They are a warlike tribe. Kakars have a reasonable political standing, represented through the Kakar Group headed by ex-Provincial Minister Malik Sarwar Khan Kakar (from Pishin). Kakars are generally better educated and have always influenced the Balochistan Government due to the presence of their MPAs in the government.

**b. Achakzais**

They are the descendants of Ahmed Shah Abdali owing to which they are a proud race. They mostly dwell on the Pak-Afghan border and vast numbers of them live in Afghanistan. The Achakzais are politically one of the most active and militant tribes, living around Pishin, Chaman, Gulistan and Quetta.

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<sup>16</sup> Mengal, "Study in Balochistan," 13-96.

### **c. Ghilzais**

The Ghilzais migrated from Afghanistan during the 17<sup>th</sup> century and settled in the Zhob, Qila Saifullah and Loralai Districts. They are educated and involved in agriculture and trading.

## **B. THE GENESIS OF SARDARI SYSTEM**

### **1. Overview of System**

The “Sardari” regime in Balochistan is a system of indirect rule in which the central authority chooses to leave certain areas of the country to be controlled by local chieftains, who profess allegiance to the state and acknowledge its “strength.” They raise revenue, apply local customs to settle disputes and dispense “justice,” and maintain order to the extent they can or deem expedient.<sup>17</sup> Many observers are inclined to attribute Balochistan’s relative underdevelopment to the tribal Sardars’ determination not to let forces of modernization, such as education and economic diversification, enter their areas. They fear that the resulting enlightenment will arouse their hitherto oppressed tribesmen to self-assertion. Tyranny of the feudal lords in Sindh and southern Punjab has likewise been blamed for the stark poverty and backwardness of the peasantry in these regions as well.

### **2. The Origin**

The Sardari system traces its origin back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century when tribes were organized with the mutual consent of tribesmen as part of the Khanate Confederacy.<sup>18</sup> The system was undermined by the British after they established their rule in Balochistan.<sup>19</sup> The system continued after independence due to lack

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<sup>17</sup> Daily Times, Reasons for Unrest in Balochistan, [www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.aspstory\\_31-1-2005](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.aspstory_31-1-2005), 3, (accessed July 2007).

<sup>18</sup> Khair-un-Nisa, *Baluchistan Through The Ages*, vol. 2 (1906), 17-53.

<sup>19</sup> Syed Abdul Qaddus, *The Tribal Baluchistan* (Ferozsons, 1990), 58.

of literacy, economic development and good governance. The Sardari system is a century's old institution, which still exists in a number of Baloch and Brohi areas of Balochistan. The understanding of the Sardari System is not possible without tracing its origin at the time of the emergence of the Kalat Confederacy founded by Mir Ahmed Khan in 1666.

The Kalat State was one of the leading and rich states that extended its sovereignty from the upper terrain of Sindh and the Suleiman Range to the shores of Mekran/Gwadar. It comprised three states: Mekran, Kharan and Lasbella. These states enjoyed autonomy but pledged allegiance to the Khan of Kalat, Mir Khudadad Khan. He organized the tribal system and asked the three rulers to do so. The three rulers individually enjoyed the command over their respective heads of tribes. The heads were known as Sardars or Nawabs. The Sardars were assisted by Waderas depending on numerical and resource-wise strength of the tribes. Sardars and the command they enjoyed over their tribes served as a bulwark of the sovereignty of the Kalat State as well as for mutual defense.

### **3. British Involvement**

Soon after the British took control of Balochistan, the major changes they made, in support of divide-and-rule policy, was to transform the Sardari system from the traditional lines into a new one. Under the new system, better known as the Sandeman System, a Sardar could remain in office as long as he enjoyed the support of the British in keeping the tribesmen intact and silent. Under the Treaty of Kalat in 1883, one of many treaties between the Sardars and British, Sardars were given regular allowances, concessions and privileges for their loyalty to the Raj. The Sardar-Raj relationship was based on a carrot-and-stick policy. Thus the nucleus of Sardars' loyalty shifted from Meeri, the palace and seat of rule of the Khanate of Kalat, to the British Residency in Quetta, and the Khan lost

control over the Sardars. Under the Sandeman System, the major role of the Sardars was their allegiance to the Empire by keeping his tribesmen subdued.<sup>20</sup>

#### **4. The Crisis of the Sandemanian Sardari System**

In 1947 the crisis of political development, which dashed the hopes of a representative system in the country, left the Sardari System untouched. The revival of democracy in 1970 brought new hopes of development and democracy for the common man against Sardari order. Ataulah Mengal, a Sardar, stepped into the office of Chief Minister with the JUI-coalition (Jamiiat Ulma-e-Islam) support to represent the interests of the province in the new setup. But the hopes proved to be short-lived due to dissolution of the Balochistan assembly by Z. A. Bhutto, which finally led to a martial law. During this period, the Sardars/Nawabs were re-strengthened against tribesmen after huge funds poured into their pockets without any accountability. Bhutto abolished the Sardari System in July 1976, but its roots were not dissolved.

#### **5. Present Tribal Feuds**

Like all other tribal cultures, almost every tribe in Balochistan is nurturing some enmity resulting in feuds which have continued for decades. These clashes, which started due to extremely petty differences, have taken many lives and have virtually isolated the concerned tribes, stalling their social growth by diverting all of their energies in seeking revenge. Some of the major tribal feuds, along with their reasons for feuding, are as follows:

- Nawab Akbar Bugti vs. Kalpars – murder.
- Nawab Akbar Bugti vs. Ahmedans – murder.
- Bugtis vs. Mazaris – murder and land.
- Bugtis vs. Raisanis – murder.
- Gazinis vs. Bejranis (clans of Marris) – land and murder.
- Hameedzais vs. Ghaibezais (Clans of Achakzais) – murder.

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<sup>20</sup> Khair-un-Nisa, "Baluchistan Through The Ages.

- Rind vs. Raisani – murder.
- Suleman Khels vs. Lawoons – land and murder.

## **IV. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS OF THE SARDARI SYSTEM ON THE SOCIO-POLITICO COMPOSITION OF BALOCHISTAN**

### **A. IMPACT/FALLOUT OF SARDARI SYSTEM**

#### **1. Political Landscape**

Balochistan is ethnically divided into Pashtoon and Baloch zones. Any charismatic leader from one zone or group may never be acceptable to the other group, thus unanimous leadership of the province has been very difficult. Politics in Balochistan have generally revolved around pro- and anti-federation elements wherein sub-nationalist parties, headed by Sardars, have caused a considerable nuisance. Balochistan has never had a strong and stable political government. Present coalition government, instead of leading the province out of its crisis of lawlessness and lack of development, is further compounding the issue. Nepotism, discrimination and tribal preferences are dragging the province into further chaos. The legislators, busy criticizing each other, enhancing their privileges and securing more development funds, are not interested in improving the law-and-order situation of Balochistan. This deplorable political landscape has given rise to certain complex crises in the region, a few of which are elaborated on below.

##### ***a. Sub-Nationalism***

The sub-nationalist movement in Balochistan traces its history to the pre-independence era when the Baloch National Party (BNP), under Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, opposed annexation of the State of Kalat with Pakistan. Following the government action against the Khan of Kalat in 1956, the disgruntled Baloch leaders floated the idea of greater Balochistan comprising

Pakistani Balochistan, Afghani Nimroz and Helmund provinces, and Iranian Seestan-o-Balochistan province.<sup>21</sup> The main themes propagated by these sub-nationalist leaders are:

- Reject the Punjab's dominance accusing it of looting the resources of Balochistan.
- Resist the establishment of military garrisons in the province to minimize the army and federal government influence.
- Hindering mega-development projects by deeming them as against the larger interest of Balochistan.
- Spreading venomous propaganda against the government, army and the Punjab.
- Accusing the government of handing over Baloch coastal areas to the U.S.A. in order to establish the CENTCOM Headquarters.

***b. Sectarianism***

A province that once boasted of its sectarian harmony has, in the recent past, witnessed terrible violence in the name of religion. In this regard, a deliberate attempt is being made to add another dimension to the worsening law-and-order situation of Balochistan.

***c. Smuggling of Arms and Ammunition***

The smuggling in Balochistan is neither considered an illegal or immoral act today, nor was it in the past; it is merely considered a trade activity with greater risks. Contraband goods are abundantly available in the province and almost every effort to prevent this large scale smuggling has failed. The smuggling of arms and ammunition added another dimension to the internal situation, thus giving rise to lawlessness in the province.

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<sup>21</sup> Trade across Frontiers in Balochistan, <http://www.weeklyindependent.com/archives/Issue2001/opinion3.html> (accessed June 2007).

#### **d. Socio Economic Status**

Lack of interest in the socio-economic development of the province displayed by all previous governments has created a sense of deprivation, thus providing an excuse to the sub-nationalist parties for airing sentiments against the Punjab and federal government. The major contributory factors towards the present socio economic state of the province are:

- Lack of interaction of people of Balochistan with the people of other provinces due to lack of a communication infrastructure.
- Nominal representation of Balochis in the armed forces and bureaucratic cadres, especially in senior ranks.
- General unemployment amongst skilled and unskilled people.
- Insufficient and inefficient social services.
- Unfounded feeling of discrimination in the accountability process.
- Poor economic conditions as a result of limited agriculture, industry, mining projects and provision of inadequate funds through NFC (National Finance Commission) Awards.<sup>22</sup>

#### **e. Major Socio-Economic Problems**

The major problems being faced by people are outlined below.

(1) **Lack of Communication Infrastructure** Balochistan has only 2,100 kilometers of black top roads as compared to approximately 6,000

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<sup>22</sup> NFC Award i.e. National Finance Commission (NFC) award is the distribution of financial resources among the provinces of Pakistan by the federal government on an annual basis. Pakistan has seven NFC awards to date. The lack of consensus in the National Finance Commission had delayed the announcement of the seventh NFC Award. As a result, the sixth Award, which lapsed in the year 2002, was still being adhered to. Then after a meeting between the president and the chief ministers (CMs), the four CMs empowered the president to take the final decision. Therefore, now the president has announced the seventh NFC Award through an ordinance. His fresh steps have revealed that the President believes in inter-provincial harmony. Since no consensus could be developed on a new NFC award and for that reason he had decided to offer more money to the provinces through a new resource distribution formula and decided to amend article 160 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to make the existing divisible pool more attractive for the federating units.

kilometres in NWFP and much more in Punjab and Sind. Similarly, the entire network of railway that exists was laid during 1885-95. The lack of infrastructure has not only made the development tedious and slow, but has also cut off the population of this province from rest of the country, creating an acute sense of deprivation.

(2) **Low Literacy Rate and Students Unrest** The literacy picture here is grim as not only is the literacy rate low, the quality of education is also poor. Politicization of educational institutions and strong student organizations have rendered the administration ineffective. The graduates here are thus not proficient in their respective fields, which results with the youth of Balochistan fail to compete at the national level. Thus, Balochistan remains out of the mainstream.

(3) **Lack of Social Services** Most of the people are unaware of the concept of social services. Healthcare, electricity, clean drinking water, gas, telephone services, etc. are considered privileges instead of basic necessities. Moreover, the existing services are not very efficient, except at the provincial capital.<sup>23</sup>

(4) **Unemployment** Unemployment, particularly amongst the educated youth, is high. Thus, they feel deprived and frustrated. The general complaint is that the federal government is not adhering to the 'quota' of Balochistan. Lack of industrial activity and the unwillingness of Nawabs to allow development has further worsened the situation. The unemployed youth, therefore, are left with few other options but to take up arms.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, [hrcp-web.org/balochistan\\_mission.cfm.html](http://hrcp-web.org/balochistan_mission.cfm.html) (accessed July 2007).

<sup>24</sup>Balochistan's Youth; Options Open, [www.balochistan.org/modules.php.html](http://www.balochistan.org/modules.php.html) (accessed July 2007).

## **2. Impact on the Current Law-and-Order Situation**

Balochistan has its own law-and-order matrix wherein tribal conflicts, poverty, the weak writ of government, unabated smuggling, gun running and availability of safe havens produce an environment where crimes are more frequent and acceptable than other parts of the country. Balochistan, due to its size, ethnic demarcations and holdings of Sardars, can be divided into distinct zones, each having its own problems and key players. The important trouble areas under the influence of Sardars are listed below.

### ***a. Armed Opposition to Military Cantonments***

The perception being propagated by Sardars, for their vested interests, is that the establishment of cantonments at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu are not meant for development, but for repression and control of the Baloch people.

### ***b. Marri Area***

The inaccessible, barren mountains of these areas are notorious refuges for criminals and outlaws, housing most of the existing Ferrari Camps of Balochistan.<sup>25</sup> These Ferrari Camps, where armed men are trained for terrorist activities, are patronized, funded and maintained by local Sardars. The major tribe inhabiting this area is the Marri, which is further divided into several sub clans. The most important of these clans are Ghazinis, led by Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, and Bejranis, led by Mir Hazar Khan Bejrani.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Balochunity.org, [www.balochunity.org/index.php/facts](http://www.balochunity.org/index.php/facts) (accessed April 2007).

<sup>26</sup> Studies conducted in command and staff college Quetta in 2003-2004 about Balochistan's turbulent situation.

**c. *Dera Bugti and Sui***

After the discovery of natural gas, exploration companies and the government of Pakistan signed comprehensive agreements with local Chieftain Nawab Akbar Bugti. According to the agreements, gas companies were supposed to provide non-technical jobs and technical educational facilities to locals and undertake development activities besides giving gas royalty to Nawab Akbar Bugti. After the military takeover of October 1999, relations soured as gas companies felt more confident in dealing with the unjust demands of Nawab. In order to maintain his writ and continue accruing benefits, Nawab resorted to attacks on gas pipelines, installations and law enforcement agencies, especially the Frontier Corps. He also established new Ferrari Camps and mined roads to coerce the government and gas companies. These practices caused considerable damage, both in terms of lives and property.

**d. *Khuzdar and Wadh***

This area lies along the strategically important RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) Highway linking Quetta with Karachi. Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal, the Chief patron of BNP (Balochistan Nationalist Party) claims to have come back to liberate the Baloch people. He has been seen as active in uniting the divisive forces of Balochistan. He has used PONM (Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement) platform to project provincial issues at national and international forums. Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal has also been active in forging alliances to bring Nawab Bugti, Nawab K. B. (Khair Baksh) Marri and Mehmood Khan Achakzai onto one platform, so that greater resistance will be offered to the mega projects initiated by the government.

**e. *Mekran Coast***

This was traditionally known as a peaceful area. However, the initiation of mega-development projects, like Gwadar Deep Sea Port and Coastal

Highway, has attracted terrorists from across the province.<sup>27</sup> These criminals, hiding in the mountains, believe that the interest of Balochistan and the Baloch lie in sabotaging these projects.

**f. Dasht (Noshki and Dalbandin)**

This vast and deserted area was relatively quiet until a few years ago. Apart from the smuggling activities, this area was only threatened by lawlessness concentrated in the Girdi Jungle. The sub-nationalists have recently carried out bomb blasts and rocket attacks in the city, which can be attributed to terrorists hiding in mountains located west of Mastung. This area also serves as a conduit for Iranian intelligence operations, human smuggling, and weapons/narcotics smuggling.

**g. Quetta**

During the last few years, Quetta witnessed numerous bomb explosions and rocket attacks which virtually became a routine activity. The situation, however, improved after the change of the police high command.

**h. Miscellaneous Factors**

A few of the miscellaneous factors contributing towards lawlessness in Balochistan are as follows:

- A weak government and its failure to establish writ over the province, and friction between various parties including in the coalition government.
- Recent incidents of sectarian violence and involvement of banned religious organizations are also contributing towards the worsening of an already poor law-and-order situation.

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<sup>27</sup> The Nation, "Balochistan Situation," [nation.com.pk/daily/apr-2005/11/columns3.php](http://nation.com.pk/daily/apr-2005/11/columns3.php) (accessed March 2007).

- Geo-strategic interference: influx of Afghan refugees and covert involvement of foreign powers.
- Enhanced activities of hostile intelligence agencies, using Afghanistan and Iran as their base to encourage sub-nationalist agenda.
- The absence of mature and enterprising local media, both electronic and printed, has increased frustration in an environment where a vacuum of information enables the exploitation of the masses by pro-active sub-nationalists.

*i. Ferrari Camps<sup>28</sup>*

These camps located at Kohlu, Sibi, Dera Bugti, Loralai and Mastung are now fairly large, boasting the strength of approximately 20-200 persons who are sufficiently equipped with automatic weapons, including rocket launchers, machine guns and mines, etc. According to recent patterns, a large number of Ferrari Camps, believed to be sponsored by influential Nawabs are providing shelter to absconders, criminals and terrorists equipped with the latest weaponry. There are over forty known Ferrari Camps in the province. The number of camps run by each tribe is as follows:

• Bugtis	-	17
• Gazini Marris	-	8
• Bejrani Marris	-	11
• Rinds	-	1
• Domkis	-	3
• <b>Total</b>	-	<b>40.</b>

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<sup>28</sup> Mengal, "Study in Balochistan," 3-9.

## **V. POLITICAL SCENE IN BALOCHISTAN AND 1973 INSURGENCY**

### **A. INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF BALOCHISTAN**

The politics in Balochistan have always revolved around the pro-federation and anti-federation elements.

#### **1. Pro-Federation Elements**

The national level political parties and some of the tribal Sardars coupled with religious parties form the bulk of pro-federation elements representing the vast majority of the population. These elements, being relatively less active, remain dormant and at the mercy of nationalist elements who happen to be more active and prominent even though they are in the acute minority.

#### **2. Anti-Federation/Nationalist Elements**

Nationalist movements in Balochistan had their genesis even before the creation of Pakistan. A nationalist party was formed in Balochistan in 1920. It was influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution of Russia. The party was against British rule and strongly opposed the leasing of Jiwani<sup>29</sup> to the British in 1939. Fearing the dangers to his own rule, the Khan of Kalat banned the party. The party leaders were expelled from the state and they regrouped themselves in Quetta with the patronage of the Indian National Congress. After the creation of Pakistan, the discovery of natural gas at Sui, and other resources in the province provided an opportunity to the nationalists to keep alive their winning popularity by connecting their causes with the rights of the people of the province. The

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<sup>29</sup> Jiwani port is located along Arabian Sea in Gwadar District, Balochistan, Pakistan. It is located near the Iranian border. It has a population of 25,000 and it is expected to become a major commercial center in concert with the development of the port of Gwadar located nearly 80 Km to the east. Abstracted from wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiwani> ( accessed August 15, 2007).

failures, misunderstandings and underestimation of the correct situation, and pushing the problematic situation under the carpet by the successive governments at the centre greatly contributed towards the spreading of nationalist tendencies in the province.

## **B. THE POLITICAL SCENE UP TO 1973**

After their independence, the political turmoil in Balochistan took a number of turns. Some of the major turning points were as follows.

### **1. Accession Problem**

The Khan of Kalat declared independence on August 15, 1947. The states of Makran, Las Bela and Kharan acceded to Pakistan in March 1948. The accession of these states to Pakistan rendered the State of Kalat as landlocked from the Arabian Sea and the Persian border. The circumstances compelled the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan on March 27, 1948.

### **2. One Unit and Insurgency of 1958**

One Unit was the title of a scheme launched by the federal government of Pakistan to merge the four provinces of West Pakistan into one homogenous unit, as a counterbalance against the numerical domination of the ethnic Bengalis of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).<sup>30</sup> The One Unit policy was announced by Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali on November 22, 1954. It was highly unpopular in Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP as it did not guarantee equal rights for provinces with lesser population. Under these circumstances the Khan of Kalat declared independence and called on the tribesmen to rise against Pakistan. This forced the government to take action and as a result the Khan of Kalat was arrested, his palace was raided, and he was deprived of his ancestral valuables. His supporters took up arms against the government and demanded

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<sup>30</sup> Story of Pakistan, "Timeline events 1947-1958," June 1, 2003, <http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A137> (accessed August 15, 2007).

the immediate release of the Khan of Kalat and abolition of the One Unit system. They were assured that they would be granted amnesty if they laid down their arms. After they surrendered, most of them were arrested and some of them hanged for treason and martial law was imposed.

### **3. Aftermath of the 1970 Elections**

The elections of 1970 saw the emergence of NAP and other nationalist parties gaining a majority. A coalition government with nationalist tendencies came to power headed by Nawab Akbar Bugti. In subsequent years, the centre provincial confrontation escalated to an unpleasant level and ended in an armed rebellion against the government.

## **C. THE 1973 INSURGENCY**

### **1. Prevailing Environments in 1973**

Emboldened by the stand taken by Sheikh Mujib in former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists demanded their “provincial rights” from Ali Bhutto in exchange for approving the 1973 constitution consensually. Tensions erupted and within six months the federal government sacked the governments of Attaullah Mengal in Quetta and Mufti Mahmud in Peshawar. The two Chief Ministers, along with Governors and forty-four MNAs (Member of National Assemblies) and MPAs (Member of Provincial Assemblies), were arrested and charged with treason. As a result, an insurgency erupted and drew the army into Balochistan.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Jānmaḥmad, *The Baloch Cultural Heritage* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982).

## **2. Causes of Insurgency**

### **a. Demand for a Separate State**

This factor has been an important political demand of some Baloch Sardars ever since Pakistan came into being, as consolidation under Pakistan threatened their absolute rule.

### **b. Influence of the Sardari System**

Sardars have remained the executive branch of the tribal organization. Any threat to the Sardari System was ferociously resisted, as was the case in 1973.

### **c. Economic Causes**

(1) Lack of Development Efforts The development of the area and the provision of civic facilities was a serious threat to the authorities of Sardars.

(2) Minerals Royalty Issue Following the discovery of mineral reservoirs, Sardars strongly felt that some royalty must be paid to them. Moreover, most of the gas being extracted out of Balochistan was used in Sind and Punjab. Thus, this fact was used as an important tool for propaganda.

(3) Sense of Deprivation While the Sardars themselves never let the development work take place in the area, they successfully sold the notion of deprivation to their innocent tribes, laying the blame for the people's fate on the government.

### **d. Exploitation by Foreign Elements**

The area was of great interest to the former Soviet Union in pursuance of their southward drive. This included practical action aimed at Balochistan, like education at Soviet universities on attractive stipends,

sponsoring of pro-Soviet student organizations with monetary assistance and training for insurgency in foreign countries. The situation was exploited by Afghanistan and India, who supported various elements opposed to the government because of their own interests.

### **3. Events Leading to Insurgency**

#### **a. *Instability in Jhalawan***

The late Doda Khan Zarakzai started collecting taxes in the Jhalawan area. He also started issuing warrants and awarding punishments.<sup>32</sup> All efforts by government officials had failed to restore peace in the region.

#### **b. *Anti-Punjab Riots***

Along the Pat feeder canal in Sibi, the Punjabi settlers had purchased some land and developed it over the years. On November 28, 1972, armed Bugti and Marri tribesmen attacked the Punjabis, killed five of them, kidnapped women, and burnt crops.

#### **c. *Las Bela Incident***

By November 1972, the law-and-order situation in Balochistan had worsened. Doda Khan Zarakzai, along with the Zehri brothers and Jam Ghulam Qadir, was fully committed to creating problems for the provincial government.<sup>33</sup> It included mischief like blocking highways and fights with Mengal tribesmen.

#### **d. *The Outbreak***

Tension ridden Balochistan finally erupted into open hostilities in May 1973, with the dismissal of the provincial government by Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This step was initiated by the government in view of anti-state activities of

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<sup>32</sup> Jānmaḥmad, *The Baloch Cultural Heritage*, 16.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

NAP Government, which had started openly supporting the dissident elements. The NAP Government had started making unrealistic demands on the central government so as to make the centre weak.<sup>34</sup>

#### **4. Operations by Insurgents**

##### **a. Organization**

The insurgents operated in small groups of tens and twenties, under Mukkadams, who in turn were under the command of a Wadera/Sardar.

##### **b. Intelligence System**

All the elevated features in the area were manned by the miscreants. The observers had binoculars and passed messages by waving turbans,<sup>35</sup> reflecting mirrors, lighting fires, etc. The custom of "Hal Ehwal"<sup>36</sup> amongst the tribal was also used for passage of intelligence. In this custom, tribesmen, while traveling, were asked for the latest information of intelligence value, and information of intelligence value was passed on.

##### **c. Logistic Support**

Under the NAP (National Alliance Party) Government, weapons and ammunition were purchased through a third party from the local market under the direction of the Sardar. For logistics support, the insurgents traveled light from base to base. The bases selected were such that they could get the support of locals to provide them food, shelter and information.

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<sup>34</sup> Jānmaḥmad, *The Baloch Cultural Heritage*.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

**d. Method of Operations of Insurgents**

The subversive activities were mainly carried out in the forms described below.

(1) Sniping Sniping is normally carried out at long ranges (400-500 yards). Sniping was normally resorted to in the following cases:

- When the target was beyond their capability to ambush or raid.
- To invite the troops to move into an area where an ambush was laid.
- At places where the population was living peacefully so as to cause harassment.

(2) Ambushes From the pattern of firing marks observed in the area, it was observed that hostiles used to organize themselves into two main groups<sup>37</sup> which are:

- **Action Group**: Further divided into two parties each consisting of 10-15 men. One of the parties occupied the lower-most height, whereas the other one was at the highest point having good visibility. These parties positioned themselves 150-200m away from the roads. Upon the arrival of the target, both the parties used to open fire on the target from different directions. At the end of the ambush one of the parties used to carry out the search of the convoy to look for weapons and other equipment.
- **The Rearguards**: These were comprised of 20-40 men and were tasked to establish the blocking positions in the area.

(3) Raids Although it was not the common practice, at times the hostiles carried out raids of important installations. The tactics used were:

- The target, after being observed for many days, was surrounded and attacked from many directions; swarmed, in other words.

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<sup>37</sup> "An Account of Significant Ambushes in Marri Bugti Area During 1973-76," (Handout by Headquarters 33 Division, 1998), 14.

- Fire was opened from any one direction, while the raiding party went into action.
- Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the target was neutralized and destroyed.

## 5. Counter Insurgency Operations by Pakistan Army

### *a. Induction*

In February 1973, the situation was getting out of control. The Pakistan Army was called upon to restore the authority of the government. The army was primarily tasked to assist civil administration in restoring law-and-order, apprehending hostiles, securing lines of communication, and helping civilian administration in developmental projects.

### *b. Deployment of Troops*

The army was deployed in three phases:

- **Phase 1 (May 1973 - July 1974)**. In this phase, initially two infantry brigades were inducted and later two more brigades were added.
- **Phase 2 (August 1974 - December 1975)**. During this phase, five infantry brigades were inducted in the area.
- **Phase 3 (January 1976 - July 1977)**. During this phase, only the replacement of units/formations was carried out.

Total troop forces deployed during the operation were:

- One infantry division, mainly in the Bugti and Marri area.
- One infantry division with one additional brigade was in the Marri and Pathan area.
- One infantry division was in Sarawan and Jhalawan area.
- A Special Services Group kept centrally in Quetta.
- The complete Frontier Corps of Balochistan.

**c. Operations by the Pakistan Army**

The major operations carried out by the Pakistan Army were of two categories: the first category was in retaliation for hostile actions, and the second category was for search and cordon. The major operations conducted by the army were:

- Brown Arrow (Kohlu Sector).
- Green Thumb (Jhalawan Sector).
- Brown River (Kohlu – Sibi Sector).
- Red Beret (Kohlu – Sibi Sector).

(1) The Turning Point A major operation in the Kohlu area was carried out by two brigades in which 125 hostiles were killed and 916 were apprehended. Subsequently, three more operations were conducted in Kohlu and Sibi in which ten brigades participated. These operations left a lasting impact on the minds of insurgents and their approach changed.

**d. Effects of Operations**

In the initial stages of the operation, the army was not very successful in fighting the insurgents due to having adopted conventional tactics. In the second stage, the army learned about the tactics of the hostiles and conducted successful operations. At this point they started surrendering voluntarily. People came to know that the army was primarily intended to help them and was not their enemy as purported by the Sardars.

**e. Tactics Adopted by Government Forces**

Initially, the units operating against the insurgency lacked the experience of fighting an insurgency and adopted conventional drills for movements and fighting. Characteristically, troops carried out deliberate operations for 2-3 days in a particular area. Since there was no follow up, hostile elements could escape conveniently. But with the passage of time and

experience, the army started dominating the insurgents. Elements of the Special Services Group were inducted into the area with attack and cargo helicopters. Troops became more vigilant and the operations were executed for a longer period, until the insurgents were flushed out of their hideouts and surrounded. Eventually our troops became experts in using unconventional tactics and defeated the insurgents.

*f. **Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People***

While these counter insurgency operations were still in progress, the government started a pacification program by introducing a number of projects in the economic and social fields for the betterment of the common people. These measures were intended to win the confidence of the locals and draw them away from the influence of their Sardars. Such measures had a positive effect on the people of the province.

**6. Difficulties Faced by the Pakistan Army**

The difficulties faced by the army in the initial stage are described below.

- **Lack of Efficient Intelligence**. The intelligence setup in the area was not very effective, and the army paid a heavy price for its shortcomings in the initial phases of the operation.
- **Language Problem**. A barrier in communication existed since the troops did not know the local language, nor did the locals understand the troops.
- **Knowledge of Area**. The troops were not proficient in operating in an area like Balochistan, and were not familiar with the area.
- **Lack of a Communication Network**. The non-existence of a communication network hampered the speedy operations by the army, yielding sufficient time for insurgents to escape after an action.

- **Problem of Identification**. Initially, every civilian in the area was considered as hostile and treated accordingly, which resulted in hatred for the army amongst locals. Therefore, no help could be sought from locals. However, in the later stages of the operation, things started developing in a better way.

## 7. Factors Contributing Towards Success

In the second and third phases of the operation, the army took certain measures which helped in controlling the insurgency. These methods are identified below.

- **Non-Availability of Safe Heavens for Insurgents in Neighboring Countries**. The insurgents did not find safe heavens in Iran and Afghanistan as the borders were sealed by government forces and the insurgent's area of operation effectively circumscribed.
- **Resolve by the Army**. The forces gave a vivid signal to the insurgents with respect to their resolve to stall the actions of miscreants and protect the geographical cohesion of the country. For example, the operations carried out by the army in the Kohlu area, with two brigades killing 125 and apprehending 916 miscreants, and subsequently operations in the Kohlu and Sibi areas with 10 brigades left no doubt in the minds of miscreants about the resolve of the army to establish the writ of the law.
- **Bold Actions Against Hostile Leaders**. In the initial stages of the operation the army was tasked with establishing small check posts in the area and to show force. Seeing the worsening situation, it was then tasked to undertake operations against the hostile leaders, and this led to achievement of better results.
- **Establishment of a Communication Network**. There were a number of roads made by the army which helped in moving to remote areas.

- **Establishment of Civil Administration**. Civil administration was established and civilian officers were sent to the interior to find out the problems of the locals. Army officers were inducted into the civil department, with a view to increase the efficiency of the related departments.
- **Pacification Measures**. The effective pacification campaign (winning hearts and minds and carrying out projects for social uplift of the masses) also contributed towards the success of the counter insurgency operations.

## 8. Lessons Identified

The counter insurgency operations in Balochistan highlighted certain lessons. Some of these include the following:

- **Rule of Law**. The state must be able to assert its influence and control. Every citizen, regardless of which tribe, area, race or belief to which he belongs, deserves the same civil rights as the next man. Anyone who deprives or tries to deprive a fellow citizen of these rights is a criminal. Even after a major military operation, the same situation that existed before was allowed to sediment.
- **Lack of Developmental Effort**. Absence of developmental work, education/civic facilities and non-involvement in national politics resulted in a lack of a national outlook and spirit in Balochistan.
- **Determination of Root Cause**. To eliminate the insurgency, it is important to find out the root cause. While the center of gravity of the insurgency was identified and neutralized, not much was done thereafter to prevent the cycle from recurring.
- **Elimination of Support Base**. For any insurgency to succeed, internal/external support is very important. Therefore, to fight insurgency, it is very important to find out the supporters and eliminate them.

- **Method of Fighting with Insurgents.** Conventional methods of fighting against the hostile opposition did not succeed. To defeat insurgents, the army had to adopt the same techniques as the hostiles, but they needed to employ them in a better way, such as the use of Heliborne Force/Special Services Group.
- **Efficient Intelligence.** An efficient and elaborate intelligence network is a prerequisite for dealing with the insurgency. Knowledge and understanding of the local population, their way of life, traditions, customs and language are very useful tools for a counter insurgency operation. In Balochistan, the intelligence system was not very effective in the beginning; hence, the intensity of insurgency could not be determined during the initial stage.

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## **VI. CURRENT TURMOIL, MEGA PROJECTS AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT**

### **A. THE SITUATION FROM 1973 – 2007**

#### **1. Government Policies and Effects**

During the 1973 Insurgency, a pacification program was initiated aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people. However, no permanent policies were formulated that could ensure a steady rate of development in the province. Successive governments failed to take this aspect into account, which resulted in increasing the gap between the development of Balochistan and the rest of the country.

#### **2. Political Developments**

In 1979, the government of General Zia ul Haq made an effort to reconcile itself with various nationalist elements. K.B. Marri, along with other tribal leaders, was released from prison. During the martial law regime, Balochistan generally remained peaceful. Tribal leaders were given important positions within the government hierarchy. However, from 1988 until 1998, Balochistan again remained partially ignored due to the instable political situation in the country. This had a negative effect on the overall development of the province. During the tenure of the present government, emphasis has been placed on political and economic development of the province, but it is probably a bit too late to offset the designs of the nationalists.

#### **3. Development Projects Undertaken**

The current government has taken the right approach of supporting mega projects in the Balochistan province, the effect of which would certainly add to the

overall socio-economic uplift of the region.<sup>38</sup> The mega project of Gwadar Deep Sea Port is one such project.

## **B. GWADAR MEGA PROJECT**

Pakistan is building a port at its southwestern city of Gwadar, which is located at the mouth of the oil rich Persian Gulf and is a possible distribution point for the natural resources of Central Asia.<sup>39</sup> Figure 2 shows the location of the Gwadar port. Islamabad is optimistic that the completion of the Gwadar port project will be a major step towards realizing Pakistan's potential as a regional hub of trade and economic activities.<sup>40</sup> The government of Pakistan's vision is for Gwadar to be a link between the East and West that will change the national economy as well as the fate of this region.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Tarique Niazi, "Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean," February 28, 2005, <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2528.html> (accessed July 19, 2007).

<sup>39</sup> Ammad Hassan, "PAKISTAN'S GWADAR PORT – PROSPECTS OF ECONOMIC REVIVAL" (Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005).

<sup>40</sup> Niazi, "Gwadar."

<sup>41</sup> President of Pakistan's Address at the Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Gwadar Deep-Sea Port, March 22, 2002, [http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE\\_Addresses/ce\\_gwadar.htm](http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Addresses/ce_gwadar.htm) (accessed April 22, 2007).



Figure 2. Geography of the Gwadar Port

## C. NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL PORT

### 1. Domestic

Sea-borne trade makes up over 10 percent of the national income for the majority of the world's top economies.<sup>42</sup> Over 80 percent of international trade, when measured in weight and volume, is sea-borne, and containerized freight is likely to grow to 70 percent of this trade by volume by 2010.<sup>43</sup> Pakistan's GDP increased from \$28.7 billion in 1983 to around \$70 billion in 2003, and its dependence on sea trade increased to about 95 percent.<sup>44</sup> The primary gateway for goods flowing across oceans remains ports. Pakistan presently has only two

<sup>42</sup> J. R. Hill, *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers* (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 17.

<sup>43</sup> Sam J. Tangredi, ed., *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), Ch. 1, 4.

<sup>44</sup> Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2003-04, [Hhttp://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/09-trade.pdf](http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/09-trade.pdf) (accessed April 4, 2005).

commercial ports, Karachi and Bin Qasim, in the Indian Ocean, catering largely to the domestic needs. Pakistan's sea-borne trade in the year 2000 was 42 million tons, and by 2015 the trade forecast is 78 million tons annually.<sup>45</sup> Both the Karachi and Qasim ports are reaching their cargo handling capacity and are likely to be deficient in meeting future demands.

## **2. Strategic**

Strategically, the close proximity of both domestic ports has inherent vulnerabilities, making them and Pakistan more susceptible to a naval blockade. The need for an alternate port became apparent soon after the 1971 war when the Karachi port complex came under Indian missile attack. The Gwadar port, 460 kilometers away from Karachi, will serve as an alternate port to handle Pakistani trade in case of an emergency or the blockade of existing ports.<sup>46</sup>

## **3. Regional**

The decision to build a port at Gwadar came twenty-five years after an initial proposal to build a port along the Makran Coast. Gwadar is strategically located on the Indian Ocean at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central Asia, both regions that are rich in natural resources. The geographic location in proximity to the crucial trade from the Persian Gulf and the largely untapped resources of Central Asia has bestowed upon Pakistan one of the vital export corridors in the region.

## **D. GWADAR PORT**

With a population of 125,000, Gwadar is now set on its way to become a hub of shipping, commercial and industrial activities. The construction work at the

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<sup>45</sup> Government of Pakistan, Environment Division, "Pakistan's Response to Objectives of Agenda 21," <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/environment-division/media/wssd-chp1.pdf> (accessed April 11, 2005).

<sup>46</sup> Government of Pakistan, Board of Investment, "Gwadar," [http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/News\\_Event/Gawadar.html](http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/News_Event/Gawadar.html) (accessed April 23, 2005).

port started on March 22, 2002. The work on the first phase of this mega project, constructed by Chinese Harbor Engineering Company, is already complete. For this phase, out of a total cost of \$248 million, China has provided \$198 million U.while Pakistan provided \$50 million.<sup>47</sup>

## 1. Scope of Work

The development of Gwadar port is being undertaken in two phases. These two phases are shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Phases I & II of Gwadar Port<sup>48</sup>

### a. Phase-I<sup>49</sup>

This phase includes construction of three berths, with a depth of 12.5 meters, and approach channels. On commissioning, these three berths will be used for the loading and unloading of general cargo that may come from as

<sup>47</sup> Government of Pakistan, "Gwadar."

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

far away as West China, Europe and the American continents. In the first phase, the 602 meter long quay or jetty will handle up to 50,000 Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) container carriers. The designed annual throughput of the three multi-purpose berths is 100,000 TEUs of containers, 270,000 tons of general cargo and 450,000 tons of bulk cargo.

***b. Phase-II<sup>50</sup>***

Phase-II will be developed through the private sector on a Built Operate Transfer (BOT) and Built Operate Own (BOO) basis. Its extension work includes nine berths, including two container terminals, two dry bulk terminals, two oil terminals, one roll-on-roll-off terminal, one bulk cargo terminal, one general cargo terminal and a channel dredged to 20.0 meters in depth with allied port facilities. The government has started negotiations with local and foreign companies to develop this phase at a cost of \$524 million. Gwadar Port, after the completion of phase-II, will have the capacity to handle vessels up to 100,000 DWT for cargo and vessels up to 200,000 DWT for oil.

**2. Port Associated Infrastructure**

While construction work on the port building is going on, a whole set of supporting infrastructure facilities are being laid down, as indicated in Figure 4<sup>51</sup>. The government has already established a Gwadar Development Authority that operates closely with the Gwadar Port Authority and other government agencies to synergize the completion of this mega project.

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<sup>50</sup> Government of Pakistan, "Gwadar."

<sup>51</sup> "Gwadar Master Plan," <http://www.gwadarnews.com/gwadarphotos/gwadarmasterplan.jpg> (accessed December 14, 2006).




Figure 4. Gwadar Master Plan

**a. Transportation Links**

The Makran Coastal Highway linking Gwadar with Karachi on a 675 mile stretch is going to be the lifeline of the Gwadar project. Completion of this highway will open up the area for business opportunities to domestic as well as international investors. It will also link Karachi with Iran, and thus open a new and shorter trade route between the two countries as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Road Network from Gwadar

The Asian Development Bank has already provided U.S. \$500 million to building road projects, linking Pakistan's Balochistan and Frontier provinces with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Road projects are, however, hitting snags due to the persistent instability in Afghanistan and the disturbed internal dynamics of Pakistan. There are also plans to lay a comprehensive rail link, along with a contemplated road network. This project is currently undergoing the planning phase.

**b. Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline<sup>52</sup>**

The long dormant project of a 1,500 kilometer long Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline (TAP) from Turkmenistan to Gwadar and other parts of Pakistan that hopes to pump Turkmen natural gas to global markets is also poised to step off the drawing board after completion of the port project. This proposed pipeline is shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Proposed Gas & Oil Pipeline

**c. Upgradation of the Gwadar Airport**

Gwadar presently has a small airport that is basically meant for small Fokker aircraft. Its expansion is already in full swing, aimed at a facility capable of accommodating all major airlines. Oman has provided a grant of \$7

<sup>52</sup> Narbaev, "The Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline," *Central Asia's Affairs*, no. 1 (2004).

million for this upgrade, and additionally, Rs. 563.35 million is being provided by the Pakistan government and the Civil Aviation Authority for this purpose.

**d. Civic Amenities**

Gwadar city is being contemplated as a replica of Dubai city. The Gwadar master plan calls for all the amenities characteristic of a modern city and developmental work is already underway to ensure that the necessary facilities are made available to establish the requisite business and housing needs.

**E. THE COMPETING PORTS**

**1. Dubai Ports<sup>53</sup>**

The Dubai Port Authority is presently handling two major ports, Rashid and Jebel Ali. The Rashid port has established itself as a world-class trans-shipment hub serving as a load center for markets in the Gulf. In March 2002, the Dubai Port Authority started construction of another port at Jebel Ali, which raised the port's capacity to 5.7 million TEU. Jebel Ali port is the largest man-made port. The port's trans-shipment flows were estimated at a total of four million TEUs in 2002.<sup>54</sup>

**2. Salalah Port of Oman<sup>55</sup>**

This is a relatively new trans-shipment hub on the Arabian Sea, which established itself as a container terminal in November 1998. Its major advantage is its proximity to the Europe/Asia trunk line route. It requires little diversion by line haul ships, allowing a quick pit stop to pick up and drop off containers for the

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<sup>53</sup> Dubai Ports Authority, <http://www.dpa.co.ae/> (accessed April 23, 2005).

<sup>54</sup> Andrew Maiden, "Oman Benefits from calm waters," *Middle East*, no. 332 (March 2003): 42.

<sup>55</sup> Salalah Port, <http://www.salalahport.com> (accessed April 23, 2005).

Arabian Peninsula, Indian and Pakistani markets. The Salalah port's current throughput is estimated at 1.2 million TEUs.<sup>56</sup>

### **3. Bandar Abbas and Chahbahar Ports of Iran**

The Bandar Abbas port possesses twenty-four berths, including two oil berths. The approach channel of Bandar Abbas (Shahid Rajaei) port is 6.4 kilometers long and thirteen meters deep<sup>57</sup>.

Iran plans to upgrade facilities in Bandar Abbas to a 2.6 million TEU capacity. The port is already connected by weekly container block trains to Tashkent (Uzbekistan) in Central Asia. The Chahbahar port has two main jetties, which can host only five vessels of up to 25,000 gross tonnage and draft of eleven meters.

### **4. Domestic Ports of Karachi and Qasim**

Karachi, being the main port of Pakistan, handles over fourteen million tons of liquid and twelve million tons of dry cargo. Port Qasim is merely fifty-six kilometers east of Karachi and may be considered an extension of the Karachi port complex. Karachi had been known as the gateway to Asia for a very long time<sup>58</sup>; however, it could not translate its strategic location into a regional hub due to the lack of domestic trade and the disturbed geopolitical situation of the area surrounding Pakistan.

## **F. COMPARISON OF PORTS**

Dubai, Jebel Ali and Salalah ports are well-established hub ports. Dubai's trade accounts for 16.5 percent of a \$20 billion economy of the UAE, and all of

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<sup>56</sup> Maiden, "Oman Benefits," 42.

<sup>57</sup> Ports and Shipping Organization, I. R. Iran, <http://www.ir-pso.com/> (accessed June 23, 2006).

<sup>58</sup> Karachi Port Trust, <http://www.kpt.gov.pk/>; Port Qasim Authority, <http://www.portqasim.org.pk/> (accessed June 23, 2006).

these ports contribute significantly in the income.<sup>59</sup> After just over four years of its establishment, Salalah port earned above \$58 million through the trans-shipment business.<sup>60</sup> The present cargo handling capacities of Qasim and Karachi ports are seventeen million and twenty-five million tons per annum, respectively, and are reaching their capacity.<sup>61</sup> As far as Iran is concerned, both ports do not have enough capacity to handle the flow of natural resources from Central Asia. Moreover, the international isolation of Iran hampers port operation, as it is not open to international users.

The presence of geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East and bottlenecks of capacity in the case of domestic ports will provide an opportunity for Gwadar port to attract a sizable share of the market, and hence establish itself as a hub.

## **G. INTERESTS, INTERRELATION & CONFLICTS OF REGIONAL AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS**

### **1. Pakistan's Interests in the Region**

Pakistan has a strategic location in the Indian Ocean region. On the west is Iran, which has traditionally been a close ally. On the east is India, which is seen as a potential adversary. In the north is China, which has been a close friend. To the northwest is Afghanistan, which is likely to become increasingly friendly towards Pakistan because of her geo-economic necessities. However, recent years have seen bitterness between the relations of the two countries due to placing of the blame on one another for controlling the remnants of the Taliban. Meanwhile, Pakistan is also located strategically in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf and acquires a special significance as nearly seventeen million

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<sup>59</sup> Matthew Swibel, "Trading with the Enemy," *Forbes* 173, no. 7 (April 2004): 086.

<sup>60</sup> Salalah Port Annual Report 2003, <http://www.salalahport.com/frame-downloads.htm> (accessed June 4, 2006).

<sup>61</sup> Government of Pakistan, "Ports in Pakistan," <http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/BFacts/ports.html> (accessed June 30, 2006).

barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily.<sup>62</sup> About 90 percent of Pakistan's trade is sea-borne and its SLOCs are passing through the Indian Ocean.<sup>63</sup> Development of a commercial port at Gwadar on the northern extremities is another important factor for Pakistan's interest in the region.

The importance of the coast of Balochistan was realized by the CIA in the 1980s citing "its strategic location near oil routes from the Persian Gulf."<sup>64</sup> For a long time the Soviet Union, prior to its breakup, desired expansion toward the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.<sup>65</sup> Pakistan and Iran had also long believed that the U.S.S.R. hoped to gain warm water ports, and the same objective is manifested in assessments of the CIA.<sup>66</sup>

In the aftermath of the Gulf War and the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the political map of the region is being reshaped and new political trends are emerging. The United States, China and India are flexing their muscles to enhance their influence in the area. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been like a roller-coaster ride, marked by alliance and close partnership during the Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan Administrations and cool or tense relations when Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton occupied the White House.<sup>67</sup> This long and checkered relationship has its roots in the Cold

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<sup>62</sup> Moonis Ahmer, "Indian Ocean: Maritime Security and Confidence Building," in *Indian Ocean Security and Stability in the Post-Cold War Era* (Islamabad: The Directorate of Naval Educational Services, 1995), 264.

<sup>63</sup> Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "Pakistan's Maritime interests and Policy," in *Indian Ocean Security and Stability in the Post-Cold War Era* (Islamabad: The Directorate of Naval Educational Services, 1995), 189.

<sup>64</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center Memorandum CIA/PA/B0-10015-m Pakistan, January 10, 1980.

<sup>65</sup> William R. Keylor, *Twentieth-century World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 500.

<sup>66</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment.

<sup>67</sup> Dennis Kux, "Pakistan: Flawed Not Failed State," *Foreign Policy Association Headline Series*, no. 332 (Summer 2001): 76.

War and South Asian regional politics of the 1950s.<sup>68</sup> After 9/11, the dictates of the GWOT have once again brought Pakistan back in the camp of the United States.

In the recent past, India and Pakistan have entered into a “composite dialogue” and there is a reasonable optimism that even if long-standing disputes like Kashmir and Siachen are not resolved, a working relationship could be established for the collective good. Iran, India and Pakistan are working closely to strike a deal over a gas and oil pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani authorities are also endeavoring to materialize the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline, which would terminate in India and would go even beyond.

Thus, optimism exists to foster economic cooperation amongst all concerned states, and the Gwadar port can provide common ground in this regard. Interest and response of the United States in the port project will have far reaching affects in both its operationalization as well as the stabilization of the strategic situation in the area.

## **2. United States’ Interests**

Although the termination of the Cold War ended a pretext for a heavy U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, American policy makers were still “preparing for two major theater wars (MTWs) in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf.”<sup>69</sup> That is why, in May 1997, in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Navy retained its twelve Carrier Battle Groups and twelve Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). The United States has an interest in keeping the oceans open to all,

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<sup>68</sup> Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, *Pak-US Relations*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, December 2, 2003.

<sup>69</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, “*Quadrennial Defense Review Report*,” September 2001, <http://www.militaryinfo.com> (accessed February 20, 2005).

which is evident from the presence of, at the minimum, the U.S. Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf since 1949.<sup>70</sup>

In the Middle East the United States' main ally, Saudi Arabia, traditionally a mainstay of U.S. policy, has 261 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (more than one-fourth of the world total), and up to one trillion barrels of ultimately recoverable oil.<sup>71</sup> Shortly after the Arab oil embargo in 1973-74, the United States (and other Western countries) created the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) as the nation's first line of defense in case of an oil crisis. In November 2001, President Bush made an unprecedented decision to fill the SPR to its full capacity of 700 million barrels.<sup>72</sup> As of July 2007, the United States imported 62 percent of its oil requirements in 2006, out of which 39 percent came from the Persian Gulf region.<sup>73</sup> The United States' economic prosperity and strategic security, therefore, depends on an uninterrupted supply of oil.

The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas are likely to remain a high priority of United States policy makers for the foreseeable future. Naval presence is likely to increase even further due to increased turmoil in Middle Eastern countries and the declining acceptance of U.S. ground forces. This presence will have a direct bearing on the Gwadar port project, and it ought to have positive effects. The Indian Ocean region has remained and will be an area of interest for the American policy makers. It is, however, a well recognized fact that the United States helps to "shape the environment" (in the words of the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review) in various regions.<sup>74</sup> Pakistan does need that help to ensure success of its port project. Notwithstanding internal dynamics, which

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<sup>70</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>71</sup> Bahgat Gawadat, "Oil and Militant Islam: Strains on US-Saudi Relations," *World Affairs*, (Winter 2003).

<sup>72</sup> Gawadat, "Oil and Militant Islam."

<sup>73</sup> Energy Information Administration, "Energy Situation Analysis report: May 3, 2002," [www.cis.state.mi.us/mpsc/reports/energy/02summer/oilimports.html](http://www.cis.state.mi.us/mpsc/reports/energy/02summer/oilimports.html).

<sup>74</sup> Nye, Jr., *The Paradox*, 144.

are pushing policies, overall economic and strategic interests ought to drive the United States to foster cooperation amongst states of the region. The United States' fostered stabilization in the area hopefully will guarantee the success of the Gwadar port project, and Islamabad needs to formulate policies that can attract such support. China, being an emerging power and the largest stakeholder in the port project, has an equally important role.

### **3. Chinese Interests**

China is an emerging global player with significant influence in the area as it is the only great power that is contiguous to South Asia. One estimate suggests that, with the present remarkable growth rate, it is expected to become the world's largest economy, overthrowing the United States by 2020.<sup>75</sup> China's desire to play an important role in the Indian Ocean stems from its historical association with the region and the presence of her vital sea trade routes in the area. Its long-term interests in the Indian Ocean are both economic and politico-strategic. Chinese government concerns about energy security in an oil import era, however, continue to dominate its strategic thinking.<sup>76</sup>

For China, South Asia, West Asia, Africa and even Europe through the Indian Ocean are closer than the U.S. west coast across the Pacific.<sup>77</sup> At present, China is not in a position to interfere effectively in the Indian Ocean, yet owing to her growing navy and her interests she can exercise considerable influence in the region. In the present unipolar environment, China wants to take the role of a major participant in the establishment of a new type of world order. This cannot be achieved with having the Indian Ocean region out of her influence.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, China also resents the hegemonic designs of India towards

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<sup>75</sup> Nye, Jr., *The Paradox*, 19.

<sup>76</sup> "Caspian energy: Looking East," *Energy Economist* (November 1998).

<sup>77</sup> M. Anwar, *Roles of Smaller Navies* (Rawalpindi: The Army Press Club, 1999), 33.

<sup>78</sup> Sun Shihai, "Chinese Perception on Indian Ocean Security," in *Indian Ocean Security and Stability in the Post-Cold War Era* (Islamabad: The Directorate of Naval Educational Services, 1995).

the Indian Ocean, and has always exhibited her opposition to such Indian presumptions. China also suspects India of supporting superpower presence in the Indian Ocean as a means of countering China. The most serious challenge for China is that the U.S. military presence in Central, South and South-East Asia may undermine Chinese influence in these regions and make it more difficult for China to achieve its security, economic and energy objectives in the future.<sup>79</sup>

China has already consolidated its access to the Indian Ocean through the Karakoram Highway and Karachi and Gwadar ports, through the China-Burma road to Burmese ports, and through the Malacca Straits. For China, the second stake holder in the Gwadar port project, the port offers a strategic toehold in the energy rich region of CARs (Central Asian Republics) and provides an alternative trade link to its western provinces. Xinjiang Province lies 4,500 kilometers from China's east coast but just 2,500 kilometers from Gwadar. This will make it possible for China to route some of its external trade through the Gwadar port.

International relations theorists suggest that as a nation becomes more prosperous and more integrated into the world economy, it will become more democratized and more anxious to preserve the world order that has made its prosperity possible. It is therefore envisaged that the Chinese would not venture into a military presence in the name of safe-guarding interests at the Gwadar Port, and stir up a never-ending spiral of seriously destabilizing events. Pakistan will have to ensure appropriate policies to dispel any such contemplation by Beijing.

#### **4. Iranian Interests**

The Persian Gulf is an important trade route in the strategic northern reaches of the Indian Ocean. Some 80 percent of the world's oil tankers leave

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<sup>79</sup> Nan Li, "11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges and War Fighting," Working Paper No. 32, *Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies* (September 2002).

the shores of the Persian Gulf destined to other parts of the world.<sup>80</sup> The geopolitical location of Iran within the Persian Gulf region is such that the northern shores of this Gulf belong entirely to Iran, which enables her to control the Strait of Hormuz. Passage through Hormuz is an issue of concern several times a year when Iran holds its war games at the mouth of Gulf.<sup>81</sup> Iran regards her role in the Indian Ocean as an extension of her interests in the Gulf.

Iran, too, is concerned with her economic interests associated with the Indian Ocean. The supply of natural gas to India, via a pipeline through the Indian Ocean, is one of Iran's mega projects. Additionally, the Iranian port of Chahbahar, located on the mouth of Gulf, could become the hub of commercial activities if the natural resources of CAR find the way to the rest of the world through this port. Iran's situation with respect to its influence on the CARs and its desire to mend fences with the West suffer many impediments.

Turkmenistan sees Iran as one of the potential export routes for both oil and gas; even many of the oil tycoons see it as a viable option; but the United States is pushing hard for alternative routes.<sup>82</sup> Washington advocates the construction of pipelines in several directions from the Caspian Region, explicitly excluding Iran.<sup>83</sup> Although Iran has seen some investment from the E.U. (particularly France) and India, it largely remains isolated from the international monetary system. Its isolation thus enhances prospects of Gwadar port success.

## **5. Indian Interests**

India is perhaps the only country on the Indian Ocean that has the economic potential, military strength and the political will to dominate this vast

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<sup>80</sup> Danesh Pajoo, "Iran and the Strategic Significance of the Persian Gulf," in *Indian Ocean Security and Stability in the Post-Cold War Era* (Islamabad: The Directorate of Naval Educational Services, 1995), 223.

<sup>81</sup> Donna J. Nincic, "Sea Lane Security and US Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce Resources," in Sam J. Tangredi, ed., *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), 157.

<sup>82</sup> "Caspian Energy."

<sup>83</sup> "The Geo-Politics of Caspian Oil," *The Janes Intelligence Review*, (July 1, 2000).

expanse of water.<sup>84</sup> Indian leaders and strategists have traditionally viewed the Indian Ocean region as a sort of Indian security zone, very loosely akin to the way Americans have viewed Central America and the Caribbean. Although Indian leaders have not explicitly laid out such a regional doctrine, Indian behavior in the Indian Ocean has generally conformed to such and implicit doctrine.<sup>85</sup>

India's dominant physical features and geographical location in the Indian Ocean indicate its dependence on the sea for both prosperity and security. India does not have any significant land access to the rest of world. Hostility with Pakistan and a difficult geography that separates India from China and Burma dictates that over 97 percent of India's trade is done through the Indian Ocean; therefore, India has critical interests in maintaining the openness of the Indian Ocean route. India depends, to a large extent, on the import of crude oil and petroleum products from the Persian Gulf region. India's production from existing oil fields has been declining over time, increasing its dependence on the import of oil.<sup>86</sup> Nearly 60 percent of the Indian petroleum requirements<sup>87</sup> are met through the imported oil.<sup>88</sup> India's Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas predicts the country's demand for petroleum products will jump to 155.3 million metric tons per year (3.106 million barrels per day) by fiscal year 2007-08.<sup>89</sup> To meet additional energy requirements, India seeks to develop economic relation with CARs in collaboration with Iran, and desires to have access to this market. For this reason, since the 1990s Central Asia has come to represent India's extended neighborhood. For India, Caspian energy supplies have a critical strategic

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<sup>84</sup> S. N. Kohli, *Economic Potentials in the Indian Oceans*, 10.

<sup>85</sup> George Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," *Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 1992): 129-42; and Devin T. Hagerty, "India's Regional Security Doctrine," *Asian Survey*, (April 1991): 351-63.

<sup>86</sup> Mohan Malhotra, "India's oil supply deficit spurs reforms to lure foreign capital," *Oil & Gas Journal*, (June 2, 1997).

<sup>87</sup> CIA, "World Factbook (as of April 17, 2007)," [http://www.indexmundi.com/india/oil\\_imports.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/india/oil_imports.html) (accessed August 15, 2007).

<sup>88</sup> Patrick Crow, "India's Outlook," *Oil & Gas Journal*, (October 12, 1998).

<sup>89</sup> Malhotra, "India's oil supply."

drawback in that they must transit Pakistan, with whom relations are continually strained over the disputed territory of Kashmir.<sup>90</sup>

There are up to thirty Indian ships at sea in Indian waters at any given time and a much larger number of ships of other nations engaged in trade to and from Indian ports,<sup>91</sup> in addition to 8-10 tankers carrying crude oil to India daily.<sup>92</sup> India is working on the strategy of building up a viable maritime (naval) force to deter any potential aggressor and to protect her SLOCs. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in his book *The Paradox of American Power*, writes that India's military capabilities are impressive in South Asia but not in the larger Asian context.<sup>93</sup> However, its strategic interests extend way beyond that and are even pretentious of the domain of regional hegemony, factors which dictate her relations with other countries.

## **6. Afghanistan's Interests**

Afghanistan has historically remained the center of contention between major powers. History knows one such struggle for mastery in Central Asia between Russia and Great Britain as "the Great Game."<sup>94</sup> Russia again ventured into Afghanistan towards the last decades of 20th century, attracting U.S. attention at a time when it was looking for suitable opportunity to undo some of the unpleasant memories of Vietnam. This Russian venture ended when, at a Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, the Soviet leaders decided to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by the end of 1988.<sup>95</sup> Hopes of building war-torn Afghanistan faded sooner than expected due to internal strife generated by warlords. The Taliban then came along to fill the leadership gap, until displaced

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<sup>90</sup> "The Geo-Politics of Caspian Oil."

<sup>91</sup> Brahma Chellaney, ed., *Securing India's Future in the new millennium* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd, 1999), 126.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid

<sup>93</sup> Nye, Jr., *The Paradox*, 29.

<sup>94</sup> Daniel Moran, *The Great Game*, 230.

<sup>95</sup> Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (Yale University Press, 1996), 146.

in 2001. Afghanistan is currently in a state of war and nation building, and it is too soon to foresee how things will settle down in the long run.<sup>96</sup>

Afghanistan lacks a functional economy of any significance. Its agrarian based subsistence economy is not even meeting the basic food requirements of Afghans, forcing the population to survive on foreign donated food. The donors that participated in the Tokyo Conference of January 2002 pledged over U.S. \$4.5 billion to Afghanistan over five years. The World Bank has estimated that the requirement of a fund for addressing basic Afghan problems to be around U.S. \$10.2 billion over five years. Based on two years of reconstruction experience, in July 2003, Care International estimated the requirement for funds to be between U.S. \$15-30 billion over a five-year period.<sup>97</sup> Gwadar port stands a bright chance of playing an active role in the entire reconstruction exercise.

Amongst other projects, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline is hoped to help revive the Afghan economy. The TAP pipeline project could prove to be a jackpot for the people of Afghanistan as the project could bring in over \$300 million as royalty to the country.<sup>98</sup> The inflow of this cash and foreign investments may help in stabilizing the country's economy and in reconstructing its infrastructure. It can be argued that a pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan will be conducive to the involvement of U.S. firms in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline.<sup>99</sup> Afghan transit trade was earlier handled through the Karachi port, but after operationalization the Gwadar port

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<sup>96</sup> Hassaan Vahidy, "Pakistan's gas discoveries eliminate import needs," *Tulsa: Oil & Gas Journal*, (January 28, 2002).

<sup>97</sup> "Main Economic Indicators – Afghanistan," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia*, (February 4, 2004).

<sup>98</sup> Ahmed Abbas, "Daulatabad-Gwadar Gas Pipeline Agreement," *The News*, (July 7, 2002).

<sup>99</sup> Hassaan Vahidy, "Pakistan's gas discoveries"

will handle it. Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani also offered his country's support for the development of the Gwadar port, saying it would act as a gateway to prosperity for the entire region.<sup>100</sup>

## **7. Japanese Interests**

The importance of the Indian Ocean to the Japanese cannot be exaggerated; it would not be wrong to state that the Indian Ocean is a lifeline of Japan. Japan averaged 3.9 million barrels per day of net oil imports from the Persian Gulf during 2002.<sup>101</sup> The need to protect her economic interest may one day invoke deeper involvement of her "Self Defense Maritime Forces."<sup>102</sup> Japan presently relies on the forces of the United States and other Western powers for her protection. Japan has no overt political goal in this region and, with its heavy dependence on this region for raw material and oil, the Japanese have always desired peace here. Japan's energy concerns dictate its policies in favor of oil from a Caspian export pipeline terminating at the Indian Ocean.<sup>103</sup> Therefore, it is safe to assume that Japan will support the operationalization of the Gwadar port project.

## **8. European Union Interests**

Western Europe averaged 2.3 million bbl/d (barrels per day) of oil imports from the Persian Gulf during 2002.<sup>104</sup> E.U. members possess only about 0.6 percent of the world's proven reserves of oil and 2.0 percent of the world's natural gas, and it is estimated that two-thirds of the E.U.'s total energy

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<sup>100</sup> "Kabul Offers Help for Gwadar," *The Dawn*, (August 5, 2003).

<sup>101</sup> Energy Information Administration, "Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet 2004," <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/pgulf.html> (accessed March 21, 2005).

<sup>102</sup> M. Anwar, *Roles of Smaller Navies*, 34.

<sup>103</sup> "The Geo-Politics of Caspian Oil."

<sup>104</sup> Energy Information Administration, *Persian Gulf Oil*.

requirements will be imported by 2020.<sup>105</sup> The E.U. is, therefore, heavily dependent on oil transiting through the Indian Ocean. By and large their policy towards the Indian Ocean region has been one of reconciliation and resolution of security issues through the use of “soft power.”<sup>106</sup> Their dependence on oil, guarded by the U.S. Navy, has not encouraged them to seek an active role in the problems of either the Middle East or South Asia.

Nevertheless, a strong desire exists amongst European nations to have access to alternate oil resources, reducing their vulnerability to a single area source. Like all others, CARs attracted the E.U.’s attention and it strongly supports an oil and gas pipeline from CARs to the E.U. through Turkey. The pipeline route to European markets through Georgia and Turkey faces geopolitical turmoil and tough hurdles in its realization and actual execution. Separatist tensions in Georgia, instability in the Kurdish areas of Turkey, and unrest over Cyprus near the Mediterranean Turkish port of Ceyhan are some of the problems.<sup>107</sup> In this scenario, the E.U. is likely to support a pipeline to the Indian Ocean either through Iran or Pakistan. There is negligible evidence of negative trends in E.U. relations with states that matter to the Gwadar port project. The E.U. and China have developed a stable relationship over the last decade, and so far they do not seem worried about a Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean.

## **H. SOME OTHER PROJECTS IN BALOCHISTAN**

Beside Gwadar port, some of the other projects being undertaken by the Pakistan government in the province are as follows.

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<sup>105</sup> Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief 2004 – EU,” <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/euro.html> (accessed March 21, 2005).

<sup>106</sup> Nye, Jr., *The Paradox*.

<sup>107</sup> Sadia Sulaiman, “U.S. Policy in Oil-Rich Caspian Basin,” *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, [http://www.issi.org.pk/strategic\\_studies\\_hm/2001/no\\_4/article/5a.htm](http://www.issi.org.pk/strategic_studies_hm/2001/no_4/article/5a.htm) (accessed February 19, 2006).

## **1. The Mirani Dam Project**

The construction work of the Mirani Dam has been completed and was inaugurated by the president of Pakistan in November 2006.<sup>108</sup> The Mirani Dam in the Kech area of the Makran district, with a catchments area of 12,000 square kilometers, has been built at a cost of Rs 6 billion, including Rs 1.5 billion paid in compensation to the affected people. It will have a storage capacity of over 300,000 million acre-feet of water. The project was launched in 2002 and will result in a general social uplift of the project area. About 32,000 people of more than 4,400 families will benefit.<sup>109</sup>

## **2. The Saindak Project**

The discovery of copper deposits at Saindak was made in the 1970s in collaboration with a Chinese engineering firm. The Saindak copper-gold project was set up by Saindak Metals Ltd. (SML), a company wholly owned by the government of Pakistan, by the end of 1995 at a cost of Rs 13.5 billion.

The Saindak project was based on estimated ore reserves of 412 million tons containing on average 0.5 gram of gold per ton and 1.5 grams of silver per ton. The mine is reported to have produced about 50,000 tons since October 2003.<sup>110</sup> According to official estimates, the project has the capacity to produce 15,800 tons of blister copper annually, containing 1.5 tons of gold and 2.8 tons of silver. The reported production results, however, have generally remained on average more than 2,000 tons per month, which means that more than production of 24,000 tons per year has been taking place.

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<sup>108</sup> DAWN, "Musharraf inaugurates Mirani Dam in Turbat," <http://www.dawn.com/2006/11/17/top5.htm> (accessed August 16, 2007).

<sup>109</sup> "Mirani Dam Project," <http://www.lists.isb.sdnpk.org/pipermail/eco-list/2003-March/003278.html> (accessed April 15, 2007).

<sup>110</sup> Syed Fazl-e-Haider, "China digs Pakistan into a hole," [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/HJ05Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ05Df01.html) (accessed August 16, 2007).

### **3. The Livestock Development Strategy**

The Balochistan government has prepared a rangeland development program designed to support about 50 percent of the total livestock population of Pakistan and provide 90 per cent of the forage requirements for Balochistan livestock.<sup>111</sup>

#### **I. IMPEDIMENTS TO DEVELOPMENT**

There are many reasons for the economic backwardness of the province. Some of these are listed below.

##### **1. Governance/Institutional Framework**

Institutional inefficiency among government departments has been one of the major reasons for slow development in the province.

##### **2. Water Shortage**

This is one of the major problems of Balochistan. There are very few canals to take the province's share of water from the River Indus.

##### **3. Tribal Culture**

There is in fact a parallel government within the country. The individuals are more loyal to the tribal chief than to the government. For example, the share of royalties for oil and gas is paid to tribal chiefs instead of equal disbursement among the populace.

##### **4. The Law-and-Order Situation**

The negative influence of tribal chiefs is also a great hurdle in the way of the creation of a positive investment culture as well as development projects.

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<sup>111</sup> "Rangeland Development Strategy," <http://www.dawn.com/business-16february.htm> (accessed July 19, 2006).

## **J. THE PATTERN OF INSURGENT ACTIVITIES**

The general pattern of militant activities is not yet very clear. However, some of the features are as follows.

### **1. Use of Latest Equipment**

Militants are using the latest equipment for target acquisition, surveillance and communications apart from traditional methods.

### **2. Organization/Stage of Insurgency**

The militants are generally organized into cells of 6-20 personnel capable of merging into the local population. The cells are controlled by overall regional commanders. From the organization pattern, it is evident that the militant movement is somewhere between the organization and active resistance stages of insurgency.

### **3. Use of Media**

This is a new development in the Balochistan scenario. Militant elements are actively utilizing media to further their cause. Newspapers, pamphlets, radio transmission and internet websites are being utilized to influence the minds of the people.

## **K. CAUSES OF UNREST**

Balochistan is once again in a state of unrest, and has been for the last three years. The major causes are described below.

### **1. Minerals Royalty Issue**

As previously noted, Balochistan is blessed with huge natural resources but any royalty generated here only goes to tribal Sardars. These Sardars have

been blackmailing the government to increase the royalty and the allied perks. The issue has been portrayed as exploitation of Baloch resources by Punjab.

## **2. Attacks on National Assets and Frontier Corps**

These actions, besides challenging the writ of the state, have also caused considerable damage to the national assets.

## **3. Inter- and Intra-Tribal Rivalries**

Tribal rivalries have also made the law-and-order situation in the province more complex by obscuring the line between anti-government actions and tribal enmities.

## **4. Army Cantonments**

Nationalist elements are worried by plans to build more military cantonments at Gwadar, Kohlu and Dera Bugti.<sup>112</sup> They see these as evidence of the federal government's plan to break their grip over the unlawful and unchecked authority.

## **5. Mega Development Projects**

Mega development projects are being opposed by the nationalists on the following accounts.

### ***a. Demographic Change***

The Sardars follow the contention that these projects will change the demography of the province.<sup>113</sup> It is likely that Gwadar will hasten the arrival of two million people.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Najam Sethi, "Armed Balochi Nationalism Poses Grave Situation to Pakistan Security," <http://www.satribune.com/archives-August04.html> (accessed April 18, 2005).

<sup>113</sup> Sardar Akbar Khan Bughti, interview by Dr. Shahid Masood, @ ARYONE World, Islamabad, March 5, 2005.

<sup>114</sup> Pakistan Army, "Area Profile Report," June 2004.

**b. Threat to the Feudal System**

The economic prosperity in the province will raise awareness amongst the masses and weaken the feudal hold. Thus, development projects remain a threat to the feudal system in the long run.

**c. Miscellaneous**

- Gross neglect of development in Balochistan by successive governments.
- Unchecked smuggling of narcotics, arms and ammunition.
- Absence of mature and enterprising local media, which increases frustration and exploitation of the masses by pro-active nationalists.

**6. The Political Situation**

The weak political government in Balochistan is unable to establish writ over the province due to friction between various parties included in the coalition government.

The nationalists, having been left out of the power game and after suffering defeat in the general elections, are apprehensive of their future in politics. Hence, they are trying to portray certain issues as anti-Baloch, mainly to gather public support.

**L. THE POSSIBILITY OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT**

Owing to changing geo-political and geo-economic environments, some of the regional countries have developed interest in Balochistan. The major players include India, Afghanistan and Russia.

## 1. India

The Indian motives include the following:

- **Economic Goals**. India wants to pursue her economic goals by using the port of Chah Behar and undermining Pakistan's economy by not allowing development of Gwadar.
- **Safeguarding her Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)**. The strategic location of Gwadar affords an opportunity to the Pakistani Navy to effectively interfere with Indian SLOCs.

## 2. Afghanistan

The issue of borders and Pashtoon Khawa has been a cause of ups and downs in bilateral relations. Specifically, the problems can be broken down into the following areas.

### *a. The Durand Line Issue*

Afghanistan opposed the membership of Pakistan to the UNO (United Nations Organization). This act was followed by the convening of 'Loya Jirga' on July 26, 1949 in Kabul, which declared the Durand Line agreement null and void.

### *b. Support of Baloch Insurgencies*

Owing to the interest as mentioned earlier, Afghanistan supported the insurgencies of 1958 and 1973. The insurgents were given refuge in Afghanistan.

### *c. The Russo Afghan War*

The war resulted in the influx of Afghan refugees into NWFP and Balochistan. This influx tilted the demographic balance in the province.

#### **d. The Stance of the Present Afghan Government**

There has been no direct involvement in Balochistan affairs by the Afghan government. However, there might be some involvement of some power groups, such as Taliban, Indian and Iranian elements, which have their influence in Afghanistan.

### **3. Russia**

Balochistan has been important to Russia in the past. Russia had plans to control the supply of Gulf oil through the capture of Balochistan. During the Afghan war, there were connections between Russia and Baloch nationalist leaders, but at that time the Soviet Union was hesitant<sup>115</sup> to make such an overt move by contributing substantial aid to the Baloch resistance movement. However, the desire of Pakistan to access Central Asian States (CARs) is at odds with the Russian interests. If the Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline project succeeds, it would negatively affect the Russian economy. The Russian economy, in its present form, is based on the monopoly of *Gazprom* (a state owned gas company) and if *Gazprom* goes under, the Russian economy will be severely affected. Therefore, Russian re-establishment of ties with the Baloch nationalists cannot be ruled out.

### **M. NATIONALIST'S DEMANDS**

The nationalists asserted that the denial of power to the provincial government in order to control their natural resources is the root cause of differences with the federal government. A few of their important demands and reservations are listed below.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, (Quetta, Balochistan: Goshe-e-Adab, 1988), 387.

<sup>116</sup> Mir Mohammad Aslam Buledi (Senator), "Application to Prime Minister," February 2005. Most of the demands have been taken straight forward from the reference material.

## **1. Pakistan's System of Governance**

- The country should be run according to the spirit of the Federal Parliamentary System. The National Assembly should be abolished and all of its regulatory and legislative powers should be shifted to the provincial assemblies and the Senate.
- The National Reconstruction Bureau has decentralized 30% of provincial government functions and powers to district governments out of total existing 32%, but is silent on decentralizing the functions and powers of federal government.
- The federal government should look after only three subjects: currency, defense and foreign affairs.
- Increase in minerals royalty for Balochistan.
- The criteria for distribution of National Finance Commission Award should also cater for population density, poverty and backwardness of the area, in addition to the criteria of population.

## **2. Provincial Government Jurisdiction**

- Natural resources, ports, shipping and security should be controlled by the provincial government.
- The business initiatives in the province should be handled by the Balochistan Chamber of Commerce, as it is a provincial subject.
- The provincial government should be allowed to make direct economic ventures with foreign investors.
- The government should not generate any new mega project without involving a Baloch representative.
- Control of all mineral and gas installations should be handed over to the Balochistan provincial government.
- Financial accounts should be controlled, monitored and audited by the provincial government only.

### **3. Security Concerns**

- Construction of new military cantonments in Balochistan should be stopped forthwith.
- No military action should be taken in the province.
- The security system of the province needs to be built according to the aspirations of Balochistan.
- The merger of the Balochistan Levies into the Balochistan Police Force should be repealed.

### **4. Gwadar**

- Control of Gwadar should be given to the Balochistan provincial government.
- Gwadar Deep Sea Port Authority should be shifted from Karachi to Gwadar.
- Construction work of the second phase of Gwadar port should be dropped.
- Lands allotted to non-locals under housing schemes should be cancelled, especially in Gwadar.
- All non-Baloch's doing business in Gwadar must not be allowed the right to vote in any elections held in Gwadar.

## **VII. INFORMATION OPERATIONS DOMAIN/TOOLS TO COUNTER A SITUATION LIKE BALOCHISTAN**

### **A. PREMISE**

We are living in an age where every possible field of human life and activity is dominated by information. The scenarios and related information around us are changing at an extremely rapid pace. The advancement of technology to quickly process and disseminate raw data into useful/meaningful information in an appropriate manner to the concerned quarters has forced the decision makers not only to know the information related to the adversary, but to protect their own information. This phenomenon has also necessitated incorporating the Information Operations (IO) tools in the conventional planning and execution of tasks both during peace time as well as amidst the stressful and volatile situation of conflicts. Failure to do this in a timely and appropriate manner may result in adverse consequences, both militarily and politically. Unfortunately, there is less emphasis and understanding among some conventional military commanders about the fact that if the IO tools are employed in the true sense, with deliberate vision and strategic understanding well before and even during any conflict or campaign, it can not only be cost-effective for the impending campaign, but it can ensure achievement of desired results with minimum loss of time and effort.<sup>117</sup> A significant problem surfaces when we fail to adequately integrate IO with military operations. So, the obvious question arises: why do we fail to integrate the IO tools and guidelines into conventional planning?

### **B. DIFFICULTY IN INTEGRATING IO**

There are essentially three issues which must be considered in order to integrate IO with military operations. These are: IO doctrine, intelligence support

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<sup>117</sup>Thomas Rid, *War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq*, (Routledge, 2007).

to IO, and resourcing the IO efforts.<sup>118</sup> First, in most of the cases, the military doctrine of various countries does not provide military commanders adequate guidance for integrating IO into their operations. Doctrine presents IO in a disjointed manner and as a function that is essentially separate from the commander's other requirements and missions, not as something that must be integrated into all his requirements and missions. Second, IO requires proper intelligence support to be effective, but intelligence doctrine and resourcing do not allow intelligence support to IO to be effective. Intelligence doctrine provides little practical guidance on support to IO and intelligence processors and analysts are currently unprepared to provide the in-depth analysis of the information environment IO requires. Third, most militaries have not resource themselves to conduct IO in an effective manner. Due to the combined effect of all of this, the information mechanism fails to adequately portray the information environment. Also, it hinders the activities through which commanders can process the reporting that would allow them to analyze and portray the information environment. Professional Military Education and unit training programs do not stress IO as an integrated function and do not present commanders with realistic situations in which they may achieve success in the information environment. As a result of these three issues, commanders just do not understand how to integrate IO.

### **C. WHAT ARE IO AND IW?**

Before getting into the business of Information Operations and Information Warfare it is appropriate to discuss what information actually is. As per the definition in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and associated terms, the definition of Information is, "Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. Information also refers to the meaning that a human assigns to data by

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<sup>118</sup> Joseph L. Cox, "Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong?" School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 05-06.

means of the known conventions used in their representation.”<sup>119</sup> Here the important element is that information obtained from any medium, once the cognitive filters are applied to it by human beings, starts carrying some meanings. These meanings are bound to be related to the type of cognitive filter applied as well as the quality of that filter. So, it is very likely that the same information may convey different meanings to different persons as per their previous knowledge, background, and prevailing environments in which context the information has been obtained and interpreted. The cycle of raw data from different sensors and sources of information becoming knowledge is depicted in the Figure 7 below.




Figure 7. The Process of Raw Data Becoming Knowledge.

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<sup>119</sup> Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” June 13, 2007, 258.

## **1. Information Operations (IO)**

Information Operations (IO), specifically in the military context, are described as integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.<sup>120</sup> These elements of military operations are mostly associated with the Information Operations as defined by the DoD.

A key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain information superiority. Thomas Rona, an early proponent of Information Warfare, offered the following definition:

The strategic, operation, and tactical level competitions across the spectrum of peace, crisis, crisis escalation, conflict, war, war termination, and reconstitution/restoration, waged between competitors, adversaries or enemies using information means to achieve their objectives.<sup>121</sup>

## **2. Information Warfare (IW)**

Defining Information Warfare is a difficult and formidable task. A RAND study suggested that IW is evolving rapidly in response to the information revolution, therefore the definition is mostly imprecise. In fact the defense Science Board observed that, “we lack a common vocabulary.” One U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Fogelman, viewed IW as, “The fifth dimension of warfare.” Martin Libicki reports that some of the definitions of IW were so broad

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<sup>120</sup> JP 3-13, “Information Operations,” February 13, 2006, Ch. 1, 1.

<sup>121</sup> Dr. Thomas P. Rona is often credited with first applying the term “Information Warfare”, and has performed research for US DoD throughout the mid 1990s, on the historical, theoretical and operational concepts of IW. This definition has been picked up from his article, “From Scorched Earth to Information Warfare”, in Cyber war Security, Strategy and conflict in the Information age, Fairfax,-PP-911.

that they appeared to “cover all human endeavors.”<sup>122</sup> So, it appears that everyone has twisted the parameters of IW as per their own convenience and understanding.

IW is the use of information, or information systems, to disrupt or destroy an organization perceived to be an enemy. The over-riding objective is to coerce the target to act in a way that is favorable to the attacker’s wishes and overall plan. The use of information to gain advantage over an adversary is not new; however, the magnitude of the impact of these tactics has increased in this information age. Society as a whole is feeling the impact and accompanying massive changes as information increasingly becomes a source of power, influence, and economic gain. There are a number of definitions available, which describe the term IO in various manners. There seems to be conflicting views about this term among the scholars and warfare experts. One such definition is, “the use of information or information technology during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.”<sup>123</sup> Here it should be clarified that not everyone agrees that Information Warfare is limited to the realm of traditional warfare.

An interesting development took place when DoD decided to abandon the term IW (Information Warfare). In Joint Publication 3-13, “Information Operations,” of February 2006, the term IW was removed from the IO doctrine. Nevertheless, it is staying on and is frequently used to mention a specific portion of IO.

Warfare at the information level may take on several possible forms and manifestations.<sup>124</sup> Numerous authors have described the future shape of Information Warfare related to different layers of human society. One very well

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<sup>122</sup> Martin Libicki, “What is Information Warfare?” (ACIS Paper 3, National Defense University, 1995) 6.

<sup>123</sup> Libicki, “What is Information Warfare?”

<sup>124</sup> Edward Waltz, *Information Warfare Principles and Operations* (Artech House Publications, 1998), 15-16.

respected piece in this domain is *Cyber War is Coming* by Professor John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, where they have described it in four different categories: Net warfare, Political warfare, Economical warfare, and Cyber warfare.<sup>125</sup> Their observations and conclusions are based on the expanded global development of information infrastructures.

#### **D. OVERALL IO PERSPECTIVE (UNITED STATES)**

##### **1. The Information Environment**

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.<sup>126</sup> The actors include leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect,

analyze, apply, or disseminate information. The information environment is one in which humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and it is therefore the principal environment of decision making. Even though the information environment is considered distinct, it resides within each of the four domains. The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive.

##### **a. The Physical Dimension<sup>127</sup>**

The physical dimension is composed of the command and control (C2) systems and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations. In Pakistan, this dimension has been further augmented and given the name of C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup>SR, which stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, IO, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Under this umbrella, all the related activities are also covered.

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<sup>125</sup> Waltz, *Information Warfare*, 17.

<sup>126</sup> JP 3-13, "Information Operations," Ch. 1, 2.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

It is also the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. This includes the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. Comparatively, the elements of this dimension are the easiest to measure, and consequently combat. Power has traditionally been measured primarily in this dimension.

**b. *The Informational Dimension***<sup>128</sup>

The informational dimension is where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2 of modern military forces is communicated, and where the commander's intent is conveyed. It consists of the content and flow of information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that must be protected. If the information is breached in this stage, the overall effectiveness of any impending operation is degraded to a greater extent. In Pakistan, this dimension is mostly looked after by the respective services intelligence set-ups under the umbrella of the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) directorate.

**c. *The Cognitive Dimension***<sup>129</sup>

The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. The SPD (Strategic Planning Division) in Pakistan, in collaboration with ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations) directorate, takes care of this dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence this dimension. Therefore, operations like PSYOP have a major role to play here.

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<sup>128</sup> JP 3-13, "Information Operations."

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 3.

## **2. Principles of Information Operations and Core IO Capabilities**

Success in military operations depends on collecting and integrating essential information while denying it to the adversary and other target audiences. Basically, this constitutes the most essential and critical element of any campaign. This is implemented through one of the core capabilities of IO which is OPSEC (Operational Security). Of the five core IO capabilities, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries; now they have been joined by EW and CNO. The following outlines of IO capabilities have been taken directly from the referenced documents and are provided as background.

### ***a. Psychological Operations***<sup>130</sup>

PSYOPs are planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to target audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. PSYOP personnel advise the commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts of every aspect of force employment, and how to develop a strategy for developing and planning the dissemination of specific PSYOP programs. During a crisis, a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) is deployed. A POAT is a small, tailored team of PSYOP planners, product distribution/dissemination, and logistics specialists. The POAT assesses the situation, develops PSYOP objectives, and recommends the appropriate level of support to accomplish the mission.

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<sup>130</sup> JP 3-13, "Information Operations," Ch. 2, 1.

**b. PSYOP as an IO Core Capability<sup>131</sup>**

In today's information environment, even PSYOPs conducted at the tactical level can have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval process that must be understood, and the necessity for timely decisions is fundamental to effective PSYOP and IO. This is particularly important in the early stages of an operation given the time it takes to develop, design, produce, distribute, disseminate, and evaluate PSYOP products and actions. PSYOP must be coordinated with CI (Counterintelligence), MILDEC, and OPSEC to ensure de-confliction and control. There must be close cooperation and coordination between PSYOP and PA staff in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and coordination of the core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO; particularly PA, MILDEC, CNO, CMO, and EW.<sup>132</sup>

**c. Military Deception**

MILDEC is described as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces' mission. MILDEC and OPSEC are complementary activities — MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrect analysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions, while OPSEC seeks to deny real information to an adversary and prevent correct deduction of friendly plans. All the Information Operations capabilities have competing priorities for the resources required for deception and the resources required for the real operation. For this reason, the deception plan should be developed concurrently with the real plan.

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<sup>131</sup> JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations," September 5, 2003, Ch. 4, 3.

<sup>132</sup> JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations," Ch. 4, 5.

**d. MILDEC as an IO Core Capability<sup>133</sup>**

MILDEC is fundamental to successful IO. It exploits the adversary's information systems, processes, and capabilities. MILDEC relies upon understanding how the adversary commander and supporting staff think and plan and how they use information management to support their efforts. Each of the core, supporting, and related capabilities has a part to play in the development of successful MILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over time.

**e. Operations Security<sup>134</sup>**

OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions and other activities to: identify what friendly information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently accurate knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary decision makers critical information about friendly forces and intentions; and cause adversary decision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly information.

**f. OPSEC as an IO Core Capability<sup>135</sup>**

OPSEC complements MILDEC by denying adversary information required to both assess a real plan and to disprove a deception plan. The process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and taking measures to mask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a defense-in-depth approach. To be effective, other types of security measures like physical security, IA (Information Assurance) programs, computer network defense (CND), etc. must complement OPSEC.

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<sup>133</sup> JP 3-58, "Joint Doctrine for Military Deception," May 31, 1996, viii.

<sup>134</sup> JP 3-13, "Information Operations," Ch.4, 3.

<sup>135</sup> JP 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security," January 24, 1997, Ch. 2, 1.

**g. *Electronic Warfare***<sup>136</sup>

EW refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) and directed energy to control the EM spectrum. EW includes three major subdivisions: EA, electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). EA (Electronic attack) involves the use of EM energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability. EP ensures the friendly use of the EM spectrum. ES consists of actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conducting of future operations.

**h. *EW as an IO Core Capability***

EW contributes to the success of IO by using offensive and defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarial use of the EM spectrum while protecting friendly freedom of action in that spectrum. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and computer usage extends both the utility and threat of EW. All of the core, supporting, and related IO capabilities either directly use EW or indirectly benefit from EW.

**i. *Computer Network Operations***<sup>137</sup>

CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military operations. CNO stems from the increasing use of networked computers and supporting IT infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. CNO, along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade and disrupt core, supporting,

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<sup>136</sup> JP 3-13.1, "Electronic Warfare," January 25, 2007, Ch.3, 1.

<sup>137</sup> JP 3-13, "Information Operations," Ch. 4, 1.

and related Information Operations capabilities, and to deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure.

***j. CNO as an IO Core Capability***

The increasing reliance of sophisticated militaries and terrorist groups on computers and computer networks to pass information to C2 forces reinforces the importance of CNO in IO plans and activities. As the capability of computers and the range of their employment broaden, new vulnerabilities and opportunities continue to develop. This offers both opportunities to attack and exploit an adversary's computer system weaknesses.

**3. Information Operations Supporting Capabilities**

Capabilities supporting IO include IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, and COMCAM. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities.

***a. Information Assurance<sup>138</sup>***

IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority.

***b. IA as a Supporting Capability for IO***

IO depends on IA to protect information and information systems. IA and IO have an operational relationship in which IO are concerned with the coordination of military activities in the information environment, while IA protects

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<sup>138</sup> JP 3-13, "Information Operations."

the electronic and automated portions of the information environment. IA and all aspects of CNO are interrelated and rely upon each other to be effective.<sup>139</sup>

**c. *Physical Security*<sup>140</sup>**

Physical security is concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security process includes determining vulnerabilities to known threats, and applying appropriate deterrent, control and denial techniques responding to changing conditions.

**d. *Physical Security as a Supporting Capability for IO***

Just as IA protects friendly electronic information and information systems, physical security protects physical facilities containing information and information systems. Physical security often contributes to OPSEC, particularly in the case of MILDEC, when compromise of the MILDEC activity could compromise the real plan.

**e. *Physical Attack*<sup>141</sup>**

The concept of attack is fundamental to military operations. Physical attack disrupts, damages, or destroys adversary targets through destructive power. Physical attack can also be used to create or alter adversary perceptions or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable information systems.

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<sup>139</sup> DoD Directive 8500.1, "Information Assurance (IA)," and DoD Instruction (DODI) 8500.2, "Information Assurance (IA)."

<sup>140</sup> JP 3-07.2, "Antiterrorism;" JP 3-57, "Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations;" and JP 3-10, "Joint Security Operations in Theater."

<sup>141</sup> JP 3-13, "Information Operations."

***f. Physical Attack as a Supporting Capability for IO***

Physical attack can be employed in support of IO as a means of attacking C2 nodes to affect enemy ability to exercise C2. IO capabilities, like PSYPO for example, can be employed in support of a physical attack to maximize the effect of the attack on the morale of an adversary.

***g. Counterintelligence<sup>142</sup>***

CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, or sabotage conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof.

***h. CI as a Supporting Capability for IO***

CI procedures are a critical part of guarding friendly information and information systems. A robust security program that integrates IA, physical security, CI, and OPSEC with risk management procedures offers the best chance to protect friendly information and information systems from adversary actions.

***i. Combat Camera***

The COMCAM mission is to provide the combatant commands and other higher-ups with an imagery capability in support of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations.

***j. Combat Camera as a Supporting Capability for IO***

COMCAM supports all of the capabilities of IO that use images of friendly force operations to influence an adversary or support its own forces or

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<sup>142</sup> JP 2-01.2, "Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Operations."

allies.<sup>143</sup> They provide images for PSYOP, MILDEC, PA, and CMO use, but can also be used for BDA/measures of effectiveness (MOEs) analysis. COMCAM can also provide records of IO actions for subsequent rebuttal proceedings.

***k. Information Operations Related Capabilities***

These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conducting of IO.

***l. Public Affairs<sup>144</sup>***

PA is public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both external and internal audiences. PA is essential for joint forces information superiority, and credible PA operations are necessary to support the commander's mission and maintain essential public liaisons.

***m. Civil-Military Operations<sup>145</sup>***

CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace. They are conducted across the range of military operations to address root causes of instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster, or may be conducted independent of other military operations. CMO may include

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<sup>143</sup> Field Manual [FM] 3-55.12; Marine Corps Reference Publication [MCRP] 3-33.7A; Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures [NTTP] 3-13.12; Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Instruction) [AFTTP [1]] 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations.

<sup>144</sup> JP 3-61, "Public Affairs."

<sup>145</sup> JP 3-57, "Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations."

performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government.

***n. CMO as a Related Capability to IO***

CMO can be particularly effective in peacetime and pre- or post-combat operations when other capabilities and actions may be constrained. Early consideration of the civil-military environment in which operations will take place is important. As with PA, the CMO staff also has an important role to play in the development of broader IO plans and objectives. Distribution of information about CMO efforts and results through PA and PSYOP can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals.

***o. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy<sup>146</sup>***

DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by military and state components, in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the government.

**4. How IO Targets an Adversary**

IO may target human decision making or automated decision support systems with specific actions. Technology allows automated decision making to be targeted with increasing precision and affords more sophisticated ways to protect it. The focus of IO is on the decision maker and the information environment in order to affect decision making and thinking processes, knowledge, and understanding of the situation.

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<sup>146</sup> DODD 3600.1, "Information Operations (IO)."

## 5. How IO Can Affect Data

IO can affect data, information, and knowledge in three basic ways:

- By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that add, modify, or remove information from the environment of decision makers.
- By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, communicates, processes, and/or stores information in support of decision makers.
- By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use data, information, and knowledge.

## 6. Various Effects Which Can Be Achieved Through IO

All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive operations. Commanders use IO capabilities simultaneously to accomplish the mission, increase their force effectiveness, and protect their organizations and systems. Commanders can use IO capabilities to accomplish the following:

- **Destroy.** To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.
- **Disrupt.** To break or interrupt the flow of information.
- **Degrade.** To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 or communication systems, and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade the morale of a unit.
- **Deny.** To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical information, systems, and services.
- **Deceive.** To cause a person to believe what is not true.
- **Exploit.** To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information.

- **Influence.** To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to own forces.
- **Protect.** To take action to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment and information.
- **Detect.** To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.
- **Restore.** To bring information and systems back to their original state.
- **Respond.** To react quickly to an adversary's or others' IO attack or intrusion.

## VIII. IO HELPFULNESS IN DEFUSING THE BALOCHISTAN SITUATION AND APPLICABILITY OF IO CAPABILITIES

The situation in Balochistan is unique in the sense that it is internal to Pakistan, yet has many influential hands manipulating it from outside the country. Balochistan's strategic significance and natural endowment make it a critical province for Pakistan. Strategically, Balochistan bridges Central, South, Southeast and East Asia on one end, and Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East on the other. Regional states, especially India, cannot reach the energy and trade markets of the Caspian Sea region without transit through Balochistan. Iran is also not comfortable with the development of the deep sea port of Gawadar.

The Taliban are alleged to have some operational bases in Balochistan, in addition to those in Pakistan's tribal north. In the west, Sistan-Balochistan, also known as western Balochistan, is up in arms against the Iranian government. On December 15, 2005, a daring assassination bid was mounted against a motorcade of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad on the Zabol-Saravan Highway, in which one of his bodyguards was killed.<sup>147</sup> Pressure is, therefore, mounting on Islamabad to resolve the situation in Balochistan before it spirals out of control.

Pakistan has been watchful of Balochistan's violent surroundings, especially since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, which delivered Kabul from the Taliban. Yet the Taliban, however repugnant, were Pakistan's guardians of its northwestern frontier with Afghanistan and its southwestern border with Iran, freeing up Pakistan's military resources to allow it to fortify its eastern border with India. Since the Taliban's toppling in 2001, Pakistan feels that its western border is now exposed to "hostile intentions." It has since moved fast to build up its military presence in Balochistan, planning a host of garrisons all across the

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<sup>147</sup> *Terrorism Monitor*, February 23, 2007.

province. Pakistan also began to build naval defenses in Balochistan to safeguard its nearly 1,000 kilometer coastline. One such defense installation is the Jinnah Naval Base at Ormara, which is the Pakistan Navy's (PN) second largest base after its flagship naval port in Karachi. The Jinnah Naval Base has displayed Balochistan's paramount naval importance that has long been envied by regional powers, including the former Soviet Union and India. Yet the Jinnah Base is ancillary to the development of Pakistan's ultimate naval defenses in Balochistan's coastal town of Gawadar, which sits along the Arabian Sea coast.

The tribal and Sardari System has been going on for centuries in Balochistan. The Baloch Sardars and Numdars were able to keep their hold on the tribes due to backwardness and limited or no access of the people to resources. Now, as the government of Pakistan is going through with the mega projects like the deep sea port of Gawadar, a coastal highway and other mineral exploration projects, the Sardars fear for their continued hold of the tribes. The complex situation in Balochistan does demand that it should not be dealt with through the power of conventional military resources; rather, it is the contention of this thesis that the elements of IO must be utilized to deal with the situation in an amicable and effective manner.

## **A. APPLICABILITY OF IO CAPABILITIES IN BALOCHISTAN**

### **1. Psychological Operations**

PSYOPs are planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to target audiences. Although this core capability of IO is mostly used against foreign audiences, its utility for local/domestic audiences can not be ruled out. Particular to the Balochistan issue, the application of PSYOPs is very much relevant. The poor socio-economic conditions prevailing in the majority of the province is due to fewer opportunities available to the masses. This phenomenon gets roots if development plans are not undertaken and mega projects related to all kind of industry, business, agriculture and other public

sectors are not seen and understood as beneficial by the general population. The road to prosperity for the Baloch majority lies in opening mega projects in the province, projects which can create economic activity for the poor people of the land. The fact that the so-called Sardars and Maliks are resisting government efforts to set up mega projects like Gawadar deep sea port indicates that the Sardars and other tribal heads do not want to see the poor Baloches prosper.

One other fact which can be used in the realm of the PSYOP is that the royalties of the natural gas and other minerals extracted out of the province have not been utilized fully by the political and tribal heads, who instead have used most of them for their own personal benefits and luxuries. They never tried to use this money to establish schools and universities or to spend some amount for the general welfare of the poor people of the province by opening hospitals and other socially useful institutions. The fact that the present government is trying to uplift the socio and civic conditions of the public is a step in the right direction and must be appreciated.

It is another fact that whenever the cantonments are opened locally they do generate economic activity for the area. The government plans to open cantonments in the entirety of Balochistan with the view to ensure the safety of natural gas plants as well as to make for better change in the life of the particular area in which the cantonment would be opened. With every cantonment, the housing, schools, medical centers and such facilities that do come to that place will ultimately contribute to the socio-economic improvement of the area. This approach by the government is also being rejected by the Sardars and Maliks with their own mal-intentions. This fact should also be considered for the exploitation by the PSYOPs teams.

It is important to recognize that to conduct successful PSYOPs, all the efforts should be conducted with a deep analysis of the cultural strata, keeping in mind the traditions of Balochistan. Not only this, but it would be more appropriate to develop the themes for individual tribes or a group of tribes who have common traditions and social setups. It cannot be universal for all the tribes as they differ

significantly in their customs and traditions. The sophisticated means like Internet, print media, and electronic media should be tailored appropriately to address the mental and social setup of the respective target audiences in Balochistan. However, if these resources would be employed in a general fashion to persuade the simple people of Balochistan, they are not likely to bear fruit as it is quite likely that the target audiences would not be able to pick them. A successful strategy for the PSYOPs campaign should first need to be researched with respect to having a complete match with the local grain, then it should be implemented in a phased manner. Nevertheless, this core competency has a great chance to contribute in the overall achievement of the objectives of the IO campaign.

## **2. Military Deception**

Typically, this IO core capability is utilized against opponent militaries. In the case of the Balochistan situation, its application in the true sense is not envisaged. The militant factions are more expert in unconventional warfare, which is otherwise conducted against a powerful conventional force. So, the only way to use this core capability is to use it in conjunction with the PSYOP to convince the target audience that any violations of the law of the land or any attempt to make the law by the miscreants would be dealt with full military might without exception. The commitment of the armed forces to establish the writ of the law of the land will have positive results on the achievement of the objectives. For this purpose, the appreciation of the thought process of the decision makers of the miscreants should be done carefully and continuously at every level of the operation. Subsequently, the prevailing situation should be revisited to amend and mold themes in accordance with the changing environments.

## **3. Operations Security**

In fact, the success of any operation depends upon the degree of success with which the OPSEC is maintained. In the case of Balochistan, the relevant

details of operation have to be kept secret to avoid them reaching the decision makers of violent factions. As it is not possible to deny all kinds of information about any operation, the first step could be to identify what information is critical information about their own forces and intentions. Then they could cause miscreant decision makers to pick up some information which appears to be relevant about the operation but is not critical, in other words to misjudge the relevance of known critical information. In doing this, the critical information about their own forces and intentions remain secure, whereas the adversary also feels that they are well-informed about the planning and intentions of the operation.

#### **4. Electronic Warfare**

This IO core capability, if used appropriately, can be of great help to conduct operations precisely with a minimum of collateral damage and casualties of their own troops. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and computer usage extends both the utility and threat of EW. In the Balochistan situation, the available means of controlling the electromagnetic spectrum will be of much use in order to know about the wireless traffic of the miscreants, while at the same time providing appropriate protection to one's own communicating assets. All three elements of EW, electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES), should be used in unison to complement each other and with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying the miscreant's combat capability. Through the professional use of EP, the friendly use of the EM spectrum at all times before and during the operation can be ensured. Using the ES domain of EW, efforts should be made to intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and the conduct of their own operations.

## **5. Computer Network Operations**

Keeping in view the nature of the insurgency and the capabilities that the miscreants maintain in the Balochistan province, the utility of CNO as a full-fledged core capability of IO is remote and limited. It is not expected that the miscreants are making use of networked computers and supporting IT infrastructure systems. However, overseas support, which is available to the miscreants in this field, suggests that all the measures at hand must be taken to protect one's own infrastructures. In this regard, the CND (Computer Network Defense) operations such as to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity in the computer networks should be ensured. Beside these, actions that not only protect computer systems from external resources but also from exploitation from within should also be considered while planning the IO campaign in the Balochistan province.

### **B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES**

The supporting IO capabilities are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO campaign. If not all then most of the supporting IO capabilities are very much pertinent to the Balochistan province. Nevertheless, there would be a need to integrate and coordinate these supporting capabilities with the core capabilities. Sometimes they appear to be overlapping with the core capabilities, so their integration and coordination is a must for a successful IO campaign.

#### **1. Information Assurance**

All measures, as required under this capability, are essential to be used for the successful completion of the Balochistan campaign. These measures include the actions taken to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. If all such-like activities will be carried out, the information superiority will be ensured in our campaign in Balochistan.

## **2. Physical Security**

This aspect has two dimensions. One part of it is related to the security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The other part is related to the physical security of the troops. Under the prevailing environments in Balochistan, the 2<sup>nd</sup> aspect has immense importance, as it directly affects the intangible factor of the morale of the troops. The major impediment here is to identify the miscreants from the common people. If a mistake is committed in this task, the repercussions can be very grave. Instead of positive, the impression and perception builds up in a very negative way among the masses. This is especially important because success cannot be achieved without the help of common Balochis in this insurgency.

## **3. Physical Attack**

No military operation can succeed without a physical attack on the opponents if the resistance is not willing to lay down arms without an armed conflict. But for Pakistan, security forces taking military action against their own people is a very sensitive issue. Therefore, all the diplomatic efforts to deal with the situation through peaceful negotiations must be tried before taking any physical military action. The situation, which is currently prevailing in Balochistan, warrants that physical military operations should be undertaken at a number of selected places. Foreign influence along the Afghan border and in the areas adjacent to the Iran border has enabled the miscreants to pick up sophisticated arms and have combat encounters with security forces. The destruction of natural gas pipelines is becoming routine in some of the more troubled areas. If the writ of the government is not restored in such areas, the miscreants may come to believe the government is not serious in establishing the rule of law in particular areas. Therefore, carefully planned and religiously executed military actions seem to be one of the options in establishing a better environment in

Balochistan. The expected results from such a venture may be further brightened if supporting PSYOPs back up the military campaign simultaneously.

#### **4. Counterintelligence**

Somewhat overlapping with operations security, CI procedures are a critical part of guarding friendly information and information systems. For a successful IO campaign in Balochistan a detailed and comprehensive security plan has to be chalked out. This security plan should integrate IA, physical security, CI, and OPSEC. Only a comprehensive and well synchronized and executed IO plan will help achieve campaign objectives in Balochistan.

#### **5. Combat Camera**

This sophisticated supporting IO capability can pay rich dividends in the accomplishment of the mission in Balochistan. The rugged and difficult mountainous terrain in the province makes it difficult to observe all the areas of operation through conventional means of surveillance. Even radars are not effective due to the line of sight problem here and there. The imagery obtained through the COMCAM mission can assist in ascertaining the latest activities and positions of the miscreants in various parts of the province. This would be of great help in planning and conducting military operations with minimum collateral damage and with maximum effective neutralization of the targets in the area. Subsequently, the battle damage assessment can also be conducted through COMCAM, which facilitates planning and the use of force to be employed in the later phases of the operation.

### **C. INFORMATION OPERATIONS RELATED CAPABILITIES**

There are three military functions, PA, CMO, and DSPD, specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and the rules under which they

operate must not be compromised by keeping in mind the core and supporting IO activities. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff for the entire campaign in Balochistan.

## **1. Public Affairs**

PA again has two aspects, one is that it is related to the dissemination of information both to the friendly troops and friendly public audiences to counter the misinformation and disinformation spread by the adversary. This objective is achieved by the dissemination of truthful information. The second aspect of PA is that it provides security to OPSEC by taking the media into confidence by the pre-release of critical information. If this functionality of PA is not performed, it is most likely that critical information may reach the media in a manner which can compromise the OPSEC. In the operation in Balochistan, both the dimensions of PA would be pertinent. Fact-based information would help in building public opinion about the rationale for operation against the miscreants and would also ensure that the public of Balochistan does not believe the misinformation/propaganda launched by the miscreants. The independence and the openness, which the media enjoys in Pakistani society, also demands that the 2<sup>nd</sup> aspect of PA is used to its full extent. Otherwise, it is likely that critical operational information may be made public by the media, which would have serious repercussions on the operational planning of the campaign in Balochistan.

## **2. CMO as a Related Capability to IO**

CMO can be particularly effective in peacetime and pre- or post-combat operations when other capabilities and actions may be constrained. In the case of Balochistan, the prospects appear to be remote for CMO, but in fact the efforts to reach out to the poor masses may be productive. The majority of the Balochis

like to see their day-to-day life pass smoothly and without disturbance from the outside. So, under this phenomenon, CMO planned carefully and in a phased manner may be very effective in the Balochistan campaign.

## **IX. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. PREAMBLE**

The first responsibility of any government is to provide security for its citizens. Political violence and terrorism fall into a gray area that may entail both foreign and domestic threats to state security. The challenge is to develop counter-terrorism strategies that deal effectively with the threat without antagonizing its citizens or neighboring states. Most counter-terrorist strategies focus on a military or police perspective and overlook the prospects for diplomacy, negotiation and reform, which is essentially the information operations domain. The Information Operations tools, if applied sensibly, can prove especially helpful in resolving the issues and conflicts to deflate the pressures with the least risk and the least cost.

### **B. STRATEGY PARAMETERS**

The parameters of the strategy to deal with the insurgents and miscreants in Balochistan may have these cardinal features:

- Make no deals with miscreants/insurgents and do not submit to blackmail.
- Treat them as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law. Ultimately bring criminals to justice that attempt to damage the national resources and thereby challenge the writ of the government.
- Apply maximum pressure on all influential groups/elements that sponsor and support miscreants by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions/restrictions.
- Have a clear-cut dialogue with the suspected states who are fueling and supporting them to stop all such aid and activities. In the

pursuit of this objective help from allies like the U.S.A. can be of great value.

- Work for changes in culture of the youth and make efforts in the overall socio development of the poor masses by creating economic activities in the province.
- Equip and train the law enforcing and other security agencies to deal with the situation in an unconventional manner.

## **C. LESSONS LEARNED**

### **1. Poor Socio-Economic Conditions**

In today's world, the quality of any social structure in a region is based on its economy. Better economic conditions generally reduce the chances of minor and major corruption and keep its masses away from crime.

### **2. Writ of the Government**

The governments' use of the masses for political objectives is a dangerous trend. Using the Sardars as agents has weakened the writ of the government and has strengthened the Sardari System.

### **3. Sense of Political Deprivation Amongst the Masses**

Owing to the weaker writ of the government, the provincial matters have been handled or affected by Sardars according to their individual whims and wishes. This gave a sense of political deprivation to the common masses which has taken deep roots at present.

### **4. The External Factor**

The geo-strategic importance of Balochistan is a major reason for the influence of external factors on the internal security environment of the province.

India and some other nations are believed to be financing the anti-state elements against the growing Chinese presence in Balochistan in mega projects such as Gwadar.

#### **5. Ineffectiveness of Law Enforcement Agencies**

The role of law enforcing agencies has not been aggressive against the criminals bred by the Sardars of the province. This has given the miscreants further courage to continue their criminal activities.

#### **6. Lack of an Infrastructure**

The province has been deprived of any major communication and road infrastructure. The development whatever was planned could not root in an area devoid of basic infrastructure and thereof incapable of absorbing the development package.

#### **7. Miscellaneous**

- Lack of job opportunities within and outside the province.
- The law-and-order situation can also be attributed to the Afghan refugees, especially those who keep crossing the border unchecked.
- Employment of army on Internal Security (IS) duties does not seem to be acceptable to most of the people.
- Lack of awareness amongst the masses and low literacy level.
- Lack of political will of successive governments to develop the province.

## **D. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Deliberate Pro-Active Planning**

In analyzing the Balochistan situation it is evident that the policies and strategies implemented thus far have always lacked deliberate planning. Most of the strategies devised were reactive in nature. Deliberate planning was considered to ensure that the response of government agencies is not only reactive but pro-active. This could have been done. This might have encouraged law enforcing agencies to follow a deliberate plan and thus execute it in a useful manner. In the absence of a deliberate proactive strategy to deal with the Balochistan situation, success seems to be a remote possibility.

### **2. Lack of a Defined Goal**

Whenever efforts were put into stabilizing the situation in the province they lacked a clear-cut objective. The strategy to deal with the Balochistan situation has been more of a fire fighting practice and the resources were employed with no defined goals.

### **3. Cutting the Lifelines**

Violent Political Groups (VPGs) such as the one operating in Balochistan need money, activists, public support, freedom to maneuver, access to weapons and explosives, secrecy, and publicity. Government can institute programs to deny and disrupt each of these lifelines. However, each such program entails other consequences that may provoke community anger and outrage, validate miscreant/dissident grievances, or encourage support for terrorism as a necessary evil. The organization, skills and training required may be beyond the scope of traditional police or military organizations to handle them amicably after the lifelines have been sufficiently denied.

#### **4. Avoid Discrete Profiling**

Like soldiers that wear camouflage uniforms to blend into natural environments, or snipers seeking to disguise themselves, miscreants and dissidents work at blending into the settings of Balochistan's various areas, both socially and culturally. As a result, they look like everybody else and can't be identified on sight. In cases where they share visible characteristics there is a temptation for authorities to attempt profiling, which can alienate communities, without focusing on specific individuals. Such measures often provoke an unwelcome backlash that deepens discord.

#### **5. Containment Strategy**

In the case of the Balochistan issue, except for a few, most of the miscreants/dissidents tend to come from a host community or a minority group that lives in a somewhat defined area, although they get support from overseas sources. An attempt can be made by the government pursuing the containment strategy designed to shrink, or limit, the conflict zone, which has been identified over the period. Barriers can be erected to restrict or deny access. Such measures make movement more difficult, but it is a slippery slope and problems can be further exacerbated by segregating communities, which in turn breeds greater hatreds and more miscreants in the society.

#### **6. Applicability of IO Tools**

The applicability of all Information Operations tools will be required for tackling the Balochistan situation in a professional manner. All the relevant IO core, related and supporting capabilities should be implemented wherever possible to reach to the solutions to Balochistan's problems. Deliberate planning for PSYOPs can be very much cost-effective if it is prepared and executed with care and in an appropriate manner.

## **7. The Wholesome Approach**

The current situation in Balochistan is very turbulent and demands appropriate measures to be undertaken by the government. It may not be termed as an insurgent movement. However, if the issue is not amicably resolved in an earlier time frame, it may gather sufficient mass and generate the requisite momentum to bring the very integrity of the country into question. The options available to the government in order to resolve the issue are listed below.

### ***a. Option I - Political Handling***

Despite the negative influence of the Sardari System, Balochistan remains a very traditional area. Therefore, the Sardari Nizam should be dealt with realistically. In this regard, efforts should be made to persuade all Baloch Sardars and nationalist/sub-nationalist political parties to move towards a political solution. They may also be included in the provincial government. The government should also endeavor to provide similar funds and authority to all Sardars as being given to others for the development of their areas through streamlined procedures. The government should also take strong judicial action against those found involved in serious criminal and anti-state activities.

#### (1) Merits

- Affords a political solution, generally acceptable to the masses and will create harmony on all major issues.
- Apparently a compromising option but has the long-term potential to neutralize the Sardari Nizam.
- The sub-nationalists, when satisfied, will be less vulnerable to hostile agencies.
- Further deterioration of law-and-order can be avoided.
- Does not entail heavy expenditures, thus affordable.
- No chance for hostile media to exploit the situation.

## (2) Demerits

- Relatively a weak course of action of compromise by the federal government, thus it is vulnerable to further exploitation by anti-government elements/opposition to achieve maximum leverage, which may be detrimental to efficacy of the adopted course.
- A long-term solution, which may take a U-turn if mishandled by the present or future governments.
- Transitory acceptance of Sardari Nizam.

### ***b. Option II - Use of Force***

Troubled areas like Dera Bhugti, Kahran, Kohlu, and Wadh may need to be subdued through military operations and Sardari Nizam needs to be eliminated in Balochistan through state power and might. This option should also include massive economic development to free the common man from the clutches of Sardars.

## (1) Merits

- Writ of the present government will be established.
- An immediate and direct solution to the problem.
- This option may be able to obtain instantaneous response of general masses against Sardari Nizam.
- Earlier economic development of affected areas will be possible.

## (2) Demerits

- The resultant collateral damage may develop more hatred in the hearts and minds of common Balochs.
- May lead to insurgency-like situation.
- Hostile elements can exploit the situation in international media, especially through human rights organizations.
- A resource-heavy solution.

- May endanger national assets like gas fields and on-going mega projects during clashes with armed sub-nationalists.
- Use of force cannot ensure lasting peace.

**c. Option III - Massive Economic Uplift**

With no change in the present political status, the government should undertake a massive economic uplift, both short-term and long-term at the fastest possible pace. In the meanwhile, pro-federation political rivals of the hard-line Sardars should be given gradual governmental support. Simultaneously, all those found involved in serious anti-state activities should be handled strictly.

(1) Merits

- The masses will be satisfied, and therefore will not fall prey to a sub-nationalist agenda.
- Influence of Sardari Nizam will reduce gradually.
- A policy of carrot-and-stick is adopted.
- Will afford a progressive solution to the problem.
- The writ of the government will gradually be established.

(2) Demerits

- A resource-heavy solution.
- Old policy of divide-and-rule may not work for a long time; therefore it will not be a permanent solution.

**d. Option IV – Ban and Restrictions**

The government can think of this option, but the merits and demerits of such option are very dicey. If it works, fine, the result may be very rewarding. However, simultaneously, chances are that the situation may further deteriorate. The different kind of bans and restrictions which can be thought of are listed below.

### (1) General Bans and Restrictions

- Impose press censorship.
- Ban opposition political parties.
- Ban opposition newspapers.
- Ban public assemblies.
- Ban religious assemblies.
- Ban or limit activities of community and humanitarian groups.
- Ban protest marches and demonstrations.
- Ban dissidents from appearing or speaking in public or in public media.
- Erect barriers to separate factions, or deny movement and maneuvering.
- Impose restrictions on travel.
- Impose restrictions on employment of target populations.
- Introduce extensive video surveillance.
- Utilize electronic intelligence measures.
- Use aerial surveillance measures.
- Arrest dissident leaders.
- Arrest outspoken critics, theologians, teachers, and intellectuals.
- Impose limitations on citizenship, especially by the Taliban and Afghan refugees in the area.
- Impose limits on property ownership and transfer.
- Ban displays of certain flags and symbols.
- Restrict target population commercial activities (exports/imports), with focus on smuggling from Afghanistan and Iran.

(2) Wide scale Measures The state may adopt legislation for special powers and authority. These authorities may include:

- Ability to stop and search individuals.

- Ability to enter and search homes, businesses and any other facilities.
- Ability to monitor financial, phone, medical or library records.
- Ability to detain people without notice, charges, trial or legal recourse.
- Ability to conduct trials without legal counsel.
- Ability to control (fabricate) evidence.
- Ability to detain or convict on presumption of guilt.
- Ability to convict on “intent” to conspire charges.
- Ability to conduct unauthorized phone taps and surveillance.
- Ability to declare martial law.

## **8. Common Recommendations**

In fact it is a combination of all the options which the government must adopt in order to resolve the Balochistan issue in an amicable manner. The efforts and energy focused on one or two elements may provide relief temporarily, but ultimately for the long-term solution the government has to adopt multi-prong approaches considering all the available options. Some of the common recommendations are provided below.

### ***a. Educational Reforms***

- (1) Educate the masses to think logically and they will revolt against the Sardari Nizam of their own accord. All efforts must be made to direct the masses towards educating their children. For this purpose, the system of free education should be introduced. Madrassas, especially with false Islamic teachings, should be checked to follow the true and enlightened religious values.
- (2) Teachers from other provinces with better incentives should be employed for creating cohesiveness with the Balochs and countering negative propaganda.

- (3) Quota for Baloch students, along with scholarship in other provinces, should be enhanced and they should be provided with the opportunity to get an education in the elite schools in other provinces.

**b. Early Completion of Mega Projects**

The early completion of on-going mega projects like Gwadar deep sea port will usher an era of tremendous economic development and activity in the province. It will subsequently help in eliminating the socio-economic deprivation of the masses.

**c. Communication Infrastructure**

Development of a communication infrastructure like roads, telephones, ports, airports, etc. will not only help the federal government, Central Asian Republics (CARs), and China to establish a trade route through Balochistan, but will also improve the economic condition of the locals.

**d. Media Campaign**

The following aspects must be given due consideration:

- (1) The point of view of the government should be transmitted to the locals in their native languages.
- (2) The effects of Sardari Nizam and its relevance in the modern era should be tactfully handled, whereby the actual message should be conveyed to the masses without offending the Sardars.
- (3) The positive social, political, and economic effects of the mega projects undertaken by the government should be conveyed to the populace.
- (4) All efforts should be made to ensure that media reaches all areas and all segments of society.

**e. Intelligence Gathering**

- (1) Intelligence agencies must penetrate nationalist organizations in order to foil their nefarious designs before implementation.
- (2) Locals should be encouraged to join law enforcing agencies by lowering the selection standards and increasing incentives.
- (3) Other Sardars and tribal heads who support government policies should be given more projection, incentives, and support.

**f. Economic and Social Uplift**

It has been confessed at the highest level that Balochistan has been ignored in the past and that none of the previous governments took it seriously. There is a need to resolve the genuine grievances of the masses in terms of economic uplift and social development of the province.

**g. Small Developmental Projects**

Though the present regime has initiated a number of mega projects in the province, their effects are not likely to reach the masses in the immediate future. Hence, there is a need to undertake smaller projects within the length and breadth of the province, so that the masses will be able to get immediate relief.

**h. Dealing with Nawabs/Sardars**

Nawabs should not be allowed to adopt a unified stance. They should be dealt with politically as well as militarily. Thus, Ata ullah Mengal needs to be dealt with only politically, whereas the most militant of all the Sardars, Khair Baksh Marri, should be dealt with through force.

**i. Conversion of Areas**

Conversion of B (semi-go areas) areas into A areas (go-areas) should be undertaken immediately. This is essential to establish the writ of the

government as well as for undertaking the large mega projects in the area. The establishment of cantonments at specified new locations will of great help in achieving this objective.

***j. Law Enforcement Agencies***

Law enforcement agencies in Balochistan should be reinforced in their capacity and capability to handle the situation on their own, as the army's involvement in IS (Internal Security) does not augur well in the overall context of solidarity.

***k. Check Against Smuggling***

Smuggling and gun running within Balochistan is one of the major destabilizing factors which need to be effectively checked. In this regard, law enforcement agencies should be given a free hand, especially at the Iran and Afghanistan borders. However, at the same time, the local people should also be accommodated in various job vacancies so that they can earn their living with respect.

***l. Dealing with the Sectarian Threat***

Law enforcement agencies have met considerable success in dealing with the networks involved in sectarian violence against the Shiite community and arresting culprits. But still, a lot is required to be done towards ushering-in the sectarian tolerance amongst various strata of society through the positive contribution of key religious figures.

***m. Afghan Refugees***

Law enforcement agencies must adopt strict measures to control the cross-border movement of Afghan Refugees. Routine checks at the international border need to be enforced very effectively and any laxity should not be ignored to avoid refugees falling prey to criminals with vested interests.

***n. Enhancement of Special Educational Quota***

The education standards in the province have suffered due to underdevelopment, corruption and social backwardness. Graduates from this province are therefore unable to compete with students from other parts of the country. It is therefore deemed essential that special quota in various public schools, Cadet Colleges in Balochistan and elsewhere in Pakistan for students of Balochistan, particularly from Marri and Bugti areas, be enhanced.

***o. Enrollment in the Armed Forces***

The people of Balochistan have minimum representation in the armed forces, especially among the senior ranks. It is therefore suggested that an extensive enrollment drive in the army may be taken up in areas of Marris, Bugtis and Mengals, etc. with a view to provide them with an employment opportunity.

***p. Role of the Media***

Sub-nationalists are backed by the ignorant and they thrive on the exploitation of this ignorance. Electronic and print media must be utilized to educate people so that their enormous potential can be directed towards nation building. As a first step, the government must ensure that Pakistan television broadcasts and mainstream publications are available in every part of Balochistan. Special programs may be run to expose the designs of sub-nationalist elements with special emphasis on unveiling the vested interests of the Nawabs as well as other miscreants.

**E. CONCLUSION**

Perhaps the path to peace and prosperity will lie in gradual evolution not revolution. Ironically, the activities that eventually help resolve political conflicts involving our own miscreants are often actions, or reforms that were demanded from the beginning. The cycle of violence is ultimately broken by a cycle of

reform. If there is one lesson from human history, it is that people will rebel and fight for justice and equality - they always have and always will. If there is a second lesson, it is the age-old maxim that none have ever given up power voluntarily.

The security picture of Balochistan seems to be gloomy and grim, thus warranting an immediate and prompt response from all concerned. This not only includes the government functionaries, input from the general masses is also required. People-to-people contact, as has been started by the present regime, is likely to bring home the desired results. An amicable management of the Balochistan problems calls for wide-ranging changes in the existing system of governance and political management. The province should be given more financial, administrative and political autonomy in operational terms. No enduring solution of the Balochistan problem is possible unless the federal government decides to trim its role in the polity. Major concerns of the Baloch leaders about the on-going mega projects should be accommodated, even if this requires some changes in these projects

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