POST-9/11 EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD’S ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

by

Colonel Matthew A. Raney
United States Army National Guard

Professor Bert Tussing
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**  
Post-9/11 Evolution of the National Guard’s Role in Homeland Defense

**6. AUTHOR(S)**  
Matthew Raney

**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**  
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**  
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
<th>19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>Same as Report (SAR)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The United States' strategy to defend the homeland has been evolving since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Not only have the terms used to describe this strategy changed, so have the roles and responsibilities of many of the institutions tasked with executing the strategy. The Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) are two examples of a radical organizational shift in strategy. In other instances, the implementation of change has been somewhat slower, such as in the case of the National Guard. One of the most notable changes in the National Guard has been its shift from a Cold War era strategic reserve to its current role as an operational reserve. But there have been other changes in the manner in which the National Guard operates. The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine some of the post-9/11 recommendations to increase, enhance or change the National Guard's role in homeland defense and civil support, to review steps actually taken by the National Guard to improve its homeland defense/civil support capabilities, and to illustrate the disparity between what the experts have said should be done and what the National Guard has actually done.
During the past five years, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States’ strategy to defend the homeland has been evolving. Not only have the terms used to describe this strategy been changing, so have the roles and responsibilities of many of the institutions tasked with executing the strategy. Created in 2002 in response to the terror attacks, the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) are two examples of a radical organizational shift in strategy. In other instances, the implementation of change has been somewhat slower, such as in the case of the National Guard. One of the most notable changes in the National Guard has been its shift from a Cold War era strategic reserve to its current role as an operational reserve in the Global War on Terrorism. But there have been other changes in the manner in which the National Guard operates. The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine some of the post-9/11 recommendations to increase, enhance or change the National Guard’s role in homeland defense and civil support, to review steps actually taken by the National Guard to improve its homeland defense/civil support capabilities, and to illustrate the disparity between what the experts have said should be done and what the National Guard has actually done.

In order to understand post 9/11 recommendations to alter the National Guard’s role in homeland defense, it is necessary to briefly examine the direction U.S. homeland defense policy has taken over the past five years. Less than a year after the terrorist attacks, in July of 2002, the Bush Administration published *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*, which cited the following three specific homeland security objectives: to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. A few months later in February 2003, the Administration adopted a *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the primary purpose of which was to focus on identifying and defusing terrorist threats before they could reach the borders of the United States.

Two years later, in March 2005, the Department of Defense published *The National Defense Strategy of the United States*, which provided the military component of the two strategies cited above. In this document, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the United States would focus “military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward, and layered defense of our nation, our interests, and our partners.” The Secretary pointed out that to adopt a “reactive or defensive approach would not allow the United States to secure itself and preserve our way of life as a free and open society.” Therefore, the strategy
called for the establishment of a layered defense, but with the main U.S. defensive effort being placed well forward in order to defeat terrorists outside of the United States. Defensive measures were also to be taken inside the United States. The strategy states that,

At the direction of the President, the Department will undertake military missions at home to defend the United States, its population, and its critical infrastructure from external attack….In emergencies, we will act quickly to provide unique capabilities to other Federal agencies when the need surpasses the capacities of civilian responders and we are directed to do so by the president…6

To accomplish this, the Department of Defense planned to do the following:

At home, we are increasing the capabilities of our domestic partners local, state, and federal, to improve homeland defense. This Department seeks effective partnerships with domestic agencies that are charged with security and consequence management in the event of significant attacks against the homeland. In doing so; we seek to improve their ability to respond effectively, while focusing the unique capabilities of this Department on the early defeat of these challenges abroad.7

As the strategies for homeland security and homeland defense evolved, so too, did their associated terminology. However, when defense writers and the various think-tanks began writing about homeland defense requirements shortly after 9/11, the terminology had not been clearly defined. For this discussion there are three terms-- homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support, which must be understood. In June 2005, the Department of Defense published its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which not only defined these terms, but also stated who is responsible for executing them. The document reads as follows:

Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency for homeland security….Homeland defense is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. The Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense….Defense support of civil authorities, often referred to as civil support, is DoD support, including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.8

A More Comprehensive Homeland Defense Role for the Guard: The Heritage Foundation

Just a few months after the terror attacks of 9/11, defense analysts, think-tanks, and various writers began to postulate on what the National Guard’s role in homeland defense, also
referred to at the time as homeland security, should be. Two members of the Heritage Foundation, Jack Spencer, a Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security, and Dr. Larry Wortzel, a prolific author and expert on intelligence, national security and strategy, were some of the first to advance their ideas about what steps the National Guard should take to provide a more comprehensive homeland defense and civil support capability. Writing in April, 2002, they pointed out that during the 1990s, as a result of force reductions, the active U.S. Army and Air Force had become increasingly dependent upon the National Guard. In addition, due to its presence in local communities and the large numbers of policemen and firefighters in its ranks, the National Guard was amply qualified to serve as a first-responder and to assume the lead military role in homeland security. Therefore, Spencer and Wortzel recommended that the federal government should do the following:

- Formally refocus the mission of the National Guard on homeland security as a major mission;
- Take steps to make service in support of homeland security equal in respect and benefits to service abroad;
- Provide adequate funding for homeland security;
- Ensure that the Guard’s State Area Commands administer homeland security missions;
- Provide adequate funding for the active services to assume the combat support services now performed by the Guard; and use the Guard’s resources wisely.

Spencer and Wortzel argued that as long as the National Guard’s primary mission was to support the active component in its wartime mission overseas, the National Guard would not be available to defend the homeland. Furthermore, if the National Guard continued to support the active component overseas, then the active component would never expand its capabilities to be able to execute its wartime mission without significant assistance from the Guard.

Brinkerhoff and the Homeland Defense/Civil Support Brigades

Colonel John Brinkerhoff, U.S. Army (retired), served as acting associate director for national preparedness of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) from 1981 to 1983. Writing in May 2002, Brinkerhoff expressed his belief that, a “comprehensive way to meet the demand for military and police forces for both waging war overseas and defending the homeland needs to be found.” He pointed out that during the Cold War, in the event of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, military plans called for the entire National Guard to be
mobilized to support the U.S. Army overseas. Therefore, according to Brinkerhoff, since under these circumstances the National Guard would not be present in the United States, “it was not contemplated that the Guard would have a role in homeland security.”

Brinkerhoff considered several options, the first of which was to limit the National Guard to what he referred to as its original militia role. Under this scenario the Guard would give up the federal piece of its dual status mission and work exclusively for the states. It would be reconfigured into a constabulary force of 500,000 and would give up its federal mission of augmenting the active Army and Air Force during time of war. Instead, the National Guard would focus exclusively on homeland defense and civil support missions within the respective states. Although pointing out that this option would eliminate what he believed to be the complexities of state and federal dual status, Brinkerhoff found this solution to be not only politically unacceptable but militarily unfeasible, since not only the National Guard but the Army Reserve and the active Army would be unready for combat during the lengthy transition to this system.

Brinkerhoff then considered the possibility of restricting the National Guard exclusively to its federal role, which he quickly found to be unacceptable because it would leave the governors of the 54 states and territories without the approximately 450,000 state personnel needed to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions. His third option would be to double the size of the National Guard, adding an additional 500,000 National Guardsmen to the 450,000 already in existence and dividing the organization into two entities; one which would be restricted to supporting the federal mission, and the other, which would provide the state governors with a homeland defense and civil support capability. He found this option to be impractical due to recruiting and funding challenges. Different standards between the two organizations would result in one element being perceived as superior to the other and therefore less desirable to potential recruits, and one organization would doubtless receive more funding than the other, causing an even greater rift.

Brinkerhoff’s fourth solution was a hybrid of the first three. Under this solution, the strength of the National Guard would be increased by 50,000 soldiers and airmen, from which each state would organize a homeland defense/civil support brigade consisting of from 500 to 1,500 soldiers and airmen to be used as a rapid response force. These specialized forces would be dedicated to the homeland defense and civil support mission only and would provide four functions. First, they would form a command and control headquarters which would control operations and allocate resources. Second, they would provide a rapid response force of approximately 200 soldiers which would be required to arrive at the disaster site within two
hours of notification. These soldiers and airmen would conduct damage assessments, make recommendations regarding additional force requirements, and conduct RSOI operations (Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration). Lastly, these troops would provide command and control for a force of 500,000 State Guard volunteers that would be mobilized as necessary to deal with specific disasters. Brinkerhoff argued that these dedicated homeland defense/civil support forces would always be available and could work closely with municipal, county and state agencies to prepare disaster response plans.18

The Rand Study, and the Question of Funding

The Rand Corporation published its comprehensive study on Army Forces for Homeland Security in 2004. The study opened with a definition of homeland security, or HLS, which it defined as “activities in support of civilian organizations in domestic emergencies, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and civil disturbances.”19 This is but one example of the evolution of terminology during the past five years. By today’s standards, the Rand definition of HLS refers to a combination of homeland defense and civil support. At any rate, the study made several recommendations pertaining to the National Guard. One of these was that the Army should support legislation designed to allow DoD to fund the National Guard to conduct homeland defense and civil support activities.20 The study presented a scenario in which much of the Army, the Army Reserve and the National Guard were serving overseas. At this juncture, it suggested that the Army’s response might be to make the National Guard responsible for homeland defense and civil support and to have the Guard create civil support battalions (CSBs) consisting of 900 soldiers and organized into ten regions across the United States.21 Each of these CSBs would be capable of responding to emergencies within 18 hours of notification and would be trained to conduct a fairly complex array of tasks, such as engineering support, search and rescue, and emergency medical care. Additionally, in responding to emergencies too large for the CSBs to handle alone, the battalions would establish the command and control organization for follow-on units.22

CSIS: Backing Away from Title 10 and Organizing for Regional Support

The most recent and in-depth study on the future of the National Guard was headed up by Christine Wormuth and produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in July of 2006. This study made several general observations. One of these was that although the authors agreed with the National strategy to develop an active, layered defense, a part of the defense was missing. They pointed out that the technology required to secure thousands of miles of border and shoreline, and to identify and interdict those who might be bringing weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs) into the United States, either does not yet exist or is lacking and will not be available for fielding for at least another ten years. Therefore, according to the study, at least in the short-term the United States should focus more effort on preparing to respond to catastrophic events.\textsuperscript{23} Another observation can be found in the study’s opening remarks, where the authors level criticism at the Department of Defense for not embracing its civil support mission to the degree they believe it should. The study recommended that:

DoD needs to accept civil support as a central mission and act accordingly. Almost five years after the September 11 attacks, DoD continues to hold the civil support mission at arm’s length. If protecting the homeland is really the top priority, DoD needs to start planning, programming and budgeting for the mission.\textsuperscript{24}

According to Wormuth and Company, the National Guard can and should provide the homeland defense and civil support capability that, according to the study, is currently lacking. The study recommended that the National Guard reduce to some degree its traditional support for Title 10 conventional campaigns, but that it should remain multi-mission capable. Reducing its emphasis on the Title 10 federal mission would enable the Guard to focus more attention on homeland defense and civil support. In short, the study found that it is time for the National Guard “to move beyond the historical focus on fighting ‘the big war’, and place more emphasis on missions like stability operations and homeland defense and civil support.”\textsuperscript{25}

As noted by the CSIS study, there are some problems associated with the National Guard backing away from its Title 10 role to any degree at all. At a time when the U.S. Army is calling for Congressional support to “assure access to our reserve components,”\textsuperscript{26} doing so may not be an option. The CSIS study points out that DoD does not want its access or its ability to utilize the National Guard in a Title 10 status reduced. At the same time, according to the study, the National Guard does not want its Title 10 role reduced either, fearing that doing so would result in substantial cuts in federal funding and equipment.\textsuperscript{27} In spite of this, most of the study’s recommendations require that either the National Guard’s Title 10 role be reduced or the National Guard be given additional resources.

One of the key recommendations made by the CSIS study called for the Department of Defense to

At a minimum…resource and organize the National Guard to serve as the backbone for ten regional Civil Support Forces that would be responsible for regional planning, training, and exercising and would be able to deploy initial response forces rapidly to the scene of an event.\textsuperscript{28}
These Civil Support Forces, or CSFs, would consist of two elements—the headquarters and the Civil Support Force. Although the study doesn’t go into great detail about how these elements would be manned and organized, it does provide a general outline for what these elements do.

Each of the ten CSF headquarters would be created by dual-hatting the existing National Guard Joint Force Headquarters located in the ten states in which the regional FEMA headquarters are located. These CSF headquarters would develop regular working relationships with the FEMA regional headquarters and would be responsible for the preparation and execution of plans, the training of CSF units, and the conduct of homeland defense and civil support training exercises. In the event of a disaster, the CSF headquarters would provide initial communications, establish command and control and conduct Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) for follow-on units.29 The study does not say whether the headquarters element would consist of full-time or traditional part-time National Guardsmen, or a combination of the two.

The states within each of the ten FEMA regions would provide the traditional M-Day30 units that would constitute the Civil Support Force. These units would rotate in and out of the Civil Support Force early in the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model queue, spending one year in the cycle, training and preparing to respond to catastrophic incidents. During this time, these CSF units would not be eligible for overseas deployment.31 Under normal circumstances those units assigned CSF duty would fall under the command and control of their respective state governors. During a crisis, the regional CSF headquarters would design the CSF force based on the size and nature of the catastrophe. Working with the respective state governors, the CSF headquarters would request the CSF units required by utilizing the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).32 Finally, according to the study the CSF force, tailored to respond to a specific crisis, would be capable of deploying to the disaster site within twelve to twenty-four hours.33 According to CSIS,

The CSFs would provide a dedicated capability for catastrophic response that is grounded in the federalist system, they would not turn the National Guard into an exclusively homeland defense force, permanently focus certain units only on homeland defense, or break the overseas rotation base.34

The View of the National Guard Bureau

Having conducted an examination into some of the recommendations made by homeland defense experts and defense think-tanks interested in the National Guard’s role in homeland defense and civil support, it is now time to look at what changes the National Guard has actually adopted since September 11, 2001. In order to set the stage for this examination, it might be
helpful to look at what some of the senior leadership of the National Guard have said about this transition.

In his 2007 National Guard Posture Statement, Lieutenant General Steven H. Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, said that “The National Guard has undergone a total transformation in the past few years. The once ponderous Cold War strategic reserve transformed itself into an agile, lethal operational force capable of joint and expeditionary warfare—a uniquely flexible force simultaneously capable of responding to a broad range of civil and humanitarian crises.”

Unfortunately, in spite of this transition the National Guard is experiencing significant problems. According to LTG Blum,

The Guard—with the exception of those units mobilized for war—is still underresourced for many of the missions it now performs. Army Guard units in particular remain manned at Cold War levels, lack a robust cadre of full-time support personnel, and are equipped well below wartime requirements.

So, for the present, those units serving overseas, well forward in the layered defense are fully manned and equipped. However, on the domestic front, although the Guard may be suffering from manning issues, a far more serious problem centers upon equipment shortages. At present, the Army National Guard has less than 35 percent of the equipment needed to perform its wartime mission. And, according to LTG Blum, this domestic equipment shortage has already had an impact on the Guard’s ability to provide civil support here in the United States. “The Guard, since September 11th, has been well equipped for its overseas missions….The response to Katrina, however, revealed serious shortcomings in the equipping of Guard units for Homeland Security and Defense.”

The preceding paragraph touched on the National Guard’s ability to provide a domestic homeland defense and civil support capability. But to what degree does the National Guard want to be involved in the homeland defense and civil support mission? Although his views might be representative, while not speaking officially for the leadership of the National Guard Bureau, one senior officer in the Bureau summed up his views on the National Guard’s roles and responsibilities where homeland defense and civil support are concerned. When asked his opinion on the findings of the recently published CSIS study, which called upon the National Guard to remain multi-mission capable while pulling back somewhat from its Title 10 federal role in order to focus more effort on homeland defense, the officer responded:

I really have trouble with that. Where do we get the money for a single-focus force? Who is smart enough to come up with the next mission set? You are only going to get resourced if you stay under the Army umbrella. We’re not interested in being anything but inside the Army. We are not pursuing a homeland defense mission.
Fortunately, in spite of such challenges, the National Guard has taken steps over the past five years to improve its homeland defense and civil support capability.

Shortly after the terror attacks of September 2001, National Guard Bureau mandated that each of the states begin transitioning their State Area Command (STARC) Headquarters and their Air Guard State Headquarters by combining the two headquarters into a single Joint Force Headquarters. In a briefing in October of 2004, LTG Blum explained that this action was taken so that we can leverage the capabilities of both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard and find a way to pull in, in a very collaborate and synchronized way, the capabilities of the Navy and the Coast Guard for homeland defense and response to weapons of mass destruction events here at home.40

LTG Blum explained that these new joint headquarters were to be capable of providing "command-and-control, communications, computers, intelligence fusion, analysis, information sharing, surveillance, [and] reconnaissance of their local areas."41 And finally, that each of the state Joint Force Headquarters were in effect, ...a tactical joint task force capable headquarters that is able to manage the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, Coast Guard active duty, reservists or National Guard, or all in combination, if necessary, to include interagency and intergovernmental responders to whatever incident may be in each one of these states or territories.42

In a memo dated 14 July 2003, under the subject heading “Joint Force Headquarters—State Transformation Guidance,” LTG Blum assured the Adjutants General of the various states that The Directors of the Army and Air National Guard and I agree that this is not simply an act of changing office symbols. The mid-range goal of this process is to achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC) of each JFHQ-State within 3 years, to include doctrinally sound joint operations performed by JFHQ-State based on formally approved joint manning documents and joint duty positions.43

Four years later, in his National Guard posture statement for 2007, LTG Blum stated that the most important transformational changes the National Guard had adopted since the terror attacks of 2001 had been the establishment of these state Joint Force Headquarters.44

A View from the Guard Outside of the Bureau

Perhaps not surprisingly given their mission, there are some problems associated with these Joint Force Headquarters. Unfortunately, when the National Guard Bureau mandated the establishment of the Joint Force Headquarters, it did not provide any additional manning for the joint staff. According to the Chief of Staff of the Kansas Army National Guard, “National Guard Bureau did not provide any additional TDA [Table of Distribution and Allowances] positions to
man the Joint Forces Headquarters. They simply put the Army and Air together and called it joint."45 This begs the question, "Where do the joint staff officers come from?" To a large degree the answer lies in the dual-hatting of staff officers. Again, the Chief of Staff noted above stated that in his state,

The J-6 is the DOIM (Director of Information Management) who does Army and Air, but mostly Army as each Wing has an IM (Information Management) officer. We designated the DOMS (Director of Military Support) as the J-3 DOMS. The G-3 does Army military operations, and the J-3 DOMS does domestic. When we have a major operation the G-3 puts on a J-3 hat and engages as an operations officer.46

There is no question that dual-hatting within the Joint Force Headquarters is required. In fact, National Guard Bureau’s "Joint Force Headquarters—State Implementation Plan," states that "In addition to functional responsibilities, joint staff members may be assigned as a ‘dual-hatted’ joint staff member and would be responsible for multiple roles within the functional area."47 When asked his views on his state’s Joint Force Headquarters, MG Tod Bunting, Adjutant General of Kansas, stated that,

The biggest issue pertaining to our Joint Force Headquarters is that it is still all but totally unfunded. Much of our Air National Guard presence is because we leaned forward and have taken eight full-time positions out of hide. Most states have not done so. National Guard Bureau needs to deliver on this mandate. It is the right thing to do, it is working and getting better every day here, but it is time to resource this transformation.48

Although not a post-9/11 initiative, the National Guard has made great strides since September 2001 fielding teams trained specifically to assist with the consequence management of a weapon(s) of mass destruction. In 1998, President Bill Clinton called upon the Department of Defense to create ten teams trained to deal with the increasing threat of chemical, radiological or biological weapons of mass destruction. The National Guard began the process of manning, training and equipping what were originally called RAID teams (Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection), which have since become known as Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) upon authorization by Congress in 1999.49 Since that time, the National Guard has been authorized a total of 55 WMD-CSTs, of which 34 are now fully manned and certified as trained.50 The mission of the WMD-CSTs is to support local and state authorities at domestic WMD/NBC incident sites by identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures and assisting with requests for additional military support.51
At least one of these teams is authorized in each state or territory, and they are manned by twenty-two National Guardsmen. The teams have already proved their value in times of crisis: 18 CSTs provided personnel and equipment that were vital to the National Guard response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These teams conducted assessments of contamination levels remaining after the floodwaters receded. They provided critical communications and consequence management support to local, state, and federal agencies. Most importantly, they provided advice and assistance to the local incident commanders that dramatically impacted the recovery effort.

Only alluded to above, it should be noted that one of the most powerful tools possessed by these teams are their Unified Command Suite (UCS) communications system, which enables different communications systems to talk to each other, making them interoperable. This capability helps obviate one of the most serious problems encountered during interagency operations. Although currently barred from service overseas by Congressional mandate, “the National Guard is working to change legislation to allow CSTs to support military operations overseas.”

Another step taken by the National Guard has been to initiate a program known as the Critical Infrastructure Protection-Mission Assurance Assessment (CIP-MAA). According to the National Guard Bureau website, the mission of the CIP-MAA is to “conduct all-hazard risk assessments on prioritized Federal and State critical infrastructure in support of the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP).” However, the National Guard 2007 Posture Statement says that the MAA detachments conduct vulnerability assessments of Department of Defense (DoD) critical infrastructure, and that they are designed to help educate civilian agencies on protection and emergency response techniques, and to develop relationships between the National Guard, first responders, and owners of critical infrastructure. The CIP-MAA detachments are made up of two teams consisting of six soldiers and six airmen specialists. Each team has a mission analyst, an electrical specialist, a transportation specialist, a water and HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning) specialist, a communications specialist, and a Petroleum, Oil and Lubrication (POL) specialist. There are currently a total of six of these detachments; one each in six of the ten Federal Emergency Management (FEMA) regions. National Guard Bureau plans to train and equip four more teams which will be allocated to the four remaining FEMA regions.

Another new National Guard homeland defense/civil support unit is the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package, which is better known by the acronym “CERFP”. These teams are composed of four elements; search extraction, decontamination, medical, and command and control. Existing
engineer units provide the soldiers for the search and extraction element, and chemical units provide the manning for the decontamination element. Finally, National Guard medical units provide the personnel for the medical element of the CERP. The teams are "designed to provide a regional capability to locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform medical triage and treatment, and conduct personnel decontamination in response to a weapon of mass destruction event." In the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act, Congress approved the creation of an additional five CERFP teams, thus bringing the total to seventeen. The twelve existing teams consist of 100-125 personnel, and at present, one CERFP is located in each of the ten FEMA regions.

The Army National Guard is not alone in providing special units or systems which provide a valuable homeland defense or civil support capability. The Air National Guard began fielding an air-transportable field hospital which provides a tremendous homeland defense/civil support capability in 2002. The soft-sided hospital is called the Expeditionary Medical Support, or EMEDS. Its mission is to provide an air-transportable, self-contained hospital which, once deployed, can be used to stabilize critically injured patients so that they can then be evacuated to a fully-functional hospital. In addition,

The hospital is modular and can be expanded or reduced in capability as the situation dictates. The EMEDS has an emergency room, a family practice clinic, a flight surgeon, physician’s assistants, an intensive-care unit, a dental clinic, respiratory therapist, anesthesiologists, operating room, a pharmacy, supply room, a laboratory, radiology department, bioenvironmental and public health teams, and surgeons that can perform orthopedic and general surgery.

In its normal configuration, EMEDS provides beds for ten patients. However, one of the twenty-five bed versions of EMEDS, or EMEDS+25, has been programmed for fielding to each of the ten FEMA regions. The hospitals have been deployed during Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.

The Joint Force Headquarters, WMD-CSTs, CIP-MAAs, CERFPs and EMEDS are all small, specialized units that provide valuable capabilities but do not provide the manpower needed to deal with a major homeland defense scenario or civil support operation. In an effort to provide a sizeable conventional military force capable of quickly providing an initial response to a crisis, LTG H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, directed the State Adjutant Generals to organize rapid reaction forces, referred to by NGB as National Guard Response Forces, or NGRFs. According to National Guard Bureau’s IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 04-01, dated 21 September 2004, all states should

...prepare and maintain a NGRF task force capable of responding/assisting in the protection of critical infrastructure and other state, national assets, or any
other missions as directed to promote stability and security in the states/territories and our nation within existing fiscal resources.  

LTG Blum’s intent, as stated in the aforementioned plan, was for each state and territory to

…plan, establish and maintain a rapid reaction NGRF capability (up to 500), utilizing existing units/personnel, capable of responding (departing assembly area) within a four (4) to eight (8) hour window…with an initial force of 75-125 personnel based on available state structure. A follow-on force of up to 375 personnel will augment within twenty-four (24) to thirty-six (36) hours…

The Implementation Plan tasked units designated as NGRFs with several complex, collective tasks, such as providing site security, presence patrols and shows of force, civil disturbance and crowd and riot control, establishing roadblocks and vehicle checkpoints, protection of Department of Defense (DoD) critical assets, and providing security for the National Guard CERFP teams while they conduct their mission.

The capabilities of the NGRF are extremely important due to their rapid response requirements and the critical nature of their mission. They would provide the initial military muscle needed at the site of a homeland defense event or a civil support disaster. In order for a unit to develop and maintain the ability to mobilize and deploy quickly and to proficiently execute the collective mission sets noted in the preceding paragraph, the unit would have to be stabilized long enough to train at both the individual and collective level on those tasks noted. For traditional part-time soldiers who drill one weekend each month and conduct one two-week annual training each year, it would take some time for the unit to develop a reasonable level of skill on the NGRF tasks, even if the unit had no other Mission Essential Task List (METL) training requirements. However, most of these units do have another set of METL tasks upon which they must train. Army National Guard units from the company level up have a METL that is tied to their overseas Title 10 warfighting mission. This being the case, most units assigned the NGRF mission must find the time to train on both sets of tasks. Again, unit stability is critical. The Chief of Staff of the Kansas Army National Guard stated that although the state had implemented the NGRF concept two years ago, within a year of implementation the state had to reassign the NGRF mission to an Air National Guard unit because the infantry battalion that had the mission had deployed to Iraq.

Between Recommendation and Realization

Up to this point, this study has conducted a brief examination of what homeland defense experts and defense think-tanks have recommended in terms of enhancing the National Guard’s ability to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions in the post-9/11 world. This
study has also provided an examination of the steps actually taken by the National Guard since September 11, 2001 to improve its homeland defense/civil-support capability. The question at this point is, “What is the ‘delta’ between what the experts have recommended and what the National Guard has actually done?”

Jack Spencer, writing for the Heritage Foundation in 2002, recommended formally refocusing the mission of the National Guard on homeland defense.66 One National Guard Bureau senior leader commented that the National Guard was not looking for a homeland defense mission and that the National Guard was not interested in coming out from under the Title 10 umbrella.67 LTG H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, in October of 2004 stated that:

…the National guard is participating in every single aspect of our national security strategy, one being defense of the homeland is number one, that is always job one for the National Guard, but it doesn’t mean we have to defend the homeland here at home if we may be participating in what I consider to be, to use a sports analogy, the unscheduled—I mean a scheduled away game, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Kosovo, in Bosnia, the Horn of Africa.68

Later, John Brinkerhoff proposed increasing the National Guard by 50,000 soldiers and airmen in order to enable each state to form a National Guard brigade dedicated to the homeland defense/civil support mission.69 The Army National Guard’s authorized strength remains at 350,000, and the Guard has not created any dedicated homeland defense brigade-sized formations in the individual states. The National Guard has however, created several types of small, technical teams designed for specific homeland defense and civil support missions. It has also tasked existing company and battalion-sized units—units that already have missions, with providing a homeland defense/civil support National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) capability. Given that these units already have Title 10 overseas missions upon which they must focus, in addition to their additional duty of serving as a homeland defense/civil support RRF, they cannot be considered dedicated to the homeland defense/civil support mission.

In its study, the Rand Corporation presented a scenario in which the United States is at war, and much of the active Army, Army Reserve and National Guard had been deployed overseas. The Rand study suggested that under such circumstances, DoD might assign the National Guard the responsibility for homeland defense and civil support and order it to organize battalions in each of the ten FEMA regions dedicated to these two missions.70 In some ways, the current situation meets the conditions of the Rand scenario. Much of the Army, Army Reserve and National Guard are deployed overseas. Although not required by DoD to do so,
National Guard Bureau created National Guard Response Forces (NGRFs) not one in each of the ten FEMA regions as envisioned in the Rand scenario, but one in every state and territory. In terms of numbers of soldiers, the National Guard has exceeded the Rand requirement. However, the units tasked with the NGRF mission are not dedicated exclusively to that mission, as suggested by the Rand study.

According to National Guard Bureau, in spite of extremely high Title 10 operational requirements in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, National Guard soldiers are still available to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions here at home. In October 2004, LTG Blum stated that 75 percent of the National Guard is always available to the state governors should the governors need them. Later, in December 2006, LTG Blum commented that, "Amid the most extensive mobilizations of our Army and Air Force in decades, we have promised each governor that every state will have at least 50 percent of its National Guard forces on hand to deal with emergencies." But again, since the majority of the National Guard’s funding comes from the federal government, the units tasked with the NGRF mission must focus primarily on preparing for their wartime federal Title 10 missions. Therefore, the NGRFs cannot be considered as being dedicated to the homeland defense/civil support mission. Additionally, whether or not these units possess the equipment, personnel, unit cohesion and training required to perform the RRF tasks cited as being necessary by the Rand study is questionable. As reported by Ann Scott Tyson of the Washinton Post, a recently released preliminary report by a congressional commission studying the readiness of the National Guard and Army Reserve states that the National Guard’s ability to respond to a domestic crisis may at present, be seriously limited. Tyson claims that 90 percent of the Army National Guard units in the United States are "not ready," and further that,

The Department of Defense is not adequately equipping the National Guard for its domestic missions," the commission’s report found. It faulted the Pentagon for a lack of budgeting for “civil support” in domestic emergencies, criticizing the “flawed assumption” that as long as the military is prepared to fight a major war, it is ready to respond to a disaster or emergency at home.

Most recently, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the National Guard “move beyond the historical focus on fighting ‘the big war,’ and place more emphasis on missions like stability operations and homeland defense and civil support.” The study called upon the Department of defense to

At a minimum…resource and organize the National Guard to serve as the backbone for ten regional Civil Support Forces that would be responsible for regional planning, training, and exercising and would be able to deploy initial response forces rapidly to the scene of an event.”
The study proposed that the Civil Support Force (CSF) consist of two elements; a dual-hatted joint force headquarters/CSF headquarters, and the CSF force, drawn from traditional National Guard units in their first year of the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) rotation. Creating these CSFs, the study says,

…would provide a dedicated capability for catastrophic response that is grounded in the federalist system...[and] would not turn the National Guard into an exclusively homeland defense force, permanently focus certain units only on homeland defense, or break the overseas rotation base.76

But again, if the CSF headquarters is dual-hatted, it cannot be considered dedicated. Further, under the ARFORGEN model, reserve units in their first year of the ARFORGEN cycle are in the reset and train phase, and at that stage are the lowest priority for equipment, manning, or funding, and are resourced accordingly. This being the case, how effective can the CSF be in terms of providing a dedicated homeland defense/civil support capability? And again, since their primary federal mission is to reset and train, these units cannot be considered to be dedicated to the homeland defense/civil-support mission.

In December, 2005, the Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, stated that,

We have to establish Reserve Component roles in homeland defense and civil support. While this process is ongoing, we have to continue to explore, develop and solidify RC roles in homeland defense and civil-support missions. Doing so will enhance operational predictability and clarify domestic RC resourcing, training, readiness, equipping, and command relationships. This requires us to develop policies that leverage RC capabilities and the community base to meet developing homeland defense and civil-support roles...[and] establish training, mobilization and equipping policies that facilitate the domestic employment of the RC.77

As the above quote demonstrates, the role of the National Guard in homeland defense/civil-support continues to evolve. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges is developing a clear understanding of the threat. It is difficult to apply the appropriate capability against a threat unless the nature of the threat is well defined and thoroughly understood. This may explain why there is such disparity between what the think-tanks and the experts say is needed, and what the National Guard is actually allocating to the mission. Further, an understanding of associated terminology is crucial. For example, Webster's dictionary defines the word “dedicated” as “1: devoted to a cause, ideal, or purpose 2: given over to a particular purpose.”78 Therefore, if one recommends that some portion of the National Guard, or selected National Guard forces be dedicated to the homeland defense/civil-support role, as most of the writers and think-tanks
cited herein have done, then the assumption must be made that these units will have no other mission. Clearly, this word has either been misused or misunderstood.

Endnotes


5 Ibid., 1.

6 Ibid., 10.

7 Ibid., 15.


10 Ibid., 2.

11 Ibid., 4.


13 Ibid., 2.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., 24.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 25.
18 Ibid.


20 Ibid., xiv.

21 Ibid., 32.

22 Ibid., 33.


24 Ibid., x.

25 Ibid., ix.

26 Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, iii.

27 Wormuth, 64.

28 Ibid., 74.

29 Ibid., 75.

30 M-Day stands for “Mobilization Day,” and refers to traditional members of the National Guard who, at a minimum, drill one weekend each month and two weeks each year during annual training. These are non-full time members of the National Guard.

31 Wormuth, xi.

32 EMAC Homepage, “What Is EMAC,” available from http://www.emacweb.org/98; Internet; accessed 6 January 2007; Lynn E. Davis, et. al., “Army Forces for Homeland Security,” *The Rand Corporation*, p. xi, available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG221/ ; Internet; accessed 8 October 2006. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) plays a crucial role in providing the individual states a means of providing support to each other, to include military support to civil authorities during times of crisis. EMAC became public law in 1996 when it was ratified by Congress. However, it traces its roots back to mutual assistance arrangements made by the Southern Governors Association in the early 1990s. Administered nationally by the National Emergency Management Association, the EMAC is one of the most powerful tools available to state governors. It enables stricken states to expeditiously request the support they need from states that want to provide help in response to a natural disaster. EMACs provide contractual agreements between states which enable them to send equipment and personnel to states that need it. These contracts are legally binding and make the requesting state responsible for all costs of out-of-state forces.

33 Ibid., 75.
Ibid., xi.


36 Ibid., 2.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Comments made to the author by a senior member of National Guard Bureau, U.S. Army War College, Fall 2006.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.


45 COL Joe Wheeler, Chief of Staff, Kansas Army National Guard, e-mail message to author, 24 January 2007.

46 Ibid.


48 MG Tod Bunting, Adjutant General, Kansas National Guard, e-mail message to author, 12 February 2007.


54 Ibid.


56 Blum, National Guard 2007 Posture Statement, 22.

57 Ibid.


59 Blum, National Guard 2007 Posture Statement, 23.

60 Wormuth, 71.


63 Ibid.


65 Wheeler.

66 Spencer and Wortzel, 2.

67 Comments made to the author by a senior member of National Guard Bureau, U.S. Army War College, Fall 2006.


69 Brinkerhoff, 25.

70 Davis, 32.

71 Blum, “The National Guard: Full Spectrum Force in the Global War on Terror.”

72 H. Steven Blum, “The National Guard: Challenges and Opportunities,” The Officer, 82 (December 2006): 50.

74 Wormuth, 63.

75 Wormuth, 74.

76 Wormuth, xi.

