



Factors influencing career satisfaction and dissatisfaction in five groups of Land Force Lieutenant-Colonels

A targeted follow-up to the Army Climate and Culture Survey

*Donald R. McCreary
Defence R&D Canada – Toronto*

*Angela R. Febbraro
Defence R&D Canada – Toronto*

*LCol (Retired) Peter Bradley
Royal Military College of Canada*

*Danielle Charbonneau
Royal Military College of Canada*

*LCol Martin Villeneuve
Canadian Forces Director General Military Careers*

Defence R&D Canada – Toronto

Technical Report

DRDC Toronto TR 2006-088

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Principal Author

Original signed by Donald R. McCreary, PhD

Donald R. McCreary, PhD

Approved by

Joseph Baranski, PhD

A/Head, Command Effectiveness and Behaviour Section

Approved for release by

K. M. Sutton

Chair, Document Review and Library Committee

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Abstract

This study explored job satisfiers and dissatisfiers among 49 Army LCol in five MOCs (Combat Arms and Logistics). The study was in response to findings from *The Army Climate and Culture Survey*, where the LCol rank was highlighted as potentially disaffected. Quantitative results (using the JSS and WES) showed that the LCol were generally satisfied and very engaged in their work. Qualitative findings from a series of focus groups and e-mail responses revealed several job satisfiers (the opportunities to command, to influence the CF/Army, and to work with soldiers as mentors and educators; the intrinsic aspects of their work; and the extrinsic aspects of their work). However, the qualitative findings also revealed a series of dissatisfiers with regard to promotion (second language requirement, academic requirements, prior command requirement, the need to be placed in one or more A-jobs, excessive workload demands, the effects of promotion demands on family, and the Army Succession Planning Process), leadership (general leadership issues such as micro-managing, feeling free to question leaders, transformational vs. transactional leadership, and other organizational issues), general organizational issues, concerns about the post-command transition to a staff job, and concerns about workload, OPTEMPO, and quality of life. The study also asked LCol to suggest possible ways to address or fix their biggest dissatisfiers. Responses focused on the need to provide sufficient resources to LCol (among others), set priorities (e.g., resources to match requirements), improve promotion and reward systems (e.g., modify or eliminate the second language policy or tier system), change organizational structures (e.g., to reduce bureaucracy) and organizational culture (e.g., to increase the use of mission command), improve leadership at the senior levels, introduce formal sessions between LCol and senior officers in order to enhance communication, improve the career planning system, enhance quality of life initiatives (including better pay, pensions/benefits and housing), and empower LCol (e.g., by giving a bigger role to COs in personnel decisions).

Résumé

La présente étude effectuée auprès de 49 lcol de l'Armée de terre dans cinq GPM (Armes de combat et Logistique) a pour objet d'évaluer la satisfaction et l'insatisfaction au travail. Cette étude donne suite aux résultats du *Sondage sur la culture et le climat de l'Armée de terre* qui révélait qu'il risquait d'y avoir du mécontentement chez les lieutenants-colonels. Les résultats quantitatifs (obtenus à l'aide de l'Enquête sur le lieu de travail et les employés [ELTE] et du Système de soumission des travaux [SST]) démontrent que les lcol sont habituellement satisfaits de leur travail et très dévoués. Les résultats qualitatifs d'une série de groupes de discussion et de réponses par courriel ont permis de déterminer plusieurs facteurs de satisfaction au travail (les occasions de commander, d'exercer une influence sur les FC et sur l'Armée de terre et d'agir à titre de mentor et d'instructeur auprès des soldats, ainsi que les aspects intrinsèques et extrinsèques de leur travail). Cependant, les résultats qualitatifs révèlent aussi une série de facteurs d'insatisfaction par rapport à l'avancement professionnel (les exigences linguistiques et scolaires, les préalables au commandement, la nécessité d'occuper un ou plusieurs postes de niveau A, une charge de travail excessive, les répercussions familiales des demandes d'avancement professionnel, et le processus de planification de la relève de l'Armée de terre), au leadership (les questions d'ordre général sur le leadership telles que la microgestion, la liberté d'interroger les dirigeants, le leadership transformationnel par rapport au leadership transactionnel, et les autres questions organisationnelles), aux questions organisationnelles d'ordre général, aux préoccupations concernant le passage après un poste de commandement à un poste d'état-major, et aux préoccupations concernant la charge de travail, l'OPTEMPO et la qualité de vie. Dans le cadre de l'étude, on demandait également aux lcol de suggérer des moyens possibles de répondre à leurs principales insatisfactions et de combler leurs demandes. Les réponses sont notamment axées sur la nécessité de fournir suffisamment de ressources aux lcol, de fixer des priorités (p. ex., des ressources correspondant aux exigences), d'améliorer les mécanismes d'avancement professionnel et de récompense (p. ex., modifier ou abolir la politique en matière de langue seconde ou le système de catégories), de modifier les structures organisationnelles (p. ex., réduire la bureaucratie) et la culture organisationnelle (p. ex., utiliser davantage le commandement de mission), d'améliorer le leadership des supérieurs, de mettre en place des séances officielles entre les lcol et les officiers supérieurs afin de favoriser la communication, d'améliorer le système de planification de carrière, d'améliorer les initiatives relatives à la qualité de vie (notamment de meilleurs soldes, pensions, avantages sociaux et logements), et de donner du pouvoir aux lcol (p. ex., en donnant un rôle plus important aux CMDT dans les décisions liées à l'état-major).

Executive summary

Factors influencing career satisfaction and dissatisfaction in five groups of Land Force Lieutenant-Colonels

McCreary, D.R., Febbraro, A.R., Bradley, P., Charbonneau, D. and Villeneuve, M.; DRDC Toronto TR 2006-088; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; July 2006.

Background

In the 2004 *Army Climate and Culture Survey* conducted for the Director General – Land Capability Development (Land Personnel Concepts and Policy), LColS appeared to be experiencing some of the highest levels of career dissatisfaction in the Land Force. The survey results highlighted four main findings: (1) LColS reported difficulty completing their daily assignments, as well as the added burden of having to work on “unnecessary things;” (2) LColS reported experiencing less transformational leadership from their superiors than would be expected on the basis of their rank; (3) LColS reported feeling less free to question their superiors’ decisions and were less inclined to approve of others questioning leaders than would be expected on the basis of their rank; and (4) LColS were less favourable to second language requirements than other ranks.

To address the reasons behind the apparent dissatisfaction, a targeted follow-up was conducted. Focus groups were conducted with Army LColS in five military occupational categories (Combat Arms and Logistics). These occupations form the nucleus of Army culture at the LCol rank level and thus were viewed as the most appropriate sample for studying LCol dissatisfaction in the Army. Questions were asked about the issues that emerged in *The Army Culture and Climate Survey*, as well as other possible reasons for job dissatisfaction.

Participants and Procedure

In September 2005, all 209 Canadian-based Land Force LColS in the five target occupations were sent an initial contact letter outlining the goals of the study and requesting their participation. From that initial contact, 30 LColS participated in one of nine focus groups conducted at Army bases across Canada, as well as at National Defence Headquarters. Another 19 LColS participated via e-mail. In both groups of LColS, participants were asked to discuss or write about nine general questions concerning the factors that influenced their job satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Participants also completed a commonly used measure of job satisfaction, as well as a measure of psychological work engagement and a demographics questionnaire. The sample was comprised of LColS in all three command phases of that rank (i.e., pre-, mid, and post-command).

Findings

With regard to the quantitative measures of job satisfaction, this group of LColS appeared to be more satisfied with their job (compared to the US scale norms, which were based on over 28,000 responses from a wide range of occupations) in terms of their pay, their co-workers, and

communication within the organization. They were less satisfied compared to the norms with regard to operating policies and procedures. Their responses did not differ from the norms on the scales assessing satisfaction with promotion, immediate supervisor, monetary and non-monetary issues, contingent rewards, and the nature of the work itself. The measure of psychological work engagement showed that the LColS were highly engaged in their jobs, with more than half of the respondents having the highest score possible on the measure.

Qualitative findings showed several job satisfiers, including: the opportunity to command, to influence the CF/Army, and to work with soldiers as mentors and educators; the intrinsic aspects of their work; and the extrinsic aspects of their work. However, the qualitative findings also revealed a series of dissatisfiers. With regard to promotion, second language requirements, academic requirements, the prior command requirement, the need to be placed in one or more A-jobs, excessive workload demands, the effects of promotion demands on family, and the Army Succession Planning Process were the most commonly mentioned dissatisfiers. On the issue of leadership, general leadership issues such as micro-managing, feeling free to question leaders, transformational vs. transactional leadership, and other organizational issues were mentioned frequently. Other dissatisfiers included general organizational issues, concerns about the post-command transition to a staff job, and concerns about workload, OPTEMPO, and quality of life. The study also asked LColS to suggest possible ways to address or fix their biggest dissatisfiers. Responses focused on the need to provide sufficient resources to LColS (among others), set priorities (e.g., resources to match requirements), improve promotion and reward systems (e.g., modify or eliminate the second language policy or tier system), and change both organizational structures (e.g., to reduce bureaucracy) and organizational culture (e.g., to increase the use of mission command). LColS also suggested an improvement of leadership at the senior levels, the introduction of formal sessions between LColS and senior officers in order to enhance communication, the improvement of the career planning system, enhancing quality of life initiatives (including better pay, pensions/benefits and housing), and empowering LColS (e.g., by giving a bigger role to COs in personnel decisions).

Conclusions

The outcomes from this study show that Army LColS are not entirely dissatisfied with their jobs. There are a number of job-related satisfiers and dissatisfiers among the LColS who participated in this study. Many of the dissatisfiers were those identified in *The Army Culture and Climate Survey*. In addition, the high level of psychological work engagement shows that these LColS are highly committed to their jobs. However, in this study we also asked participants to offer suggestions for how they feel the CF/Army could address those negative aspects of their job. While many of these suggestions may not be practical, they provide a voice for a group of officers who, in some respects, feel they have lost theirs.

Sommaire

Factors influencing career satisfaction and dissatisfaction in five groups of Land Force Lieutenant-Colonels

McCreary, D.R., Febraro, A.R., Bradley, P., Charbonneau, D. and Villeneuve, M.; DRDC Toronto TR 2006-088; R & D pour la défense Canada – Toronto; July 2006.

Contexte

Le *Sondage sur la culture et le climat de l'Armée de terre* de 2004 mené pour le compte du Directeur général – Développement des capacités de la Force terrestre (Bureau des concepts et politiques sur le personnel de l'Armée de terre) a révélé que les lcol affichaient l'un des plus hauts taux d'insatisfaction professionnelle dans la Force terrestre. Les résultats du sondage mettent l'accent sur quatre principaux points : (1) les lcol mentionnent qu'ils ont de la difficulté à effectuer leurs tâches quotidiennes, en plus du fardeau d'avoir à travailler sur des choses non essentielles, (2) ils signalent que leurs supérieurs exercent moins de leadership transformationnel que ce à quoi ils s'attendraient compte tenu de leur grade, (3) ils signalent qu'ils hésitent à contester les décisions de leurs supérieurs et qu'ils ont moins tendance à accepter que les autres remettent en question les supérieurs contrairement aux attentes compte tenu de leur grade, et (4) ils sont moins favorables aux exigences en matière de langue seconde que les autres grades.

Afin de comprendre les raisons de cette insatisfaction évidente, un suivi ciblé a été effectué. Des groupes de discussion ont été formés avec les lcol de l'Armée de terre de cinq catégories d'emplois militaires (Armes de combat et Logistique). Ces postes forment le noyau de la culture de l'Armée de terre pour le grade de lcol et constituent donc l'échantillonnage le plus approprié pour l'étude portant sur l'insatisfaction des lcol de l'Armée de terre. Des questions ont été posées sur les points soulevés dans le *Sondage sur la culture et le climat de l'Armée de terre*, ainsi que sur d'autres raisons possibles d'insatisfaction au travail.

Les participants et la procédure

En septembre 2005, les 209 lcol de la Force terrestre canadienne qui occupent les cinq catégories de postes ciblées ont reçu une lettre qui avait pour but d'établir un premier contact et qui résumait les objectifs de l'étude et sollicitait leur participation. À la suite de ce premier contact, 30 lcol ont participé à l'un des neuf groupes formés aux bases militaires de l'ensemble du Canada, ainsi qu'au Quartier général de la Défense nationale. En outre, 19 lcol ont participé par courriel. Dans les deux cas, les participants étaient invités à répondre, de vive voix ou par écrit, à neuf questions d'ordre général concernant les facteurs qui conditionnent la satisfaction ou l'insatisfaction qu'ils éprouvent au travail. Les participants ont aussi rempli un indicateur de satisfaction au travail fréquemment utilisé, ainsi qu'un indicateur de dévouement au travail sur le plan psychologique et un questionnaire sur la démographie. L'échantillonnage englobait des lcol des trois phases de commandement de ce grade (c.-à-d. l'étape préalable, la mi-étape et l'étape postérieure au commandement).

Résultats

En ce qui a trait aux mesures quantitatives de satisfaction au travail, les lcol de la Force terrestre semblaient satisfaits de leur travail (par rapport à la norme américaine, qui se basait sur plus de 28 000 réponses parmi une vaste gamme de postes) relativement à leur salaire, à leurs collègues, et à la communication au sein de l'organisme. Par ailleurs, ils étaient en deçà de la norme quant à la satisfaction à l'égard des politiques et des procédures opérationnelles. Leurs réponses ne différaient pas de la norme quant à l'évaluation de la satisfaction par rapport à l'avancement professionnel, aux superviseurs immédiats, aux questions monétaires et non monétaires, aux récompenses offertes et à la nature du travail en soi. L'indicateur de dévouement au travail sur le plan psychologique démontrait que les lcol sont grandement dévoués à leur travail, puisque plus de la moitié des répondants détenaient le plus haut résultat possible sur l'indicateur.

Les résultats qualitatifs démontraient plusieurs facteurs de satisfaction au travail, notamment l'occasion de commander, d'exercer une influence sur les FC et sur l'Armée de terre, et d'agir à titre de mentor et d'éducateur auprès des soldats; les aspects intrinsèques et extrinsèques du travail sont également des facteurs de satisfaction. Cependant, les résultats qualitatifs révélaient aussi une série de facteurs d'insatisfaction liés le plus souvent à l'avancement professionnel, aux exigences linguistiques et scolaires, aux préalables au commandement, à la nécessité d'occuper un ou plusieurs postes de niveau A, à la charge de travail excessive, aux répercussions familiales des demandes d'avancement professionnel et au processus de planification de la relève de l'Armée de terre. Au sujet du leadership, les questions d'ordre général sur le leadership telles que la microgestion, la liberté d'interroger les dirigeants, le leadership transformationnel en regard du leadership transactionnel, et les autres questions organisationnelles revenaient fréquemment. Parmi les autres facteurs d'insatisfaction figuraient les questions organisationnelles d'ordre général, les préoccupations concernant le passage à un poste d'état-major après un poste de commandement et les préoccupations relatives à la charge de travail, l'OPTEMPO et la qualité de vie. Dans le cadre de l'étude, on demandait également aux lcol de suggérer des moyens possibles de répondre à leurs principales insatisfactions et de combler leurs demandes. Les réponses sont notamment axées sur la nécessité de fournir suffisamment de ressources aux lcol, de fixer des priorités (p. ex., des ressources correspondant aux exigences), d'améliorer les mécanismes d'avancement professionnel et de récompense (p. ex., modifier ou abolir la politique en matière de langue seconde ou le système de catégories), de modifier les structures organisationnelles (p. ex., réduire la bureaucratie) et la culture organisationnelle (p. ex., utiliser davantage le commandement de mission). Les lcol ont également suggéré d'améliorer le leadership des supérieurs, de mettre en place des séances formelles entre les lcol et les officiers supérieurs afin de favoriser la communication, d'améliorer le système de planification de carrière, d'améliorer les initiatives relatives à la qualité de vie (notamment de meilleurs salaires, pensions, avantages sociaux et logements), et de donner du pouvoir aux lcol (p. ex., en donnant un rôle plus important aux CMDT dans les décisions liées à l'état-major).

Conclusions

Les résultats de cette étude démontrent que les lcol ne sont pas totalement insatisfaits de leur travail. Il existe un certain nombre de facteurs de satisfaction et d'insatisfaction liés au travail parmi les lcol qui ont participé à cette étude. Beaucoup de facteurs d'insatisfaction étaient les mêmes que ceux qui ont été relevés dans le *Sondage sur la culture et le climat de l'Armée de*

terre. De plus, le haut taux de dévouement au travail sur le plan psychologique démontre que les lcol sont vraiment engagés dans leur travail. L'étude invitait aussi les participants à faire des suggestions sur les moyens que les FC et l'Armée de terre devraient utiliser selon eux pour contrer ces aspects négatifs de leur travail. Même si plusieurs de ces suggestions ne sont peut-être pas pratiques, elles permettent tout de même à un groupe d'officiers de s'exprimer, eux qui, d'une certaine façon, ont l'impression d'avoir perdu leur droit de parole.

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Acknowledgements

This project was funded by the CF Directorate of Land Personnel Concepts and Policy. The authors would like to thank the many Army Lieutenant-Colonels who volunteered their busy work and personal time to support this project.

Introduction

Background

In its 2002 strategy report, the Canadian Army outlined the importance of generating in its soldiers a sense of identification with the Army's values and goals (Department of National Defence, 2002). Through the development of this sense of commitment to the Army as an organization, job satisfaction should be generated which, in turn, should lead to intentions to stay in the Army longer (Tett & Meyer, 1993).

To assess soldiers' degree of commitment to the Army, as well as the context in which those attitudes are generated, the Canadian Forces (CF) Director General – Land Capability Development (Land Personnel Concepts and Policy; DLPCP) commissioned *The Army Culture and Climate Survey* (Bradley, Charbonneau, Johnston, Campbell, & Bhattacharjee, 2004). For this study, 2472 members of the Canadian Army completed a wide range of psychological and organizational measures (81% of the respondents to *The Army Culture and Climate Survey* were Regular Force members). Included in this survey were questionnaires that assessed career intentions, job satisfaction, commitment to the CF as an organization, confidence in the organization, and perceptions of leadership.

When the data from *The Army Culture and Climate Survey* were compared across ranks, a number of career-related concerns within the Lieutenant-Colonel (LCol) rank emerged (Capstick, Farley, Wild, & Parkes, 2005). LCol displayed four sets of attitudes that were less favourable, compared to most other ranks. First, LCol reported the most difficulty completing their daily assignments. In addition to their normal duties, LCol also reported the added burden of having to work on “unnecessary things.” Capstick et al. (2005) suggested that these two concerns may be an indication that LCol are experiencing a lack of control in the workplace. Capstick et al. (2005) also felt that this lack of control may not be over the *volume* of the work that LCol do, but over the *scope* of their work.

A second finding from *The Army Culture and Climate Survey* is that LCol reported experiencing less transformational leadership from their superiors than would be expected on the basis of their rank. Transformational leadership is a style of leadership that inspires followers by providing a vision and developing an organizational culture that stimulates high performance; it transmits a sense of mission, stimulates learning experiences, inspires new and creative ways of thinking in followers, and involves mentoring and coaching followers. A different form of leadership is transactional leadership, which works on an exchange principle, such as exchanging money or praise for good work, loyalty and commitment (Bass, 1990). Research has demonstrated that transformational leaders tend to have more successful outcomes from those working under them, including higher levels of job satisfaction, work performance, and group cohesion, than transactional leaders. The fact that LCol do not appear to be experiencing much transformational leadership suggests that they may feel they are not being given a compelling vision that will motivate them to progress beyond their current expectations and, as a result, they may feel that they lack the opportunity to influence their environment.

Related to the issue of transformational leadership may be the third finding from the Survey: that LCol reported feeling less free to question their superiors' decisions and were less inclined to approve of others questioning leaders than would be expected on the basis of their rank. That is, transformational leaders should inspire their workers to challenge the status quo and facilitate dialogue between leaders and followers. Transactional leaders, on the other hand, prefer hierarchical relationships between superiors and subordinates (Bass, 1990). This type of relationship likely would inhibit someone's perceptions of their ability to question a decision made by a senior officer.

Finally, LCol also were less favourable to second language requirements than other ranks, feeling that being bilingual carries too much weight in the career advancement process. Capstick et al. (2005) suggest that these negative attitudes probably can be attributed to regulations precluding promotion for LCol who do not meet second language requirements. These regulations were outlined in CANFORGEN 045/01 (Bilingual Officer Corps Policy), and state that all officers with a rank of Colonel/Captain(Navy) must be bilingual (with a CBC level of proficiency). A recent audit of language use at National Defence Headquarters by the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages (2006) is recommending that this policy be strengthened and that only officers who meet or exceed the CBC bilingual proficiency be promoted.

Career dissatisfaction among its LCol warrants further attention from the Army leadership for many reasons. This group of officers represents the future senior management of the organization. LCol is the rank held by most commanding officers in the Army, so this rank has considerable influence on the mid-grade and junior ranks of the Army. Having discontented LCol in the Army can, therefore, have a potentially damaging effect on the morale and commitment of its more junior members. Furthermore, losing experienced officers of this rank also can have a detrimental impact on the Army's knowledge/intellectual capital and organizational management structure.

Whatever the reasons for LCol's dissatisfaction with their degree of control and influence, Capstick et al. (2005) recommend that the Army leadership make a special effort to communicate and engage with LCol. A number of initiatives have been suggested, including Chief of Land Staff town halls with LCol, having a larger number of LCol Commanding Officers in the annual Strategic Planning Session, and holding an annual meeting with key LCol staff officers. Each of these initiatives, it is hoped, would improve LCol's sense of job satisfaction and intentions to remain in the CF.

Thus, the LCol in *The Army Culture and Climate Survey* appear to be experiencing a higher degree of job dissatisfaction compared to those of other ranks. The next issue that needs to be addressed is why this is the case. Is the apparent dissatisfaction a function of the way the job is structured? Is it because of a lack of resources available to LCol to do their job properly? Or is the finding an artifact of the small number of LCol in *The Army Culture and Climate Survey* (i.e., 15)?

With regard to this last point, *The Army Culture and Climate Survey* was administered to 'samples of convenience' at all major CF bases in Canada. All Army personnel were notified of the survey in advance, and only those who were both willing and available during that time completed the survey. There are a number of possible reasons why only 15 of the Army LCol

posted to those locations completed the survey. It is possible that the low number of respondents indicates that most LCol are generally satisfied with Army life and that this group of 15 survey respondents is a disaffected, and unrepresentative, subsample. A second possibility stems from the fact that LCol hold important positions in the Army and, therefore, are very busy. It could very well be that a greater number of LCol did not complete the survey because of time constraints within their schedule. A third possibility is that the LCol who did not complete the survey may have felt that completing the survey would have little future benefit for them.

Thus, in summary, it is important to be able to determine the degree of job dissatisfaction that Army LCol are experiencing, as well as the reasons for any dissatisfaction. Determining the reasons behind the LCol's apparent job dissatisfaction is important because extensive research has shown that low levels of job satisfaction are predictive of a wide variety of personal and organizational outcomes, including poorer physical health and psychological well-being (i.e., operational readiness issues), as well as higher level of intent to leave the organization (Holt, 1993; Spector, 1997; Tett & Meyer, 1993).

The Present Study

To address the reasons behind the apparent job dissatisfaction among Army LCol, a targeted follow-up was performed. Focus groups were conducted with Army LCol in five occupational categories (Combat Arms and Logistics). These occupations form the nucleus of Army culture at the LCol rank level and thus were viewed as the most appropriate sample for studying LCol dissatisfaction in the Army. Questions were asked about the issues that emerged in *The Army Culture and Climate Survey*, as well as other possible reasons for job dissatisfaction.

Methods

Procedures

Before beginning this study, approval was received from the Defence R&D Canada Human Research Ethics Committee (Protocol L-520; see Appendix A), the CF Directorate Human Resources, Research and Evaluation (DHRRE Authorization Number 309/05; see Appendix B), and from the Royal Military College of Canada's Research Ethics Board (2005-17 MPL; see Appendix C). An information and authorization letter also was sent from DLPCP to all senior Land Force staff in September 2005 requesting their support for the project (see Appendix D).

Recruiting Participants

In August 2005, a request was sent to the CF Directorate Human Resources and Information Management (DHRIM) for a list of Regular Force Army LCol's in the four Combat Arms (Armoured, Infantry, Artillery, Combat Engineering) and Logistics Military Occupation Categories (MOCs). The request asked for names, MOCs, work address, work phone number, first official language, years of service, and gender. DHRIM returned a list containing 266 names, of which 209 LCol's were posted in each of the four CF areas (West, Central, Quebec, and East), as well as at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). The remaining LCol's were posted in the United States or overseas and were not included in the study for logistical reasons.

In September 2005, all 209 Canadian-based Land Force LCol's were sent an initial contact letter outlining the goals of the study and requesting their participation. All letters were sent in the LCol's first official language (see Appendix E). Attached to the letter was the form that potential participants would use to signal to the investigators that they wished to participate in the study. The form asked interested LCol's to indicate how they wished to participate: either by attending one of the focus groups initially slotted for each of the main Land Force areas, or by another way (to be determined in the future). Potential participants also were asked to complete a basic list of demographics, which was intended to facilitate the process of organizing the focus groups in situations where a large number of people from the same location volunteered. The completed form was then faxed to the third author (Dr. Bradley) at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Focus Group Participation

All participants who wished to attend a focus group were contacted by the third author. A total of nine focus groups were conducted. These took place in Gagetown (1), Valcartier (1), Montreal (1), Kingston (2), Ottawa (1), Hull (1), Petawawa (1), and Edmonton (1), between October 12 and December 15 2005. Some of the dates outlined in the initial contact letter were changed due to unforeseen events. At the request of a group of LCol's based in the Petawawa area, a focus group was added for that base. The focus group initially scheduled for Toronto was cancelled.

The focus groups were conducted by the third and fourth authors (Dr. Bradley and Dr. Charbonneau). The remaining authors of this report attended at least one focus group as observers. Each focus group began with the third author (i.e., the moderator) outlining the goals of the project and distributing information and research material. Participants then read an information sheet describing the study goals (see Appendix F) (they retained the information sheet for their files). They then completed three brief questionnaires (see Additional Measures section), after which the moderator requested permission to audiotape the session. All participants in each focus group agreed to have their responses audiotaped. The moderator then began asking questions and seeking dialogue. Each focus group typically lasted 90 minutes. Of the nine focus groups, six were conducted in English, two in French, and one in both official languages.

During each focus group, approximately nine questions were asked (see Appendix G). We began the session by asking about the aspects of being a LCol that gave the members job satisfaction. We felt that this was important because, if we did otherwise, the resulting dialogue may have unfairly left the impression that LCol's are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with their job. Next we asked about the dissatisfiers. There was a question about general dissatisfiers, and then we began asking about those that emerged from *The Army Culture and Climate Survey* (i.e., leadership, feeling free to question leaders, second language requirements). We chose not to ask directly about difficulty completing daily assignments because we felt that would emerge naturally. We also asked about the degree to which they understood the Army vision and its implementation. This was asked because organizational change has been shown to cause job dissatisfaction (e.g., Robinson & Griffiths, 2005; Sikora, Beaty, & Forward, 2004). Next we asked the LCol's for ways in which they or the CF would or could change their dissatisfiers for the better. Finally, we asked if there were any other dissatisfiers that we did not cover that they wished to discuss.

Non-Focus Group Participation

There were several participants who wanted to contribute to the study, but could not attend a focus group. These individuals either volunteered for a focus group but could not attend on the actual day, or they noted on the reply sheet that they could not attend but wanted to be involved in some other way. For these individuals, we e-mailed them a follow-up letter in January 2006 offering them the opportunity to participate in the study (see Appendix H). The follow-up letter was written in the LCol's first official language. In the letter, we asked those who wished to participate to contact the first author with the best way to receive the study materials (i.e., the information sheet, the three questionnaires, and the nine questions): either by e-mail or Canada Post. We also offered these potential participants several options for returning the completed files (also by e-mail or Canada Post). All participants agreed to receive and return their responses by e-mail. Once this was determined, the first author sent the participants three files: an information sheet (see Appendix I), a list of the same nine questions that were asked in the focus groups (see Appendix G), and a file containing the three brief questionnaires (see Additional Measures section).

Additional Measures

Participants in this study completed three general questionnaires: a series of demographic questions, a survey measuring general job satisfaction, and a questionnaire designed to assess level of psychological engagement with one's work. All questionnaires were available in both French and English and participants received these documents in their first official language.

Sample Demographics

A series of demographic questions were used to describe the two samples. Questions were asked about Military Occupation Category, age, gender, marital status, number of children, first language spoken, ethnicity, age when promoted to LCol rank, whether they have ever commanded at the LCol rank and, if so, whether or not they are currently commanding or whether they are post command, and the training courses taken. The demographic questionnaire can be found in Appendix J. We will not be reporting the findings from the questions asking about location of current posting or number of years at the LCol rank in order to protect the privacy and confidentiality of our participants.

Job Satisfaction Survey

We wanted to assess job satisfaction for two reasons. The first reason was to get a quantifiable estimate of the overall level of job satisfaction/dissatisfaction among the LCol's in our study. The second reason stemmed from our use of two response methods. That is, because we gathered information from both focus group and non-focus group participants, it is important that we assess any differences between the two groups in terms of overall job satisfaction. For example, were the people who volunteered for the focus groups significantly more or less satisfied with their jobs than those who answered the focus group questions by e-mail?

To assess job satisfaction, we employed the commonly used Job Satisfaction Survey (JSS; Spector, 1985; 1997). The JSS is a 36-item questionnaire designed to measure job satisfaction among public sector employees. It contains nine separate dimensions (with 4 items in each) assessing Satisfaction with Pay, Promotion Opportunities, Immediate Supervisor, and Fringe Benefits (both monetary and non-monetary), Satisfaction with Contingent Rewards (appreciation, recognition, and rewards for work well-done), Satisfaction with Operating Policies and Procedures, Co-workers, and Nature of the Work, and Satisfaction with Communication within the Organization. Items on the JSS are scored on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from "Disagree Very Much" to "Agree Very Much." Researchers using the JSS can compute either the overall JSS total (possible range = 36 to 216), or the total of each of the separate subscales (possible range for each subscale = 4 to 24), after reverse-coding 19 items. Higher scores are indicative of greater levels of job satisfaction. The JSS has demonstrated reliability (alphas ranging from .60 to .82 for the subscales, and .91 for the overall scale total) and validity (Spector, 1997). A copy of the JSS can be found in Appendix K.

Work Engagement Scale

We also included a measure of psychological engagement with work. The Work Engagement Scale (WES; Britt, 1999) is a 6-item measure of an individual's degree of personal and professional investment in their job. Research by Britt and colleagues (Britt, 1999; Britt, Adler, & Bartone, 2001) has established the reliability ($\alpha = .91$) and validity of the measure, including results from a sample of deployed U.S. military personnel. All WES items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from Not at All Like Me (1) to Very Much Like Me (5). A scale mean is computed for each person and higher scores indicate a greater degree of work engagement. A copy of the WES can be found in Appendix L.

Participants

The demographic characteristics of the present sample of Land Force LCol's are described in Table 1.

Table 1: Demographic characteristics for the two groups of participants.

Variable	Category	Focus Group (n = 30)		E-Mail Group (n = 19)	
		N	%	N	%
Gender	Male	29	97	19	100
	Female	1	3	0	0
First Official Language	English	24	83	17	94
	French	5	17	1	6
Age	35-39 Years	1	3	2	11
	40-44 Years	13	43	6	33
	45-49 Years	11	37	8	45
	50+ Years	5	17	2	11
Marital Status	Single/Never Mar	1	3	2	13
	Married	28	94	13	81
	Divorced/Sep	1	3	1	6
Number of Children	0	0	0	1	6
	1-2	9	30	1	6
	3-4	21	70	14	88
Age Promoted to LCol	35-39 Years	9	32	4	22
	40-44 Years	14	50	13	72
	45-49 Years	4	14	1	6
	50+ Years	1	4	0	0
Commanded as LCol	Yes	18	64	10	67
	No	10	36	5	33
Recent Training	Yes	16	53	11	61
	No	14	47	7	39

Notes: LCol = Lieutenant Colonel; Single/Never Mar = Single/Never Married; Divorced/Sep = Divorced/Separated. Numbers may not add up to total sample size due to missing data. Percentages are based on non-missing data only.

A total of 54 LCol were interested in participating in this study. Of the 54 people interested, 30 LCol participated in the focus groups and 19 participated in the e-mail exchange of information. Five participants who were contacted for their assistance in the e-mail exchange did not participate: one person was sent the materials but did not return them, one person declined to participate, and three people did not reply to the initial e-mail. Thus, of the 209 LCol initially contacted in September 2005, a participation rate of 24% was achieved in this study.

Because of the very small sample size, no comparisons could be made across demographic groups. However, it should be noted that the sample appears to be representative of the 209 LCols initially contacted. Of the four female LCols in the initial pool, one participated in this study. Although 70% of the LCols in the initial pool had English as their first official language, the percentages were somewhat higher in this study. This, however, is a function of the sampling methodology (i.e., more interviews were conducted outside of Quebec and the National Capital Region).

Results

The findings from this study will be presented in two general sections. In the first section, we examine the overall job satisfaction levels among the LColS in the study, as well as mean differences between those who participated in the focus groups versus those who participated by e-mail. We also explore the overall WES scores and whether there are any mean differences between the two groups. These are the quantitative findings.

In the second section we explored what the LColS said to us in response to the questions that were asked of them, as well as any other issues that arose. These are the qualitative findings.

Quantitative Analyses

Job Satisfaction

We computed the scores for the nine JSS subscales by adding up the responses for the four questions in each subscale and then averaging those totals over all participants in this study. Thus, the average score for each subscale will have a range between 4 and 24. We also computed the overall JSS score by adding up each person's scores from the nine subscales and then taking an overall average across all the participants in this study. For the overall JSS score, the average score will range between 36 and 216.

Next we examined the levels of job satisfaction among the 49 LColS who participated in this study. Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for the sample of LColS. Table 3 shows the normative values for each of the nine JSS subscales, as well as the overall JSS scale score. These norms are comprised of a wide variety of (mostly American) public service workers including medical workers (e.g., nurses, technicians), mental health providers (e.g., social workers, psychologists), police officers, and enlisted military personnel. The normative (i.e., weighted) means and standard deviations were developed from 108 separate samples, comprising data from 28,876 workers (Spector, 2006).

Comparing the responses from the Army LColS to the normative sample¹, it becomes obvious that the Army LColS are more satisfied than the US norms with regard to their pay ($z = 5.97, p < .01$), their satisfaction with co-workers ($z = 2.68, p < .05$), and the communication within their organization ($z = 2.72, p < .05$). However, the LColS were less satisfied than the norms on one scale: Satisfaction with Operating Policies and Procedures ($z = -7.21, p < .01$). The items that make up this latter scale are: "many of our rules and procedures make doing a good job difficult," "my efforts to do a good job are seldom blocked by red tape (reverse coded)," "I have too much to do at work", and "I have too much paperwork."

¹ To determine whether or not Army LColS differed significantly from the JSS norms, we used z -tests (sample mean minus normative mean over standard deviation of the sample divided by the square root of the sample size minus one).

Table 2: Average scale scores and standard deviations for the nine subscales of the Job Satisfaction Survey (possible range 4-24), as well as the overall Job Satisfaction Scale Score (possible range 36-216); N = 49.

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction with Pay	16.160	4.64626
Satisfaction with Promotion Opportunities	13.152	4.69698
Satisfaction with Immediate Supervisor	18.830	4.80006
Satisfaction with Monetary and Non-Monetary Fringe Benefits	15.458	4.21287
Satisfaction with Contingent Rewards (Appreciation, Recognition, Rewards for Good Work)	14.381	5.19398
Satisfaction with Operating Policies and Procedures	9.8542	3.63427
Satisfaction with Co-Workers	19.083	3.02650
Satisfaction with Nature of the Work	19.331	3.84983
Satisfaction with Communication within the Organization	16.201	4.59678
Overall Job Satisfaction Scale Score	142.45	25.25868

Table 3: Normative scale scores and standard deviations for the nine subscales of the Job Satisfaction Survey (possible range 4-24), as well as the overall Job Satisfaction Scale Score (possible range 36-216); norms based on 108 samples with a total sample size of 28,876 cases.

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction with Pay	12.1	2.4
Satisfaction with Promotion Opportunities	12.0	1.9
Satisfaction with Immediate Supervisor	18.7	1.8
Satisfaction with Monetary and Non-Monetary Fringe Benefits	14.3	2.2
Satisfaction with Contingent Rewards (Appreciation, Recognition, Rewards for Good Work)	13.7	1.9
Satisfaction with Operating Policies and Procedures	13.6	2.0
Satisfaction with Co-Workers	17.9	1.5
Satisfaction with Nature of the Work	18.9	1.9
Satisfaction with Communication within the Organization	14.1	2.0
Overall Job Satisfaction Scale Score	135.8	11.8

Next, we looked at differences between the two groups of LColS (i.e., those who participated in the focus groups versus those who participated via e-mail exchange) on the nine JSS scales and its overall scale scores (see Table 4)². We found three significant differences: Satisfaction

² To determine if the two groups differed significantly in their responses to the JSS, we computed independent samples *t*-tests.

with Pay, $t(47) = 2.83$, $p = .007$, Satisfaction with Communication within the Organization, $t(47) = 2.46$, $p = .02$, and the Overall Job Satisfaction Scale Score, $t(47) = 2.27$, $p = .03$. In all three cases, those who participated in the focus groups were significantly more satisfied than those who participated by e-mail.

Table 4: Means and standard deviations for the nine subscales of the Job Satisfaction Survey (possible range 4-24), as well as the overall average for the Survey (possible range 36-216) as a function of method of assessment: focus group (n = 30) or e-mail (n = 19).

	Method	Mean	SD
Satisfaction with Pay	Focus Group	17.56	3.80
	E-mail	13.96	5.10
Satisfaction with Promotion Opportunities	Focus Group	14.01	4.56
	E-mail	11.80	4.71
Satisfaction with Immediate Supervisor	Focus Group	19.10	4.54
	E-mail	18.41	5.28
Satisfaction with Monetary and Non-Monetary Fringe Benefits	Focus Group	15.93	3.65
	E-mail	14.71	4.99
Satisfaction with Contingent Rewards (Appreciation, Recognition, Rewards for Good Work)	Focus Group	15.46	4.44
	E-mail	12.68	5.94
Satisfaction with Operating Policies and Procedures	Focus Group	9.93	4.15
	E-mail	9.73	2.73
Satisfaction with Co-Workers	Focus Group	19.27	3.05
	E-mail	18.79	3.12
Satisfaction with Nature of the Work	Focus Group	20.04	3.08
	E-mail	18.21	4.70
Satisfaction with Communication within the Organization	Focus Group	17.42	4.00
	E-mail	14.27	4.91
Overall Job Satisfaction Scale Score	Focus Group	148.71	20.84
	E-mail	132.56	28.86

Work Engagement

Responses to the Work Engagement Scale show that the LColts are highly engaged in their work. Average responses ranged from 3.83 to 5.00 (on a 5-point Likert scale), with a mean of 4.81 ($SD = 0.27$). In fact, 52% of all respondents rated all six items at the extreme (i.e., Very Much Like Me). There are no norms for the WES, but research with US military personnel (93% enlisted) deployed to Bosnia showed much lower rates of work engagement (Britt et al., 2001). For that sample, the mean was 3.93 ($SD = 0.80$). When we explored differences in responses between the focus group and e-mail respondents, no significant differences emerged.

Qualitative Analyses

The dialogue from the focus groups was transcribed into a separate transcript for each session. In addition, the written responses from the e-mail participants also were placed into 19 separate transcript documents. When the discussion or document was in French, it was translated into English. Traditional qualitative data analytic procedures were followed. That is, each transcript was coded by the second author into specific themes pertinent to the project. Each theme then was explored and analyzed.

Although the interviews were transcribed verbatim, the interview excerpts that are presented in this report have been edited slightly to enhance their readability (e.g., “um,” “uh,” “you know,” “like,” etc., were deleted, as appropriate). Further, because we follow the American Psychological Association style guide, we use three ellipsis points (...) within a sentence to indicate that material was omitted from the original interview transcript. Four ellipsis points (... ..) were used to indicate any omission between two sentences. The first ellipsis point indicates the period at the end of the first sentence quoted, and the three ellipsis points follow. Ellipsis points also were used at the beginning or end of a quotation to indicate that the quotation begins or ends in mid-sentence. Square brackets were used to enclose material (e.g., additions or explanations) inserted in a quotation by the investigators.

Below we describe the main themes that emerged in three general areas: job satisfiers, job dissatisfiers, and participants’ recommendations for addressing some of their concerns. For all of the themes we describe, quotations from the LColS themselves are used to illustrate the point.³

Satisfiers at the LCol Rank

Participants spoke of several satisfiers associated with the LCol rank. These included the privilege of commanding, the ability to shape and influence the CF and the Army, the opportunity to positively impact soldiers, and the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards associated with their work.

Challenge, Opportunity, and Privilege to Command

By far, the satisfier that was mentioned the most frequently involved the challenge, opportunity, and privilege to command:

I would just say that the lieutenant colonel rank, the brass ring, clearly is commanding the units, and we've got [the] privilege to do that.

It's not the LCol rank, it's the opportunity to command at the LCol rank, I would say, more so than just the regular rank. I'm currently in a staff position, looking forward to command and that's the only thing I can think of.

³ Quotations from the focus group participants and e-mail respondents are presented together, rather than separately, as the themes that emerged in both groups were highly similar.

Outside of the position, which I think we all agree with is the best part of our current rank, is being able to be a CO....

The opportunity to [command] has been a great privilege.

The opportunity to lead and command soldiers at the battalion and base level [is what I find most satisfying about being a LCol].

Some participants described the opportunity to command as the achievement of a long sought-after personal career goal, as the pinnacle of one's career, and as the chance to do what they were trained to do:

As a currently serving commanding officer, this is what I spent my whole career being trained to do and wanting to do...

For me, anyway, it's a position as a commanding officer that you see from your first day of regimental duty as the pinnacle. ...That's what I want to do. You don't aspire to become a staff officer at NDHQ, but to become a commanding officer... So, to me, personally, it's the achievement of a career goal that...makes me happy.

For me, it is the feeling of accomplishment.

From a combat arms point of view, I think it's recognized, although the paradigm is changing slightly with brigade operations and commanding a brigade and stuff we're doing now, that the pinnacle rank for command, really, in the Canadian context, is that unit command. So that's the thing that everybody aspires to and that's what we see as...something that you really do look forward to and cherish.

It [the LCol rank] is also the rank to which most officers aspire... It is the pinnacle of an army officer's regimental career...

The participant quoted below emphasizes that being in command allows for the opportunity to use his knowledge, training, and experience:

My position allows me to use the experience I have gained over the years. ... This is rarely the case in the military. We often have the training, the qualification, but we don't necessarily have the specific knowledge for the job and we learn as we go. In this case, I get to use the knowledge and skills I have learned over the last three or four jobs on a daily basis. I gained more credibility therefore I have more leeway and authority. I find this to be a positive aspect of my work life.

Indeed, related to the challenge of command is having the responsibility, authority, power, and autonomy to make decisions and changes:

In my case, some of the more satisfying aspects of my job are that ... I have quite a bit of responsibility, but I also have some authority to go with that. I have the ability to make decisions and make things happen...

I have a lot more flexibility and responsibility and some authority to go with it.

What I like and find gratifying about my work right now is that they allow me to make my own assessment of a situation, of my role. I have had two bosses over the last two years and both of them allowed me to do so by giving me their intent and a broad idea of what they think my mandate should be. ... [They give you] enough [autonomy] to let you go about your business and come up with results.

Similarly, some participants spoke of the sense of empowerment they felt to make important decisions:

I enjoy the scope of freedom to make critical decisions and the empowerment that comes with this freedom. I also enjoy the fact that I am able in some way to shape policy and procedures at my level [and] frequently get the chance to voice my concerns with processes or procedures that need to be changed.

Shape and Influence the CF and the Army

Another source of satisfaction that was mentioned quite frequently by participants involved the opportunity, at the LCol rank, to shape and influence the CF/Army. This theme included the chance to see the direct effects of one's command on soldiers and their families – to make a difference and have an impact – as well as the opportunity to influence senior officers and even shape CF and Army policy:

The ability to hold positions in which I can exert a useful influence on an organization and lead people to get things done [is what I find most satisfying about being a LCol].

When I think of my current rank and in my current job, I can actually influence the way the Army is moving and do what I consider important things to help the progress of the Army into the future.

I think ... the other piece in my experience is...at...this rank level, actually being able to feel like I could influence decisions being made by the most senior forces, the folks in the military and in the department, because this was the working rank, in my mind... So I found that satisfying.

...As a lieutenant colonel I was actually given responsibility to, in some places, make policy or help formulate policy, and I was listened to by general officers. So I thought that there was influence there.

I guess I like the rank level I'm at now because it gives me enough position to have a bit of an influence on what's taking place... If I were any more junior [in rank], I may not have that same influence that I currently have, and there are some rewards and benefits and job satisfaction with that.

[What I find satisfying at the LCol rank], I think it's the ability to influence things. You can influence things and bring about positive change, that's the big difference.

I feel like I'm doing something that contributes to the Army, the Canadian Forces and Canada sort of as a whole.

[What I find most satisfying about the LCol rank is] the amount of impact that I have on the organization and those people that form it.

Some participants emphasized the impact on the soldiers that they could have at the LCol rank, and the chance to do something useful for them:

For me, it's I know that I help soldiers every single day. And the work that goes on in my section gets them boots and socks and weapons and stuff like that, and we're busy but we're happy busy. And we've got a small, little bunch, so it's immensely rewarding with all the frustrations and all the things that you look at, and at the end of the year you still have a huge list of things that you've accomplished, you've delivered to the field, used on operations...

We used to say to ourselves, where else in the Forces do we get a chance to impact the minds of the officers, of the young minds that are coming up the pike? An amazing responsibility!

Interestingly, some participants felt that the ability to influence the CF or Army at the LCol level was limited in Ottawa (i.e., at NDHQ), or as a staff officer, and contrasted this with the ability to get things done as a commander in a base position:

Well, having come from a staff position into a base position, I can certainly tell you there's a great deal of satisfaction being able to get things done, versus my former job I had where I smashed my head against the wall for many years to fight for money, and at the end of the day that was probably one of the most unrewarding jobs I've ever had from a staff perspective because you work your butt off, and you don't see any rewards whatsoever. So here, a very positive experience, despite the fact that there are many challenges.

I think 75% of all Army LCol's serve in Ottawa, and that's a place where we may not see the effects of [the] decisions that we take here on a regular basis where we see products, whether they be positive effects on our soldiers, positive effects on our trainees or even positive effects on our families and our soldiers' families. Once we get lost in the Ottawa milieu, I don't think we get that satisfaction.

Ottawa is a totally different thing. Even the Chief of [Defence] Staff sometimes doesn't have the power because of political aspects. He is not the one deciding whether or not we are going to Afghanistan. Politicians make that decision.

Being Able to Impact Soldiers Positively

As mentioned above, some participants spoke of the opportunity to positively impact soldiers as one of their greatest sources of satisfaction at the LCol rank. In fact, this theme was one of the most frequently mentioned in the focus groups and written responses. Participants spoke about the chance to work with soldiers and officers, or even students, in terms of shaping their development and training, facilitating their work, and providing them with equipment or capabilities that they can use:

I'd have to say it's being able to continue to work with soldiers...and have an opportunity to shape those soldiers and play a part in the bigger spectrum of the Canadian Forces.

Speaking for me, the ability to interact with soldiers on a daily basis in this current job...clearly the number one satisfier in this profession is working with the soldiers we have and their leaders, non-commissioned officers and officers. That satisfaction sustains us through the dissatisfiers.

Clearly, the payback [of being a LCol] is that you do a good job, you end up in a place like this where you're with troops and doing what we're all trained to do.

[The most satisfying part of being a LCol is] the opportunity to command and be in contact with the troops.

[The LCol rank] is also a rank level that allows quite close contact with subordinates, especially at the current time when I am commanding. Working with, and leading, soldiers and civilians, is always interesting, and is one of the reasons that I have stayed in the Canadian Forces.

[What I find most satisfying about being a LCol is the] access to information and power which is sufficient to allow me to try to help soldiers do their jobs better.

The particular job I have...you have an opportunity to interact with soldiers and give them things, provide them capabilities that make their life better. So you still have a link to the soldier and I appreciate that opportunity to do that, whereas stuck in some cubicle here writing some plan for the tenth time that'll never go anywhere.

Some participants spoke of the gratification they experienced in relation to educating officers, in general, and in the instructional role in particular:

The one that hits me the most here, I train captains, so I get young captains coming through my school and we expect in the Army that they understand the big corporate vision, the Army Strategy and the Force Employment concept, that they've got it cold, and I can tell you they do not. ... The leadership challenge I have is to educate all the young officers who are going to be the leaders pretty quick...on what the big guys really want... And it's tremendously rewarding when you get a class of 24, 25, 30 young officers in there that after a couple of weeks, I think they're a little more on net, they're on side with the corporate vision.

In terms of immediate, here and now satisfaction, it's positives in terms of working within an educational domain where you have an opportunity to not only discuss and reflect upon your profession, but in my case, impart that upon others. And then in any position where I think you're functioning in an instructional role, there's tremendous satisfaction in terms of doing that.

In addition to the participants who spoke of the satisfaction derived from educating young officers (see above), the participant quoted below also spoke of the satisfaction associated with teaching students, after having been in a position of command:

What I like the most right now is the contact with the students currently here. When I was a CO, you know ... an infantry officer joins the Army to be with the troops, not to be in staff positions but with the troops. So after having commanded, I wanted to come here...just for that, to be with the students. ... So it's a lot of work here but it's very rewarding when you're teaching. You can see students at the start and how they change at the end of the course.

Similarly, some participants spoke of the gratification they experienced from having acted as a mentor to subordinates:

Additionally, I find it satisfying that I have a significant input to my subordinates' career path and can act as mentor to provide advice to my subordinates.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Rewards

In addition to the opportunity to command, to influence the CF/Army, and to work with soldiers, participants spoke of several other sources of job satisfaction associated with the LCol rank – albeit much less frequently. Many of these sources of satisfaction involved the *intrinsic* aspects of their work, such as the opportunity to do important, challenging, interesting, or fun work, while other sources of satisfaction related more to the *extrinsic* aspects of their work, such as the respect and recognition associated with the LCol rank, good pay/benefits, and enjoyable relations with staff/co-workers. Each of these two general categories of work satisfaction are discussed in turn, below.

In terms of intrinsic rewards associated with the work itself, several participants, for example, spoke of the gratification derived from the feeling that one is doing important work. The participant quoted below spoke of the satisfaction he gains from knowing that the work he does is a valuable part of the “team’s” effort:

What I'm doing now, irrespective of the fact that I don't get a chance to work with soldiers, I still feel that what I do, and the way I do it, is important and I don't feel undervalued, because it's a team effort, right? ... So I still feel that the team has to work together and that the guys that are pulling on the reins pull in the same direction and we make it all happen.

Similarly, the participant quoted below sees the concrete value of his work, in delivering something useful to the field:

For me, I've loved coming to work and doing that stuff because I know that our work matters and..., in spite of the frustrations, you deliver something to the field and it's useful.

This perspective is echoed by another participant, quoted below:

[What I find most satisfying about being a LCol is] believing that what I do is important and useful.

Some participants spoke of the challenging aspects of their work as a LCol (not necessarily related to being in command), and of the satisfaction that they gain from meeting these challenges:

[The aspect of my work that I find satisfying as a LCol is] the amount of challenges we have. It's incredible. One year we can be working on a very challenging project and, after a posting, we get to work on other challenges that are as interesting. In our work, at our rank, challenges are quite impressive. ... There are challenges today resulting from changes in the military. ... Some of the challenges are in areas where we have little or no expertise. We get thrown in there and manage to get by and come up with results. We get clear mandates. Therefore, we have to deliver. They are impressive, interesting challenges.

I have reached a rank level that allows me to carry out a wide range of staff and command functions... In short, the potential exists for me to do a number of jobs that I perceive as interesting, challenging and, in some cases, exciting.

The participant quoted below, who is a new CO and a new LCol, spoke of the challenge but also the gratification and sense of accomplishment derived from fostering unit cohesion:

I guess...the challenge for me has been how to bring everybody within the unit...Private up to Major, all of that together to make sure that we work synergistically and collaboratively, to meet the aims of the Commander... So that's been a challenge for me, but very rewarding as well.

Still other participants spoke of the intrinsic satisfaction that they derived from the work itself, and distinguished this from the satisfaction that they might derive from the LCol rank. The participant quoted below, for example, reported loving his work so much that he would do the same job as a Private:

But I guess the interesting thing here is, is it the job you love or is it the rank you love, right? And I think there's a difference. ...But you love the job perhaps more than you love the rank. ... I mean, I'd do the job as a Private!

The participant quoted below, who is a teacher, expressed a similar sentiment:

What I do get clearly is the feedback from my students when I do a good job and they tell me, or the sort of gratification of teaching alone. ... It doesn't have much to do with me being a Land Force LCol. Rather it's just sort of the focal point of the job itself.

Other participants also expressed a high level of satisfaction with their work, describing it as fun, or as the best job they will ever have:

[What I find satisfying about being a LCol is] wearing this uniform everyday and doing fun things both in garrison and in the field and with other nations as well.

I think all of us are all here doing the best job we'll ever have and doing it for the most part because it's actually fun to do the right thing and to be able to see the result.

Indeed, several participants conveyed that there was no job that they would rather be doing:

You know, all this said, speaking for me personally, there's no other job in the Canadian Forces I'd rather be doing.

I enjoy going to work everyday.

As far as I'm concerned there's no job better.

I'd lick the floors to stay and do this sort of job because I know that it counts and it matters and I've seen the results of that.

In addition to intrinsic satisfactions, several LCol spoke of the extrinsic satisfactions they derived from their work. For example, some spoke of the recognition from others that they (LCol) are doing important work:

I have reached a rank level that allows me to carry out a wide range of staff and command functions, along with the perceived acknowledgement that I have reached a level of knowledge and experience that is recognized by others in the military, and outside.

Similarly, several participants spoke of the recognition and respect that they received from others in relation to, or because of, their LCol rank. Some spoke of the credibility and authority that accompanies others' perceptions of the rank. Below is an excerpt from a conversation during one of the focus groups, between the researcher (R) and a participant (P):

R: So, but are you telling me that there was a certain credibility that went with the rank level, ... that made folk listen to you?

P: I worked in Ottawa as a captain, a major and a lieutenant colonel. There was zero influence as a captain rank there, major rank you just basically were filling in the blanks, and as a lieutenant colonel I was actually given responsibly to, in some places, to make policy or help formulate policy, and I was listened to by general officers.

Similarly, the participant quoted below relates how the LCol rank (apart from being in command) confers one with a certain degree of authority and credibility, for example, when debating ideas within the institution. Accordingly, the LCol rank is a tool that allows one to be listened to, and thus be more effective within a hierarchical organization such as the CF:

Certainly the rank gives you the authority to speak on the CLS's behalf with more credibility. It allows you to talk to other organizations in the agency and not be subordinate, so it is a tool to do your job better. When conflicting ideas or concepts come out of places like Kingston and your Navy and your Air Force, if they're coming from a LCol, it's very difficult [as] a Major to tell him he's full of crap. So you do need the rank to be at the same level to compete institutionally with the ideas and to offer counter-arguments that are just as credible when these things are being debated. So it is a necessary step to work in the bureaucracy of the business. ... It means you can't be buffalo-ed and when you've got good points, rather than, the institution typically doesn't necessarily hold people's value at the quality of their ideas, it has as much to do with the rank on your shoulder. There is this phenomenon of the opinion of the senior rank present and if you aren't in the league, you've got a very tough time in getting your ideas through, because with rank comes a certain amount of credibility, authority and that sort of stuff and the opinion of the senior men present is so prevalent in our business.

Along the same lines, the participant quoted below spoke of the satisfaction, in terms of respect, that he gets from his military peers. This respect is expressed in being sought out for guidance and leadership, being consulted, and so forth:

I suppose the satisfaction I get from the rank is really in terms of respect from my peers on the military side...who look to me quite often for ... my opinions based on my experience and my rank, obviously, and you know, they seek leadership ... on issues and whatnot. So, I take a certain amount of gratitude in that.

The participant quoted below spoke of how, at least in some cases, LCol's are treated differently from others (i.e., lower ranks) when they walk into a room.

If you're looking at satisfiers...I saw a huge difference when I was promoted. When I was a Major before I was promoted, I was in a staff position, so I was working to death in a cubicle. And when I got promoted, I was lucky enough to come to command but besides that, people treat me much differently. ...Now there are positions in the Army where LCol's are staff worker bees, but not so much here. So here, geographically, when you walk into a room, you are treated different. Whereas there are places that LCol's are back the same as that cubicle rat that I was as a Major, where [here] it's not the case.

Other extrinsic satisfiers, such as positive relationships with co-workers/staff and good pay/benefits, also were discussed in the focus groups and written responses. Below is a quotation from a focus group participant who values his staff:

I have a good staff that works for me.

Similarly, the participant quoted below enjoys the people with whom he works. Indeed, in contrast to other participants who have been quoted (i.e., those who emphasize the intrinsic satisfaction that they derive from their work), for this participant, co-workers provide the main motivation for coming to work in the morning:

So for me what's important is the people I work with in my section and in the other sections around me. They are working on hard projects. They are very satisfied because they see the results of their work and I enjoy working with them. So, you know, what makes me want to come in to work in the morning is the people I work with, nothing to do with the job.

Interestingly, only a few participants mentioned pay or benefits as a potential source of job satisfaction. However, much of the discourse regarding pay and benefits indicated that these were not considered very important as sources of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction). Instead, participants felt that other more intrinsic aspects of their work were much more important to their overall job satisfaction than pay or benefits:

The [job satisfaction] survey we just completed had a lot of reference to benefits. I don't think any of us are going to argue that that is the most unsatisfying thing.

Pay is not a significant dissatisfier.

You know a lot of the questions seemed to revolve around sort of benefits and pay, and I don't see that being a big motivator for me.

Pay, I wrote down maybe I should get a little more. Benefits, the only benefits that I can think of is PLD [Post Living Differential] for [location] should be a little higher. Otherwise I think we're pretty good.

I think we get paid well for what we do, so I don't see that as being a factor for my dissatisfaction, if you will. ... I think our peers in industry make more money than we do, for sure, but for me in this job, it's not the money. ... I have...a nice life at home and a nice house but, I mean coming to work ..., that sort of motivates you. It isn't the money.

I was amazed at how many questions on this questionnaire are about how much money we make, which frankly I don't even know what I make and I don't care! I make enough to be happy with what I can do when I have time off... So that is moot totally to me and all the benefits and crap. I do as well or better than most of my friends that I have come up through life with, so I'm happy.

In summary, the satisfiers that emerged as the most important to the LCol in this study were the opportunity to command, to influence the CF/Army, and to work with soldiers (e.g., as mentors and educators). Other sources of satisfaction for the LCol in this study involved the intrinsic aspects of their work (e.g., the opportunity to do important, challenging, interesting, or fun work), and the extrinsic aspects of their work (e.g., respect and recognition associated with the LCol rank, and enjoyable relations with staff/co-workers). In the next section we turn to the dissatisfiers associated with the LCol rank that were identified by participants in this study.

Dissatisfiers at the LCol Rank

There were several issues with which the LCol in this study were dissatisfied. These included a wide range of concerns related to promotion and leadership issues, as well as other organizational issues.

Promotion Issues

By a substantial margin, most of the discourse pertaining to dissatisfaction among the LCol in this study revolved around promotion issues. Of particular concern were second language requirements, academic requirements, command requirements, A-Job requirements, workload demands, the effects of promotion demands on the family, the Army Succession Planning Process, regimental tribalism, and concerns about future changes to the promotion system, in addition to concerns about other promotion issues. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

Second Language Requirement. Because second language training was highlighted as a major concern in *The Army Climate and Culture Survey*, we asked specifically about this issue. As in the previous study, the second language requirement for promotion was a major source of dissatisfaction here as well. For example, some participants felt that the language standards for promotion are set too high:

The standard expected for career progression is too high. Right now, they're asking for C, and I believe a B is sufficient.

'C' level testing for oral interaction is completely unrealistic. To achieve a 'C' level in French requires almost flawless speech, using a gregarious speech pattern...that is not in keeping with my personality or training, nor that of most Anglophones.

Some participants felt that too much weight is given to second language proficiency for promotion purposes:

Far too big in my opinion. It's the discriminator. By the time you get to LCol, people [are] all doing a good job. So the discriminator is what your second language ability is.

As far as second language training is concerned, I by and large support it although I have always felt pressured into it and feel too much emphasis is placed on it in terms of performance and advancement.

I have a couple of guys that worked for me last year, one was rated significantly higher for performance and potential and everything that the PER system is meant to rank you on, and he came out almost twice as bad as someone who was rated significantly lower than him, but the person rated lower had better a French profile. You know, he was Franco who could speak English. So he just rocketed to the top and he is not the one I would choose for promotion, but the system, [has] way too many points, too much [for second language proficiency]...

The participant quoted below felt particularly frustrated by the second language requirement for promotion, referring to it as biased, or an example of "reverse discrimination:"

It's a touchy subject. I think it's biased in my own opinion. Reverse discrimination in my mind, and I've had a year-long French course, but still for 20-odd years to be continually playing that game and knowing no matter how well you do your job, you can be the top dog in [location] and when you're merited, some number 10 or 15 guy who happens to have, by luck or coincidence or hard work, got the bilingual check-in-the-box, they're going to jump ahead of you on the promotion board. So as I said, we will be bilingually led, but we may not be [as] competently led in the Army. And it is probably in my books the biggest gripe I have right now in my rank.

Some participants felt that people from certain parts of the country are at a disadvantage in attaining French proficiency, for example, because of lack of exposure to French as children:

It's much easier for somebody from the East to attain proficiency in second language than it is [for] somebody from the West. It's just based on where you grew up, based on exposure. ... I'm talking as a child. You know, as a child I was more likely to hear [languages other than French], until I actually went to military college, and started hearing French on a regular basis. And so those formative years, which later on in life really play against you if you weren't exposed to it.

Similarly, some participants (both Anglophone and Francophone) spoke of the difficulties that Anglophones, in particular, face in obtaining second language proficiency, in that there are fewer places in which Anglophones, compared to Francophones, can obtain second language training, or in which they can work using their second language:

And it's unfortunate that...those are the only places for the Anglo officers to be able to go in to get the reverse experience that the Franco officers [get]. I don't blame the Francos at all and they're very fortunate that they have the majority of places to go where they can exercise their second language.

For an Anglophone who's never had the opportunity to work in another language, he's immediately behind the eight ball. And to me, it's huge, it would be my biggest dissatisfier.

Francophone officers have abundant opportunity to serve in non-Francophone units, thereby improving their ability to operate in their second official language. Such is not the case for the majority of Anglophone officers.

I can see how this is easier for a Francophone than for an Anglophone. ...We live in North America and are surrounded by the most invasive society, culture on the planet. They use the English language. There is a need to learn English [and] there are opportunities to do so. On the other hand, the Anglophone living in Red Deer doesn't have the need to learn French or the numerous opportunities like we do. That makes it more difficult. However, this country decided to adopt a law addressing bilingualism. This law implies that at a certain level, we should address our subordinates in their first official language. The two official languages of Canada have been determined. We should do it all the way or not do it at all. We said we would do it, but keep pushing it back. It was decided that in 1992 [uncertain about date] a LCol has to have an English profile of C-B-C in order to be promoted. This date has been moved to 2008. Moving up in rank means accepting new responsibilities. This is one of them.

For a Francophone, it is pretty much normal to be bilingual, but for an Anglophone, rare are those who can...properly understand and write in French. ...That's because [an Anglophone] hasn't got the chance to practice, which is the opposite for Francophones.

The participant quoted below goes even further, and sees the difficulties that Anglophones face in obtaining second language proficiency as an “institutional” problem, related to regimental traditions:

In fact, as a Major, I actually specifically requested a posting to Quebec City or Valcartier or wherever they could put me in, just for that purpose, and essentially the regiment almost burned me at the stake and suggested that perhaps I had joined the wrong regiment... I mean, that's an institutional problem.

The participant quoted below expressed a similar view:

The number of times I tried to get to Quebec and [they] said, 'you can't go there, you're an Anglo', you know. It was never said on paper, but Anglos weren't allowed in Quebec, therefore how were you going to learn French? You're not going to learn it sitting down and reading the odd newspaper. To me it's a big dissatisfier, a huge dissatisfier.

On the other hand, some participants questioned the relevance of second language training and described it as merely a check-in-the-box, or hoop to jump through, in order to get promoted. Here is an excerpt from one focus group:

R: So, [second language training is] just something that needs to be done in order to get promoted, and that's the end of it?

P1: Yeah.

P2: It's a pragmatic view.

P3: Of a corporate demand.

P4: A tick-in-the-box.

P5: A hoop to jump through, spending 6 months or a year, very valuable time that could be used for more relevant professional training.

Some participants were quite willing to undergo second language training for its own sake, or when appropriate for command, but questioned its relevance for all command positions:

For what we need to do as commanders, I am quite willing to go and do more French language training, welcome it, the right time and the place... I want to learn, more for the sake of doing it. But do I need it to command further on?

Similarly, the participant quoted below feels that a bilingual officer corps is important in order for commanders to communicate with their soldiers, but that bilingualism should not be tied to promotion:

There's no doubt that at the unit level, if you have an English and French soldier, an officer should be able to converse with both those individuals in their native tongue, because that soldier, those soldiers may not have had the opportunity to take second language training, right? And I think there is a fundamental requirement to have to do that. But that's why we should have to do it, not because the Canadian government says we need a bilingual officer corps, and therefore it's tied to promotion.

On the other hand, while second language training was seen by many participants as a hoop to jump through, it was also perceived by participants as a sometimes unnecessary hoop, for in the end, it is believed, the person who is considered the best for the job will get promoted:

Well, in the end, you can have all of the bilingual guys in the world, but they put the guy that's able to do the job in that position. So what you find is we have enough bilingual speakers to fill the bilingual jobs, but they're not the bilingual speakers that get the jobs. They're the guys who can do the job. So, it's becoming a hoop that has to be jumped through, but it's not the crucial hoop to get the right jobs.

According to some participants, this situation is not necessarily negative, and the most important thing in terms of promotion is not one's second language ability but one's ability to do the job:

...People who have all the right leadership abilities but lack the second language because they've never had the opportunity to learn it, we shouldn't be holding them back because I've also seen the case of someone who's fluently bilingual and Anglophone who's got ahead but he had no leadership ability. ... If language is a problem, then, yeah, post him to Quebec for a while....

There's also a degree of, how should I put it, it's not lost to us that there are General Officers out there who have not made the grade in French language. Despite successive warnings to all of us that we must make it by a certain year to a certain level or we will be

lost, or one Col said it'll be illegal in 2007 not to have this profile. I like that, illegal, linguistic apartheid going on here. But I know Generals who don't. And I like those generals. ...I don't think less of them. But the standards that we're being told we must achieve are not necessarily the standards uniform to everyone.

Indeed, many participants commented on the lack of uniformity in the application of rules regarding the need for second language training for promotion. However, most saw this lack of consistency as a source of frustration, and as reflecting a double standard:

I think where it rubs me raw is the double standard. There are people who get promoted to full Colonel and then immediately go back to language school for 10 weeks because they haven't got the French profile to do it. They may not ever get the French profile to do it but they're still promoted. ... Sometimes it's a bit pernicious as in terms of whether you have these rules applied to you or not. If you're part of the special 5%, well, we'll kind of wave the French rule a bit, but for the rest you, if you haven't got your numbers, you're toast.

I think the perception, at least my perception, is those who they want get through despite the regulation. There's one or two out there who I'm pretty sure don't have the numbers but yet they got to the next level, but why? The needs of the service? But if you have a rule there, why is it good for 99% and not the other 1%? So, you know, goose and gander kinds of issues.

...Growing up as a Captain, as a Major, you watch, you get your PER, you have your sort of merit board listing and stuff. You go, okay, you didn't quite have this, you didn't quite have that, you know, if you work on this, that'll help you next year. So you work hard, you do your opey-dopeys or you work on your French or you do whatever they require. But you roll around to the next one and well no...it almost looks like they're picking that little group of guys over there. They might not have the right French profile, so despite the fact that you worked on your French, they didn't have it so well, we're going to fudge the rules a bit to make... the process more appealing to that group.

It's a little frustrating being counselled by a senior officer, or senior to me, who has no undergrad degree, does not speak French, and I do both, being told to get my act together.

In fact, the lack of second language ability of others can sometimes mean more work for those who are bilingual (often Francophones), creating a sense of frustration and unfairness:

I work more here because I am bilingual. I have to help the [others] that are not bilingual, and the commandant has told me that he wants me on the floor teaching because I'm bilingual. That's not fair. What would he do if I was unilingual Anglophone? So I'm working more because I'm bilingual. ... And I don't get any recognition for that.

The same participant quoted above went on to say that while he understands Anglophones' point of view, he is frustrated by situations in which Francophones are expected to be bilingual, but Anglophones are not:

I can understand their [Anglophones'] point of view, but I have to be bilingual, so why wouldn't they have to be?

The excerpt below is from a Francophone focus group. The conversation is about the need for the second language requirement, and the frustration with current language-related inequities:

P1: There should have been requirements like that a long time ago.

P2: Oftentimes we work in what might be considered as inequitable conditions. We can't argue as well in English as we do in French. ... We have to express ourselves in English and therefore are at a disadvantage in comparison with Anglophones, especially when we are dealing with complex issues.

P1: It's very difficult and very frustrating for a Francophone. Anywhere you go, apart from this base, is an English-speaking environment.

P2: My English profile is the best one can get and yet I was once turned down for a posting in [location] because I had never previously worked in an English environment. So, it's not always equitable.

P1: You will find that Francophones don't have a problem with the requirements but Anglophones do.

R: That is your prediction...

P1: We know so.

Some participants were frustrated by the lack of opportunity and time to obtain or upgrade their second language training:

I received phone calls and emails about 8 weeks ago suggesting very strongly that I put some time into upgrading the spoken French into a C. I've a current profile for the next 3 years, so that I could get a C in my spoken French, because promotion is dependent on it. I haven't had a minute of spare time in my day, not a minute.

Some were annoyed at the time that second language training can take away from their regular duties as commanders:

I think most of us got someone coming in the darn office there who are attending these 5-week French sessions here or, you know, if you have to go to St. Jean to do a 5-week course while they could easily export that course and run the darn thing here rather than us being away for 5 weeks, away from our command.

The participant quoted below described the time-consuming nature of obtaining second language training for his subordinates:

[Second language training is] all-consuming for some of my subordinates who are trying to get to my position.

On the other hand, some participants clearly valued second language training, but were frustrated by the difficulty of finding the time to do the training:

I think certainly we're all aware of the importance, I mean, the dual nature of this country. I come from a Francophone family, my father sent me to an English school. I never took

French at school and he insisted that I speak English and not French, so I had to go back in order to speak French, right, and I mean I'm certainly glad I did do that. Obviously, I think that most of us understand the need to do that. I think the challenge for, especially LCols, is finding the time do that.

Similarly, some participants were frustrated by the lack of opportunity to use one's second language training and therefore, the inevitable loss of fluency (and wasting of resources):

We don't employ them properly... ...After...a year-long French course, we should be employing them in places like Quebec and we don't. It's just a check-in-the-box and it's a huge waste of resources.

Several participants, who are also in favour of second language training and who understand the need for the policy, criticized the second language testing system that is currently being used (i.e., the Public Service test), for not taking into account the military context, and therefore, not being fair and valid:

But our own testing mechanisms do not take into account the military language and lexicon. So, guys come in to, you learn to speak a very low level, in terms of societal levels of language to start with, and you, by nature, will use slang and modified terms because that's what we do. However, you then go into the language test, and they'll, you know, hand on heart, standing there, you can say I can converse without problem and at ease with individuals in French or English. I cannot seem to manage to get through this Public Service test, which the individual I'm speaking to probably has no knowledge whatsoever of the domain that I operate within, none whatsoever.

When we speak to soldiers, we speak Quebecois French, you know. ...We use the slang words, the same as they do and we can communicate with them. But then you...get on a telephone, doing a French test on a friggin' telephone, talking to a Public Servant in Ottawa who is judging you on your ability to speak Parisian French, proper French, and it's just a huge piss off for me.

I have NCOs who are bilingual, that their written skills are probably zero but their ability to converse in French is phenomenal. However, they probably would never get above a B because poorly structured, slang, grammar sucks, all those things which would never see them through a test. So they just don't, because they don't want to be embarrassed, and they don't want to be frustrated. And it's too bad, and I think everybody understands, everybody accepts if you come to our level you're going to have Francophone soldiers, and you have a responsibility to be able to speak to them, in their language. But it again comes back to a check-in-the-box.

The participant quoted below felt that the second language testing is too subjective:

I think the testing system...is open to favoritism because, there, it's not like a test where the answer is this. It's somebody who is subjectively assessing how good you are at speaking another language. If there was a checklist...then, then it would be okay...

Finally, the participant quoted below explained why he feels that the second language testing system in the CF is doomed to fail:

The entire language system is built to not succeed. The professors for the most part are private companies that are hired to do the teaching. It's not in their interest to have people pass because they won't come back. The testers are government, the professors and the testers, the professors don't know what the testers are asking, so they're not linked. And finally, the system...doesn't demand that we speak the second language or give us the opportunity to work it. So the system, there's no loop that says, hey, you're sending me a guy that supposedly can speak French, in our case, but he can't. The system doesn't need us to speak French so they don't ask us to, so there's no feedback loop to say to the professors you're not teaching what I need and there's no feedback loop through the testers. So...it's in no one's interest to pass anyone. It's just an endless circle.

In summary, participants described a number of sources of dissatisfaction in regard to the second language requirement for promotion, including the standard for promotion; the weight given to second language training in promotion; difficulties, particularly for Anglophones, in obtaining second language proficiency; inequities faced by Francophones; difficulties in finding the time for training; questions about the relevance of second language proficiency for command; the lack of consistency in applying the requirement for second language ability in promotion decisions; and questions about the validity of second language testing.

Academic Requirement. Some of the same frustrations regarding the second language requirement for promotion were also expressed by participants in relation to the academic requirements for promotion. In particular, some participants felt that the academic requirements merely provided a tick-in-the-box, with no real relevance to one's job. The participant quoted below felt that the academic requirement was borne out of the Somalia Inquiry, but serves no real purpose:

A lot of this came out of the Somalia Inquiry and things like that. I mean this shook up the Forces. And I remember a Captain of mine, one time when he was 2IC and I was company commander, said both of us didn't have degrees at the time...he says, goddamn it, a bunch of Generals stole something. Now we're dummies because of it. We have to go out and get an education.

A similar view is expressed by the participant quoted below:

I believe there's way too much academic mumbo-jumbo (essay writing crap) in our Staff Colleges and not near enough (about) war fighting.

The participant quoted below perceives that whether he is promoted or not will be based on academic and language requirements, rather than his performance and command experience, and resents this:

The significant dissatisfier for me is that what will discriminate between me being promoted, and that has nothing to do with my performance, nothing to do with the positions that I have fulfilled. What will determine whether or not I get promoted is whether or not I have a Master's degree and whether or not I am fully bilingual. And that's disappointing. It is a huge disappointment. You know, the fact that I commanded...seems to be irrelevant.

The participant quoted below disagrees with the weight given to education and language skills in promotion decisions:

Education and language skills are important but they should not be given the weight of 40% towards calculating promotion rankings. The reason for this is that many now deem it more important to get a Masters and learn a second language than do well at the job or volunteer to go on operations. We could see officers who are average to above average performers but have a Masters and are bilingual pass others on the promotion list who are outstanding leaders but do not have a Masters or second language skills only because they have been very busy going on operations! This is clearly not fair as the latter officer has put service before self and not the other way around!!!!

The participant quoted below perceives a disconnect between the CF requiring personnel to obtain an academic degree, and actually putting that training to good use:

And I think that the system has to look at not just a question of getting officers the check in the box if you want to increase numbers of officers with degrees. I think they seriously should be looking at how they use those people to the benefit of the Forces.

Other participants were frustrated by the fact that, on the one hand LCol's are told that they need a degree to be promoted, but on the other hand many individuals have been promoted without earning a degree:

I've done a post-graduate degree on my own time. Got to [location] and there were two officers there, not in the Army classification, who didn't even have an undergraduate degree, who were Majors. And I just had to shake my head at the talk out there...that it's very important for you to have a degree and most, and some people have worked hard to get it, and then to meet up with these other elements and they say, oh no, I don't even have that, a graduate or a diploma.

As the participant quoted below explains, the frustration stems from the perceived lack of consistency in applying promotion criteria:

But what is it to the...Majors in the regiment saying, you know, they're beating me up to finish my degree and my CO doesn't have one? That's where the dissatisfier is, is that it's not applied across the board.

Some of the frustration regarding academic requirements for promotion involve the fact that some individuals (i.e., those who are on the fast track for promotion) are rewarded with academic training opportunities, while others are not. Thus, instead of being used as a requirement for promotion, academic opportunities are being used as rewards – but only for a select few – and this is perceived as inequitable:

Take academics, a dissatisfier at the LCol rank. Who gets full-time study and who doesn't? Again, a CO, no undergraduate degree, leaves command and is going to go to school, full-time. So he was rewarded for not having an undergraduate degree by getting command, which is the pinnacle in my corps, and now he's going to be rewarded again to go off for full-time study. That's a dissatisfier for a guy that's on his last course, part-time, who's been taking 6 years to do the Master's degree.

Other participants were frustrated because they had to pursue their degrees on their own time, or were never allowed to complete their degrees on a full-time basis.

I started a Master of Arts...through [institution]. I did four courses on my own time to the detriment of my family life, and at the end of it I said, 'Okay, enough.' I went off to Staff College and then I said, 'Well you know what, if I'm going to finish this, I'd really like to do it full time and I can do it in a year.' I had a plan. I could go to school for a year and get it done, and then be a Masters-qualified officer, who has nothing to look forward to but staff jobs here or in Ottawa where I could use such a degree. And the Army just turned me down flat.

The participant quoted below expressed frustration at the lack of support from the Army for his desire for more education, which seems ironic given the academic requirement for promotion:

Certainly in the combat arms, the armoured corps, the desire to go for post-graduate or more education, you know, why do you need that? Good God, you know, oh you have to command troops, why do you want more education?

The same participant quoted above went on to explain that the Army's support for more education for its personnel depends largely on the type of education. If the education is focused on operations, then there is much more support from the Army than if it is not perceived as operations-focused. Accordingly, the participant questions whether the CF is a learning institution.

It depends, I think, on the type of education. There are a few courses, which are tick-in-the-boxes, like I suppose an MBA might be a tick-in-a-box to going higher. But any serious interest in too much education is a sideline. If someone took a Masters or a Doctorate in History then you're getting a bit too eccentric. It's got to be focused on operations. ... This idea of a learning institution, I mean that's crap.

On the other hand, the participant quoted below believes that more time should be given to candidates to complete their degrees and feels that the pursuit of higher education should be encouraged by the Army/CF, but concludes that higher education should not be a requirement for promotion to the Col rank:

A lot of points are associated to this factor during promotion boards. If this is the case, time must be allotted to candidates to complete their degree. In order to fulfill my tasks as a commander, I had to pause my academic progression. Oftentimes, LCol's that have a chance at being promoted have demanding staff or commanding positions. They don't always have time to pursue academic advancement. If they decide to do so, their family life or quality of life will suffer. Pursuing higher education should be encouraged but it should not be a factor when considering an individual for promotion to the Col rank.

In summary, concerns over academic requirements tended to focus on the tick-box nature of the decision to send someone for further academic training, often without appearing to utilize the person's new skills once the degree is received. Frustration was also evidenced over who is sent for further academic training, with some people seeing it being given as a reward. Some participants felt that too much weight was given to academic requirements for promotion, or questioned the relevance of academic requirements, while other participants felt that the Army (ironically) did not provide sufficient time or support for the pursuit of academic degrees, or were frustrated by the lack of consistency in applying academic requirements as promotion criteria.

Command Requirement. While many participants expressed frustration in regard to the second language and education requirements for promotion, some participants, interestingly, found the command requirement for promotion to be a source of dissatisfaction. Much of this dissatisfaction focused on the lack of command positions to go around (i.e., there are more LCol's than units in need of a CO), and the fact that, without having commanded, one's career is perceived to be over.

This scarcity of command positions can be very dissatisfying and stressful for LCol's. The participant quoted below feels that, without a command (or a "mainstream") position, one is "doomed," and that one's chances of getting an A-job (i.e., a job on the promotion fast-track) are limited:

If you get too far from the mainstream [commanding, unit command], you're doomed, and a LCol is about as high as you can go. ... After you've got the checks in the boxes at the lower level, but you've never commanded a unit, perhaps never commanded a brigade, your chances at getting A-jobs in this building are pretty slim.

A similar view is expressed by the participants quoted below:

Getting you to this next rank works if you're in places like Petawawa and you're on the command side. If you're outside of that, if you're part of the 95% they choose to forget about, it's a struggle, for sure.

Career progression is still tied (in the Combat Arms) to a few limited positions of command. If you're not in it you're out.

The participant quoted below describes the frustration and instability associated with the command requirement, and points out that the chance for promotion also depends on the type of command:

One thing that is frustrating for us in the Army is that in order to make it to the rank of Col, one must practically be chosen to command. ... If you occupied a command position, you are playing in the majors. ... Even command positions differ in value. Unit commander is the best command position. Then there are formation and other unit commanders, and then there are the non-commanders. That's fine and it is accepted. But, as a result, there are more postings and this creates greater instability.

Similarly, the participants quoted below also describe a hierarchy in command positions and the resulting chances for promotion:

My final point is that equal weight or consideration is not given to command positions across the Army. There are very few battalions/regiments to command and competition is tight but also timing can be key too. It appears that if a LCol in the Army does not get to command a battalion or regiment but commands a base or training centre their chance for promotion is much less.

Some commanding in garrison or commanding in Canada, it won't cut it when you will be competing against LCol's who have commanded overseas operations, and so now some branches, corps, regiments are looking at awarding PRT commands, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, for example, so that those people can be better

postured to compete against the perhaps infantry, heavy infantry, armoured commanders that will have commanded task forces overseas. So I just see another gateway is being put down that LCol's are going to have to get or they're finished.

Interestingly, when asked if they would change the requirement that states that one must occupy a command position in order to be eligible for promotion, the participant quoted below replied:

Everyone wants to command no matter what. ... Having the rank is one thing, but having the opportunity to command is [the ultimate reward].

In summary, the need to have commanded, combined with the lack of available positions, is a frustration for many of the LCol's. Additionally, some types of command appear to be more highly valued than others in the promotion system, which also is a source of dissatisfaction.

A-Job Requirement. Related to the issue of the command requirement for promotion is the requirement to have an A-job for promotion. Although an A-job is one that will likely lead to promotion, it is not necessarily a command position. Thus, according to the participant quoted below, an A-job may even be a staff job at NDHQ, particularly if it is operations-focused. A-jobs may mean working long hours in an understaffed situation, but this, it seems, is the price to be paid for the chance at promotion to full Colonel:

So we all know that if we wish to be promoted to full Col then we've got another A-job ahead of us, and not in command so now you're talking...a 3 o'clock in the morning to a 9 o'clock at night job in NDHQ working in DLR or [garbled term] or someplace like that where they're woefully undermanned.

Other participants spoke of the long work hours usually demanded by an A-job:

If there are any [prospects for future promotion], then I know in my mind I have to go to an A-job, and I have to work my guts out for the possibility of another one. That's frustrating.

Still others expressed frustration at how A-jobs are filled. According to the participants quoted below, a lot depends on personality, or "back-door" methods:

One of the dissatisfiers out there is the way they fill A-jobs. A lot of it's done by personality.

You could be qualified to fill that job, but there are too many back door methods of how they select people to fill them. That's what dissatisfies me.

The participant quoted below observes that, like command positions, A-jobs are scarce and in high demand:

There can only be so many A-jobs or else everybody'd be walking on water.

As noted above, only certain types of jobs are considered A-jobs. The participant quoted below, who works in a technical area, perceives that he is not, in fact, in an A-job, and hence his chances for promotion are slim:

I knew the day I got promoted to LCol, I was never going to be promoted again, because of my background and the fact I was technical, therefore the system no longer had any value. ... So the system is designed for those who are moving upwards, but not designed for the technical people gone off to the side. And I think it's the same with the other ranks too, but certainly with the LCol level, that's as high as you can go and be technical in my opinion.

Similarly, the participant quoted below explained how being assigned to a reserve unit can damage one's chances for promotion:

You can be an average adjutant in a regular force infantry battalion and have a good PER which will probably lead you a promotion to Major. On the other hand, you can be an excellent regular force adjutant assigned in a reserve unit and have an excellent PER and yet be ranked much lower because you are in a reserve unit. The reserve position won't have as much weight on the promotion board. ... In some cases, you might be the best person on the planet, but since you occupy a particular position, you will never get a promotion.

In summary, A-jobs appear to be required for promotion, but they are scarce and require a large time commitment. Having an A-job appears to be necessary, but not sufficient, to be promoted. There is some concern about how A-jobs are filled. Furthermore, not all MOCs appear to have equal access to A-jobs and, hence, promotion beyond the LCol rank.

Workload Demands. As noted above, several participants commented on the high workload demand associated with A-jobs and the chance for promotion. A few participants mentioned the high workload demand for promotion in general as a dissatisfier and wondered if it is worth it or not:

...As a LCol, you're going to work like a dog. I mean, I was a DS in [location] as a LCol and you're the guy, there was no staff that came with that job. You were there making the traces out and stuff like that on the weekends and stuff... And you come out of command and you're not quite sure you want to stay in or not.

Today an officer, I feel like...I would have to work 18 hours a day if I want to get promoted. That's my feeling.

In Ottawa, this type of position involves a minimum of 10 to 12 working hours per day. ... I already made my mind up and the answer is no [it's not worth it]. I know where I stand, we all know each other and compare ourselves to one another, and I don't want to put in the effort. On a personal level, I could do it, but I'm not willing to put my family through this.

Effects of Promotion Demands on the Family. In fact, a number of participants spoke of the effects of striving for promotion on their family. Many felt that the requirements for promotion – the long hours at work – can be very stressful and demand many sacrifices from the family. Some participants seemed resigned to this fact although some also recognized the costs:

Well, my wife has realized, she knew going into this it would be several years of not seeing heck of a lot of me, and she accepted that.

I don't know if it's a fair proxy, but I remember talking to a number of guys about going on a tour and how they dealt with it at home...and a lot of them, their approach was that they had a contract with their family that they were just gone. And that's what we're all briefed on, right? The psychology of it is you leave and you do this kind of go away phase and you're gone and then there's the slow comeback phase. So that's a very long, painful time to work through, but that's the way you deal with it. That is exactly the kind of mentality that we used when I came to be a CO.

I think the approach I'm guessing most of us take which is your family just goes in a closet for a couple of years and you deal with it. They pick up the scraps whenever you have time to do stuff. So it's not a burning issue for me because I've kind of, our contract at home is that I'm around when I'm around... It's costly at the end. I think that's one of the things where you see guys that are really starting to tire, because their families are tired and cranky after that period as well.

I'm sure every one of us here, you know, it's my wife that's taking a hit for this, and my kids, but she recognizes that this is what I've always wanted to do...and she's there to support me, and she believes in the regimental family and the role that we play in it and she knows I'm not going to be here too often...but yeah, it's... tough.

A few participants seemed less willing to accept the implications of striving for promotion for their family lives:

Well, I've been around senior officers for 5 years, working directly for generals and colonels, and I've seen the lifestyle. My wife didn't sign up for that lifestyle. My kids have no idea what's going on with dad.

Well, yeah, she's not very happy right now. I was expecting to work a lot. Right now it's worse than I thought, there's more work than I thought I was going to do.

The participant quoted below is no longer willing to sacrifice his family for future promotions, has decided that it is not worth it, and has made a conscious decision to take himself off the promotion track:

The problem is that sometimes, one must occupy three or four key positions in order to be considered for promotion. This means that 10 to 12 years of effort went in to this. Everyone, including families, had to sacrifice their lifestyle in order [for me] to get a promotion. ... I don't want to put in the effort. On a personal level, I could do it, but I'm not willing to put my family through this. ... Eventually you get to a point where you are drained and are faced with family problems resulting from the many moves and you ask yourself: Should I keep going? I decided I would not. If it was only up to me, there wouldn't be a problem, but there are consequences on my family and there are social consequences. This is why I made the decision not to pursue this. ... The rewards I get at the professional level and all the positive aspects that came out of this lifestyle do not compensate for the problems my children now have to face, my spouse's frustration and the sacrifices we made overall.

This sentiment is echoed by another participant, who is quoted below:

Many years ago, I realized that at the end of my career, when the uniform comes off, the most important factor in my life will be my family. Since coming to that realization, I have made choices that fall, almost without exception, on the side of what is best for my family. This is a conscious decision – one taken with the knowledge of likely career implications within the current CF and Army career systems.

Similarly, the participant quoted below says that he now only takes jobs that will allow him to balance his career and family needs. Interestingly, he feels that it is not the Army's responsibility to accommodate his family's needs. However, he recognizes that taking only jobs that will allow him to achieve a work-family balance will likely diminish his chances for promotion.

I have the opportunity to [balance my career and family needs]. I can't say that has always been the case. ...When I got promoted to LCol, I made career choices... I don't ask for jobs that won't allow me to take care of my child. I take jobs that will allow me to do both. If the time comes where I can no longer do that I won't expect the Army to give way... I will have to concede. When I can no longer do what is asked of me, I will leave. The Army is not responsible for my situation. It factors in, but deciding to undertake a career in the Army is a personal choice. ... Today, I manage to get by. I take jobs that allow me to do so and I negotiate with my boss. ... [They] are definitely not jobs that will lead me to higher levels.

Thus, in the pursuit of promotion, there appear to be many sacrifices made by LCol's and their families. Most evident is a lack of work-life balance which may be leading to a deterioration of the quality of family life experienced by LCol's. In some cases, relationships with spouses and children appear to be tenuous at best. One of the biggest losers may be the Army, as some LCol's may choose to leave the Army rather than sacrifice their families any further.

Army Succession Planning Process. Another source of dissatisfaction related to the promotion process concerned the new Army Succession Planning Process (ASPP). According to the new system, abilities are ranked in a 4-tier system and people are told what they need to do to be promoted to the next level. This system was designed to be more open and transparent than the previous promotion system. Thus, career management and promotions are no longer supposed to be carried out via the "old boys' network." However, according to some participants, the regiment still plays a key role in the promotion process:

[The promotion process is] very much driven, up until the rank of LCol, so from Lieutenant to Majors, it's very much a regimental or corps influence that decides how quick, how slow, where you go, where you work. The Army's setting up its succession plan and the like. It has not been as effective in mapping where they want LCol's to go. Maybe that's why there's a bit of dissatisfaction out there. It's basically, you're in the regimental view, and then you're not, you work for the Army and the Army doesn't say anything.

We have a new thing now, the succession planning, which is still fairly new, I would say, where now you get a letter that tells you where you're tiered. Does your corps or regiment, whatever, believe that you're going to be a Col or a General, so you're told that.

Some participants felt that the new process is personality driven:

Two of us, both Majors in my corps, applied for the job and we weren't chosen because this system, it's personality and tier stream, succession planning driven, chose [someone else] because they wanted to get him promoted.

For many participants, the new ASPP is still evolving, and is still unclear in many respects:

Well, I think it's evolving, Army Succession Planning. We got our current jobs through that process... I don't have clear visibility on what the Army is doing, other than picking the right guys to command units and command bases and the like. I don't know what else in their succession planning. I know [what] they're doing on language training for us, for example, to make sure they get us our language training at the right time.

There is Army Succession Planning. And I'm not quite sure how it all transpires but there [are] various boards, committees that sit around tables in Ottawa and they choose who is going to become, essentially...a General, or a full Colonel.

Although some participants stated that they support the principles of the ASPP (i.e., the tier system), several reported that they had not yet received a tier letter:

The principle is good, because it actually is a plan that is extant on a piece of paper and you could show people, and say "here's our expectations of you in the future. Whether you rise to them or not is up to you, but we feel you're going here, right." The intent was to issue a letter every year and map out for individuals where the system thinks they should go. I have yet to receive a letter.

For some participants, having not received a letter has not shaken their confidence in the ASPP:

I support the system. I supported it when I first had to deal with it and advise a General Officer on its relative strengths. I still believe in it. ... I, personally, in not receiving a letter [it] doesn't mean I don't believe in the system. I do believe in it, and I support it, and it's a great thing.

...I support the succession planning system wholeheartedly, absolutely...and because I haven't received any notification of it personally, doesn't mean I'm not in it. So I'm not so naïve to think that I'm out of it completely.

Although some participants conceded that subjective elements are always a part of any promotion system, they nevertheless felt that the new promotion system was an improvement on the old one:

We won't take the politics away because you can't take the politics away, you can't take subjective judgments away, or nepotism away, but it's better than what we used to have.

It is always going to be a subjective process, but is a fair process.

The participant quoted below described the new system as more honest than the old system, but still frustrating:

At least with the way they're doing succession planning now, for those of us in our rank, there is at least a degree of honesty, because we all get a letter now, saying okay the

Army Succession Board has sat and we evaluate you as a tier, it's all tiered now. So they tell you what tier you're in. And if you're in a certain tier, you got potential, baby, you could be the CDS. ...So, there is a degree of honesty to it. And that's actually kind of refreshing. At the same time, it's a little disappointing, right, because I didn't join the Army to command a [small] base, right? But on the one hand the Army succession planning has some positive aspects, and on the other hand, it still is frustrating.

The conversation below, from one of the focus groups, reflects concerns and opinions about how the ASPP can either raise or lower people's expectations, or in general, affect people's future career aspirations:

P1: The risk, I guess, is when they tell someone they're not ranked, but they're going to just switch off and go, alright, I'm getting not a bad pay cheque, I'll take a quiet job somewhere and work 9-to-5 and not really care because the system's told me I'm not going anywhere.

P2: Or alternatively, you promised something to someone...in a letter, [they] infer that they're going somewhere, they don't deliver, then the redress of grievances start and people are afraid of it. I still think it's a better system.

P3: But the other side of the coin is the honesty of telling them they're not going anywhere. It's time to start looking for a job that's laterally satisfying.

Similar sentiments were expressed in relation to tier letters. One of the participants in the conversation quoted below refers to his tier letter as a "cut-off letter."

P1: I've only seen one letter myself as a LCol and...

P2: It's a cut-off letter! [laughter]

P1: It said the party's over.

P2: Yup!

P1: ...Thanks for coming out. [laughter]

On the other hand, some participants felt that the new system still "strings people along:"

I think it's nice that the succession plan is telling you what the system thinks of you and we probably should do that sooner for a lot of people. But we tend to kind of string them along, oh, you know, you work a bit harder, we'll look after you. But no one really comes out and says, you're a plug, out you go.

The participant quoted below is still wondering what his career future will hold, despite ASPP:

I have only received one letter in the last 4 years since the Army Succession Plan came into place. Nobody has since spoken to me about what my future may hold. Am I expected to lobby on my own behalf, or should I have a reasonable expectation for someone senior to me to counsel me on my future?

The person quoted below has a particularly negative view of the ASPP. The participant feels that, rather than providing a look ahead, the new system kicks people when they're down:

The tier system in place, in terms of career progression, is looked at in a very derisive manner and is felt to rather kick a man when he's down rather than provide any kind of look ahead.

In general, the ASPP appears to be seen by most LCol's as a better procedure than the one it replaced. However, there is the acknowledgement that the system is experiencing some growing pains (e.g., some people have never received letters, while others have received letters only intermittently). Some LCol's feel the process is just as flawed as the previous system.

Regimental Tribalism. Related to the ASPP, participants also raised concerns about the role of the regiment in the promotion process.⁴ In particular, some participants perceived that tribalism within the regimental system engenders favouritism regarding who gets promoted and who does not, a perception that is facilitated by fluctuating evaluation standards:

...There are different standards, and it will change from year to year. And this is where the perception of favouritism comes in. Especially when we speak of regimental Col's and corps committees... .

Similarly, some felt that a uniform system is needed that goes beyond regiments or corps:

There needs to be a uniform application that goes beyond corps and regiments. Once you've got past the general staff system in [location] and you are employable amongst a broad...spectrum of jobs, joint and earning, then we need to get beyond the regimental prescriptions and applications in succession I think.

The participant quoted below questioned whether regimental executive committees can appropriately tier-rank personnel based on "gut feelings," and spoke of the political issues involved (i.e., how regiments try to further their own interests by promoting their own members):

In my...regiment, [tier rankings are] based on the gut feel of a series of Col's and maybe a General or two within the regiment. ...Regimental executive committee[s]...sit and talk about Majors and Captains and have the audacity to actually believe that we can appropriately tier them and say that that Captain is likely going to be a CDS. So, and this is where we get in to it, so someone years ago has said we need Generals. Generals influence what happens and so we need some Generals in our regiment up there or our corps up there, to influence our survival within that regiment, that corps, and they start to pick early. That kind of went by the wayside for a period of time. Now it's starting to come back. Especially if you're in a regiment that at one time commanded everything and through a series of unfortunate events [now] commands nothing.

⁴ It is unclear as to which rank this regimental influence (or "within-regiment breeding") applies. Some participants stated that the regimental influence extended to the rank of Major, while other participants indicated that the regimental influence extended to the rank of LCol. In either case, the tier letters that are sent as part of the ASPP, as already discussed, are driven by the regiments/corps.

Other participants spoke of the undue influence of the regimental corps on an individual's career progression. Without a push from one's corps, one will reach a ceiling in career advancement:

There's a lot of LCol's disgruntled because you can become a LCol if you perform well. Regardless of what your corps says, you can make it that far. But without that push from your corps, you're not going to go any further.

The participant quoted below felt that his regiment actually hindered his career progress, and that the regimental system in general only serves to promote a select few "stars:"

I've got some particularly negative views about the regiment and the regimental system. In my own case, sorry, it did nothing for me for the last 10 years, and my promotion to this rank had nothing to do with...the regiment. ... They were holding me back, quite frankly. [In the] ...regimental system, getting you to this next rank works if you're in places like Petawawa and you're on the command side. If you're outside of that, if you're part of the 95% they choose to forget about, it's a struggle, for sure. So, I think the succession planning stuff is a good way to show how people move along, but to get on the first view of the succession planning list means that the regiment has to have picked you and made you one of the stars. So then you get...into the succession planning game. If you're outside of that, you're done!

The participant quoted below suggested removing the regimental influence on promotion, even while reluctant to advocate for the elimination of the regimental system altogether:

I'd hate to say get rid of the regimental system, and I won't, because I think it's important to maintain that. I would say that you remove elements like regimental Col's, and what have you, and go strictly by a merit board approach where the regiments have no influence, and the corps have no influence on it.

Similarly, the participant quoted below defends the regimental system in terms of its efficiency in producing combat-capable, cohesive army units, but perceives several flaws in the system in terms of its influence on promotion. Once again the political nature of the regimental system is raised:

One of the things that I see as being dysfunctional almost... is...the tribalism that's already been alluded to in the regimental system. I'm a believer in the regimental system in terms of the production of soldiers and...the efficiency that it brings in creating combat capable forces, the camaraderie, etcetera, on the personnel level. There are, however, many dysfunctional aspects to that type of tribalism that regrettably leaves a lot of us out in the cold. And that is when...you got different regiments competing for positions when there are scarce positions to be had, etcetera, it becomes a sort of battle..., with quotas and whatnot.

The same participant quoted above went on to suggest switching to systems used by other nations:

Maybe we ought to do like the Australians and do a number of battalions; they're all the same, they train the same anyway, you know. I think it would serve the people in the system somewhat better.

On the other hand, the participant quoted below felt that his regiment did not do enough to help promote him as the best candidate for a job, but does not question the regimental system itself. This candidate considered his regiment's inability to "sell" his candidacy a big "slap in the face:"

You need a man who can put the fist on the table and say "That's it. I had enough of that bullshit. I know I have the best candidate, cut that out." ... And that's a big dissatisfaction because, until you are at the LCol [rank], you don't have that many chances to get a CO's position, and when you get it, it's because your branch has been pushing for you to get it, because they see in you a leader somewhere along their big sphere of things that you may become a full Col one day, and become one of their leaders.

Thus, there are many concerns about the control that regiments appear to have in the promotion process. While most participants were not calling for disbanding the regimental system, most felt that the promotion system would be fairer if the regimental influence was removed from the process.

Concerns about Future Changes to the Promotion System. In addition to concerns about the present promotion system, including the ASPP and the regimental influence on promotion, a few participants expressed apprehension about future changes to the promotion system, such as planned procedural changes to the Army Merit Boards for LCol. As the participant quoted below explains, in the new system, all combat arms will be grouped into one merit board:

I think it's maybe not registered with everyone, but it's going to be a dissatisfier. ...Starting next year...all the combat arms will be grouped into one merit board. So, infantry, armoured, artillery, engineer, all together. ...Now that's the intention. They haven't come out with the details yet. I think it's going to be a dissatisfier unless they really are careful with this because potentially, a LCol could top the merit list and not get promoted and guys below him get promoted, because we still have PMLs [Preferred Manning Levels] in all our corps. For example, that the guy the highest on the list is 15, he gets picked up and off he goes to be promoted. And guys higher than him who are in different [smaller] PMLs will not get picked up. So, it's a great intention, but I don't think it's been thought through.

The participant quoted below is concerned that although tribalism may be avoided with the new system, new gateways will be erected as a result of future changes to the promotion system. In particular, he feels that the new system will favour those with command experience in overseas operations:

I see that these gateways, whether you get to staff college, whether you get an A-job, whether you get the command job, and I know that we're about [to] have a promotion board for LCol to Col starting next year where it would be [possible] to avoid the tribalism better. So we bring them in together. But already I'm seeing that as a gateway, and so people know that that's how we get a certain branch promoted...and I use the command example. [For some] commanding in garrison or commanding in Canada, it won't cut it when you will be competing against LCol who have commanded overseas operations, and...so now some branches, corps, regiments are looking at awarding PRT commands, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, for example, so that those people can be better postured to compete against the perhaps infantry, heavy infantry, armoured commanders that will have commanded task forces overseas. So I just

see another gateway is being put down, that LCol's are going to have to get, or they're finished.

In response to the participant quoted above, the participant quoted below pointed out that dissatisfaction with a generic board for promotion to Col has already begun, due to the weight given to academic credentials:

But the Army board promotion to Col, the generic board is already dissatisfying a lot of people because there's points tied to academic degrees. And if you look at the points you get for a Master's degree, there's a lot more engineers with Master's degrees than there are infantry officers, as an example.

Similarly, the participant quoted below is also concerned about the greater weighting that will be given to education and second language credentials (or "potential") under the new promotion system:

I think it's next year they change the PER process where potential will have more points value than performance, and potential, if we boil it down to its baseline if you will, it's based on education and second language. And so now...if you don't have a post-graduate degree and your numbers aren't up on French...you're spending your command time chipping away at trying to increase your point value.

Other Promotion Issues. In addition to the promotion-related concerns discussed above, participants also spoke of a number of other promotion-related dissatisfiers. Some felt, for example, that the promotion system was too subjective, particularly in relation to judging academic potential:

Just back to the PER aspect there... If you've got an undergraduate degree, you get X points, period. If you have a Master's degree, or you're working on a Master's, then there's a range of points that can be assigned here. So this introduces a high level of subjectivity within the PER process. ...It's based on the group that's sitting around the table, and they'd look and they'd say, well...working on a Master's, well what university is it? Well, they're not qualified really to talk in universities, but they can say...the guy's got some Mickey Mouse program he's working on, 2 points. Where another one said, well he's doing his...whatever... in Toronto, well we'll give him 10 points. He hasn't got it yet but we'll give him 10 points. There's a level of subjectivity that exists, which...will just raise more questions...

In contrast, the participant quoted below felt that the promotion process was becoming too mathematical, and that it lacked the human element:

I think that the merit board system has become too mathematical: Counting dots. In an effort to be unbiased and letting the files speak for themselves, we have taken the human out of the equation.

Some participants felt that the promotion process (e.g., the ASPP) is not sufficiently transparent or clear:

...On the one hand the Army Succession Planning has some positive aspects, and on the other hand, it still is frustrating. ... [It's not clear how they're deciding who gets stuff and who doesn't.]

How they really come to [a promotion] decision, I'm not sure... I get the impression it's sort of the regimental brotherhood sits around and decides sort of who the next commanding officer is going to be, and who should be the next commander of the brigade or something.

According to the participant quoted below, there are too many “back door” methods in the promotion process:

You know, who are those with potential? You can say that their score for second language and academics [is high or low]..., but a lot of our system is back-door. The guy that is tiered with potential to be a General officer is going to get the break ahead of the guy that isn't.

The participant quoted below felt that transparency is lacking regarding the criteria that factor into promotion decisions, despite the fact that, as we have seen, many participants identified key promotion criteria (e.g., second language requirement, command requirement), even if they perceived the criteria to be unfair:

As it stands now there is no transparency on what factors and weight is considered before deciding where a member falls out in the potential to progress to high-tier positions in the Army!

When asked whether he felt that the criteria for promotion were transparent or not, the participant quoted below responded that the criteria were difficult to pinpoint, especially in relation to short-term goals, but that in the end, the promotion system was a good one:

The criteria are changing and difficult to pinpoint. There is no clear pattern for short-term goals. There is no sure way to get to a particular position. However, on a longer-term you get the big picture. It's a good system.

The participant quoted below linked what he perceived as a lack of transparency in the promotion system to the importance of “who you know” (or “who knows you”) to promotion decisions. He concludes that the promotion system is fraught with favouritism and dishonesty:

They tell us it is a transparent process. There is a succession board, a promotion board, there is this board, that board, blah blah blah board. I continue to say that your chances [for promotion] are dependent on who knows you and who you know. ... If you are new in the organization, forget it, you will fail because nobody knows you. The seniors around the table do not know you. Even if your boss says that you are the best employee, that you do a great job...forget it. You won't go anywhere if you are not seen and heard by the seniors. And that, in my opinion, is not being transparent. It is not being honest with our LCol. It's favoritism and a lack of judgment...

Similarly, other participants boil the situation down simply to “who one knows:”

I believe the system has broken down to something even worse than in years past -- it's a matter of who you know.

The sources of frustration are things such the fact that selection requirements will vary depending on who is writing them up. At some point a pattern emerges and people think

that they know what to do in order to get promoted and suddenly, the pattern changes. Why is that? Then you find out that a particular individual has worked for him 6 years ago and... These scenarios still exist in the Army today.

A few other participants also felt that one's chances for promotion depend on one's visibility with key decision-makers:

Now, is there an 'Old Boys Club?' I wouldn't say that. ...My perception is...it's not that bad. It 's not good, but it's not that bad. ... [But a LCol] can work his ass off for 48, 50, 60 hours a week, they don't see it. The only guy who sees it is me and the boss. ... What is important is to be assigned to a project or activity that has a lot of visibility, where people can say: "Yes, him... he was working on this or that project which had an effect, we saw him, big impact. If that's not there, forget it.

According to one participant, there is a perception that promotion will occur more quickly in certain trades, and that this is unrelated to performance and therefore unfair:

Career progression seems inconsistent. Specifically, the combat arms are all treated very different in terms of speed of promotions. Engineers seem to go fast, armour and infantry medium, and artillery extremely slow. [There is no] explanation for this and there is a perception that certain trades are better for moving ahead, no matter the performance level.

Other participants expressed their concerns about the fairness of the promotion system in terms of its procedures (as opposed to its outcomes).⁵ When asked whether or not he was convinced that the promotion process was fair, the participant quoted below responded:

Exactly right [I am not convinced that the process is fair]. It's why did he get it and that other individual didn't? Why? A lot of it is because he's been tiered to be much more successful throughout his career, so the doors open easier. ... And it goes back to personality...and perception. There's too much outside of the structure of the merit list.

However, not all participants felt that the promotion process is unfair, as indicated by the participant quoted below:

I feel I have been rewarded through my career. I've never focused on getting promoted, but I think the system has been fair.

I think the selection process for the command positions is one of the best there is. The deputy commander or the commander himself with the generals lead this process. They go through the list of candidates suggested by the units.

It is always going to be a subjective process, but [it] is a fair process.

The participant quoted below feels that the system is fair, but that it exacts costs and sacrifices for LCol's and their families:

⁵ This is sometimes referred to in the organizational literature as procedural justice (see Greenberg, 1986).

Usually, the selection process is fair. The problem is that sometimes, one must occupy three or four key positions in order to be considered for promotion. This means that 10 to 12 years of effort went in to this. Everyone, including families, had to sacrifice their lifestyle in order to get a promotion.

On the other hand, while the participant quoted below also feels that the promotion system in general is fair, he nevertheless identifies unfairness in outcomes (i.e., unworthy individuals being promoted):

Career progression system, in general, is good. The impression remains that some are anointed and will progress no matter what type of job they do, and what type of mess they leave behind as they stream along punching their tickets. I have seen examples of COs grossly over-expending resources, demonstrating poor tactical knowledge at Computer Assisted Exercises, and yet they are promoted.

Several participants, such as the one quoted below, felt that the promotion system has been unfair to them personally:

[What I find most dissatisfying about being a LCol is] the lack of opportunity to progress, equitably, in rank, regardless of performance and potential ratings and regardless of available positions at the next rank level for which I am more than qualified.

Many participants expressed particular concern about the promotion criteria used in the promotion system. As discussed earlier, much of the dissatisfaction involving promotion criteria pertained to the second language and education criteria. One of the major recurrent themes was a concern that academics and second language training (i.e., “potential”) are considered more important than command or previous experience or “performance:”

That shift to more and more weight for potential gets back into that who's on the list, who's not on the list, because oh what's your gut feel, and what's this person's potential, not can they do the job, do you think they'll be able to do the job and I don't know, I'm not that in favour of this shift. I think we got 40% for potential now which is a fair chunk of the weight.

Similarly, the participant quoted below feels that after a certain point, performance and previous experience is irrelevant in the promotion system, and that the only things that are important are the check-in-the-box discriminators:

If you've made it to the point that files are being considered, then performance is now rendered irrelevant. Previous experiences are rendered irrelevant. The only thing you can then use are check-in-the-box discriminators [such as bilingualism and academic degrees].

The participant quoted below disagrees with the promotion criteria (the “rules”), but nevertheless feels that the promotion system is a good one, because it manages to rank people according to the criteria, rather than in contradiction to the criteria:

My personal feeling is that our PER system is pretty good. It gets people to within a rank of probably where they should be under the rules of the system. I'm not saying the rules of the system are good. But the PER system does get people to within a rank, I would say, of where they should be, one higher, one lower, depending on circumstances. But I have

a lot of faith in the system, not in the rules that back the system. ...How the PER is structured, what they consider important, I don't necessarily agree with (name of other participant). ... If you accept the criterion, down where the bullets are, and in potential, if you accept those as criteria, then the system measures those criteria well.

Some participants were frustrated because they felt that promotion criteria frequently change, or are too dependent on personality or the person performing the evaluation:

The process changes from year to year. ... The merit boards are not always looking at the same thing and that's one of these, you know, language is important. Well by the time you get your numbers, language isn't important anymore, it's undergraduate degree. And by the time you get that, that's not important anymore. It's that you've done an A-job. It just keeps changing and changing and changing.

And it goes back to personality and perception.

Some participants were frustrated because they felt that other contributions not related to promotion are not recognized:

I feel that I have no further progression, but I have a lot to offer the Army, and I don't feel that the "system" recognizes that.

Some participants criticized what they perceived as “ageist” promotion criteria, which, according to their perspective, defines an older person as automatically lacking potential:

When you say you've got potential, it means you're young, right? If you're 45 against a 25-year old, you've got less potential. Only because you're older, not because you've done the same courses. ... When you say the guy lacks potential, it's because he's older, right? I've got old Captains working for me. They're outstanding guys. ...There's no way you can suggest that they couldn't do the job at the next rank, but do they have the time left to be CDS? Well, that's not their fault, quite frankly, but the system compels you to say that there's a lack a bit of potential. I think that's crap.

And it was linked to age as well. You know, from a certain rank, at a certain age, so some people saw the writing on the wall and bailed. (And by the way, many of them have done very well elsewhere.)

Other participants also raised issues related to age and promotion. Some expressed the concern that the current promotion system bypasses or ignores late developers, because in order to get promoted to a higher rank and to get the right opportunities (A-jobs), one must be selected early in one's career (e.g., through the tier system). Those individuals who get selected early and are then put on the fast track to promotion were referred to as “streamers” by some participants. The following conversation between two focus group participants (P1 and P2) focuses on streamers:

P1: These young officers are in streamer positions and it's hard to teach them. ... Streamers are the individuals that perform better than others and are put in the fast track. Their career progression is faster in order for them to reach high level positions. I have nothing against this practice otherwise we would end up with a 75-year old CDS and that's not what we want.

P2: I think the problem lies in the fact that some individuals that have a rapid career progression think they know it all when they really don't. There are streamers who get to learn what they need and gain sufficient experience to perform well in these high positions. I wouldn't say that there are more streamers with insufficient knowledge and experience but it's almost split half and half. ... But oftentimes these individuals climb the hierarchy quickly only to stop and wait once they make it to higher level positions. I think it's alright to push individuals up the hierarchy but... Is it really necessary to push these members up the ladder this early in their career, or [would] we be better off having them gain more experience?

A similar theme about the dangers of pushing individuals up the hierarchy too early is expressed by the participant quoted below:

How do you tell a Lieutenant that he's going to be Chief of Defence Staff or not? And how do you tell a Major that? Jeez, they're still kids! ... If you follow that succession planning logic...telling people sooner rather than later, I mean, there is a point where you're still allowed to learn, you're still supposed to be making mistakes. ... Now, it's like a zero-defect game, and choosing your top 5% when they're Lieutenants and Captains in units? Man, that's immensely tough.

Conversely, some participants felt that individuals should be groomed, or identified early, when they are young, so as to identify a career path for them:

But if you're going to groom a guy, groom him when he's young. Don't wait till he's a full Colonel, then you realize he's got no French profile and then you send him on an emergency course?

They should be able to identify whether a candidate is a level one, two, three or four. ... A level one candidate will become CDS. They are starting to do so, but they must start doing this early in an individual's career. An individual should know exactly where he is heading. Someone should tell him that if he wants to go a certain way, this is what he should do. If you keep doing what you are doing, this is where you will be heading. This way, career managers and the individuals should be able to determine a career path.

In summary, numerous promotion-related issues were articulated by participants as sources of dissatisfaction or frustration in this study. These included frustrations with the second language requirement for promotion, academic requirements, and command or A-job requirements; workload issues associated with striving for promotion and the effects on the family; concerns about the ASPP and the regimental influence on promotion decisions; concerns about future changes to the promotion system; and other promotion-related issues, such as concerns about promotion criteria (lack of transparency, elements of subjectivity, ageism, etc.). Clearly, dissatisfaction with the promotion system emerged as a major theme in this study.

Leadership Issues

Although most of the discourse regarding dissatisfiers at the LCol rank focused on promotion issues, a number of leadership-oriented dissatisfiers also were identified in the focus groups and written responses.

Quality of Leadership. One major category of dissatisfaction in this area pertained to the quality of the leadership received from senior officers or upper management. Several participants expressed dissatisfaction in relation to a perceived “culture of micromanagement” in the Army/CF, and along with this, a perceived lack of power or agency among LCol:

[Am I feeling pretty micro-managed?] Oh, yeah. Everything from personnel policies, to operational decisions, to my own calendar.

...Quite frankly, the very top today is telling us what we're doing with individual soldiers. Right, they're not saying...all the way down through the chain to a commanding officer, 'here's a task, you determine what needs to fill it.' They are saying, 'either send that soldier, or this company, by name, is the one that's going to go do the task.' So...that's the kind of micro-planning that's going on.

It's also frustrating when they give you a task to do but don't let you carry it out the way you want to. When you give me a task, give me the tools to do it and I will do so, but don't tell me halfway what I should and shouldn't be doing.

Some participants, such as the two quoted below, contrasted the risk-averse, mission-directive, micromanagement culture that they perceive exists within the Army with the doctrine of mission command that is supposed to characterize the Army organization:

The most dissatisfying part of being a LCol, and being in command, is the dichotomy. As a CO and as a LCol, I have been entrusted with a wide range of powers and authorities. In my current job I have also been entrusted with a significant budget... With my years of experience, knowledge and professional development I expect to be able to use my judgment in the conduct of my duties, and the careful stewardship of my people and resources. Yet I often feel like a junior officer, with my decisions and actions being questioned, or in many cases receiving specific direction on how to carry out tasks. Despite working in an environment that is supposed to be 'Mission Command' (tell us what needs to be accomplished, and give me the resources to do it, and let me determine how to do the job), I am clearly working in a risk adverse, 'Mission Directive' atmosphere. Mission Command only appears to be done when the Commander has no time to think the problem out in detail, and then little thought is given to resources required.

As it stands, freedom of action is constantly reduced. It is based on high level risk management.

Similarly, the participant quoted below describes a CO as living in a fishbowl, with little freedom to move:

And, you know, in the spirit of mission command, here's the intent, here's where we're going. There's your unit, get on with it. Yet, ...[COs are] still observed to such a standard. It's like a unit CO living in a fishbowl where the Army commander is going to or the bureaucracy above that level will not let him use mission command, will not let him have the freedom to move.

One participant described the micromanagement culture as akin to a marionette show:

But there also seems to be an awful lot [of Generals or Full Colonels] who are almost like marionettes and dance to the tune from the politicians through to...whoever is pulling the strings at the top and they're dancing to it. And they're going to make everyone below them dance because they have to dance, or feel they have to.

Participants often associated the culture of micromanagement with too much decision-making power given to staff officers:

We have a doctrine of mission command, but we have a culture of micro-management from the staff.

[What I find most dissatisfying about being a LCol is] that the system, staff officers at the strategic and operational level, tend to question decisions made by COs and sometimes try to quash them. They have no authority as they are advisors who should only make recommendations not decisions. Decisions and direction must come from leaders in the chain of command only. Clearly in the past, COs had much more power and since the '90s our powers and responsibilities have decreased while those of staff have increased!

Indeed, several participants reported feeling frustrated by a lack of power or agency at the LCol rank. Some participants felt that they had more power as a Major than as a LCol, or that staff officers have more power than COs. The participant quoted below, for example, feels that his job as a CO is simply to follow orders.

To me personally the most unsatisfying thing is [the] lack of agency, for my rank and experience and position. My experience ...as a Major, I had far more greater agency as a Major, far more influence on strategic thinking, far more access to General Officers than I do as a Commanding Officer. In fact there are many times as a Commanding Officer I feel my job is simply to shut up and colour...within the lines. ... The agency that we have as staff officers is far greater than we have as commanders in general, in my opinion.

The participant quoted below feels that far from being “empowered,” he possesses very little power and that power in the organization is kept at the highest levels:

They tell us that we are going to be "empowered," but we are not. One of the questions I asked this week or last week was: "As acting, what are my powers?" I have none. I don't have additional powers. I can't sign anything. I can sign on behalf of the boss, big deal. What are my disciplinary powers, my financial powers, and my administrative powers? I don't have any. They're not delegated. It's kept at higher levels.

The participant quoted below describes what he perceives to be a “top-down approach” regarding Army training and the limited input that he feels he has in regard to identifying resource needs. He feels that he has little freedom to voice his perspective:

There's a top-down approach prescribing training to us, without us having enough say to come back and say, we need that but we need this too, and I should be resourced for this. *My perspective on training.*

Similarly, the participant quoted below reports that, as a CO, he has never been asked his opinion of a specific Army initiative (i.e., the Army Support Review):

As a commanding officer, I have never been asked my opinion or my input into the [Army Support Review] process. I've never been given a briefing by a Commander on the review process in the chain of command. I have been expected to post soldiers out, without argument, post soldiers in, and rearrange and reorganize in accordance with this review process. I have no agency to put my input in.

Indeed, several participants expressed frustration at the perception of not being listened to, or of not being asked for their opinion:

You know, and you think after 32 years of service people should at least listen to you or consult you. Zero.

You know, we're considered the pointy end and know best what's working down here at our level and yet very few people seem to seek our input before a decision is made on something that impacts us. We're then told to implement this decision made by higher but oh, by the way, nobody really asked us what our thoughts were to start with.

I find a lot of the frustration is providing what we think is good advice and not having it followed. ... We think we've got the best idea or at least a reasonable idea on how to proceed forward, and we offer that and it's...an incredible effort to try and get anybody to move on it, or to believe you...

What we are looking for in the end is getting sufficient leeway in order to analyse a situation and put forward recommendations. And we expect that these recommendations will be taken into consideration. We don't expect our recommendations to be taken word for word but rather considered in the high scheme. That is what is most important. [And that isn't always the case...] It's probably the most frustrating part at our level [when your recommendations aren't taken into consideration].

The participant quoted below feels that while LColts are often heard by senior officers (the "adults"), they are often not listened to, and therefore have limited influence:

At the rank of LCol, you always have hope that you are able to influence the decisions of the seniors, the 'adults' as we call them. ... You always hope and think that they listen to you. You think that the work you submit, the opinions you issue are listened to. But they are often only heard. Do they listen? I believe that there is a difference to be made between the terms listening and hearing. We are often heard, but are we often listened to? Are we understood? I think that's another story.

The same participant quoted above went on to say that only the most senior officers at the highest levels will listen, while senior officers at the lower levels will not:

Depending on the level on which you interact with them, you will get different results. The senior levels (BGen and above) listen to us and take into consideration what we tell them. But the lower levels (Maj-LCol-Col) hear us. They do not listen. There were several opportunities this year...where we told them: "Don't do this, do not include this in the report." But the report was sent up the chain, without any modifications. I find this frustrating. ... Our peers will listen to us on these matters. Nevertheless, there are situations, as stated earlier, where subordinates of our peers and supervisors will disregard our recommendations and send the documentation up the chain of command.

The LCol quoted below is frustrated both at not being listened to and at not feeling free to question decisions of staff officers:

[What I find most dissatisfying about being a LCol is the] fact that area and Army headquarters do not pay attention to our opinions and observations when they ask for it. We have experience, we (LCol) were commanding combat units, and we are in direct contact with our troops and yet, we can't argue or question decisions. Everything is planned and decided by staff officers who, for the most part have never been in command of an Army unit.

In summary, many of the LCol in this study feel that they work in a culture of micromanagement that does not take into consideration their extensive experience. Many feel that they had more power and agency as a Major and that this significantly detracts from their ability to command.

Feel Free to Question Superiors? Because it arose as an issue in *The Army Climate and Culture Survey*, participants were asked specifically whether or not they felt free to question the decisions of superiors, and few responded with an unqualified yes (or no). Most participants gave a somewhat mixed response, or qualified their response in some way. When asked whether he feels free to question the decisions of superiors, the participant quoted below, for example, reported feeling free to “clarify,” but not to “question:”

Question is a strong word... not really. All we can do is clarify a topic. Sometimes, if you bring up something important you can influence their decision.

Similarly, the participant quoted below prefers to use the term “discussion” when asked if he feels free to question superiors. Further, he feels that this “discussion” must be done with the right tone:

Yes [I feel free to question superiors], if I believe there is an issue. But questioning must always be done with the right tone and I prefer to use the term "discussion" as, at the end of the day, orders are orders and the mission is paramount.

The participant quoted below reported feeling free to question his superiors, but only in order to validate their decisions:

I feel free to engage my superiors with questions to validate their decisions, and to point out complexities or concerns.

The participant quoted below, who is not currently in an operational position, reported feeling free to be vocal, but attributed this sense of freedom to not being on the path to promotion:

We're not considered operational, therefore, you know, we're not as concerned about the next great PER to try and get the next best job because we ended up, by choice, where we are, like what we do, and are willing to stay there. So, I think that allows us to maybe be a bit more vocal and not have to worry about that loyalty button being pushed.

Similarly, the participant quoted below feels free to question his superiors' decisions, but tries to do it in a “smart way,” and is not on the promotion track:

Yes I do [feel free to question my superiors' decisions]. I try to do it in a smart way. ... I feel I can ask him anything I want. If I was still trying to make it to the next level, I would probably do what I used to do, which is to shut up and do as I am told.

In contrast, the participant quoted below reported feeling limited in his ability to question some superiors; more specifically, those who may perceive the question as a challenge to their authority. Yet, this same individual reported that other commanders are open to people questioning their decisions, and linked this to their overall level of maturity:

So maybe it's a matter of personality in the current environment, but even in my last job I felt limited. It's like you're challenging their authority. See, a mature commander, I had a Chief of Staff I could go to. I called him the calm, cool, collected [guy]. ... This guy? Never a problem. What's the problem, let's talk about it. This is what I do, this is how I am handling this file, you're good, get on with it. See that was really enjoyable.

Similarly, the participant quoted below reported that feeling free to question superiors depends on the personality of the individual superior:

Depends totally on the personality of the superior and the command climate they create. I have experienced healthy, open and collegial relations as well as a menacing atmosphere in which questioning was clearly unwanted and suspect. My feeling is that there is less of the latter today.

The participant quoted below also reported that feeling free to question superiors depends on the individual superior. He also felt that some superiors will react negatively to being challenged no matter how much tact or care is used, but he always felt good about expressing his opinion and concerns to superiors, regardless of the outcome:

I think it all depends on your superior. You have to be tactful in order not to challenge your superior in front of your peers, but some will not accept it even if you are tactful. When I look at my experience, there have been times where I didn't have a problem expressing my dissatisfaction or my opinions on a particular topic, but other times I had to be very careful in doing so. Even then, some people took it the wrong way. No matter what the turnout, I was pleased when I had expressed my concerns or opinions.

Some participants reported feeling able to question their direct superiors, but unable to question those higher up in the chain of command. Below is an excerpt from a focus group in which two participants are discussing the risk of being labeled a "whiner" if one questions or complains about the decisions of "higher ups":

P1: Well, our boss always listens to us. You know, we can bitch all we want to him and offer our suggestions, but it goes back to...how far up do they listen that week. You know, well you can vent and feel good about it, but in the end you're still told to get on it.

P2: Yeah. And that's a very good point because at the end of it...you get labeled up the food chain somewhere, you know, so and so, the whiner from [location]. Here he is once again complaining about something.

The participant quoted below reported feeling free to question his direct commander, and reported doing so regularly, but wondered whether or not his input might be filtered in some way by staff officers:

I feel free to question my direct commander, but...I often feel that input from subordinate commanders is filtered by the staff so that it seldom is presented as intended nor understood as intended by the CLS [Chief of the Land Staff].

The same participant quoted above reported that his input has not been welcomed, but grudgingly accepted:

My input has not been welcomed, although it has grudgingly been accepted after a battle with staff of over a year.

The participant quoted below reported feeling free to question superiors, but has found that questioning rarely changes the superior's decision:

Definitely, especially as I've become as old or older than they are, including the CWOs and MWOs that surround me. However, this is not the issue. I've found that the questioning rarely sways the foregoing decision. At least one's "marker" is on the table.

Several participants (about 10) reported feeling free to question superiors without qualification. Below are a few quotations to illustrate:

Absolutely [I feel free to question superiors].

Always.

Yes, they are open to questions and observations.

On the other hand, a smaller number (about 3) of participants felt absolutely unable to question their superiors, as illustrated by the quotation below:

No [I do not feel free to question superiors]. If my point of view is contrary to a course of action that he has already decided, then it is clear that he has no interest in my point of view or suggestions. This happens even in the formative stages of a course of action, and even behind closed doors. His reaction to any contrary point of view has stifled any urges on my part to raise any issues. I attempt to get on with the plan, for better or worse.

In summary, feeling free to question superiors is a difficult area. It may be influenced by the personality or the "maturity" of the superior, or by whether the LCol is perceived by higher-ups as a "whiner". Several participants felt that any questioning of superiors had to be done tactfully, carefully, or in just the right tone. Some participants only felt comfortable questioning superiors if they were not also concerned about promotion. While several participants reported feeling completely free to question superiors, a few felt absolutely unable to do so.

Transformational vs. Transactional Leadership. Participants were also asked whether or not they felt that leadership from above was *transformational* or *transactional*. As we noted earlier, transformational leaders inspire followers by providing a vision and developing an organizational culture that stimulates high performance; they transmit a sense of mission,

promote learning experiences, and inspire new and creative ways of thinking in followers, as well as playing a mentoring or coaching role. Transactional leadership works on an exchange principle, such as exchanging money or praise for good work, loyalty and commitment.

Once again, most participants gave a mixed or qualified response, in that most felt that both transformational and transactional leadership was present in the Army. The participant quoted below felt that while some transformational leadership can be seen at the top of the CF, most senior officers are transactional leaders:

It depends on the individual. I can see elements of transformational leadership right at the top, [but] there is a preponderance of transactional leadership. ... Senior leadership has to get out more and talk to the troops and explain the vision.

Similarly, the participant quoted below feels that transactional leadership is the default leadership style in the CF, and that while there are many transformational senior officers, transformational leadership has not been institutionalized:

Transactional leadership is the default of an organization like DND and the CF. ... There are many generals who are out there are transformational leaders, too. But it isn't institutionalized, and it takes one transactional leader to screw the whole thing up.

Other participants also perceived transformational leadership only at the most senior levels of the CF:

From Colonels, mostly transactional. From Generals, it appears more transformational, although I have rarely worked directly for one.

Personally, I would characterize the leadership of my immediate supervisor as transactional. As for the seniors, they demonstrate more transformational leadership. But that's my perception.

The very few transformational leaders that I have served under have normally won my lasting respect and loyalty. Unfortunately, until very recently, the Canadian Army did not do much to produce transformational leaders at the senior levels. ... The typical Canadian General Officer in my experience is a well-meaning but colourless, unemotional bureaucrat who is usually stingy with praise and reward, and has very weak personality projection (atrociously so in some cases...). This has, however, begun to change for the better in the last few years. The current CDS is an excellent example of how good we can be.

On the other hand, the participant quoted below felt that at the very top level of the CF (the Chief of the Defence Staff, or CDS), transformational leadership was only partially present, in that it lacks the coaching element.

The CDS wants to fix the Force, grow the Force, and you can't. I don't know what his reasoning is, but this whole thing needs a reality check. ...The vision is there, the innovation is there, is it good, has it been thought through? Hopefully. Inspiration in part is there. And the coaching? Not there.

On the other hand, the participant quoted below feels that his direct supervisor is transformational, but perceives less transformational leadership as one proceeds up the leadership hierarchy:

I mean, certainly from my direct supervisor, I'd say he's quite transformational. As you start to go higher than that, then it's transactional. It is very much a 'either you're with me or you're against me' sort of thing, and you know, if you're an obstructionist, you're being contrary-minded, it is viewed as being disloyal.

According to one participant, quoted below, transformational leadership can turn quickly into transactional leadership if the leader's will is met with resistance from subordinates:

But quite often it's transformational first, and then quickly changes to transactional if you don't get that immediate buy-in. And I think there is an awful lot of trying to educate you, get you onside, but very quickly, if that's not working, it goes back to Plan B, and okay, either you're part of the program, or you might as well get out.

Other participants felt that leadership from above was mostly (and increasingly) transformational, and spoke more positively, and in a less qualified fashion, about the current state of Army leadership:

Well, certainly [transformational leadership is] in all of these new leadership manuals that are out there and I was quite surprised actually to see it all in there. You can almost say we've borrowed a couple of chapters out of some civilian management manuals and things like that and we've put them out there. I think it's refreshing and especially with some of the commanders that we have today. I mean, the present CDS is quite dynamic, inspirational, and it's a nice change. So are we using it? I think people are trying.

I'm pretty comfortable that we're seeing a lot more of the transformational approach... I think you can have personalities in there, but I think at the end of the day, we start to see a lot more of that. I'd say certainly having been a staff guy as a LCol, too, I see that a lot more than maybe transactional aspects of, you know, you have to get certain things accomplished, and very output-driven. You got to get this and this and this done. Whereas here you got a brigade commander perhaps who is selling the vision and inspiring you to get on with something.

The Army leadership has evolved greatly over the last ten years and our operational experience is starting to pay dividends. The majority of the senior leadership tends to be transformational leaders. It is nice to see our leaders not only trust us more but encourage us to use our initiative and take more risk! In the past, I would categorize a majority of our leaders as careerists who were risk adverse and micromanagers. We have come a long way!!!!

The bosses I have now (area commander and brigade commander) use a transformational leadership style. The way they present their long-term plans, mission plans and objectives is stimulating. The goals are attainable and agree with our primary mandate, which is to have troops trained and ready to deploy for their country.

[I receive mostly transformational leadership from superiors.] My boss is fully supportive of new ways of thinking and creative solutions to problems.

In contrast, other participants perceived current leadership in the chain of command as mostly transactional:

I certainly, in the last year in command, I've received a couple of pieces of correspondence which has strictly been transactional leadership, no question about it. In fact I wanted to stand up to attention while I read the letter from one of our senior officers where it was sort of towing it his way and no other way and ...[it] was not open for discussion and that if we were to discuss things it was to be seen as disloyal...

It is clear to me that I work in a transactional leadership environment. ...I am tasked in a specific manner, leaving me very little freedom to either select an approach, or to even demonstrate that I might have an approach that I have created. The Commander works steadily on providing rewards..., but at the same time does not attempt, in my point of view, to provide a rewarding atmosphere. I am expected to do more work with fewer resources, despite the cost of business, and the expectations or requirements going up.

Similarly, the participants quoted below feel that the current army cultural system does not encourage transformational leadership, and that it rewards transactional leadership:

Transformational leadership relates in some ways to the mission command philosophy (i.e., empowerment, accountability, etc.). The Army at this time does not have this state of mind. In order to make a change such as this, individuals should...incorporate these concepts in their speeches and should constantly self-examine their actions. We can't simply talk about change and expect it to happen on its own. We have to work at it and be intellectually disciplined. We are not doing this right now. ... I believe that the system is not set-up to be transformational. The political side of things has a lot to do with it.

...Our system has always rewarded transactional leaders and continues to do so. If we don't put real effort into changing the system, nothing will change. We have to start rewarding people for the right things. Here is an example: It is said that the Canadian soldiers are some of [the] best-trained soldiers in the world. ... Nevertheless, our pre-deployment training periods are getting longer and more intense [and] we are having operational tempo problems because we ask too much of our people. ... If our soldiers are that good, why don't we simply add on to their basic training and reduce their pre-deployment training? ... Not only don't we do this, but we reward commanders for giving extensive training to their unit by giving them a good PER and a promotion. ... Things will not change! We keep rewarding behaviours we want to get rid of.

Finally, a few participants felt that current Army leadership was neither transformational nor transactional, but that current Army leadership was inadequate or reactionary; or, they did not perceive the constructs of transformational and transactional leadership to be valid. The participant below, for example, feels that transformational leadership represents nothing new, but simply good sound leadership, and that we need only look to historical examples of good sound leadership, not trendy (civilianized) buzz words:

I think one of the things that really bothers me is this trendy crap that we're pumping. When you start scratching through a bunch of the new high glossy stuff which we're selling, what is wonderful about it is you go back to articles written by General Fallud at the end of the Second World War in India and find the principles that are being espoused

for huge sums of money, sadly to us, by civilian companies who have managed to repackage it. Transformational leadership, to be honest with you, I think is a lot of crap. It's good, sound, traditional leadership. The successful leaders who looked after their soldiers and ensured that those people did what they needed to do when they did it and were looked after appropriately have always been there. And we've just decided to name it something different. We've also put it in PERs. You know, leading change as an assessment [criterion]. What kind of crap is that? It's our job to lead and if change is an element of that, that's fine. So we've mixed things, we've civilianized stuff, which I find personally offensive. We've trendied a bunch of things which again, I find personally offensive because if any organization must be rather conservative, we must. Change is a part of it but we need to maintain a certain degree of conservatism to ensure that we can act appropriately for the nation, for the interests of the nation.

The participants quoted below feel that current Army leadership is neither transformational nor transactional; they describe their senior leadership in various ways, ranging from neutral to terrible (e.g., false, careerist):

Neither - what I see is false leadership at the next rank level. The impression that I am left with is a firm desire at the next rank level to reach General Officer rank, whatever the cost.

I would say my boss is the same rank and junior. He's a nice guy, but I wouldn't say he's doing either right now. He's leading, but you know, neither good nor bad.

I am physically separated from my boss... . Although I greatly respect him and know that he cares about the soldiers in my unit, he has had little opportunity to exercise personal influence since taking Command... Most of my work and direction comes directly from ...Ottawa... Direction has been exceptionally poor; the attitude with respect to my soldiers seemingly callous, with seemingly no hope for the future. The leadership situation has been terrible and has had a profoundly negative impact on me and all of my soldiers.

I have seen precious few transformational leaders in my career and this includes immediate past and present superiors and the one above them. By the same token, I haven't seen much transactional leadership either (i.e., overall a lack of fundamental leadership at the Col rank in the last two that I have worked for). I just marvel at how others get promoted, noting that both my current and previous superiors were non-operational, air force officers, nice people but generally inept at leading personnel.

In summary, participants perceived a wide variety of leadership styles among senior officers in the Army/CF. While it is recognized by some that transformational styles are preferred (and can have a lasting influence), most LCol's in this study appear to be experiencing transactional leadership more often than they should.

Other Leadership Issues. In addition to issues of micromanagement, a lack of agency and voice, and transformational versus transactional styles of leadership, participants also were frustrated with other aspects of the leadership of superior officers. For example, some participants felt that senior officers were so overworked and distracted by trivial issues, that their ability to lead was compromised:

Our senior leaders are so distracted with bullshit every day they have only minutes to "think" about what they should think about.

... Our commanders are so busy at the higher levels that they rely heavily on their staff to be the ones that sort all this out, and their ability to actually command, I think, is less.

Some participants felt that their leaders did not give enough positive feedback to subordinates for a job well done:

I think you reach this rank as a LCol and people assume well, okay, you're there, you're sort of the senior middle management, therefore you don't really need much guidance, much leadership, and...they tend to just leave you alone. Whereas sometimes...you still need... that motivation and that little pat on the back ...

Similarly, some participants felt that their leaders were too remote or detached:

Distant. They are too busy to provide good oversight and leadership.

As opposed to leaving their cubicle and coming for a little visit and stuff, you have to fill these incessant little updates and sit reps. Every week you have to fill out what you've accomplished that week so you can give it to your leadership, so they can see sort of how things are going. Well, how about you come over and maybe have a coffee or have a visit, and it just drives me nuts!

Some felt that leaders had unrealistic expectations due to their detachment, or inadequate situation awareness:

Completely unrealistic expectations from a seemingly detached leadership are also a dissatisfier.

Some participants also criticized superior officers for being careerist, as evident in the participants quoted below:

...careerism, I think, is still a problem. You know, superior officers ... you can tell. ... And when you work for a CO that wants to go up, it's easy to see. Whenever there's a visitor of higher rank it's the whole ka-bang. When they do meet-and-greets, you can tell it's just a tick-in-the-box. They're not really interested in you or your family. It's just, they have to go through it because a Commandant goes through it. ...And that has been the case for a few Commandants or higher superior officers that I've [had].

In a similar vein, some participants criticized senior leaders for possessing a low level of command maturity (which they sometimes associated with micromanagement):

The other problem is command maturity in the Canadian Army. I don't know how to fix that but it's not just inexperience, it's maturity in command. The problem with this is that it has an impact on many other things. I find. ...Commanders don't command long enough so that...they go in for 2 years, they make their mark, they want to impress everybody and go. If that same commander would stay there for 4 years or 5 years, ... you'll end up with more mature commanders.

A mature commander doesn't get excited with nothing. Area level, if an Army council comes up, if there's a big commander conference comes up, the staff prepares the work...and the conference takes place, everybody's happy. And he would mention, if you want to go home at three o'clock, and you've got nothing to do, go home. On the opposite, and I would qualify the other commander as a micromanager, tied with careerism, command maturity, when you have a staff officer who commands like a staff officer, everybody is stressed out. Before every Army council, briefing notes on everything, and the Army councils then were every 2 months. So you spend 3, 4 days preparing, phoning, you're stressed out for this Army council and when the commander comes back he wants to pass that on to his subordinates. So, big commander conference, briefings, like you would spend 2 weeks worth of work preparing something that, in comparison to the previous commanders who I thought was more mature. ... [Command maturity has to do with] the degree of reaction to events...willing[ness] to take a few risks, toler[ate] maybe a few mistakes...

Some participant felt that their leaders were utilizing a tactical rather than strategic leadership strategy, inappropriately so:

...You've got an executive level now that wants to work on tactical time. And they think that all this stuff can get done in a weekend and why aren't we getting this fixed by Christmas and why don't you get in the back of the truck and shut the 'f' up, sort of thing. So, there's this tactical mentality amongst the strategic leaders...that is just plain wrong. ... Guys who make snap leadership choices, and the snap stuff is more suited to tactical level quite frankly. So in this headquarters right now, you see it all the time where you got these executives who think, ah, we'll just get it done by the weekend. You know, work harder guys. What's up with that? I mean, there is a school of thought that...there are some things the Generals don't need to know, right? I mean, does he need to know the colour of the socks? ...I mean they should be thinking bigger issues.

Our strategic HQ is focusing too much on the tactical aspects. All of this is done based on a risk management perspective and concerns about what Members of Parliament would say if something falls into the hands of the media.

A few participants felt belittled or demeaned by their superior officers and, in general, perceived a lack of respect and recognition for their efforts from their leadership:

Lack of recognition of the super-human effort required to continually make something out of nothing is a major dissatisfier. Lack of respect for one's professionalism is also a fundamental dissatisfier.

Being threatened by a supervisor, being belittled and demeaned by a supervisor, being supervised by someone who has no apparent interest in my job, but uses me to help his/her job at my expense.

Even the weak performers...and they want to do their best, and...you have to respect that. And that's another thing I don't see all the time, respect, for the number of years, and I would respect people. ... People have ambition and they want to succeed, and for a person to say, no, you're no good and you're not going to make a career in the Army, you

have to be pretty certain. So, and I think some superior officers are so focused on their own career they forget the basic values.

A few participants felt that in some respects, the “information age” was having a negative impact on leadership, for example, by distracting leaders from the job of leadership, by engineering the overload of useless information, and by creating work for others on trivial issues.

I mean, part of it is the information age, right? I mean the e-mail is a curse and anyone can send an e-mail to anybody and...you dare not leave your workstation alone because someone will come in and send an e-mail to the CDS! Yeah! But, you know, you go, you travel, you come back, you got 250 e-mails. You're brought to your knees for 2 days answering some of these things and whether it's the...server is shutting down in 2 hours, or...there's a...hockey game, come join the team, you still have to read it and decide it's trash, right? So, you know, we won the Cold War without e-mail? ...We actually did some good, World War II was won without all this stuff. ... How could we be so successful in the past without all this technology stuff? So, I'm not convinced that some of these tools that we use now are actually making it better, and that...means then if you're sitting at your workstation you have to feed the beast. The General has a question about [something]...he didn't like the last sentence of a briefing note and he wants to know when we're going to do a trial. Okay well, all right, drop everything, the General wants it, okay, but that takes an hour-ish to sort some of these things out. And it isn't that it's taking the people who have to respond to that away from moving a major equipment project forward that takes 10 years to deliver, right?

Some participants linked senior leaders' need for information to micromanagement, and a lack of real communication with subordinates, as seen in the conversation quoted below:

P1: And maybe that creeps in this idea of micromanagement there. Their drive to know, the accessibility to technology and this becomes their ability to penetrate down the levels and ask these questions easier now than ever before and it's convenient for them. And for whatever reason the executive level likes to do that. It does present a bottleneck.

P2: And this also links in with this getting the Generals out of the office. It's too easy for them to sit and send an e-mail because it's less time consuming. ... They can send you an e-mail in 30 seconds. Whereas to get out of their office to walk down, they would get the answer to the question but there would also be some other discussions so they'd lose 10 minutes rather than 30 seconds, and therefore they can annoy a lot more people and bother a lot more people with these 30-second bullets than they would if they got out of the office. But if they got out of the office, they'd know what's going on in more detail and it's a destructive cycle. It's almost like...Generals should not be allowed to have computers in their office. They should be torn out because it distracts them from doing their real job, which is leadership.

In summary, participants spoke of a number of sources of dissatisfaction or frustration that involved leadership issues, including leader detachment, lack of effective communication and command maturity, careerism, and lack of strategic leadership.

Other Organizational Issues

Participants also conveyed a number of other organizational sources of dissatisfaction. Some participants felt that the CF is not a learning organization, but rather a results-driven, bureaucratic, top-down organization that values efficiency over effectiveness and in which decisions are staff-driven rather than command-driven.

But this idea of a learning institution, I mean that's crap. I mean we are still results-driven, we are still a zero-fault game here, zero defect sort of effort.

By learning organization, we mean an organization that recognizes that people learn from their mistakes. ... The problem is that the CF has been talking about them for 10 years now and nothing [has] happened.

I'm not happy with the level of bureaucracy within the department. We say we want to empower people, we want to do things better, we want to do things quicker, but then at the same time, all of the various different components within the department seem to set up their own little bureaucracies and you have to go through dozens and dozens of different agencies to get anything done, and I think our internal bureaucracy is getting worse rather than improving.

Unfortunately, the structure used to promote long-term plans and missions is bureaucratic and arduous. To sum it up, there is a strong will to get things done the right way, but guidelines and too much paperwork get in the way.

There's a top-down approach prescribing training to us, without us having enough say to come back and say, we need that, but we need this too.

...Basically, everybody that controls the resources you get and when you get them and how you get them, it's driven by staff...

My number one frustration as a CO is the staff-driven decisions, not command-driven decisions that we're often left to deal with.

...Way too much frustration is felt at the staff level where moving issues is like running through Jell-O.

Staff officers have too much power and are not in touch with reality.

...As a commanding officer you know your soldiers. You know what drives them, you know them personally, you know their situation, and if something comes up where...they need to be released or there needs to be something else take place, you know, someone in the bureaucracy at a staff level, often junior in rank to you, nowhere physically located close to you, second-guessing the recommendations that you've made and telling you, well we think that you should go in this direction with this. And your hands are tied at that time. That's very frustrating. ... We make our recommendations based on the powers that have been granted to us, but often they're trumped by the bureaucracy...

It's the triumph of efficiency over effectiveness, of the MBAs over the military historians, if you will.

Several participants felt that Army culture is characterized by tribalism (both regimental and environmental) and "zero-risk tolerance," and that the culture change required for mission command has not yet occurred.

...What is hindering [change] is continued support and sustainment of some very tribal elements...which is hugely frustrating because we need to make some, it's an old term, I guess, smash a few eggs and get on with a few things, but because we are continuing somehow to be sensitive about feelings or tribal issues, we are unwilling to move ahead.

...There is way too much parochialism and self-interest continuing to drive decisions and paralyze the organization.

Well, there seems to be zero-risk tolerance when it comes to making personnel decisions. Thus, it becomes centralized in NDHQ and with it becoming centralized it becomes inefficient, and it takes a large amount of time to process a lot of things. Of course, if you left the decision with the COs, sure mistakes will be made, but that's all part of risk acceptance.

Despite the current CDS' approach to "accept risk"...we remain "risk adverse".

...Probably in all the work we've done over the last few years to try and encourage the issues of the manoeuverist approach, and mission command, and all these things. We seem incapable corporately, to accept challenges to to use or open debate and discussion.

The cultural change [to support mission command] will never happen since we don't support it at a high level. Risk management still revolves around removing the person at fault and creating new policies preventing any other similar incidents from happening.

The participant quoted below felt that the early attrition of LCol's could in part be attributed to a lack of mission command, or micromanagement:

I see guys retiring out of positions in command. Packin' it in and actually, that's it, I'm done! ... And, you know, in the spirit of mission command, here's the intent, here's where we're going. There's your unit, get on with it. Yet, they're still observed to such a standard. ... I know guys that have turned down command for the same reason, saying, no, it's not what it used to be, I can't command the battalion, the Army's going to do it for me... I'm not left alone to train the way I want, to get ready the way I want.

CF/Army Transformation and other Organizational Processes and Structures. On a broader level, some participants expressed frustration with various organizational processes, structures, and systems, such as Whole Fleet Management, the Defence Management System, and CF transformation, or felt that there was too much organizational change and/or it was happening too quickly.

We've restricted so much how the units can actually do things...we have this whole fleet management [system] so they don't have all the equipment they need, really restricted training budgets, field time is limited, there isn't that much ammunition.

Well, there are mistakes along the way and that's normal. This has nothing to do with LCol's dissatisfaction levels. For example, we adopted the whole fleet management concept as a part of the Army's transformation that started 2 or 3 years ago. One aspect of the whole fleet management is to create a training pool at the brigade level, a training equipment pool on a national level at the Wainright training centre, a logistic stock, and an operational stock. We took some equipment away from the combat units in order to create these stocks. The idea behind all of this is fine, but there are unexpected drawbacks. For example, the rapid response unit for domestic operations now only have a third of their equipment. What are they supposed to do in terms of equipment in case of a deployment? One and a half years later we had to face this situation and only then did we deal with it. Inevitably, this type of change forces a mandatory redesign, but I don't see this as a big problem. If we have to push for things to change otherwise, we won't make it. The armed forces in general tend to favour a conservative approach. Therefore, if you want things to change rapidly, you have to push harder and you will certainly make mistakes along the way. These problems will be dealt with as we move along. This may cause people to work overtime, but that's not an issue specific to LCol's.

Defence Management System...that's the process we go through. You can make that work in about 4 or 5 years and it can be immensely successful. The long drawn out projects are because you have this internal debate. People don't understand the system...there's not coherent views between a series of Army Generals. It's immensely frustrating to have to work through that because that just adds time to the project and we're of course results-driven, we want these to deliver, but if you've got a 2-year debate going on into...how many anti-armour systems may or may not be purchased, man, that's soul-destroying.

I think that as a staff officer... certainly there are dissatisfiers because there's a lot of change. We're always talking about change and improving the way the Army functions and runs, and I think often the amount of change that we try to make happen in a short time span is counter productive, in that many of the issues that our staff officer is working on will never see the light of day. There's a lot of good work going on and a lot of staff officers, and I've been one, feel a level of frustration because they can't get decisions on what they're working on...they don't have a good sense of confidence that what they're working on will come to fruition.

Well, the Army is transforming according to its plan internally. Our CF resources, it's coming out of our hide. And...with all this change, what is our capacity to change? How much change can we sustain...are we capable of? So in my head, you see train wrecks and this and that, but we'll get there but it's not going to be pretty. And there's going to be a lot of carnage along the way.

And it's the pace of change that is part of the biggest challenge because we're changing before all the resources are there, so we're resource short, because the staff officers who are designing the change are on very tight timelines, and they're not being as consultative as we would like them to be.

Other participants also expressed concerns about Army and CF transformation, in particular about the implementation of transformation and the personnel being tasked to carry out the implementation:

We are in that very chaotic phase as an institution, and I'm talking about the CF as a whole, not just the Army, and I'm trying to figure out how we're going to transform, without derailing our effectiveness. And it's not easy. I have no answers.

We're going through this restructuring process and...we have actually less people to move projects forward now than ever before, and...you just can't even nearly respond to all these little issues that come along when you've got people who are making snap decisions.

And we've heard the CDS talk about fix, grow, transform. And from a sustainment-based perspective, you cannot fix unless you put resources into the sustainment base... So, there's a cost to transformation...

...With all this change and everything that's going on, we've got multiple organizations vying for the same asset, and that's usually our soldiers. You've got all your commitments here, which is to train your unit, you're fulfilling non-combatant evacuation operations, you're fulfilling DART commitments, you're fulfilling unit area Army national taskings as they come along, you're supporting Air Force requests for their trainings from time to time and vice versa. It's just, we had this big recruiting drive that isn't happening. There's no soldiers being pumped out of this 5000 that I can see anyway and we've got the same Sergeant and Warrant and basic soldier prepared to do five different things in any given day, and of course we're now generating, again, troops for overseas. So they want all this change to happen, but it's rob Peter to pay Paul, and hopefully we don't need to pay Peter back anytime soon.

When we're talking about transformation...in the Canadian Forces today, we're talking about needing guys up there who have got a head on their shoulder, and who are innovators. And what you find is that most of these people that are doing the innovating, aren't even qualified... We've got people that are sort of parachuted into positions...usually according to rank, and are about to do a job, and not that they're bad people necessarily, but you know, let's bring the skills along with the person to do the job properly.

...In order to satisfy this Chief of Defence Staff's transformation...he tends to be stripping out all the A-players.

Although some participants, such as the first participant quoted below, felt that they understood the relationship between Army and CF transformation, others, such as the second and third participants quoted below, were uncertain as to how Army transformation fits with CF transformation:

The Army began its transformation before the CF began theirs. The Army's transformation...focused on how to adapt a training structure to better prepare troops for operations. The CF transformation has just begun and has some common aspects with the changes in the Army, but focuses more on a higher-level command and control

framework. In essence, we are establishing Canada as an operational theatre. That's pretty much the ultimate goal of the CF transformation.

I have somewhat of a sense of where the Canadian Forces are going, and having heard some of...the CDS's comments about how we have to be more joint, both domestically and abroad and I absolutely agree with that. I do not have a good sense of how the Army's going to fit into this whole scheme.

And the Chief of Defence Staff's transformation is good. I could see it, it makes sense to me. Where, how the Army fits into that is a little bit more cloudy.

Further, although many felt that they understood the vision underlying Army Transformation, and many liked the vision and felt part of its implementation, many participants nevertheless expressed concerns about its implementation, as indicated in the quotations below:

You've got this strategic vision, which is brilliant, and that middle part of just operationalising it, which is painful.

I would say that the challenge we have is we have a great strategy for 15 or 20 years out, but the problem is, because we've torn the whole train set apart at the same time, and we're all trying to do operations at the same time, we have not taken the time to say...we need this to be implemented over the next 10 years and work back and say how it's going to happen so we all have a clear understanding. Instead it's, 'here's our 15-year vision, and here's what you're doing next week'. And because there is no clear line, we kind of meander back and forth through the months and the years, change this, move this. Because there is no middle-ground plan in my mind. Um, big picture is great, it's the execution piece that we have no clear visibility on how it affects us next week or next month or next year.

I understand the Army vision. I am part of its implementation. It's the manner of implementation that is often questionable as in my experience it has often been counter-productive.

I understand [the Army vision] but its implementation appears spotty and uncoordinated.

The participant quoted below was concerned that the vision lacked clarity and precision at the tactical, practical level:

I think in terms of conceptual framework, there's a lot there. It is to me a bit disconcerting when we were training at the tactical level, and utilizing concept papers as the primary references. ...Concepts are fine...for the higher levels, but at the lower levels you need manuals and a bit more, not quite as prescriptive as historically, but you still need guidance, you still need firm guidance that will help you ensure that when you are faced with the difficult, complex problems that you will be faced with, you'll have drills and skills that will help you respond appropriately because you don't have time for debate and you don't have time for open discussion, focus groups about whether or not you should go left or right. And that's where I see my greatest concern right now is that we have some wonderful fluff that sits there. ... You get concepts being presented as tactical level issues, which leave far too much flexibility and do not lend themselves to

precision. ... There is no singular, precise kind of theme, doctrinal framework in which to operate within. ... And that's where, for commanding officers, the challenges are right now, is balancing the conceptual image and the practical realities of delivering forces on operations on a day-to-day basis. We've created a blur, and I think that's where my greatest concern is in the transformation issue is that blur is reaching down and touching at the unit level, and it creates confusion where perhaps there shouldn't be.

In particular, several participants felt that while the vision may be sound in principle, it fails to consider the lack of resources, low recruitment and high attrition:

A vision without resources is a hallucination!

I understand the vision, but...a lot of us feel constrained by the number of people that are available to help make it come true. We have a shortage of staff now at various headquarters that is not enabling us. We have our own shortage in the units and people are going, their tempo is too high and that we're losing sight, I think, of the vision as well, as we're just trying to survive.

Everything looks good in my view of the vision and everything, but getting there is problematic because we don't have the manning to do it, and our recruiting numbers for this year are extremely low...

And with fifty-some thousand in uniform now, we're being asked to do, probably five times what we were asked to do in the old days with more accountability, more requirements on the individual, get your Master's, do this, do that, at the LCol level just alone, let alone at the soldier level, oh come on. You know, sure, the vision's out there and the transformational goals are set and all the rest of it. Are we going to get there? Not without a hell of a lot of angst if you ask me.

Some of the dissatisfaction I think will start bubbling up with the CF transformation, as a lot of it's done on the backs of the Army. Take Canada Command as an example. Who do you want to staff that thing? People [who] have the experience in operations. Well guess what, 70% of the people going out of this country are Army. And we are only 20,000 people. So we're a third of the Force doing 70% of the work, and now we are going to have to provide people to things like Canada Command, just to make it credible and make it operational in a quick time frame. And that only detracts from the amount of people that can go out of the country to do the job again. So I don't think there's a real proper balance at the CF level, based on who does the work. So the Army is always asked to kick in people because we have the credibility and the experience.

Well [the Army vision] is innovative. Is it good? I'm not so sure. So already after a couple of years of introducing this thing, the concept is you're supposed to have two task force or two units worth that can deploy anywhere plus a surge capacity. Well, now the surge capacity is out of the question because we don't have enough people. So the vision is there, innovation is there, is the quality there? I'm not so sure. ... My big concern, my personal concern right now in the Army is the personnel. We can't even fill in the people that we're losing. Attrition is higher than the production and so the Canadian Forces are going to grow by 5000? How do you get there? ... I haven't heard a plan.

The Army Vision is solid and certainly laudable. Not wishing to be argumentative here but it is not the Vision that one implements - it is first the concept of operations that falls from the Vision and the ensuing plan that is implemented and this is where the Vision appears to be failing. When an entity does not have access to the correct type or quantity of resources but issues the plan anyway, there is high risk of failure. ... For God's sake, grow the wheat before you expect flour or cereal - the training system cannot keep up to the current or immediate future of sustained expeditionary operations without even higher risk.

Similarly, some participants felt that the vision is impractical and unrealistic, or felt that change may be occurring too quickly:

...We're doing too much now, we're advancing at a too wide of a front. ... We're doing too many things at the same time. The CDS wants to fix the Force, grow the Force, and you can't [do both at the same time]. I don't know what's his reasoning is, but this whole thing needs a reality check.

Yes [I understand the vision and feel part of its implementation]. But it is, in my opinion, still disjointed and disconnected with respect to the CF vision, which is, in itself, not connected to political and fiscal realities. "Live within means" is not, in my experience, a welcome concept within the Army/CF.

I certainly understand it and I know what the vision is and where our end state is supposed to be, but I'm not confident that we're going about it the right way or at the right pace. I think we're going too quickly...

The participant quoted below felt that the vision lacks depth or substance:

I thought I [understood the vision] at one time and it was being well articulated, so I thought. But then I hung around a bit longer and had an opportunity to kind of watch, and you start to realize that some of that vision is really only one Powerpoint slide deep, and there's no real depth or substance to it... You think you're heading toward this vision, this sort of structure that might make sense or tends to make sense, but then halfway there, oh no, let's kind of nudge it this way, let's go with this direction, and it all sort of depends who's at the helm at the time, and it's more their personality driving it as opposed to maybe some sort of military estimate that we like to follow.

Similarly, the participants quoted below felt that the vision frequently changes, or will not stand the test of time:

We've been in a state of flux and change ever since where there's been a new vision. ...The goal posts keep moving every 2 years. ... There's been a new Army way ahead, a new Army vision every time the Army commander changes.

One would argue that if the CDS changes in the next year because of a change of government, a new CDS, a Navy guy, might not buy any of this stuff. ...And the new government may not want us to go down these paths. Well, that doesn't mean we have a long-term vision. I mean, this doesn't stand the test of time!

The vision changes and, you know, one General's priorities of equipment aren't the next guy's, and all of a sudden now you've got DGSP who says we've got to have guns. Well, guns were killed off, right? Guns were going nowhere. ...We have a General, the CDS who when he was Commander of the Army said we got to have MGS [Mobile Gun Systems]. Well, the tank and the MGS were moved off well...

Yes, I understand the Army Vision and support it. Implementation is more of a challenge as it is continually changing.

Conversely, the participants quoted below felt that the current Army vision represents little real or substantive change:

...In many cases, I am witnessing many things within the CF that are on their third or fourth go round and one can easily estimate where things are going.

...By the time you get to this rank you have enough experience to have seen many different, you know, this transformation looks like an iteration I've already seen before.

Oh, it was General Jeffrey that actually initially proposed the Army transformation and where it was going. Now they've refined that vision ... over the past few years, but I don't think it's changed that much.

Some expressed a desire to have a (greater) role in the implementation of the vision:

I don't have any problem with where the Army and the Armed Forces is going. I agree with it, wholeheartedly. I'm ready to push it. And I'd like to have a say in the tactics of how it's implemented.

And in this time of transformation and change, I think we're at a point where a lot of people should be engaged more deliberately in the decisions that are being made, and to me, that's where the frustration is, is that we're being stymied from being an active participant in the development and the changes that our Forces are going through.

Lack of Resources and "Overprogramming". As we've seen mentioned several times before, but in different contexts, many expressed dissatisfaction with the "insane tempo" or "over-programming" in the Army, the limited resources, the lack of proper training and equipment, and the problems with attrition and recruitment. Here, the participants address these issues directly.

The dissatisfier of tempo is real, we are over-programmed.

And the pace does not slack. You know, if I look back 30 years ago when I joined, we had 120,000 people in uniform. Now to be sure, we had some fat and we got rid of...some of the excess we had, but these days we are pared to the bone...and the tempo today compared to the tempo 30 years ago, oh give me a break!

The people are getting broken, the attrition is rising right now. To me that would be a trigger to say that maybe the Op tempo is too high. I think the attrition is about 10%. ...I see a lot of senior COs getting out. I remember...I saw a graph showing people, the attrition, the officer corps after 25 years...people get out progressively. Senior COs at 20

years, it's a big drop, 25. And what does that mean? ... My theory is the Army has a human resources crisis and we don't even know it. That's how bad it is. Right now, if you would ask the Army commander, what's your plan to...cover your attrition and to get to 3000, what's the Army plan? There is no plan. ... They can't even fill the positions that are available now. ... And I haven't heard a solution yet. ... The other aspect of it, equipment procurement. Since this new Force Employment concept, new equipment, la la la. You know how long it's going to take to have this equipment in the service right now? 15 years! ... And you know what the target is? 11 years. So...there's a disconnect here. And everybody goes about their business as if, you know, everything is good.

The other side of the pancake I'm facing...is tempo. Whenever I add training requirements to preparation for operations...I'm stealing days, on weekends, and nights. And the second-biggest dissatisfier to me is...what I term is the insane tempo that we are going through right now. And it's felt by our soldiers not just by LCol's, but as the LCol I have to answer to them every time I talk to them, and explain to them and their families why this is going so fast, so furious.

I would say my biggest frustration is lacking resources, both people and money, red tape. If I want to get things done, I have to push the envelope, I have to listen to what lawyers have to say and do the right thing, which is oftentimes not what they're advising me to do, just because it makes sense. So [it is] extremely frustrating to get things done because it's a constant battle, just always fighting for the resources, money and people.

...We send soldiers overseas...and a lot of times they're training on equipment once they get there because they don't want to spend the money to provide us the amount of equipment we need here to train on. And something as simple as a rifle sight, night-vision goggles, you know, the standard rule I've been told is well if we buy 20,000 of this brand, 2 years from now they're obsolete. Whoop-dee-doo! You know, 2 years from now we're all training on that generation, but at least we're training on it, and you just adapt as you go. So, sometimes their philosophy on why things are not done just doesn't make sense to us, and we're the ones who are trying to explain it to the soldier who is about to go out the door with great kit but just not in the numbers that should be there.

It is extremely frustrating working within a culture that truly believes in 'train as you fight, fight as you train' when the resources are so meager that equipment has to be pooled so that High Readiness training and deployment can take place. It is very hard to face soldiers and tell them that 'the kit and equipment will be there when the time to train comes' when you are pretty sure that though they will have it in-theatre, they may not be able to train with it beforehand.

Well, the big stress on it is resource shortfalls. An effective military unit is traditionally not very efficient. There is excesses built in, there's reserves. But we've shaved the ice cube right down so there is [nothing] left. There's no reserves, no redundancy. So when you have a shock to the system like having to deploy a large number of troops overseas, it leaves huge holes all over the place.

The ability to train our soldiers is difficult because of resource shortfalls. To put in extra training, one almost feels guilty. ... You almost feel like you're cheating...the system, because you're stealing training opportunities, but it's absolutely required to get our soldiers up to that level.

[I] stole a training opportunity, which was frowned upon by elements in the chain of command and the chain of staff... ... And almost feel guilty because of outside pressures. Training that is in some cases could be viewed as fun, but also it's vital in building cohesion and putting the fun in the Army. ... And that's one of the reasons we're experiencing the attrition rates we have with our NCOs.

The participant quoted below felt that the risk associated with inadequate training will eventually be felt by the CO and his or her soldiers:

But in this system, higher says they will assume risk by not giving enough training, but they're not assuming the risk, it's the CO that's assuming the risk, and the soldiers that are assuming the risk.

According to the participant quoted below, with almost everything considered a "top priority," those items that are considered in that class, such as professional development training, fall by the wayside:

The problem is...with the scope of change, the scope of the number of operations we're stuck into, everything is priority one, and they're making the conscious decision to say professional development training, for the most part, adventurous training, those kind of things, are sliding to a lower priority because we can't fail at those priority-ones...and there's so many of them.

Many saw a lack of prioritization as a major organizational and leadership problem (i.e., not setting priorities, not matching priorities to resources, or senior leadership not being able to "say no").

The major stressor has to do with the establishment of priorities. There are always too many priorities when compared to resources (time or people) to accomplish all of the tasks to the level of satisfaction of our class "A" personalities.

Available or assigned resources have never met the assigned task. Never! The consequences of this are extensive, including seldom being able to complete something to the appropriate standard; reduced feeling of accomplishment and therefore less job satisfaction; extra work hours - almost never recognized; less time with family; greater stress; etc.

And I think if someone on the floor of the House of Commons raises a question of the Minister, the boots are crappy in op theatre and then all of a sudden we're answering questions about boots and the quality of boots and who we're buying boots from. [Leaders] need to have the maturity to say boots aren't the issue, our guys are great. They're doing a great job, let's get off their backs. I mean, the institution at the executive level needs to be able to say, that's a dumb question! Our guys are too busy to answer that goofy little thing. We've got great boots, this is goofy! But no one will say that. All of a

sudden...papers will be flying, we'll be writing stuff on boots and why we've got this and that and the other thing. Come on!

One of the things I've never heard enough of, if at all, is a senior leadership saying no to something. You know, that's one too many, we're not going to do it. ...People up above refuse to say no so they pass it down, down and down....

One of the things that I've heard and I've seen...it's the "can do" in the Army, you never say "can't," and people are just trying to do too much.

Many participants felt that they, personally, were spending too much time on low-priority issues (such as signing administrative chits), and not enough time on important, strategic issues – or just trying to do too much in too little time, or with too few resources:

We feed the beast, 75% of my time is feeding the beast for little things that don't matter, right? ... 75% of it is the flavour of the day, the flavour of the week, it's not long term.

We are asking too much! Those working on a strategic level should be planning ahead and leaving the day-to-day stuff to others. As it stands, we are stuck doing both. There is no way we can do long-term planning and day-to-day stuff with little or no resources.

One participant felt that, contrary to his expectation of being a commanding officer, he was being asked to command spare parts, not units, and explained that it is difficult to build a cohesive team under these circumstances.

One of the big frustrations of being a unit commander at the lieutenant colonel rank, which should be the pinnacle of being a lieutenant colonel, is you aspire to this, and then when you get there, you find out you're not really commanding a unit, you're commanding a collection of spare parts to go out, bits and pieces, to different operations. ... So there is that whole issue of cohesion and trying to build a team to watch, it's like trying to hold sand, as it falls through your hands.

A few participants felt that more communication between commanding officers and medical officers was needed so that commanding officers could better assess the fitness/readiness of their troops for deployment.

I won't say it's a problem, but, again, the units that we grew up in had our own unit medical station [UMS] as part of the regiment. The MO was the doctor, the medical advisor to the commanding officer. We still have that to a degree, but the responsiveness as a commanding officer to one of my injured soldiers, to understand what we can do for him, has been negated. I've had to put policies in place for my senior NCOs to understand why we must maintain patient confidentiality, why they can't just walk into the UMS and say, hey bomber, what's wrong with you, things like that, and not understanding that when a soldier comes back to work, you can't ask what's wrong with him and why does he have light duties. Is that wrong? I don't know, it's the Canadian Privacy Act.It's what we wear the uniform to defend, but it's no source of frustration because they are not responsive to us anymore, and we're trying to work around it but, no.

I'll just say that, despite all the confidentiality issues, putting all those aside...this is a very different business here where we put people's lives on the line here, and you have to

have your finger on the pulse, and that means that you got to have intimate communications with your medical staff so you understand who those folks are that...have addictions and this and that... You have to have visibility on those things, otherwise you can be potentially putting people in harms way.

Finally, some participants felt that they lacked mentoring or adequate career management and counseling.

In our branch, I tell you that if I don't have the support of the combat arms, I am going nowhere. ... The only way to get promoted is that, you need one of these combat arms who takes you under his umbrella and say: "Walk with me young man, we're going to carry [you] away."

...The lack of mentorship/counseling...is frustrating. No opportunity to look ahead and make plans or accept your limitations.

The management of my career is a shambles in my mind - indeed, I have no career anymore. It's now just a job.

In summary, participants had several concerns about general organizational issues. Most prominent was the lack of appropriate resources, including people, to fulfill their obligations. Related to this was the impact that the current rate of operational tempo was having on organizational resources. Other frustrations included the risk averse culture in the CF, the bureaucracy, as well as concerns over the implementation of the CF and Army visions of transformation.

Concerns About Post-Command

Another significant source of dissatisfaction stemmed from participants' apprehension or uncertainty about their next, or future, postings. In particular, several participants expressed concern that their future post-command job would not be as rewarding as command:

My concern right now is post command, and that's starting to weigh on my mind thinking that this is the epitome of my career and what's next, and that certainly causes me some concern...that the position won't be as rewarding...

I'm thinking about the time when I'm not commanding anymore... The scariest question you could probably ask any of us is, well, what are you going to do next?

It's hard to get all that excited. ... I haven't been all that excited about anything beyond being a CO. Like this is really it. You know, you've been managed and developed by a branch or a regiment up to this point in time, and now you're about to be kicked out of the nest and off to do something that you really don't have a good feel for.

And once you're on a certain track, you know, what is there after command? ...What do I have to look forward to after this? Another staff job?

Once command at the unit level has passed, for those fortunate enough to have been selected for this responsibility, you are just another staff flunky, not quite a Col (where

true respect begins - Base Commander/Brigade Commander), but something more than a Major.

What do [I] find most dissatisfying about being a LCol? Post-command humiliation, cubicle drudge, long wait for promotion...

Returning to a staff position is not always as challenging for the mind as being in a commander position. Command positions entail very stimulating activities. They also allow us to immediately see the results of our actions.

Indeed, several other participants spoke of their concerns about moving into a staff position after having been in a command position:

When you assume a command position you are given many responsibilities, you also get a lot of leeway. You have the power. As soon as you become a staff officer, your power is taken away from you. You are no longer allowed to do the things you could as a commander. Once you become a staff officer you are practically at the bottom of the chain of command. ... An example of this is that as a commander you have the power to authorize leave for an individual. As a staff officer, you still have subordinates working for you but you no longer have the power to authorize leave. This power is only given to commanders. There are many instances like this one where the system takes powers away from LCol's as soon as they become staff officers. ... It's almost as if you lose the right to use your own judgment.

To go from a commanding officer to a staff position is like dropping to a lower social class.

A battalion commander has his own jeep driver, his [armoured] vehicle driver, his secretary, and his adjutant. He is the king...he gets to decide who does what and when. As a staff officer, the only [thing] you get is a cubicle, a phone, and a computer. You don't get to decide anymore. You become the newcomer, therefore your opinion isn't worth very much.

Another thing I wanted to bring up on a broader level is that the commander position in the Army is the last position where the LCol will be in close contact with the troops. That is a key element. As a commander he interacts directly with soldiers. As a staff officer, the only way to influence the troops will be through other commands.

The participant quoted below, who is currently enjoying being in a command posting, expressed anxiety regarding the uncertainty of his next posting: Would it be an "A-job," and how hard would he have to work if he wants to be promoted again?

In this job, in this command here, it's a pleasure to come to work everyday. However, when I leave this job next summer, they are going to tell me what my prospects of future promotion are. If there are any, then I know in my mind I have to go to an A-job, and I have to work my guts out for the possibility of another one. That's frustrating.

Related to concerns about post-command were concerns about being posted at NDHQ in Ottawa. Participants spoke of having (or expecting) to work extremely long hours, of not

being able to influence things or make a difference, and of having to work on projects that could be cancelled by politicians at the drop of a hat. NDHQ positions were also described as involving a loss of status and power or authority.

When we are posted to Ottawa, new challenges arise. The weight or importance given to LCol's isn't the same. We are now a key player, we have important issues, large challenges, but no authority. We do not have the same level of authority as we would have if we were on base. But the work we have to do is as important, and as critical since it adds to CF's vision and mission. This scenario is excessively frustrating and demanding.

Ottawa is a totally different thing. Even the Chief of [Defence] Staff sometimes doesn't have the power because of political aspects. He is not the one deciding whether or not we are going to Afghanistan. Politicians make that decision. That's the way it works. If he doesn't have the power, how can we?

In Ottawa...it was ridiculous. Again, I have never worked that much in my life.

Interestingly, for some participants, it was not so much the workload (the amount of work) that was frustrating, but having to work long hours specifically in the NDHQ environment or as staff officers. Participants did not seem to mind working long hours as commanders:

Frankly if they want me to work 12 hours a day, then this is the job I'm willing to do it in. Now, have me work these hours as a staff officer in Ottawa and I'll rant, because it's not what I directed my career for, so I don't mind as much here as a commanding officer.

Concerns About Workload, OPTEMPO, and Quality of Life

Participants also talked about other workload-related dissatisfiers. Although many participants reported that they worked long hours (e.g., about 10-12 hours per day), and often worked during evenings and on weekends, many of the frustrations they expressed had more to do with facing too many demands in too little time, and with having to spend too much time on low-priority issues (or high-priority issues), than the sheer volume of work.

The problem is...with the scope of change, the scope of the number of operations we're stuck into, everything is priority one...

But...the pressure of the place, the fact that...your inbox will never be empty, there'll always be one more or 15 more tasks to do, you're always juggling 17 number-one priorities...

I go back to the point...about tempo or over-programming. I often joke that the armed forces will improve 10,000% if all of the senior officers, the general officers and the colonels left at noon and went home, allowing the rest of us to catch-up. Their schedules are unrealistic as well. The numbers of meetings, the time they have to dedicate to real issues is very short, real important issues.

It's not just old age that makes time go faster, it is the pace around here.

...Busy is not the word. ...Some of us grew up in this brigade, and yeah it was busy but it was a fun busy, it was a different kind of busy. This is a management of chaos busy.

In short, many participants felt that they lacked control over their work (e.g., projects could be pulled at any time), and associated this with the risk-averse culture of the Army/CF.

I have worked on two projects in the last 2 years. In both cases, after one year's worth of work we reached a point where we pull the plug or we keep going. I was lucky, both of them went through. But if they had not, I would have had the impression that all the time I had spent working on this project was for nothing. ... It was out of my control.

It's not so much the [amount of] work but rather not having the freedom of action. The higher rank we are, the wider our range of action should be. We are paid to make these decisions, to take risks, and respect them. We don't need the administrative measures controlling our behaviour, that's what I am being paid for. If something wrong happens resulting from the way I manage the unit, I will be accountable for my actions. I am paid to do so. That is a cause for frustration.

Furthermore, although a few participants felt that deployment opportunities were too limited, or would have liked a higher operational tempo, most participants who talked about the tempo issue expressed discontent with the high level of operational tempo and with the negative effects of this, and of postings in general, on their family lives (including their spouse's employment). For example:

...As we get older our...personal lives become more complex. The kids are growing up as well and feeling their way around and challenging your authority and what have you. So you have to deal with it, and every move becomes a little bit more difficult, because a good move is one where the kids say, yeah, we like this place. ... So...that contextual stress that would come with...the issues dealing with the family certainly have an impact on your job and how you view things and view your desire to stay in the Forces.

..To rip [families] up every 3 years and move them to a new location, it makes it very hard for spousal employment.

It's still tough. I mean, in my case, this job that I do cost my wife her career. ... She gave up [profession], just got tired of doing the moves.

There is a big morale problem in the Army, we know that. Why? Because we are always gone on operations. The family suffers a lot from the fact that we are away on a mission. Post-traumatic stress, the family suffers again. You can't come back from a 6-month mission and expect to reintegrate in your family by saying..."I am here." No, no, there is an adjustment phase. ... When you arrive at the airport, it is not as simple as telling them: "Hi my love, come and see me." They are going to say: "Who are you?" Or, they might pout because you've been away for 6 months and they hold it against you. ... If we look at those aspects, I have to say: no, it is not pleasant at all.

Interestingly, the participant quoted below compares his situation (i.e., the sacrifices that his career demands from his family) to that of other professionals in other occupations in the civilian world.

...There comes a point when the profession continues to demand, particularly the after hours because it cuts into family time...it becomes a bit of a burden. ... Because no other profession demands that they take an individual away from their family and sort of make them work day and night for a year at a time, or 2 years at a time. I mean, if you look around the Canadian government, who else is doing that? Lawyers and doctors aren't doing that. ... I mean, these are the types of real-world dissatisfiers of when, you know, the more transparent world I think are going to confront the military more and more because people are talking about it and I think it just sort of creates that sort of atmosphere where people say well this is stupid. Enough is enough. I'll get out and take the 148% salary, thank you very much, because otherwise, I can hang around here and be dissatisfied and tomorrow they'll post me to I don't know, wherever that may be. Someplace maybe I don't want to go.

Indeed, participants felt overall that while, on paper, the CF takes family needs and “quality of life” issues into consideration, in practice, it often does not.

I think this issue is problematic. The organization tells us to take care of your family. But in reality, the system does not allow much room to do so. For example, what's the use of taking a 2-week leave when you know that doing so will result in 4 weeks of overtime to catch up for the time you were on leave? It's useless. ... It is a question of choice. There have been years where I put my career before my family. However now, my family comes first. My family followed me everywhere and lately I have been put on a mandatory posting restriction because I didn't want to make my family move. My children...have never spent more than 2 years in a particular school because we kept moving.

Family issues can be seen at two levels: (1) you take care of the family because they will not, and (2) if you're going for a career, then you lose, or you put the family aside. For me, it's always been family first, the rest will follow... The main source of dissatisfaction, when we talk about family issues, is that the system is not family-oriented. Quality of life, bull! ...If you are deployed, they will not take care of your family. They have good intentions, they put all kinds of initiatives in place, although these initiatives only help with their needs, not the ones of the families. ... I am very satisfied with my family life. I've been married for 20 years, I have [number] kids and we are all very happy. We made a lot of sacrifices. My wife made all of the sacrifices by saying: "Okay, we are going to go there, we are going to go there." But when you ask someone to move every 2 to 3 years, you are not taking in consideration the needs of the family. When you ask a person to go on four operations in 6 years, you are not taking in consideration the needs of the family. I don't agree with these aspects. But overall, it is not too bad. It really depends on you. Because I don't remember one initiative...where the system has done something aimed towards the...well being of the family. Good intentions, no doubt in my mind. Good people with good intentions. [But] reality?

[Because of numerous postings] my children had to change schools... Whenever I asked for things that would have allowed me to stay longer at the same location, the career manager would say: we can't do that, your plan is faulty. ... Asking for a long-term vision was like pulling teeth.

The participant quoted below, on the other hand, does not expect the Army organization to accommodate his family's needs, but feels that maintaining a work/family balance depends on an individual's attitude or personal choice. (Earlier, we saw a similar attitude expressed by a participant in relation to the effects of striving for promotion on the family.)

It's a question of attitude. Because of the clear choices and expectations. When the time comes where I realize I can no longer provide the service that is expected of me it will be up to me to go elsewhere. I'm not asking for charity... never. I plan and I tell my boss: "I'll go to this..., I won't go to that since it makes more sense to send this guy, I'll send a replacement here and I'll go to this event because it's more important." He realizes that I have to manage my weekends and the nanny, and we pull it off. I don't tell him all of this at the last minute. I don't say please, I just do it. I show him that I have a viable plan and he approves it.

The participant quoted below goes even further and suggests that there is too much emphasis placed on Quality of Life and similar programs in the CF:

Too much emphasis is put on various programs such as quality of life, harassment, equity, suicide prevention, violence and substance abuse programs. These programs are done to the detriment of training. These programs and policies are useful but shouldn't apply to the CF the same way they apply to Public Services. A lot of efforts and resources are invested into policies and programs aimed at watching our backs rather than training.

In contrast, the participants quoted below spoke of the negative psychological effects of high OPTEMPO on individuals and their families. Implicit in their words is the importance of addressing these negative effects.

...We talk about our most important resource [being] our soldiers. And I [have] seen the cumulative effect of what's been going on for a number of years, and we do not have performance metrics in place to gauge whether we've got the throttle pegged to the floor for an extended period of time here. And worst, I have seen horrendous numbers of folks needing to talk about domestic disputes, the suicide ideations, it just goes on and on.

So I think we're going through the same cycle [of high OPTEMPO], and what I've seen in all of these guys who've done the CO thing is that they are burned right out after doing that. And so we're asking soldiers and their families to do it again, and again, and again. I would be stunned if there isn't a significant spike here [of family, marital, and social problems] given how much these guys are trying to do...

The participant quoted below spoke of his sense of powerlessness regarding the situation of high OPTEMPO :

Probably the one thing that I feel...almost powerless, I guess, is not being able to influence and my number one concern for the troops is that they're...back home for only 12 months between ROTOs and they're continuing to go and...knowing that is really not a healthy and sustainable environment for them to be in. And ...there's only so much I can do, because I still have to train these guys, I still have to push them hard between ROTOs or they're not going to be ready for the next one, and that's concerning. And that's the one thing that I really do feel quite powerless about. ...I'm concerned about the long-term health after I'm gone, are these guys going to be able to keep going?

In summary, in addition to identifying a number of sources of job satisfaction among our sample of Army LCol's, this study brought to light a number of their concerns regarding workload, tempo, quality of life, and other sources of dissatisfaction related to promotion issues, leadership issues, and other organizational issues.

Addressing the Dissatisfaction: What Can the CF/Army Do?

In addition to sharing their satisfactions and dissatisfactions at the LCol rank, participants also were asked what the CF or Army could do to improve their overall job satisfaction, and to recommend changes that would make the Army a happier place for them and their peers.

Provide Sufficient Resources

The most frequently mentioned recommendation was to provide sufficient resources, and in particular, sufficient personnel:

We got to get more people in, either that or take an appetite suppressant. And we won't do that.

It all boils down to not having enough resources and the key one is people.

Being over-programmed is a reflection of being too small. The Armed Forces, not just the Army.

[If I could be Grand Poobah for a day], I'd say provide the LCol with the manning necessary to do the job, period.

[If I could be the Chief of the Land Staff tomorrow?] I would develop a plan to get the personnel in.

When I say the centre of gravity is personnel, that would be my first priority. The money is there, the equipment is coming, but people are broken. So that would be my first priority.

We can have all the equipment in the world, we can have all the headquarters we want, until we got guys sitting in the jobs who are filling the position, we're not going to get any further ahead.

Other participants mentioned the need for additional resources in general, whether in terms of personnel, kit, or equipment resources:

[If I could be King for the day I would] increase kit and equipment holdings for every Combat Arms unit so we could not constantly be chasing our tails robbing Peter to pay Paul just so we can train realistically. I would also, more importantly, increase manpower so that combat units, training institutions, and HQ staffs (in that order) are manned optimally-maximally, so that we are not constantly having to ask people to go away for extended periods. This way, soldiers posted to training institutions are actually taking a bit of a break from the field force.

Give us (and the entire CF) the resources we need to realize the potential that we have. I have seen or worked alongside a number of the world's militaries and we are still pretty good: we just need the people and resources to get things done.

Give necessary financial, material and human resources to all Army units in order for them to train adequately.

Indeed, related to the recommendation to provide sufficient resources is the recommendation to improve the training system, which depends on having adequate resources:

At this time we are exhausting ourselves owing to a cumbersome training system exacerbated by insufficient manpower. Increases in kit and men would go a long way to ensuring better morale in the CF/Army and would personally make me happier - and feel as if the institution is doing the right thing. Right now, it is hard maintaining loyalty to a system rife with insufficiencies like ours.

Our biggest gap here is our manning void right now. We have, I'm told around 700 or 800 people sitting in Borden waiting for training. We've got to correct the training system and I would close her down and start again from scratch and although those 700 or 800 guys who are waiting to go trades training would be coming into the Army doing their basic Army training and then 3 years later they could go off and scrub pots or whatever they do.

Set Priorities

Another recommendation that was frequently voiced by participants was the need to set priorities. Participants felt that the Army is trying to do too much with the limited resources it has, and that it needs to set priorities. These priorities could be determined based on relevance, for example, or on whether or not an activity was in line with the Army vision:

I would try to prioritize and reduce the amount of crap we're doing. Because I believe the Army is... trying to do too much. [We have to ask ourselves] does whatever little bit of activity we choose, does it actually contribute to the vision for the Army? Is there, can you make a link? ...Can someone look down the road and tell me that it is actually going to contribute something to the overall success of the vision?

I would try and prioritize the stuff. ...Because I know, in my own heart, that we can't do all the stuff we're trying to do at the same time, without doing it badly. But I'd be happy if you just said your priorities are this, this, this, and that's systemic, it's not just kind of a one-shot deal but work is prioritized by most important to least important, and things that are least important then sometimes don't get done.

The participant quoted below felt that the Army should examine officer training and education in terms of its relevance:

I would suggest that we take a very hard look at officer training and officer education with a view to providing officers with the essentials that we feel they need the most and trimming out a lot of the non-essentials because it'll save time.

Several participants emphasized the need for the CF/Army to “live within its means,” in a sustainable fashion, rather than try to do more with less, or risk burning out its people and equipment. According to some, this would require a realistic re-examination of priorities based on available resources:

The CF must learn to "live within means" - it continues to try to do "more with less" and, in so doing, it "breaks" its people and its equipment on a regular basis. Such business practice would not be acceptable in the "outside world." Clearly, the CF must be "combat capable," but there is a need to achieve that goal in a sustainable structure that does not burn out our people and our equipment.

[The CF/Army should] distribute priorities according to available financial resources. Reduce the number of tasks at the national level. Provide all Army units with sufficient resources in order to train them adequately and meet the Army's requirements and priorities.

Bring CF manning up to the tasks assigned, or reduce the tasks to the level supportable. Stop manning establishments at a given percentage when the work is allocated on the basis of 100 percent. Realistic assignment of resources to tasks would greatly improve working conditions and job satisfaction.

Improve Promotion and Reward Systems

Other participants focused on recommendations on how to improve the promotion and reward system. One recommendation, in particular, involved changing the second language policy in regard to promotion. For example, some participants recommended that, rather than fluent bilingualism, functional bilingualism should be sought for the officer corps:

I would change the rule that says we need a bilingual officer corps, because that is unachievable, and I would change it to say that we need an officer corps that can communicate in both official languages.

Some participants recommended eliminating the second language policy altogether, for the Army and possibly the CF, or removing the linkage between promotion and language ability:

I would spend my time developing a plan to get the Army and potentially the Canadian Forces out from under the Official Language policy because...it's all consuming at all rank levels. Think of the time and money we spend when the soldiers come into the chain, train them up in second language and in reality, the people who are in the positions that require it get it one way or the other. Morale would increase, I think people would be more comfortable in their jobs, happy to serve a little bit longer. This is heresy, I realize, and I'm a strong proponent of it, but again I look at what consumes my subordinates right now and for a lot of them who are outstanding soldiers and officers, this is the only thing holding them back!

De-link promotion to language abilities.

The participant below recommended eliminating the second language requirement unless it is specifically needed for a particular position, and in that case, making it mandatory:

I'd do away with the 2nd language requirement, unless actually needed for a position, and then make it mandatory. In doing so, I would seek nothing but 1-year French courses for all, and only use intensive 3-week courses to refresh. We are wasting time and money with an unnecessary requirement, and are angering a lot of good people in the process!

The participant quoted below suggested that the timing of second language training as well as the positions that actually need to be bilingual should be reviewed:

As for language training in general I would say we have pooched this across the board. First, second language training should not be done upon joining the CF as members lose the keenness for their occupation training as they have spent so much time in a classroom setting and have become lazy. I would suggest we should put newly promoted Captains on a year-long course upon completion of their first tour of duty at the Regiments. As we all know the op tempo is very high and taking the training after a tour would be considered somewhat of a break. I think we need to review which positions in the CF actually need to be bilingual. I would suggest that Directors at the CF level, usually Cols and all Generals, need to be bilingual but most other Colonel positions do not.

The participant quoted below recommended implementing a personal learning plan for all Anglophone officers that would ensure that they serve in Francophone positions, in order to deepen their second language ability:

Maybe we need...to rotate Anglophone officers through Francophone positions, to harden the depth of their language. Why shouldn't we be doing that?

Other participants focused on changing other aspects of the promotion system. The participant quoted below, for example, recommended eliminating the regimental and corps influence on promotion decisions, and instead employing a system based strictly on "merit:"

I would say that you remove elements like regimental Cols...and go strictly by a merit board approach where the regiments have no influence, and the corps have no influence on it.

The participant quoted below recommended eliminating the ASPP or tier system:

Do away with the tier system.

The participant quoted below also recommended the adoption of a "merit-based" system, one that is blind, in his opinion, to "discriminatory practices," such as age or fluency in a second language:

The CF should adopt a truly equitable merit system - that is blind to language and age and other discriminatory practices. Should the "best" person be close to retirement, that person should still be allowed to take on the mantle, albeit for a short period of time. Should the "best" person require language training (official 2nd language or other), then that training should be provided to allow that officer to perform his/her duties.

The participant quoted below advocated for a more transparent promotion system, in which LCol and, in particular, COs have more power:

Give LCol and specifically COs more powers and be more transparent on how promotions and progression is actually decided.

The participant quoted below also advocated for a more transparent and equitable promotion system, one in which all are treated uniformly:

I would try to be more transparent and fair. That's what I would do. What's good for the gander is good for the goose. Same thing for everybody, but apply it, enforce it, ensure that it is enforced. And I would have an ombudsman to verify [the transparency and fairness of the promotion system and decisions].

Some participants recommended changes to the awards and commendations system:

[I would] fundamentally reform the awards and commendation programme. It is seriously flawed. I have seen people do absolutely remarkable jobs and receive not so much as a thank-you, and others just perform their routine job to an acceptable standard, but because of the job itself, receive a CLS or DCDS commendation (e.g., a Camp Sergeant Major on an overseas deployment). People deserving of recognition through the award of military merit programme go unrecognized because no one cares enough to write up a recommendation, or to be recognized requires 'padding' the resume. The system is flawed and the awards themselves have diminishing respect.

Similarly, some participants recommended finding ways to reward those (many) individuals who are not in line for promotion, but who nevertheless work hard and make important contributions:

I think one of the things we'd need to do is if we're accepting there is this A-group and...the rest of the LCol, of which there are quite a few, it's a bit of pyramid bottleneck, you're not going farther, we need something to keep them motivated and reward them. [In] the military...promotion is the reward for performance... There's got to be some other reward system, because [people are] still working their 9-, 10-hour days, working their heart out, yet it's very hard to reward them. You know, send them away on a conference, give them a job that's very interesting, but there's...not enough things you can do for those people.

The participant quoted below feels that staff officers should have access to promotions in the same way that commanding officers do:

Some people, including myself, think that LCol that aren't in command positions could very well be excellent staff officers in Ottawa at the strategic level. They could remain in their position for a longer time period. They could have access to promotions the same way that commanding LCol do. These people might be happier working in a context like this where they can learn more and have greater control over their career path.

The participant quoted below recommends that individuals who go on overseas deployments over and over again should be rewarded with enhanced pay and benefits:

I think it is vital that the CF and Army recognize those individuals who go on overseas missions time and time again... [They] continue to put service before self and accumulate a significant level of hardship, risk and stress both overseas and on the home front both physically and psychologically. I would suggest there should be a benefits

segment added to our pension plan or pay scales to adequately acknowledge this. It is wrong that members who have never served in an operational theatre get the same pension as those who have time and time again!

The same participant quoted above also recommended changes regarding *who* should fill positions in foreign countries as a reward. Instead of filling these positions with people close to retirement, the participant recommends filling them with younger, more enthusiastic LCol, but who are not high on the list for promotion:

We are short of Cols to fill positions in foreign countries, such as Attachés and in Allied/NATO HQ. We also tend to send personnel who are on their last few years in the CF as a gift or a retirement posting and many are not up to the realities of the tempo in these Strategic and Operational HQ. I would suggest there is scope to send younger/keener LCol overseas who may not be high on the list for promotion to Col due not to their performance but lack of having a Masters or language score which would give them more job satisfaction and something to look forward to than the current alternative of staying a staff officer in HQ until they retire years down the road. It is because of this lack of opportunity, not promotion, that many LCol get out of the CF at the 20-24 year mark as they cannot see themselves as a Staff Officer for the rest of the career sometimes up to 10-15 years!!!!!!!

Change Organizational Structures and Culture

Besides changing aspects of the promotion system, some participants advocated making other organizational changes. For example, the participant quoted below recommended eliminating all external headquarters, systems and bureaucracies that he feels do not support the Army:

I would get rid of all the external headquarters and systems and bureaucracies that don't support the Army. I'll give you an example. The areas. The areas only exist because we try and cater to the Reserve Force, to say one Army, one team, one vision. We don't have one Army, one team, one vision. We have a Reserve Force and a Regular Force. The Regular Force is dying because we have systems that cater to the Reserve because it's politically acceptable to say so.

Similarly, the participants quoted below also recommended eliminating certain bureaucratic structures, such as some of the headquarters, or in general, transforming the bureaucracy:

Get rid of some of the headquarters and put those positions back to where they belong. We are way too small to have such a huge overhead.

Create a system that recognizes the fluid/fickle political environment and yet allows for the efficient and effective making of tough decisions by senior leaders – in short transform the bureaucracy first.

The participant quoted below also had some suggestions for changing organizational structures, in this case, reducing the Environmental Command structures, with implications for career advancement:

The ECS [Environmental Command] structures are not sustainable within the current funding envelope provided by the GOC [Government of Canada]. If, as the CDS has

spelled out, the emphasis is on the newly formed operational command structure, then the old ECS structure must be reduced to one of force generation and training. The Army must cease to compete for command and for resources and recognize its essential place in the structure as a force generator and trainer. This would then drive the career streams to be truly "joint," taking into account more than the traditional, "Regimental System" approach to career advancement.

The participant quoted below recommended a fundamental change to Army organizational culture; that is, eliminating the risk-averse culture and enforcing the implementation of mission command:

Enforce the implementation of Mission Command, and work hard to turn around the risk-adverse culture of military and government.

As the participant quoted below indicated, this may entail trusting LCol's more to do their job:

Trust me, and treat me as if they trust me.

The participants quoted below recommended the creation of a more predictable, stable, proactive Army culture, rather than a reactive culture:

I would create circumstances that would establish some predictability in the Army's Canada-based existence. No matter what level of command I have worked at: battalion, brigade or Area, everybody is firefighting the next day or the next week. This leads to band-aids and improvisations instead of well-reasoned solutions.

Well, stability would be nice. Not so much...a posting in one spot, but it's just sort of stability and consistency of thought and direction would be a bit of a reward or a bit of a treat for a change.

The participant quoted below felt that the 2-year period spent as a unit commander is too short, and that this should be replaced with a 3-year period, in order to increase individual and unit stability (as we saw earlier, in the section on Other Leadership Issues, another participant also felt that the command period was too short, but that person suggested a 4-5 year tenure in order to procedure more mature commanders):

The 2-year period spent as a unit commander is too short. This should be a 3-year position allowing for greater individual and unit stability.

Some participants felt that something needed to be done about the information overload that characterizes many modern organizations, including the Army:

With the technology now, the Generals can get the details, which they couldn't get before, and it's almost insatiable. They can get them and they know they can get them so they want them, whether or not they should have them.

Especially, I believe, at the LCol rank level [one] can only handle so much information in the run of the day before your head gets full and you say screw it and you walk away. And I think what we need to do is...come up with some form of system...to make sure that the ... systems that don't add value to all the stuff we do, and by that I mean things like cell phones, blackberries... .. And I would...reduce the task load on the soldier that

has to worry about all this stuff, CANFORGEN messages and all this crap that comes down the pipe. I would streamline it such that the officers had what the officers needed to command and act as leaders, and that the soldiers had the information and the tools and subsets that they need to function more effectively as soldiers. ...Certainly at the officer level, we are inundated with so much garbage that we really don't need. Let's find our signals in the noise and deal with what we need to be successful, and equip ourselves as such.

Improve Leadership

The participants quoted below suggested improving the leadership, particularly of Colonels, and reducing "careerism:"

Improve the leadership quality of Colonels.

Officers, generally, and Colonels, in particular, must be less "careerist" and more interested in the welfare of their people (and less interested in the welfare of themselves).

In contrast, the participant quoted below suggested somehow guaranteeing the high quality of senior leadership, particularly evident in General Officers:

Finally, I would guarantee (somehow...?) that we will continue to have the high calibre of senior leadership we are increasingly seeing in our Army General Officers.

The participant quoted below is seeking clear, top-down leadership:

Clear unambiguous top-down non-parochial direction which focuses on the things that matter so I can get on with my job in a satisfying and productive manner.

The participant quoted below sees the managing of career expectations as an important leadership and organizational responsibility:

Better communication to its officers about the short, medium and long-term [career] expectations.

Hold Formal Sessions

A few participants recommended holding formal sessions similar to those suggested by Capstick et al. (2005), in order to enhance communication between LColts and senior leadership. The participant quoted below recommended that the CDS and the three environmental chiefs should hold an annual 2-day session with all line unit commanders, in order to discuss issues:

I...truly believe that the CDS, DCDS, and the three environmental chiefs should once a year hold a 2-day bitch session, for lack of better terms, with all the line unit commanding officers, Army, Navy and Air Force. And have them together, without their bosses, to discuss issues that they see coming from the proverbial cold face. Invest in them some support of their opinions, having been charged by a CDS to be commanding officers of the F-echelon units of the Army. I think that they would gain two things, not only a lot of information and perceptual issues, which they may not get otherwise. They would also be

able to communicate certain corporate issues in a manner that they may not get. They may also get a far better feel for what the real opinions, views, and concerns are from a group of individuals that annually changes.

Similarly, the participant quoted below recommended a “platoon commander’s hour,” in which LCol’s would gather together with the CDS or CLS in order to discuss their frustrations:

I think a big platoon commander's hour. I think gathering LCol's in one place and having the CDS or the Chief of Land Staff sit down, okay guys, what's making you angry? And when you do this with your platoon and your troops, it's Leadership 101. We have in the past seen people do this and have the courage enough to stand up in front of some pretty smart folks, some pretty critical folks and take the abuse and then say, okay, noted boys, perhaps we'll act on that. ...You would have to organize it such that there weren't career implications and you'd have to have people who could withstand the scrutiny to be able to lead that sort of thing.

In a similar vein, some participants advocated for improving communication between commanding officers and their soldiers, for example, through more direct personal contact:

The CO should take a day to visit the troops, get in touch with troops.

If I was the commander for one day, I would spend that day visiting the troops. You know...go see what they have to say. ... The guy at the top's got to be connected with the troops. He's making decisions every day, and if he does not have that connection with the troops, then he's often times making decisions, I think, in isolation of reality because of where you are. It's important. The litmus test is always face-to-face with troops, because the troops will always give it to you right between the [inaudible], what they're thinking.

Improve LCol Well-being by Improving Career Planning

A number of recommendations focused on enhancing the well being of individual LCol’s (and by extension, in some cases, their families). For example, some participants advocated for a longer-term career plan so that they could know where they would be posted for the next few years. In addition to knowing what they would be doing career-wise, better career management would allow for better financial and family relocation planning:

I would have liked to envision what was planned for me more than one year in advance. This is greatly frustrating for me...but not as much as it is for my spouse [laughter]. ... I would say give us a long-term plan. ... Tell us what is the plan for us for the next 3 to 5 years. ... It would make the family feel more stable, we would know what to do with our house and it would allow me to plan according to my next posting.

Similarly, the participant quoted below recommended that people be informed about postings farther in advance:

Sort out progression and postings so that people know farther in advance (i.e., 9-12 months vice the current 3-6 months) what they will do and where they will go to do it. That is, for a year in which there is movement.

The participant quoted below was particularly concerned about post-command career management, and suggested better planning in this area:

For the infantry, I also have a concern over post-command career management. Impression is that there is really no one looking out for you once you have completed command. This may not be the actual reality, but it is a definite impression.

Reduce Workload and Operational Tempo

Some participants recommended a reduction in workload or operational tempo, or at least matching tasks with resources:

...People are broken... We're trying to do too much. We're trying to fix the Force, grow the Force. Fix it first.

Match tasks with resources.

Reduce the number of task at the national level.

Slow down the pace.

LCols work longer and harder than ever before. Our superiors have to manage expectations, cut back work, and occasionally give a day off here and there to what is, in my opinion, the hardest working rank (outside of NDHQ).

Improve Quality of Life

The participant quoted below recommended that the CF/Army should help members to better balance their own needs with those of the CF:

Better take into account and balance my personal needs/wishes with those of the CF.

Similarly, some participants recommended accelerating quality of life initiatives, or enhancing pay, pensions, and housing:

I would like to see the QOL initiative accelerated....

I'd increase salaries but see a bigger spread between Officers and NCOs, and provide investment advice, so that soldiers of all ranks have a decent nest-egg (or a home paid for) when they depart the Army after a full career.

Pay raise for Combat Arms NCOs (MCpl to MWO). They do all the heavy lifting.

[Improve] pay, benefits, and job recognition.

I would suggest there should be a benefits segment added to our pension plan or pay scales to adequately acknowledge [those who go overseas time and time again].

Better housing that does not take ALL of your pay increase directly into another agency so you are still left behind the cost of living increase curve. Pay that is tied to responsibility of the position...

Empower LCol

A few participants recommended that the chain of command should become more involved in personnel-related decisions. For example, the participant quoted below felt that there should be better collaboration between a CO and a Medical Officer (MO), so that a CO could have better knowledge of the state of fitness/readiness of his or her troops:

I think there is too much of a gap between medical services and the chain of command. ...We are taking away from the commander's management responsibility. Medical services and the chain of command are closely intertwined. The state of operational readiness is related to the medical state of our personnel. In the past, when an individual had a problem, he met with medical services, his section commander, as well as his platoon commander. That way, we knew our personnel and their state of readiness, and their morale. When I had a doctor in the unit he used to tell me what the unit morale was without going into personal, clinical details. Now, an individual has the freedom to go straight to medical services without us knowing anything about it. It is now hard to get insight into the state of readiness and unit morale from a medical perspective. We should link these two components together. ... I understand that some things are personal and do not affect me or the operations. But I feel we are entitled to know personal details if and when it affects employment and/or deployment capabilities.

The participant quoted below urged more power, in general, for LCol:

I don't know how to do it, but I think I would try and do something to empower LCol, to make decisions which are now held at a higher level.

Finally, one participant recommended improving fitness standards:

I would like to see a more aggressive pursuit of Physical Fitness standards.

To summarize, participants offered a number of recommendations to the Army/CF to improve the overall job satisfaction of LCol: provide sufficient resources; set priorities; improve promotion and reward systems (e.g., modify or eliminate the second language policy or tier system); change organizational structures (e.g., to reduce bureaucracy) and organizational culture (e.g., to increase the use of mission command); improve leadership; introduce formal sessions between LCol and senior officers that will enhance communication; improve the career planning system; enhance quality of life initiatives (including better pay, pensions/benefits and housing); and empower LCol by giving a bigger role to COs in personnel decisions.

Conclusions

The outcomes from this study show two general sets of findings. First, there are a number of job-related satisfiers among the LColos who participated in this study. The data from the Job Satisfaction Survey showed that LColos were more satisfied than the US norms on three scales (i.e., satisfaction with pay, coworkers, and communication within the organization), less satisfied than the norms on one scale (i.e., satisfaction with operating policies and procedures), and as satisfied as the norms on the remaining scales. Similarly, the findings from the psychological work engagement measure showed that LColos were highly engaged in their work. The fact that so many responded at the “extremely engaged” end of the continuum for every question is evidence of the degree to which they take their work seriously.

However, one cannot say that LColos are satisfied with their jobs based on the JSS and WES findings because the JSS and WES measure only a limited number of work dimensions. This is why it is important to supplement the findings from the JSS and WES with findings from the focus groups and e-mail responses. The qualitative data revealed a number of additional job satisfiers, including the opportunity to command, to influence the CF/Army, and to work with soldiers (e.g., as mentors and educators). However, it should be noted that not all LColos (in the five MOCs examined here) will be given a command. Most will reach a career plateau as a staff officer. Other sources of satisfaction for the LColos in this study involved the intrinsic (e.g., the opportunity to do important, challenging, interesting, or fun work) and extrinsic (e.g., respect and recognition associated with the LCol rank, and enjoyable relations with staff/co-workers) aspects of their work.

The second general finding is that, while LColos are satisfied with some aspects of their jobs, they are dissatisfied with other aspects. The dissatisfiers include those related to promotion, leadership, general organizational issues, concerns about post-command, and concerns about workload, OPTEMPO, and Quality of Life.

The findings from the focus group discussions and e-mail submissions tended to mirror those from *The Army Climate and Culture Survey*, in part because we asked specifically about the job frustrations that emerged from that study. But the findings from the current study also extended those from the earlier survey. That is, whereas *The Army Climate and Culture Survey* suggested that Army LColos are dissatisfied with the amount of work they do, their leadership experiences (including questioning leader decisions), and second language training, the present study provided reasons why LColos are dissatisfied in these areas.

For example, although transformational leadership has been shown to be more effective than transactional leadership (Bass, 1990), LColos in this study report experiencing transformational leadership only sparingly. While they tend to feel that senior CF/Army leaders display transformational leadership, they also note that it is not consistent, and that senior leaders sometimes change from a transformational to a transactional approach depending on people’s reactions to the former (e.g., if they cannot convince someone of the legitimacy of an argument using a transformational approach, they may switch to a more hierarchical, “do as I say” type of transactional leadership).

Similarly, LCol in *The Army Climate and Culture Survey* reported working on too many unnecessary projects. Based on the responses from the qualitative portion of this study, we have a better indication of what they meant by that. What the LCol told us was that they faced too many demands in their job, for which they had too little time. Because of this, they found themselves having to spend too much time on more mundane, low-priority issues (e.g., signing forms) when they would have preferred to have given more attention to the more important, higher-priority work that passed their desks. In short, as noted by Capstick et al. (2005), many LCol appear to feel that they lack control over their work.

The biggest concern for LCol was the second language training requirement for promotion to Colonel. A number of concerns and suggestions were raised, with many focusing on the difficulty of finding opportunities to work in the other official language in order to promote retention of the second language. These types of concerns were recognized by both Anglophone and Francophone speakers. Thus, the findings from this study add depth to those from *The Army Climate and Culture Survey*.

In addition to raising concerns, this study also asked LCol to provide potential solutions to their main dissatisfiers. One of these solutions was echoed by Capstick et al. (2005): town hall meetings between senior CF/Army staff and LCol, where LCol could offer advice and gripe without the threat of career/promotion retribution. Many LCol felt that this would be a good avenue to have their voices heard, especially when they tend to feel that, even though they have exceptional levels of experience, their advice often is ignored.

The most frequent suggestion for addressing CF/Army concerns was focused on the perceived need to match resources with requirements, either by increasing resources or decreasing requirements. It was frequently noted that the current state of affairs was damaging to the people in the CF. If the number of hours worked by LCol (whether in A-jobs or not) is an example of the typical level of involvement of senior CF/Army officers, then there is merit to their concerns. Research exploring the outcome of role overload (especially in the work domain) consistently shows that the more time people spend at work, the less healthy they become. Role overload has been linked to increased burnout, depression, anxiety, as well as decreased job satisfaction (see Higgins, Duxbury, & Johnson, 2004, for a review). Role overload also has been linked to higher rates of work absenteeism and lower levels of job commitment, including increased likelihood of leaving (Duxbury & Higgins, 2003; Higgins et al., 2004). In a recent Canadian study, Higgins et al. (2004) showed that those experiencing role overload (especially work overload) were more likely to be in poorer health, to be treated by a general practitioner for physical ailments, to be treated by a mental health professional, and to have required both inpatient and emergency room care. Thus, there are severe implications to CF/Army staffing if resources (especially people) remain scarce, while requirements remain high.

In summary, the present study explored job satisfiers and dissatisfiers among 49 Army LCol in five MOCs (Combat Arms and Logistics). The study was in response to findings from *The Army Climate and Culture Survey*, where the LCol rank was highlighted as potentially disaffected. Quantitative results (using the JSS and WES) showed that the LCol were generally satisfied and very engaged in their work. Qualitative findings from a series of focus groups and e-mail responses revealed several job satisfiers (the opportunity to command, to influence the CF/Army, and to work with soldiers as mentors and educators, the intrinsic

aspects of their work, and the extrinsic aspects of their work). However, the qualitative findings also revealed a series of dissatisfiers with regard to promotion (second language requirement, academic requirements, prior command requirement, the need to be placed in one or more A-jobs, excessive workload demands, the effects of promotion demands on family, and the Army Succession Planning Process), leadership (general leadership issues such as micro-managing, feeling free to question leaders, transformational vs. transactional leadership, and other organizational issues), general organizational issues, concerns about the post-command transition to a staff job, and concerns about workload, OPTEMPO, and quality of life. The study also asked LCol's to suggest possible ways to address or fix their biggest dissatisfiers. Responses focused on the need to provide sufficient resources to LCol's (among others), set priorities (e.g., resources to match requirements), improve promotion and reward systems (e.g., modify or eliminate the second language policy or tier system), change organizational structures (e.g., to reduce bureaucracy) and organizational culture (e.g., to increase the use of mission command), improve leadership at the senior levels, introduce formal sessions between LCol's and senior officers in order to enhance communication, improve the career planning system, enhance quality of life initiatives (including better pay, pensions/benefits and housing), and empower LCol's by giving a bigger role to CO's in personnel decisions.

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Annex A DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee Approval

Defence R&D Canada - Toronto
1133 Sheppard Avenue West - PO Box 2000 - Toronto - Ontario - Canada - M3M 3B9

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (HREC) REVIEW

Protocol Number: L-520
Title: Assessing Career Dissatisfaction in Land Force Lieutenant Colonels
Investigator(s): **Dr D. McCreary**, Dr A. Febbraro, LCol M. Villeneuve*, Dr P. Bradley**, and Dr D. Charbonneau**
* Directorate Human Resources Research and Evaluation (DHRRE)
**Royal Military College, Kingston
Section: Command Effectiveness and Behaviour
Research Centre: DRDC Toronto

Ethical Review

Committee Members: Dr J. Landolt (Chairman)
Dr F. Buick (physiology member)
Dr C. Courchesne (alternate medical member; absent, comments received)
Dr D. Pestell (medical officer; absent)
Dr A. Febbraro (psychology member; excluded, Co-I)
Dr D. McCreary (research ethics representative; excluded, CO-I)
Dr J. Keillor (alternate psychology member)
Mr J. Stephens (legal representative)
Dr F. Sunahara (monitoring member)
Mr R. Thoms (internal lay member; absent)
Mr J. Ulrichsen (alternate internal lay member)

Secretary: Miss W. Seabrook
In Attendance: Dr D. McCreary and Maj C. Carlos (medical support coordinator)
Date of Meeting: 10 August 2005


Review and Discussion:

1. Dr McCreary spoke to the protocol indicating that this study will focus on career-related concerns within the Lieutenant-Colonel (LCol) ranks. LCols display dissatisfaction with their degree of control and influence that are not found in the other service ranks. Information will be gathered from focus group questions, and

1/2

mail responses to written questions from non-focus group participants to address the issue.

2. The Committee had a number of concerns, which were implemented by the investigators (see memo McCreary/Chair HREC, 17 August 05, and email traffic regarding “unsigned consent” – attached).
3. Subject to the requirements at para 2, which were addressed by the investigators, the revised protocol is APPROVED and assigned the designation: Revised Protocol #L-520.
4. **The investigators are reminded that any changes in the approved protocol or any untoward incidents or injuries arising as a result of a subject’s participation in the study are to be brought to the attention of the Committee Chairman as soon as they occur either verbally or in writing. Additionally, the Principal Investigator should complete, as soon as possible, Annex I in: DRDC Guidelines for Human Subject Participation in Research Projects – see Corpranet for Form.**
5. This approval is valid for the period of 18 months from the date of this meeting. Subject involvement must be complete by this date; otherwise, the protocol will require further review.
6. On completion of this research project, the Principal Investigator must provide Chair, DRDC HREC with the following:
 - a summary of any untoward incidents, and
 - a summary of “lessons learned”, including
 - number of subjects that participated
 - whether or not objectives were met, and
 - any other information deemed important to the HREC for conducting future experiments of this type.


Jack P. Landolt, Ph.D.
Chairman
DRDC HREC
(416) 635-2120

Attachments:

2/2

Annex B DHRRE Research Review Approval

Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation
National Defence Headquarters
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa ON K1A 0K2

DHRRE RESEARCH REVIEW BOARD DECISION

Serial Number: 399/05

Title: ASSESSING CAREER DISSATISFACTION IN LAND FORCE - LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Researcher: Dr D. McCreary

Organization: DRDC

Review and Discussion:

1. The general idea of any research on individuals is to provide a product respecting the rules of the scientific approach and following the established research practices of the behavioural sciences. Your research proposal satisfies these two requirements and is therefore approved.
2. Your project is assigned survey coordination number: 399/05. **The following text shall be displayed on the front page of your survey(s) and consent form(s):**

DHRRE authorizes the administration of this survey within DND/CF in accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Authorization number: 399/05.

DRERH autorise l'administration de ce sondage dans le MDN/FC en accord avec le CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Numéro d'autorisation: 399/05.

3. You are reminded that any changes to the approved protocol or any untoward incidents or injuries arising as a result of any subject's participation in the study shall be brought to the attention of the Committee Chairperson in writing immediately.
4. This approval is valid for Lieutenant-Colonels within the Land Forces. Approval is granted for the period of 5 September 2005 to 30 November 2005 and the distribution must be complete by this date; otherwise, the protocol will require further review.

5. To ensure that the survey co-ordination function primarily serves practical rather than research interests, DHRRE requires the following documentation to complete our records:

a. an electronic copy of any research reports arising out of this request/project.

6. **The following disclaimer shall be presented as the first page of the research report.**

“The opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces”

7. Please accept our acknowledgements for your contribution to research within the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.

(original signed by)

R.A. Boswell, MA

Lieutenant-Colonel

Acting Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation

(613) 992-0244

Annex C RMC Research Ethics Approval

03/28/2006 15:32 6135416822

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PAGE 02/02



ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA · COLLEGE MILITAIRE ROYAL DU CANADA

PO Box 17000, Stn. Forces · CP 17000, Succursale Forces · Kingston, Ontario · K7K 7B4

Ethics Approval Letter

File number: 2005-17 MPL
Project title: Assessing Career Dissatisfaction in Land Force Lieutenant Colonels
Principal and co-investigators: Dr. D.R. McCreary and Dr. A. Febbraro (DRDC), LCol
M. Villeneuve (DHRRE), Dr. P. Bradley and Dr. D. Charbonneau, Department of
Military Psychology and Leadership
Date of submission: 26 Aug 2005
Anticipated commencement date: Sep 2005
Anticipated completion date: Dec 2005
Date of approval: 6 Sep 2005

This is to inform you that RMC Research Ethics Board (REB) has granted approval to the above-mentioned project, and it can now proceed. The approval is based only on the documents submitted and only in the language(s) presented. This approval is valid for 12 months. If the project goes beyond this date, you must inform REB and obtain approval for an extension.

It is noted that this project has already received approvals from Human Research Ethics Committee of DRDC and from DHREE.

During the course of the research, no deviations from or changes to the protocol, information document or consent form may be initiated without prior written approval from the RMC REB.

Signature: S. Ranganathan
Dr. S. Ranganathan
Chair, RMC REB
Phone: 613-541-6000 x6057
e-mail: ranganathan-s@rmc.ca

Annex D DLPCP Letter of Support to Senior Staff

Land Personnel Concepts and Policy
National Defence Headquarters
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2

5762-2 (LPCP 4)

20 September 2005

Distribution List

Army Lieutenant-Colonel Study

1. In 2004, the Army commissioned the "Army Climate and Culture Study". One of the results showed that Lieutenant Colonels (LCols) from Armour, Infantry, Artillery, Engineers and Logistics Land MOCs had high levels of career dissatisfaction. In 2005, Land Personnel Concepts and Policy (LPCP) and Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto proposed further research that would examine issues raised by Army Lieutenant-Colonels. This research is authorized by CLS and is part of the Army Social Science Research Programme 2005-6.

2. This fall, Dr Don McCreary, Research Psychologist, Stress and Coping Group, DRDC Toronto will be conducting focus groups with pre-command, command and post-command LCols across the Army. Letters from DRDC will be sent directly to LCols in your Area inviting them to participate. It is expected that there will be requirements for coordination between the Areas and DRDC to arrange focus group sessions. Direct liaison between GIs and Dr Don McCreary is authorized.

3. The information obtained from these focus groups is important to future development of personnel plans, programmes and policies for LCols. Addressees are requested to support this research and encourage full participation in this

1/2

Concepts et politiques en matière de personnel
de la Force terrestre
Quartier général de la Défense nationale
101, promenade du Colonel-By
Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0K2

5766-1 (CPPPT 4-2)

Le septembre 2005

Liste de distribution

Étude sur les lieutenants-colonels de l'Armée de terre

1. En 2004, l'Armée de terre (AT) a commandé le sondage sur la culture et le climat de l'AT qui a notamment révélé un niveau d'insatisfaction professionnelle très élevé chez les lieutenants-colonels (lcol) des GPM de l'arme blindée, de l'infanterie, de l'artillerie, du génie et de la logistique de la Force terrestre. En 2005, Concepts et politiques en matière de personnel de la Force terrestre (CPPPT) et Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) - Toronto ont proposé qu'une recherche soit effectuée afin d'étudier les points soulevés par les lcol de l'AT. Cette recherche approuvée par le CFMD fait partie du programme de recherche en sciences sociales 2005-2006 de l'AT.

2. Cet automne, M. Don McCreary, psychologue en recherche, Groupe du stress et des stratégies d'adaptation, RDDC Toronto, animera des groupes de discussion avec des lcol de l'ensemble de l'AT qui exerceront un commandement, occupent un poste de commandement ou l'ont déjà fait. RDDC enverra directement aux lcol de votre secteur des lettres les invitant à y participer. On prévoit que les secteurs et RDDC devront coordonner la tenue des séances des groupes de discussion. Les communications directes entre les GI et M. Don McCreary sont autorisées.

3. L'information recueillie grâce à ces groupes de discussion est importante pour l'élaboration future des plans, programmes et politiques relatifs aux lcol. On demande aux destinataires d'appuyer cette recherche et on les

DMCS 29387
5200-1

Annex E Initial Contact Letter Sent to Army LCol

19 September 2005

Dear Land Force Lieutenant-Colonels:

Re: Career Dissatisfaction Among Land Force LCol

In the recent Army Climate and Culture Survey conducted by the Director General – Land Capability Development (Land Personnel Concepts and Policy), LCol appeared to be experiencing some of the highest levels of career dissatisfaction in the Land Force. The survey results highlighted four main findings: (1) LCol reported difficulty completing their daily assignments, as well as the added burden of having to work on “unnecessary things;” (2) LCol reported experiencing less transformational leadership from their superiors than would be expected on the basis of their rank; (3) LCol reported feeling less free to question their superiors’ decisions and were less inclined to approve of others questioning leaders than would be expected on the basis of their rank; and (4) LCol were less favourable to second-language requirements than other ranks. However, these findings were based on a very small sample of 15 Army LCol and may not be representative of the career concerns facing most Army LCol.

To determine the representativeness of these findings, the Director of Land Personnel Concepts and Policy has asked Defence R&D Canada – Toronto to examine this issue in more depth. Along with researchers from the Royal Military College, we will be conducting a series of focus groups with LCol across Canada. These will take place this Fall, will be held at most major Army centres, and will last between 1-2 hours.

Any data that you provide will remain strictly confidential. The risks associated with your participation in this study are minimal, as the issues to be raised consist of day-to-day aspects of work life. Unfortunately, we cannot accommodate everyone who volunteers for the focus groups: the focus groups will be capped at a maximum of 8 people. However, everyone who is interested in contributing their thoughts to the focus group questions will be given an opportunity to do so once the focus groups have finished.

If you would like to participate in the focus groups, please complete the Reply Sheet attached to this letter and FAX it to LCol (Retired) Peter Bradley at the Royal Military College. The information is strictly confidential and will be used to determine the locations for the focus groups, as well as to determine the best composition for each. Please note that showing an interest in participating at this stage does not mean you are committing yourself to the focus group project. You are free to withdraw your participation at any time.

The Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) and the RMC Research Ethics Board (REB) have approved this study (Protocol L-520). DHRRE authorizes this project within DND/CF in accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02 and has authorization number 309/05. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at Don.McCreary@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or (416) 635-2008

(English-speaking only; to discuss the study in French, please contact Dr. Danielle Charbonneau, Charbonneau-d@rmc.ca or (613) 541-6000 ext. 6635).

Sincerely,

Don McCreary, PhD
Defence Scientist

REPLY SHEET FOR LCOL FOCUS GROUP STUDY

To help us in organizing the focus groups for this project, we need some information from all potential participants. Please answer these questions and FAX this Reply Sheet within five (5) days of receiving this letter to LCol (Retired) Peter Bradley, PhD, at **613-541-6822**.

Below are the dates and locations for the focus groups (more specific locations and times are to be determined). Please check your preferred location:

- Gagetown, Wednesday, October 12
- Valcartier, Wednesday, October 19
- Montreal, Wednesday, October 26
- Kingston, Thursday, October 27
- Edmonton, Friday, November 4
- Ottawa, Wednesday, November 16
- Toronto, Friday, November 18
- I can't make it to any of the focus groups, but would like to contribute to the study in other ways.

Note: Unfortunately, we are unable to cover any travel-related costs you may incur when attending these focus groups.

Name:			
Location of current posting:			
Phone:		E-mail:	
MOC:		Gender:	Male Female
Number of years at LCol rank:		Have you ever commanded at the LCol Rank?	Yes No
If you have commanded at the LCol rank, are you (please circle):			
Currently Commanding		Post-Command	

Le 19 septembre 2005

Aux lieutenants-colonels de la Force terrestre

Objet : Mécontentement des lcol de la Force terrestre au chapitre de leur carrière

D'après le récent sondage sur le climat et la culture de l'Armée de terre mené par le Directeur général – Capacité du développement Force terrestre (Concepts et politiques personnel Force terrestre), les lcol semblent ressentir, face à leur carrière, des niveaux d'insatisfaction parmi les plus élevés de la Force terrestre (FT). Les résultats du sondage ont fait ressortir quatre grandes constatations : 1) les lcol ont indiqué avoir de la difficulté à terminer leurs travaux quotidiens et devoir travailler à des « choses inutiles »; 2) les lcol ont dit obtenir de leurs supérieurs un leadership moins transformationnel qu'on ne s'y attendrait de la part de militaires de ce grade; 3) les lcol se sentent moins libres de remettre en question les décisions de leurs supérieurs et moins enclins à approuver les remises en question d'autres chefs qu'on ne s'y attendrait de la part de militaires de ce grade; 4) les lcol voient les exigences linguistiques d'un œil moins favorable que les militaires d'autres grades. Ces conclusions, toutefois, reposent sur un très petit échantillon de 15 lcol de l'Armée de terre et peuvent n'être pas représentatives des préoccupations de carrière de la majorité des lcol de la FT.

Pour juger du caractère représentatif de ces conclusions, le Directeur – Concepts et politiques en matière de personnel de la Force terrestre a demandé à Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada – Toronto d'approfondir la question. De concert avec des chercheurs du Collège militaire royal, nous nous proposons de tenir une série de groupes de discussion auxquels nous convierons des lcol de tout le Canada. Ces rencontres auront lieu cet automne, dans la plupart des grands centres de l'Armée, et dureront de une à deux heures.

Tous les renseignements que vous fournirez demeureront strictement confidentiels. Les risques associés à votre participation à l'étude sont minimes, les thèmes abordés se constituant des aspects quotidiens de votre vie au travail. Nous ne pourrions, malheureusement, accepter tous les intéressés, car il y aura au maximum huit participants à chaque discussion. Toute personne, cependant, qui désire communiquer ses vues quant aux questions abordées lors des discussions aura l'occasion de le faire une fois celles-ci terminées.

Si vous désirez prendre part à l'un des groupes de discussion, veuillez remplir la fiche de réponse jointe à la présente lettre et la transmettre par télécopieur au Lcol (retraité) Peter Bradley, au Collège militaire royal. Les renseignements sont strictement confidentiels et serviront à décider des lieux où tenir les discussions ainsi qu'à déterminer la meilleure composition pour chaque groupe. Veuillez remarquer que l'expression de votre intérêt, à l'étape actuelle, ne se traduit pas par un engagement de votre part à l'égard du projet. Vous pouvez retirer votre participation quand bon vous semble.

Le Comité d'éthique en matière d'étude sur des sujets humains (CEESH) de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) ainsi que le Comité d'éthique de la recherche du Collège militaire royal ont approuvé l'étude (protocole L-520). Le Directeur – Recherche et évaluation en ressources humaines (DRERH) a autorisé le déroulement du projet au sein du MDN et des FC en conformité avec le CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02 et lui a attribué le numéro d'autorisation 309/05. Si vous avez des questions, n'hésitez

pas à communiquer avec moi à l'adresse Don.McCreary@drdc-rddc.gc.ca ou au numéro (416) 635-2008 (en anglais seulement; pour discuter de l'étude en français, veuillez vous adresser à Mme Danielle Charbonneau à l'adresse Charbonneau-d@rmc.ca ou au numéro (613) 541-6000, poste 6635).

Merci de votre attention,

Don McCreary
Scientifique de la Défense

FICHE DE RÉPONSE EN VUE DE L'ÉTUDE EN GROUPES DE DISCUSSION COMPOSÉS DE LCOL

Pour nous aider à organiser les groupes de discussion du présent projet, il nous faut quelques renseignements sur les participants potentiels. Veuillez répondre aux questions suivantes et transmettre votre fiche de réponse dans les cinq jours suivant la réception de cette lettre au Lcol (retraité) Peter Bradley, par télécopieur au **(613) 541-6822**.

Vous trouverez ci-dessous les dates et locations des groupes de discussion (les heures et locations précises sont à déterminer). Veuillez indiquer votre préférence.

Gagetown, le mercredi 12 octobre
 Valcartier, le mercredi 19 octobre
 Montréal, le mercredi 26 octobre
 Kingston, le jeudi 27 octobre
 Edmonton, le vendredi 4 novembre
 Ottawa, le mercredi 16 novembre
 Toronto, le vendredi 18 novembre
 Je ne peux être présent(e) à aucun des groupes de discussion, mais je désire contribuer à l'étude d'autre façon.

Malheureusement, nous ne pouvons couvrir les dépenses reliées à votre participation à ces groupes de discussion.

Nom :			
Lieu de l'affectation actuelle :			
Téléphone :		Courriel :	
GPM :		Sexe :	M F
Nombre d'années au grade de lcol :		Avez-vous déjà commandé au grade de lcol?	Oui Non
Si vous avez déjà commandé au grade de lcol (veuillez encercler la bonne réponse) :			
Commandez-vous à l'heure actuelle?		Avez-vous cessé de commander?	

Annex F Information Sheet Used in Focus Groups

Purpose	The purpose of these focus groups is to get at the root causes of the perceived lack of control and other aspects of career dissatisfaction that Land Force LCol's seem to be experiencing.
The Present Study	Each focus group will contain 6-8 Army LCol's and will last 1-2 hours. During this time, we will ask you about what aspects of your career are satisfying, dissatisfying, as well as how the CF can improve your career satisfaction. In order to be as accurate as possible, we will be recording each focus group and later transcribing them for analysis. Before each focus group, we will ask participants to complete a demographic questionnaire and a short job satisfaction survey used in the public service. This latter questionnaire will allow us to compare the overall satisfaction of focus group participants to other samples.
Voluntary Participation	Your participation is completely voluntary. You may end your participation at any time during the focus group, and you may refuse to answer any question, without repercussion or penalty.
Importance of Your Participation	The findings from this project will be presented to the Director of Land Personnel Concepts and Policy in the form of a final report. The accuracy and quality of the findings we present is entirely dependent on the openness of our participants. Thus, should you choose to participate, it is important that you be as honest as possible.
Guarantee of Anonymity	Your anonymity is guaranteed. Your name will not be included anywhere in our data files. Your information will be combined with those from other participants and only group data will be presented. To assist us in this, please do not put your name on any research materials and refrain from naming yourself during the focus groups. If excerpts from the focus groups are to be used in reports or publications, no identifying information will be included. In the event of an information request filed under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, the Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) is also required by law to screen all data to ensure that individual identities are not disclosed, prior to releasing any information.
Guarantee of Confidentiality	The confidentiality of your responses is guaranteed. DRDC researchers are guided by, and adhere to, professional and ethical guidelines concerning behavioural research that involves people. Only DRDC-authorized researchers will have access to the information from this

	evaluation. DRDC is responsible for confidential storage of the data in a secure area.
Benefits	This research will benefit the CF by helping them to develop a greater understanding of what aspects of their careers LCol's are dissatisfied with, including the factors that contribute to dissatisfaction and how the CF may be able to mitigate its effects. Ultimately, this study could lead to policies and procedures that could improve retention of senior Land Force officers.
Risks	There are no known risks associated with participating in this focus group.
Contact Information	<p>For any further questions or concerns about this project, or if you wish a copy of the final report, please contact Dr. Don McCreary, Stress & Coping Group, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2008, 634-2008 (CSN), or Don.McCreary@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (English-speaking only; to discuss the study in French, please contact Dr. Danielle Charbonneau, Charbonneau-d@rmc.ca or (613) 541-6000 ext. 6635)</p> <p>This project has been reviewed and approved by the DRDC Research Ethics Board (Protocol L-520). If you would like to speak with the Chair of this Board, please contact Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, 634-2120 (CSN), or Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca</p> <p>DHRRE authorizes this project within DND/CF in accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02 and has authorization number XXX/XX.</p>

Thank You for Participating

Objet	Les discussions de groupe visent à discerner les causes profondes de la perception de manque de contrôle et des autres aspects du mécontentement professionnel que semblent éprouver les lcol de la Force terrestre.
Étude	Chaque groupe de discussion sera formé de six à huit lcol et durera de une à deux heures, pendant lesquelles nous vous demanderons quels aspects de votre carrière vous semblent satisfaisants et insatisfaisants, et ce que peuvent faire les FC pour rehausser votre degré de satisfaction. Pour atteindre la plus grande précision possible, nous enregistrerons toutes les discussions de groupe et les transcrirons par la suite aux fins d'analyse. Avant chacun des groupes de discussion, nous demanderons aux participants de remplir un questionnaire démographique et un bref questionnaire sur la satisfaction au travail utilisé dans les sondages menés dans la fonction publique. Ce dernier questionnaire nous permettra de comparer la satisfaction générale des participants aux groupes de discussion à celle d'autres échantillons.
Participation volontaire	Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. Vous pouvez y mettre fin quand bon vous semble au cours de la discussion et vous êtes libre de refuser de répondre à une question ou à une autre, sans crainte de répercussions ou de sanctions.
Importance de votre participation	Les conclusions auxquelles mènera ce projet seront soumises au Directeur – Concepts et politiques personnel Force terrestre sous forme de rapport final. La précision et la qualité des conclusions que nous présenterons dépendent entièrement de l'ouverture des participants. Ainsi, si vous décidez d'y prendre part, il importe que vous vous montriez aussi franc que possible.
Garantie d'anonymat	Votre anonymat est garanti. Votre nom ne figurera nulle part dans nos dossiers de données. Vos données personnelles seront combinées à celles d'autres participants, et seules des données de groupe seront présentées. Pour nous appuyer à ce chapitre, nous vous prions de n'inscrire votre nom sur aucun des documents de recherche et de vous efforcer de ne pas vous nommer pendant la discussion. Si des extraits des discussions doivent être utilisés dans des rapports ou des publications, aucun renseignement permettant de vous identifier n'y sera versé. Advenant qu'une demande de renseignements soit soumise en vertu des dispositions de la <i>Loi sur l'accès à l'information</i> ou de la <i>Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels</i> , sachez que le Directeur – Accès à l'information et protection des renseignements personnels (DAIPRP) est tenu par la loi de passer au crible toutes les données pour s'assurer que l'identité des personnes n'est pas révélée avant de communiquer quelque information que ce soit.

Garantie de confidentialité	Le caractère confidentiel de vos réponses est garanti. Les chercheurs de RDDC sont guidés par des lignes directrices professionnelles et déontologiques en matière de recherche comportementale sur les humains et ils y adhèrent. Seuls des chercheurs autorisés par RDDC auront accès aux renseignements de cette évaluation. RDDC est chargé de conserver les données dans une zone protégée afin d'en garantir la confidentialité.
Avantages	La recherche avantagera les FC en les aidant à mieux comprendre les aspects insatisfaisants de la carrière des Icol qui contribuent à leur mécontentement et la façon dont elles peuvent en atténuer les effets. En bout de ligne, l'étude pourrait mener à l'élaboration de politiques et de procédures susceptibles d'améliorer le maintien en poste des officiers supérieurs de la Force terrestre.
Risques	Aucun risque connu ne s'associe à la participation aux présents groupes de discussion.
Coordonnées des personnes ressources	<p>Si vous avez d'autres questions ou réserves au sujet du projet, ou désirez obtenir un exemplaire du rapport final, veuillez communiquer avec M. Don McCreary, Groupe du stress et des stratégies d'adaptation, RDDC Toronto, aux numéros (416) 635-2008 ou 634-2008 (RCCC), ou à l'adresse Don.McCreary@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (en anglais seulement; pour parler de l'étude en français, veuillez communiquer avec Mme Danielle Charbonneau à l'adresse Charbonneau-d@rmc.ca ou au numéro (613) 541-6000, poste 6635).</p> <p>Le projet a été revu et approuvé par le comité d'éthique de la recherche de RDDC (protocole L-520). Si vous désirez parler au président de ce comité, veuillez communiquer avec M. Jack Landolt aux numéros (416) 635-2120 ou 634 2120 (RCCC) ou à l'adresse Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca.</p> <p>Le DRERH a autorisé le déroulement du présent projet au sein du MDN et des FC en conformité avec le CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02 et lui a attribué le numéro d'autorisation 309/05.</p>

Merci de votre participation.

Annex G Questions Asked to All Participants

Career Dissatisfaction in Army LColS

Below are the questions we asked Army LColS in the focus groups we conducted during the Fall of 2005. Please consider each one and write as little, or as much, as you want to in response to each one.

1. What do you find most satisfying about being a LCol?
2. What do you find most dissatisfying about being a LCol?
3. Do you receive mostly transformational or transactional leadership from superiors? **Note:** **Transformational leaders** inspire followers by providing a vision and developing an organizational culture that stimulates high performance; they transmit a sense of mission, stimulate learning experiences, and inspire new and creative ways of thinking in followers. **Transactional Leadership** works on an exchange principle, such as exchanging money or praise for good work, loyalty and commitment.
4. Do you feel free to question superiors?
5. Do you understand the army vision and feel a part of its implementation?
6. How do you feel about the career progression system in general and second-language requirements and training in particular?
7. Realistically, what do you feel the CF can do to improve your overall job satisfaction?
8. If you were King (or Queen) for a day, what one or two things would you do to make the army a happier place for you and your peers?
9. Are there any other dissatisfiers or stresses regarding your work or quality-of-life that you'd like to tell us about?

Mécontentement professionnel des lieutenants-colonels de l'armée au chapitre de leur carrière

Voici les questions que nous avons posées aux lieutenants-colonels de l'armée participant aux discussions de groupe que nous avons tenues à l'automne 2005. Veuillez examiner chacune d'elles et y répondre en écrivant le moins possible ou le plus possible, comme bon vous semble.

1. Qu'est-ce qui vous satisfait le plus dans le fait d'être lieutenant-colonel?
2. Qu'est-ce qui vous mécontente le plus dans le fait d'être lieutenant-colonel?
3. Quel genre de leadership vos supérieurs exercent-ils en général? transformationnel ou transactionnel? **Note : le leader transformationnel** inspire ses subordonnés en fournissant une vision et en établissant une culture organisationnelle qui stimule un niveau élevé de rendement; il transmet un sens de mission, encourage l'expérience d'apprentissage et stimule chez ses subordonnés de nouvelles méthodes créatives de penser. **Le leader transactionnel** s'appuie sur un principe d'échange, comme échanger de l'argent ou des éloges contre un travail bien fait, la loyauté ou le dévouement.
4. Vous sentez-vous libre de poser des questions à vos supérieurs?
5. Comprenez-vous la vision de l'armée et avez-vous l'impression de faire partie de la réalisation de cette vision?
6. Que pensez-vous du système d'avancement professionnel en général et des exigences en langue seconde, surtout de l'instruction?
7. Tout en restant dans le domaine de ce qui est réalisable, que pensez-vous que les FC peuvent faire pour améliorer votre satisfaction professionnelle?
8. Si vous étiez roi (ou reine) pour une journée, citez une ou deux choses que vous feriez pour faire de l'armée un milieu beaucoup plus satisfaisant pour vous et vos pairs.
9. Y a-t-il dans votre travail ou dans votre qualité de vie d'autres facteurs de mécontentement ou de stress dont vous voulez nous faire part?

Annex H E-Mail Sent to Non-Focus Group LCol

Hello,

Last September I sent you a letter asking you to participate in a study of “Career Dissatisfaction Among Land Force LCol” and you indicated your interest in helping out with the project. Since then we have conducted 9 focus groups with 30 LCol across Canada. However, because you were interested in contributing to the study, I want to give you the opportunity to provide your own input before my colleagues and I begin analyzing the responses we already have and start writing our final report for the Director of Land Personnel Concepts and Policy.

If you still wish to participate, I will send you four documents: (1) an information sheet describing the study (you should keep this for your files; it contains contact information in case you would like a copy of the final report); (2) a list of the questions we asked during the focus groups; (3) two short questionnaires assessing job satisfaction (so that we can be sure that those who attended the focus groups were not more or less dissatisfied than those, such as yourself, who contributed this way); and (4) a short list of general demographic questions, so that we can provide a basic description of the sample in our report. You would then fill out the last three documents and return them to me. Your responses should be anonymous and will be kept confidential.

However, I would like you to choose how I send those documents to you:

1. The easiest way is by e-mail. If you choose this option, I will send you the documents as Word files; you can complete them on your computer and e-mail them back to me. I will copy the files into a master file and delete the originals, protecting your anonymity.
2. An alternative is that I e-mail you the files, you can complete them on your computer (or by hand), and you can then print them out and either FAX or mail them to me.
3. A third option is that I can mail you the documents in a hard copy format and you can send them back to me in a stamped, pre-addressed envelope that I will provide.

Because my co-investigators and I have an April 1st deadline to finish our report, we would appreciate hearing back from you as soon as possible. If you wish to participate, it would be great if you could get your responses to us within a week of receiving the documents.

Please respond to this e-mail and let me know if you are willing and able (given the time constraints) to participate and, if so, how you would like to receive the documents (i.e., one of the three options mentioned above).

Thank you,

Don McCreary

En septembre dernier, je vous ai envoyé une lettre vous invitant à participer à une étude sur le « mécontentement des lieutenants-colonels de la Force terrestre au chapitre de leur carrière » et vous avez indiqué que vous étiez prêt à contribuer au projet. Nous avons tenu depuis 9 discussions de groupe dans tout le Canada où 30 lieutenants-colonels ont pris part. Toutefois, vu votre intérêt à participer à l'étude, je vous donne l'occasion de formuler vos observations avant que mes collègues et moi analysions les réponses que nous avons déjà reçues et commençons à rédiger notre rapport final pour le Directeur –Concepts et politique personnel Force terrestre.

Si vous souhaitez toujours participer, je vous enverrai quatre documents : 1) une fiche de d'informations décrivant l'étude, que vous devriez garder dans vos dossiers car elle contient les coordonnées de la personne à contacter au cas où vous aimeriez recevoir une copie du rapport final; 2) une liste des questions que nous avons posées pendant les discussions de groupe; 3) deux courts questionnaires évaluant la satisfaction professionnelle (afin que nous puissions nous assurer que ceux qui ont participé aux discussions de groupe ne sont ni plus ni moins satisfaits que ceux qui ont contribué de la manière dont vous le faites); 4) une petite liste de questions démographiques générales qui nous permettront de fournir une description de base de l'échantillon dans notre rapport. Vous remplirez ensuite les trois derniers documents et me les retournerez. Vos réponses devraient être anonymes et seront gardées secrètes.

Je voudrais toutefois que vous choisissiez la manière par laquelle je vous enverrai les documents :

1. La façon la plus simple est par courriel. Le cas échéant, je vous enverrai les documents comme fichiers MS Word. Vous pouvez les remplir à l'ordinateur et me renvoyer les fichiers par courriel. Je les copierai dans le fichier principal et supprimerai les originaux, assurant ainsi votre anonymat.
2. Autrement, vous remplissez à l'ordinateur ou à la main les documents que je vous envoie par courriel. Vous les imprimez ensuite et me les envoyez par télécopieur ou par la poste.
3. Une troisième manière consiste à vous envoyer les documents imprimés. Vous me les renvoyez dans une enveloppe pré-adressée et affranchie que je fournirai.

Mes co-chercheurs et moi devons remettre notre rapport le 1^{er} avril. Nous vous serions donc reconnaissants de nous faire connaître votre décision le plus tôt possible. Si vous souhaitez participer, l'idéal pour nous serait d'obtenir vos réponses dans la semaine où les documents vous sont parvenus.

Veuillez répondre à ce courriel et me faire savoir si vous êtes disposé(e) à participer et en êtes capable (vu l'échéancier). Le cas échéant, veuillez préciser la manière dont vous voulez recevoir et retourner les documents (parmi les moyens possibles susmentionnés).

Pour discuter de l'étude en français, veuillez communiquer avec Dr. Danielle Charbonneau, à l'adresse électronique charbonneau-d@rmc.ca, ou par téléphone au 613-541-6000, poste 6635 (CSN 271-6635).

Merci.

Don McCreary

Annex I Information Sheet Sent to E-Mail Participants

Information Sheet for Non-Focus Group Participants

Purpose	The purpose of this study is to get at the root causes of the perceived lack of control and other aspects of career dissatisfaction that Land Force LCol's seem to be experiencing.
The Present Study	The enclosed questions ask you about what aspects of your career are satisfying, dissatisfying, as well as how the CF can improve your career satisfaction. Also enclosed are a few demographic questions and a short job satisfaction survey used in the public service. This latter questionnaire will allow us to compare the overall satisfaction of those who participated in a focus group to those who, like yourself, did not participate in a focus group.
Voluntary Participation	Your participation is completely voluntary. You may end your participation at any time, and you may refuse to answer any questions, without repercussion or penalty.
Importance of Your Participation	The findings from this project will be presented to the Director of Land Personnel Concepts and Policy in the form of a final report. The accuracy and quality of the findings we present is entirely dependent on the openness of our participants. Thus, should you choose to participate, it is important that you be as honest as possible.
The Anonymity of Your Answers	Your anonymity is guaranteed. Your name will not be included anywhere in our data files. Your information will be combined with those from other participants and only group data will be presented. To assist us in this, please do not put your name on any research materials. If excerpts from the written material are to be used in reports or publications, no identifying information will be included. In the event of an information request filed under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act, the Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) is also required by law to screen all data to ensure that individual identities are not disclosed, prior to releasing any information.

<p>The Confidentiality of Your Answers</p>	<p>The confidentiality of your responses is guaranteed. DRDC researchers are guided by, and adhere to, professional and ethical guidelines concerning behavioural research that involves people. Only DRDC-authorized researchers will have access to the information from this evaluation. DRDC is responsible for confidential storage of the data in a secure area.</p>
<p>Benefits</p>	<p>This research will benefit the CF by helping them to develop a greater understanding of what aspects of their careers LCol's are dissatisfied with, including the factors that contribute to dissatisfaction and how the CF may be able to mitigate its effects. Ultimately, this study could lead to policies and procedures that could improve retention of senior Land Force officers.</p>
<p>Risks</p>	<p>There are no known risks associated with participating in this survey group.</p>
<p>Contact Information</p>	<p>For any further questions or concerns about this project, or if you wish a copy of the final report, please contact Dr. Don McCreary, Stress & Coping Group, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2008, 634-2008 (CSN), or Don.McCreary@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (English-speaking only; to discuss the study in French, please contact Dr. Danielle Charbonneau, Charbonneau-d@rmc.ca or (613) 541-6000 ext. 6635).</p> <p>This project has been reviewed and approved by the DRDC Research Ethics Board (Protocol L-520). If you would like to speak with the Chair of this Board, please contact Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, 634-2120 (CSN), or Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca</p> <p>DHRRE authorizes this project within DND/CF in accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02 and has authorization number 309/05.</p>

Thanks again for your participation!

Fiche d'information à l'intention des non-participants aux groupes de discussion

Objet	Les discussions de groupe visent à discerner les causes profondes de la perception de manque de contrôle et des autres aspects du mécontentement professionnel que semblent éprouver les Icol de la Force terrestre.
Étude	Nous vous demandons, par les questions ci-jointes, quels aspects de votre carrière sont satisfaisants, quels aspects sont insatisfaisants et ce que peuvent faire les FC pour rehausser votre degré de satisfaction professionnelle. Nous y avons joint quelques questions de nature démographique et un bref questionnaire sur la satisfaction au travail utilisé dans la fonction publique. Ce dernier questionnaire nous permettra de comparer la satisfaction d'ensemble des participants aux groupes de discussion à la satisfaction de ceux qui, comme vous, n'y ont pas pris part.
Participation volontaire	Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. Vous pouvez y mettre fin quand bon vous semble et vous êtes libre de refuser de répondre à une question ou à une autre, sans crainte de répercussions ou de sanctions.
Importance de votre participation	Les conclusions auxquelles mènera ce projet seront soumises au Directeur – Concepts et politiques personnel Force terrestre sous forme de rapport final. La précision et la qualité des conclusions que nous présenterons dépendent entièrement de l'ouverture des participants. Ainsi, si vous décidez d'y prendre part, il importe que vous vous montriez aussi franc que possible.
Caractère anonyme de vos réponses	Votre anonymat est garanti. Votre nom ne figurera nulle part dans nos dossiers de données. Vos données personnelles seront combinées à celles d'autres participants, et seules des données de groupe seront présentées. Pour nous appuyer à ce chapitre, nous vous prions de n'inscrire votre nom sur aucun document de recherche. Si des extraits des réponses écrites doivent être utilisés dans des rapports ou des publications, aucun renseignement permettant de vous identifier n'y sera versé. Advenant qu'une demande de renseignements soit soumise en vertu des dispositions de la <i>Loi sur l'accès à l'information</i> ou de la <i>Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels</i> , sachez que le Directeur – Accès à l'information et protection des renseignements personnels (DAIPRP) est tenu par la loi de passer au crible toutes les données pour s'assurer que l'identité des personnes n'est pas révélée avant de communiquer quelque information que ce soit.

Caractère confidentiel de vos réponses	Le caractère confidentiel de vos réponses est garanti. Les chercheurs de RDDC sont guidés par des lignes directrices professionnelles et déontologiques en matière de recherche comportementale sur les humains et ils y adhèrent. Seuls des chercheurs autorisés par RDDC auront accès aux renseignements de cette évaluation. RDDC est chargée de conserver les données dans une zone protégée afin d'en garantir la confidentialité.
Avantages	La recherche avantagera les FC en les aidant à mieux comprendre les aspects insatisfaisants de la carrière des Icol qui contribuent à leur mécontentement et la façon dont elles peuvent en atténuer les effets. En bout de ligne, l'étude pourrait mener à l'élaboration de politiques et de procédures susceptibles d'améliorer le maintien en poste des officiers supérieurs de la Force terrestre.
Risques	Aucun risque connu ne s'associe à la participation au sondage.
Contact Information	<p>Si vous avez d'autres questions ou réserves au sujet du projet, ou si vous désirez obtenir un exemplaire du rapport final, veuillez communiquer avec M. Don McCreary, Groupe du stress et des stratégies d'adaptation, RDDC Toronto, aux numéros (416) 635-2008 ou 634-2008 (RCCC), ou à l'adresse Don.McCreary@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (en anglais seulement; pour parler de l'étude en français, veuillez communiquer avec Mme Danielle Charbonneau à l'adresse Charbonneau-d@rmc.ca ou au numéro (613) 541-6000, poste 6635).</p> <p>Le projet a été revu et approuvé par le comité d'éthique de la recherche de RDDC (protocole L-520). Si vous désirez parler au président de ce comité, veuillez communiquer avec M. Jack Landolt aux numéros (416) 635-2120 ou 634 2120 (RCCC) ou à l'adresse Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca.</p> <p>Le DRERH a autorisé le déroulement du présent projet au sein du MDN et des FC en conformité avec le CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02 et lui a attribué le numéro d'autorisation 309/05.</p>

Merci de votre participation.

Annex J Demographic Information Sheet Completed by all Participants

Basic Descriptive Information

This information will help us describe our sample in our final report to the Directorate of Land Personnel Concepts and Policy.

Location of current posting (please circle):	LFWA LFCA LFQA LFAA NDHQ			
MOC:		Gender:	Male Female	
Marital Status:	Single/never Married Married or Common Law Divorced/Separated Widowed	Do you have children? How many?	None One Two Three or More	
First Official Language:		Age:	_____ years old	
Ethnicity:		Age when promoted to LCol rank:	_____ years old	
Number of years at LCol rank:		Have you ever commanded at the LCol Rank?	Yes No	
If you have commanded at the LCol rank, are you (please circle):				
Currently Commanding		Post-Command		
Recent training courses taken:				

Information personnelle

Cette information nous aidera à décrire l'ensemble des participants dans notre rapport final au Directeur - Concepts et politiques personnel Force terrestre.

Lieu de l'affectation actuelle :	FTSO	FTSC	FTSQ	FTSA	QGDN
GPM :		Sexe :	M	F	
État matrimonial :	Célibataire / Jamais marié(e) Marié(e) ou Conjoint de fait Divorcé(e) / Séparé(é) Veuf / Veuve	Avez-vous des enfants? Combien?	Aucun Un Deux Trois ou plus		
Langue maternelle officielle:		Âge:	_____ ans		
Groupe ethnique:		Âge au moment de la promotion au grade de lcol	_____ ans		
Nombre d'années au grade de lcol :		Avez-vous déjà commandé au grade de lcol?	Oui	Non	
Si vous avez déjà commandé au grade de lcol (veuillez encercler la bonne réponse) :					
Commandez-vous à l'heure actuelle?			Avez-vous cessé de commander?		
Perfectionnement professionnel récent Cours suivis :					

Annex K Job Satisfaction Survey

Job Satisfaction Survey

Please circle the one number for each question that comes closest to reflecting your opinion about it:

Disagree with very much	Disagree moderately	Disagree slightly	Agree slightly	Agree moderately	Agree very much
1	2	3	4	5	6

1. I feel I am being paid a fair amount for the work I do	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. There is really too little chance for promotion on my job	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. My supervisor is quite competent in doing his/her job	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. I am not satisfied with the benefits I receive	1	2	3	4	5	6
5. When I do a good job, I receive the recognition for it that I should receive	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. Many of our rules and procedures make doing a good job difficult	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. I like the people I work with	1	2	3	4	5	6
8. I sometimes feel my job is meaningless	1	2	3	4	5	6
9. Communications seem good within this organization	1	2	3	4	5	6
10. Raises are too few and far between	1	2	3	4	5	6
11. Those who do well on the job stand a fair chance of being promoted	1	2	3	4	5	6
12. My supervisor is unfair to me	1	2	3	4	5	6
13. The benefits we receive are as good as most other organizations offer	1	2	3	4	5	6
14. I do not feel that the work I do is appreciated	1	2	3	4	5	6
15. My efforts to do a good job are seldom blocked by red tape	1	2	3	4	5	6
16. I find I have to work harder at my job because of the incompetence of people I work with	1	2	3	4	5	6
17. I like doing the things I do at work	1	2	3	4	5	6
18. The goals of this organization are not clear to me	1	2	3	4	5	6
19. I feel unappreciated by the organization when I think about what they pay me	1	2	3	4	5	6
20. People get ahead as fast here as they do in other places	1	2	3	4	5	6
21. My supervisor shows too little interest in the feelings of subordinates	1	2	3	4	5	6
22. The benefit package we have is equitable	1	2	3	4	5	6
23. There are few rewards for those who work here	1	2	3	4	5	6
24. I have too much to do at work	1	2	3	4	5	6
25. I enjoy my coworkers	1	2	3	4	5	6
26. I often feel that I do not know what is going on with the organization	1	2	3	4	5	6
27. I feel a sense of pride in doing my job	1	2	3	4	5	6
28. I feel satisfied with my chances for salary increases	1	2	3	4	5	6
29. There are benefits we do not have which we should have	1	2	3	4	5	6
30. I like my supervisor	1	2	3	4	5	6

Disagree with very much	Disagree moderately	Disagree slightly	Agree slightly	Agree moderately	Agree very much
1	2	3	4	5	6

31. I have too much paperwork	1	2	3	4	5	6
32. I don't feel my efforts are rewarded the way they should be	1	2	3	4	5	6
33. I am satisfied with my chances for promotion	1	2	3	4	5	6
34. There is too much bickering and fighting at work	1	2	3	4	5	6
35. My job is enjoyable	1	2	3	4	5	6
36. Work assignments are not fully explained	1	2	3	4	5	6

Sondage sur la satisfaction au travail

À droite de chaque énoncé, veuillez encercler le chiffre qui se rapproche le plus de votre opinion sur l'énoncé.

Tout à fait en désaccord	Modérément en désaccord	En léger désaccord	Légèrement d'accord	Modérément d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Je crois toucher la juste rémunération du travail que j'effectue					1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Mon emploi comporte vraiment trop peu de chances de promotion					1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Mon superviseur (ma superviseuse) est assez compétent(e) dans ses fonctions					1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Je ne suis pas satisfait (satisfaite) de mes avantages sociaux					1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Quand je travaille bien, j'en reçois la reconnaissance qui m'est due					1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Beaucoup de nos règles et procédures rendent difficile la réalisation d'un bon travail					1 2 3 4 5 6
7. J'aime les gens avec lesquels je travaille					1 2 3 4 5 6
8. J'ai parfois le sentiment que mon travail est inutile					1 2 3 4 5 6
9. Les communications semblent bonnes au sein de l'organisation					1 2 3 4 5 6
10. Les augmentations de salaire sont trop rares					1 2 3 4 5 6
11. Ceux qui donnent un bon rendement dans cet emploi ont de bonnes chances de promotion					1 2 3 4 5 6
12. Mon superviseur (ma superviseuse) est injuste envers moi					1 2 3 4 5 6
13. Les avantages sociaux dont nous jouissons sont aussi bons que ceux de n'importe quelle autre organisation					1 2 3 4 5 6
14. Je n'ai pas l'impression que mon travail est apprécié					1 2 3 4 5 6
15. Les tracasseries administratives entravent rarement mes efforts pour fournir un bon travail					1 2 3 4 5 6
16. Je constate que je dois travailler plus dur en raison de l'incompétence des gens qui m'entourent					1 2 3 4 5 6
17. J'aime accomplir les diverses tâches de mon emploi					1 2 3 4 5 6
18. Les buts de l'organisation ne m'apparaissent pas clairs					1 2 3 4 5 6
19. Quand je pense au salaire que l'organisation me paie, je vois bien qu'elle ne m'apprécie pas					1 2 3 4 5 6
20. Les gens avancent dans leur carrière aussi vite ici qu'ailleurs					1 2 3 4 5 6
21. Mon superviseur (ma superviseuse) ne s'intéresse pas assez aux sentiments de ses subordonnés					1 2 3 4 5 6
22. L'ensemble d'avantages sociaux que nous avons est équitable					1 2 3 4 5 6
23. Ceux qui travaillent ici ne sont pas assez récompensés					1 2 3 4 5 6
24. J'ai trop à faire au travail					1 2 3 4 5 6
25. J'aime la compagnie de mes collègues					1 2 3 4 5 6
26. J'ai souvent l'impression de ne pas savoir ce qui se passe au sein de l'organisation					1 2 3 4 5 6

Tout à fait en désaccord	Modérément en désaccord	En léger désaccord	Légèrement d'accord	Modérément d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
1	2	3	4	5	6
27. Je ressens de la fierté à faire mon travail				1	2 3 4 5 6
28. Je suis satisfait(e) de mes chances d'augmentation de salaire				1	2 3 4 5 6
29. Il y a des avantages sociaux que nous n'avons pas, mais que nous devrions avoir				1	2 3 4 5 6
30. J'aime bien mon superviseur (ma superviseure)				1	2 3 4 5 6
31. Je fais trop de paperasserie				1	2 3 4 5 6
32. Je ne crois pas que mes efforts soient récompensés à leur juste valeur				1	2 3 4 5 6
33. Je suis satisfait(e) de mes chances de promotion				1	2 3 4 5 6
34. Il y a trop de bisbille et de frictions au travail				1	2 3 4 5 6
35. Mon travail est agréable				1	2 3 4 5 6
36. Les attributions de tâches ne sont pas entièrement expliquées				1	2 3 4 5 6

Annex L Work Engagement Scale

Job Engagement

Please indicate how well each statement describes you.

	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>A Little</i>	<i>Somewhat</i>	<i>A Lot</i>	<i>Very Much</i>
1. I feel personal responsibility for my job performance.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I am committed to performing well at my job.	1	2	3	4	5
3. How well I do in my job matters a great deal to me.	1	2	3	4	5
4. How well I do in my job influences how I feel.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I really care about the outcomes that result from my job performance.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I invest a large part of myself into my job performance.	1	2	3	4	5

Échelle d'engagement envers le travail

Veillez indiquer dans quelle mesure chacun des énoncés suivants vous décrit.

	<i>Pas du tout</i>	<i>Un peu</i>	<i>Quelque peu</i>	<i>Bien</i>	<i>Très bien</i>
1. Je me sens personnellement responsable de mon rendement au travail	1	2	3	4	5
2. Je suis déterminé(e) à donner un bon rendement au travail	1	2	3	4	5
3. La qualité de mon rendement au travail compte beaucoup à mes yeux	1	2	3	4	5
4. La mesure de mon rendement au travail joue sur mon bien-être général	1	2	3	4	5
5. Je me soucie vraiment des résultats de mon rendement au travail	1	2	3	4	5
6. Je m'investis beaucoup dans mon rendement au travail	1	2	3	4	5

List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

ASPP	Army Succession Planning Process
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CLS	Chief of Land Staff
CO	Commanding Officer
Col	Colonel
CWO	Chief Warrant Officer
DCDS	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
DGSP	Director General Strategic Planning
DHRIM	Directorate Human Resources Information Management
DHRRE	Directorate Human Resources, Research, and Evaluation
DLPCP	Directorate Land Personnel Concepts and Policy
DLR	Directorate Land Requirement
DND	Department of National Defence
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
DS	Directing Staff
ECS	Environmental Command Structures
GOC	Government of Canada
HQ	Head Quarters
JSS	Job Satisfaction Survey
LCol	Lieutenant-Colonel
Maj	Major
MBA	Master of Business Administration
MCpl	Master Corporal
MGS	Mobile Gun Systems
MO	Medical Officer
MOC	Military Occupation Category
MWO	Master Warrant Officer
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PER	Performance Evaluation Report
PML	Preferred Manning Level
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Program
QOL	Quality of Life
RMC	Royal Military College of Canada
ROTO	Rotation
UMS	Unit Medical Station
US	United States
WES	Work Engagement Scale

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA <small>(Security classification of the title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)</small>		
1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document, Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's document, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.) Publishing: DRDC Toronto Performing: DRDC Toronto Monitoring: Contracting:		2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <small>(Overall security classification of the document including special warning terms if applicable.)</small> UNCLASSIFIED
3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification is indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C, R, or U) in parenthesis at the end of the title) Factors Influencing Career Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction in Five Groups of Land Force Lieutenant-Colonels: A Targeted Follow-Up to the Army Climate and Culture Survey (U) Facteurs qui conditionnent la satisfaction et l'insatisfaction sur le plan professionnel chez cinq groupes de lieutenants-colonels de la Force terrestre : Suivi ciblé du sondage sur le climat et la culture de l'Armée de terre		
4. AUTHORS (First name, middle initial and last name. If military, show rank, e.g. Maj. John E. Doe.) Donald R. McCreary; Angela R. Febraro; Peter Bradley; Danielle Charbonneau; Martin Villeneuve		
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION <small>(Month and year of publication of document.)</small> July 2006	6a NO. OF PAGES <small>(Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.)</small> 144	6b. NO. OF REFS <small>(Total cited in document.)</small> 17
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of document, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) Technical Report		
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The names of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.) Sponsoring: Tasking:		
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.) 20ce	9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)	
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document) DRDC Toronto TR 2006-088	10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers under which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)	
11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on the dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.) Unlimited distribution		
12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, when further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.)) Unlimited announcement		

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(U) This study explored job satisfiers and dissatisfiers among 49 Army LCol in five MOCs (Combat Arms and Logistics). The study was in response to findings from The Army Climate and Culture Survey, where the LCol rank was highlighted as potentially disaffected. Quantitative results (using the JSS and WES) showed that the LCol were generally satisfied and very engaged in their work. Qualitative findings from a series of focus groups and e-mail responses revealed several job satisfiers (the opportunities to command, to influence the CF/Army, and to work with soldiers as mentors and educators; the intrinsic aspects of their work; and the extrinsic aspects of their work). However, the qualitative findings also revealed a series of dissatisfiers with regard to promotion (second language requirement, academic requirements, prior command requirement, the need to be placed in one or more A-jobs, excessive workload demands, the effects of promotion demands on family, and the Army Succession Planning Process), leadership (general leadership issues such as micro-managing, feeling free to question leaders, transformational vs. transactional leadership, and other organizational issues), general organizational issues, concerns about the post-command transition to a staff job, and concerns about workload, OPTEMPO, and quality of life. The study also asked LCol to suggest possible ways to address or fix their biggest dissatisfiers. Responses focused on the need to provide sufficient resources to LCol (among others), set priorities (e.g., resources to match requirements), improve promotion and reward systems (e.g., modify or eliminate the second language policy or tier system), change organizational structures (e.g., to reduce bureaucracy) and organizational culture (e.g., to increase the use of mission command), improve leadership at the senior levels, introduce formal sessions between LCol and senior officers in order to enhance communication, improve the career planning system, enhance quality of life initiatives (including better pay, pensions/benefits and housing), and empower LCol (e.g., by giving a bigger role to COs in personnel decisions).

14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

(U) job satisfaction; job dissatisfaction; Army Lieutenant-Colonel

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