THE ARMY YOU NEED:
RETOOLING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BY

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.

USAWC CLASS OF 2007

This PRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-
**1. REPORT DATE**
31 MAY 2007

**2. REPORT TYPE**
Program Research Project

**3. DATES COVERED**
00-00-2006 to 00-00-2007

**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**
Army You Need Retooling the Army National Guard

**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**

**5b. GRANT NUMBER**

**5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER**

**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**

**5e. TASK NUMBER**

**5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER**

**6. AUTHOR(S)**
Patton Pickens

**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**

**9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)**

**11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)**

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**14. ABSTRACT**
See attached.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

<table>
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<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
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**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
Same as Report (SAR)

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**
32

**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Patton K. Pickens

TITLE: The Army You Need: Retooling the Army National Guard

FORMAT: DDE Research Project


CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The US Army is too small to impose order on a large population. Thus, it can face the future in one of three ways: it can avoid conflicts that may require occupation of an enemy’s homeland, it can expand its capacity to compel the compliance of an occupied population, or it can expand its capacity to promote the cooperation of an indigenous people. The first alternative is unacceptable; it forecloses a way to pursue strategic ends. The second is infeasible; Americans will not support an army big enough to subjugate a foreign population, and the nation lacks the means to maintain an army so large. The third option requires retooling the Army National Guard.

Most of the Army’s stabilization and reconstruction capacity should reside in the National Guard. The American Army is the most powerful land-based force in the world, and cutting combat forces from the Guard will not sacrifice the warfighting capacity it needs to remain so. It will however, make the National Guard a more relevant force while increasing the Army’s overall ability to maintain order in occupied territory. Moreover, aligning the Guard’s state and federal missions with the skills many of its members already hold will enable it to respond more rapidly and more effectively to either level of government.
THE ARMY YOU NEED: RETOOLING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

This paper is not about winning the war in Iraq; it is about winning the next war the nation calls upon the US Army to fight. It is about choosing wisely when to fight, and having the right capabilities in sufficient capacity to win when that day comes. It flows from the premise that the United States will not face a peer or near-peer competitor for at least two decades, and thus it assumes that the Regular Army will quickly achieve a decisive victory in any major conventional combat operation it may undertake during that time.

Yet for all its power, the American army has an Achilles Heel: it is too small to impose order on a large population. This paper explores the implications of that vulnerability, examines alternatives to rectify it, and concludes that retooling the Army National Guard as a stabilization and reconstruction force is a remedy that conforms to American social norms and economic realities.

The Army You Have: The Case for Stabilization and Reconstruction Forces

The American army has a magnificent combat record, but its checkered performance in stabilization and reconstruction operations has sometimes threatened to undercut its battlefield success. Perhaps the greatest failure of an American stabilization and reconstruction operation in history followed the American Civil War when Union armies crushed the Confederacy but Reconstruction failed to secure the fruits of victory. The 30,000 federal troops that occupied the former Confederate states were insufficient to impose order, and the North did little to rebuild the shattered South.
Ultimately, Reconstruction failed so completely that the South, though militarily defeated, remained politically defiant and racially divided. A hundred years passed before Republicans finally made political inroads into the ‘Solid South’, and it took the descendants of slaves nearly as long to achieve even a modicum of the equality promised in the Fifteenth Amendment. Even a casual observer might question whether Northern military victory achieved either of the Federal strategic objectives to restore the Union and free the slaves. Sadly, it would not be the last time that American battlefield success failed to bring about strategic success.

The United States military is, by far, the most powerful fighting force in the world today, and it will remain so for the foreseeable future. In the next twenty to twenty-five years however, the US Army is far less likely to need additional combat troops than it is to need a stabilization and reconstruction force. With no peer or near-peer competitor on the horizon, its highly trained, well equipped Active Component already has both the capability and capacity to win in major combat without relying on its Reserve Component combat assets. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that, when operating jointly with equally capable air and naval forces, it can eject an aggressor and restore the legitimate government of a friendly nation faster than it can mobilize and deploy its National Guard combat brigades. Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that even after the force reductions of the 1990s, the Regular Army retained sufficient combat capacity to rapidly seize the initiative and dominate an opponent. Yet it also demonstrated that the Total Army lacked the capacity to exploit tactical and operational successes to achieve strategic goals. Sixteen years after the United States crushed the Iraqi army during the Persian Gulf War, the American army stands on the verge of
defeat in Iraq.

What distinguishes the success of operation Desert Storm from the quagmire of Iraqi Freedom? The answer lies in the divergent nature of the two operations. Desert Storm was a war of restoration; Iraqi Freedom is a war of deposition. In 1991, American forces quickly withdrew after penetrating Iraqi territory only to the extent necessary to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait; in 2003 they seized and retained a vast expanse of Iraqi territory. When President George H. W. Bush ordered a cease fire after Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein remained in control of Iraq; by the time the younger President Bush declared major combat operations there at an end, Saddam’s government had ceased to exist. Desert Storm concluded with Kuwaiti officials standing ready to resume control of their emirate; the *dominate* phase of Iraqi Freedom ended with the only organized body capable of exercising control of Iraq already failing to do so.

An army has two tools to stabilize an occupied territory: a firm grasp or a deft touch and the United States initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom unprepared to use either. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25, 2003, General Eric K. Shinseki opined that it would take “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” to “curb ethnic tensions and provide humanitarian aid” in postwar Iraq. The Defense Department disagreed and employed a smaller force instead. That small but powerful force rapidly overwhelmed the Iraqi army, but the paucity of troops left it incapable of controlling many areas of the country. Moreover the nature of the operation changed as the *dominate* phase gave way to the *stabilize* phase. Though “U.S. and coalition forces were able to adapt to their newfound requirements, initially they did not do so with the same precision, confidence, and
effectiveness as they demonstrated in the warfighting phase."5

Thus, much of Iraq fell quickly into chaos. In May 2003, Lieutenant Colonel Clay Mitchell, Deputy Commander of the 101st Corps Support Group, was aboard the last US helicopter to leave the airfield at Iskandairyah, Iraq. Watching the scene that unfolded below, he later remarked, was like watching ants swarm an animal carcass; even before the departing Blackhawk was lost to site waves of looters rushed the gates, scaled the fences and stripped whole buildings to their frames.6 The country was spinning out of control. Unfortunately, Mitchell was not the only one to notice; Ba’athists and common criminals saw it too.

Though initially dazed by the rapidity of the US advance, by July 2003 Saddam loyalists realized that if the American army was unable to quell the looting it would be equally impotent against a Ba’athist insurgency. In Nineveh province, one of their first attacks came on the Fourth of July when a brief volley of mortar fire fell on a Forward Arming and Refueling Point at the north end of Mosul airfield. Soon thereafter, they began ambushing isolated American convoys along the desolate road between Tal Afar and Mosul and firing rocket propelled grenades into the freight cars of unguarded supply trains as they rolled north from Baghdad. Sabotage along the main oil pipeline from Nineveh province to Baghdad became so common that the 101st Airborne Division considered patrolling it with tanks before concluding that the limited number available would only prove inadequate.7

At the same time criminal activity soared. Thieves brazenly cut the high-tension power lines in northern Iraq and stole the transmission cables. The manager of a sugar beet processing facility within site of the 101st Airborne Division Rear Command Post
posted armed guards to protect the plant from intruders. A firefight erupted near the
same command post when a local farmer, thinking that thieves were pillaging his crop
during the night, opened fire on a US-led foot patrol. By the end of the year the
burgeoning chaos was already becoming reminiscent of the post-Bellum South.

Three years later it has become evident that America is in jeopardy of losing the
war in Iraq, and some observers blame the debacle on the failure of US forces to
establish order there from the beginning. Kanan Makiya, an Iraqi exile who urged Bush
administration officials to invade his own country, admitted that "lots of things went
wrong." "Above all" however, he traces the roots of the continuing unrest, to the
ubiquitous looting. "The sense of insecurity that today pervades Baghdad," he said in
an April 2007 interview, "was born on the day of the liberation of Iraq, April 9th, 2003,
when looting went rampant." The United States failed to establish order in the first
weeks of the war and now faces a multi-faceted insurgency that threatens US strategic
success. Moreover, Iraq is not the only place where a dearth of troops has left a
shadow hanging over initial military triumph.

The situation in Afghanistan is remarkably similar. Over the last year, Taliban
attacks on Afghan authorities and government facilities have increased markedly. At
this writing, the United States is increasing its troop presence there, urging its NATO
allies to do likewise and asking them to lift conditions that restrict the employment of
their forces to non-combat roles. The shortage of troops in Afghanistan is so apparent
that congressional critics of the war in Iraq justify calls for a US withdrawal from that
country by arguing that the troops are needed in Afghanistan. The lesson to be drawn
is clear: once an army loses control of an occupied territory, it takes a large combat
force to restore order.

The Bush administration seems to be taking that lesson to heart. Faced now with an increasing likelihood of losing in Iraq and a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, the administration is desperately attempting to salvage both situations with more troops. In January 2007, President Bush announced that he was ordering 21,500 additional US combat troops to Iraq. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates followed by extending unit deployments to Iraq by three months, effectively bolstering the US presence there. About the same time, the Defense Department delayed the redeployment of one brigade of the 10th Mountain Division from Afghanistan, and the administration laid plans to send another 15,000 soldiers to support a spring offensive against a resurgent Taliban. These efforts may improve the immediate situation, but they only address the current crisis; they do nothing to prepare the army for the future.

The Army You Want: Why Increasing Combat Capacity is the Wrong Approach

In the future, the United States should avoid wars of deposition – wars likely to require long-term occupation of foreign territory. However, there is truth in the cliché that hope is not a method, and what the isolationist calls ‘adventurism’ the army officer calls ‘a course of action’. From a military perspective, it would be irresponsible to prematurely foreclose the military way with which to pursue a strategic end, so when such scenarios cannot be avoided, the US Army must be prepared to impose order or foster cooperation.

Military traditionalist might find the first option attractive. It requires more combat capacity – capacity that can be employed just as well in conventional combat as in
stabilization and reconstruction operations. Furthermore, training soldiers to fight is something for which the military is well-prepared; it is a familiar and comfortable task. Finally, no one can be certain how vast or densely populated the next territory the United States occupies may be, so there is a built-in argument for expanding the army to account for all but the most absurd eventualities. With no clearly defined requirement, the demand for troops – and resources – has a hypothetically unlimited ceiling.

Regrettably, this seems to be the path down which the Bush administration is now heading. The president has already proposed adding 92,000 soldiers and marines to the active force over the next five years, “so that the American Armed Forces are ready for all the challenges ahead.” However, while such an increase may be sufficient to achieve the stated goal, it is a socially unacceptable and fiscally unsustainable course. Though Congress and the public seem willing to support a larger force today, that support will surely fade.

Americans distrust large standing armies. When Samuel Adams remarked that a “standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People,” he expressed a fear born in the pre-Revolutionary period and subsequently heightened by the post-Revolutionary Newburg Conspiracy and Pennsylvania Troops Mutiny. Not surprisingly then, when President George Washington recommended an army of 2,631 soldiers, Congress balked and cut the nascent American Army to less than one hundred officers and men instead. That miniscule force gave birth to a ‘small army' tradition, and the country has rarely had one large enough to impose order on a foreign population ever since. Thus, it seems
unlikely that the United States will maintain an army sufficient to carry out such a task during the next twenty to twenty-five years.

Since the Revolution, Americans have only maintained a large standing army during the Cold War. Though Congress has consistently increased endstrength in the immediate aftermath of every national crisis, it has just as consistently reduced the standing force as danger became more distant. After the War of 1812, Congress authorized an army of 12,000 men, but slashed it to just over 6,000 in March of 1821. After the American Civil War Congress authorized 54,300 soldiers, but by 1876 the Regular Army’s authorized strength stood at slightly less than 27,500 officers and men. Twenty years later America’s 28,000 troops “did not represent an army in any operational sense of the word.” Even 130 years after the Revolution, in early 1912, the United States was “a negligible military power . . . with only 110,000 men under arms.” The success of the Continental Army validated a ‘dual army’ model, and in times of crisis Americans have relied on reserves to augment a small standing force ever since.

Yet, even if the American people were willing to maintain a large standing army, the country cannot afford one. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has dedicated an ever-increasing share of its national budget to entitlement programs. In 1946, entitlements equaled just 2.5 percent of US gross domestic product and consumed less than 10 percent of all federal outlays. In contrast, the nation devoted 19.2 percent of GDP and 77.3 percent of total outlays to defense in that same year. Whether measured as a percentage of GDP or in constant dollars, entitlements overtook defense expenditures between 1971 and 1972, and the disparity has


continued to rise in both relative and absolute terms (charts 1 and 2).

More significantly, entitlements now account for more than 64 percent of all federal
spending and are projected to consume almost 70 percent of the US Government’s available funds by 2011 (chart 3).\textsuperscript{16}


**The Army You Need:**
**Retooling the National Guard**

The United States does not need a larger army; it needs an army with more stabilization and reconstruction capacity. In August 2005, Brian G. Watson, writing for the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, argued that the United States lacks the “Stabilization Capacity” and the “Reconstruction Capacity” necessary to achieve its strategic ends.\textsuperscript{17} The same year, the president specifically acknowledged that the United States “has a significant stake in enhancing [its] capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries . . . in transition from conflict.”\textsuperscript{18}

Yet military traditionalists have been reluctant to accept the stabilization and reconstruction mission. In 1997, Brigadier General Robert Richard (USMC) testified
before the House Committee on National Security that a “breakpoint for combat training is . . . unavailability of units to train for combat due to commitments other than combat. Warfighting,” he said, “is a perishable skill.” Not surprisingly, the committee’s report concluded that, “the expanding demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations . . . are placing at risk the decisive military edge that the nation enjoyed at the end of the Cold War.” Attitudes had changed little when, ten years latter, General (Ret.) Gordon R. Sullivan observed: “Despite a long history of performing stability operations, policymakers [have] not always embrace[d] these tasks as a core mission for the U.S. Army.” Perhaps the US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) best summarizes the argument:

Throughout the past decade . . . [a]rguments were offered that many of the situations that existed required military forces to employ different, softer skills that degraded their overall combat readiness and negatively effected [sic] their warfighting ethos. It also was opined that . . . it would take a considerable time and effort to retrain, adjust attitudes, and sharpen individual and collective skills for combat.

Despite such reluctance however, the Department of Defense appears to be the consensus agency within which to establish a stabilization and reconstruction capability. Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of The Pentagon’s New Map and Blueprint for Action, argues that the stabilization and reconstruction force “must grow within . . . the confines of the Defense Department,” and the military seems to have accepted his position. The November 2003 Joint Operations Concepts established “Stability Operations” as one of only four Joint Operating Concepts. A year later, Joint Publication 3-0
specifically incorporated *stabilize* as one of six phases in its recommended joint campaign phasing model. Following that, the Defense Department issued DoD Directive 3000.05, which states, “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that must be given priority comparable to that of combat operations.”

Having overtly accepted the mission, the Defense community must now build stabilization and reconstruction forces specifically trained, equipped and organized for the task. Thus far, “planners have taken that Marine unit or some Army infantry, bolstered it with a few of the other assets identified, and sent it out;” they “have muddled through, underutilizing the combat portions of the force for lack of actual *combat* and overworking the rest.” This *ad hoc* approach made sense when stabilization and reconstruction missions were less common, but the nation will need a professional force as they become more frequent. According to General Gordon R. Sullivan (US Army, Ret.), “the forces engaged in [stabilization and reconstruction] missions cannot merely be assembled *ad hoc* from units designed, equipped and trained for major combat.” On April 17, 2007, Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (US Army, Ret.) staked out a similar position in prepared remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The United States, he wrote, must have a “very strong corps of trainers, advisors and military assistance groups” and “many more specialized units . . . such as special operating forces, civil affairs, military police and engineers.” Both men seem to agree with the CETO assessment that stabilization and reconstruction forces will need tailored medical assets, flexible logistics, non-lethal weapons, working dogs, explosive and chemical detectors, unmanned vehicles, linguists, civil affairs, and psychological operations capabilities.
There are only two ways to build this kind of stabilization and reconstruction force: add it to existing Total Army endstrength or convert current force structure. Since the American people will not support a substantial and long-lasting increase in Army endstrength, and the country cannot afford one in any case, converting force structure is the only viable option. And there are two reasons why the conventional combat capacity resident in the Army National Guard is the logical candidate for conversion: relevance and effectiveness.

The National Guard risks becoming irrelevant if it remains the combat arms-heavy force it is today because the United States is unlikely to become engaged in the kind of fight that the National Guard is now organized to wage. Indeed, some analysts contend that the Guard is far more likely to be used in the future for stabilization and reconstruction operations than for major combat. It is true of course, that National Guard combat brigades have made significant contributions to the war in Iraq, but their employment might not have been necessary if the United States had used a larger contingent of Regular Army combat troops to begin with. Moreover, had the Army closely followed the advancing combat units with a properly trained and equipped stabilization and reconstruction force, it might have exploited its tactical success rapidly enough to prevent chaos from erupting in the wake of the advance. Either way, it would be a mistake to base force structure decisions that will shape the Army for the next two decades on the National Guard’s role in the current war. Doing so would only put the Army on the time-worn path of preparing to fight the next war by preparing for the last one.

Retooling the National Guard as a stabilization and reconstruction force will also
enhance its effectiveness. By aligning its federal and state missions, the Guard can focus on one set of Mission Essential Tasks, making it a more effective tool for both the president and the governors. Guard combat arms units may train for heavy combat, but in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, they performed salvage operations; cleared debris; restored sewage systems and rebuilt infrastructure; established security; directed air traffic; billeted relief workers and displaced persons; distributed fuel, food, water and ice; conducted search, rescue and evacuation missions; provided medical care; supported local law enforcement; and established or re-established basic and satellite communications.\textsuperscript{32} These functions resemble the Force Application Capabilities laid out in the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept and the metrics

![Assessments](image)

Figure 1
that US Marines used to assess stabilization and reconstruction progress in Iraq (figure 1) more than they do many of the collective tasks in the Army’s Mission Training Plan for the Mounted Brigade. Clearly then, they are equally useful when responding to a domestic crisis as they are in a foreign stabilization operation, and if the National Guard can perform them well in one place it should be well-prepared to do so in the other. Furthermore, converting the National Guard from a combat force to a stabilization and reconstruction force should improve mission effectiveness by leveraging the civilian-acquired skills of individual Guard soldiers. Organizing the bulk of the nation’s stabilization and reconstruction force within the National Guard will enable Guard soldiers who wish to do so to serve in a Military Occupational Specialty that closely parallels their civilian employment, which should yield better individual performance and thus enhance collective performance. Indeed, the White House report of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina recommends this and the National Guard Bureau all but boasts that its soldiers “come in with civilian-acquired skills that bring extra capabilities that their unit would not normally have.” Anecdotal evidence suggests these civilian-acquired skills have enabled some Guard combat support units serving in Iraq to equal or outperform similar Active Component units. The civilian-acquired skills that their soldiers brought to the battlefield “complemented their military training and made them more adept, knowledgeable and flexible than [their] active duty counterparts.”

Moreover, the usefulness of these skills seems equally evident in both overseas and domestic missions. “An Iraqi policeman may have limited respect for an American Soldier who attempts to train him in the methods of civilian law enforcement. But, when that Soldier is a National Guardsman with 20 years of civilian experience as a police
officer, that Soldier’s credibility and impact as a trainer is vastly enhanced.\textsuperscript{36}

Meanwhile, when many of the organizations that responded to Hurricane Katrina knew nothing of the region, one National Guardsman, regularly employed by the US Department of Agriculture, used the organization’s Digital Topographic Support System and data set to produce over 800 maps those agencies needed to support recovery operations.\textsuperscript{37}

Despite these advantages, there will be those who dismiss this proposal, and the most skeptical critics may be some of the most influential stakeholders. Senior National Guard officers have reacted “violently” to previous proposals to trade-in their combat arms units for combat support organizations.\textsuperscript{38} The rationale they put forth is that combat arms units:\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Are more versatile than other units and can thus adapt to a wider range of State missions.
  \item Are more stable, less likely to change from one type of unit to another.
  \item Are usually resourced at a higher level.
  \item Are less likely to disappear when the army reorganizes.
  \item Can execute decentralized training as squads and platoons at unit Armories more easily than support units, which need to be integrated into more highly organized exercises to train effectively.
  \item Generally have more people and so require more Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) positions, meaning more State Jobs.
\end{itemize}

Perhaps these concerns were once valid, but today they are dubious at best, and at least one knowledgeable observer credits them as much to concern over prestige as
to any substantive objection to reorganization.\textsuperscript{40}

Indeed it is ironic to hear National Guard officers contend that combat arms units can perform a wider array of missions than support units when Regular Army officers have consistently maintained that operations \textit{other than war} detract from their ability to conduct their ‘primary’ warfighting mission. If executing a non-combat mission can take the edge off a Regular Army battalion, imagine the effect it might have on a National Guard battalion that only undergoes two weeks of collective training a year. It takes more than two weeks a year to train large combat units to conduct complex operations, and the performance of National Guard combat brigades in Iraq, admirable though their service has been, confirms that even “six months of preparation does not provide the same foundation as five, 10, 15 years of full-time experience.”\textsuperscript{41}

Even if combat arms units are more versatile than support units, that hardly justifies maintaining them if the nation needs a different type of force – and the Guard insists on doing so to its own detriment. During the Cold War National Guard combat formations comprised the nation’s strategic reserve in what was expected to be a ‘come as you are’, high intensity scenario. They were high on the Time Phased Force Deployment List and resourced accordingly. Times have changed, and the ‘come as you are’ scenario now calls for more stabilization and reconstruction capacity. Thus, if the National Guard insists on holding onto its combat formations, it is may find itself in the unenviable position of fighting for resources for the least critical assets.

On the other hand, implementation of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model may off-set the declining significance of National Guard combat units. The ARFORGEN model makes one in three of the Regular Army’s brigade combat teams –
and one in six of those in the National Guard – available for deployment in any given year. To make the model work, the Army will have to devote significant resources to the National Guard combat units in the ready and available phases of the ARFORGEN cycle. This may however, have an almost perverse unintended consequence.

Having poured resources into the National Guard brigades in the available phase of the ARFORGEN cycle, the Army may feel compelled to use them – even in wars that are unlikely to be long-lived. By definition, units in the available phase of the cycle should be at a higher state of readiness than those in the two other phases – regardless of component. The one in six available National Guard units should therefore, be more ready to deploy than the two out of three Regular Army units that are in the reset/train or ready phases of the cycle. If a crisis arises, the Army cannot then opt to deploy Regular Army units in the ready or reset/train phases of the ARFORGEN cycle before calling on the available National Guard brigades. Doing so would at least tacitly suggest that the Army leadership doubted the National Guard’s capabilities and imply that the resources devoted to bringing them to the available state of readiness had been wasted.

Despite past resistance, the Army may already be leaning in the direction this paper proposes. Six National Guard combat brigades are already converting to multifunctional support or engineer brigades. Moreover the National Guard Bureau already has plans to establish ten core homeland readiness capabilities including engineering, communications, transportation, medical, security and logistics in each state and territory. Finally, “in 23 states, the Adjutant General also serves as the State Director of Emergency Management, State Director of Homeland Security, or both.”

Of course, this is not the only proposal to establish a stabilization and
reconstruction-like force. Some have urged the Department of Defense to create separate units to perform peacekeeping and other duties consistent with the stabilization and reconstruction mission, which would allow the remainder of the armed forces to focus on combat.\textsuperscript{44} This proposal conforms closely to that model. Thomas P.M. Barnett has proposed a force organized within a “Department of Everything Else” to perform what he calls “SysAdmin” duties. Taken to extreme, what is proposed here would be very similar. Depending on the situation, National Guard forces could be ‘loaned’ to the Department of State or Homeland Security, much the way the Coast Guard becomes a Navy asset in wartime – only in reverse. Brian G. Watson recommends incorporating an organic stabilization and reconstruction capability into Active Component brigade combat teams, an idea that is not inconsistent with this proposal. The Army needs to incorporate some stabilization and reconstruction capabilities into the Active Component, just as it needs to retain some combat forces in the National Guard.

Whichever proposal it implements, the United States will need a stabilization and reconstruction force to maintain order the next time it cannot avoid a war of deposition. It could accomplish the same task with more Regular Army combat forces, but that kind of army is inconsistent with American traditions and forty-five years of federal spending. The National Guard has a surplus of combat formations that are ripe for conversion to the stabilization and reconstruction role, and retooling the Guard as such a force would ensure its relevance, align its structure to better support both its state and federal missions, and enhance its effectiveness.
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8 There was a common perception that Saddam loyalists were colluding with criminals to sow disorder.


11 George W. Bush, “2007 State of the Union Address,” (speech before a joint


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