Force Structure Changes in the U.S. Pacific Command - Roles and Responsibilities of Headquarters and Support Functions
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

Objectives. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the changes to the force structure for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Specifically, we evaluated the force structure requirements, criteria, and costs, as well as the role of host-nation support and impact on the readiness of U.S. forces in USPACOM. This is one in a series of reports concerning the changes to the force structure for USPACOM. This report addresses headquarters and support organizations' roles and responsibilities.

Scope and Methodology. We met with and interviewed officials from U.S. Army; U.S. Air Force; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Forces Korea; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army, Pacific; Eighth U.S. Army, Korea; Korea Region, U.S. Army Installation Management Agency; Pacific Air Forces; and 5th Air Force, Japan.

We reviewed the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army Transformation Roadmap, the Air Force Transformation Plan, and testimonies dated from November 2003 through March 2006 to determine DoD and Service transformation strategies and details. Additionally, we received organization and mission briefs to determine the roles and responsibilities of the various command elements throughout USPACOM. We obtained and analyzed tables of distribution and allowances to determine authorized personnel levels. We performed this audit from January through December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.

Results-In-Brief and Effect. The USPACOM and the Services had not reduced or eliminated redundancies and unnecessary roles and functions that were the result of force reductions, installation closures, and restructured command and control functions that may have eliminated the need for some headquarters and support functions. USPACOM and its subunified commands continue to undergo significant changes in force structure. For example, U.S. Forces Korea, specifically Eighth U.S. Army, reduced its forces by 24 percent of the stationed troops and closed 19 installations. Additionally, the Air Force's transformation diminished the responsibilities of the Air Force in the 5th Air Force in Japan. Eliminating unnecessary functions will benefit USPACOM and the Services by providing more effective command and control, use of human resources, and support to the warfighter.

Management Comments and Audit Response. The comments of the Director, Operational Plans and Joint Matters, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space and Information
Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force on the recommendation were nonresponsive. While we commend the U.S. Air Force for continuing to implement the vision and strategy set forth in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the intent of our report is to further identify opportunities for streamlined command and control, the efficient use of human resources, and support for the warfighter. We request that the Director reconsider his position and provide additional comments on the report by April 12, 2007. Additionally, we request the Director to clarify whether he is responding on behalf of Pacific Air Forces and 5th Air Force. Lastly, we request the Commander, Pacific Air Forces and Commander, 5th Air Force provide separate comments on the report by April 12, 2007.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Korea concurred, with comments, on the recommendation. The Deputy Chief of Staff stated that U.S. Forces Korea intends to issue a draft overarching plan during the second quarter FY 2007, which will integrate support for the command and agency transformation plan into the overall U.S. Forces Korea. The plan will be in addition to regularly recurring focus sessions by Commander, U.S. Forces Korea to review the ongoing transformation and provide guidance on planning for the transformation.

Although not required to comment, the Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, U.S. Pacific Command concurred with the recommendations, stating that the command will support U.S. Forces Korea with planned force reductions and transformation plans. The Deputy Director also stated that a manpower analysis of U.S. Forces Japan and the 5th Air Force is warranted and requested that final manpower requirements for U.S. Forces Japan be coordinated with the U.S. Pacific Command J1, Manpower Policy and Oversight to make U.S. Forces Japan ready to meet theater and warfighting missions. As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 2 to include coordination with U.S. Pacific Command.

Although not required to comment, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Installation Management Command, responding for Installation Management Command - Korea\(^1\), stated that the Installation Management Command generally agreed with the recommendation to the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea although he expressed some disagreement with the observation and methodology of the report. The Chief of Staff stated that the Installation Management Command - Korea is developing a transformation plan that corresponds and supports the U.S. Forces Korea transformation plan. We request that the Chief of staff provide us with this transformation plan when issued in the 2nd quarter of FY 2007.

The Commander, U.S. Forces Japan did not comment on the recommendation. We request that the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan provide comments on the report by April 12, 2007.

\(^1\)Formerly the U.S. Army Installation Management Agency, Korea Regional Office (KORO).
Results and Effect on Operations

The USPACOM and the Services had not reduced or eliminated redundancies and unnecessary roles and functions that were the result of force reductions, installation closures, and restructured command and control functions that may have eliminated the need for some headquarters and support functions. Eliminating unnecessary functions will benefit USPACOM and the Services by providing more effective command and control, use of human resources, and support to the warfighter. USPACOM, in conjunction with its subunified commands and the Services, needs to validate the requirement for headquarters and support functions within the subunified commands’ areas of operations.

Background

DoD is reshaping the defense environment and developing a 21st century total force. U.S. forces are becoming more agile and capable of rapid action and are exploiting information advantages to increase operational effectiveness. As stated in the “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 6, 2006, headquarters organizations, such as USPACOM and its subunified commands, and processes that support U.S. forces must develop similar attributes. DoD must align its culture, authorities, and organizations to facilitate effective decision-making and enable responsive mission execution while maintaining accountability. Reducing vertical structures and processes and improving horizontal integration are keys to successful DoD transformation. DoD must undertake reforms to reduce redundancies and improve the flow of business processes.

Audit Results

As USPACOM and the Services restructure their forces in the Pacific to meet transformation goals, they should work jointly to streamline support and headquarters functions.

Setting the Forces in Korea. As U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) restructures, realigns, and reduces its forces, it must restructure support functions accordingly. Beginning in 2004, the governments of the United States and Republic of Korea agreed to reduce U.S. forces in Korea from 37,500 to 25,000 personnel (12,500) by 2008 and realign the remaining forces to two areas south of Seoul. As of May 2006, the USFK reduced its force by 9,154 personnel. The USFK plans to close 59 installations and sites on 36,000 acres by the end of 2008. As of December 2005, the USFK closed 31 installations and sites on 11,000 acres of land. As the USFK Commander stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 7, 2006, the reduction principally affects the Eighth U.S. Army, which is reducing its force by 40 percent. The negotiated reduction, however, does not

2USPACOM has three subunified commands: U.S. Forces, Japan; U.S. Forces, Korea; and the Alaskan Command.
include supporting units and commands that are not under the operational or administrative control of USFK.

**Supporting Commands.** Some units and commands stationed in Korea support USFK but have a different chain of command. For example, the regional U.S. Army Installation Management Agency provides operations support for the Eighth U.S. Army. The Installation Management Agency was created in 2002 to reduce bureaucracy and apply a uniform business structure to manage U.S. Army installations. The Installation Management Agency has seven regional offices, one of which is the Korea Regional Office (KORO). The KORO mission is to support readiness and mission execution and the well-being of soldiers, civilians and family members, improve infrastructure, and preserve the environment. Working in direct support of the Eighth U.S. Army, KORO manages Army installations in Korea equitably, effectively, and efficiently. KORO, however, reports directly to Installation Management Agency headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.

KORO headquarters has four area support organizations designated as Areas I, II, III, and IV. The KORO Table of Distribution and Allowances for FY 2007 shows authorized personnel of 4,051 for the four KORO areas. If personnel assigned to KORO headquarters are included, the authorized personnel strength will increase to 4,570. Between 2004 and 2005, the Army transformed from supporting 30,000 soldiers at 100 camps and stations to supporting 20,846 soldiers at fewer than 81 camps and stations in Korea. Changes planned through 2008 will result in 18,000 soldiers stationed at 48 camps and stations centered around two hubs. The Eighth U.S. Army reduced the number of active duty personnel in Korea by more than 8,000 troops and closed 19 of the 36 KORO installations as planned. According to KORO officials, the 19 installations are part of Area I Support Activity and are in caretaker status that requires minimum utilities and contracted guard services. KORO had not, however, reduced manpower authorizations to reflect the reduction in the number of forces supported and installations closed (see table).

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<th>KORO Personnel Levels Compared to the Reduction of Forces by Fiscal Year</th>
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\(^1\)Eighth U.S. Army force reductions were primarily 2nd Infantry Division forces located in Area I.

\(^2\)As of May 2006.
KORO officials stated that they took on additional missions as Eighth U.S. Army troops moved out of Korea. For example, KORO officials stated that the command is involved with the environmental cleanup of closed installations. Those officials stated that although KORO was experiencing an initial increase in personnel, they had not developed a plan that would transform the command comparably with the transformed Army forces and supported installations. For USFK to remain on schedule with agreed reductions of U.S. forces in Korea, the USFK must coordinate reductions of reporting units and other stovepipe command elements. At a minimum, supporting units should have a plan for their forces that matches their mission.

**Setting the Forces in Japan.** U.S. forces in Japan are realigning and restructuring in accordance with the agreements between the DoD and the government of Japan May 1, 2006, “United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” Although U.S. Forces Japan is a subunified command of USPACOM and 5th Air Force is a subordinate command of Pacific Air Forces, neither has operational control of the air wings in Japan. As U.S. forces in Japan restructure, USPACOM and U.S. Forces Japan should work with the Pacific Air Forces to determine whether 5th Air Force personnel could perform dual assignments to support the U.S. Forces Japan headquarters.

**Air Force Transformation.** The Air Force is changing its command and control structure. The concept of the transformation is to align the numbered Air Forces to concentrate on warfighting and allow the Air Force Major Commands to focus on organizing, training, and equipping personnel. The Air Force Major Commands are Service subdivisions assigned to a major segment of the Air Force mission and are directly subordinate to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Examples include Pacific Air Forces, Air Combat Command, and Air Force Space Command. The numbered Air Forces in the Pacific shown in the following figure, “Air Force Command and Control Transformation in the Pacific,” are the 5th Air Force located at Yokota Air Base Japan; the 7th Air Force located at Osan Air Base, Korea; the 11th Air Force located at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska; and the 13th Air Force located at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

**Pacific Air Forces.** The Pacific Air Forces started to implement the Air Force transformation by developing the new warfighting headquarters, Kenny Headquarters, in Hawaii. Under the new structure, the numbered Air Forces in the Pacific have responsibilities provided by Pacific Air Forces. Operational control is the authority to organize and employ the forces necessary to accomplish a mission. Administrative control is authority for administration and support for matters not included in operational missions. (For acronyms used in the figure, see Appendix A.)
**Air Force Command and Control Transformation in the Pacific**

Source: Pacific Air Forces

**5th Air Force.** The figure explains the Pacific Air Forces’ command and control structure. As shown, the 5th Air Force does not exercise operational control over subordinate wings. As of June 4, 2006, the 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Japan consisted of 130 personnel. Pacific Air Forces’ officials stated that they plan to establish a detachment from Kenny Headquarters as a forward warfighting headquarters at Yokota Air Base. The detachment will be staffed by realigning approximately 50 of the 130 personnel from the 5th Air Force unit manning document to the Kenny Headquarters detachment unit manning document. The detachment will act as the forward element of the warfighting headquarters for wartime operational command. The remaining 80 personnel assigned to the 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base will continue to provide limited administrative oversight for the three wings in Japan.

In September 2006, Pacific Air Forces’ officials recognized that the 5th Air Force mission was significantly diminished under the new structure and they considered eliminating the unit. However, the Pacific Air Forces maintained the 5th Air Force at the request of the government of Japan to continue the face-to-face communications between the U.S. Air Force and the Japanese Air Self Defense Force.
Date: March 12, 2007  
(Project No. D2006-D000LA-0124.003)

**Dual Roles.** The U. S. Forces Japan and 5th Air Force are already connected because the Commanding General, U. S. Forces Japan is also the Commanding General, 5th Air Force. The two entities are collocated and provide support to subordinate commands and coordinate with their Japanese counterparts. The U. S. Forces Japan and 5th Air Force can become the leading organizations by implementing the vision in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report that advocates moving toward more joint operations, reducing redundancies, and ensuring the efficient flow of business processes. In the “Global Defense Posture Report to Congress,” March 30, 2006, one of the USPACOM changes in global posture was that 5th Air Force would remain and its personnel would also be assigned to U. S. Forces Japan. Assigning 5th Air Force personnel also to U. S. Forces Japan would maximize the limited human resources of both commands and result in increased combined operations.

**Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response**

**U.S. Air Force Operational Plans and Joint Matters.** The Director, Operational Plans and Joint Matters, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, U. S. Air Force, stated that past, present, and future PACAF activities were closely coordinated with U. S. Pacific Command and U. S. Forces Japan and meet the spirit and intent of the recommendation. The Director stated that, in addition to already realigning 110 authorizations from 5th Air Force to 13th Air Force, the Air Force expects to eliminate 12 positions from 5th Air Force and align 47 more authorizations to 13th Air Force. After completing the realignments, Detachment 1, 13th Air Force will be activated at Yokota to act as the forward command and control element of the numbered Air Force. The Director also stated that the remaining 5th Air Force authorizations will continue to provide limited administrative oversight of the three Air Wings in Japan, continue communications with the Japanese Air Self Defense Force, and maintain 35 authorizations to support the dual-hatted Commander, 5th Air Force and Commander, U. S. Forces Japan. The Director recommended striking the discussion in the report concerning Pacific Air Forces previous thoughts on the future of 5th Air Force stating this internal discussion adds no value to the DoDIG report.

The Director stated that the Air Force is serving the broader Quadrennial Defense Review objective of jointness by consolidating theater operational command and control capabilities into the 13th Air Force to better support the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command throughout the region. Further, Pacific Air Forces and 5th Air Force have no authority to review and establish joint billet requirements.

**Audit Response.** We commend the Air Force’s actions in continuing to implement the vision and strategy set forth in the Quadrennial Defense Review. However, as we stated in the report, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review advocates moving toward more joint operations, reducing redundancies, and ensuring the efficient flow of business processes. The U. S. Forces Japan and 5th Air Force can accomplish these objectives with a manpower study to make the best use of limited human resources. The 5th Air Force is
within the Pacific Air Forces chain of command and is commanded by a dual-hatted position with U.S. Forces Japan. Accordingly, Pacific Air Forces has the authority to perform a manpower study to verify that the personnel requirements of the command are congruent with the mission. The U.S. Pacific Command also believes that a manpower analysis is warranted.

We recognize that the Pacific Air Forces and the 5th Air Force are not authorized to establish joint billet requirements. However, they can, in close coordination with U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Pacific Command, identify the skill sets and positions that would be best suited for designation as joint billets. Additionally, we request that the Air Force provide documentation concerning the Director’s assertion that Air Force activities past, present, and future make the recommendation unnecessary.

Further, we do not agree that the discussion concerning the Pacific Air Forces’ previous thoughts on the future of 5th Air Force adds no value to the DoDIG report. That discussion illustrated that the Pacific Air Forces recognized that the 5th Air Force mission was significantly diminished under the new structure and they were considering eliminating the unit.

**U.S. Army Installation Management Command.** Although not required to comment, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Installation Management Command, responding for Installation Management Command - Korea, generally agrees with the recommendation to the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. However, the Chief of Staff stated that the Installation Management Command disagrees with the observation and methodology of the report.

The Chief of Staff stated that the Installation Management Command – Korea focuses on faces while the DoDIG methodology focused on the table of distribution and allowances (spaces). The table of distribution and allowances does not address the changes to roles and responsibilities that the Installation Management Command – Korea is undertaking such as master planning, anti-terrorism planning, and law enforcement. Additionally, the Chief of Staff stated that, with the standup of Installation Management Command – Korea, funding has driven the management of the civilian workforce requiring Installation Management Command – Korea to manage faces versus spaces. Correcting the tables of distribution and allowances has been an ongoing challenge but the Installation Management Command – Korea’s table of distribution and allowance has not changed. However, the Chief of Staff stated that the Headquarters, Installation Management Command intends to improve all table and distribution and allowances in FY 2007.

Further the Chief of Staff stated that once U.S. Forces Korea transforms, the table of distribution and allowances can be adjusted and authorizations and personnel can be realigned within the 3 year timeframe for a command plan.

**Audit Response.** We appreciate the actions the Installation Management Command – Korea is undertaking to meet the needs of the Eighth U.S. Army. However, U.S. Forces
Korea has decreased by more than 8,000 troops, the Installation Management Command – Korea has increased its personnel levels during the same period.

**Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response**

**Redirected Recommendations.** As a result of management comments we redirected Recommendation 2.

1. **We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea incorporate all DoD activities and organizations within the Korean theater of operations into the overall force reductions and require the development of transformation plans for activities and organizations corresponding to the needs of their mission.**

**U.S. Forces Korea Comments.** The Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Korea concurred with comment, and stated that a transformation plan for U.S. Forces Korea is being developed and estimated that the draft would be released during the second quarter of FY 2007. The plan will include individual component, agency, activity, and organization plans and when they will be phased into the overall transformation plan. U.S. Forces Korea transformation is incremental and ongoing and therefore a support command or agency may lag behind the supported command. Further, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea holds Focus Sessions every 3 to 4 weeks to review and provide guidance on the transformation planning.

**Audit Response.** The comments are responsive and no additional comments are required. We request that the Deputy Chief of Staff provide us with a copy of the overarching U.S. Forces Korea transformation plan when it is released in the second quarter of FY 2007. (See Attachment 2.)

**U.S. Pacific Command Comments.** Although not required to comment, the Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, U.S. Pacific Command concurred with the recommendation, stating that the command will support U.S. Forces Korea with planned force reductions and transformation plans.

**Audit Response.** We appreciate the U.S. Pacific Command’s support afforded to U.S. Forces Korea during the transformation. (See Attachment 3.)

**U.S. Army Installation Management Command.** Although not required to comment, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Installation Management Command, responding for Installation Management Command, Korea, concurs with the recommendation. The Chief of Staff stated that the Installation Management Command – Korea is concurrently developing a transformation plan that complements and supports the U.S. Forces Korea transformation plan.

**Audit Response.** We appreciate the actions the Installation Management Command – Korea is undertaking to develop a complementary transformation plan. We request a copy of the Installation Management Command – Korea transformation plan when it is issued in the 2nd quarter of FY 2007. (See Attachment 4.)
2. We recommend that the Commander, Pacific Air Forces, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command:

   a. Conduct a manpower study to determine the personnel requirements at 5th Air Force and U.S. Forces Japan, and

   b. Concurrently, identify those personnel at Headquarters, 5th Air Force that can serve in a joint capacity with U.S. Forces Japan.

**Air Force Comments.** The Director, Operational Plans and Joint Matters, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force, requested that the recommendation be eliminated from the report.

**Audit Response.** The comments are nonresponsive. We request that the Director, Operational Plans and Joint Matters, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force, reconsider his position and provide additional comments on the report by April 12, 2007.

**U.S. Pacific Command Comments.** Although not required to comment, the Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, U.S. Pacific Command concurred with comment to the recommendation stating that a manpower analysis, to determine 5th Air Force and U.S. Forces Japan, is warranted. Additionally, the Deputy requested that final manpower requirements for U.S. Forces Japan be coordinated with the U.S. Pacific Command J1, who is responsible for providing manpower policy and oversight so that the U.S. Forces Japan will be ready to meet theater and warfighting missions.

**Audit Response.** We appreciate the U.S. Pacific Command’s support. Based on management comments, we redirected the recommendation to include coordination with U.S. Pacific Command. (See Attachment 3.)

**Management Comments and Action Required**

The management comments from the Director, Operational Plans and Joint Matters, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, Department of the Air Force, on the draft report are nonresponsive to the recommendation (see Attachment 1). We request that the Director reconsider his position and provide comments on this report by April 12, 2007. Additionally, we request the Director to clarify whether he is responding on behalf of Pacific Air Forces and 5th Air Force. Lastly, we request the Commander, Pacific Air Forces and Commander, 5th Air Force provide separate comments on the report by April 12, 2007.

Management comments received from Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Korea on the draft report were responsive to the recommendations, and no additional comments are required (see Attachment 2). However, we request that the Deputy Chief of Staff provide a copy of the overarching U.S. Forces Korea transformation plan when it is released in the second quarter of FY 2007.
Date: March 12, 2007
(Project No. D2006-D000LA-0124.003)

Although not required to comment, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Installation Management Command, responding for Installation Management Command, Korea, generally agreed with the recommendation to the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (see Attachment 4). However, we request that the Chief of staff provide this transformation plan when issued in the 2nd quarter of FY 2007.

The Commander, U.S. Forces Japan did not comment on the recommendation. We request that the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan provide comments on the report by April 12, 2007.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct your questions to me at (703) 604-8863 (DSN 664-8863) or Ms. Deborah D. Crosier at (703) 604-8770.

By direction of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing:

[Signature]

Wanda A. Scott
Assistant Inspector General
Readiness and Operations Support

Attachments: As stated
Appendix A. Acronyms Used in the Air Force Command and Control Diagram

OPCON  Operational Control
ADCON  Administrative Control
HQ     Headquarters
USFK   U.S. Forces Korea
MARFORPAC  Marine Forces Pacific
USFJ   U.S. Forces Japan
PACAF  Pacific Air Force
USARPAC U.S. Army Pacific
JTF    Joint Task Force
PACFLT Pacific Fleet
SOCPAC Special Operations Command, Pacific
ALCOM  Alaskan Command
AFNEA  Air Force NOTAM\(^4\) Exchange Area
AF     Air Force
AOC    Air Operation Center
A-Staff Headquarters Staff\(^1\)

\(^1\)A NOTAM is any information concerning the establishment of, condition of, or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure, or hazard. The timely knowledge of which is essential to personnel concerned with flight operations.
Appendix B. Report Distribution

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  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM: AFASX

SUBJECT: DoDIG Draft Audit Report, Audit of Force Structure Changes in the U.S. Pacific Command – Roles and Responsibilities of headquarters and Support Functions
(Project No. D2006-DoocLA-0124.003)

This is in reply to your memorandum requesting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) to provide Air Force comments on subject report.

The Air Force is pleased that the DoDIG has focused on force structure changes in the PACOM AOR. Over the past 5 years, the Air Force has also put a great deal of effort into streamlining headquarters and support activities within the region to better support the Joint Force Commanders. However, we believe our activities past, present and future obviate the need for the DoDIG recommendation 2 to determine the personnel requirements at 5AF and USFJ as well as the potential for 5AF personnel serving in a joint capacity with USFJ.

As you recognize in the report, the Air Force has already significantly streamlined the 5 AF staff, realigning 110 authorizations to 13 AF (AFPAC), consistent with the Air Force-wide component headquarters restructure. We expect to further reduce the 5 AF staff by eliminating 12 positions and realigning 47 more authorizations to 13 AF (AFPAC). We will then activate Detachment 1, 13 AF (AFPAC) at Yokota, to act as the forward element of the 13 AF component NAF for operational command and control. This will enable the remaining 71 5 AF personnel to provide limited administrative oversight of the three USAF wings in Japan, continue face-to-face communications with the Japanese Air Self Defense Force, and provide the personal support staff for the commander, 5 AF and commander USFJ (a dual-hatted command position).

Further, although PACAF and 5 AF have no authority to review and establish joint billet requirements, 35 of these remaining 71 authorizations already support the dual-hatted commander 5 AF/commander USFJ, with assigned 5 AF personnel from the command section, Provost Marshall, Staff Judge Advocate and Protocol.

Finally, as previously recognized by SECDEF direction, 5 AF and its tightly interlocked relationship with USFJ serves a very important function in the Pacific theater. But the Air Force is serving the broader Quadrennial Defense Review objective of “Jointness” by consolidating our operational command and control capabilities in 13 AF (AFPAC) to better support the commander, USPACOM throughout the region. We are developing a more focused, dedicated
and integrated capability better able to serve the joint force commanders across the entire Pacific theater (minus the Korean peninsula).

We recommend eliminating recommendation 2 from the draft report. The recently passed, current, and planned future PACAF activities, closely coordinated with USPACOM and USFJ more than meet the spirit and intent, if not the letter of this recommendation. Further, we recommend striking the second paragraph, page 5 that discusses PACAF’s previous thoughts on the future of 5 AF. This paragraph reflects internal PACAF discussions, and, given subsequent SECDEF direction, adds no value to the DoDIG report.

Sincerely

RUSSELL J. FRASZ, Civ, USAF
Director, Operational Plans & Joint Matters
DCS, Air, Space & Information Operations, Plans & Requirements
U.S. Forces Korea Comments

MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General, Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704


1. Enclosed is the command reply to the subject draft report. Command concurs with comment to Recommendation 1 in the draft report.

2. POC is Mr. Young J. Jin at DSN (315) 723-3740, Email: jinyj@korea.army.mil.

STEPHEN T. SARGENT
Major General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. FORCES KOREA COMMAND REPLY

DODIG AUDIT OF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES IN THE USPACOM – ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (U) (PROJECT NO. D2006-D000LA-0124.003)

GENERAL COMMENTS

DODIG Observation: As U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) restructures, realigns, and reduces U.S. forces in Korea, support functions must restructure accordingly. Korea Regional Office has not, however, reduced manpower authorizations to reflect the reduction in the number of forces supported and installations closed. For USFK to remain on schedule with agreed reductions of U.S. forces in Korea, USFK must coordinate reductions of reporting units and other stovepipe Command elements.

USFK Comments: USFK continues to integrate and synchronize Korea theater transformation efforts, to include all DoD commands, activities, and organizations within the Korea Theater of Operations. This includes those commands, activities, and organizations that directly report to USFK or its components, those that support USFK missions and/or operations, and those that support national or non-DoD missions. An overarching USFK transformation plan is under development and will address individual component, agency, activity, and organization plans and their integration. While a draft transformation plan will be released during the second quarter of FY07, both USFK’s transformation planning and the transformation itself are ongoing and incremental processes that will take a number of years to complete. During a Transformation of a Major Command, such as USFK, it would not be uncommon for a support Command or Agency to lag behind the supported command due to additional tasks that are required after the change takes effect. The USFK Transformation plan will address timing and phasing of the process. The Commander, USFK holds Focus Sessions every three to four weeks to review and provide guidance to the transformation planning.

COMMENTS TO RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, incorporate all DoD activities and organizations within the Korean theater of operations into the overall force reductions and require those activities and organizations to develop transformation plans corresponding to the needs of their mission.

USFK Comments: Concur. See comments above.
Date: March 12, 2007
(Project No. D2006-D000LA-0124.003)

Recommendation 2.: We recommend the Commander, Pacific Air Forces, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces Japan:

a. Conduct a manpower study to determine the personnel requirements at 5th Air Force and U.S. Forces Japan, and

b. Concurrently, identify those Headquarters, 5th Air Force personnel that can serve in a joint capacity with U.S. Forces Japan.

USFK Comments: No comment.
U.S. Pacific Command Comments

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, READINESS AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT

January 18, 2007


1. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the DoD Inspector General Report. We concur with recommendation 1 and will support U.S. Forces Korea with planned force reductions and transformation plans.

2. We concur with comment on recommendation 2 that “Commander, Pacific Air Forces, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces Japan...conduct a manpower study to determine the personnel requirements at 5th Air Force and U.S. Forces Japan...” We believe that a manpower analysis is warranted, but should be coordinated with PACOM before the final manpower requirements are officially submitted to DODIG. PACOM J1 is responsible for providing manpower policy and oversight to ensure that USFJ is postured to meet theater and war fighting missions.

FRANK J. KISNER
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy
MEMORANDUM THRU Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, 600 Army
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0800

FOR Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, 400 Army Navy Drive,
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Changes in the U.S. Pacific Command - Roles and Responsibilities of Headquarters
and Support Functions

1. References:
   a. DoDIG Draft Report, Force Structure Changes in the U.S. PACOM, Roles and
      Responsibilities of HQ and Support Functions (Tab A).
   b. Command comments (Tab B).

2. Purpose. To provide Command comments to the subject draft report.

3. Headquarters, Installation Management Command (IMCOM) appreciates the value
   and intent of this draft report. While there is some disagreement to the observation and
   methodology of the report, IMCOM generally agrees with report's recommendation to
   the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. Comments from IMCOM-Korea are provided (Tab
   B).

2 Ends

as

CHRISTOPHER G. ESSIG
COL, USA
Chief of Staff

Attachment 4
(Page 1 of 4)
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND-KOREA REPLY
Audit of Force Structure Changes in the U.S. Pacific Command – Roles and
Responsibilities of Headquarters and Support Functions. Project No. D2006-
D000LA-0124.003, December 21, 2006.

GENERAL COMMENTS

(U) DODIG Observation: As U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) restructures,
realigns, and reduces U.S. forces in Korea, support functions must restructure
accordingly. KORO headquarters has four area support organizations
designated as Area I, II, III, and IV. The KORO FY 2007 Table of Distribution and
Allowances (TDA) shows total authorized personnel of 4,051 for the four KORO
areas. If personnel assigned to KORO headquarters are included, the total
authorized personnel strength will increase to 4,570. Between 2004 and 2005,
the Army transformed from supporting 30,000 soldiers at 100 camps and stations
to supporting 20,846 soldiers at fewer than 81 camps and stations in Korea.
Changes planned through 2008 will result in 18,000 soldiers stationed at 48
camps and stations centered around two hubs. EUSA reduced the number of
active duty personnel in Korea by more than 8,000 troops and closed 19 of the
36 KORO installations as planned. According to KORO officials, the 19
installations are part of Area I Support Activity and are in caretaker status
requiring only minimum utilities and contract guard services. KORO has not,
however, reduced manpower authorizations to reflect the reduction in the number
of forces supported and installations closed. The scope and methodology used
to determine authorized personnel levels was the IMCOM-K Table of Distribution
and Allowances.

COMMENTS TO FINDINGS

(U) IMCOM-Korea Comments: IMCOM-K disagrees with this observation
and the methodology of the report. The DoDIG methodology focused on the
Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) (spaces) to determine appropriate
personnel levels, while IMCOM-K has focused on manpower (faces) due to the
poor condition of the TDA and the requirement to provide the proper quality of
support to our customer base. IMCOM-K has reduced assigned manpower by
637 (see table) and will continue to right size our organization to meet EUSA
requirements.

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>APF Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<td>4034</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>4380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3798</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>4111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3514</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>3743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The TDA centric analysis applied does not address the changes to the roles and responsibilities with the evolution of IMCOM's assignment of Installation Management functions from the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA). Prior to the activation of the Installation Management Agency (IMA) in October of 2002, execution of base operations support (BASOPS) was under the command and control of EUSA and executed by 19th Theater Support Command. IMCOM-Korea (formerly KORO) TDA was formed from MTO+E organizations creating TDA mismatches. In addition, as United States Forces Korea (USFK) and EUSA transforms, missions that were typically assigned are being shifted to IMCOM-K (i.e., Master Planning, Air Traffic Services, Anti-terrorism planning, Law Enforcement, Records Management, Personnel Services Detachment, In-processing, and mail distribution). The IMCOM-K TDA has not (3 year lag average) changed in this short period. This fact coupled with how IMCOM has managed manpower with available dollars forced IMCOM-K leaders to manage faces versus spaces.

The growth reflected in Area I TDA (DoDIG Report page 3) between FY2003 and FY2004 was a result of BASOPS spaces transferring from Second Infantry Division to Area I Support Activity. The spaces consisted of Food Services, Auditors, Records Management, and others. The manpower associated with the increase in the TDA was already performing their assigned task under IMCOM-K leadership. The changes in FY2005 and FY2006 were internal realignments between the Area’s and a reduction of spaces returned to HQ IMCOM/HQDA.

Since the standup of IMCOM-K, available funding has been the driving force in managing our civilian workforce and ensuring that we provide Common Levels of Support (CLS) to our customers. Correcting TDAs has been an ongoing challenge throughout IMCOM. HQS, IMCOM has declared Fiscal Year 2007 as the Year of Manpower with the intent to improve all TDA accounts. Once USFK sets the force, IMCOM-K will assess the manpower to support the force. As this fidelity occurs, the TDA can be adjusted, and authorizations and assigned personnel can be aligned within the 3-year period for a TDA command plan.

COMMENTS TO RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) **Recommendation 1:** We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea incorporate all DoD activities and organizations within the Korean theater of operations into the overall force reductions and require those activities and organizations to develop transformation plans corresponding to the needs of their mission.

(U) **IMCOM-Korea Comments:** IMCOM-K agrees with DODIG recommendation. As stated in USFK's DoDIG response, there is an inherent lag in supporting organizations/forces and agencies drawing down at the same time as the supported organization/forces. In some cases, the supporting organizations must increase manning levels to support the operational forces at
the losing and gaining locations simultaneously. USFK transformation planning is ongoing and a draft will be released 2nd quarter FY2007. IMCOM-K is concurrently developing a transformation plan that compliments and supports USFK. IMCOM-K understands that internal staffing must meet the needs of our customers and two tools that will be used to develop our end state are the IMCOM Standard Garrison Organization (SGO) and Department of the Army Common Levels of Support (CLS). The majority of work force savings will occur at end state when all planned unit transitions have occurred and the Army Component of USFK is finally aligned on two installations.