

ARE ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS TRAINED AND EDUCATED  
TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE CONTEMPORARY  
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT?

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Strategy

by

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## ABSTRACT

**ARE ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS TRAINED AND EDUCATED TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE CONTEMPORARY INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT?** by MAJ Patrick R. Seiber, 83 pages.

From the Crimean War through the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military and the media have had a dynamic relationship that has changed throughout history. Many of the changes in this relationship have been based on technology, while other parts of the relationship have changed based on cultures within the military, the public, and the media establishment. In order to answer the primary research question, this thesis begins with a brief historical review of military and media relationships from 1854 (Crimean War) to present day operations (Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom) in order to capture lessons learned from history. Contemporary concerns, such as strategic communications, proposed doctrinal relationships between Information Operations and Public Affairs, and Army officer “Pentathlete” development challenges, are also addressed, as Army Public Affairs Officers have requirements to support each of these areas. Research will show whether or not the current Army Public Affairs Officer training and development model listed in DA Pam 600-3 (December 1995) prepares FA 46 officers for the ongoing challenges in the contemporary information environment (CIE).

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## ACRONYMS

ABC	American Broadcasting Company
ACS	Advanced Civil Schooling
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
BOLC	Basic Officer Leadership Course
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CFD	Career Field Designation
CIE	Contemporary Information Environment
CNN	Cable News Network
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
CPIC	Combined Press Information Center
DA	Department of the Army
DINFOS	Defense Information School
DoD	Department of Defense
FA (30)	Functional Area
FM	Field Manual
HRC	Human Resources Command
IO	Information Operations
MFE	Maneuver, Fires, and Effects
MNFI	Multi-National Forces Iraq
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPORD	Operations Order

OPSEC	Operational Security
PA	Public Affairs
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PAOQC	Public Affairs Qualification Course
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Course
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TWI	Training With Industry
USAF	United States Air Force
USMA	United States Military Academy
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The global information environment continues to change. The question is whether or not the Army public affairs officer (PAO) is trained and developed to meet and adapt to the ongoing changes in the information environment. In World War II, PAOs had to focus mainly on radio, newspaper, and magazine media. By the time of Vietnam, television joined the media. Modern day PAOs must be prepared to interface with the media in the form of print, wire, television, Internet, and other nontraditional or nonmedia members utilizing tools, such as web logs (known as “blogs”), to communicate information at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. How does a PAO operate with the stories released from all venues of the media? How does the PAO prepare the commander to engage and come to terms with all of the various forms of media? How do public affairs operations tie in with information operations? How do, or will, information operations and public affairs officers work together to achieve the effects needed in today’s information environment? Information operations and strategic communications are two new transformational military topics that are still being developed at this time. Strategic communications is also a transformational topic in both high-level corporate and the most senior levels of government, as the president of the United States now has a Strategic Communications Director. If the Army intends to adopt a model of maintaining strategic communicators, then how does it grow and develop effective strategic communicators? This then requires the question of whether or not the current PAO training and development model meets the requirement to develop effective strategic

communicators. It also requires the Army to declare whether public affairs or information operations has the lead in the development of strategic communicators.

The current PAO training and development model requires officers to initially serve as a basic branch officer for several years. Some of the other military services' PAOs begin serving in their specialty immediately after initial officer training. During recent media panel discussions at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, one issue raised by former ABC News Correspondent John McWethy was that the Army PAO model is not the best from his perspective. On Armor branch day at the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in August 2006, a former regimental S3 discussed challenges he had as a maneuver primary staff officer in that his PAO could not read an operational summary. As a result, his PAO could not timely and accurately inform media personnel arriving in the regimental area of operations (AO) about ongoing military activities. As a result, the S3 took on the media operational liaison responsibility from the PAO. The Combined Arms Center Strategic Communications Director, then LTC (P) Boylan, stated during the (Section 16) CGSC media panel that the PAO community wants to sustain the current model so that Army PAOs are qualified within the Army operations so that they can better engage with the Army topics and information in their dealings with the media. The Army now has another Functional Area, Information Operations (FA 30). Public affairs is required to contribute to information operations, and together they make the new Effects Division within the Maneuver, Fires, and Effects career field. What will information operations officers require from public affairs officers? What is the venue for interface with each other? These appear to be all new and interesting challenges that do not yet have all the answers.

PAO career development is the topic of this thesis. One approach to determine the answer would be to take the current DA Pam 600-3, ask one media member, one senior level maneuver commander, and the PAO career manager for their thoughts on the model. After collecting each of their comments, one would compare and contrast their thoughts, then submit the results for review. But America is a nation at war. The enemy effectively uses the media as a weapon not only to challenge the will of the American people, but to further the insurgent cause. The Army is frustrated that the “good news stories” going on in deployed areas are not being reported to the American public. The military has its own culture, with its own language and acronyms. The media has its own culture as well, with its own language, internal codes, and acronyms. The two embrace the Constitution, but in different ways. Obviously, this is a “seam” that is turning or has turned into a hole that the enemy attempts to exploit for a strategic advantage. An assumption is that one of the tasks the Army PAO must do is to close that gap to order to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage. Just as an infantryman must be proficient with his individual weapon, and a tanker must be proficient with the tank weapon systems; so must the PAO be proficient in military-media relations and the information environment. Weapons proficiency in combat arms requires repetition in training, training for adverse conditions, and placed in “world class” training opportunities that better prepare the soldier to fight in the contemporary operating environment. As such, PAOs must receive similar training and developmental opportunities. The question is whether or not the Army currently provides these opportunities. If the Army is not providing the necessary training, then how or where does it provide these training and

development opportunities to better prepare Army PAOs to support military requirements and produce the effects needed in the contemporary information environment?

There are several different types of media: television, print (newspaper and magazine), wire, Internet, radio, and now “blogging” from soldiers or other observers that are not part of the “official media.” In addition to media relations, the Army PAO must also provide internal command information, Public Affairs unit training, prepare Public Affairs Operations Order (OPORD) annexes, as well as edit written information provided by public affairs soldiers for publication in installation, unit, or other print media. With this in mind, this thesis will cover several topics regarding the media and military relationship. These topics include how PAOs can support the commander in regard to conducting media operations, interfacing with information operations, and supporting the battle staff. It will also cover what the current training and development model looks like and what, if any, changes should be made. The PAO professional education opportunities will be examined as well, including courses offered at the Defense Information School (DINFOS) Public Affairs Officer Qualification Course (PAOQC) located at Fort Meade, Maryland; Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) opportunities at various universities across America; and Training With Industry (TWI) opportunities with various media and marketing corporations across the United States. The thesis will also attempt to describe at a basic level the dynamics of information operations and how public affairs will integrate into it.

This thesis will not cover command information or the Army’s own internal broadcast and print journalism, as noncommissioned officers typically handle this portion of public affairs duties in the Army. The thesis also will not cover PAO requirements

concerning community information, as it falls in a similar category as command information. It also will not provide a detailed description of information operations (IO) or what information operations officers do, as the focus will be on how public affairs supports information operations. It also will not cover PAO duties in regard to internal broadcast operations (both radio and television), as these responsibilities should not change in the near term.

Additional assumptions are that interviews will need to be conducted with commanders, media members, and serving PAOs to obtain their perspectives. Interviews will be utilized because the topic of PAO support to IO is a relatively new with an anticipated limited availability of documented military research.

Some common acronyms are provided that will be used throughout this thesis. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and Information Operations (IO) acronyms will be used often. A Functional Area (FA) is the job outside of one of the sixteen basic branches that an officer serves in upon completing Functional Area Designation. For example, if an officer initially served in the Infantry and then received Public Affairs as a Functional Area during Functional Area Designation, then that officer will serve in the PAO Functional Area for the remainder of the officer's military career. Each FA has its own number. The two FA acronyms that will be most commonly utilized throughout this paper will be FA 30 (IO) and FA 46 (PAO). Another common acronym that will be used is the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC). BOLC includes the first three steps of junior officer development. BOLC I includes precommissioning training with Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and United States Military Academy (USMA) graduates. BOLC II is a common postcommissioning

training course that is currently offered at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Benning, Georgia. BOLC II focuses on basic soldier skills to provide officers more of a warrior ethos and equalize training received during BOLC I. BOLC III (formerly known as Officer Basic Course-OBC) is the basic branch training officers receive before reporting to an officer's first duty station. Career Field Designation (CFD) normally occurs at the ten year mark for most officers, but a few select officers complete CFD at the four year mark. Once an officer has completed the CFD process, the officer will serve in the career field he or she was designated in by that process.

There are several commonly used definitions regarding military communications. Some of these are as follow:

**Public Affairs:** Those public information, command information, and community relation activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.(DODI 5400.14 1996, 14)

**Information Operations:** FM 3-13 defines Information Operations as “**the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decisionmaking.**” (FM 3-13 2003, Paragraph 1-53)

The next chapter will include an examination of historical and contemporary literature on media and military relations, Public Affairs officer development, and examine what the PAO can do to support information operations in the contemporary operating environment.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

When first exploring for material to support PAO professional development ideas that would support IO, there was an anticipation that limited amounts of printed literature would be available on this topic. This was assumed because IO is a relatively new career field that most military writers do not yet understand, and as a result choose to stay away from it. This was a false assumption, as there is a considerable amount of recent and relevant publication available that supports exploration in the field of IO and how PA ties into supporting IO.

Upon refining the secondary and tertiary questions for each area of research this document will address, it is necessary to group each piece of literature into which question the resource material will help answer. Thus, the resource literature is broken down into three main categories: (1) historical reference material, (2) contemporary problem literature, and (3) the current Army solution literature. Some pieces of literature selected for this study is not exclusive to one category, particularly the 18 October 2006 interview transcript with (then) LTG Petraeus.

#### Defining the Problem Literature

One of the most difficult things to do in any operation is to properly define the problem. In order to better define the problem for this thesis, three things must be accomplished. First, there needs to be an appreciation for the challenges associated with the contemporary information environment. Much like a doctor of medicine requests or consults a medical history prior to conducting an examination, there needs to be a

historical appreciation of the challenges associated with media and military relations. Second, after providing a historical background, there must be an understanding of the many contemporary information challenges from several points of view. These points of view include currently serving PAOs, military commanders, and members of the press. Finally, the author wanted to provide a framework that describes the media battlefield and some current techniques used across the force for fighting on the media battlefield.

### Historical Framework and Defining the Contemporary Information Environment

There are three primary books used in this study to provide historical reference to contemporary media and military relations. *The Media and the War on Terrorism* by Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb provides a recent historical background of information regarding war media coverage from World War II through the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It specifically addresses the challenges of a twenty-four-hour news cycle, both from the civilian press and the PAO-press officer perspectives and provides a great amount of information on what caused the rift in military and media relations in Vietnam (Hess and Kalb 2003, 18). Another book that helps to provide more background information to help examine the Information Environment is *The First Casualty* by Phillip Knightly. The subtitle of this book states, *The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq* (Knightley 2004, cover). Knightley provides great historical insight regarding western media and military relationships over the past 150 years. Knightley goes into a great amount of detail into how both technology and cultural differences have impacted the government and media relationships over the years. Knightley goes into a fair amount of detail regarding propaganda and how the

government and the media have worked together to both report the truth about war, yet also support the government effort in mobilizing the population to support the government in war. The third primary resource used in the historical section is *The Global Journalist* by Philip Seib. Seib's book provides the reader with information about military and media relationships when the military is engaged in operations other than war such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These three references provide the bulk of material used to provide the historical foundation of defining the challenges in the contemporary information environment.

### Historical Background of Media and Military Relationships

The tension of the demands of the press and the needs of operational military commanders has been around for centuries. The press has the desire and motivation to provide the civilian populace with timely information about what is happening in military operations. The military establishment also wants to inform the civilian populace about military operations, but only after it has had time to insure the reputation of key individuals, units, or actions has been sanitized by the chain of command to provide a positive light on what is happening on the battlefield. Up until 1854, newspapers normally would hire young officers to send letters from the battlefield to provide information regarding military campaigns. This placed junior officers in a bind of trying to serve two masters; newspaper editors and the military chain of command. The newspaper editors were not satisfied with the content nor the timeliness of the information provided by these officers, as the officers would not send the letters back to the editors until the information was scrutinized by the chain of command (Knightley 2004, 2).

## Crimean War

This changed in 1854 with The Crimean War, when *The Times'* of London manager Mowbray Morris and editor John Delane determined there had to be a better way of obtaining timely information than relying on the military establishment. The declaration of war against the Crimea brought an unprecedented amount of support from the British population for this decision, as most of the workers were against Czarist politics (Knightley 2004, 2). Delane selected a journalist by the name of William Howard Russell accompany a British force to Malta in February 1854. Russell stayed in Malta until late March and then sailed with another British force to Gallipoli (Knightley 2004, 5). While in Gallipoli, Russell began sending letters back to Delane informing him about how the British Army leadership had priorities out of line for this operation and how the French Army was clearly superior to the British Army based on care of subordinates, commissaries, and hospitals. Russell asked Delane whether or not he should continue to send these letters, as it might appear unpatriotic. Delane told him to continue to send the letters and that he would not (at least initially) publish the reports in *The Times'* but did provide the information in the letters to members of parliament. The information in these letters would later help bring down the British government (Knightley 2004, 5-6). The *London Daily News* also sent a representative to cover The Crimean War named Edwin Lawrence Godkin who had been in Greece the year prior. Godkin was able to witness the British preparations for battle and he was able to see how the British supply lines would be cut at Varna, noting the lack of horses across Turkey to support logistics (Knightley 2004, 6). Through the correspondence of both Godkin and Russell to their respective newspapers back in London, the government and the military establishment were under

attack by two different newspapers. This caused problems for the war correspondents, as military leaders frowned upon officers and soldiers corroborating accounts of what happened on the battlefield. Senior military leaders also refused to support the journalists on the battlefield with supplies, rations, or access for information. This forced journalists to do two things that they still do today: 1) Find another way to get around the battlefield, and 2) Stop and ask as many soldiers and officers as possible to obtain their account of the battle (Knightley 2004, 7-8).

Russell is most known for his famous account known as “The Charge of the Light Brigade,” in *The Times*’ on 14 November 1854. This report caused mixed reactions across the civilian populace--one of what Knightley termed as “shocked pride.” The British populace was sad because of the defeat, but proud of how their military conducted a valiant fight (Knightley 2004, 10). Russell continued reporting the accounts of the British Army, including how poorly the British Army had prepared or cared for the wounded in battle. As a result, the British populace called for immediate medical care reform for soldiers (Knightley 2004, 12).

With the government and the military establishment now “on the ropes” of the civilian populace due to what is being reported in the media about operations in the Crimea, the British government now must develop its own plan on how to re-gain support of the civilian population. The camera was a new invention at that time that could provide live imagery that cannot be changed, thus provide credibility to government through photographs of military operations. The British government then hired a man that had photographed the Royal Family by the name of Roger Fenton to go the Crimea. Lord Albert provided a letter of introduction for him to the British military leadership and

Fenton then became one of the first official military photographers on March 8, 1855 (Knightley 2004, 13-14). Fenton did take many photographs of military activities in the Crimea, but most of these activities were not from the heat of battle. In fact, most of the photos he took were photos where “everything looks ship-shape and everyone happy” and “the interiors of the forts after the bodies had been removed” (Knightley 2004, 14). Fenton made the choice not to take photos of such things as the bloody aftermath of the “Charge of the Light Brigade,” as he knew photographs of that event would not meet the criteria he was hired to provide to the British government. It is interesting to note Fenton and Russell never worked together on the battlefield, so the synchronization of photograph and a story to go along with it by a journalist would happen later in history (Knightley 2004, 14).

The British Army launched a failed attack on Sevastopol in June 1855. Russell, already known for criticizing British military leadership, blamed Lord Raglan for the loss in his letters to *The Times*. “Queen Victoria let it be known that she was displeased with *The Times*’ and its attacks on Raglan” (Knightley 2004, 14), and the British government officials quickly clamored support of the Queen and very nearly accused Russell of treason. Sir William Codrington replaced Lord Raglan as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and consulted with Secretary of War Lord Panmure to determine ways the press could be restrained when covering military operations. Thus, military censorship was introduced on 25 February 1856. Codrington’s general order stating that any individual providing or publishing information of value to the enemy, including “premature and improper publication of its number, conditions, etc.” would be grounds for ejection of that individual and grounds for future ejection of anyone accused of the same offense

(Knightley 2004, 15). This order had little impact on the remainder of the Crimean War, for it was over by the time the troops returned to London, but the precedence regarding censorship was set, and it would impact later military operations throughout history (Knightley 2004, 15-17).

One additional dynamic regarding military and media relations was introduced in the Crimean War. As Russell was not sponsored by the government he had to rely on resources from *The Times*' to include money for rations, shelter, clothing, and transportation. *The Times*' wanted the stories, so it provided Russell with the payment for these resources and he stayed with the British forces throughout the entire length of the war. Fenton stayed for about three months then returned to England, as he believed he had accomplished his mission in providing support for the British government in the form of his photographs (Knightley 2004, 14).

### American Civil War

The American Civil War of 1861-1865 had some of the same challenges covering military operations as did the Crimean War. These challenges included censorship, demands of timely information from journalists to reporters, and support from the military and government establishment. Newspapers were still the primary medium of media information, but magazines such as *Harper's* and *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly* contained sketches and drawing of different events of the war. The technology did not yet exist to allow photographers such as Matthew Brady to place still photographs with newspaper or magazine stories. The invention and use of the telegraph greatly enhanced the speed in which news could get reported back to editors from the frontlines (Knightley 2004, 20).

The appetite for news regarding the American Civil War was not only high for the American populace, but had an international audience as well. *The Times'* (London) initially sent William Howard Russell to the United States to cover the war as Great Britain had significant interest in the outcome of the Civil War due to cotton textile trade relations with the South. Russell, however, had more of a personal interest in the Northern cause, as he was against slavery. So, this placed him in a unique position of being personally for one cause, yet sent to provide reports back to England on how the other side was faring in the war (Knightley 2004, 36). As Russell was a seasoned war correspondent, he had the ability to quickly and accurately describe the accounts of what happened at the first battle of Bull Run. He sent his reports to London, and subsequently the reports that went to London were sent back to US newspapers. The results were devastating to the morale of the Union states as the readers discovered that the Union forces were not only defeated at Bull Run, but soundly routed (Knightley 2004, 36).

The reports newspapers brought using British sources for accuracy caused concern as to how accurate the reports from American journalists would be. Much like in Great Britain, the American public--both in and out of uniform--wanted information as to how the war was going for each side. Newspaper editors across the country (both North and South) placed tremendous pressure on journalists to provide the latest information in the shortest amount of time. Newspapers such as the *Chicago Times*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and several New York papers could sell up to five times of their normal distribution for details on big battles (Knightley 2004, 23). Naturally, this type of pressure encouraged journalists to embellish accounts of battle or of other things that may have been seen on the battlefield. This type of pressure frustrated the American readers

and caused many readers to question whether or not to believe anything they read in the American papers (Knightley 2004, 21-22).

### World War I

At the start of World War I, so to in all previous Nineteenth Century warfare, writing letters was as fashionable as sending e-mail is today. Thus, when hostilities began in World War I and letters began pouring back to the civilian populace in England about what was happening on the frontlines, something had to be done about it. Propaganda is as old as Sun Tzu, but World War I brought about the first organized use of propaganda to influence the civilian population. In addition to initiating formal propaganda, the British government designed and used the “Defence of the Realm Act, a system of censorship . . . so severe that its legacy lingers today” (Knightley 2004, 84). This act entitled newspaper executives to receive extra benefits from the British government in exchange for publishing and disseminating government propaganda to the civilian populace. Thus, the newspaper editors placed tremendous pressure on wartime correspondents to provide favorable reports about what the British Army was doing in battle than what in reality was taking place (Knightley 2004, 84-85). The British government developed a plan that vilified the German people as aggressors, only slightly better than Genghis Khan (Knightley 2004, 86). This type of vilification of the Germans assisted in rallying the civilian populace of Great Britain against the Germans and helped counter the letters coming in from the frontlines. The propaganda machine developed by the British has been referred to as the model that Joseph Goebbels used to develop the Nazi propaganda plan for World War II (Knightley 2004, 86).

The British government hired many of the writers from several newspapers to help vilify the Germans and rally support from the English population about the War with Germany. While the government readily supported having journalists as part of the propaganda team, the military did not. Lord Kitchener did not care for war correspondents and as such, war correspondents were not allowed into France with the British Army (Knightley 2004, 89-90). British newspapers then turned to Winston Churchill, then Lord of the Admiralty and a former war correspondent himself, for assistance in access for journalist to cover naval activities. Churchill stated that there was no place on a warship for a journalist and recommended that journalists should stay in London and write stories provided by members of the military (Knightley 2004, 91-92). Lord Kitchener appointed Colonel Sir Edward Swinton to the staff of the commander-in-chief in London to write stories to help keep the British population informed about what was going on with British forces in the war. Swinton was selected for this duty because he (Swinton) had written a couple of books before the war. Swinton had the dubious challenge of writing reports and stories about the war that had to be reviewed by several generals, including Lord Kitchener, before they could be published. As a result, these reports were very “watered down” and publishers in London found the reports relatively useless (Knightley 2004, 91). Newspaper editors knew that fresh stories about the war would sell more newspapers, and more stories will result in more readers, and more readers result in more profit. Thus, there had to be another way to obtain accurate information more quickly than through the military about what was happening on the World War I battlefield.

One of the first big stories from World War I that did not come through the military actually came from an American journalist named Granville Fortescue, who happened to live in Belgium near Ostend just prior to the beginning of the war. When it looked like war would break out in Europe, he chose to move his family to London and offered his services to the London *Daily Telegraph*. After receiving no reply from the *Daily Telegraph*, he decided to return to Brussels and learn what was happening in Europe through the American Embassy. While in Brussels, Fortescue heard the report from local residents about German soldiers already entering Belgium near Visé. Fortescue then contacted the *Daily Telegraph* and informed them of the situation regarding the German Army entering Belgium and on 13 August 1914 the *Daily Telegraph* ran the story. Fortescue initially received calls back from editors of the *Telegraph* informing him the Foreign Office, other newspapers, nor any other officials could prove his report was true. The next day, Fortescue received another call back from the *Telegraph* offering him a job as a roving war correspondent, as Fortescue's report indeed was true. "Great Britain had just declared war on Germany for breaking Belgian neutrality. Fortescue's story had just given the *Telegraph* a twenty-four-hour world scoop, and the other British papers were rushing men to Europe to try and catch up" (Knightley 2004, 92-93).

Newspaper editors then rushed correspondents into Europe, bypassing the official channels of the British military. Journalists would ride trains, take bicycles, walk, whatever it would take to get where the action was in order to get the latest information from the front. Initially, the British military establishment plan to deal with journalists was to have them "arrested, then pull their passports, and have them expelled" (Knightley

2004, 93). Journalists then began sending stories back to London via courier using any means necessary.

Other challenges that journalists faced during World War I was being caught in the middle of providing accounts of what was going on in the war, with what the editors were willing to publish or could publish due to the obligation to support government propaganda. A report on the defeat of British forces on the battlefield would not be published unless it supported another government aim needed for propaganda. For instance, the Press Bureau in London did not report the loss by British forces at Mons, Belgium. The two journalists Arthur Moore of *The Times* and Hamilton Fyfe of the *Daily Mail* personally observed the defeat of British forces and submitted their report back to London. These two men wrote their report to their respective newspapers in England, with the assumption they would not be published due to censorship regulations, but thought that the reports should be given to proper officials within the British government. Upon review of the reports, the head of the censorship board (F. E. Smith) decided to amplify some areas of the report in order to get the message across England that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) needed more men immediately in order to defeat the German menace (Knightley 2004, 95-97). Although this defeat was reported, other British and French defeats, such as the Battle of Frontiers, did not go reported until after the war was over (Knightley 2005, 97).

By 1915, Great Britain realized it should not maintain a staunch position against war correspondents traveling with British units. Part of this shift was due to the fact that the American press was having success in meeting with German military leaders and getting the German story across to the American public. Since the British military

establishment had taken such a strong stand against having journalists with their forces, the British story was not getting out to the American public. As a result, the British Cabinet forced the General Headquarters to pursue allowing select correspondents to remain in the field with British units. This was one of the first cases where the General Staff had to develop what we would today call “ground rules” for these journalists to follow when reporting information from the field. The staff had to make such decisions as to whether or not specific regiments could be mentioned by name, weather conditions, or which locations of actions could be discussed. The staff also had to think through what sort of information would be good for recruiting more soldiers back in England (Knightley 2004, 100-101).

The first group of these reporters reported for duty in June 1915. This group of six men represented ten different British newspaper or press agencies, and at times their ranks included another five journalists. These gentlemen wore officer uniforms without rank, a green armband, and they were afforded the honorary rank of captain. The British Army provided them a headquarters, transportation, censors, and orderlies. The Army also provided them with what today would probably call a PAO. These PAOs were called conducting officers, and it was not a particularly enjoyable task for a notable British officer with a taste for adventure to conducting officer duty. The journalists were not allowed to go anywhere on the battlefield without a conducting officer. Thus, the conducting officers did everything with the journalists, including activities such as sleeping and eating. Conducting officers had the right to read all letters, products, and dispatches to insure the journalists were following the ground rules. Over time, the journalists got into a daily routine with their conducting officers on how stories would be

covered. The journalists would rotate who would go forward with the conducting officer, and the remaining journalists would remain behind and interview prisoners of war that were being evacuated from the front lines. At the end of the day, the journalists would determine what the overall story should be, write their articles, provide it to the censors, and whatever story was leftover was shipped to London. Once the stories reached London they could not be further edited because the censor edits had been completed in France. The journalists soon began to identify more and more with the soldiers on the field and the censors did not have as much information that needed to be edited as the journalists learned what could and could not be reported. Once this transition started to happen with the journalists, the units in the field also began changing their stance regarding journalists in the field. The problem for the journalists then became reporting the truth when things might go badly for that unit, knowing that the information would be censored by these same units. This is a challenge that still exists today (Knightley 2004, 101-104).

Still photographs and sketches of action from the front were placed under scrutiny by censorship. Two government approved photographers were allowed to the front to take photos of events that would help document the official history of the Great War. Thus, there would be no official photographs available for the newspapers from the Western Front. Sketches were not available until 1916, and were permitted only then because the War Office determined it needed some artists to go forward to provide sketches that could be used to promote propaganda on the home front. There were many restrictions placed on them, much like the journalists, which included no sketches of dead people (Knightley 2004, 105).

As stated earlier, the American public was receiving more of the German view during the initial stages of the Great War due to the ability of the American journalist to report on German military activities in Europe. Leaders in Great Britain became concerned, as the war would draw on, Great Britain would need additional support from the United States. Therefore, British leadership began turning the anti-German war propaganda toward America. This began in 1915 with the sinking of the Lusitania, and proceeded in 1917 with the reports of unrestricted German submarine warfare in the Atlantic. The Arthur Zimmermann telegram to Mexico requesting Mexico to support Germany in exchange for return of former Mexican lands such as Texas and New Mexico also helped turn the once neutral America to almost overwhelmingly support Great Britain (Knightley 2004, 129-130). Due to this support, American war correspondents that once were able to freely write what happened on the battlefield, now faced almost the same situation the British correspondents faced regarding the “grip” of propaganda in their own countries (Knightley 2004, 132-133). Just as the British had its own Bureau of Information the United States established a Committee on Public Information, chaired by a journalist by the name of George Creel. The Creel Committee consisted of speakers that went throughout American cities and communities with the task of rallying the American public against the Germans. This committee sent a writer by the name of Lowell Thomas to go to Europe and provide more literature to encourage more American participation in the Great War against Germany. Thomas did not find anything in Europe, but instead went to the Middle East and met T. E. Lawrence. Thomas’ articles about “Lawrence of Arabia” became “brilliant propaganda” (Knightley 2004, 132) and helped swell the ranks of American military volunteers.

## World War II

During the interwar period, the populations of both Europe and America started receiving news in forms other than newspaper and magazine. Families received information via the airwaves of radio receivers located in their individual homes. Families on both continents would stop by their local cinema for entertainment on the silver screen. As part of the entertainment package prior to the start of a movie in a cinema theater, news agencies produced newsreel images of different events happening around the world. Thus, when World War II began in 1939, the public had more available means to receive the news. These varied forms of media automatically caused more competition between various news agencies to get to the story first. These forms of media also caused challenges for Public Affairs Officers, as news transmitted via radio waves could get to destinations much quicker than telegraph or via courier. Newsreels could provide “real time” images, but since it took longer to send, edit, and release newsreel information, PAOs or other government censors typically had time to insure information recorded on newsreels was in the proper context.

As these two inventions impacted the way that Americans began receiving their news, the governments of nations involved in the war took notice as well. Many individuals have seen such movies as “Twelve O’ Clock High,” “Midway,” and “South Pacific.” In each of these movies, the storyline has a part for such characters as “Tokyo Rose” or “This is Germany Calling.” These characters represent part of the propaganda effort by the Axis forces to defeat the morale of the Allied fighting force. Radio was also used to provide government information to the population about how the war was going and what individuals could do to help support the war. Numerous people listened via

radio to such famous speeches as President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy" speech, Winston Churchill's "Fighting on the Beaches" speech, and General Eisenhower's announcement that the Allies had landed on the beaches of France on 6 June 1944. Due to the speed of radio, journalists could report events as they were happening--much like a play-by-play baseball announcer would describe a baseball game in describing the details of what was happening at any given time. Edward R. Murrow became a household name due to his radio studio broadcasts during the Battle of Britain in 1940 (Seib 2002, 16). The challenge in providing live radio coverage was not necessarily the talent of the correspondent, but the logistics necessary to transmit what was happening over the airwaves. These logistics included time, electricity, and battery power for journalists traveling forward on foot with radio transmitters, and relay antennas positioned to provide radio coverage back to London from the European theater (Hess and Kalb 2003, 13). In the Pacific Theater, due to the vast expanse of the ocean, it became quicker to relay messages via the official communiqué (Knightley 2004, 323). This time was shortened due to the later addition of Army and Navy relay stations located at Papau-New Guinea and New Caledonia.

The propaganda machines of Great Britain and the United States continued to use the press to provide assistance in rallying support for the Allies, much like what had been done in World War I. There was one significant difference though, and this was with the American military. When President Roosevelt mobilized the country for war, he also mobilized the American press agencies. Correspondents were put into uniform and served as Public Affairs Officers for the various branches of the armed forces. Journalists more or less willingly accepted (and in many cases self enforced) the rules of censorship placed

on reporting wartime news events (Hess and Kalb 2003, 19-20, 25). Another phenomenon that began happening in World War II was the fact that several American and British Generals learned that promoting a positive image through the press to the public back in the US was in their best interests. Thus, General officers began maintaining their own personal journalists with them to provide the “right leader” image to the public back in the United States. This initially worked well for General George Patton, until he had the famous incident of slapping a soldier, and then that image was tarnished. Other General officers learned from Patton’s mistake and made certain that when big events happened on the battlefield, journalists would be with the generals when they arrived on the battlefield.

There are a great amount of specific details regarding media and military relations in World War II, more than could possible be covered in this thesis. As a result of the vast amount of information available regarding media in World War II, this topic is recommended as a subject for a separate historical thesis for a PAO that may be interested in writing about media and military relations in World War II.

### Korea

There were few technological advances in the way news was delivered to the public during the inter-war years between World War II and the Korean conflict. This being said, there was a change in American culture. Unlike World War II, the entire United States was not mobilized to support the war effort on the Korean peninsula. The United States was now a “superpower,” and as the American people believed they had done their part to secure victory in World War II, there was a hesitation on the part of both the government and the population to mobilize for another war effort. Thus, when

the conflict began in Korea, correspondents were not mobilized or in uniform as they had been during World War II. In fact, at the beginning of the conflict the only American journalists located in Korea were with the news agency based in Seoul, the remainder were located in Japan with MacArthur's headquarters. Journalists were present during the initial battles as they observed American soldiers being routed by Communist forces. At this point, there were no censorship rules in place and when American soldiers involved in the fighting asked journalists whether or not the truth of the conflict would be reported back to the United States, the journalists did not know the answer. So, initially, the journalists reported what they witnessed to their respective news agencies and the news was subsequently reported to the public by these news agencies. General MacArthur's staff and Army leaders in Korea were furious. Two journalists, Tom Lambert (Associated Press) and Peter Kalischer (United Press), were told they could not return to Korea to provide war coverage by the Public Information Officer (predecessor to the modern day Public Affairs Officer) on General MacArthur's staff in Japan. Lambert and Kalischer pleaded personally with General MacArthur, who did lift the ban but warned them that they "have an important responsibility in the matter of psychological warfare" (Knightley 2004, 366-367).

Thus, journalists were now faced with whether or not to impose self-censorship, or ask the military to impose censorship on them. The military was not yet prepared to set the parameters regarding censorship. Journalists were placed in a precarious position of writing precisely what they observed to meet the demands of publishers, or lose support from the units fighting the battles if it went against what military leaders thought needed to be covered from the field (Knightley 2004, 367-368). Support from the military was

key, as there was very limited infrastructure to support communications needs for journalists outside of military channels from Korea. Much of the news had to be relayed from Tokyo, but in order to get to Tokyo, journalists would have to locate available space on military transportation. In order to get the story to publishers quickly, that meant trying to find space on aircraft shuttling back and forth from Korea to Japan.

When Allied Forces made the landing at Inchon, arrangements were made by General MacArthur to have the news agency chiefs with him on the command ship McKinley. Magazine writers and columnists were placed on barges with the initial assault force, while many newspaper agencies did not get to the landing until three days after the assault. In addition, General MacArthur saw to it that the news agency chiefs had special access to facilities providing telephone lines to Tokyo so the “official” report of the assault would be reported “quickly and accurately” to the American population. News agencies that tried to bypass this “official” channel received reprimand from General MacArthur’s staff, and journalists that attempted to bypass this channel would not receive American military support to get the story to Tokyo (Knightley 2004, 371).

After Seoul, and later Pyongyang fell to United Nations troops, most journalists thought the war was over and this was reported to the American public. This changed after reaching the Yalu River at the border of Manchuria, when Communist forces struck back. General MacArthur’s headquarters tried to maintain that the war was still going well, but journalists with units at the front could, and did, report otherwise. In order to regain the initiative with the American population, the Air Force and later the Army began to issue press releases indicating how many enemy had been killed—North Korean or Chinese—to the last man. MacArthur then issued his “home for Christmas” promise,

and when that promise was not delivered, the American public began to grow weary of the Korean conflict (Knightley 2004, 373).

The question regarding censorship had not yet been answered until General MacArthur reinstated full military censorship on news messages, broadcasts, magazine articles, and photographs from Korea after a significant number of incidents discrediting the corruption within the South Korean government were reported to the United States. Thus, in order to maintain legitimacy, MacArthur saw that this was the time to impose censorship. This was first tested by Peter Webb of the United Press when he happened to be in the vehicle that first arrived at the scene of where General Walton Walker (commander, Eighth Army) had just been killed in an automobile accident. Webb reported the story to Tokyo, where it was cleared by the censor and subsequently published. Eighth Army headquarters had Webb arrested until he proved that the story had been cleared by the censor. He was subsequently released (Knightley 2004, 376-377).

As stated earlier, the American public grew weary of the conflict after having a complete victory in World War II. The restlessness in America with the Korean situation that it caused then candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower to state, "I will go to Korea and end the war," in a campaign speech (Hess and Kalb 2003, 27). This statement may very well have sealed victory for Eisenhower, as he was the first Republican candidate elected President of the United States since 1932.

### Vietnam

There has been considerable discussion over the years about press coverage of American military action in Vietnam. In fact, military and media relations remain

strained and lessons continue to be taught using examples of media relations from the Vietnam conflict. Unlike the time period between the end of World War II and the Korean conflict where there were little technological advances regarding how the population received its news, two significant advances happened after the Korean conflict and the end of the Vietnam conflict in 1975. The most significant of these technological advances was television. Beginning in the late 1950s, part of the “American Dream” was owning a television set and placing it the living room where the radio used to be. Through television, media news outlets had the ability to not only tell the public what was happening in a war zone, but show them as well. The second technological advance that happened during Vietnam was the ability to transmit television signals via satellite, which significantly reduced the time news stories could be reported from around the world. Although the ability to report live news images from around the world would not happen until the first Gulf War in 1990-1991, taped newsreels from war-zones could be edited and released within hours as opposed to three days at the start of the war (Hess and Kalb 2003, 20).

In addition to the changes in technology, there was also a change in how the military treated members of the press during Vietnam. As opposed to the high amount of censorship the military provided during Korea, in Vietnam there was virtually no censorship. Journalists reporting in Vietnam routinely would purchase uniforms, protective gear, and even weapons on the black market and then link up with a unit to join American military forces on a patrol. Some journalists termed it as an “open war” (Hess and Kalb 2003, 21-22). There were journalists that began coverage of the Vietnam conflict in 1962 with the belief that the conflict was justified. In February 1968, Walter

Cronkite conducted a CBS commentary and indicated that the Tet Offensive was having a tremendous effect on United States forces and began to express doubts about whether or not the United States involvement in Vietnam was going anywhere. President Lyndon Baines Johnson believed that the comments from Walter Cronkite significantly influenced American opinion against the conflict in Vietnam (Hess and Kalb 2003, 27).

For the first time, Americans now had the ability to view the conduct of the war in their own homes. Images of priests setting themselves on fire, villages burning after napalm bombs were dropped, and images of American soldiers fighting and dying had a significant impact on the psyche of the American public. These images that in wars past had remained in the wartime theatre of operation, were now broadcast on the evening news. The ability to see the raw war footage quickly turned the American public against the war effort. Sectors of the American public took extremes in their position against the war by conducting violent antiwar demonstrations, jeering returning war veterans, and evading the draft in significant numbers. The initial military plan to allow unhindered press coverage of the war backfired.

### Iran, Grenada, and Panama

Both Iran and Grenada provided two examples of how the military establishment desired an opportunity to re-gain the trust of the American population after Vietnam. When the American hostages were captured by Iranian militiamen and students in 1979, national and international press provided footage of the American hostages which compelled the American leadership to develop a plan to free the hostages. Desert One was the codename for the event, and due to several mishaps, the military was unsuccessful in accomplishing the rescue mission. The press had virtually no notification

about the event, only hearing the announcement the mission had not been successful from President Carter the morning after the rescue attempt (Valliere 1992, 72). The Iran hostage crisis was a centerpiece of the evening news and became a key political issue during the 1980 presidential campaign season. There is a distinct recollection of viewing the inauguration of President Reagan with a split screen view of the simultaneous release of the Iranian held hostages.

Grenada provided another opportunity for the military to regain the trust of the American population. President Reagan was a master at using the press to promote his agenda and the potential of Soviet expansion at an airfield in Grenada provided him the opportunity to demonstrate American resolve against the Soviet Union's "Evil Empire." Overall, this operation was viewed as a success tactically and strategically. Operationally, there were some challenges. One of the challenges involved media coverage of this event. Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, commander of the operation, was very concerned about "minimum casualties" (Metcalf 1988, L6-2-4). As such, he did not plan to have the press arrive on Grenada until day three of the operation. When he asked his staff how many members of the media planned to conduct reports on Grenada, he was told four hundred. This figure was more than he had anticipated, and as such decided to send a press pool of twenty-five initially, followed by fifty the following day, then once there was sufficient space to house all of them he would get them all on the island (Metcalf 1988, L6-2-10). In his final comments regarding public affairs, Admiral Metcalf states that the media entry into this operation was properly timed and that the operational commander must have control over the media events (Metcalf 1988, L6-2-14). There were reporters on the other hand, that disagreed with Admiral Metcalf's assessment. A reporter from *The*

*Washington Post* reported he had been held “incommunicado” on the USS Guam during this event, while another reporter rented a speedboat and attempted to get to Grenada before being turned away by naval aircraft (Schwartzkopf and Petre 1993, 297-298).

Military relations with the press did not improve with the United States invasion of Panama in 1989. The concept of a “press pool” was planned by the military to allow journalists to move to the combat area and provide news coverage. The “press pool” was moved to a warehouse where “firsthand” reports were sent via messages released by military Public Affairs Officers. Approximately one hundred other journalists tried to move to the combat zone by deploying with units from the United States. Some of these journalists were also placed within the “press pool,” with the promise that they could later move forward with the press pool to the combat area. Unfortunately, the military did not deliver on this statement stating that no facilities for the press were available and that they had not been planned for in the operation. Many of the correspondents then returned disgruntled to their parent news agencies (Knightley 2004, 485).

#### Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm

The most significant technological advance that happened during the 1980s leading up to the first Persian Gulf War was the expansion of cable television and the ability for the public to view news twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week on news network stations. Networks such as C-SPAN and Ted Turner’s Cable News Network (CNN) provided the cable subscriber the opportunity to view national and international news live, around the world, due to the expanded use of satellite technology. Thus, through networks such as CNN, news could be transmitted simultaneously around the world. News networks that had this type of capability also took more of an international

identity, rather than an American identity. When President George H.W. Bush contacted media outlets and informed them it was ill advised to stay in Baghdad due to the planned allied air attacks, most of the traditional American networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) left, but Ted Turner told his CNN correspondents that they could stay in place (Hess and Kalb 2003, 23). As a result of Turner's decision, what is now termed as the "CNN effect" was born. The video images and Peter Arnett's reporting of the American attack from Baghdad provided not only the American public, but an international audience the opportunity to view the war from the enemy point of view in individual homes.

This change in technology created a new challenge in media and military relations, as journalists now had the ability to provide views of both sides of the conflict to an international audience. International journalists from CNN had the approval of the Iraqi government to remain in Baghdad, despite the warning from the United States to leave. CNN was also extremely popular with the American population, so CNN also had to provide coverage of what American forces were doing to prepare to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Often times CNN provided war information to then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney faster than official government channels (Hess and Kalb 2003, 63). The challenge the military now had was to determine how to get the story to the media without jeopardizing the security of deploying military forces. The decision was made to implement the "media pool" system; however, the pool would consist of a small, select amount of journalists that had been approved by the Department of Defense. In order to prevent other American journalists from moving to Saudi Arabia on their own to cover Operation Desert Shield, the State Department disapproved visas for journalists to travel to Saudi Arabia. In August, the Defense Department approved a total of seventeen visas

for journalists to travel as part of the media pool to Saudi Arabia. The journalists selected for the media pool were escorted by military officers wherever they went and were told there were insufficient American forces in the area to withstand an Iraqi attack (this was in August of 1990) and that journalists should not report that information if they wanted to stay in Saudi Arabia. The journalists complied with the request. The “pools system” only allowed a certain number of journalists to report about the war, and those journalists that were selected as part of the pool were expected to share news information with other news correspondents. This created quite an up-roar among journalists, who continually jockeyed amongst each other for media pool selection. Some individual journalists and smaller media organizations initiated a lawsuit against the Pentagon for violating the First Amendment right of Freedom of Expression for limiting the number of journalists that could be part of the “pool.” However, many of the larger news agencies declined to participate due to the concern that military leadership would turn away their correspondents and as such lose coverage of the war. There were a few journalists who tried to cover the battlefield without the support of the United States military. For example, CBS journalist Bob Simon and his television crew were captured by an Iraqi patrol while trying to cover the war outside of the media pool. The U.S. military then provided a more or less “I told you so” response when news of their capture was reported on CBS. With reporters fighting against each other for coverage through the media pool, access and membership within the media pool maintained by the approval of the military by what was reported to the public, and approval ratings of the conflict very high by the American public...it appeared the military had figured out how to solve the military and media relationship. This was not to be the case (Knightley 2004, 489-492).

The United States military had the ability to control American journalists, but they still did not have the ability nor the authority to control international journalists such as Peter Arnett of CNN, John Simpson of BBC, and Brent Sadler of ITN (Knightley 2004, 492). The main incident that caused considerable debate in Western countries was the coverage of the after effects of an Allied bombing in a primarily residential area within Baghdad called Ameriyya. In this incident, over 1,600 civilians were killed and the cameras of each of these three networks provided global coverage of the resulting carnage from this event. The outrage was not necessarily the civilians that were killed, but rather the network coverage showing the devastating carnage on international television. Part of the intent of the American military was to demonstrate how new battlefield technology could reduce unnecessary casualties and now this message was challenged by the proof that mistakes do happen on the battlefield and that the battlefield is not as “clean” as the American public would like for it to be. The military was able to recover from it, as when they reported that the bunker was indeed the target and Saddam Hussein should not have placed civilians inside the bunker (Knightley 2004, 493-495).

There has been some discussion over the years about the imagery from Operations Desert Storm and how it may have impacted President George H.W. Bush’s decision to end the ground war after seeing images of Iraqi convoys along Iraqi Highway One--the “Highway of Death” from February 1991. The author did not find any evidence of this in his research material, but a valid assumption can be made that the Western public does not want to see images of death on neither the twenty-four, nor the evening news cycle. As the President must be in touch with the sentiments of the American public, it would be a valid assumption that when the images of the “Highway of Death” were shown on

television screen across America, he saw the images through the eyes of the American public. The American public saw a totally defeated Iraqi army, and a superior American combat force that Americans could be proud of. With these ideas in mind, it likely made sense to cease hostilities as the American public was convinced of a total victory due to the imagery provided by members of the press. That perception was not necessarily reality, as the majority of Americans had no idea that Saddam Hussein still had Republican Guard and other Iraqi forces remaining in Iraq that Americans would fight a little over a decade later.

### Somalia and the Balkans

The 1990s brought new challenges to military and media relationships, particularly after the end of the Persian Gulf War and the significant drawdown of military forces due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. The military found itself searching for what it should be doing since the conventional threat of the Soviet Union had all but gone away. In 1992, images of a starving population in Somalia with food supplies being controlled by warlords were broadcast around the world. Leaders, such as President George H. W. Bush, sensitive to the public mood to intervene chose to send U.S. forces to support the United Nations in conducting stability and humanitarian relief operations. The initial landings at Mogadishu were well covered by the press, as sailors and marines landing in Mogadishu were greeted by flashing bulbs rather than machine guns (Seib 2002, 44-45). Terrorists in Mogadishu were more adept at using the media to inform and influence a worldwide audience about their operations by providing images of captured and dead American servicemen. The terrorist intent was to show the American public that this conflict was not “clean” and that if Americans were sent to fight against

Muhammed Fadeed, they would be dealt with accordingly. These images assisted in influencing President Clinton to pull U.S. forces from Somalia (Seib 2002, xii-xiii).

Much like the images projected of the starving people in Somalia, the international reaction to images and reports of genocide in Bosnia caused government leadership in many western countries to make decisions involving the commitment of military forces to stop internal Bosnian strife. Another phenomenon that happened during the initial stages of this conflict was an open confrontation from Christiane Amanpour of CNN with then President Bill Clinton regarding the American policy toward Bosnia. Other journalists took note of this conflict, which caused military and government leaders to re-think strategy when discussing high profile events with very experienced international correspondents. Amanpour made it quite clear that she would find a way to report what was happening, despite attempts by a government to do otherwise (Seib 2002, 53-54).

One of the most significant military media events happened before any American forces were actually in Bosnia. Tom Ricks, a journalist from *The Wall Street Journal* was embedded with the First Brigade, First Armored Division, while it was located across the Sava River preparing to perform a reconnaissance mission of Northern Bosnia. Colonel Gregory Fontenot was reported questioning whether or not a year would be enough time for United States troops to stabilize the tensions across Bosnia. While discussing reconnaissance operations into the Orasje (Croatian) pocket of Northern Bosnia with his soldiers, he described the Croatians as racists and willing to kill people based on skin color (as he was talking to two of his African-American soldiers). Ricks had been with the unit for several days, an assumption was made that the reporter understood the

context of what was said as background information. Both of these statements were reported to the national media, and shortly afterward, Colonel Fontenot was relieved of his command. The shockwaves of this event caused many senior leaders to completely avoid talking to the press at the risk of losing their career (News Media Update, 20 May 1996).

### Kosovo

Kosovo was a unique conflict in that it was a reflection of what NATO had been designed to do, which was defeat an oppressive communist regime. In this conflict, NATO united to fight against Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia. Since Milosevic had not been brought to terms for atrocities from Bosnia, the Western press assisted NATO in providing the propaganda to make Milosevic the villain by comparing him to Hitler and stating that the Serbs had produced mass graves for the Albanians, much like they did for the Bosniacs. The military largely controlled media access, by only providing press briefings in headquarters and drawing attention to briefers and briefing charts rather than allowing media interviews in the field. Official briefings provided what was called battle damage reports based on bombings and casualty estimates. Reporters remained in neighboring territories, but really did not have any real-time information to report (Knightley 2004, 520-522). When reporters actually did cross into Kosovo, they did not find the mass graves nor the massive amount of battle damage that had been reported.

### Afghanistan

The events of 11 September 2001 brought images of how international terrorist organizations had the capability to strike American soil and directly impact the American

public. The American viewer now had more of an awareness of international terror, and as such, the international audience was particularly interested in how the United States would respond to an attack on United States soil. This created a significant challenge regarding media and military relationships, as there was an incredible amount of pressure for news agencies to obtain information to report about how United States forces would respond to this attack, while simultaneously the military had to be concerned about operational security (OPSEC) of planned or ongoing missions.

At the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, the primary way the public received information was through Pentagon controlled press briefings. This was the primary source, as the initial forces involved in the conflict were Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Air Force bombing missions. Neither of these forces was conducive for embedded media or live reporting due to the potential reporting of special tactics and procedures that would place United States military forces in jeopardy (Knightley 2004, 529-530). Other initial concerns included access to United States troops in such countries as Uzbekistan, where host nation sensitivities to the presence of international press could impede host nation support (Hess and Kalb 2003, 86). Another interesting phenomenon during the initial stages of the war in Afghanistan was then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld routinely taking the podium at press conferences at the Pentagon. Torie Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, made no secret about how it was Secretary Rumsfeld's intention to manage the flow of information in order to prevent leaks to the media. Many reporters took issue with this stance from Pentagon leadership (Hess and Kalb 2003, 96).

The Pentagon did put together press pools, much like it did during the first Gulf War. Journalists in the press pool were brought to Camp Rhino, but were not allowed to call it Camp Rhino. The journalists were provided stories through the Public Affairs Officers, and they were escorted to specific areas for limited amounts of time. Many times, the news information that came from Public Affairs Officers in Kandahar, were actually put together by Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Even specific information happening on the camp could not be reported until authorized by Public Affairs Officers (Hess and Kalb 2003, 167).

Despite the attempts to control the media through press briefings, resourceful journalists found ways to get around the restrictions from the government by funding their own way into Afghanistan. Michael Gordon from *The New York Times* was one such journalist who found himself in the middle of a firefight between two coalition warlords that were fighting against each other near Tora Bora. Dan Rather also found a way to get into Kabul to provide information about what was happening in Afghanistan (Hess and Kalb 2003, 98).

### Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation Iraqi Freedom provided the international public the opportunity to view the conflict from a myriad of angles. First, due to the “CNN Effect” as described earlier, journalists from many different nations were able to provide coverage about what was happening simultaneously from the views of the coalition soldier on the ground, the Iraqi government in Baghdad, and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Most of the major broadcasting corporations had hired former senior level military leaders to serve as “experts” to provide additional analysis about what was happening as the coalition

attacked through Iraq. Due to the need for the press to cover the conflict and the desire for the military to maintain more control over what the media provided in regard to information about the war, the concept of embedded media was established by the DoD. Through embedded media, the public had the ability to view near “real-time” footage about what was actually happening on the ground as soldiers, sailors, and marines conducted the battle against a live enemy, as journalists would deploy as part of a unit and would remain with that unit throughout the conflict. News agencies sent journalists to Fort Benning, Georgia, before the war to receive military equipment and general military information that would provide better initial context when reporting information from a military unit. From Fort Benning, correspondents were sent out to deploying units so that units and correspondents could get more familiar with one another as well as gain a solid grasp on what could, and what could not be reported according to the ground rules. Journalists were allowed access to classified information, primarily so that the journalist could place a story into the proper context as well as gain an understanding of when the information could be released. Reports from both the media and the military indicated that the process of embedding the media for this operation was a huge success. The press had access, the media got the military story to the public, and those members of the media that violated the ground rules were not allowed to report the story. The most notable incident involved Geraldo Rivera from FOX News, when he took information from a tactical rehearsal and basically conducted a rock drill on the ground of what was going to happen in an upcoming operation while the camera was rolling. As a result of this incident, Rivera lost the privilege of remaining embedded with that unit and was removed from the operational area.

## Current Military Challenges and Concerns Regarding the Contemporary Information Environment

In addition to information environment historical background, this thesis will provide current concerns and challenges within the environment. The first of these is security. In August 2001, USAF Lieutenant Colonel Beth Kaspar wrote Occasional Paper No. 23 for the Center of Strategy and Technology of the Air War College. Her paper “The End of Secrecy? Military Competitiveness in the Age of Transparency” discusses the security challenges the US military will have as a result of information that can be collected via the Internet (2001, iv). Former Marine Captain Michael Ferguson also discusses these same challenges in his 1999 *Marine Corps Gazette* article “The Internet, Our Enemy’s Best Friend” (1999, 48).

Several available articles discuss Department of Defense concerns regarding how the military is not doing a good job in conducting public affairs. One such article by Gordon Lubold titled "Defense Secretary Wants Improved Communications" in the *Navy and Air Force Times* discusses how former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed the Pentagon needed to improve its communications planning and how the military establishment needed to think more strategically about communications (Lubold 2006, 16). Ted McKenna had an article in the 5 June 2006 *PR Week* titled, “US Military to Expand Joint Public Affairs Unit,” that discussed how public affairs officers were deployed without the cultural or environmental training required to successfully facilitate both foreign and U.S. media requirements (McKenna 2006, 2) More recently, David Cloud and Thom Shanker of *The New York Times* published an article “Pentagon Widens Its Battle to Shape News of Iraq War.” It discussed how the Department of Defense established an office to serve as a “rapid response unit” to react to military news reports

and respond to potential press misinformation regarding Iraq or the workings of the internal defense department (Cloud and Shanker, *The New York Times* 3 November 2006, sent via e-mail).

Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, there have been a myriad of recent articles discussing the media and military relations. Richard Halloran also discussed media and military relations from a journalist's perspective in his summer 1995 *Parameters* article "Soldiers and Scribblers Revisited: Working with the Media." Mr. Halloran provided insight into which branches of the Armed Forces do a better job in working with the press than other services and the reasons he believes that the Army and Marine Corps PAOs seem to do a better job than Navy or Air Force PAOs due to the experience of being a line officer prior to becoming a PAO (Halloran, *Parameters* Summer 1995, 10-Classroom Handout). One article examined the manner in which BG Vincent Brooks (then Army Chief of Public Affairs) discussed the Army's plan to engage the media by use of embedding media within units during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Neill 2003, 18). Another article by Dr. Bill McCollum and Mr. Steven Kerrick discussed how to educate the press about military culture and subsequently educate the military about the media culture and how this education would improve military and media relations (McCollum and Kerrick 2006, 15).

The doctrinal relationship between Public Affairs and Information Operations is also one of the research "pillars" that must be conducted. In order to effectively fight and win on the media battlefield, there must be doctrine available to help guide commanders and staff officers through the steps needed for success. The current FM 3.0 from 2001 did not adequately address the challenges of the Information Environment. However, the new

FM 3.0 provides the framework in how the Army plans to effectively fight and win in the Information Environment. As the new FM 3.0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, is pending publication, *Issue Paper: Information Operations (IO)* for the new FM 3.0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, will serve as the basis in the development of Chapter 7, “Information Operations,” of FM 3-0. According to this issue paper, Public Affairs will support information operations in the areas of informing and influencing target audiences and will tie in with psychological operations (PSYOPS) to accomplish inform and influence tasks. Its Chapter 7 is critical in that it specifically provides doctrine on the PAO-IO relationship and the requirements PAOs will need to support IO. This relationship will not only drive educational requirements for PAOs, but also PAO requirements to educate members of the media about the definition of this relationship. There are several concerns about the doctrinal relationship between Public Affairs and PSYOPS, as by law PSYOPS cannot be done on the American Public. There was such concern about this potential relationship that General Richard Myers (then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) issued a memorandum to his commanders voicing concern about this relationship. Congressman Ike Skelton (D-Missouri) commented on this memorandum and voiced his concerns about this relationship in his letter dated 11 February 2005 (Skelton FDCH Press Release, 11 February 2005). In January 2005, Colonel William Darley had an article in *Army* magazine discussing this relationship, “Why Public Affairs is not the same as Information Operations” in order to help alleviate concerns about the IO-PAO relationship (Darley 2005, 9).

## Current and Proposed Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Regarding the Media Battlefield

Is the media a battlefield? The Center for Army Lessons Learned in December 2006 published a series of articles, collectively titled “Media is the Battlefield.” In addition, part of our required reading for C400 included a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in July 2005 that spent at least three pages discussing how “more than half of the battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma” (al-Zawahiri 2005, letter). The enemy sees our center of gravity as the American public. If the enemy can provide images through the media of how the enemy is defeating the American service-member, then the lack of support at home should bring about the defeat of the American abroad. Thus, the reason the media is described as a battlefield.

Foreign networks, such as Al Jazeera, have a significant impact on the media battlefield outside of the United States. Articles that help support this claim include Ehsan Ahrari’s Fort Leavenworth 2006 CGSC handout *Odds are even in the “information” war* (Ahrari 2006, A751 handout) a 25 September 2005 time.com article by Sally B. Donnelly titled *Al Jazeera Hires an Ex-Marine*, (Donnelly time.com, 27 September 2005) and an 18 October 2006 article in *The Wall Street Journal--Europe* titled “Terror TV Is Coming to Arab Living Rooms in Europe: The Hamas Network” (Dubowitz and Snow, *The Wall Street Journal—Europe*, 18 October 2006). Each of these articles help provide justification on why the US military needs to have an understanding of global media and how it impacts the military battle-space.

There is quite a bit of recent publication about the application of IO and Public Affairs in current military operations. The primary resource used for this area of research

is the transcript of an interview with then Lieutenant General (now General) David Petraeus, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center. This interview was conducted in order to gain the perspective of an operational and strategic level leader on the expectations commanders have of their PAOs. His insight, as well as the proposed doctrine in the draft FM 3.0, Chapter 7, provided the focus needed to identify requirements and capabilities to better support military operations in the contemporary information environment (Seiber 2006, transcripts attached). During this interview, LTG Petraeus discussed the PAO-IO relationship, as well as what is needed in regard to PAO specific training and development needed to support ongoing combat operations.

There are several recent articles that discuss successful integration of PAO-IO at the tactical and operational level. Two such articles in the May-June 2006 edition of *Military Review* include Lieutenant General Metz's article "Massing Effects in the Information Domain" (Metz et al, *Military Review* May-June 2006, 2-12) and Colonel Ralph Baker's article "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations" (2006, 114-133). Each of these articles provide great insight as to what the commander needs from PAOs in the contemporary information environment.

There are articles about the amount and type of public affairs officer training. Arthur Tulak has an article about PA's emerging role in information management. This article will be used to determine whether or not the Public Affairs role supporting IO integrates with proposed IO doctrine. Additional ideas for consideration include the following: (1) ways that the PAO could be used with IO in utilizing media as a weapon,

(2) how to maintain credibility while preserving or participating in deception operations, and (3) how utilizing media information can impact enemy effectiveness.

To conclude this “defining of the problem” literature section, the author will provide information on what current PAOs see as requirements. Colonel Steven Boylan, Combined Arms Center Strategic Communications Director, conducted an interview with the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth and discussed his experience serving as the Director of the Combined Press Information Center (CPIC) for Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). In this interview, COL Boylan discusses some of the duties--many of them more nontraditional--that he had to do as a senior level PAO in a deployed environment (Garcia August 2006, see attachment). An article by Pamela Keeton and Mark McCann in the November-December 2005 edition of *Military Review* also discussed what PAOs need, particularly in education and development, to better conduct operations in today’s information environment (Keeton and McCann 2005, 83).

#### Identifying the Current Army Solution Literature

The primary resource used to provide information on the current solution for training and developing Army PAOs is DA Pam 600-3, dated 28 December 2005. There have been institutional changes across Human Resources Command since publication of that manual, and the most recent information is posted on the FA 46 HRC homepage. The intent is to crosswalk what is currently shown in DA Pam 600-3 with information posted on the HRC website. For further reference information go to [https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/opfamio/FA\\_46/FA46.htm](https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/opfamio/FA_46/FA46.htm) and click on the FA 46 collaborative page.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter will provide the methodology used to answer the question of whether or not the Army Public Affairs Officer are trained and developed to meet and adapt to the ongoing changes in the information environment. The methodology is broken down into two research focus areas, each requiring answers to additional tertiary questions. The intent is to determine: (1) What are the requirements Army PAO's must have to meet challenges within the contemporary information environment? and (2) What are the current capabilities available to meet the requirements? Each one of the secondary questions will be discussed in further detail in this chapter with proposed tertiary questions and a method in which to obtain the answers to each question. Chapter 4 will provide the answers to the questions listed in this chapter, with chapter 5 providing the conclusions and recommendation.

The original intent was to provide the current PAO career and development model according to the December 2005 version of DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, at the beginning of this chapter in order to provide a model to reflect upon while reviewing requirements. The best way to determine whether or not the current model meet requirements is to provide the requirements early and then provide the current Army model in order to better facilitate comparison and contrast of available options for PAO development.

## Requirements

Therefore, the first question that must be answered is one of requirements. What are the requirements for Army PAOs to support information operations in the contemporary operating and information environment? In order to answer this question, the author developed six tertiary questions. The questions are as follow: (1) What are some of the challenges learned from history that remain in the contemporary operating and information environment that Army PAOs must be prepared to deal with? (2) What is strategic communication? How does Public Affairs tie into various definitions of this new term? (3) What does the information operations career field require from the public affairs career field? (4) What does the commander require from the Army PAO? (5) What expectations do members of the media have from Army PAOs? and (6) What other Army officer specific requirements are out there that PAOs must complete? Some of these questions have additional tertiary questions that will be answered. The next few paragraphs will explain how the answer for each of these questions concerning requirements will be formulated.

## Defining the Information Environment

In order to identify challenges in the contemporary operating and information environment that PAOs must be prepared to deal with, there was ample available literature to answer this question. As discussed in chapter 2, there are numerous articles available that discuss challenges in the contemporary information environment (CIE). The intent is to expand on such topics as media relations, media on the battlefield, keeping stories in proper context, and some human concerns in the information environment. Detailed historical information regarding the development of the CIE was

provided in chapter 2. For example, during the Civil War the only press that the military had to deal with was primarily newspaper reporters. During World War I magazines were added to the media mix. During World War II, radio transmissions and film footage were added, plus the press in uniform was integrated with the fighting forces as part of the wartime mobilization effort. During Korea and Vietnam, America was not fully mobilized for war and neither was the press. During Vietnam television was added as a new media. Desert Storm provided the “CNN effect” meaning a 24-hour news cycle that could provide coverage from both the allied and the enemy perspective. Today the internet and multiple national and international press agencies provide almost instantaneous news coverage. As the information environment continues to change, the military media experts must be prepared to meet the changes of this new dynamic environment.

### Contemporary Military Challenges

After providing the reader with examples of several challenges PAOs currently face in the COE the next question becomes one of requirements. What is strategic communication and how does Public Affairs tie into the various definitions of this new term? Strategic communication has different meanings depending upon which manual is read or the response a leader may provide in response to a question. The intent is to provide the reader with several definitions of strategic communications so that one understands there is no single answer to this definition and as such, understand that an Army PAO must be prepared to support each definition. For example, the DoD, Army, and one strategic leader (Lieutenant General David Petraeus) have different definitions of strategic communication. One definition used regarding strategic communication has to

do with the level of assignment. For example, a PAO working for the DA or DoD staff may consider the communication that he or she conducts to be considered strategic communication. A strategic leader may state that it does not matter where the PAO is working, it is a matter of which level of media covers the event. For example, a brigade PAO could have a CNN reporter covering events within the brigade area of operations (AO). Due to the presence of a CNN reporter in the brigade (tactical) area, it could now be defined as strategic communications. Army PAOs must understand how various agencies or leaders define strategic communications and how the PAO must be prepared to support each definition of strategic communications. The next requirement involves Information Operations. What does Information Operations officers require from PAOs? This is a key question, as this question will significantly impact the amount of research needed to complete this project within the allocated space. As IO and PAO doctrine is in the beginning stages of development, there may not be much published information about this topic. The concern is that if the relationship (or proposed relationship) is not properly defined, then the author will have to provide how Public Affairs could (or should) support IO, as well as a counter-argument of how IO could support Public Affairs. Ideally, the new FM 3-0 (Full Spectrum Operations) will be available prior to release of this thesis in June 2007. If this manual is released, it will fully explain the proposed Army doctrinal relationship concerning PAO and IO.

Fort Leavenworth is the “home” of Army doctrine and the proponentcy for IO is also located on Fort Leavenworth. As such, the first question within the IO-PAO relationship is what does doctrine (or proposed doctrine) state are the requirements for Public Affairs Officers to support Information Operations (or vice versa)? This will

include discussions with IO doctrine writers at Fort Leavenworth. There is some concern about a doctrinal relationship between IO and PAO, particularly as it deals with Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) as by law, Public Affairs and PSYOPS cannot be intertwined. This leads to the next question, which is, what should the doctrinal relationship should look like? The follow-up question is, What are the concerns about the doctrinal (or proposed doctrinal) relationship? Once the IO requirements are provided, relationship defined, and the concerns addressed, the determination will be made regarding whether or not this proposed relationship provides any new or additional duties PAOs have not traditionally performed due to the proposed doctrinal changes.

A concern at the forefront of any staff officer is what he or she must do to support the commander. This leads to the next requirement question of what do commanders require of their PAOs? In order to answer this question, there are three supporting questions that must be answered. The first of these is what do commanders expect from their PAOs? The second question is what does the commander see the PAO currently capable of doing to meet these expectations? The last question is what recommendations do commanders have to help make PAOs meet operational expectations? This will include education, training, and development opportunities. In order to answer these questions, the plan is to conduct interviews with leaders that have experience at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. There are also articles available written by successful commanders on how leaders effectively used their staffs to conduct IO and PAO operations that includes specific responsibilities for PAOs within the articles.

## Media Concerns

The following requirements question has to do with members of the media. What expectations do members of the media have regarding Army PAOs? This question will likely be one of the easiest questions to answer as there are several published accounts of what the media wants in regard to the embedding process used in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) versus the media pool method used for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). There are also published accounts of what members of the media are looking for in regard to a “sound-byte.” However, the topic must be addressed as PAO’s need to understand the pressures of a twenty-four hour news cycle, how to shift from local to international media coverage, and how to get the story placed in the proper context. As such, it is an easy question to answer in regard to research, but it is extremely important as media relations is the key to both supporting IO and the maneuver commander.

The final section has to do with additional Army officer requirements. In this section the intent is to address the Army officer as a “pent-athlete” and use the characteristics listed by General Schoomacher to help define other additional requirements PAOs will need to complete. Particular attention will be paid to lifelong learning and the strategic thinker portions, as that directly ties to the training and education PAOs will require to meet challenges in the contemporary information environment.

The requirements section will answer six questions. These are: (1) What are the challenges in the contemporary operating and information environment that PAOs must be prepared to deal with? (2) What is Strategic Communication and how does Public Affairs tie into various definitions of this new term? (3) What do Information Operations

Officers require from PAOs? (4) What do commanders require from the PAO? (5) What expectations do members of the media have regarding Army PAOs? and (6) What additional requirements must PAOs complete in order to meet the goal of becoming a “pent-athlete?” Once the requirements have been identified, the author will summarize the requirements and proceed to the next research category, current Army PAO capabilities.

### Current Capabilities

What are the current capabilities available to meet the demands of the contemporary operating and information environment? The intent of this section is to provide the reader information regarding the current training and development “model” presently used by PAOs. There are three questions that must be answered in this section. The questions are: (1) What is the current career development model? (2) What education opportunities are available? and (3) What assignments are available? The primary document that will be used to answer this question is DA Pam. 600-3. Information posted on the public affairs career manager website will be used to provide answers to these questions as well.

In regard to the current career development model, charts will be used from DA Pam. 600-3 to provide the “roadmap” of current PAO career development. In order to augment the roadmap, there will be discussion regarding the impact of the CFD process, timeline, and promotion opportunities.

Opportunities for professional education are important for any officer. In light of the requirements, there will be four areas of examination to determine what education opportunities are available. These include: (1) What is currently taught at the PAOQC at

DINFOS? (2) What additional courses (if any) are perhaps being proposed at the PAOQC? (3) What opportunities exist for advanced civil schooling (ACS)? and(4) What training with industry (TWI) opportunities are available? In order to answer these questions, the DINFOS course listing available on the Internet will be used. In addition, opportunities for ACS and TWI are listed on the PAO Human Resource Command (HRC) branch manager homepage. These opportunities will provide the ability to compare current educational opportunities with previously listed ideal educational requirements in chapter 5.

The final portion of the capabilities section is assignments. An assumption is that the Army is interested in building strategic communicators throughout the PAO corps of officers. As such, there are assignments available from the captain through colonel level. An exploration of career development opportunities and sequencing of assignments will be made with the current PAO career manager and other senior level PAOs currently assigned on Fort Leavenworth. Discussion will include tactical vs. strategic level assignments and the advantages and disadvantages of each type of assignment.

Again, the intent for this section is to provide information on the current model of training and development opportunities available for PAOs. This section also provided a current status on education opportunities. These education opportunities include PAOQC, ACS, and TWI. Finally, this section provided information on assignment and promotion opportunities available and some of the concerns with various assignments. Results of analysis (which will be recorded in chapter 4) of this section will be matched up with the results of the requirements section to provide a recommendation in chapter 5.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

This chapter will provide the research results used to answer the question of whether or not the Army Public Affairs Officer is trained and developed to meet and adapt to the ongoing changes in the information environment. The methodology provided in chapter 3 stated there would be three primary research focus areas, each requiring an answer to additional tertiary questions. The intent is to provide: (1) a definition of the problem regarding the CIE and some of the overall challenges associated with it and (2) the current Army solution to solving this problem. Each of these focused research areas will require additional tertiary questions that must be examined in order to adequately provide answers to secondary research questions. Chapter 5 will provide final conclusions and areas of recommended study for further research.

#### Defining the Problem

The first task that must be accomplished is that of defining the problem. In order to define the problem, there must be a frame of reference for the reader to appreciate the challenges PAOs face in the CIE. Military professionals prefer historical references as a framework to link current challenges with the past. As such, there will be a short history of challenges associated with military and media operations from the Crimean War through current operations supporting the Global War on Terrorism. This will help answer questions regarding some of the challenges in the contemporary operating and information environment that Army PAOs must be prepared to deal with.

Once an understanding of the historical references regarding challenged in military and media relations has been obtained, the thesis will examine current CIO challenges, such as strategic communication and how PAOs are impacted by the various definitions of this new term. It will also explore other demands placed on PAOs by determining support requirements from the Public Affairs career field to the Information Operations career field. Additional demands placed on Army PAOs come from commanders, chiefs of staff/executive officers, and members of the press. As a result, there must be some investigation into what some of those demands may be in order to prepare PAOs to meet these demands. At the end of this section, the author intends to compile a list of the characteristics and training that an Army PAO needs in order to be successful in today's CIE.

## Lessons Learned From History

### Crimean War

It should be noted that the media outlet covering a war must have a vast amount of resources available to support journalist battlefield expenditures, particularly if the journalist is not sponsored by the military. Strong news agencies will provide resources to journalists that produce information that the populace will read. This, in turn, leads to more sales of newspapers—which leads to more resources to support the journalist. Thus, it is important to know what the editors want the reporters to produce when dealing with the media. This is the first lesson that is applicable for contemporary media operations.

## American Civil War

Another interesting phenomenon that developed during the Civil War was the matter of how some commanders encouraged the press to travel along on the campaign, while others did not. For example, General Sherman did not care to be around war correspondents. Quotes like “Now to every army and almost every general a newspaper reporter goes along, filling up our transports, swelling our trains, reporting our progress, guessing at places, picking up dropped expressions, inciting jealousy and discontent, and doing infinite mischief” (Knightley 2004, 28). As a result of his (and select others like his) attitude, most journalists avoided reporting the campaign with that commander. General U. S. Grant, on the other hand, was more open to the prospect of having correspondents with him and as such, readers in the North knew much more about Grant’s campaigns than they did Sherman’s campaigns (Knightley 2004, 29).

## 1865-1914

The period of time between the end of the American Civil War and the beginning of World War I brought few technological changes in the way that war was reported to the civilian populace. One thing that both the American and British press knew they needed to do was regain the trust and confidence of their respective populations after the numerous accounts of misinformation and propaganda from the Civil War. Military leaders realized that in order to inform the public about the glory of whatever military operations they were participating in would require coverage by war correspondents. Thus, where violence due to warfare happened around the world, war correspondents were there. This included journalists, such as Mark Kellogg (Associated Press), who was with Custer at Little Bighorn, to Richard Harding Davis, who is accused of helping

William Randolph Hearst start the Spanish-American War (Knightley 2004, 45). As education received higher priority during this time period due to the lack of conflicts in both Britain and the United States during this time period, there was a higher literacy rate in both countries by the start of World War I.

### World War I

The primary lesson learned from World War I is the fact that this was the first conflict in which the military took more of an active role in integrating the press into daily military operations. The military had to develop ground rules on what the journalist could and could not report, and the military had to provide an individual from within the military organization to escort the press on the battlefield. The journalist during the Great War had the dilemma of reporting the facts versus what will be most supportive to the soldiers and leaders on the front. News organizations have the same dilemma; receive additional funds from the government by promoting propaganda or reporting true stories that may go against the propaganda machine that sell more newspapers. This dilemma is another challenge that remains in the Contemporary Information Environment.

### World War II, 1939-1945

The historical lessons the reader must understand about media and military relations in World War II are that: (1) In the Western countries, the press was mobilized to support the war effort. (2) Journalists wore uniforms and served as military PAOs. (3) Newsreels and radio provided new additional media outlets. (4) Western press agencies were expected to support the Information Agencies of both the United States and Great Britain in distribution of propaganda--both at home and abroad. and (5) The Press agreed

to do this due to the full mobilization of national resources due to the formal declaration of war by President Roosevelt. There has not been a formal declaration of war since World War II and, as such, all of the instruments of power have not been brought together to support the war like it did during World War II. Thus, when American military service-members discuss implementing the same standards on journalists as they had during World War II, the argument from the journalist is that the President must ask Congress for a formal declaration of war and mobilize the nation to support the war effort. Until such a proclamation is made, military officers can expect the same sort of challenges in war correspondent coverage.

### Korea

The key learning point from the Korean conflict regarding military and media relations is that there must be a framework of ground rules established before any conflict. Korea provides a classic case where both the military and the media were confused on what could be reported and as a result, there were several changes in rules that resulted in damaged relationships throughout the conflict. Press and media planning must be included in any military operation, and the considerations of what each element of the media will need—whether video footage or just time with soldiers for a newspaper article—must be addressed in that planning. Establishing ground rules and planning for media engagement can be a significant force multiplier if done properly. If not done properly, then misinformation is more likely to occur, which will result in more effort on the back end rather than the front end to clear up misinformation.

## Vietnam

As a result of the lessons learned during Vietnam, the military took a very hard stance in maintaining limited press coverage of combat events until 2003 with Operation Iraqi Freedom. The military learned the press must have guidance and cannot operate with total freedom on the battlefield. The main lesson from Vietnam that remains applicable today is that members of the media must complete some sort of vetting process before conducting media coverage of military operations. As part of this vetting process, the media members must agree to a set of ground rules on what can and cannot be covered on a live news shot. The military must also take steps to insure members of the press are briefed and education about military operations in order to help prevent miscommunication about military activities. The military must learn that if it does not actively participate in what the press is reporting, then the military will not get a vote on what is being reported to the civilian population.

## Iran, Grenada, and Panama

These three conflicts proved that a media engagement strategy must be planned out and incorporated in the operational plan, not as an afterthought. The concept of “press pools” can work, provided there is a plan in place to integrate the press within the operation and the press clearly understands where and when that will be in the operation. Each of these operations were relatively short, with some of the events using only a few select small units. Care should be taken to insure that the need to get the press into a position to report a story does not overwhelm the capability of the operation. This could be where a pre-determined “cut line” for various members of the press remains at the senior levels of the Department of Defense that allows certain press members access to

military events through the use of a tier system. Those individuals selected in the top tier must understand a responsibility to share news information with other agencies that do not have representatives on certain select military operations. This list should then be passed down to operational planners so that press requirements are included in the overall operational plan.

### Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm

While tight control of the media greatly enhanced Operational Security of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the American public did not have the overall idea of what the individual soldier was doing on the battlefield. The only way to get the news was from the larger networks, with smaller networks getting only second hand information. In order to allow smaller networks or news agencies to get information, there needs to be a way to get these organizations into theatre with deploying troops if the size of the military conflict will allow it. There must be some control over the media, and integration of the media must be incorporated within operational planning. The other factor that must be considered is the twenty-four hour news cycle. News can now be reported at any time, anywhere around the world. Thus, PAOs must know how that cycle operates and who the decision makers are within the cable television networks that determine what makes and what will not make the news. The American public was fortunate that Saddam Hussein did not know how to inform and engage the international media outlets; as he did nothing but live up to his dictator label. Anti-American terrorist organizations learned from the mistakes of Saddam Hussein, and learned how to inform and engage the international media in order to influence world opinion.

### Somalia and the Balkans

There are two primary learning points from the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia. The first of these is that there is no period of time when meeting with the media that is “off the record.” This being said, background information must be clearly explained to journalists and labeled as background information. This is particularly important when describing information that may be classified for a certain period of time. The second learning point is that the power of a visual image shown to an international public cannot be underestimated. Thus, when planning for engagements with international media, take the time to identify an ideal location that will best provide the commander the visual environment needed to convey his message to the viewing international public. This could mean conducting interviews in locations that are not normally in the journalists comfort zone.

### Kosovo

In regard to technology, the internet began serving the public as a primary source in which to obtain news information. Satellite communications, less bulky camera equipment, and current still photography that could be broadcasted immediately through modern communications allowed information to be reported to the public at an unprecedented speed. Individuals around the world now had the ability to get up to date news via the internet or via cable news programs on the computer. Newspapers and magazines are providing “old news” to its subscribers by the time news is written, printed, and distributed. This now caused military planners to think through how to best accommodate the various members of the press with various forms of media. These challenges remain on the current media battlefield.

## Afghanistan

The DOD allowed embedding of select members of the press with Special Operations Forces (SOF) beginning in December 2001 (Hess and Kalb 2003, 97). This was done largely because of the realization that the Global War on Terror was going to be fought in more of an unconventional manner than wars had been fought in years past. As such, the military would have to find a better way to provide media coverage of military events without jeopardizing OPSEC of its forces. The successful embedding of limited journalists with SOF served as the genesis for the widespread media embedding plan used for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

## Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the initial phase, did weave all of the facets of technology, information dominance, media access, and press control that were needed to make a successful campaign for coalition forces. However, after the change of regime happened, and most of the embedded journalists returned back to their respective parent news agencies, the relationship changed again. The focus of the remainder of this chapter is to determine what the current challenges in this relationship are and how the Army is meeting these challenges.

### Contemporary Challenges

If embedded media was the answer, then why is there still friction in media and military relationships? Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, Army Chief of Public Affairs during the first portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom, discussed how embedded journalists would observe actions on the battlefield and subsequently report these observations to

their parent news agencies faster than reports were transmitted through official military channels. As a result, at press conferences where Central Command official briefers would conduct press conferences, questions would be asked of the briefer in which the individual was not aware of what had happened on the battlefield. As these press conferences had journalists from national and international news agencies present and the questions and verbal and non-verbal responses from briefers could be viewed by a national and international audience, a miscommunication or an appearance of censorship was relayed to the viewing audience. These incidents would later have to be cleared up, but due to the pressures of the twenty-four hour news cycle, by the time it was cleared up it had already made the news and attempts to clarify what happened did not make the headlines (Neill 2003, 18).

### Strategic Communications

Part of this effect is what is now called strategic communications. There are various ways to define strategic communications, and there is a lot of discussion about who is responsible for conducting strategic communications.

**Strategic Communication** can be described as the proactive and continuous process that supports the national security strategy by identifying and responding to strategic threats and opportunities with information related activities. It is “focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power” whose primary supporting capabilities are Public Affairs; military IO and Public Diplomacy. (U.S. Army War College *Information Operations Primer*, November 2006, 9)

The intent of this section is not to get into a detailed analysis on strategic communications. The intent is to understand that Army PAOs must be familiar with this

definition and understand that at any given time, the PAO must be prepared to engage in strategic communication. There are leaders at the strategic level that do not necessarily agree with this definition, as some leaders consider communication strategic if there is an international or national media reporter covering a story in a tactical area. This is how the terms “strategic corporal” or “strategic lieutenant” have become commonplace as conduct covered at this level can quickly impact operations at the strategic level. The challenge this creates is that it takes time and experience to be an effective strategic communicator. LTG Petraeus emphasized this fact when he stated, “A Public Affairs Officer can over time start to develop that kind of familiarity with the issues, but that takes time and it takes sitting in, and you know just accumulating the detail, the knowledge, and the expertise. And again it doesn’t come easily, it doesn’t just fall out of the tree into somebody’s hand, it takes real study. So when I say ‘write a press release’ what you’re after there is something short and to the point” (Seiber 2006, 2). The Department of the Army recently gave the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs the task as the lead for Army Strategic Communications. This creates challenges within the Army structure, as one of the key elements that the Army must communicate with is Congress, and that responsibility belongs to the Legislative Affairs department, which is outside of, and senior in rank to OCPA.

The key to meeting this challenge is to insure the Army PAO is prepared to engage in strategic communications. This entails developmental assignments and education opportunities that will allow exposure to strategic level issues and the ability to observe how experts in strategic communications respond to the challenges of the CIE. LTG Petraeus stated, “You know, in certain respects I was fortunate, again, to have worked in

the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and I was very fortunate to have seen at that level what goes on, to have been a 'fly on the wall' basically, and in some cases I was able to coordinate for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and was able to meet many members of the press through those experiences" (Seiber 2006, 5). Opportunities like this must be afforded to Army PAOs if the Army wants PAOs to take the lead in strategic communications.

#### Doctrinal Challenges-Supporting Information Operations

One of the ongoing current challenges is how PA will support IO? Recently, when asking the Air Force Public Affairs assignments officer about whether or not Air Force PAOs have the requirement to support IO, her response was, "We try not to blur the line. If we lose our credibility as a PA, we're hosed" (Whitesell e-mail, 10 January 2007). There also is concern about this at more senior levels in government as well, as Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri issued a statement regarding his concern with IO misinformation being provided to the American people (Skelton letter, 10 February 2005). Army doctrine is transitioning to a position where Army PA will support IO in the "Engage and Influence" realm of IO in the new FM 3-0. This role is key, as now Army PAOs must be able to perform the analysis on media and target audiences not only at the US local, regional, and national level, but the host nation and international media level as well. At the same time, the PAO does not engage in Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), even though both functions will fall under the same function within IO. The Army PAO must effectively communicate this new role to journalists and commanders in order to eliminate potential misinformation about what PAOs are responsible for in a

deployed area. As LTG Petraeus stated when discussing the new proposed doctrinal relationship regarding PAO supporting IO and the concerns about the PA-PSYOPs relationship, “There’s got to be very close coordination about PSYOPS not dealing with the press, PAO dealing with the press, and the IO trying to, again, keep it all coordinated” (Seiber 2006, 8).

### Educating the Press and Press Expectations

As discussed in the historical section, the PAO must understand the demands of a twenty-four-hour news cycle. The PAO must also understand what will make and what will not make the news. Just because there is a significant amount of good information available about what may be going on in a specific area of responsibility (AOR), that in and of itself may not make the news. The PAO must understand how to take this information and turn it into a newsworthy product. In order to produce more news stories, the PAO needs to know what the news agencies are looking for in order to produce a good story. Many times this could happen by taking the time to educate members of the press about military affairs. With fewer individuals serving in both places of responsibility in government (as well as journalism) it is of the utmost importance for PAOs to educate members of the press about life in the military and military operations in general.

The press has the pressure of getting news out as quickly and accurately as possible. PAOs have the responsibility to insure the information is placed in the proper context. According to John McWethy, formerly of ABC News:

The relationship between the military and the news media will always be an issue. But, it does not have to be a problem. The greater the exposure between the press and the military and the military to the press, the better the

understanding because you are putting it in human terms, for both sides. . . . The more hours and minutes soldiers can be with real reporters--and reporters with real soldiers--the more they will understand how to turn the challenge of this relationship into a more manageable posture. (McCollum and Kerrick 2006, 8)

Another way this could be done is for PAOs to establish personal relationships with journalists. There are several techniques in how to do this, perhaps the most appealing would be if there was a way for the PAO and journalist to come together and work in the same place. As LTG Petraeus states, “Again, if you are trying to educate in a sense generalist PAOs, to be Division PAOs, Corps PAOs, and sort of strategic level--strategic meaning national level PAOs, then I think you put them in a job to develop the ability to deal with national media” (Seiber 2006, 10).

One of the other things that the PAO must understand is what do journalists need in order to put together a news story. This will vary between each form of media. For example, a television reporter will want to obtain the right kind of background to produce video footage. The PAO should try to place that individual with a unit that has the specific type of action or vehicles to produce video footage. On the other hand, a newspaper journalist may only need to talk to soldiers. In that case, all that may be needed is to identify available soldiers for the newspaper journalist to interview as the location may be irrelevant. Thus, the PAO needs to have the experience to know right away what the journalist needs to get the story based on the form of media. An ideal way for the PAO to get this experience is through working with the various forms of media industry for a period of time. If there was a way for PAOs to obtain this type of education it would assist in shortening the time needed to assess press needs and meet the demands the press must meet in supporting the twenty-four hour news cycle.

One final “area” that must be emphasized is the fact that in order to get the military news story to the public, there must be means of getting the press to where the story is happening. Colonel Steve Boylan discussed this challenge during a recent interview with the Contemporary Operations Study Team.

One of the things that I had requested but was never able to be given support for, which the next time this happens should be planned for if there is a combined press operation set up, was assets such as aircraft that were a little more dedicated on a daily basis to media operations. That would go a long way in facilitating what we want the media to see. There were many, many times that I could not get a journalist out to something I wanted them to see and report on because of a lack of transportation assets. . . . But if I had two dedicated aircraft to use per day for whatever purposes of media transport or media facilitation that I deemed necessary, then I think we would have seen a much different view, the American public would have seen a much different view, of the war than what they got to see. There needs to be a faster means and process to get information from the tactical level to the strategic level and commanders need, this one is probably the hardest, to have their trust and confidence in their public affairs or their communications subject matter experts. They need to trust that they are going to pass the right information up the technical channels, the public affairs channels, to be able to be responsive, timely, and accurate to the media so that we can have our say. Because if we don’t get the ability to respond by their deadline, it is not our deadline, it is their deadline, they are going to print or they are going on air with or without us. If we don’t try to impact that story by providing them the accurate information, then they are going to go with what they have and we have to live with the consequences, and nine times out of ten we have to play catch-up and try and correct the record, but by then it is too late. (Garcia 2006, 11-12)

PAOs must understand this challenge and have the ability and credibility to obtain this type of support from the commander and other key individuals on the staff.

### Commander Expectations

In most Army units, the PAO serves as part of the commander’s personal staff. As such, the PAO is also closely tied in with the primary staff as part of the IO working group. Some commanders will have the PAO serve as the tour guide for media moving

into and out of the unit AOR. Depending upon the time or what is going on within the organization, trying to meet all three of these responsibilities can be a daunting challenge.

LTG Petraeus stated his expectations of his PAO are as follow:

He would have a reasonable knowledge of the mechanics of all the different forms of media. He would have some appreciation of who the different members of the media were, and if they (the media) had a particular bend or a reputation and background. I would love to have a PAO that could write very quickly and very well effectively and execute press releases on the toughest of issues. Somebody that recognizes the press' job is to report accurately, not necessarily positively or negatively about what we're doing, but accurately report what we're doing, and to realize that it is our performance that determines whether it is a positive or negative story. The press also has an obligation to get the context of its stories correct, I say that because the reader or viewer . . . and that the press has the responsibility to properly characterize the basis of their observations to draw conclusions . . . and so forth, and not let one observation characterize an overall effort, good or bad, on the basis of one example . . . not to over-generalize or not to under-generalize, but again to sort of "get it right" to provide that kind of information to a reporter . . . the PAO for the unit, in a sense, is the Commander--not the PAO--to a degree, now I don't want to get carried away, but unless the PAO is a facilitator, a coordinator, occasionally a drafter of some again message, press release, a COMSEC, what have you . . . and the more that he can do the latter I mean that's the better he is a source of knowledge about who the press are and a source of expertise about dealing with some of them and what the you might expect out of them (the press) what their position is, what their track record is, and that sort of thing. (Seiber 2006, 1, 2)

At the tactical level, the commander may or may not place a significant amount of expectations on the PAO. Colonel Ralph Baker, former commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division found that upon initial deployment into Iraq in 2003 and 2004, he did not place much emphasis on IO or PA. Shortly afterward, he found that he was spending up to 70 percent of his time working IO issues and then pulled one of his most talented officers "out of hide" to serve as his PAO since his BCT was not allocated one (Baker 2006, 13, 20).

## Additional PAO Expectations

The enemy is successfully fighting and winning the information war.

Jihadis pursue these strategies using sophisticated, modern methods of communication and public relations. They segment audiences and adapt their message to the audience, apply some of the same PR techniques used by large corporations, conduct disinformation campaigns, and coordinate communication with operations. They do this using a variety of sophisticated means, including traditional mass media and new media channels. (Corman and Shiefelbein 2006, 2)

In order to counter the enemy in this effort, there needs to be some sort of integrated IO training course that facilitates all facets of IO to defeat this threat. This course should not be Army specific, but it should be a course where both joint and other government agencies meet and train together in order to synchronize IO counter-information efforts against the enemy.

There are professional requirements that PAOs must complete in order to receive consideration for promotion to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. At the present time, there is no opportunity for a FA 46 to advance to the general officer level, as the Army Chief of Public Affairs has traditionally come from an Operations background. With this in mind, an expectation is that there are opportunities for continued professional education in the field of PA and IO to better support the strategic level commander. If these two fields are going to work together, then there should be an opportunity for PAOs to learn about IO, and IO officers to learn about PA. Additionally, opportunities for additional schooling should be made available outside of schools of journalism.

But I think that is the difference, and to answer your question is how do you prepare those folks better, the answer is you get them out of their intellectual comfort zone and send them to the Kennedy school of government instead of the Columbia School of Journalism. Now I am overdrawing that, as I don't know that I've met anybody at the Columbia School of Journalism, but I suspect the focus more on developing journalists rather than developing folks that sort of rub

elbows with Cambridge, Massachusetts folks in Washington D.C. and that kind of stuff...I have had this view for a while and I have shared it with the Chief of Public Affairs for the Army, who agrees. So, I think that, and that's why Fred Wellman, who went to Harvard this year, Public Affairs Officer, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, who was my PAO with MNSTC-I, did a very good job and he is benefiting enormously from being around David Gergen for example, and that is the kind of experience you want. (Seiber 2006, 6)

Finally, there are also the requirements of developing the PAO as an Army Pentathlete. There are some specific areas that pentathlete development that PAOs must be more proficient in than others. These specific Pentathlete PAO focus areas are in italics in figure 1.




Figure 1. The Army Pentathlete Model

Source: January 2007 Armor Branch Briefing located at [https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/BRANCH\\_BRIEF\\_\(WEBSITE\\_5JAN07\).ppt#345,10](https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/BRANCH_BRIEF_(WEBSITE_5JAN07).ppt#345,10), "The Pentathlete" Growing Army Leaders in the 21st Century; Internet; accessed 17 May 2007.

Summary of Requirements

In order to meet the challenges of the CIE, the PAO should receive training and development in several areas discussed in this section of chapter 4. As a review, first of all the PAO needs to have an appreciation of the history of the media and military

relationship. Next, the PAO needs to be familiar with what is and what is not news. The best way to learn this is by working with all of the various forms of media (video, print, radio, and wire). In order to meet the challenges associated with being a personal as well as a primary staff officer, the PAO must understand the dynamics of how the PAO fits on an Army or Joint Staff. Due to the current trend of PAOs not being eligible to move into the general officer ranks, consideration must be given for opportunities for additional civil schooling outside of the field of journalism in order to better support the strategic level commander. In addition to schooling, officers should be afforded the opportunity to work in a support role at the strategic PA level in order to gain exposure to how strategic communications should work prior to a potentially strategic level assignment. Finally, there must be some sort of annual professional development seminar or forum to share current PA tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to facilitate success on the media battlefield.

In order to help keep these requirements in mind while reading the remainder of this chapter, the requirements are summarized in table 1.

Table 1. Requirements		
Requirement	YES	NO
Course on History of Military and Media Relationships		
Opportunity to train/work with media personnel (TWI) and all forms of media (video, print, wire)		
Opportunities for additional military school (JPME) with fellow staff officers		
Opportunities for additional non-military schools (ACS) outside of journalism		
Opportunity to observe/work in Strategic environment prior to strategic assignment		
Professional training opportunities/seminars on how to meet CIE challenges with other agencies		

## Current Capabilities

The primary resource used to examine what the Army is currently doing to develop Army PAOs is DA Pam 600-3, dated 28 December 2005. This document is under revision, as PA is now under the Maneuver, Fires, and Effects (MFE) Division in the Officer Professional Management Department (OPMD) at Human Resources Command (HRC). The best place to get the most up-to-date information is via the FA 46 HRC homepage, which provides the latest information regarding FA 46 training and development opportunities. Using the latest chart from the website, the current FA 46 training and development model is shown in figure 2.




Figure 2. Current FA 46 (PAO) Career Development Diagram

Source: FA 46 Career Homepage; available from [mhtml:https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/6715378!FA46\\_Career\\_Map\\_files/slide0001.htm](https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/6715378!FA46_Career_Map_files/slide0001.htm); Internet, accessed 4 March 2006

Based on this model, an FA 46 officer must first serve four to eight years in a basic branch prior to becoming a PAO. Upon selection as a PAO at the early or regular Functional Board Designation (FBD), then the officer will attend the Public Affairs Officer Qualification Course (PAOQC) at the Defense Information School (DINFOS) located at Fort Meade, Maryland. Officers selected for assignments in broadcast detachments will subsequently attend the Broadcast Managers Course (BMC). The courses offered in DINFOS are in table #. Of particular note, a total of two hours are dedicated to the history of PA, eight hours are dedicated to the PA and IO relationship, and two hours are dedicated to a class on PSYOPS (DINFOS-TAPI PAOQC Instruction January 2005, 12, 17-18). Although this does meet the criteria of having a class on PA history, it does not lend itself to the type of in depth study required in understanding the nature of the media and military relationship as it has evolved through history.

Table 2. DINFOS Courses

FUNCTIONAL AREA 1 - Fundamentals of Public Affairs

UNIT 001: Introduction to Defense Public Affairs

UNIT 002: Joint Services Overview

UNIT 003: Public Affairs and Ethics

UNIT 004: Roles & Responsibilities of the PAO

UNIT 005: Introduction to Communication

UNIT 006: Public Affairs History

UNIT 007: The Nature of News

UNIT 008: Public Affairs & US National Strategy

UNIT 009: Military Website Policy & Design

UNIT 010: Guidelines for Release of Information

UNIT 011: Psychological Operation & Civil Affairs Overview

UNIT 012: Public Affairs and Information Operations

UNIT 013: Public Affairs and Combat Camera Operations

UNIT 014: Command Message Development

UNIT 015: Public Affairs Overseas

UNIT 016: Strategic Communication Planning

UNIT 017: Introduction to Internal Information  
UNIT 018: Public Affairs & Environmental Protection  
UNIT 019: Public Affairs & AFRTS Operations  
UNIT 020: Public Affairs & Military Law  
UNIT 021: Public Affairs Deployment Operations  
UNIT 022: Public Affairs and Operations Other Than War  
UNIT 023: Public Affairs & Media Law  
UNIT 024: Introduction to Community Relations  
UNIT 025: Annex F Preparation  
UNIT 026: Public Affairs & Logistics  
UNIT 027: RESERVED  
UNIT 028: Introduction to Media Relations  
UNIT 029: Crisis Communications  
UNIT 030: Visual Communication & Electronic Imagery  
UNIT 031: Media Panel  
UNIT 032: Crisis Communication Guest Lecture  
UNIT 033: Current Issues Panel

#### FUNCTIONAL AREA 2 – PUBLIC AFFAIRS WRITING

UNIT 001: Introduction to Public Affairs Writing  
UNIT 002: News Writing One (Leads)  
UNIT 003: News Writing Two (Bridges & Body)  
UNIT 004: Military Newspaper Policy & Design  
UNIT 005: News Writing Three (External Release)  
UNIT 006: News Feature Writing  
UNIT 007: Broadcast Writing  
UNIT 008: Military Newspaper Management  
UNIT 009: Editorial News Writing

#### FUNCTIONAL AREA 3 – MEDIA RELATIONS

UNIT 001: Initial Accident Release  
UNIT 002: Media Facilitation in Operations  
UNIT 003: Response to Media Query  
UNIT 004: How to Conduct Media Training  
UNIT 005: Public Affairs Guidance Development  
UNIT 006: Media Interviews  
UNIT 007: Accident Release Follow-Up  
UNIT 008: Preparing Military Spokespersons for Interview  
UNIT 009: News Conference Preparation and Facilitation

#### FUNCTIONAL AREA 4 – SPEECHWRITING & PUBLIC SPEAKING

UNIT 001: Speechwriting & Oratory  
UNIT 002: Manuscript & Speaker Introduction Preparation

FUNCTIONAL AREA 5 – SERVICE UNIQUE

FUNCTIONAL AREA 6 – FINAL PRACTICAL EXERCISE

FUNCTIONAL AREA 7 - COURSE ADMINISTRATION

SOURCE: <http://www.dinfos.osd.mil/DinfosWeb/CourseInfo/tpi/PAOQC.pdf?1236552>  
pgs. 1-2, accessed 9 May 2007

After receiving initial PAO training at DINFOS, only a select few PAOs will get the opportunity each year to receive either Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) or Training with Industry (TWI). For fiscal year (FY) 2006, the number of ACS and TWI for Army Public Affairs officers is listed in table 3. In order to put this number into perspective, the current breakdown number of PAOs is 357, thus only 2 percent of PAOs currently receive the opportunity to participate in TWI/ACS (Warren e-mail, 30 March 2007).

Table 3. FA 46 ACS and TWI Opportunities (FY 06)	
ACS/TWI Opportunities/Slots Available	Location
ACS 3 slots	Various
TWI 1 slot	Ketchum, Chicago
TWI 1 slot	Fleishman Hillard, NY
TWI 1 slot	Fox News, NY
TWI 1 slot	Fleishman Hillard, DC
TWI 1 slot	Fleishman Hillard, Atlanta

Source: US Army Human Resources Command Website, accessed 18 December 2006.

PAOs also will receive ILE training, but it is currently not with the majority of the maneuver, fires, and effects officers at Fort Leavenworth. As a result, the PAO (and the IO officer for that matter) do not participate in the Advanced Officer Warfighter Course (AOWC) at Fort Leavenworth upon completion of ILE. In addition to the AOWC, PAOs

miss out on the opportunity to receive additional skill identifiers, such as 6Z (Strategist), 3H (Joint preparation skill identifier), 5X (Historian), and 3Y (Space Operations). This also places PAOs at a disadvantage in competing for the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth due to PAOs not currently having the ability to complete AOWC.

In regard to assignments, according to figure 1, there are few strategic level assignments available at the captain level. The potential for strategic exposure can happen at the brigade (major) level. There does appear to be some opportunity for interagency training, but not until the O-6 level.

Summary of Analysis

Using table 4, the analysis of whether or not the Army is training and developing PAOs to meet the challenges of the CIE is as follows.

Table 4. Analysis of Requirements vs. Capabilities		
Requirement	YES	NO
Course on History of Military and Media Relationships	Exposure only	
Opportunity to train/work with media personnel (TWI) and all forms of media (video, print, wire)	Very Limited	
Opportunities for additional military school (JPME) with fellow staff officers	War College (O-5P & O-6)	
Opportunities for additional non-military schools (ACS) outside of journalism	Very Limited	
Opportunity to observe/work in Strategic environment prior to strategic assignment		X
Professional training opportunities/seminars on how to meet CIE challenges with other agencies	O-6 Only	

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a “D” or a “D-plus” as a country as to how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas that’s taking place in the world today.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 27 March 2006

#### Conclusion

Based on historical information, review of current challenges within the CIE, requirements of Army commander, media representatives, and doctrinal challenges, the Army does not train and develop Army PAOs to face the challenges of the CIE.

#### Recommendations

1. The Army should adjust the OPMS model to allow for further development and training earlier in a career of a PAO rather than toward the end. With the recent change in the Career Field Designation process where an officer can become a PAO at the four or eight year mark rather than the five or ten year mark under the previous OPMS model, there is additional time available to train and educate Army PAOs prior to serving in a potential strategic assignment (for example, the BCT PAO).

2. As select officers can become a PAO at the four-year mark in the early CFD process, PAO branch must consider coordination with accessions command to identify and target potential PAO candidates at the three commissioning sources (USMA, ROTC, and OCS). As an incentive to retain officers on active duty for a period longer than the Active Duty Service Obligation after commissioning, the Army has been offering options for additional years of service such as fully funded graduate school, branch of choice, or

duty station of choice. An option for PAO branch could be two fold. First, PAO could be offered as a Branch Detail option where officers initially serve in select combat arms or combat support branch for up to three years, attend DINFOS, then begin serving as a PAO. The advantage with this program is that it still allows Army PAOs to initially serve in an operational assignment to better understand what the Army is about prior to serving as a PAO. It also allows cadets/candidates interested in becoming a PAO the opportunity for FA46 to begin tracking career progression at the time of commissioning for those individuals selected for FA-46 branch detail. The second option would be to offer a guaranteed graduate degree and/or training with industry opportunity as an ADSO agreement at the time of commissioning. The opportunity for additional education and training in the PAO career field would entice PAO career minded officers to agree to additional military service for the opportunity of a TWI/ACS slot with a reputable program. If a PAO branch detail applicant requested the TWI/ACS ADSO option, the applicant would have an initial three year additional ADSO for taking the TWI/ACS ADSO. Upon completion of TWI/ACS the applicant would then receive an additional three-four year ADSO. By the time the branch detailed PAO with the TWI/ACS commissioning ADSO option completed all service requirements, the officer would then be ninth year of military service, prepared to then serve as a Major in a strategic level assignment.

3. PAOs and IOs need the opportunity to train with other MFE primary staff officers at the Fort Leavenworth ILE/AOWC. At the present time, PAOs and IOs train at satellite locations away from other maneuver and fires officers. As a result, the maneuver and fires officers that attend the course at Fort Leavenworth do not have a full

appreciation as to what PAO and IO do in regard to staff planning for Full Spectrum Operations. Likewise, maneuver and fires officers are more likely to remain weary of media engagement due to the lack of experienced PAO/IO officers upon arrival in operational units after ILE graduation due to the lack of familiarity with the media engagement process.

4. All PAOs need the opportunity to attend at least one year of ACS in a field other than Journalism, preferably a topic regarding international relations or strategic communication. Following a year of ACS, all PAOs need to receive a year of TWI with a rotation of at least three months through video, print, radio/wire, and internet news services. This training should be completed after an initial two-three year assignment as an assistant PAO at the strategic level. This education program allows PAOs and members of the press to better understand and educate each other about the military and news media cultures that should improve due to more opportunities to establish professional relationships prior to working with one another on the CIE battlefield. PAOs should then attend ILE at Fort Leavenworth to get re-integrated with Army doctrine and staff processes.

5. There needs to be a joint information operations course that brings together new IO, PAO, PSYOPs, CA, and inter-agency personnel to train these officers how to fight the counter-information war on the contemporary battlefield. This should be a shorter course (less than one month), but it should be offered to experienced mid-grade officers. The ideal place for this course would be either immediately following, or immediately prior to ILE at Fort Leavenworth. A refresher or a further advanced course then should be offered to officers moving into primary PAO billets at the O-5 level.

6. An in-depth media and military history course should be a requirement at DINFOS (if not an Army requirement through APAC).

7. Based on the above recommendations, the proposed DA Pam 600-3 FA-46 career roadmap would look like figure 3.




Figure 3. Proposed FA 46 Career Path

NOTE: Recommended changes are in italics.

### Recommendations for Further Research

There are several areas within this thesis project that warrant additional research.

There was an initial anticipation of limited availability of contemporary literature concerning the ongoing military and media relationships. Upon completion of this project, there are areas that were intended for research in this project, but due to the

plethora of readily available research material and the limited amount of space given to complete the project, it cannot be included in this thesis project.

1. Identify whether or not one of the other military services, other government agencies, or a non-government agency-corporation already has an acceptable PAO training model that meets the requirements listed in chapter 4 that could be readily implemented by the Army within a short-time period.

2. Should FA 30 become a skill identifier for PA and PSYOPS officers instead of a separate Functional Area?

3. Should PAOs track in the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of assignment?

4. Where should PAOs attend ACS for an other than journalism advanced degree?

5. How should the FA 30 and FA 46 communities and accessions command identify and meet the demand requirements for Effects officers in the CIE?

6. Military and media relations of World War II are lessons still applicable today?

## APPENDIX A

### TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETRAEUS

This document is a transcript of an interview by MAJ Patrick Seiber with LTG David Petraeus, Commander, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. This interview occurred at LTG Petraeus' quarters between 1005-1100 hours on 21 October 2006. The purpose of this interview was to gain insight from an Operational and Strategic level leader perspective which competencies Army Public Affairs Officers (PAO) need to support commanders in the contemporary information environment. MAJ Seiber is pursuing a Master of Military Art and Science degree in Strategy at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The topic of MAJ Seiber's thesis is Army PAO training and development to support the contemporary information environment.

MAJ Seiber: Again sir, the purpose of the interview is to gain perspective from the operational and strategic leader level the competencies that Public Affairs Officers require to support the contemporary information environment. Anything that may ask or anything that you don't want to answer sir, you certainly do not have to and you are certainly welcome to anything that I may publish and a transcript of the interview.

LTG Petraeus: Okay

MAJ Seiber: Sir, first of all as a Division Commander, what initial expectations did you have of your Public Affairs Officer?

LTG Petraeus: He would have a reasonable knowledge of the mechanics if you will of all the different forms of media. He would have some appreciation of who the different members of the media were, and if they (the media) had a particular bend or a reputation and background. I would love to have a PAO that could write very very quickly and very well effectively and execute press releases on the toughest of issues. Somebody that recognizes the press' job is to report accurately, not necessarily positively or negatively about what we're doing, but accurately report what we're doing, and to realize that it is our performance that determines whether it is a positive or negative story. The press also has an obligation to get the context of its stories correct, I say that because the reader or viewer...and that the press has the responsibility to properly characterize the basis of their observations to draw conclusions...and so forth, and not let one observation characterize an overall effort, good or bad, on the basis of one example...not to over-

generalize or not to under-generalize, but again to sort of “get it right” to provide that kind of information to a reporter.

MAJ Seiber: Did your Public Affairs Officer meet those expectations?

LTG Petraeus: There have been very few Public Affairs Officers out there who write exceedingly well, in fact, perhaps there is only one I ever saw who really wrote . . . and I’m talking about this is a high standard now, as a Fellows speechwriter in a very high level job with SACEUR . . . but, relatively few, the fact is that relatively few officers write well [sp], and by well, I mean really, really well. I’m talking about a standard measured against best of the writers and journalists in academics . . . trying to begin to measure them [officers] against the really effective writers in the world. But, although, you know against the standard, what it is, the problems in defense and its structure of supporting arguments, to tell them what you are going to tell them, tell them, and then tell them what you told them, and that is a lot easier said than done. Good writing is very, very hard and indeed harder to do it under any kind of pressure and when the stakes are very high, as they certainly are. So again, I think perhaps the only officer that really truly, in personal experience now . . . was a Public Affairs Officer for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He was a Navy Captain that had some impressive Ivy League academic credentials and was a really exceptional and professional Public Affairs Officer. A number of PAOs have again a variety of familiarity with who the folks in the press are. By the way, I would add another category to the list of expectations, sometimes all you need your public affairs officer is to be in a sense, is to juggle lots of different balls in the air at one time. Those balls being the visits of arriving different members of the press, and in a sense to service all their needs, as some members of the press because of their stature can have some [expectation] that they ought to be treated reasonably well and not kept waiting for transportation or have support reasonably coordinated. Sometimes what we most need perhaps to do is to keep all that mechanism working as those are operations, as you know, for as you are moving press around the battlefield or in an operational area where there is a vicious, barbaric insurgency then again you’ve got to have security and transportation. I was not looking for Public Affairs Officers generally that could in a sense be a spokesman. I think that is a different matter and I think we have seen whenever we have tried to get spokesmen, and what you needed actually, and I am talking about spokesmen at the highest level now, in general are operators. We’ve tried a variety of different ways to do this over the years and I’ve watched this in the Chairman’s Office, during Kosovo, for example the Kosovo Air Campaign, at the end of the day there was no substitute for an ai...[broke for coffee]...now where were we?

MAJ Seiber: Sir, you were discussing the operational level.

LTG Petraeus: Okay, yea-at the highest levels, that’s why General Caldwell is the spokesman for MNFI because he is an operator, he is very savvy, he’s smart, he’s been at the highest levels, and in fact he replaced me as the Chairman’s Exec, and he had a fellowship at Harvard. He has all this kind of experience to tell you the truth. But, during the Kosovo air campaign eventually we tried, I think, three different briefers probably before they finally realized before we’ve gotta have, you know, this is an air campaign.

Let's get an Air Force General, who also understands the context in which this [campaign] is being carried out, who can get spooled up in the details of the operation and who can answer the kind of technical questions that the press asks and has a right to ask. The answer, and so we ended up with, I think it was Major General Wald at that time, for example, who ended up as the spokesman for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and you know, you've got to have someone who really knows the answers. When some Public Affairs Officer cannot get up and answer all those kinds of questions in those cases, we tried that once or twice, in fact, with the very sharp Public Affairs Officer we had. It's a lot easier when you are on the other side of the podium, but when you are the guy and the lights are beaming, you have to really understand the topic and you don't get that by being a part time participant. So in that sense, if you see where I am going, in that sense we need PAOs who are facilitators more than they are the spokesman or the expert. Now, at a certain level you can combine those two, and you know, you get the Charlie Snows of the world who, you know, are really good in front of the camera or in front of the microphone and have the kind of background and breadth of knowledge and all the rest of that where they can get spooled up quickly based on their abilities for "one over the world" type questions. But I don't think you are going to find that's the case now. A Public Affairs Officer can over time start to develop that kind of familiarity with the issues, but that takes time and it takes sitting in, and you know just accumulating the detail, the knowledge, and the expertise. And again it doesn't come easily, it doesn't just fall out of the tree into somebody's hand, it takes real study. So when I say "write a press release" what you're after there is something short and to the point. It is not spokesman kind of stuff, it's just conveying "here it is," understand it is the command's view or response on a particular issue and it may be that a few times [the PAO] goes out and gets the facts or the substance and then follows the evident response. Again that is very different from being in front of the camera and being a spokesman.

MAJ Seiber: Yes sir, going back to the operational level, I assume when you took command of the 101st [Airborne Division] that you were not deployed just yet, and then you did get deployed.

Did your expectations change in regard to what your PAO should be capable of while deployed?

LTG Petraeus: Well yes, certainly the stakes are much, much higher obviously when you are doing something that is say, condemned in the world's view. Now I wouldn't say it is softball when you are not deployed, but unless you have some kind of real crisis or some kind of real challenge, you know the local press was generally there and that is what you normally dealt with at Fort Campbell. So what we were normally dealing with, generally, was sort of the regional and local press and stringers from the media networks if there was something that really rose to the level of National interests then they would get involved, but it really didn't extend beyond the National. That's not to say that it couldn't get picked up periodically by the Early Bird to get something nationally or that someone wouldn't come in periodically. But, when all of the sudden it was starting to look like we might head off to war, you know, then we had major folks coming in and that's a very different world. And that's, I think the challenge of the PAO

community is that PAOs traditionally, normally, usually, when you are not at war, spend most of their time doing sort of local stuff, publishing the local newspaper if you will, i.e. “The Leavenworth Lamp.” You’re dealing with local events, well, you know, and local events again (in general) are not too explosive, as such they don’t have the National layers of publicity you get into when you do something nationally and so the stakes are lower frankly that means that you can make the occasional misstep and you don’t have to seize on it. There is a predisposition, I mean you are living with them, they can’t sort of, you know there is going to be a dialogue, there is going to be a benefit of the doubt both ways, of course you have got to live in the neighborhood and so I think there is some sort of predisposition of support and understanding and that may or may not be the case when all of the sudden the National media shows up. And again, they [the National media] are out for a reason, the big story, understandably that is their job they will their best. The vast majority will circumvent the National level press, the major newspapers, the major networks are generally going to strive to report accurately both with their content and with their characterization. Generally they strike a balance, they are not out to spin one way or the other. There are certainly some dubious positions among some of them, and certainly among some of the OP-ED folks, and certainly you have just got to be aware of them.

MAJ Seiber: How did you see your PAO “tie in” with the rest of your Division staff?

LTG Petraeus: Well, the rest of the Division staff obviously had to enable what the PAO’s effort was, as we were bringing in lots of press during certain periods, obviously of combat operations, so then FRAGOs as you well know that go out that support every member of the press and every time we move them out on the battlefield in the operational environment it requires FRAGOs, it requires coordination, it requires meetings. It is mostly, probably in the operational realm that some of the coordination will involve subordinate units, needless to say it involves commanders, and lots of other members of the organization. Obviously it is not one of the best interests of the organization normally, but they need them [the press].

MAJ Seiber: Sir, so was the “tie in” with your PAO as a member of your personal staff work effectively with the remainder of the Division staff?

LTG Petraeus: Yea, sure, the chief supervises it, now the PAO may have direct access to me, but the Chief is not into so much the message as he is into the facilitation of the event. You know the truth is, the PAO for the unit, in a sense, is the Commander—not the PAO—to a degree, now I don’t want to get carried away, but unless the PAO is a facilitator, a coordinator, occasionally a drafter of some again message, press release, a COMSEC, what have you..and the more that he can do the latter I mean that’s the better he is a source of knowledge about who the press are and a source of expertise about dealing with some of them and what the you might expect out of them (the press) what their position is, what their track record is, and that sort of thing.

MAJ Seiber: Was your PAO “tied in” with your Information Operations officer?

LTG Petraeus: I don't know that we had an IO officer in the first year actually, in fact I sure don't recall if we did. If we did, they were all in one big cell. We did not have the kind of explicit, formal organizational structure that has developed in the last two years or so. Not at that level anyway. It started to emerge, but it was not that structured. The Chief did the coordination of all of it, so the Chief is the one who did my work and began with a future plan using the G-3 Plans, through the G-3, who coordinated in a sense the effort of the Psyops, the PAO, the MPAD who was out there running around and then some of the messages were pushed down of course tactical Psyops had to be able to respond to the Brigade commanders' desires and Battalion commanders' desires. And then we assigned the MPAD tasks to stand up TV and radio stations and all that stuff, and the PAO as necessary was coordinating all that stuff. So, again, none of the lines were all that crystal clear when you really get into it.

MAJ Seiber: What do you believe was the biggest operational level lesson learned in regard to Public Affairs during your time as a Division Commander?

LTG Petraeus: You can't win if you don't play. It's not optional, it's not my option. America has a right to know what their sons and daughters are doing.

MAJ Seiber: All right sir, I'm going to move on to the strategic level.

LTG Petraeus: Okay, you know by the way, again strategic and operational can get pretty fuzzy when your at the different levels at certain points. I don't know how it makes much difference, now IO is a slightly different matter. Now you are in the world of what matters enormously is dealing with the Iraqi press, the Iraqi TV, we intended to do that a bit more through a combination of PSYOPS and our MPAD which often times was very separate from the PAO shop itself. The PAO shop was pretty much consumed with just coordinating all these different visits and tours, and tours take certain amounts of time. So the MPAD on the other hand, was out there interacting with the Iraqi TV station, the Iraqi radio station, and that kind of stuff, and at that time we helped them [the Iraqis] stand back up, and then we hired local media because nobody else at that time was paying any salaries as the Ministry of Information had been disestablished completely. So we reached down, at the local level, just to facilitate the Iraqis finding out what is going on. So we actually bought TV cameras, vehicles, and paid their salaries. These two teams of three Iraqis; Producer, a reporter, and a cameraman, and they were the local TV station. Again, there was not a national structure at that time. Eventually you had an Iraqi outlet to key in on, in the meantime you got the word out through the local stations just to make sure it got out. And we funded various programs. We funded "Iraqi Idol," an Iraqi talent contest basically—we had a lot of fun with that. We also had a team of comedians on the payroll and they would make public service announcements for us such as "Don't shoot your weapons in the air," "Don't shoot celebratory fire," "Don't drive like a maniac," "Don't throw trash in the street," you know all those kind of things...they were a lot of fun, in fact they were hilarious. They even had a COPS type show, "BAD BOYS, BAD BOYS, WHAT YA GONNA DO," so they began to get the word out that Iraq had some cops that were out there doing their job. I'm not certain who coordinated that, it may have been the PAO, I'm not positive. At the end of the day, the Chief was the guy

you looked to for the job. And then the Brigades did some stuff on their own as well and we funded newspapers for a while and other things of the Iraqi normal system. Somebody had to do that, so we did. We also funded the annual Iraqi culture show at the university, which included poetry readings and things of that nature. So again we did lots of that kind of stuff.

MAJ Seiber: Sir this ties in with my next question, the difference between what your expectations were at the operational level as a Division commander now that you have moved into Strategic Communications, what I am gathering from you is it seems that the PAO must have more of a base to analyze the different national and international forms of media?

LTG Petraeus: Well, let's start with the stuff that I mentioned earlier, I don't think that that you can view it at the operational level, I don't know how you distinguish between the strategic and operational level. When you have the New York Times covering an issue, it's fairly strategic; if you have CNN it's strategic.

MAJ Seiber: So, did you see a shift in your expectations of your Strategic Communications officer or your Public Affairs Officer working at the Division level to where you worked in Iraq or here.

LTG Petraeus: You know, in certain respects I was fortunate, again, to have worked in the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and I was very fortunate to have seen at that level what goes on, to have been a "fly on the wall" basically, and in some cases I was able to coordinate for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and was able to meet many members of the press through those experiences. So, I don't think the expectations changed. I think the conditions changed when all of the sudden instead of seeing the Hopkinsville New Era, or the Fort Campbell Courier, or the Clarksville or Hopkinsville newspaper, or the local Nashville TV channels and then you get Geraldo Rivera or Christiane Amanpour or Michael Gordon of the New York Times or William Arkin of the Washington Post. So again, this is a very different world because of where those stories are going to end up. Again, the expectations were always the same, the conditions were different. Instead of local press...and again, I would say it is hard ball at that level. But when it comes to the Major League or the NFL, instead of lower level ball if you will, then the stakes are pretty significant.

MAJ Seiber: How do you define Strategic Communications for the Army?

LTG Petraeus: I don't. The Army defines it.

MAJ Seiber: Okay sir, well, then how would you define Strategic Communications as you work at the strategic level?

LTG Petraeus: You know, again, I don't know that these terms are. What we have is communications, okay I guess it is strategic. I think that what Steve Boylan is doing is Strategic Communications. You know you get sort of theological, that's why I sort of

politely said I don't define it, I mean I think what Steve Boylan is doing is strategic communication and there are people that will say, that will counter and say well, he is not at the strategic level and therefore what he is doing is not Strategic Communications, and I say fine call it whatever you want to call it, I could care less. But what you have is communications at the level that you have it, and if it is dealing with national press, and at the international level. I sort of think some of these definitional levels aren't all that important. Again, we can get into all sorts of theological discussions about is it strategic, is it operational, is it tactical and I guess, presumably, maybe it's doctrinal somewhere and maybe there is some value to that at some point. Again, I think the difference whether you are dealing with local media or national media, and when you are dealing with national media the consequences are obviously more significant on a national scale. They do have strategic consequences in that sense. They can affect the strategy that is being carried out and a corporal can have strategic consequences. I guess that's why we have the great terms of strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants. So, strategic communication depends on who they are communicating with and the significance of the issue. Certainly if you are dealing with many of the issues that the Department feels it invites, again, just by the nature of the significance, it draws a strategic consequence. That might be a better grapple of a definition. I think the question is what are the consequences rather than what is the level it is being conducted at. Perhaps that's an insight that the real issue here is how widespread, how significant are the consequences rather than what level the mission is being carried out. You know, you might have the Army PAO doing something but if it doesn't attract national significance then it does it have the consequences of strategic communication? I mean, I don't know. I mean, does a guy need different skills at that [the Army strategic] level? Yes, there is the issue of working, but it is not just because of operating at that level or because who you are operating with, but it is dealing with a national level press as opposed to local press, and that is the big difference and as you get to the prep work of the PAO. Where I think it could be improved is the fact that we tend to take sort of a journalistic approach to the prep of the PAOs, rather than a broader...you know we tend to try to develop journalists instead of political scientists or political philosophers. So what you get is perhaps someone that can run the local newspaper very well, the local stuff very well. But they may or may not have sort of rubbed shoulders with or dealt with the issues that really are of serious consequence. So it is a huge leap to go, again, from being the PAO of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky to being the PAO of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, same guy, same Division, running daily stringers on the way to Baghdad, or the run up to the North, or subsequent operations. But I think that is the difference, and to answer your question is how do you prepare those folks better, the answer is you get them out of their intellectual comfort zone and send them to the Kennedy school of government instead of the Columbia School of Journalism. Now I am overdrawing that, as I don't know that I've met anybody at the Columbia School of Journalism, but I suspect the focus more on developing journalists rather than developing folks that sort of rub elbows with Cambridge, Massachusetts folks in Washington D.C. and that kind of stuff.

MAJ Seiber: Yes sir, you already answered one of my general questions.

LTG Petraeus: I know I did, I knew that is where you were headed. I have had this view for a while and I have shared it with the Chief of Public Affairs for the Army, who agrees. So, I think that, and that's why Fred Wellman, who went to Harvard this year, Public Affairs Officer, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, who was my PAO with MNSTCI, did a very good job and he is benefiting enormously from being around David Gergen for example, and that is the kind of experience you want.

MAJ Seiber: Yes sir, within Public Affairs there are opportunities for officers to stay at the strategic level of assignments or they can progress from tactical, to operational, then to strategic level assignments. As the Army "builds" more strategic communicators, do you think they should stay at the strategic level or rotate from BDE (tactical) through to strategic assignments?

LTG Petraeus: Do the Brigades have PAOs?

MAJ Seiber: Yes sir, with the new structure.

LTG Petraeus: That is actually a great question, because you could certainly argue that the best preparation to be the PAO of the Army would be to be in the office of the PAO of the Army and to learn to work those issues. That's a great question. I would actually have to think about that a little bit. You know, it runs contrary to sort of the certainly popular wisdom of the way that you develop Division commanders is by being a Brigade commander. But I don't know if that analogy works for developing a Public Affairs Officer or not. It probably gets their feet on the ground. The interesting thing is, of course at the Brigade level, you can still be dealing with Christiane Amanpour or Geraldo Rivera if you are downrange. You are sure as hell not going to do it in a home station interview. At home station you will deal with AUSA dues, memberships, or something like that, and again maybe I am overstating it, and again the duties are different, just as they are different for civil-military officers, when they are not in civil-military operations. I guess it would be nice to have a progression where you could sort of get your feet wet at the Brigade level and work through some sort of professional development that exposed them more to the strategic realm more than they have before. By this I am not meaning strategic communication, in fact the more we talk about it the more I believe you are where you are operating at. In other words, the strategic level is where the people are that affect the strategy rather than the sort of local stuff. I guess, again, if you would think about it, down at the Brigade level, when deployed, you need knowledge of those [tactical] operations so that you can help coordinate the overall effort in a Division, Corps, and higher level headquarters.

MAJ Seiber: Sir, as Fort Leavenworth is the "home" of Information Operations, how do you see Public Affairs supporting Information Operations?

LTG Petraeus: Well, we have this challenge of, first of all a very practical challenge of how do you coordinate the efforts of Psyops guys with Public Affairs guys, and by Chairman directive they are not supposed to talk to one another directly, because one can reasonably understand the concern that PSYOPS might "contaminate" Public

Affairs and vice versa. So, it's arguable, but again it is a realistic concern. So, in our society, a Democracy, and all the rest of the responsibilities that go with it....Given that, we have a natural need to coordinate the two efforts, so there you have an IO officer that can do that. Whether or not you can develop IO officers who have expertise throughout the entire realm of what is defined as Information Operations, I think, is questionable. In fact my conclusion is that you probably should not try to do that. Having one person who is truly an expert in electronic warfare, computer network attack and defense, deception, PSYOPS, Public Affairs, OPSEC, and a couple of others of these categories that are all lumped under IO, that that's probably not realistic or feasible. Now, it could be as you get to very high levels with lots of assets, that certainly, for example Multi-National Corps-Iraq we have an incredible array of assets that one person actually may coordinate, but he may at least want to have some coordination cooperation among them. But again you look at Brigade level, you look at Division level, I think in general that what you really want, and where we are not doing as well as we might is in what we call Inform and Influence tasks. Now you can call this whatever you want. I wouldn't have minded calling it Strategic Communications. Again, people who have that as their task at the Department of the Army, at the Joint Chiefs, and at the OSD level believe that they are strategic communicators, and therefore stay out of that. So we say okay fine, we won't use that term. You can call Steve Boylan whatever you want to call him, you can call the TRADOC PAO what, I don't know, he's also Strategic Communications in our book, and that's fine. So call it Public Communications, call it whatever, again, you call it Inform and Influence. But that is area in which we can do better, and we can do better in the terms of the way we communicate within the area of responsibility. In other words of a province lets say, and to take it in the Iraq context, a district. In the province capital we need to get to the locals. country wide in a place like Iraq, region wide in the Middle East and our allies in Europe have gone to Arab Al-Jazeera. Nationally, with respect to our media, [get the information to] the newspapers, and the major TV networks. Internationally, with CNN International and so forth, the UK papers and some of the others [get them the information]. Those are all the areas in which IO officers can help to coordinate the efforts of the PAO and of the PSYOPS guys. And so, in a sense, the PAOs are the "do-ers." They are the ones that begin coordinating the visits of the major press. If they can write, you know, great, they can certainly provide press releases and so forth. But the IO guy is the one that is also coordinating to make sure that the tactical PSYOPS effort, and the other efforts of your PSYOPS teams, perhaps your Military Public Affairs Detachments the may or may not be working under your Public Affairs guy because again, it may depend of how you want to organize it. Who's got Combat Camera, and the other assets that you may have out there? You may actually, again, have local reporters working for you. Again, explicitly, and you can announce that type of, it's not an effort to try and mask that, but it might be an issue of funding. Again, there's a variety of, depending on where you are in the operation, obviously at some point you hand that off. You don't want to seem to be manipulating the press. But early on, nobody else has the means. So, that would be the area that an IO officer could, and an IO officer would be in extent the "stay at home" person while the PAO is out, again, coordinating all this stuff, taking these people out, taking these people around—seeing to their needs. But there's got to be very close coordination about PSYOPS not dealing with the press, PAO dealing

with the press, and the IO trying to, again, keep it all coordinated. But [the IO] not worrying necessarily about electronic warfare, which is something we're developing—electronic warfare officers. So we're breaking that [electronic warfare officers] out. The computer network attack function is very compartmented, very highly classified—SCI level, that probably is not going to be available at Brigade or even Division level. Most likely, computer network defense—that's a Signal Officer's job, that's an information assurance officer's task. What else, deception—that's the G-3 Planner's task. OPSEC is a G-3 plans, oh no wait, we combined that, so then OPSEC is a G-3 task. So again, of these other responsibilities, let's un-encumber the IO officer of these other areas, and you know lets...as you have the very latest from Chuck Eassa, that makes it all very clear I think?

MAJ Seiber: Yes sir

LTG Petraeus: Some of this is arguable, but at the end of the day what's really going to happen, the truth is, the commander is going to assess who he has, as always, and figure out who does what for him. And that is just life. So, you can have all the organizational diagrams in the world, but if this guy can't write and this guy can, this guy is going to end up writing for me. I actually had a Master Sergeant that could write, a PAO Master Sergeant that could write for me really well back when I was a Division commander. She ended up being a higher level speechwriter and wrote a lot of the drafts that I would use and she worked directly for me in that role. We cut the PAO out of it. Quit "screwing it up" [to the PAO] she writes. So, and by the way, we come back to one very important thing. Just as we say we that the commander is the safety officer, or the re-enlistment officer, or the whatever else. You know we always say the commander is this.... The commander is the Public Affairs Officer for his or her unit, I mean, at the end of the day, really. No matter what the Public Affairs Officer is doing, or the IO officer, along with everybody else [everyone] is facilitating the commander's action. Again, you are going to have to support your commanders. You know, the press isn't there to hear the PAO, the press is there to hear, to talk to the key people that are making the decisions and the people carrying them out, not the ones that are assisting them getting around, generally.

MAJ Seiber: Last question sir.

LTG Petraeus: Yea.

MAJ Seiber: Where do you see the need for PAOs to transform and change? You talked about education earlier.

LTG Petraeus: I think again it is education and it is exposure to the, again, the strategic level press I guess that's what it would be. So, because, very quickly, somebody at the Brigade or Division level can be thrust in a situation of dealing with the Christiane Amanpours, the Dan Rathers, the Tom Brokaws, or whoever. It is a very quick transition and you can't make mistakes in that world. You do have to be very aware of what other people are saying around you or what, and that's not to imply that you are spinning, or that you are not telling the truth, or you are not being forthright. But, you cannot be

offhand. You can't be sort of off, in a sense, just sort of tossing things out there. And you can't let the emotions of the moment sort of overly color what you say. I don't think you were in here when I was talking with the lady that was in here before you, but as you well know, a situation like Iraq or Afghanistan can be a very roller coaster experience for commanders, and for particular your soldiers. You can have the ultimate high of the fall of Baghdad, a successful attack, the killing of Ouday and Qusay [Hussein], or something like that. And then you can, there is sort of a "buoyant" feel you get out of that of the enthusiasm and the optimism that can result from that can be pretty expansive rhetoric if you are not careful. On the other hand, the loss of soldiers is sort of a real blow—devastating losses of troopers (in terms of numbers), or key individuals. You know, when we lost a Brigade Command Sergeant Major, it had such an impact. At that Brigade they were all down, and the Brigade Commander, and again, you really have to watch what you say at a time like that. Because when you're alone, the response can be, again, not fully considered, and it can have strategic consequences. Again, all of us are subject to those kinds of emotional swings. What you've got to do when you are dealing with the press is to try to "dampen those out" so that you are neither overly, unreasonably, sort of optimistic or unreasonably pessimistic I guess you could say, so that you have a reasonably consistent—I guess it's a line, or what have you. But it's just a reasonably consistent message is really what it is. It needs to be a truthful message, a forthright message.

MAJ Seiber: I didn't mean to ask an additional question, but this ties in with the previous question. How do you think a PAO can get that kind of experience in order to obtain that kind of balance?

LTG Petraeus: Again, by being exposed to, and immersing oneself in the national level media. Learning who they are, rubbing shoulders with them, seeing them on the stage, drinking coffee with them, having dinner with them...you know it's getting to know them. It's exposure to them, it's really so that when the first time you meet Christiane Amanpour the "starpower" doesn't overwhelm you and makes you get sort of overcome by the fact that she is actually paying attention to you, as she's a reporter. You know, Bob Woodward shows up, again you are not overcome by that. As you can see, there are risks involved, but do understand who you are dealing with. There are others out there you need to be very wary of. You need to know they are going to be a bit more sensational than others, and inevitably you are going to deal with some of those. You have to be sensitive to the pressure by the press for a story to be first, or to be fast, or be balanced, or any of these sort of buzz words. I distinctly remember giving a press conference in the Pentagon Press Room and the CNN and FOX actually sit next to each other, right next to the door. This was a pretty big press conference, I had just come home from Iraq. I had told the press guys, the PAO folks, you know, don't pull me off this thing. I'm comfortable with the subject matter, I've lived it now for the better part of two and half years, I can handle this, I've dealt with the press. So, don't try to give me the "shepherd's crook" here you know. Don't worry about a major incident. I want this, this should be, I will answer every question until there are no more questions, period. So, let's get this thing sorted out. Well, at about the forty-five minute mark, CNN and FOX couldn't stand it any longer. They both left. One of them left and the other immediately

followed. They taped a quick spot, and then they were actually back in their chairs at about the fifty-three minute mark, or something like that. But, this is the kind of pressure that they live with. You have to understand deadlines and you have to understand the pressure of the twenty-four hour news cycle. Again, the competition to be first, to be the fastest, is considerable.

MAJ Seiber: So would you advocate a balance of training with industry for a PAO?

LTG Petraeus: I don't know what training with industry does, candidly. I don't know what they could do to work with manufacturing. I'd rather see them be an intern, take their best and brightest and put them in Washington. Just have them read the Early Bird from cover to cover. Put them in the OSD Public Affairs Office, put them in the Chairman's office. DA has various stovepipes that don't necessarily expose them to strategic stuff, but if you are trying to get people comfortable dealing with the New York Times and the Washington Post and all this kind of stuff and security issues, then put them in those issues. I'm not sure that dealing with industry, unless you want to make people who are Army Public Affairs Officers for Army Materiel Command or program management. Then that's okay, that's fine. But again, figure out what you are trying to develop. And if you are trying to develop skill, comfort, and confidence in dealing with Mike O'Rourke, Tom Ricks, Eric Schmidt, and the others of sort of the national security medium, then figure out how to get them in position where they can observe that. Sort of gradually put their toe in the water with respect to that environment. Now, if the industry is CNN, that's different. I've got it, okay, I was thinking Detroit or something like that. If it's CNN then great, if the New York Times—though I am not certain the New York Times would take them.

MAJ Seiber: Sir, I believe it is Fleishmann-Hilliard, CNN, and Fox

LTG Petraeus: Fleishmann-Hilliard, I believe that is an ad agency isn't it? Well, they may be the ones that are doing recruiting, and if you want to develop someone for recruiting command, and again we need them. But again you have sort to try and figure out what you want to send someone out to get an education for. Again, if you are trying to educate in a sense generalist PAOs, to be Division PAOs, Corps PAOs, and sort of strategic level—strategic meaning national level PAOs, then I think you put them in a job to develop the ability to deal with national media. So, I'm not sure if you look at our courses in the PAO world whether that actually does that. Now, should there be a track for PAOs? Gosh, I don't know, I haven't looked at what slots you all have to fill in that regard. So, you really have to look at your personnel inventory and what you are trying to do with Public Affairs Officers and then figure out whether you want to track them at a certain point or make them all generalists. Are you trying to develop them all to be general public affairs officers or the Chief of Public Affairs of the Army or what have you.

MAJ Seiber: Sir, those are all my questions.

LTG Petraeus: Great, I hope that was helpful.

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