

THE PROLIFERATION AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS
AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THE GREAT LAKES
AND HORN OF AFRICA

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Strategy

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE PROLIFERATION AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THE GREAT LAKES AND HORN OF AFRICA, by Major Aphaxard Muthuri Kiugu, 91 pages.

In Africa, the effect of the proliferation of SALW continues to impact negatively on the socioeconomic development particularly within the GLHA subregion. Since 2000, several initiatives on the matter have been developed. Foremost among the subregional and regional initiatives are the Nairobi and Bamako declarations on the “African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons” in March and December 2000, respectively.

This study seeks to examine the strategy’s ends, ways and means of how the GLHA countries are dealing with the SALW problem with emphasis on Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. It also analyzes the challenges the subregional governments have encountered while tackling the menace and measures they have developed to mitigate them. It is clear that the strategies’ ends and ways are sufficient to contain the problem but only require better coordination, integration and synchronization into one main effort.

The author concludes that the war on SALW remains elusive unless all member states show the political will to address the factors of increased supply and demand of SALW and allocate more resources (means) in order to allow the ways to achieve the strategic ends.

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ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism
BD	Bamako Declaration
BASIC	British American Security Information Council
CEWARM	Conflict Early Warning Mechanism
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAANSA	Eastern African Action Network on Small Arms
EA	East Africa
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War
EASBRIG	East Brigade
EAPCCO	East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
EU	European Union
HOA	Horn of Africa
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
GWOT	Global War on Terror
GLHA	Great Lakes and Horn of Africa
KANSA	Kenya Action Network on Small Arms

KVPDC	Kerio Valley Peace and Development committee
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MLC	Movement for the Liberation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
ND	Nairobi Declaration
NS	Nairobi Secretariat
NP	Nairobi Protocol
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NAP	National Action Plan
NFP	National Focal Point
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PPDI	Pastoralists Peace and Development Initiative
PLANEM	Planning Element
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons
RCD-N	Rally for the Congolese Democracy-National
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SG	Secretary General
SRIC	Security Research and Information Centre
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SALIGAD	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAS	Small Arms Survey
TGF	Transition Federal Government
UN	United Nations

UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNAFRI	United Nations African Institute
UKDFID	United Kingdom for International Development
UANSA	Uganda Action Network on Small Arms
UNPoA	United Nations Plan of Action
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UJCC	Uganda Joint Christian Council
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Forces
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNDDA	United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
VOA	Voice of America
WASDA	Wajir South Development Association

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

In Africa, small arms and light weapons (SALW) have been in use ever since the advent of the Arabs in the continent during the time of slave trade in the seventeenth century. In Uganda, the first guns and gun powder ever used in the country were brought by Arab traders around 1844 and some were sold or given as gifts to the Kabaka (King) of Buganda Kingdom (U.S. Library of Congress, 1990).

The greatest influx of SALW into Africa however was as a result of the wars of 1990s. Due to their easy availability and characteristics, these weapons have been widely used as equipments of violence in all conflicts that the United Nations (UN) has intervened in around the world (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) 1999, xiii).

SALW are the most commonly used means of violence in the recent conflicts world over as evidenced in interstate or intra-state conflicts. Continued use of SALW result in millions of deaths, high rates of civilian casualties, orphans, homelessness, disabilities and insecure environments in open violation of international humanitarian law. During the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, more than 750,000 people were massacred with a combination SALW and machetes. In Somalia in 1992, rebel groups attacked UN peace keeping forces using all sorts of SALW. Many of the direct victims in these conflicts are women and children. It should be understood that these weapons do not necessarily cause conflicts but it is their easy access which fuels them, hence creating

insecurity, slowing development and hampering humanitarian aid to the affected people (UNIDIR 1999, 4).

The Cold War era preoccupied the world with weapons of mass destruction and other major weapon systems. When it ended, the international community did little to monitor the global trade of small arms and light weapons. Today, many nations and international organizations are concerned about easy access to these weapons and the impact they have on the societies which offer them sanctuary. Due to their characteristics and demand for use in the conflict areas, SALW have been increasing in numbers than the opposite. The reason behind this is that these weapons are easy to obtain, easy to handle, relatively cheap to acquire and can be transported from one location to another with minimal detection (Klare n.d).

Today it is estimated that more than half a billion SALW are in circulation around the world. These weapons are produced in large quantities by over 70 manufacturing countries and in several others that make them in craft industries. SALW are normally used as standard equipment for the armed forces and other security services globally. Their unchecked accumulation and transfer can arguably be directly correlated to the number of internal conflicts and escalation of crime and violent activities the world over (Small Arms Survey Publications 2004).

Proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW pose great challenges to disarmament efforts by affected governments and various players around the world today. Prior to World War II, SALW were synonymous with militaries and police forces and were not accessible to ordinary people. However, after the Cold War, leftover SALW found ready markets mostly in Africa (UNIDIR 1999, xv).

Nations of the East and West, who manufactured SALW, supplied their allies with weapons on the pretext of supporting national liberation movements or to quell internal uprisings in those countries. In all these conflicts, SALW were commonly used against noncombatants with a view of causing instability and, at times, overthrowing established governments. The effects of proliferation of SALW impact on civilians, who become innocent victims, and have greatly retarded the social infrastructure of many affected countries in Africa. Irrespective of the dire consequences resulting from wide spread usage of these weapons, until recently, minimal attention has been paid to their proliferation (UNIDIR 1999, xv).

This is not to say that the proliferation of light weapons is a fundamental cause of conflict. The wars now underway in the world are being driven by a combination of factors, including historical disputes over territory and more modern disputes over national governance and the distribution of state resources. But the easy availability of weapons makes it more likely that potential belligerents will choose violence and not negotiation, as the way to satisfy their grievances. The abundance of arms has contributed to the severity, duration and geographic scope of recent wars. In this sense, the proliferation of arms is a very significant factor in the dynamics of contemporary conflict (UNIDIR 1999, 9).

The Organization of African Union (OAU), formed in 1963 with the mandate to fight colonialism, was the only continental body that championed the fight against proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms but did not have the mechanism and capacity to do so. On 9 July 2002, the 38-year-old OAU was transformed into the African Union (AU) at the heads of state and government meeting held in Durban, South Africa. It is evident that the Union is now working to live up to its expectations in respect to tackling issues of insecurity that have engulfed the continent especially West Africa and the GLHA region for decades now (Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, 2002).

The continued increase of insecurity in several African regions, due to uncontrolled SALW among other issues, has posed serious challenges which require comprehensive strategic approaches. African governments have made some progress by initiating forums and protocols to deal with the menace. Foremost among the initiatives, is the “Bamako Declaration (BD) on the African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in December 2000. At the regional level, the GLHA came up with a document in March 2000 called the “Nairobi Declaration (ND) on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons” (Sabala 2004, 10).

In November 2000, the GLHA countries came up with an action plan for the ND known as “Implementation Plan of the Coordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.” In accordance with the objective of the ND, the implementation plan was meant to foster regional co-operation and exchange of ideas and experience, and create favorable conditions for a closer regional understanding in order to facilitate workable programs towards achieving the set objectives (Eavis 2002).

It is worth noting that the BD is the initiative that set an agenda for the Africa’s fight against the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the continent. The BD laid a foundation that led to the ND, whose objectives are based on the seven pillars of the BD, which will be discussed later in this paper. The Nairobi Declaration is a political document which spells out the regional scope and is a strategic document that lays a firm foundation for the successful control of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in the GLHA regions. It envisages that other vital players,

such as multi-national agencies, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups, will assist in the effort to control and reduce proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in the GLHA (Thusi 2003).

Background

The political geography of the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa describes the region occupied by Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Djibouti, and Somalia. The subregion is regarded as a focal point of the proliferation of SALW on the African continent. This subregion contains second-hand arsenals emanating from decolonization during the Cold War era. Almost the entire region is engulfed with prolonged inter-and intrastate conflicts, armed ethnic conflicts, territorial disputes, cross-border wars, civil wars and cattle rustling. Such activities are common in Ethiopia, Sudan, the DRC, Northern Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and the border areas of Kenya and the Republic of Somalia. The abundant supply of weapons continues to disrupt security and hamper all facets of development in the subregion (Thusi 2003).

In Sudan, the government has been at war with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in one of the most prolonged wars in the history of conflicts on the continent. It has left a trail of devastation and anarchy. In Uganda, the government has struggled for many years with a notorious militia group called the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) since 1989. The LRA, led by Joseph Kony, operates in the northern Uganda. The group was operating from bases in Southern Sudan, but in early 2005 it relocated to Eastern DRC. The LRA, using SALW in their possession, has continued to commit numerous abuses and atrocities, including the abduction of children, who they

use as child soldiers, rape, maiming, and killing of innocent civilians, in addition to destabilizing northern Uganda (Thusi 2003).

In 1998, the DRC had six foreign countries supporting either of the two main warring factions that were well organized and equipped with large quantities of small arms received from foreign sources. The warring factions, namely the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and Rally for the Congolese Democracy-National (RCD-N), have been receiving enormous support from foreign protagonists resulting in a situation which has been described as “Africa’s First World War”(Thusi 2003).

Somalia has not had a functioning government since the fall of Said Barre in 1991. Today, the country acts as conduit for all sorts of weapons to the subregion, with many Somali militia reported to be involved in the illegal trade in SALW which reaches markets in Ethiopia and the Kenyan capital of Nairobi with ease. A good example is the weapons used during the attempted shooting down of an Israeli air liner, as it took off from the Mombassa airport on the Kenyan coast in late 2002, using man-portable surface-to-air missiles, classified as light weapons. The missiles are believed to have been ferried from Somalia (Thusi 2003).

SALW proliferation has contributed to several cross-border conflicts, resulting in cattle rustling among the pastoral groups along the Kenya border districts bordering Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. Though tribal conflicts and cattle rustling are traditional practices among these pastoral tribes they were not characterized by the use of SALW until after the Cold War. The wide spread availability result of SALW resulted in high death rates and increased low-intensity wars which have spread throughout the whole region today (Thusi 2003).

There are several sources of illicit SALW but much of the illegal weapons in the hands of insurgents, rebels or cattle rustlers in the GLHA come from the governments' stocks that were meant for government security forces but were inadequately controlled and mishandled. This would often be the case after a legitimate regime change or overthrow of a government where weapons accountability is poor a situation that allows them to fall into the wrong hands. That is how the Lord's Resistance Army of Uganda managed to form into an armed rebel group using the weapons that had collected after the government of Idi Amin was overthrown in 1979 (Prout World Assembly 2006).

International Players

In 1995, UNGA established the panel of governments' experts on small arms to assist the Secretary General (SG) to make a report on ways of addressing the issue. In their report (A/52/298), the panel of government experts on small arms found out that in one way or another, most of the UN system was dealing with the indirect aftermath of the recent civil wars fought commonly using SALW. This report helped to highlight the problem of SALW in the international arena. Since then, the UN has been in the forefront in the efforts to tackle the issue (UNGA 1999, 1-2).

Today, the Security Council is involved in reduction and prevention measures of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SAWL by implementation of the recommendation of the SG in his report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of conflict resolutions and sustainable development in Africa (UNGA 1999, 8).

Further, in July 2001 the UN adopted the "UN Plan of Action" (UNPoA) with the aim of preventing, combating and eradicating the proliferation and illicit trade in SALW

in all its aspects, in the national, regional and global levels. By doing this, UN member States, agreed to introduce radical measures to implement the plan. The member states of the GLHA recognized the importance of the UNPoA and went ahead to quickly implement its provisions as guided by the ND established one year earlier. The main issues addressed by the UNPoA provisions included stockpiling of arms; import, export and transfer control measures, marking, tracing mechanism and brokering; educating the public, destruction of collected weapons; drawing of standard legal framework and boosting operational capacity (RECSA 2006).

According to the International Action Network on Small Arms' (IANSA) 2004 review, although there have been notable efforts by NGOs, the United Nations (UN) and national governments, the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW is still rampant with serious human consequences. At the international level, the UN has continuously tried to work out ways of marking small arms to enable law enforcement agencies to intercept illegal trafficking and identify weapons used in crime and against human rights. The UN has also been involved in developing programs designed to sensitize people in countries affected by the misuse of SALW, helping them to understand the effects of undue accumulation and uncontrolled transfers of weapons and promoting more international participation in the fight against the problem (IANSA 2004).

African Union's Initiative

The issues concerning the negative impact of SALW in Africa began to raise concern among African leaders in 1996 when the OAU, decided to address the problem of proliferation and dissemination of SALW with the aim of reducing it. Various heads of

state declared a commitment to fighting the trafficking of illegal SALW at the subregional levels and eventually at the continental level (Sabala 2004, 9).

The OAU held its 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Algiers, the capital of Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999, and adopted Decision AHG/Dec.137 (LXX). It resolved to develop an African strategy to tackle the issues emanating from proliferation, circulation and illicit trafficking of SALW and draft a common agenda for presentation to the UN conference of 2001 (British American Security Information Council (BASIC) 2000, 1).

In July 1999 in Algiers, Algeria, the OAU's assembly of heads of state and governments addressed the problem of SALW in the continent. A common position was agreed upon as well as recommendations for adopting policies, institutional arrangements and operational plans for tackling the impact from illegal trafficking, proliferation, piling up and illicit use of SALW (Ploughshares, 1999).

Bamako Declaration

The forum that became prominent, and a pace setter, in resolving the SALW problem on the African continent, was when representatives of the member states of the OAU, met in Bamako, Mali, from 30 November to 1 December 2000. Its purpose was to develop a sustainable strategy for “An African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” commonly referred to as the Bamako Declaration. The BD was in preparation for the “UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,” organized under the UN Program of Action (UNIPoA) for the prevention, combating and

eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. The conference was held in New York, from 9 to 20 July, 2001 (Sabala 2004, 12).

This declaration was a follow-up to a previous decision made by heads of states and government in 1999. The BD bound signatory governments to embrace common measures to eradicate the proliferation of SALW within the African continent. The declaration encompassed vital commitments by the partners, as stressed in several regional forums and declarations in the different parts of the continent, through which governments have initiated programs and set guidelines and objectives to be met.

The BD was developed:

To promote measures aimed at restoring peace, security and confidence among, and, between member states with a view to reducing the resort to arms, promote structures and processes to strengthen democracy, the observance of human rights, the rule of law and good governance, as well as economic recovery and growth, and importantly, to promote comprehensive light weapons that, include both control and reduction, as well as supply and demand aspects, that are based on the coordination and harmonization of the efforts of the member States at regional, continental and international levels and which involve civil society in support of the central role of governments (Sabala 2004, 12).

The BD spells out the danger of uncontrolled proliferation of SALW in the continent with the African leaders and heads of governments having realized the negative effects the proliferation and trafficking of SALW has on stability and economic development in the continent (Sabala 2004, 12).

Economic development thrives in secure environments. Interstate conflict and internal instability caused by the use of SALW result in damaged physical infrastructure which is key to economic growth. Armed groups in conflict areas often control transit routes for smuggling activities, and at times disrupt the country's ability to exploit its natural resources. Protracted wars divert human and economic resources away from vital

services, such as education, health and service industries. In post-conflict eras, where governments have not articulated re-integration programs, former combatants become social misfits and may resort to crime to earn a living (Klare n.d).

Insecurity, combined with poor infrastructure and weak governance, discourages investment for fear of personal safety and the uncertainty of recovering profits from investments. Government projects suffer delays in disbursement of donor money and, at times, lose total donor support. High criminal activities, such as banditry, bank robberies, and car jacking further hamper economic development. This further erodes investor confidence and the will to start up a business in an insecure environment. The increase in use of SALW by criminals diverts government spending to address security concerns at the expense of economic development. This in turn leads to high poverty levels and unemployment with many youth resorting to the use of SALW for survival (Klare n.d).

Tourism is one of the leading sources of revenue, especially hard currency, for the governments of the GLHA and one of the largest sectors that offers a large percentage of employment either in the sector itself or tourism-related industries. In Kenya for instance, it is comparable to revenue earned from the export of agricultural produce, such as coffee and tea. The sector has lately suffered due to adverse security warnings to visitors who frequent certain tourist destinations. The widespread use of SALW has continued to affect this sector with serious consequences. There have been numerous instances of tourists becoming victims to criminal attacks using SALW leading to loss of property, life or serious injuries (Klare n.d).

The BD was further boosted when one of the AU's programs, "the New Partnership for Africa's Development" (NEPAD) subcommittee of Peace and Security

pressured to make the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW a priority in its organization's agenda. In February 2003, an AU/NEPAD consortium on peace and security initiated a plan of action which stressed the need for a concerted effort to prevent, fight and eradicate the menace of proliferation and trafficking of SALW and an African Strategy on disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reconstruction (DDRR) after conflict resolution (Sabala 2004,13).

The Declaration further spells out actions to be taken at national, regional and even at international levels. These measures are core to resolving the problem and cannot be achieved in isolation from one another. Action at the national level of all participating countries is necessary for successful accomplishment of the BD. In order to be fruitful, the whole region must be involved. The BD's objective is to lay a framework for action against illegal trafficking and proliferation of SALW in Africa as well as a vital roadmap and reference document to supplement all other important plans and strategies that have been agreed upon at subregional and national levels such as the ND (Sabala 2004, 13).

The Nairobi Declaration

In implementing the BD, subregional states have initiated programs in the GLHA area which has been particularly adversely affected by the use of illicit SALW. Foreign affairs ministers of the GLHA met on 15 March, 2000 in Nairobi, Kenya for four days to address the problem in the two regions. The representatives of Burundi, the DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda signed the ND which came up with a plan to deal with the menace the details of which will be discussed further in greater detail. All the ministers agreed that the problem of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW into the region had been motivated by internal political

conflicts and poverty. They agreed that in order to curb the menace successfully, required tougher measures to enhance good governance and respect for human rights, the rule of law, improvement of democracies and measures to promote economic development. Other measures identified were enhancement of border security, introduction of stringent measures at all border points and improving standards of living of the pastoral communities, among others (Global Policy Forum 2000).

The ND set the objectives for an implementation plan which was later established in November, 2000 and later reviewed by a group of ministers in August, 2002. Several years after signing of the ND, some countries have made progress in implementing it while others are lagging behind. The key to the successful implementation of the declaration is having the countries doing it simultaneously and at the same pace across the region. The inability of the GLHA countries to make progress on the SALW issue along side each other will slow the impetus due to shared ethnicity background across borders. The ND pays particular attention to cross-border types of conflicts, political instability and trafficking of illicit SALW and its impact in the region. The implementation plan calls for a concerted effort between governments, civil society groups, and regional bodies working towards the objective of achieving the implementation plan. The plan is action oriented based on seven pillars which spell out action guidelines for the implementation of the declaration. The pillars of the Plan are:

An institutional framework. The declaration calls for the establishment of National Focal Points (NFP) as national coordinating bodies and the Nairobi Secretariat (NS) as regional coordinating body.

Regional cooperation and coordination. The declaration focuses on regional cooperation meaning that all efforts, programs, and initiatives should have a regional scope.

Legislative measures. The Plan agitates for development of a legal framework that is uniform and standard to regional governments regarding the manufacture, possession, import, export, transfer, transit, transport and control of small arms.

Operational capacity-building. For the success of the plan, the regional governments have to ensure that resources are available to support the regional institutions such as the NS and NFPs.

Control, seizures, forfeiture, distribution, collection and destruction. This plan called for government's capacity to control and account for SALW in their possession. Many countries in the region have large amounts of unregistered SALW.

Information exchange and record keeping. The problem of proliferation of SALW requires exchange of information, data collection and up-to-date record keeping especially by the law enforcement agencies.

Public awareness. The Plan recommends drawing of programs and establishing projects which would promote public awareness of the consequences of the proliferation of SALW (Thusi 2003).

Regional Initiatives

Three of Africa's subregions, namely the GLHA, West Africa and Southern Africa, have established their regional coordinating agencies in line with the Bamako Declaration. The GLHA countries formed a secretariat called the Nairobi Secretariat on Small Arms and Light Weapons with its offices in Nairobi (now the Regional Centre on

Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA). It serves all countries that are signatories to the ND. The secretariat's objective is to coordinate the regional plans for implementation. Some of the programs targeted include planning workshops for national co-ordinators, developing work plans for the region and cooperating with other key players in the region such as; the Eastern Africa Network on Small Arms (EAANSA), the Uganda Action Network on Small Arms (UANSA) and Kenya Action Network on Small Arms (KANSA) (Sabala 2004,21).

At the spirit of promotion of law enforcement as part of the implementation plan, the GLHA countries agreed to form the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) whose mandate was to work in support of the declaration. This organization should play a crucial role in combating the proliferation of SALW in the region utilizing the expertise of the police dealing with all sorts of crime and cross-border criminal activities, such as firearms and drugs trafficking, cattle-rustling, terrorism and searching for lost or stolen arms (Thusi 2003).

National Initiatives

The countries of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have all complied with Para 3A of the BD. It urges member countries to establish institutional, legal and administrative frameworks to deal with the issue of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW by establishing National Focal Points (NFP) in each country as a mechanism to coordinate and harmonize all national efforts in addressing the problem of Proliferation, circulation and illicit trafficking of SALW (Sabala 2004, 19-20).

Ethiopia established its NFP in October 2003 and placed it under the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission as a unit. Kenya established the Kenya National Focal Point

(KNFP) in January 2003, with membership drawn from the security organs and relevant government ministries, while Uganda established its NFP in October 2001 together with a national coordinating agency charged with the responsibility of successful implementation of the Bamako Declaration (Sabala 2004 19-20).

In a bid to curb the common cross-border cattle rustling between two common border tribes, the Kenyan and Ugandan governments, in 2003, agreed to increase efforts to disarm the pastoral ethnic tribes living in both countries. The cultural aspect of the pastoral communities in the Subregion needs to be given more attention than just face value talks because of the large number of SALW in circulation within these communities and across into the neighboring countries where traditionally grazing fields are not limited to international borders. This is an issue that the countries of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have struggled to resolve for years now without success (Practical Action 2003). The subject matter will however be analyzed deeply in chapter 4 of this study.

The civil society groups played pivotal roles in supplementing the governments' efforts in the formulation of the Nairobi Declaration and its implementation. Traditionally however, most African governments have sour relations with the civil society groups due to their open criticism of the government's poor performance. Regarding the fight against the proliferation of SALW in the GLHA, it is needless to say that the governments' initiatives can not yield much success without the expertise, skills and resources that are derived from these civil society groups. The Nairobi Declaration clearly encourages full participation of such groups in all national and regional efforts in combating the problem of the proliferation of SALW. Evidently, these groups have always played a great role in

conflict-prone zones even in the absence of a legitimate government, such as Somalia, with encouraging results (Klare n.d).

Author's Motivation

The author's personal interest in researching this topic is due to the feeling that the other greatest concern in the GLHA subregion other than HIV/AIDS and health is protracted intra-state armed conflicts, which have led to uncontrollable insecurity in the urban towns due to possession of small arms and light weapons by criminals. These weapons have been easily trafficked through unmanned porous borders into the urban and rural towns with serious impact on people's ways of life.

Failure by the regional governments' ability to show the political will needed to win the war against proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW has forced the pastoral communities to take "law into their own hands" by acquiring arms by any means to defend their livestock against cattle rustlers.

The author's tribal home district of Meru, in the Eastern part of Kenya, borders pastoral communities of the Rift Valley, and North Eastern and other Eastern regions synonymous with cattle rustling and banditry activities using SALW. He has also witnessed part of his Armored Brigade Battalions deploy troops and squadrons in an infantry role in operations along the vast borders of Sudan and Ethiopia to contain frequent attacks from cattle rustlers.

In 2005, the Kenyan Government tasked the army with a secondary role of aiding civil authority by conducting military operations aimed at disarming the pastoral communities of the North Rift Valley after years of protracted and notorious cattle raids

and inter-ethnic skirmishes amongst these communities and at times with pastoral communities of Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia.

In 2003, the author served with the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and was involved in the disarmament, demobilization repatriation and re-integration program of Hutu militia back to Rwanda from the Eastern region the DRC. As a military officer, and a citizen from the affected region, the author feels he has an obligation to give his input towards solving the menace of the proliferation of SALW and share his experiences and views with interested parties who have similar concerns.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research project is to examine the strategy (ends, ways and means) of how to deal with the proliferation of illicit SALW into the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region with emphasis on Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. This paper will assess how the subregional member countries can implement the Bamako and Nairobi declarations in the face of major challenges posed by continued conflicts in some of the countries which are signatories to the declarations, and the continuing cross-border cattle rustling and ethnic conflicts.

This paper will also examine at how the governments can use the national instruments of power, namely; diplomacy, information, military and economic instruments, commonly referred to as DIME, as an approach towards eradicating the problem. This concept will be addressed at length later in the paper.

Proposed Research Question

The primary question this research will try to answer is are the strategies that the three countries have selected adequate to eliminate the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the GLHA subregion?

Secondary Questions

Are new strategies necessary or do the BD and the ND provide sufficient strategic guidance to deal with proliferation and illicit trafficking SALW?

Can the GLHA member states create the conditions to coordinate an effective regional approach towards solving the problem of SALW?

What resources will the subregional governments require to successfully deal with the situation and how can the resource constraints be overcome?

How will the governments partner with other multi-national organizations, NGOs and other elements of the civil society in the fight against illegal SALW?

How can the GLHA countries integrate and synchronize their efforts to achieve one common objective.

The Scope of the Research Paper

The research will narrow down to the subregional level comprising the GLHA with special focus on Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda since they are the countries that suffer significantly from this common phenomenon.

Assumptions

This research paper has four underlying assumptions:

The first assumption is that the policies, initiative programs developed and institutions established, in respect to implementation, of the Bamako and Nairobi Declaration will remain in force.

The second assumption is that the proliferation and trafficking of illicit SALW will continue in the GLHA until all governments in the region work in unison to combat the problem.

The third assumption is that the UN, donor community, the civil society and NGO's will continue to support the regional governments' efforts in implementation of the Nairobi Declaration by providing logistical requirements and funding of training programs for security agents and custom officials and educating the pastoral communities through seminars and workshops in an effort to bring together all stake holders to a common understanding.

The fourth assumption is that the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda will continue to cooperate in joint initiatives to control movement of pastoral communities who share the same culture and traditional values with the aim of reducing the need for SALW.

Definitions

The terms defined below, will be used in the research:

Proliferation: This means growth by the rapid increase of parts or in number. Small arms proliferation is a term commonly used by organizations and individuals advocating control of illegal small arms and their trade around the globe. Most organizations and individuals use the term, particularly in regards to small arms sales to private parties and individuals in conflict prone zones (The Free Dictionary).

Civil Society. Civil society, as used in the Nairobi Declaration, Refers to a collective entity where citizens interface with each other and with the state. Civil society is usually assumed to be composed of a range of organizations including social movements, professional and voluntary associations, grassroots organizations, nongovernmental organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, academic and philanthropic institutions, community groups, youth and women's organizations and religious related organizations. In many cases independent media and the informal sector are also included as part of civil society. Among other roles, civil society can influence public opinion and performance, can help hold governments accountable, and can complement national and local administrations in the establishment of effective governance (Thusi 2003).

DIME: Countries use elements of national power to pursue their national interests.

The 1997 "U.S. National Security Strategy" stated that the U.S. must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors." The instruments of national power that would be applied in a balanced, synchronized and coordinated fashion to achieve these goals, include diplomacy/political, information, military and economic elements of power, commonly referred to as DIME (Kem 2006,C202RC-1-6).

Illicit Trafficking of Arms: This is understood to cover the international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of states and/or international law (UNGA 1997).

Light Weapons: Light weapons refer to heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, portable missile launchers and mortars of less than 100mm (UNGA 1997).

National Strategy: Strategy, in its literal meaning, is all about the "way" (concept). National leadership utilizes the "means" (resources) in an attempt to achieve stated "ends" (objectives) in support of its interests. Art Lykke, a lecturer at U.S Army War College, defines the key components of a strategy as follows; Ends (objectives) explain the matter to be achieved. Ends are objectives, which if accomplished, create or

contribute to the achievement of the desired end state at the strategic levels being analyzed in order to serve national interests. Ways (strategic concepts/courses of action) explain "how" the ends are to be achieved by utilization of resources. These consist of places, concepts, policies, alliances and progress designed that "if implemented" would achieve the ends. The concept must be clear enough to give planning guidance to the implementer and must be planned to be adequately resourced. Means (resources) explain what particular resources are to be employed in applying the concepts to achieve the set objectives. Means can either be tangible or intangible. Tangible means include personnel and equipment, funds, and facilities. Intangible means are things like will, political capital, courage, or intellect. Ends, ways, and means usually become confusing while developing or analyzing a specific strategy. Therefore the solution is to focus on the questions. Objectives will always answer the question of what is to be accomplished. Concepts, or ways, explain how the resources will be utilized while the resources, or means, explain what will be employed in order to achieve the ends (Yarger 2006, C 202RA-5).

Small Arms: Small arms refer to pistols, rifles and carbine machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns (UNGA, 1997).

Limitations

This research is conducted away from the area of concern and therefore the protagonists in the implementation of government strategies are not available for interview. This limitation will however be minimized through the guidance of the thesis committee members who are instructors at the Army Command and Staff College

Department of Joint and Multinational Operations and experts in African Strategic Studies and detailed research and analysis.

Delimitations

The issue of proliferation and trafficking of illicit SALW is complex and involves all African states, with each of the subregions dealing with their particular problems. The scope of the research of this paper will be limited to the GHLA subregion, with particular attention to Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The paper will focus on the governments' efforts toward eradicating the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW. It will study all initiatives at national and regional levels with emphasis toward effective implementation of the BD resolutions.

The research will consider what other partners such as the UN, EU, IGOs, NGO's, and civic society groups' roles in this war could be. Furthermore, the study will rely extensively on information and documents resulting from declarations, seminars, workshops, agreements and protocols developed for the region.

Significance of the Study

Insecurity of any form severely hampers the economic growth of any nation, since security is essential for systematic long-term development. The impact of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in the GLHA is usually seen and experienced through human suffering. As a measure to alleviate this, much of the governments' spending is directed towards fighting insecurity along the borders and among pastoral communities as well as and in urban areas and rural towns. Therefore, any efforts by individuals,

groups of people, international, regional and national organizations, NGOs, civil society groups, and governments to combat the problem of SALW are worth studying.

This research work will assess the strategies that the subregional governments have put in place to implement the BD and the ND. It will also analyze the challenges these governments have encountered along the implementation path and how they have developed or are developing measures to overcome them. The main effort of this paper is to strategic and operational recommendations that the subregional governments can incorporate into their existing frameworks, in order to meet the objective of eradicating the proliferation, circulation, transfer and illicit trafficking of SALW in the region.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in GLHA is a problem that has beset the subregion for many years. This issue has been addressed at global, regional, subregional and national level. Many documents have been written by scholars and other interested parties regarding this issue. Regional and national institutions have held conferences, seminars, workshops and training forums all with a common agenda of alleviating this problem. Information on the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW that is available in print and electronic media cover primarily the following areas:

Efforts by the international community to help eradicate the problem of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW subregion.

The regional and subregional initiatives.

The national level programs by the subregional countries and complementary role of civil societies.

Efforts by the International Community

In the part one of the book *Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues*. Michael Klare, in his article “An Overview of the Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons,” argues that for over 30 years the international community, including the United Nations has only been paying attention to transfers of major weapons systems such as tanks, artillery pieces, military aircraft and naval warships, while remaining oblivious to the danger posed by the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW. The

end of the Cold War era changed the world order resulting in a reduction of conventional wars and the emergence of more devastating internal conflicts within states. Klare feels that this new dimension of warfare has made policy shapers pay more attention to the problems emanating from licit and illicit trading in SALW, with the bulk ending in the conflict areas in the GLHA (UNIDIR 1999, 3).

In the part two of his report entitled “Recent Trends in the Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” Klare argues that proliferation of SALW continues to fuel the widespread internal conflicts and civil wars, with the African continent suffering the worst consequences. He implies that this has contributed to increased levels of insecurity in the affected subregions and mentions some of these dangerous trends as:

The growing lethality of light weapons; the proliferation of technology to manufacture light weapons; the growing world wide dispersion of surplus arms left over from the cold war era; and the growing illicit trade in light weapons (UNIDIR 1999, 5-7).

On the growth of arms production technology, the same author states that there are 45 countries producing SALW and 22 of these are in the developing world. In Africa, the two major producing countries are South Africa and Egypt. Though most of the countries in the developing world were initially producing these weapons for their local forces, they have now turned to exporting these weapons to other African countries. Egypt is reported to have sold its locally-produced version of AK-47 assault rifle to Rwanda and many other countries. The increasing number of SALW manufacturing countries has led to the escalation of illicit trafficking of these weapons by making them easily accessible to militia and rebels to sustain their war efforts in the conflict-prone areas (UNIDIR 1999, 3).

The Regional and Subregional Initiatives

In his article “SALW in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Subregion: Challenges and Ways Forward”, Paul Eavis, the executive director of Safer World, states the strategies that the governments of Kenya and Uganda ought to adopt to curb cattle rustling, which is one of the major factors contributing to the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW within the pastoral communities of the subregion. He argues that the two states need to strategize through stringent measures and employ resources that would promote cross-border cooperation between the police forces and other government agencies. He further deplores the poor mechanisms applied by both governments in controlling movement of armed pastoralists across borders (Eavis 2002, 255).

Robert Muggah and Eric Berman, in a report entitled “A Study Commissioned by the Reference Group on Small Arms of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee,” contained in the book “Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” claimed that the issue of small arms and insecurity problems in Kenya can not be tackled without linking it to the problems the whole GLHA subregion is facing in the context of internal conflict experienced in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Muggah and Berman 2001, 10-11).

Muggah and Berman are in agreement with Paul Eavis’ argument and attribute this to the inability of the subregional governments to register any sustainable measures in controlling SALW in the hands of various armed militia groups. This, coupled with the countries’ porous borders, has contributed to the free movement of these weapons in and out of the conflict zones. It is estimated that slightly more than five million SALW are in circulation in the Horn and East African regions alone. Following the power vacuum in

Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, Somalia, has been a significant source of all sorts of SALW. Somali traders collude with international arms dealers to traffic them across the 1,200-km Somali frontier with little interference, with the Somali port of Kismayu being the point of entry for such illicit arms. In Sudan and Ethiopia, SALW are reported to be transported easily across borders by the pastoralists. Uganda runs an arms factory at Nagasonbola, about 250 km from the Kenyan border, and it is speculated that there is illicit trafficking of small arms ammunition into Kenya through unscrupulous traders or the pastoral communities, like the Karamojong (Muggah and Berman 2001,10-11).

It can therefore be concluded that the flow of SALW across the Kenyan border was massive until its recent closure and aggressive patrolling by Kenyan military forces. This action led to the defeat of the Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU) by the army of the Transitional Federal Government of Somali (TFG), supported by Ethiopian forces. Muggah and Berman further argue that IRIN's report of November 10, 2000, indicates that up to 5,000 automatic rifles could have been trafficked back and forth across the Kenyan/Somali porous borders every month. Automatic rifles such as AK-47s and M-16s with US, Chinese and Bulgarian markings have been confiscated in the major Kenyan towns near the border, such as Wajir and Garissa by the Kenyan police. Kenya operates a small arms ammunition factory in the western town of Eldoret, which was established in 1996 with foreign assistance from Belgium. According to the 1998 "Jane's Intelligence Review," the factory is capable of producing 20 million rounds per year. It is feared that some small arms ammunition from this factory might have been marketed to criminal and insurgent groups across the borders (Muggah and Berman 2001, 10-11).

In a report presented by Mr Francis Sang, the Executive Secretary of RECSA, to UNPoA in July 2006, he reported that since 2001, RECSA had at that time facilitated the convention of four ministerial conferences, all aimed at reviewing the progress of the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration. The conferences were held in August 2002, April 2004, June 2005 and April 2006, respectively. The issues addressed by these conferences were:

Approval of the common agenda for coordinated action and implementation of the UN plan across the subregion.

Adoption of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the GLHA.

The transformation of the Nairobi Secretariat on Small Arms into RECSA and its recognition as the regional coordinating body supported by the international community to effectively carry out its mandate of implementing the ND and the Nairobi Protocol (RECSA 2006). The member States of the GLHA showed their commitment by adopting a RECSA five year work plan, covering the years 2006 to 2011. They also approved its budget. The work plan focuses on three key areas, namely; organizational development, policy and research, advocacy and partnership (RECSA 2006).

National Institutions Initiatives and Civil Societies Support

A survey report, conducted by Safer Africa as an independent contribution to the European Union (EU) commission and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in support of studies leading to SALW and explosives remnants of war (ERW) policy development in the EU, observed that the political will in support of the proliferation of SALW in the GLHA is gaining strength with the subregional

governments who are signatories to the ND fully supporting the efforts of RECSA. The survey indicated an improved relationship between the subregional governments and the civil society involved in the fight against the proliferation of SALW. Respondents to the survey believed that public awareness across the subregion has increased tremendously than ever before, due to the involvement of civil societies in touch with the local populations (UNIDIR 2005).

According to the survey, the subregion has established interdependency between the RECSA and national efforts, such as Focal Points, resulting in the two levels augmenting each other in resolving the problem. The subregional level provides the national governments with the zeal to maintain the momentum while the national efforts ensure that all needs within that particular country are adequately addressed (UNIDIR 2005).

In March 2006, RECSA, SaferWorld, SaferAfrica and SRIC sponsored a subregional conference in Kampala, Uganda to assess progress made by the member states and civil societies. During the conference, it was realized that the civil society has developed several initiatives in support of governments' efforts in the war against the proliferation of SALW. In Uganda and Kenya, for instance, the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) and National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) mandated women, religious and community leaders to spearhead community programs geared towards addressing the SALW problem on the Kenya-Uganda border. Following this empowerment, the UJCC and NCCCK are currently implementing a cross-border peace-building program with the aim of combating illicit trafficking of SALW into either of the two countries. The program targets all types of leadership, from both sides of the border

including women, youth and religious groups. The program aims at identifying and training leaders to mobilize their communities in monitoring and reporting any acts of trafficking and misuse of small arms. It is also concerned with establishing a partnership between the border communities and local government and the police in tackling SALW issues together with insecurity (SRIC 2005).

The Kenya Action Network on Small Arms (KANSA) is the Kenyan chapter of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), which is a global network of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in fighting proliferation and the misuse of small arms in the world. It is aiding the government in support of its efforts to combat the issue of SALW in the country. To affirm this, KANSA's five members are represented on Kenya's NFP (SRIC 2006).

Dr. Nene Mburu, a retired Kenya army officer, in his case study "The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkana Districts: the Case for Appropriate Disarmament Strategies," argues that in the effort to combat the problem of SALW in Uganda, in 2001 the government employed the military in its strategy aimed at disarming the Karamojong ethnic group located in the north eastern part of Uganda. The group is a nomadic tribe whose livelihood depends on cattle raising and is one of Africa's most notorious tribes known for the proliferation of guns used for cattle raids from their neighboring tribes including those across the border in Kenya (Mburu n.d, 2-3).

Dr.Mburu states that there have been six attempts to force the community to surrender their weapons and therefore viewed the ongoing initiative with skepticism. The disarmament exercise planned by Ugandan government in 2001, and continuing to this date, was planned to be conducted in three phases The first phase was to deploy the

Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) to the Karamoja region to collect intelligence and coerce local leaders to spearhead the government's effort of disarmament by persuading the Karamanjong to surrender weapons voluntarily. In the second phase, the government planned to recruit a vigilante group which would continue with the disarmament program even after withdrawal of the military. The last phase would be to deploy the UPDF to carry out the disarmament tasks by force until the mission is accomplished (Mburu n.d, 2-4).

According to Dr Mburu the UPDF has achieved minimal success because the military plan targeted specific subtribes and counties without any long term strategies, and did not address either the cultural aspect or the community's historical background that led to the ethnic animosity between the Karamojong and their cross-border counterparts, particularly the Turkana of Kenya. This supports the author's believe that the problem of SALW cannot be decisively eliminated by any one country without coordinated actions with each other and particularly applying the factors of DIME. He further states that the government must address the factors that have led to the failure of the previous initiative and also involve neighboring pastoral communities of Kenya on the Sudanese border. This study suggests that before these nomadic tribes of Uganda and Kenya can be disarmed there must be corroboration between the international communities to eradicate the cartels in the international arms trade from flooding the region with SALW. Also, subregional countries need to pay attention to this problem and develop policies geared towards this war, in addition to strengthening the existing ones (Mburu n.d, 2-4).

In a BICC press release of 16 December 2002 titled “Horn of Africa: High Concentration of Small arms as a Breeding Ground for Terror” Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold claims that illicit trade in SALW is highly prevalent in the Horn of Africa subregion. An organization called Small Arms and Light Weapons in IGAD (SALIGAD), a project for Intergovernmental Authority and Development (IGAD) member countries, has initiated programs aimed at mitigating this trend. The author is of the opinion that the solution to reducing the numbers of SALW possessed by private parties and the ability to control the misuse of those held by government agencies, is the development of serious disarmament programs. Like other writers, he says that for the government to achieve any meaningful success there will be a need to identify the underlying issues and conditions that make these communities to acquire arms. Gebre-Wold, the project leader of SALIGAD, concluded by saying that: "It is necessary to establish alternatives to the use of weapons in enforcing one's interests or in dealing with conflicts--in particular in the minds of the people" (Gebre-Wold 2002).

Thokozani Thusi in his book *“The Changing Concept of Disarmament in Africa,”* argues that SALW is the biggest impediment to disarmament efforts due to their easy accessibility and handling. He gives an example of money spent to buy a modern jet fighter (about \$ 50 million) as amount that can equip a fighting force of about 200,000 with SALW at today's market rates. The easy availability, accessibility and circulation of these arms in Africa, and GLHA in particular, means that failure by the subregional governments to articulate strategies to eliminate the means and ways through which they are accessed by unscrupulous parties will continue to undermine the gains so far made in this fight. Measures to minimize the availability of illicit SALW from circulation needs

serious government involvement in controlling their sale, transfer and ownership (Thusi 2003).

The review carried out shows strong signs of success through the initiatives developed by the GLHA countries in the fight against the problem of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW. The BD set out the framework which the AU's signatory member countries agreed to implement. The BD reinforced what the ND had already initiated earlier in the year. The implementation process may appear slow due to the prevailing conflict situation in the GLHA but at the same time, it is important to underscore success thus gained despite the conditions impeding the process.

The subregional governments have continued to evaluate the achievements made and at the same time review existing norms by setting more guidelines in line with the BD and ND. These have been developed through a series of workshops conducted in 2004, 2005 and 2006. RECSA is living to its expectation as the subregional body empowered to coordinate all governments' activities in partnership with civil society, NFPs, NGOs and international organizations such as EU and UN. This coordination has enabled states to develop workable guidelines such as: SALW stockpile management; record keeping; marking of weapons collected; weapons collection and destruction procedures; control of import, export, transfer and transit of SALW; promoting public awareness through education; drawing new and standardizing legislative measures; operational capacity; mutual legal assistance and licensing private ownership, among others. It is hoped that such guidelines will harmonize legislation of SALW within the subregion to comply with a common standard.

The cordial working relationship between RECSA and the civil society is a clear sign of independence from political interference. The civil society groups have previously been complained that despite the fact that they are stakeholders in this fight and are contributing enormous resources, governments have been locking them out of the decision making processes, an issue that keeps putting the two parties in habitual conflict.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The methodology adopted when carrying out this research has been the qualitative method. The qualitative research method is defined as:

Multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials, case study, personal experience, introspective, life story interview, observational, historical, interaction, and visual texts-that describe routine and problematic moments and meaning in individuals' lives. (Denzin and Lincoln 1994).

Qualitative research method therefore involves a deeper understanding of peoples' behavior. The method relies on factors influencing various aspects of human behavior. In using this methodology, the biggest challenge encountered was the unavailability of key players in the institutions fighting the proliferation and trafficking of SALW in the GLHA subregion who could have provided vital information if they had been reached. However, despite this shortcoming, the methodology adopted still enabled the researcher to gather adequate information from secondary sources. The information gathered gives a balanced indication of the achievements made so far in the war against proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW.

Methodology

The first part of this research method will be the collection of information from primary and secondary sources. This will primarily entail a review of publicly available information including reports; official statements made by government officials to

various global, regional and national forums; concept notes made by individual researchers and writers; newspapers, journals, periodicals and books; protocols and minutes of record of proceedings during AU meetings and other related materials. Finally a descriptive analysis of the gathered information and relevant national, regional and international processes will be done to ascertain its relevance in relation to the proposed problem statement. The information contained in these materials will be further evaluated to present a broader outlook before arriving at the conclusion. This chapter sequentially presents the activities and events that were identified during the research process.

The qualitative research method used in this study adopts the following five steps as described by William Wiersma in his book “*Research Methods in Education*” (5th Edition) as identification and isolation of the problem; reviewing of information collected and developing hypothesis; collection and classification of source of relevant materials; data analysis and organization of facts into results; and formation of conclusions and synthesis and presentation in an organized form (Wiersma 1991, 8).

Lack of quantitative data, as is the case with this study, requires that a qualitative assessment be conducted to identify where gaps or shortcomings in the present system occur.

Step 1: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

Chapter 1 introduces the problem as being the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW into the African continent with a focus on the GLHA subregion of Africa. Until recently, the international community has paid little attention to the impact of international trade in SALW upon the conflict-prone regions of the world. The wake up call was precipitated by the widespread wars across Africa with devastating effects,

particularly in the GLHA subregion, due to protracted internal conflicts that have engulfed countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, DRC and Somalia. The UN is now in the forefront initiating plans, such as the UNPoA, geared towards eradicating the problem (Klare, n.d).

The challenges of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in Africa have been discussed in several forums by African leaders. The OAU heads of state meeting held in Bamako in Mali in December 2000 addressed the issue with the seriousness it deserved and developed a framework outlining sustainable measures to curb the problem. This meeting laid strategies for fighting the problem throughout the entire continent by recommending the formation of subregional organizations. In the GLHA subregion, governments had met earlier in March of that year and came up with the ND to address the challenges brought forth by the problems of illicit arms the subregion. The BD therefore only strengthened the ND's ideas (Thusi 2003).

Step Two: Reviewing of Information Collected

This study has attempted to evaluate what others have learned and written about this problem and determine their views and concepts. This enabled the research to be conducted effectively even though involvement of the stake holders involved in developing these would have been valuable. Information collected and reviewed clearly shows that adaptation of ND in November 2000, by the subregional organizations made a break-through for implementation of the BD resolutions. Establishment of a RECSA, with full compliment of a Secretariat in Nairobi, reaffirms the seriousness the countries in the GLHA have put towards eradication of the problem.

This study has revealed that at the national level, countries have established NFPs, which fall under direct control of RECSA, but are vested with the responsibility of coordinating all activities and efforts in their respective countries with the sole purpose of eradicating the problem of proliferation of SALW. During review of information collected, it was noted that many authors have given their views, concepts and recommendations which offer meaningful solutions to the success in the fight against eliminating the problem. As a result of step 1 in the process, the primary question of what strategies the three countries selected for study have put in place that can help eliminate the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the GLHA subregion has been addressed.

Step Three: Collection and Classification of Relevant Data

The data collected in the course of study is classified as follows: support by the international community to subregional and national level initiatives, involvement of the AU, regional and subregional bodies, national initiatives and support from the NGOs and civil societies groups.

Step Four: Data Analysis, Organization of Facts and Analysis of the Elements of Supply and Demand of SALW

The concept of analyzing the data collected will be based on elementary techniques with the aim of determining the strategies the GLHA subregional governments have put in place, in terms of ways and means to achieve the end-state of the eradication of proliferation of SALW within the countries' borders. The data collected will be analyzed in the following manner:

Part 1 will identify the role of the international community in the fight against the proliferation of SALW in the GLHA subregion.

Part 2 will evaluate measures taken at the regional level in implementing the BD in the GLHA subregion.

Part 3 will evaluate the effectiveness of RECSA as a subregional body mandated to steer all matters concerning illicit arms in the GLHA subregion.

Part 4 will identify the strategies subregional governments have adopted to enable them achieve their objectives.

Part 5 will use the qualitative assessment methodology to analyze the key initiatives, or “ways,” being applied in reducing the problem in the GLHA through the elements of supply and demand of SALW. This leads to an assessment of the effectiveness of the various initiatives in tracking and enforcement measures in reducing “supply” of SALW and the measure of tracking under the factor of “demand.” By doing this, the qualitative assessment will possibly identify gaps or shortcomings in the present strategy. This should clearly lead to identifying types of activities that could be used to shore up those gaps or shortcomings. The qualitative assessment will evaluate how each initiative has been able to reduce the supply and/or demand of SALW through the elements of tracking and enforcement. Each initiative will be evaluated using the values of 0, 1 and 2. The measurement of these values will be discussed in further detail during the analysis presented in chapter 4.

Step Five: Drawing of conclusions and Recommendations

The last step in the methodology will be to draw conclusions based on the evaluation and analysis of the “ways” as reflected in step four. Conclusions will be

arrived at after analyzing the effect of the initiatives (ways) the GLHA subregional governments have put in place. Finally, recommendations will be made towards developing a sustainable strategy to deal with the problem of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW.

Arrangement of Chapters

This study is organized in five chapters with each covering a particular portion of the research analysis as follows:

Chapter 1 of the research identifies and isolates the problem and provides the background of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in the GLHA.

Chapter 2 presents a review of information on the background of the subject matter and key players at the global, regional subregional and national levels. Written documents on information from the UN, AU, and several subregional organizations form part of the reviewed literature. For the subregion, more emphasis is on the ND which, through its implementation, gave birth to RECSA. This forms the basis of the research.

Chapter 3 gives an outline of the methodology adopted for the research study.

Chapter 4 will analyze the progress made thus far by the subregional governments, through various initiatives and proposed strategies, towards eradication of the problem along with the constraints affecting their success.

Chapter 5 forms the conclusion of the research study and will cover all deductions noted along. This chapter will present a recommended strategy on positive measures that would be meaningful in the fight against the problem. Recommendations on further possible research will be made as well.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter 4 analyzes the strategies devised by various key players, including the international community, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and civil society groups, all with the common objective of achieving the desired end state of the eradication of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in the GLHA subregion. This chapter will analyze the information gathered using the methodology of ends (objectives), ways (strategic concepts/courses of action) and means (resources), as taught at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, in order to ensure the strategy is coordinated and synchronized to most effectively achieve the desired end state. The analysis will be conducted in the following manner:

Part 1 will discuss how the subregion's cultural aspect impacts directly on supply and demand for SALW within the adjoining neighboring areas between Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan. It is important to understand the cultural aspect for the perceived need for SALW (demand) and how it directly impacts on any strategic initiatives in reducing the problem. Therefore, any discussion on this issue must be predicated upon the cultural environment in which the member states try to achieve the desired end state.

Part 2 will discuss the objectives (ends) that the subregional governments identified in a bid to implement the "Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa."

Part 3 will discuss the strategic concepts (ways) that were designed to ensure that the ways and means of the strategy are coordinated and synchronized to most effectively achieve the desired strategic ends. This part will further analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the “ways” in controlling the factors of supply and demand. These selected factors of supply and demand will be analyzed against the existing sub-regional initiatives such as RECSA, NFPs and NAPs resulting in a qualitative assessment evaluating the impact that both tracking and enforcement measures are having on reducing the problem of the proliferation of SALW in the GLHA. Each initiative will be scored against the measures of tracking and enforcing each scoring either 0, 1 or 2 with 0 being least and 2 as the highest score.

Part 4 will discuss resources (means) available and what resources the subregion requires to implement the “ways” which, in turn, should support the strategic concepts adopted at the subregional and national levels to enable them to achieve the strategic objectives.

Part 5 will analyze via qualitative assessment matrix the overall integration, coordination and synchronization of ends, ways and means at the subregional level in order to achieve the desired objectives of reduction in SALW. This will be done by analyzing the factors of supply and demand to identify the initiatives that either track or enforce these two factors and how successful they have been in doing so thus far.

Part I: Analyzing the Cultural Impact on the Demand of SALW

Part 2, 3 and 4 of chapter 4 will discuss and analyze the current ends, ways and means in tackling the problem of SALW in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. From that discussion, one may get the impression that huge amounts of money have been spent

shaping ways without any meaningful results. This part will analyze how cultural practices have rendered the fight against the problem of SALW much less effective among the pastoral communities of the northern and northeastern Kenya. Similar problems are encountered in Uganda and Ethiopia as the pastoral communities in the whole subregion share this common phenomenon. As Taya Weiss states:

Illegal small arms proliferation and trafficking in Africa happens in a context far removed from traditional definitions of the state and state control. Where marginalized communities form part of 'unofficial' economies, conflict easily thrives under the policy-making radar. Local peace building groups have grown as a grassroots opposing force to 'low-level' conflict, offering conflict resolution and small arms demand reduction strategies where more ambitious state-sponsored projects fail. There is currently a lack of dialogue between governments that regulate small arms and the local peace builders who reduce the demand for them, although such communication can pave the way to new forms of human security. Policy makers and donors can learn from the challenges and realities of small arms work in areas outside of traditional government control to plan interventions that fall on the spectrum between the more common supply-side regulation and emergency response (Weiss 2004).

The Culture of Pastoralism

Kenya's North Rift region of the Greater Rift Valley comprises the districts of Turkana, West Pokot, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Marakwet, Baringo, and Samburu with a larger percentage of the population practicing pastoralism. This area is characterized by socio-economic under-development and lags far behind in formal education. These districts were traditionally marginalized by the British colonial government and continue to be isolated politically and economically even after more than 40 years of independence. This underdevelopment is a result of its geographical isolation and continued insecurity resulting from traditional cattle rustling practices both within Kenya and across the borders with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The Turkana and Pokot communities, who are notorious cattle rustlers, have similar cultural practices regarding

cattle. Socially, a man is identified with the number of cattle he owns. High prices for marriage have forced men to steal in order to meet the bridal dowry which could amount to tens of cows, hundreds of goats and a few camels. Pokot customary laws prohibit one from stealing from within the community but encourages raiding other tribes, such as the Turkana. Before the 1970s, men from both communities used bows, arrows and spears for protecting their communities. As a result of the proliferation of arms, mostly resulting from civil wars in Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan, it became easy to sell cows and buy arms at very low prices. This gun culture has now been embraced by young men, who can no longer be controlled by their parents after taking over security of the communities, previously a domain for the older men. It is important to understand that these communities basically own guns not for armed violence but for economical survival. The value of a gun is counted in terms of what number of animals it can be used to capture rather than their impact on killing human beings (Weiss 2004).

The Kerio Valley Peace and Development Committee (KVPDC), a community-based organization (CBO) managed through the NCKK, is one example of a group that has been working with the Pokot community since 1996. The group has established peace initiative committees to sensitize the community on the negative impact of a gun culture. The committee works with women, youth, and elders. For such initiatives to succeed, they require substantial material support from the government or private donors in order to maintain the gains already made (Weiss 2004).

The Pokot and Turkana can be likened to the Karamajong of Uganda and the Oromo of Ethiopia as far as cattle rustling is concerned. Understanding these communities' cultural heritage and practices requires interaction with the affected people

at the local level. That is why the development of initiatives based on urban settings and making assumptions without focusing on the cultural reality of the pastoralists makes fighting against the problem of SALW much more of a challenge.

North Eastern Kenya

The North Eastern province of Kenya is a vast arid land sharing almost 700 km of border with Somalia. Like the Turkana and Pokot communities of North Rift Valley, this region was also marginalized by the colonial government making it one of the least developed areas of Kenya. The area is occupied by Somalis who have an ethnic affiliation with the Somali of Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti sharing the same culture and language. Isolated from the Kenyan government, the Somalis allied with the Somali of Somalia and started a secessionist's movement in the 1960s which, with time, generated into the Shifta (bandit) War. Though the government won by using the military instrument of power, the impact is still evident today in the number of gun violence cases encountered in the area. The colonial government established grazing boundaries for Somali clans to demarcate grazing areas as an attempt to resolve conflicts over water and grazing rights. This system was abolished after independence, perhaps due to increased population and the number of livestock which led to communities grazing freely in what would have been other clans' territories. This culturally unstructured grazing pattern continues to trigger inter-clan conflicts (Weiss 2004).

Garissa and Wajir are two border districts in the province that have continued to experience insecurity resulting from banditry and livestock raids between clans for power and control of the water and other natural resources. This problem of a gun culture was aggravated further in during the 1977-78 Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia

resulting in an arms proliferation in the region. The situation was further compounded in 1991 with the influx of Somali refugees after the collapse of the Somali government. This situation increased banditry activities such as raids, robbery with violence, highway robbery, looting, mutilations, rape and murder. To resolve these conflicts, "The Pastoralist Peace and Development Initiative (PPDI)", a local NGO, has been working with these communities to facilitate the peace and reconciliation activities in the Garissa district since 2000. The PPDI identifies the main source of inter-clan conflicts as competition for access to limited natural resources, especially water and grazing grounds, which are brought about by the perennial droughts that characterize the district. PPDI has established location-based peace and development committees that successfully negotiate for grazing rights for different pastoral groups in different livestock migratory zones (Weiss 2004). These activities help reduce the level of animosity between the groups which, in turn, reduces the chances of resorting to gun play when one group feels aggrieved or transgressed by the other.

In Wajir, the SALW problem led to the professional and business people from Wajir South forming the Wajir South Development Association (WASDA) in 1993 with an objective of supplementing the government's development activities. To improve the livelihood of pastoral communities, WASDA has identified the problem areas that need to be addressed such as animal health care, educating the communities, water and social services, resource constraints, cultural practices and the lack of policies on pastoral development (Weiss 2004). The government should work with such groups as WASDA to tackle the needs of the northeastern communities which, according to the group, would

reduce the need to keep weapons for protection. Measures to improve the quality and quantity of livestock, with clear market policies should also be considered.

The analysis of the cultural aspects of the pastoral communities has clearly shown that the problem of SALW can be eliminated only if the actors interact with and involve the stakeholders. The demand for SALW can be reduced if the fight against the problem can gain momentum at the local level with the “means” geared towards working in areas inhabited by pastoral communities who acquire weapons to protect their livestock or steal to sustain a livelihood that is highly dependent on livestock. Until this is achieved, the demand factor can not be easily reduced.

The reasons for the increased demand for SALW in the affected areas vary and are changing with time. Most of the measures being put in place to combat proliferation are biased towards the supply rather than the demand side. The strategies to reduce demand for SALW should include the social, economical, political and environmental aspects of the perceived need to own arms. Analysis of the cultural dimension in most African states will demonstrate why the use of force by government agents has been largely unsuccessful. The majority of the conflicts in Africa can be understood from the perspective of individualism, clanism, tribalism and privately sponsored militarism that form the driving power behind conflicts and war. Therefore, the actors in the fight against small arms ought to consider a balanced approach when dealing with communities such as those of Kenya’s Rift Valley whose livelihood relies on the use of SALW (Weiss 2004).

Part II: Discussion of the Objectives (ends) of Subregional Governments

Before 2000, the GLHA subregional countries were reluctant to act on the problem of proliferation and illicit trafficking and misuse of SALW until its impact rose to devastating heights. The GLHA countries began addressing the problem seriously as a block before other African subregions. The member countries, represented by foreign affairs ministers and representatives of the governments of Burundi, DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, set a good example when they met in Nairobi, Kenya on the 15th of March 2000 and signed the ND. The members agreed to draw a road map with the objective of eradicating the problem of proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in the GLHA. They realized that implementation of the ND agreements could create an environment with conditions for subregional peace and development (Thusi 2003).

Strategic Objective (Ends) of the ND

The ND formed the platform from which all the SALW issues in the GLHA subregion revolve. The member states of the GLHA subregion, along with the AU and other international community members, agreed that the availability of SALW negatively impacted on the affected states' stability and human security. Rather than identifying specific objectives, the ND made decisions touching on conflict resolution, joint cooperation in information sharing, encouragement of a common agenda, such as drafting of common laws on SALW and cooperating with the UN, IOs, NGOs and civil society to address the problem of SALW (Global Policy Forum 2000).

The ND, therefore, provided a document expressing a political intent for future actions in the GLHA subregion, but it lacked the clear strategic objectives (ends) needed

to form the basis of a sustainable framework for the member countries. The situation remained so until 21 April 2004 when the GLHA countries formed the “Nairobi Protocol (NP) for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.” The NP provided the strategic objectives required the decisions of the ND.

The Nairobi Protocol

“The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa” is an agreement that was signed by the ministers of foreign affairs and other plenipotentiaries of the states party to the ND at Nairobi, in Kenya, with the aim of reaffirming member states’ commitment to the implementation of the ND and the “Coordinating Agenda for Action.” The members realized that in order to take effective action against the problem of SALW in the subregion, they had also to address the broader issues exacerbating this problem which were identified as internal political strife, threat from terrorist activities and abject poverty. The members recommended the formulation of initiatives, such as a framework to promote democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, the rule of law and good structures for economic development. The NP observes that the inability of the subregional states to judiciously control and monitor their expansive and porous borders, coupled with inadequate immigration and customs control measures at points of entry and exit and cross border movement of disarmed refugees, complicated the matter further (SaferAfrica 2000).

According to Article 2, the first two objectives (ends) of the Nairobi Protocol are the actual strategic end states, which are to:

“(a) prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of small arms and light weapons in the subregion.

(b) prevent the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the subregion”(SaferAfrica 2000).

The remaining three stated objectives, when analyzed by the ends, ways and means theoretical framework, are actually “ways” to achieve the first two objectives.

They are:

(c) promote and facilitate information sharing and cooperation between the governments in the subregion, as well as between governments, inter-governmental organizations and civil society, in all matters relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

(d) promote cooperation at the subregional level as well as in international fora to effectively combat the small arms and light weapons problem, in collaboration with relevant partners.

(e) encourage accountability, law enforcement and efficient control and management of small arms and light weapons held by States Parties and civilians. (SaferAfrica 2000).

Therefore, analysis of the subregional strategies will be based on the first two stated objectives of the NP.

Part III: Discussion of the Strategic Concepts (Ways)

This part will analyze the concepts or “ways” that the subregional governments have put in place and the role of the international, regional and national level organizations they have cooperated with to support the objectives of the NP.

Cooperation with the International Community

More than ever before, the problem of SALW has drawn international concern after being neglected for such a long period. The bringing of the SALW issue to the fore has recently attracted various stakeholders ranging from governments, international and regional organizational bodies, IGOs, NGOs and civil society groups. IANSA takes the

initiative to coordinate and support in networking NGOs worldwide, promoting their capacity to cooperate in various fields of specialization (Borrie 2005).

Contribution of the United Nations

The issue of the proliferation of SALW was discussed for the first time in a UN meeting in a 1995 General Assembly resolution (A/RES/50/70B). The meeting established the “Panel of Governments’ Experts on Small Arms” to conduct research on the issue which the SG presented to the General Assembly via the reports (A/52/298(1997)) and (A/54/258(1999)). In their reports, the panel found out that in many cases, most of the UN system was dealing with issues related to proliferation of SALW primarily in relation to civil wars. This report became an eye opener and changed the concept of the problem entirely. The UN Security Council got involved in addressing the concerns of SALW in the GLHA subregion more than ever before (UNGA 1999, 1-2, 8). At the strategic level, these forums opened the door for multilateral cooperation which significantly became focused on the subject leading to the “UN Conference on Illicit Traffic in SALW in All Its Aspects,” held from 9-20 July 2001 in New York. The participating member states agreed to adopt the UNPoA as a show of deeper commitment to dealing with the problem (RECSA 2006).

The member states of the GLHA subregion were represented in the July 2001 UN Conference by RECSA, a body that is striving to coordinate all activities of the GLHA governments and harmonizing their progress through forums and conferences. The issues discussed at the UNPoA conference, such as stockpiling of arms, imports and exports of SALW and transfer control measures, had already been addressed by RECSA and only required an aggressive approach by respective governments to make them realizable

(RECSA 2006, 4). In line with implementation of the UNPoA, progress has been made with Kenya and Uganda successfully establishing National Action Plans (NAPs) as national coordinating agencies and all the subregional countries have managed to establish National Focal Points (NFPs) which are organizations with the purpose of coordinating resources from national to the local levels. Kenya has already developed a new national policy on acquisition, possession and use of SALW and is in the process of reviewing the country's laws on SALW (SaferAfrica 2006). The UN continues to support subregional initiatives on the problem mainly in partnership with RECSA. More discussion on NFPs and NAPs will follow later in this chapter.

RECSA

During the ND, the signatories realized that a subregional coordinating mechanism would help achieve the objectives which led to forming the Nairobi Secretariat on Small Arms and Light Weapons in June 2005. To give it more prominence the Secretariat was transformed into what it is today which is RECSA. RECSA coordinates all the efforts with NFPs within member-states with a common agenda of eradicating the proliferation, accumulation and illicit trafficking of SALW. To achieve this, RECSA needs to devise preventive and combative measures, and control of the stockpiling and illicit trafficking in the GLHA subregion. In order to build an organization with an international outlook, and one encompassing the subregional needs, RECSA developed a working relationship with subregional governments throughout Africa, the international community and donor organizations, regional and national bodies, and private sector and civil society groups in a joint venture aimed at controlling and eradicating the problem of SALW the subregion. Some of the organizations with

significant presence in RECSA activities are the United Nations' Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), EAPCCO, and the Interpol subregional bureau in Nairobi, UNAFRI and EAC, among others (RECSA 2006).

This partnership is expected to increase the prospects of improved security, enhanced development, and promotion of gender equality in addition to having an area devoid of armed violence. One way RECSA strives toward achieving its objectives is by supporting the following activities: workshops both at regional and national groups; training of law enforcement agencies; hosting and coordinating ministerial review meetings and national coordinators' meetings from states party to the ND for continued evaluation; reviewing and assessing progress of the implementation plan, and conducting public awareness campaigns through the media and printed material for distribution to the subregional governments (RECSA 2006). RECSA has succeeded in the development of "ways" at the subregional and national levels in the GLHA, but these concepts will be difficult to execute until the necessary resources (means) are made available.

The East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO)

At a regional level, the mechanisms of dealing with the SALW problem have not targeted the improvement of law enforcement approaches but instead have dwelled on politically oriented documents without any practical agenda. It was therefore realized that empowering the law enforcement agencies, such as the EAPCCO (an interregional body), with tools they require, like a communication network, would enable them to share information among member states' police as well as better working relations with the immigration and customs departments (Mc Lean 2000).

As a “way”, EAPCCO is a body that has expertise in handling matters related to criminal activities, including those related to SALW, and if its ideas are given due support and adequate resourcing by the subregional member states for implementation, the problem can be reduced tremendously.

The East African Community (EAC)

The EAC comprises the three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and plans to eventually include Rwanda and Burundi. In 2000, through its inter-state committee on security, it agreed on the need to include the EAPCCO on the committee in order to create better forums to address the problem of SALW (McLean 2000).

The EAC is an intergovernmental organization with the objectives of creating the East African Federation with a common socio-political and with economic development agenda. Sustainable development can not be achieved in an insecure environment which scares potential investors. That is why the EAC’s security committee is working with other regional bodies, such as IGAD and EAPCCO, to come up with actions that would address the problem of SALW.

The National Focal Points

Under the control and coordination of RECSA, the subregional respective governments successfully established the NFPs as national bodies to handle all matters relating to SALW in the member countries.

Kenya’s NFP was established in June 2002 and was fully operational in March 2003. The body falls under the office of the President, and is vested with the

responsibility of policy formulation, development of a National Action Plan (NAP), conducting research and coordinating activities to control the proliferation of illicit SALW. The Kenya NAP for arms management has been completed and is now transitioning into the implementation stage (RECSA 2006).

The Uganda NFP was established earlier, in 2001, and became fully operational in March 2003. Initially it was placed under the Uganda Police Force as a unit to manage the routine functioning of the Secretariat. Today, however, the Uganda NFP has developed into a multi-faceted body working under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in partnership with several government ministries and departments and various civil society groups. In February 2003, the Uganda NFP, in conjunction with civil society groups such as SaferAfrica, successfully completed a mapping exercise aimed at identifying the extent of the SALW problem in the country and managed to formulate a NAP by November of same year. Standing by its mandate, in August 2004, the Uganda NFP set the stage by burning a stock of weapons declared surplus, obsolete and or unsafe by the Uganda Armed Forces and the Uganda Police (RECSA 2006).

The Government of Ethiopia established its NFP in September 2003 and was officially launched in Addis Ababa on the 29th of September 2004 (SaferWorld 2006). Ethiopia's efforts to maintain the tempo Kenya and Uganda have reached in the fight against the problem of SALW have been hampered by the long-standing conflict with Eritrea and the problem posed by various rebel groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The three countries have achieved a milestone in establishing NFPs, which are the national bodies coordinating all activities tailored to deal with the issues of SALW, and reporting their progress to RECSA at the appropriate forums. NFPs are

initiatives established at national level but just like many other concepts, effective implementation of their plans remain to be seen due to scarcity of resources and seemingly unending conflicts which have not yet given disarmament programs a chance to bear fruitful results.

The National Action Plans (NAPs).

Apart from establishing NFPs, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya have gone a step further and developed NAPs as pilot projects at the local level and formulated “National Arms Management Policies” to offer guidelines on the implementation of NAPs. The NAPs are designed to provide a five-year framework through which respective governments are expected to take practical and realistic actions and, through prioritization of pertinent issues, establish a workable and sustainable national mechanism on SALW control. In Kenya and Uganda, NAPs are at the implementation stage with programs aimed at providing a comprehensive roadmap for remedies to the SALW menace (SaferAfrica 2005). In Kenya for instance, civil society groups derived from every province have been trained on the issue of SALW to assist the government in implementing its strategy in combating the problem of SALW. All provinces have established task forces which have already undergone training in preparation for tackling the problem (IAANSA 2006).

Uganda launched its NAP on 26 September 2005 by destroying an additional 3,000 assorted weapons. The event, which was coordinated by Uganda’s NFP, presented an opportunity for the state to explore further ways of attaining a sustainable solution to the problem of SALW (RECSA 2006).

Kenya officially launched its “National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management” on 13 July 2006. The baseline assessment presented with the plan estimated that about 2 million Kenyans, out of an estimated population of 33 million, have access to SALW. The assessment is a litmus test of the government's intent to implement control measures towards curbing the proliferation of illicit SALW in all its aspects. This document indicated that the eastern and northeastern parts of the Kenya possessed the highest number of firearms. Their easy availability can be linked to pastoral communities in the region and to cross-border movement to and from Ethiopia and Somalia. The high demand for weapons, according to the survey, is associated with the lack of capacity by the police to deal with the situation (IANSA 2006). NAPs articulate measures that individual states need to take to manage and control arms but it appears that more time is spent on management plans rather than obtaining and mobilizing resources to begin containing the circulation and transfer of arms within and across boundaries.

Problems emanating from SALW differ from one area to another and within the same country due to the different cultural reasons of their usage and availability. Due to this reason, Saferworld, in collaboration with civil society groups and government officials, is engaged with both Kenya and Uganda in conducting a detailed analysis in the quest of arriving at a workable solution to the problem at the local level. After doing this, the groups will develop implementation plans based on each country's requirements. The adopted solutions emanating from these pilot projects may be applied in other parts of the two countries requiring similar attention (SaferWorld 2006).

Part IV: The Resources (Means) Available

This part will analyze the resources (means) that the subregional member states have put in place, or projected to do so in support of the “ways” identified to achieve the strategic objective which is creating a subregion free of conflicts largely due to uncontrolled and illicit SALW. The GLHA states have tried to employ resources at their disposal to prevent the further growth in the SALW problem. However, until the establishment of RECSA, the subregional states lacked good policies and mechanisms for combating SALW issues in an integrated and synchronized manner. This was further aggravated by lack of political goodwill from member countries.

The governments of Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia have often been forced to deploy their military forces to disarm the pastoral communities. These exercises have been unsuccessful due to the intricacies of these communities’ traditions and attitude. Kenya, however, made a breakthrough when it successfully deployed the military for disarmament programs in the North Rift Valley districts in 2005 and 2006. Using military engineering assets, it initiated community and general infrastructure projects, such as water pans, and dams, schools and roads, as an assuring gesture of the government’s support to the pastoral communities in exchange for disarmament agreements. This is a way of extending the resources and services to areas largely devoid of government presence. Similarly in Ethiopia, the government continues to control the misuse of firearms in pastoral and nomadic communities where more than 80 of the country’s ethnic tribes attach their livelihood to the possession of arms. Ethiopia’s Federal Police and its military are working in a coalition to enhance border controls and prevent the illegal trafficking from across the porous borders, especially with Kenya where cattle

rustling is rampant (IAANSA 2006). In Kenya, the government introduced measures to discourage private parties from owning firearms. The government further trained civilian police reserves and armed them to protect their pastoral communities and their property. The government now finds itself handicapped in its policy of disarming pastoral communities, including the police reserves it had earlier armed. The disarmed argue that they remain vulnerable to illegally armed counterparts from Ethiopia, Uganda or Sudan (SaferWorld 2006).

The Kenyan local newspaper the “Sunday Nation,” on 11 March 2007, described a joint operation conducted in 2006 in the Rift Valley by the provincial administration, supported by the military, as one of the measures the government is taking to disarm the pastoral communities. The operation recovered 2,300 guns, the majority from Samburu herdsmen. At an average, the paper reported that the Kenya police collect 1000 guns every year and that the government has so far destroyed 12,000 guns in line with the 2000 Nairobi Protocol which stipulated that such illicit weapons be burnt to ashes and metal residues smelted. These SALW are trafficked by the former Somali military soldiers after the collapse of Somali government, which find ready markets to gangster groups operating in cities like in Nairobi’s poor suburbs. The weapons of choice are G-3 and AK-47 rifles (Sunday nation 2007). Such noble programs are, at times, slowed by retrogressive local politicians cheat the local communities that this will render them incapable of any defense against attacks from other hostile communities. If the government adopts initiatives such as increasing its services in these marginalized regions, this could change this cultural attitude of the pastoral communities. The government further needs to provide these groups with alternative sources of livelihood

and assist in establishing cordial relationships amongst themselves to stop the traditional habitual conflicts with each other and soften their hard-line stance on disarmament.

Uganda has been engaging its military in disarmament exercises focusing on the Karamoja region which, for decades, has been experiencing continuous conflicts within the community especially with its neighbors of Kenya and Sudan. To control this, the government has deployed the military and vigilantes in strategic zones within the community and along the borders in order to protect innocent population and property. The groups work with community leaders to coerce armed herdsmen into voluntary disarmament. There has been remarkable co-operation between the governments of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda in concurrent disarmament of the border tribes to prevent trafficking of arms from one disarmed zone into the other (Sabala 2004). Past operations conducted simultaneously in Kenya and Uganda yielded minimal results because the communities viewed this as a hostile act rather than for their own good. Research confirms that the Pokot and Turkana tribes of Kenya, and the Karamojong of Uganda, own weapons for survival and their livelihoods. It is therefore logical to imagine that for them to voluntarily accept any form of disarmament the governments need to guarantee them security and help provide means for the sustainability of normal life which can only be achieved through providing more government services to the local level.

The EAPCCO

The EAPCCO was established on 20 June 2000 and came into force on 21 August 2002. The body recognizes Interpol's subregional bureau in Nairobi as its secretariat. The police's knowledge and experience in dealing with the issue of SALW, especially along the notorious illegal border routes, to counter cross-border movement of drugs, stolen

vehicles and cattle, and terrorism-related activities, is under utilized. It is the same organization that should build the capacity to enforce the rule of law and regulations related to the acquisition and possession of arms (Thusi 2004). EAPCCO has been co-opted into the EAC through its security committee. This move was aimed at promoting better working relationships by developing a memorandum of understanding to link both parties with RECSA in order to form a well-linked and formidable force in combating the problems of SALW in the GLHA subregion (McLean 2000). This integration is, however, hampered by a lack of networking capacity between countries and necessary equipment to enable them to function efficiently. The cooperation between the Kenya Police and provincial administration with their Ugandan and Ethiopian counterparts in recovering livestock stolen from either of the sides has born fruit. Networking these groups will improve their efficiency and productivity.

National Focal Points

NFPs are interagency working groups mandated to coordinate representatives from crucial government ministries and departments whose functions are related to SALW in any aspect. These include; ministries of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Gender, Education, and Local Government. In addition, law enforcement agencies, such as the police, customs and immigration, are incorporated. NFPs took drastic action to recognize the potential of civil society groups and organizations in this field and, more often than not, began including them in their membership. This change has increased the impetus in handling the problem (RECSA 2006). On paper NFPs appear to have the right concepts which and if well coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with the government and civil society efforts and given the funding

required, they can achieve a lot within a given period of time. What remains to be seen is how best these agencies can use the resources they have been given to achieve the end state.

Cooperation with NGOs and Civil Society Groups

The working relationships between governments, civil society groups and NGOs, such as IANSA, Saferworld, SaferAfrica, and SRIC and others, has improved tremendously. IANSA focuses on different fields of interests ranging from disarmament and development to human rights and law. Many of these groups have a vast knowledge among diverse fields of experience which favorably augments the various national and regional initiatives, such as RECSA (IAANSA 2005). These groups' close relationship is now noticeable in the countries of the GLHA which a few years ago viewed the involvement of such parties with suspicion.

One of IANSA's key affiliates is the East African Action Network on Small Arms (EAANSA). It comprises various smaller organizations operating in the GLHA subregion with particular interest in Eastern Africa (EA). IANSA's partner organizations include, The Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), Uganda; People with Disabilities (PWD-U), Uganda; the Peace & Development Committee (PDC), Ethiopia; and the Africa Peace Forum (APFO). The latter actively participated in training programs in Kenya on the implementation of the ND through sensitization campaigns. EAANSA assists EA governments in developing independent initiatives as well as coordinating efforts that would promote human security. Civil society organizations, such as KANSA (Kenya) and UANSA (Uganda), in collaboration with international actors, have sponsored radio and television programs on the problems of SALW within their countries. In Ethiopia, the

Federal Police airs various television and radio programs aimed at educating and raising public awareness and, at the same time, establishing close cooperation between the police and the general public. The weekly programs focus on activities related to combating crime and ensuring peace and security (Ploughshares 2003). Such projects and programs, sponsored by various groups, will perhaps only in urban areas where people are literate and have access to media. The rural population is disadvantaged and requires written literature in their native language in form of leaflets to promote awareness campaigns.

The rivalry between the governments and civil society in the GLHA subregion was brokered by RECSA through NFPs, which managed to improve the relationship. Saferworld, an NGO with expertise on the SALW issue, has exploited this opportunity and is successfully working with the national institutions in the GLHA subregion. In Kenya, Saferworld is currently supporting the government's strategy in developing and implementing national programs for small arms control, community-based policing, security of citizens and pursuit of justice, and strengthening the capacity for conflict-sensitive development and resolution through community sensitization programs. Saferworld, with other partners, has developed closer working relations with the KNFP in conducting an assessment of the small arms situation nationwide and has assisted in the formulation of a "National Action Plans on Arms Management and Disarmament." Furthermore, Saferworld and its partners coordinate with the Office of the President and Kenya Police on a national community-based policing program which has attracted immense support from the communities around the country (SaferWorld 2006).

In Uganda, Saferworld's work has been tackling the proliferation of SALW and offering assistance in promoting development in conflict areas. Saferworld, in partnership

with other NGOs, development agencies, donor organization and civil society groups, has been instrumental in working with the Ugandan government on conflict dynamics programs. An example of such is the assessment it conducted on behalf of the Swedish International Development Agency on the effect of a cashew nut exporting project, in relation to continued conflict in northern Uganda, a project developed to give the community an alternative to cattle herding. Saferworld had previously conducted a similar assessment of a government rural electrification project in Uganda in 2005. Like in Kenya, Saferworld has helped the government formulate and implement a “National Action Plan on Arms Management and Disarmament”(SaferWorld 2006). The communities will need to be involved from the initial stages and educated about the processes and the benefits of such projects for them have a sense of ownership.

In Uganda, groups such as Saferworld, have also worked with government agencies, civil society bodies, donors and local communities to address the conflicts between communities and the government. They pay particular attention in assessing the impact of various development projects on the conflict in the northern part of the country and provide advice on how to make those projects community-owned with the intention of making them realize recognition by the government. Though such projects are commendable, at times, development and humanitarian programs can be counterproductive especially when the local communities are not involved from the initial stages. Pastoral communities of the GHLA are very sensitive to projects affecting their animals, such as the sinking of bore holes, without consulting all communities or clans that the project will serve. Any humanitarian agencies providing help needs to understand communities’ dynamics first or else, rather than helping to build prosperity,

this will escalate the existing conflicts between local communities over access to basic needs like water and pasture lands (SaferWorld 2006).

Saferworld's program in Ethiopia addresses the government's needs to focus on regional small arms control measures and promoting the establishment of working relations between civil society groups, government officials and donors on the important role civil society groups could play in assisting the government in the formulation of national development policies. Saferworld and its partners have developed research programs aimed at developing frameworks to attract development assistance to the government of Ethiopia and address the conflicts, especially in pastoralist communities, that keep SALW for security of their animals (SaferWorld 2006). Like in all of the subregion's countries, many groups are out to help formulate policies. The major impediment that remains unaddressed is the allocation of resources to implement them. Ethiopia is no exception to this problem.

World Vision is an NGO that has been involved in promoting traditional conflict resolution methods among warring pastoral communities along the Uganda-Kenya border. The organization estimates that there are 160,000 unregistered SALW within these communities making them some of the most armed but least developed in the subregion due to cattle rustling activities that create an unsafe environment for economic development. World Vision's objective is to promote the already established traditional conflict resolution mechanisms by developing and aiding community-based peace and conflict resolution committees through the administrative system of government from local and district levels to the national level (IAANSA 2006). World Vision is a Christian NGO that has worked with pastoral communities in Kenya for a long time and

understands the communities' needs by assisting them in solving their problems amicably. Governments should cooperate with such groups that have developed footholds in these problem areas.

Local Christian Church-based organizations have not been left out of this war either. In Uganda and Kenya, the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) and National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) have mandated women, religious and community leaders to spearhead community programs that address the SALW problem on the Kenya-Uganda border. The UJCC and NCCCK are, at the moment, implementing a cross-border peace-building program aimed at eradicating the illicit trafficking of SALW into either of the two countries. The program has proved effective because it targets community stakeholders by identifying with their leadership from both sides of the border, comprising all age groups and both genders, and religious groups who form training groups for monitoring activities related to SALW in their areas of responsibility. These Christian groups also aim at establishing partnerships between border communities, local government and the police in tackling the SALW problem (SaferWorld 2006). In East Africa, the best tool for communicating to the people is through the church. Church organizations interact with local communities better than government agencies because of a sense of mutual trust and the spiritual contract between the people and the church.

Generally the efforts of IOs, NGOs and civil society groups have realized meaningful results simply because, apart from working with the government agencies, they have contacts with the affected people and are stakeholders in the war on SALW. Now that the subregional governments have agreed to cooperate with these groups and

incorporate them in their programs, it is expected that more actions will be taken towards achieving the ends.

PART V: Analysis of the Integration, Coordination and Synchronization
of Ends, Ways and Means

One may conclude that that the GLHA subregional countries have theoretically developed a fast-track approach to combating the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in the subregion. The ND set the stage for engagements between subregional governments and cooperation with the international community, regional IGO's, NGO's and the civil society groups. The fact that all the member countries of the GLHA subregion were united by a common phenomenon to come up with the ND is a genuine indicator of their desire of finding a lasting solution to the problem of SALW.

The transformation of the Nairobi secretariat on SALW in the GLHA into RECSA and the continued support by the member countries shows their political will. This has previously been the missing link resulting in policies covering SALW being shelved away or lightly addressed. RECSA coordinates all actions related to SALW between governments and all other key players but lacks the powers of enforcement. It represents the entire subregion in all regional and international forums. In 2001, RECSA gained international recognition when it represented the subregion at the UN conference which drafted the UNPoA with a global agenda to strengthen the fight against illicit SALW. Since then, RECSA continues to cooperate with UN agencies, such as UNDDA, in supporting programs at subregional and national level.

The IOs, and NGOs such as IANSA, Saferworld and SaferAfrica, in coalition with civil societies, have developed a working relationship with RECSA and their

respective governments. With their skills and technical expertise they continue to play a crucial role in assisting the governments in formulating sustainable policies on SALW. Their particular success story is their role in the formation of NFPs in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia through the synchronization of RECSA and the recent development of NAPs in Kenya and Uganda. The GLHA countries took an early stand and developed strategies to control the age-old problem that has retarded individual governments' attempts towards establishing a secure environment for sustainable development. This initiative was motivated by the BD and boosted by the UNPoA in their agenda to support regional and subregional action plans on SALW.

This chapter analyzed some of the issues that many authors view as the key components of a strategy namely the ends (objectives), ways (concepts) and means (resources) that the subregional governments have identified to help in fighting the war on proliferation and illicit transfer of SALW in the GLHA.

The Nairobi Declaration is a document founded on political goodwill from which all SALW matters stemmed. Rather than shaping the way for further deliberations, the ND failed to provide a clear intent for decisive policies that would later be articulated in the Nairobi Protocol. The objectives laid down in the NP set the stage for the subregional governments to develop arms policies aimed at the reduction or eradication of the problem of SALW.

Truly, the subregion has well defined the ways of tackling this problem, notably the transformation of the Nairobi secretariat into RECSA, a body empowered by member states to address the problem in the entire subregion. Many IGOs, IOs, NGOs and several civil society groups came on board and helped develop many policies and implement

programs at the local, national and regional levels. After analysis of these groups' concepts, it is reasonable to conclude that since the adoption of ND in 2001, enormous resources have been spent on creating the "ways"(policies, projects, programs, protocols, accords, etc) while comparatively less been done to implement them towards combating the problem. At this stage of events, one would have expected to notice measures of effectiveness established by RECSA to evaluate what results have been realized.

It is, however, important to appreciate the efforts made by some NGOs and civil society groups that are working with people at the community level, referred to as community-based organizations. Such groups understand the cultural dimension of the SALW problem in pastoral areas where government services are minimal despite these groups' inability to function more effectively due to limited resources. It appears that winning the hearts and minds of the pastoral communities in the GLHA subregion will be one big step towards achievement of the ends, but on the ground, a lot of resources (means) need to be employed toward the effort.

The reason why little has been achieved in addressing these issues is because the subregional governments are still struggling to synchronize and integrate the resources available, such as equipping the police and the immigration departments with necessary tools for controlling border posts and within the countries, and the lack of good policies to enable the spread of government services to areas marginalized due to remoteness and insecurity and the failure to correct mistakes made in the past. Recommendations toward solving the SALW problem will be discussed in chapter 5.

The question that would linger in anybody's mind is why there hasn't been any significant success in controlling the problem of illicit small arms with these numerous

groups fighting the same war with the same objectives. The answers to this question could be many, but the issue here is that most of the “means” analyzed earlier are mostly utilized to formulate theoretical policies which lack the resources to put them into action. A lot of money has been invested in hosting forums away from those affected mostly resulting in reports which are filed without translating the “talk” into the “walk.” The practical implementation of the ND remains key to this fight but it is slowed by lack of governments’ capacity constrained by inadequate resources.

Part V: Analysis of the Overall Integration and Coordination
of the Ways and Means to achieve the Strategy’s Ends

Any systemic resolution to the SALW problem in the GLHA sub-region will require significantly mitigating or reducing both the supply and demand factors surrounding the availability and possession of these weapons. This analysis is a qualitative comparison and assessment which gives a better understanding of the application, practicability and effectiveness of initiatives so far developed to reduce both the supply and demand for SALW. These selected factors of supply and demand will be analyzed against the existing sub-regional initiatives resulting in a qualitative assessment showing the impact that both tracking and enforcement measures are having on reducing the problem. This analysis is depicted in figure 1. The qualitative assessment values assigned to each of the initiatives (ways) used in figure 1 will be 0, 1, and 2. The description of these values are:

0 = No action is being taken to track and enforce supply and demand of SALW and little to no action is being taken to impact upon the motivation (perceived need) for SALW.

1 = Minimum action is being taken and resources allocated to track and enforce supply and demand of SALW and minimal action is being taken to impact upon the motivation for possessing SALW.

2 = Considerable action is being taken and resources allocated to track and enforce supply and demand of SALW and considerable action is being taken to impact upon the motivation for possessing SALW.

For the purpose of this analysis the evaluative factors of supply and demand, as well as the sub-variables of tracking, enforcement, and motivation are defined as follows:

Supply: The degree to which the amount of SALW continues to flow into the subregion.

Demand: The level of which people in the subregion feel they must have personal access to SALW

Tracking: Programs and activities focused on identifying the origin of SALW flowing into the subregion and its locations and approximate quantities.

Enforcement: The degree to which civil authorities are present in and have the ability to apply the rule of law regarding the possession and trafficking of SALW in the subregion.

Motivation: The cultural and sociopsychological factors that influence either the real or perceived need for possessing SALW. Any effective strategy expecting to positively impact upon the reduction of SALW must address the social and cultural basis for this need by presenting viable physical security and sustainable economic alternatives to the need for possessing SALW.

Qualitative Assessment of the Initiatives (Ways)

The following will form the discussion of the analysis of the qualitative assessment conducted on each of the SALW strategy's "ways" in the form of the initiatives constructed to solve the problem. This analysis is a result of the author's assessment of levels of effectiveness for each of the initiatives.

RECSA: This is a regional body mandated to coordinate SALW initiatives and plans for implementation in the GLHA subregion. Though it has succeeded in supporting development of initiatives, such as NFPs, it lacks the capacity for either tracking, enforcement, or motivational factors to curb the supply and demand of SALW, therefore it receives an assessed value of 0 in all four aspects.

The Military: The role of the Military is defense of territorial borders but may provide aid to civil authority. Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have in the past deployed their military for disarmament programs though with some success due to the traditional culture which requires educational awareness campaigns among the pastoral communities. In the table, therefore, the military receives an assessed value of 1 in both tracking and enforcing the reduction of both supply and demand. However, due to the civil affairs programs executed by the military in building infrastructure to facilitate increased government services to the pastoral regions, they receive a value of 2 under the demand sub-factor of motivation since such projects are designed to facilitate the provision of alternative economic options which should reduce the demand for SALW.

The EAPCCO: This subregional police organization was formed to strengthen law enforcement measures through cross border coordination and cooperation within the GLHA countries. The table shows that the subregion's police forces have the capacity to

track both factors of supply and demand, receiving a value of 2 in each, but are doing little in enforcement due to the lack of good network systems, such as communication facilities, to enable them cooperate between themselves. Because of this, in the supply sub-variable of enforcement, the police have been assessed a value of 1. Their work is further hampered by lack of transport facilities and, at times, a lack of local support due the police's arrogance and unprofessional manner of handling SALW issues such as killing individuals suspected of being involved with SALW. Since the role of the police is the enforcement of the rule of law, they receive a 1 under the demand sub-factor of motivation, especially if the local populace realizes that the police could arrest them for possessing SALW.

NFPs: These interagency organizations were developed as a mechanism to coordinate and harmonize all national efforts, especially supply and demand, in addressing the SALW problem. However, at present, the NFPs' interagency structure has just been formed and has not yet become active in countering the supply and demand factors in the subregion. Thus, the NFPs do not presently have the capacity for the tracking or enforcement of measures to curb the supply of SALW nor are they yet active in impacting on tracking the demand for SALW and motivating the populace to reduce their demand for SALW. Therefore they have been assessed a value of 0 across the board.

NAPs: The NAPs are not yet fully functional action plans in Kenya and Uganda aimed at developing sustainable and workable mechanisms in tackling the problem of SALW within these specific countries. The NAPs are expected to provide substantial practical and realistic actions on handling issues of SALW. The plans are intended to be

implemented by the NFPs, which are not yet fully functional, thus can not yet be fully assessed in terms of tracking, enforcement, and motivation actions aimed at controlling supply and demand for SALW. They have therefore received an assessed value of 0 in all factors.

EAC: The East African Community is a political and economic block whose aim is to integrate the three, and potentially five, member countries' resources and economies for the betterment of their people. While in its formative stage, the EAC has only a security committee charged with coordinating security issues within member countries without an emphasis on SALW. The cooperation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania allows their police leeway to pursue illicit arms (hot pursuit) across borders. Because of this, the EAC receives an assessed value of 1 under the supply sub-factor of enforcement and a value of 0 for its lack of tracking the supply of SALW. The EAC, being still in the formative stage, has not yet taken concrete steps towards improving the economic outlook for the people in the region of this study. Thus, while the EAC conceivably will address alternative sustainable economic activities to reduce cattle rustling, at present no actions are being taken. Therefore, they receive a value of 0 for the demand sub-factor of motivation.

Private Sector Actors: The NGOs, civil society groups and CBOs are the only bodies which have shown commitments with links at the subregional, national and local levels. Due to their networking systems and direct interaction with the stakeholders, they have the ability to track both the elements of supply and demand but have no enforcement authority. As depicted in Figure 1, these bodies have received an assessed value of 2 in tracking both supply and demand. They have proved very useful in tracking

SALW, especially within the pastoral communities, during their daily interaction with the locals, a condition that the government should exploit through increased cooperation with them. Because the private sector actors have no authority to enforce laws, the value of enforcement under the factor of supply is not applicable (N/A) to them. However, these private sector actors are the primary means through which the socio-cultural motivations driving the demand for SALW are being addressed with the goal of significantly changing the local peoples' attitudes towards the perceived need to possess them. Therefore, they receive a value of 2 in addressing the motivational factors driving the demand for SALW.

Summary of the Analysis

The overall assessment is that only the military, EAPCCO, and private sector actors (NGOs, civil society groups and CBOs) have made an impact on the factors of supply and demand. The military and the police are the only “ways” that have done something to enforce actions to curb supply and demand. Since they are the nations' security forces they are the ones specifically charged with that role. The EAC received the value of 1 under the enforcement aspect of the supply factor since its members' security forces have the right of hot pursuit of those suspected of trafficking SALW. Under the demand subfactor of motivation (the level of the perceived need to possess SALW); the military receives high marks primarily for its civil affairs activities; the EAC received a value of 1 impacting on the motivation to possess SALW due to its hot pursuit policy; and the private sector actors are, at present, the key players in tracking the supply and demand of SALW and in affecting the motivational factor for possessing them. This summary is graphically depicted in figure 1.

Table 1. Qualitative Assessment Matrix of the GLHA Initiatives				
INITIATIVES	SUPPLY FACTORS		DEMAND FACTORS	
	Tracking	Enforcement	Tracking	Motivation
RECSA	0	0	0	0
MILITARY	1	1	1	2
EAPCO	2	1	2	1
NFPs	0	0	0	0
NAPs	0	0	0	1
EAC	0	1	0	0
NGOs, CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS AND CBOs	2	*N/A	2	2

Key:

0 = No action is being taken to track and enforce supply and demand of SALW.

1 = Minimum action is being taken and resources allocated to track and enforce supply and demand of SALW.

2 = Considerable action is being taken and resources allocated to track and enforce supply and demand of SALW.

*N/A = Not applicable.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions and Recommendations

The GLHA continues to suffer from the consequences of massive proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons due to an increase in unabated intra-state conflicts over the last two decades. The OAU did little to alleviate this problem from escalating into what many have referred to as “weapons of mass destruction.” Unlike the defunct OAU, the AU has recognized the reality of the matter, with each subregion dealing with specific areas through the implementation of the Bamako Declaration resolutions.

The GLHA subregion has steadily increased its effort to combating the problem in the entire subregion and particularly at the national levels. The subregional efforts were integrated into the Nairobi Declaration. The member states succeeded in developing numerous meaningful “ways” and it is encouraging to note how they have recognized the need for openness, sharing of information and co-operation with each other in all matters relating to SALW in the subregion. Through follow-on meetings subsequent to the ND, they also recognized that implementation of any meaningful programs required co-operation with IGOs, IOs, NGOs, subregional governments and civil society groups for technical advice and financial assistance. The areas that still require closer attention include the conducting of research and data collection, boosting of further working relationships between the states and civil society groups, and the increase of government services in the region most affected.

The GLHA Subregional Success

GLHA countries have taken a clear lead in the fight against the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in Africa. The success story here is that the governments of the subregion have shown definite resolve to fight the SALW problem. This is manifested in the various initiatives individual countries have developed, such as NFPs and NAPs, toward the achievement of the end state. Particularly encouraging is the role that private sector actors are playing in tracking of SALW and in addressing the motivation for the perceived need to have them.

Somalia has been the source of most weapons used by illicit parties engaged in crime in the subregion, with Kenya and Ethiopia suffering the heaviest toll. It is believed that approval by the UN Security Council, in February 2007, to support the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping force to Somalia, to be followed later by a UN force, would lead to a secure, stable and peaceful country. This would create a conducive environment for the disarmament of the many warring factions thus boosting the war against proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW into the neighbouring countries.

The subregional governments have committed enormous time and resources to maximize their support for the disarmament process. The states party to the ND have held a series of meetings meant to evaluate the achievements made and identify the shortcomings for further review which would lead to formulation of acceptable timelines and benchmarks in line with the ND and the NP.

Recommendations resulting from the Assessment of the Subregion's Initiatives

RECSA: The formation of RECSA, in 2001, is a real success story in that it is the strategic body aimed at coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the strategy's

“ways.” This body has gained global recognition in its strategic role making it credible to attract further financial backing from international bodies such as the UN, the EU, NGOs and regional bodies under the auspices of the AU. RECSA stands as an independent body relatively absent of political influence and is fully supported by all member states, a situation that enables it to effectively discharge its duties. Within its mandate, RECSA coordinates all subregional governments’ NFPs and assesses their plans and activities before disbursement of financial support. The body further boasts of softening the hard-line stance of member states against involvement of the civil society groups into its programs. RECSA needs to establish clear measures of effectiveness in order to assess the degree of success it is achieving to meet the strategic ends.

The Military: When all the measures are put in place, the military may be called to conduct joint disarmament programs with neighboring countries. For this to succeed there should be government representation on the ground immediately to provide the lacking services in order to eliminate the recurrence of demand.

EAPCCO: To make the police more effective, there is urgent need to enlarge the force and revamp it with necessary personnel, equipment and better means of transport and communications needed to enable them to act effectively and build confidence with the communities they work with for their success.

NFPs: Conceptually, NFPs are similar to interagency working groups where people are attached to them as the situation dictates. In order to make the NFPs more effective personnel must be permanently assigned to them as their primary duty.

NAPs: With the plans being pilot projects in Kenya and Uganda, it is too early to conclude whether they will prove effective in enabling other actors in tracking or

enforcing the factors of supply and demand. The expectation is that with adequate resources and focused direction, the policies and plans emanating from the NAPs will be effective in reducing the problem of SALW.

The EAC: Once in full operation, the EAC will be required to empower all government departments and national initiatives to be engaged in tracking and enforcement of measures to reduce supply and demand without border limitations. It is hoped that the EAC, as a subregional body, will provide more resources for enforcing the laws regarding the possession of SALW as well as tackle the perceived economic need for possessing SALW with alternative economic development programs.

Private Sector Actors: NGOs and Civil Society Groups and CBOs presently are the most effective actors in the war on SALW. Local church groups have been working with local communities and traditional pastoral groups who view the concept of holding guns as a cultural imperative and not an illegal act. International and regional NGOs, have assisted governments in the GLHA subregion in developing guidelines expected to synchronize and harmonize legislative procedures governing the trade, possession and use of SALW within the subregion. In this fight, the civil society groups have proven to be an instrument of change. The experience, expertise, capacity, diversity, and enthusiasm of the groups' participants auger well for the implementation of follow-up steps at the national, subregional, continental, and international levels. Information and lessons learned are shared through the newly created national and regional small arms networks, a situation that has helped donors understand the level of resources needed for success. The confidence developed in such groups will lay a firm foundation for future government and civil society groups' engagement on small arms issues and, more

specifically, on concrete efforts to implement the ND. In the qualitative assessment matrix, they have received a maximum assessed value in terms of tracking both supply and demand. Greater efforts need to be made in coordinating the activities of the private sector actors with governmental actors without jeopardizing the private sectors' neutrality.

The Way Forward

The member states of the GLHA subregion have resolved to cooperate in an effort to promote programs aimed at the eradication of SALW in order to foster economic and human development. Chapter 4 analyzed the strategies in place and the reasons why the outcome of the fight is going unnoticed. Though the ND does not have clear-cut “ends,” at least it identifies decisions that set the conditions for further exploitation leading to the setting of sustainable objectives through the Nairobi Protocol. To achieve the “ends,” several “ways” and “means” have been developed by various proponents. The challenge to their success has, first of all, been the lack of overall substantial tracking and enforcement mechanisms due to poor integration and synchronization of the strategy's objectives (ends) with the “ways” and “means,” and secondly, no real effort at providing viable economic alternatives to cattle rustling.

The issues that the subregion most needs to address are the complex reasons behind the demand for SALW. There is urgent need for the understanding the cultural aspect of keeping arms for the protection of the pastoral lifestyle and culture and the impact on the development in the areas where these pastoral communities live. There is a common phenomenon in the whole subregion with marginalized zones where government services are limited or virtually non-existent. The GLHA governments must

commit more resources toward increasing their presence in these areas to instill in the people the concept of being members of a larger society and the nation within which they reside. This can be done through the extension and provision of essential services including security. Failure by the governments to correct the mistakes made by the colonial governments regarding the arid and semi-arid areas continues to erode the communities' confidence in the governments forcing the inhabitants to take the law into their own hands leading to the acquisition of weapons for the protection of their property.

Governments in the subregion should mobilize all relevant national instruments of power (DIME) as resources which, if well coordinated and synchronized, are likely to achieve the desired end state. It ought to be understood that without eliminating the culture of cattle rustling, the demand for SALW and their supply will not be mitigated.

This study realized that there are adequate strategies in place but the challenge is lack of resources to achieve them. The GLHA governments need to address the circumstances leading to increased demand for SALW despite numerous ways devised to fight it. As a result of this research it is clear that the strategies' (ends and ways) are sufficient. What is needed is the provision of more resources (means) to allow the ways to achieve the strategic ends.

Recommendation for Future Study

A further study is therefore recommended to expand this analysis to the entire GLHA subregion proper including the countries of Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and the DRC.

ILLUSTRATIONS



Figure 1. The Geographical Location of GLHA Subregion in Africa
Source: <http://www.iss.co.za/ASR/12No2/Content.html>. Accessed on 14 May 2007.



Figure 2. The Geographical Location of GLHA States
Source: <http://disarmament.un.org/update/mar2000.pdf>. Accessed on 21 March.



Figure 3. Recovered SALW in Kenya before Burning in June 2005
Source: <http://www.recsasec.org/kenya.htm>. Accessed on 17 March 2007.



Figure 4. Burning of Illicit SALW Recovered in Uganda in September 2005
Source: <http://www.recsasec.org/uganda.htm>, accessed on 17 March 2007.

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