BORDER INTERDICTION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
A LOOK AT ALGERIA, RHODESIA, AND IRAQ

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Border Interdiction in Counterinsurgency: A Look at Algeria, Rhodesia, and Iraq

In 1956, to counter insurgent infiltration of fighters and weapons, the French built the Morice Line, a barricade system built around an electronically charged fence. The Morice Line was remarkably effective in stopping insurgent infiltration. While the Rhodesians attempted similar border fortifications, they lacked the resources to successfully employ such means. They instead found the employment of highly mobile teams to track and kill insurgents more successful, given their resource constraints. The US-led Coalition in Iraq, after a slow start, employed small advisory teams in support of Iraqi security forces working from border forts to secure Iraq’s borders. The three case studies show that border interdiction is a relatively inexpensive component of a counterinsurgency campaign, but can be a vital component of that campaign if the counterinsurgent interdicts the right target (manpower, weapons, or funding).
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

BORDER INTERDICTION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY: A LOOK AT ALGERIA, RHODESIA, AND IRAQ, by Timothy M Bairstow, 109 pages.

One of the tools available to the counterinsurgent when devising a campaign is the interdiction of the insurgent’s movement of men, materiel, and money at the border. This thesis examined three case studies of border interdiction in insurgency: the French in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, the Rhodesian experience from 1965 to 1980, and the current Coalition experience in Iraq. In 1956, to counter insurgent infiltration of fighters and weapons, the French built the Morice Line, a barricade system built around an electronically charged fence. The Morice Line was remarkably effective in stopping insurgent infiltration. While the Rhodesians attempted similar border fortifications, they lacked the resources to successfully employ such means. They instead found the employment of highly mobile teams to track and kill insurgents more successful, given their resource constraints. The US-led Coalition in Iraq, after a slow start, employed small advisory teams in support of Iraqi security forces working from border forts to secure Iraq’s borders. The three case studies show that border interdiction is a relatively inexpensive component of a counterinsurgency campaign, but can be a vital component of that campaign if the counterinsurgent interdicts the right target (manpower, weapons, or funding).
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALN</td>
<td>Armée de Libération Nationale</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corsan</td>
<td>Cordon Sanitaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (elements of national power)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFP</td>
<td>explosively formed penetrator</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale</td>
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<td>IRGC</td>
<td>Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps</td>
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<td>JIATF</td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistancia Nacional Moçambicana</td>
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<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Army</td>
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<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

There is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war.¹

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

From 1954 to 1962 the French Army fought a bitter counterinsurgency effort against Algerian revolutionaries intent on wresting Algeria from French control. In March of 1956, when France granted independence to Morocco and Tunisia, but retained control of Algeria, these two countries became safe havens for Algerian insurgent training camps and supply depots. In September of 1957, the French Army completed what was to become known as the Morice Line, an obstacle belt consisting of an electrified fence, mines, and other obstacles that ran along two hundred miles of the border between Algeria and Tunisia (and also included a less elaborate defensive line along the border between Algeria and Morocco).² The French manned the line with thirty thousand troops, supported by radar, artillery, and aircraft. The effects upon the Algerian insurgency were vigorous and lasting; within the first seven months of the Morice Line’s construction, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the native Algerian resistance, lost over six thousand men and forty-three hundred weapons during FLN attempts to cross the border.³ From 1958 through the war’s conclusion, the French Army forced fifteen to twenty thousand FLN fighters to sit out of the war because the FLN was unable to penetrate the Morice Line’s formidable defenses.⁴

While the French ultimately lost Algeria due to political considerations, most historians agree that the French Army left Algeria under favorable military conditions (in
other words, the French armed forces were winning militarily). French Army’s military
success in Algeria was due in large degree to the effects of the Morice Line upon the
Algerian insurgency. The Morice Line forced the FLN to leave anywhere from 20 to 50
percent of its fighting force outside of Algeria. More importantly, those forced to the
sideline were fighters who had undergone extended periods of training at insurgent bases
in Tunisia or Morocco, thus leaving the FLN forces in the Algerian interior deprived of
their most capable forces. Attempts to bring trained fighters into Algeria from Tunisia
were disastrous for the FLN and resulted in the loss of hundreds of FLN recruits for little
gain. Likewise, the FLN could not move recruits to training camps in Tunisia to train in
relative safety. Nor were Algerian insurgents able to smuggle weapons across the border.
The French effectively cut off the Algerian insurgency from its most critical source of
manpower and supplies.

Other counterinsurgent forces have sought similar results by restricting or
stopping the flow of personnel and weapons to the insurgency being fought. The United
States planned and partially built the McNamara Line in Vietnam in a futile attempt to
stop the North Vietnamese from supplying the Viet Cong with recruits and weapons. Rhodesian security forces successfully sought to stop the flow of men and arms into
Rhodesia, not through a physical barrier but by conducting mobile interdiction efforts
using highly trained light infantry supported by attack and transport helicopters. In 2006,
the United States once again finds itself in the business of attempting to interdict trained
fighters and weapons from insurgent forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

At first glance, the idea that a counterinsurgent force must seek to prevent the
movement of enemy personnel and weapons from moving across borders seems self-
evident. However, a cursory examination of both counterinsurgency theory and doctrine shows that there is little agreement as to whether the interdiction of personnel and weapons along the border is an effective and efficient component of a counterinsurgent strategy. David Galula, a French Army officer with considerable counterinsurgency experience in three conflicts, wrote in *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, “[Insurgents] need very little in the way of supplies in order to survive. Cutting them off from their sources would require great effort to produce little result.” The Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual*, based on Marine counterinsurgency experiences in Haiti and Central America, devoted a mere two paragraphs to interdicting insurgent logistics.

Other works, however, placed considerable emphasis on denying the insurgent lines of supply and movement of personnel to and from his external safe havens. A recent RAND study that examined five decades of previous counterinsurgency studies made the implementation of “major border security systems” one of four major recommendations to guide US counterinsurgency strategy. Kalev Sepp, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, examined forty-eight insurgencies in the twentieth century and concluded that border security should be one of the key components to a successful counterinsurgency campaign. The literature review of this thesis will explore the opposing views in more detail. The existence of such opposing views, however, demonstrates the necessity for deeper study concerning the utility of concentrating on severing insurgent lines of communication across borders as a major component of a counterinsurgency campaign.

This thesis seeks to provide some insights concerning the necessity of interdiction at the border and the level of effort operational and strategic planners should dedicate
towards interdicting the cross-border movement of insurgent logistics and personnel as part of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. This work examines military means integrated with diplomatic, informational, and economic measures. Secondary questions include: What conditions favor interdiction of insurgent logistics and personnel? Conversely, what conditions make the interdiction of insurgent logistics and personnel difficult? What techniques have worked in interdicting insurgent logistics? What techniques have not worked?

This study will explore the questions above by examining three case studies: the French interdiction of Algerian insurgents from 1954 to 1962, Rhodesian counterinsurgency efforts from 1965 to 1980, and Coalition efforts to interdict insurgent personnel and logistics in Iraq from 2003 to 2006. The study includes Algeria and Rhodesia as case studies because counterinsurgent forces in both cases were relatively successful in interdicting their opponents. Iraq was chosen as a case study due to personal experience and to provide a contemporary focus.

Examining the three case studies shows that while interdiction of insurgent men and material at the border should be an integral part of a counterinsurgent strategy, interdiction alone will not win a counterinsurgency. The case studies also show that the ideal system to interdict insurgent forces along the border should not aim to block the insurgent from entry altogether, since doing so is prohibitively expensive in terms of material and manpower; border system(s) established should slow the insurgent’s entry and identify the point of entry to the counterinsurgent force within enough time for security forces to counter the penetration.
French interdiction efforts in Algeria fell primarily in two areas: a naval blockade in the Mediterranean Sea to prevent the movement of insurgent men and material into Algeria, and the construction of the Morice Line. While French naval efforts were not excessively costly and could be carried out with the units available to the French Mediterranean fleet, the construction and manning of the Morice line required an enormous manpower investment on the part of the French Army. At various times between 1956 and 1962, the French used 30,000 to 80,000 troops to man the Morice Line along the Tunisian border. As noted, these French troops tied down up to one-half of the Armée de Libération Nationale’s (ALN) available manpower for most of the war. Despite the line’s cost in material and manpower, it was arguably a highly effective component of the French counterinsurgency strategy in Algeria. The French also used several less effective techniques, such as a cross-border air raid in Tunisia, diplomatic pressure on those governments that supplied weapons to the ALN, and assassination of arms dealers who sold and delivered the weapons.

The Rhodesian armed forces lacked the manpower and material available to the French. This factor, combined with the vastness of their borders, forced the Rhodesian armed forces to pursue a strategy of economy of force. The most successful Rhodesian interdiction efforts originated from intelligence of impeding border incursions from Zambia and later Mozambique. Thus forewarned, Rhodesian security forces used aircraft to spot incursions and then inserted light infantry forces via helicopter several kilometers forward along the expected axis of advance of the insurgent force. These small light infantry forces would then work in tandem with helicopters, with either the helicopters or the infantry forcing the insurgents into open terrain where they would be destroyed by
either the ground forces or aircraft. Rhodesia’s nonmilitary (economic, diplomatic, and informational) means of interdiction were very limited because of the pressure placed on the Rhodesian government by the international community due to the country’s white minority rule.

Interdiction efforts by Coalition forces in Iraq share similarities with both the French and Rhodesian experiences. Like the Algerian border with Tunisia, Iraq’s borders run through desert areas with extensive visibility and limited concealment for insurgent forces. This geography lends itself well to the use of fortifications to intercept the movement of weapons and fighters. However, as in Rhodesia, manpower constraints limit Coalition forces; there are simply not enough troops in Iraq to invest the numbers that would be required to support a structure like the Morice Line along Iraq’s borders. The solution that Coalition forces have resorted to incorporates elements similar to both the Algerian and Rhodesian experience. Since June of 2004, the Coalition has funded and built 258 border forts. Iraqi border police, working with American training teams, operate from these forts. Iraqi Army and Coalition troops reinforce the border police, with airborne surveillance provided by the US military. Other US efforts to interdict Iraqi insurgent men and equipment have included diplomatic pressure on Iraq’s neighbors and economic pressure to intercept money in transit to Iraqi insurgents.

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic of interdiction as a component of a counterinsurgency strategy. Chapter 2 consists of a literature review of the theory and doctrine dealing with interdiction and a brief review of the literature pertinent to each of the three cases studies. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used for research. This thesis uses comparative case studies to explore the
use of interdiction as a component of a counterinsurgency strategy. Chapter 4 demonstrates how the research results surrounding the case studies help address the issues presented above, such as the effectiveness of border interdiction, techniques of border interdiction, and integration with other elements of national power. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and includes recommendations for planners at the operational and strategic level of war.


5Ibid.


12Horne, *Savage War of Peace*, 89.


CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter has four sections. The first section discusses the role of interdiction in current US counterinsurgency doctrine and theory. The remaining three sections discuss literature pertaining to each of the three case studies: the French experience in Algeria, Rhodesian counterinsurgency efforts, and US operations in Iraq.

Interdiction in Doctrine and Theory

Current US counterinsurgency doctrine pays little attention to interdiction. The US counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, mentions securing international and regional borders as a line of operation, but gives no suggestions as to how that line of operation should be carried out. FM 3-24 instructs the counterinsurgent to “make every effort to stop insurgents from bringing material support across international and territorial borders,” but it offers no guidance as to how to accomplish this task.\(^1\) In the chapter pertaining to logistics in counterinsurgency operations, FM 3-24 stated, “In COIN operations, analysis of logistic capabilities/shortfalls of the insurgent forces is especially significant.”\(^2\) Presumably, this “analysis of logistic capabilities” would include an analysis of how insurgent forces move men and material to the battlefield.

Other US doctrinal publications gave equally scant attention to interdiction. FM 3-07, Stability Operations, did not mention interdiction.\(^3\) The Marine Corps Small War Manual devoted a mere two paragraphs to the subject.\(^4\) The US Army’s FM 90-8, Counterguerilla Operations, contained the most detail on the subject; it devoted four
pages to “border operations” and offered planners two techniques to control cross-border movement. However, since one of these techniques relied upon forced population relocation, the number of effective techniques (applicable to most situations) offered in the FM 90-8 dropped to one.5

When compared to current US doctrine, twentieth-century literature on counterinsurgency theory paid more attention to interdiction, but the theory provided little in the way of instruction for planners considering this line of operation. David Galula, a French Army officer with experience in three counterinsurgencies over the course of ten years, wrote Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, perhaps the most-read work on counterinsurgency theory. In his work he mentioned that “whether the area [in which the insurgent operates] can be easily isolated” was a key consideration for the counterinsurgent.6 Galula gave a caveat to this consideration earlier in his work when he mentioned that the insurgent needs very little in the way of outside logistic support early in the conflict. According to Galula, the insurgent only needs outside logistic support when he is ready to transition to conventional operations.7 Sir Robert Thompson, a British officer with extensive experience in Malaya and Vietnam, provided an opposing viewpoint from the same era in which Galula wrote. Thompson cautioned that the counterinsurgent force should not waste efforts on securing borders until the final stages of “mopping up.” Instead, Thompson advocated long-range penetration operations into the enemy’s safe haven as a better use of valuable manpower and resources.8

Interdiction of insurgent men and material played a more prominent role in more recent writings on counterinsurgency theory. Kalev Sepp, a professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School, included border security as one of several “best practices in
counterinsurgency” in a *Military Review* article of the same name. Another recent *Military Review* article by Lester Grau, at the US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, advocated examining the use of border fortifications in order to help seal the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan. A recent RAND Corporation study advocated border security systems as one of four major recommendations for counterinsurgent forces. The study, by Austin Long, looked at several border security systems in the past and provided several brief recommendations.

**Algeria**

A sizable quantity of literature dealing with the French counterinsurgency experience in Algeria exists in both academia and general literature. Interest in the Algerian insurrection rose in recent years due to perceived similarities between the French experience in Algeria and the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most commonly read book on the Algerian insurrection is Alistair Horne’s *A Savage War of Peace*. Other notable secondary sources include Edgar O’Ballance’s *The Algerian Insurrection* and Martin Alexander and J. F. V. Keiger’s *France and the Algerian War 1954-62*. Another detailed account of the Algerian insurrection is in Robert Asprey’s collection on guerilla warfare, *War in the Shadows*.

None of the sources listed above discussed French interdiction efforts in much detail. While each of the authors listed mentioned the effectiveness of French efforts to seal Algeria’s borders and coasts from FLN infiltration, none of the works above devoted more than a handful of pages to the means by which the French Army and Navy sealed Algeria’s borders. Presumably, the authors devoted little time to French interdiction efforts because the subject did not provide entertaining reading when compared to either
the French use of torture or the French Army’s efforts in the interior of the country (both of these subjects received considerable attention in the works mentioned above). The detail required to closely examine French interdiction efforts exists almost solely in professional journals and primary sources of the French officers who actually participated in operations along the Morrice Line (or in the Mediterranean Sea with the French Navy). A French military history journal, *La Revue Internationale D’Histoire Militaire*, compiled the most accessible collection of these primary sources. *La Revue* contained numerous accounts by officers that served along the Morrice Line and participated in the “Battle of the Frontier.”

**Rhodesia**

Literature on Rhodesian counterinsurgent efforts generally fits into one of three categories: a large body written by black African nationalist (and often communist) revolutionaries, an even larger body of literature by Rhodesian ex-military and government authors, and a relatively small body of objective work written for academic purposes. The first two categories show significant biases. The first leans so far towards the African insurgent that the authors downplayed any Rhodesian government successes and exaggerated insurgent successes. The second holds up the Rhodesian soldier as the pinnacle of soldierly virtue and, at times, pines for the return of white-minority rule in southern Africa.

Studies for the US military form most of the objective literature on Rhodesian counterinsurgency experience. Both the US Army War College and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College published professional works on Rhodesian counterinsurgency efforts, as has the RAND Corporation. The most comprehensive work
on Rhodesian counterinsurgency (not commissioned by the US military) is R. K. Cilliers’ *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia*. Rhodesian counterinsurgency doctrine still exists in the form of an “Anti-terrorist Operations Manual” from 1975.

Some information on Rhodesian interdiction efforts exists in more obscure sources. Rhodesian use of land mines to prevent insurgent infiltration is absent in most accounts of the conflict; however, advocates of a ban on land mine use cover the subject in some detail.

All of the literature on Rhodesian counterinsurgency pointed to several trends. One, since the Rhodesian military was so small in comparison to the size of the territory and population that the military controlled, it developed into a highly efficient force. Second, the Rhodesian military developed innovative techniques using aircraft and light infantry to counter insurgent infiltration. Lastly, Rhodesian forces effectively used preemptive raids on insurgent camps in neighboring countries as an effective means to prevent insurgents from crossing the border.

**Iraq**

Little literature exists on the interdiction of men and material in Iraq. Most of the available literature consists of articles in the general press (*New York Times, Christian Science Monitor*, etc.). Almost all of these articles relied upon firsthand observations by reporters embedded with US military teams that trained Iraqi security forces. Press releases form another abundant source of information about Iraqi border interdiction efforts, although these cover only the successful building and manning of border outposts. The preponderance of information on interdiction efforts in Iraq comes from firsthand accounts of US servicemen in Iraq and unit after-action reports, although much
of this information is classified or otherwise restricted from public release. To date, one article on Iraqi border security has appeared in a professional journal ("Iraq and the Problem of Border Security" in SAIS Review by Robert Bateman, an active duty Army officer).  

Perhaps the largest problem in literature dealing with Iraqi border security is the lack of open source information on the subject. Since the conflict is ongoing, much of the information on the interdiction of insurgent personnel and material is classified, either due to its content or the medium on which the information is handled (i.e., on a secure Internet system). Additionally, because Coalition forces are still fighting the insurgency (and improving border interdiction efforts) at the time of writing, it is too early to discern the effect of border interdiction on the insurgency.

Summary

The above review of literature shows several trends. First, current US doctrine pays little attention to the interdiction of insurgent men and material along the borders of the conflict area. However, in numerous counterinsurgencies (to include US efforts in Iraq), the counterinsurgent force used interdiction as a major line of operation.

The means employed by counterinsurgent forces to conduct interdiction varied according to the resources available. As chapter 3 will show, the French devoted considerable resources in both manpower and material to their interdiction efforts. Rhodesian security forces, out of necessity, relied less on static obstacle works and far more upon mobile teams of light infantry and pre-emptive strikes in their interdiction efforts. The United States pursued a mix of static positions and mobile forces, but has relied almost entirely upon indigenous forces for interdiction.
1Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington: Department of the Army, December 2006), 5-12.

2Ibid., 8-4.


5Department of the Army, FM 90-8, *Counter Guerilla Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1986), 3-44 to 3-47.


7Ibid., 39.


CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Method

This thesis uses comparative case studies to explore the use of interdiction as a component of a counterinsurgency strategy. The three case studies included are the French interdiction of Algerian insurgents from 1954 to 1962, Rhodesian counterinsurgency efforts from 1966 to 1980, and US efforts to interdict insurgents in Iraq from 2003 to 2006. This work will examine the doctrine of each counterinsurgent force and their use elements of national power to affect interdiction of insurgent men and material. To organize the elements of national power, this thesis uses the categories of: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (often referred to as “DIME”). The emphasis in this work is on the employment of military power, since that will be the most useful to operational and strategic planners. The thesis also addresses the other three elements of national power as planners cannot consider the military realm in isolation from politics. Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the different interdiction efforts and has three sections, one section per geographic case study. Each section will examine the doctrine, written or unwritten, that each counterinsurgent force applied toward interdiction and then examine the counterinsurgent’s use of the national elements of power. The nonmilitary elements are addressed first.

Rationale Behind Case Studies

The case studies were selected because each adds certain insights into a counterinsurgent force’s use of interdiction. The French effort in Algeria shows a force
that successfully conducted interdiction as a major part of its counterinsurgency strategy. Since the French kept over 15,000 to 20,000 FLN insurgents from joining the conflict in Algeria, the French military provides an example of how interdiction can be successfully conducted. The Rhodesian case study depicts a military that also successfully conducted interdiction, despite being short of manpower and materiel. Rhodesian security forces could not afford to man their frontiers in the French manner so they used mobility, intelligence and preemptive raids to conduct interdiction. Thus the first two case studies illustrate successful methods of interdiction that could potentially be replicated by forces today. The fact that both the French and the Rhodesians lost their counterinsurgencies does not detract from using their experiences as case studies; the reason to study the two cases is because the interdiction efforts were successful, even if the overall strategies were not.

United States efforts in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 merit inclusion as a case study for several reasons. Most importantly, an examination of US interdiction efforts in Iraq in comparison to the other two case studies provides a point of reflection upon current operations. Secondly, the US case study differs in that the bulk of the combat power used to conduct interdiction, especially along the border, comes from Iraqi security forces, rather than US forces. Thus, the US case study is somewhat different in the aspect of the forces employed. Lastly, examining US interdiction efforts in Iraq may show the benefit of using certain technologies that did not exist during the first two case studies.

Limitations

This thesis operates under two limitations. First, since the United States is still engaged in Iraq, the thesis cannot fully explore the state of operations there without
delving into the classified realm. In order to be of utility to the average military reader, this thesis will only examine Iraqi operations from unclassified sources. Secondly, the three case studies do not cover the full range of conditions under which a counterinsurgent force might use interdiction. In particular, there is a wide variety of different environments under which such a strategy could be pursued. While the three case studies provide examples of a variety of terrain over which such operations have been conducted, they cannot cover every combination of terrain, vegetation, and climate that could conceivably be encountered while attempting to sever insurgent lines of communication.

**Key Terms**

In order to discuss the border interdiction of men and equipment, it is necessary to establish a common definition of the following terms: insurgency, interdiction, lines of communication, and logistics.

**Insurgency:** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Insurgencies vary in their motivations, approaches, and means. Insurgencies further vary in their means and ability to raise manpower, weapons, and funds. While in some instances these insurgent requirements may be supplied strictly from internal sources, most insurgencies rely upon some means of external support. In order to maintain their required funding, many insurgencies develop relationships with organized crime or undertake in criminal activities themselves. This relationship with organized crime is particularly relevant to this thesis when the organized crime includes smuggling or the cross-border movement of illegal goods.
**Interdiction**: An action to disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be effectively used against friendly forces. An insurgency’s “surface military potential” can be interdicted using any one of a nation’s national elements of power (DIME). The counterinsurgent can use diplomatic means by applying pressure upon the states from which insurgents are smuggling their weapons or personnel. The counterinsurgent can apply informational means either to the insurgents themselves (by advertising the counterinsurgent’s knowledge of insurgent means of cross-border movement) or to the population supporting the cross-border movement (by advertising the harmful consequences of supporting the insurgent’s smuggling).

Economic means available to the counter-insurgent consist primarily of sanctions upon the countries permitting the insurgent’s cross-border movement. Lastly, military means can be employed to block the insurgent’s movement or to destroy the insurgent as he attempts to cross the border.

Interdiction in the definition above can occur almost anywhere the enemy has “surface military potential.” For example the insurgent’s supplies or manpower already cached inside a country can be interdicted before they reach the insurgent force. Within this thesis, “interdiction” will refer only to interdiction of manpower of materiel moving across international borders.

**Line of communications**: A route, either land, water and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Again, insurgents may have “a base of operations” either outside the country in which they operate or inside the country. This thesis is concerned with those lines of communication that cross international borders.
**Logistics**: This study will use the term “logistics” in a manner normally associated with “combat service support:” the essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks, necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces. It encompasses those activities of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield.

Logistics also includes not just the movement of material, but also personnel. An insurgency may need little in the way of material support, especially in its earlier stages; in order to continue their armed struggle, the insurgents need little more than enough weapons and ammunition to outfit their fighters. It is a rare part of the world where this material cannot be found in sufficient quantity. Personnel, on the other hand, are not so easily available. Harder yet to resource are trained personnel to carry out the insurgency. Thus, often the “goods” that an insurgent force needs to spirit across a border are trained people, not weapons.

This thesis uses the names of states that were commonly used to represent the states during the time period discussed. For example, the state formerly known as Rhodesia is now called Zimbabwe. Since it was called Rhodesia during the time addressed in this work, it will be referred to as Rhodesia in order to avoid confusion.

1Ibid., 1-101.


3Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-16 to 1-18.

4Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-11.

5Department of the Army, FM 1-02 or MCRP 5-12A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2004), 1-103.
6Ibid.

7Department of the Army, FM 1-02 or MCRP 5-12A *Operational Terms and Graphics*, 1-113.

8Ibid., 1-114.

CHAPTER 4
THREE CASE STUDIES: ALGERIA, RHODESIA, IRAQ

Algeria

The French experience in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 provides one of the most successful examples of interdiction in a counterinsurgency campaign. The Algerian insurrection began in November of 1954 when several members of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), a newly formed nationalist group, conducted attacks against police stations, farms, and government buildings across northern Algeria. The insurrection, fed by Algerian dissatisfaction with French rule and the desire of Algerians for independence, quickly grew in momentum to become a full-scale guerrilla war that eventually cost France her most prized colonial possession and came close to causing civil war in France itself.¹ The insurgent movement named itself the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and its military wing the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN).

While the ALN had several thousand untrained men ready to take up arms, it had considerable shortages of trained fighters and weapons to use against the French.² When the insurrection first started in 1954, the ALN possessed no more than four hundred weapons, mostly hunting rifles and shotguns.³ While the ALN was able to obtain some weapons by attacking police stations and from Algerian soldiers who deserted from the French Army, these quantities were insufficient to sufficiently arm the rebellion.⁴

In order to both supply its fighters and establish training bases, the ALN looked across Algeria’s borders to Tunisia and Morocco. Both countries were former French colonies that had been granted independence in March of 1956. These states’ new sovereignty allowed the ALN to establish a network of bases and depots in both countries.
in order to prosecute the war against the French in the interior of Algeria. By the end of
the war, the ALN established thirty-one different bases, depots, or training centers in
Tunisia and over forty smaller bases and offices in Morocco. Of the two countries,
Tunisia was more important to the ALN. Late in the conflict, the ALN kept up to thirty-
thousand troops in various camps in Tunisia, although for most of the war the number of
fighters in Tunisia was about one-half that number. While the ALN also maintained
small training detachments and logistical depots in Egypt and Libya, the equipment and
trained men from these bases could only enter Algeria through either Tunisia or Morocco
as the French Navy patrolled the Algerian coast. The FLN’s apparatus outside of
Algeria, known as the external FLN, played a significant role in the movement’s armed
struggle inside Algeria. By 1957, the external FLN was able to send over a thousand
weapons a month into Algeria.

The French possessed no doctrine to guide their efforts to staunch the flow of
weapons and trained men coming from Tunisia and Morocco. Nor did they have a
written, formal doctrine with which to approach counterinsurgency, despite experience
fighting in Indo-China from 1946 to 1954. However, the French Army developed
informal doctrines that generally fell between two camps: a “warrior’s doctrine” that
espoused a continuation of conventional military operations and a doctrine of reliance
upon psychological operations. David Galula, who served as a company commander in
Algeria, argued that most French officers figured out their own doctrine. What was
adopted by most officers was the doctrine of guerre revolutionary. Guerre
revolutionaire focused on the support of the people and led to the employment of five
operational principles: establish a capable intelligence apparatus, provide local security,
conduct rapid operations with mobile reserves, establish the legitimacy of the local
government and security forces, and isolate the insurgency from support.\textsuperscript{10} Isolating the
insurgency from support was a twofold enterprise: denying the insurgents the support of
the populace and denying the insurgents support from their bases outside the country.
Due to the lack of equipment, munitions, and trained fighters in Algeria early in the
insurgency (and the large potential supply outside the country), denying outside support
became the French high command’s top priority by 1956.\textsuperscript{11}

Aside from military means, which will be discussed later, the French employed
their diplomatic and economic elements of power in attempts to stop the flow of weapons
and trained men into Algeria. As former colonies, both Morocco and Tunisia were still
largely dependent upon economic aid from France. The French government used threats
of ceasing economic aid to both countries in order to pressure the Tunisian and Moroccan
governments to take action against ALN camps on their soil and in 1957, France ceased
all of its economic aid to Tunisia. Another form of economic leverage the French
employed was to recall French expatriates working for the governments of Tunisia and
Morocco.\textsuperscript{12} While the French failed to cripple the Tunisian and Moroccan governments
with this latter measure, the withdrawal of French expatriates had a harmful effect on the
Tunisian and Moroccan bureaucracies.

Diplomatically, the key means available to the French were to publicize how the
Tunisian and Moroccan governments were complicit in supplying arms to the FLN. In
1958, the French government compiled a list of countries that were actively providing
arms to Algerian insurgents or allowed companies to sell to Algerian proxies. The French
government announced its possession of the list and threatened to make the list public if
other governments did not clamp down on arms sales to the FLN. This threat had little effect on the Arab and Soviet bloc countries that were supplying arms, which included Yugoslavia, China, Soviet Union, Egypt, and Libya. However, the threat had a marked effect on Western Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Finland, all of whom had previously turned a blind eye to purchases made by FLN proxies from Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, or Libya. Financial transactions conducted by companies from these states on behalf of the FLN dropped significantly after the threat of publication. During the same time period, several Western European arms dealers who were known to have arranged illegal arms transactions on behalf of the FLN were assassinated or died under suspicious circumstances; these assassinations are thought to have been carried out by the French Service d’Espionage et Countre-Espionage (SDECE). The SDECE also operated arms factories in Spain and Switzerland that produced faulty weapons for the FLN.

It should be noted that the governments of Tunisia and Morocco were under conflicting pressures from external and internal sources. While the French applied various means to reduce Tunisian and Moroccan support for the FLN, the Tunisian and Moroccan governments faced pressure from their citizens to increase government support for the FLN. The anticolonial aspect of the FLN’s cause held particular appeal for the people of these two countries who had just recently been released from the status of colonial subjects themselves. However, if the Tunisian or Moroccan governments were too overt in their support for the FLN, they might invite military action in their countries by the French.

French military efforts to stop ALN weapons and fighters from crossing the border were much more successful than the economic and diplomatic efforts. The French
military efforts at interdiction primarily consisted of a naval blockade and the Morice Line.

The French Navy’s interdiction caught little in the way of weapons and men, but it was a critical aspect of the French overall interdiction campaign. Without the efforts of the French Navy, the FLN could have easily smuggled weapons and men to Algeria through the coastal waters of Algeria. To halt the FLN movement of weapons over the sea, the French Navy had to intercept and inspect trade ships and fishing vessels along Algeria’s nine hundred miles of coastline. French naval activities fell into three categories: gathering intelligence on maritime movements, surveillance of ships (both by naval reconnaissance planes and coastal patrol boats), and inspecting suspicious vessels. The number of French ships participating in these efforts rose from seventeen in 1956 to thirty in 1959, with most of these ships being coastal escort craft. Half of these ships were at sea on any given day with 20 percent of the remaining ships on alert to intercept maritime traffic if necessary. 17

The French did not limit their naval efforts to Algerian coastal waters. The French Navy also intercepted cargo ships from numerous countries well outside coastal waters, as far away as the Atlantic and the English Channel. The French were constrained in these long-range intercepts as they elicited diplomatic protests from other European countries. 18 These interceptions were, however, fruitful, resulting in the seizure of arms shipments on cargo ships from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece. From the start of interdiction efforts through the end of the war, the French Navy intercepted ten vessels carrying 1350 tons of weapons, which the French Navy claimed was equal to the amount of weapons that the ALN already had in the interior in 1958. 19 If this estimate
is accurate, then the French Navy stopped the ALN from doubling their quantity of available weapons.

While the French Air Force played a supporting role to Navy and Army interdiction efforts, the French Air Force did interdict one key insurgent in October of 1956. Working with French intelligence services, the French Air Force was able to force the landing of a Moroccan aircraft carrying Ben Bella, the leader of the FLN, as his plane flew over the Mediterranean en route to Cairo. This operation caused an enormous international uproar and may have been counterproductive in the end since the FLN was capable of generating new leaders more easily than the French could build international sympathy their actions, which many painted as an act of piracy.

No other French operation had greater success at interdicting ALN men and weapons than the Morice Line (the “Morice Barrage” as it was known to the French). Perhaps more than any other aspect of the French counterinsurgency campaign, the Morice Line hobbled the ALN’s military capability. The earliest versions of the line started as short (ten kilometers) barbed wire fences along Algeria’s border with Morocco in 1956. Early lines were plagued by several problems. First, the line was built directly upon the border with Morocco, instead of being offset from the frontier. Thus, when French troops fired upon ALN fighters attempting to breach the line, French fires landed in Morocco, which posed a threat to Moroccan civilians and provoked diplomatic protests from the Moroccan government. Second, the French were hesitant to reinforce the fencing with mines as the officers who built the early line remembered how the Viet Minh in Indo-China dug up French mines and subsequently used them against French troops. Both problems degraded the effectiveness of the early line, but these problems
were corrected by moving the line back from the Moroccan frontier by several kilometers and eventually using mines in the line.

Early attempts to build shorter sections of line along the Tunisian border were also plagued with problems. The French learned through experience that the line was ineffective until it was combined with observers and a means of making the line a lethal barrier. A unit of French Marines found on the night of 2 August 1956 that ALN fighters had removed five kilometers of barbed wire fencing. This section was neither mined nor observed by French troops. The ALN left behind a stake, on which they left a page of a French tactics manual which read “any obstacle not covered by fire is ineffective.”

The Morice Line was completed in September of 1957 and stretched along the Tunisian frontier from the Mediterranean Sea two hundred miles south to the Sahara Desert. A shorter version was built along the Moroccan border. The initial line (on the Tunisian frontier) was built along a preexisting road from Bône to Souk-Ahras and continued south to Tébessa. In 1958, the line was extended farther south to Negrine (see figure 1). While the composition of the line varied according to the terrain upon which it was built, most sections of the line consisted of an eight foot fence flanked with a barbed wire apron and fifty meters of minefield on either side of the fence.
The fence itself was electrified with five thousand volts of electricity through means of power transmission plants every fifteen to twenty kilometers along the fence. From these transmission stations, French engineers could detect breaks in the line and determine where the line had been breached. This information was then transmitted to mobile reserves, or to an artillery battery which could deliver 105-millimeter howitzer fire at the point of the breach. The electrified fence was the key component of the Morice Line, since the fence provided both a lethal barrier that deterred casual attempts at breaching and also provided French commanders with the precise location of deliberate breaching attempts. The electrified fence was thus a significant measure that provided economy of force. Because the French Army lacked an electrical engineering capability,
French engineer units were reinforced with engineers from the French navy who had substantial experience with the electrical generation plants aboard French ships. The French Navy also supplemented French Army efforts along the line by providing radar to detect breaching forces before the enemy forces reached the line. The French Navy converted ship radars (American AN/PQ-10) for ground use and installed the radars in relatively flat areas along the line that were mostly free of vegetation. To man the radars the navy formed Navy Ground Detection Units that were maintained through the end of the war. The French later used these units to man radars in the Sahara Desert, south of the line, to detect ALN attempts to skirt the line in camel trains.

Once the line was complete, with the electrified fence, mines, observers, and reaction forces, the ALN found the line was an extremely formidable barrier to their infiltration attempts. From late 1957 to the summer of 1958, the ALN attempted to breach the line in ever-increasing numbers. The French named this period the Battle of the Frontier. During this time, the ALN attempted to both move trained fighters from their base camps in Tunisia and Morocco into Algeria and to move new recruits out of the country for training at the same camps. Most of these attempts to cross were conducted in units ranging from platoon to battalion size. The ALN would typically breach the electrified fence with insulated wire cutters or Bangalore torpedoes and move as many forces through the breach as possible before French security forces arrived on scene. Once through the breach, the ALN troops would disperse to avoid pursuit and detection by French troops.
The results of the Battle of the Frontier were devastating to the ALN, both physically and morally. In the seven months after the line was completed the ALN lost over 6,000 fighters killed and 4,300 weapons captured by the French.\(^{30}\) The worst engagements for the ALN occurred when they attempted to breach the line in large numbers. When French forces detected breaches they would attempt to slow the penetration down through the use of artillery fire while reaction forces drove to the point of penetration. Larger breaches would be met with mechanized reaction forces and, in some cases, airborne troops dropped along the line of march of the ALN units. While most of these engagements lasted no more than one night and usually resulted in a few dozen ALN deaths, several breaching attempts lasted for up to two weeks and resulted in the death of hundreds of ALN troops.\(^{31}\) The worst of these engagements for the ALN was the Battle of Souk-Ahras from 1 to 14 April 1958 when the ALN attempted to breach the line with a one thousand-man strong regiment. At the conclusion of the battle, the ALN had lost 529 killed and 100 captured.\(^{32}\)

The effectiveness of the line grew as the French improved the reaction times of their forces and built roads to improve mobility inside the line. By the end of 1957, French commanders estimated that they were detecting and preventing at least one third of ALN attempts to enter Algeria. Within a year they estimated that French troops destroyed or turned back 95 percent of the penetration attempts.\(^{33}\)

By mid-1958, the ALN all but ceased attempts at large-scale penetrations of the line. Most attempts at crossings were made in very small groups and were reserved for the movement of key leaders across the border. The ALN attempted to circumvent the line to the south by moving through the Sahara, but cross-desert attempts had to be made
in caravans of camels or vehicles, both of which were easily detected by French radar or aircraft. Larger penetrations, such as a two-company attempt on 23 February 1959 that ended in 175 fighters killed or captured were handily contained by French forces. By mid-1959, ALN fighters in Tunisia facing the prospect of crossing the Morice Line asked to be imprisoned in Tunisia rather than face the dangers of an attempted crossing.34

By the end of 1959, the ALN shifted its approach to the Morice Line. ALN leaders recognized the line’s ability to prevent penetration into the interior. Rather than attempt to break the line, the ALN now aimed to tie up as many French troops on the line and inflict as many casualties as possible on French forces.35 Thus, the ALN approached the line not as an obstacle to be breached, but as an objective to target. Instead of attempting to cross the line, ALN troops resorted to merely attacking positions along the line with small arms fire and light mortars. As a result, French forces were forced to move significant quantities of forces (artillery batteries, reactionary forces, and maintenance facilities) out of sight from the line itself so that these forces could not be observed. With the exception of observation posts and combat outposts, all French facilities displaced at least one kilometer from the line to avoid fires and observation from across the line.36 In response to the mortar attacks, the French converted some of their ground detection radars into counter-mortar radars in order to detect the firing positions of ALN mortars.

Compared to the results produced, the Morice Line was a relatively cheap endeavor for the French Army. Construction of the line cost 245 million Francs (approximately fifty million US dollars). Labor costs (48 percent of the total cost) were relatively cheap, due to the use of native Algerian workers. The material costs consisted
mostly of mines (1.2 million mines, accounting for 20 percent of total cost) and barrier materials (mostly fencing, 32 percent of total cost). The construction of the line consumed only .55 percent of the army’s budget, but prevented the ALN from growing in numbers or weaponry. In addition to the material cost, the defense of the Morice Line and casualties in battles to prevent penetrations during the Battle of the Frontier cost the French 273 dead and 736 wounded. Losses were heaviest in the Foreign Legion and parachute regiments as these units comprised the bulk of the reaction forces. However, French losses arguably would have been higher without the Morice Line, as the ALN would have been able to infiltrate thousands more fighters and weapons into Algeria without the line blocking their path. Not only would French losses have been higher, but the presence of additional FLN fighters inside Algeria would have further degraded security inside the country.

While highly effective, the Morice Line was not without significant problems. Aside from the human and material costs, it eventually became a target for the ALN (as discussed earlier). The troops manning the line were almost constantly in the defense which, over time, sapped men and officers of their initiative. Second, the line was manpower intensive, and the men used on the line could not be used to directly affect the primary “target” of French counterinsurgency efforts, the Algerian people (aside from preventing more insurgents and weapons from reaching the Algerian population). Technical problems confounded the engineers who built and manned the line: animals and weather both registered false breaches of the line, and occasional floods washed away fences and mines in wadis. The French responded to the former with manpower and the latter by securing low-lying sections of the line (mines and all) with concrete.
One additional technical problem was that the electrical detection capability of the line could have been rendered completely ineffective if the ALN had simply conducted multiple simultaneous breaches along a one hundred kilometer front. Fortunately for the French, the ALN never exploited this weakness, most likely out of ignorance of the weakness.

Nor was the line completely effective at stopping penetrations by ALN insurgents. Even after the ALN changed their approach to the line from attempting to break through to simply targeting the line, ALN troops still made several successful attempts to cross the line. From the summer of 1958, when the ALN changed their approach, through the end of 1959, the French detected eight successful penetrations of the line between Tunisia and Algeria, including one instance where the ALN was able to infiltrate between three hundred to four hundred fighters through the line without being detected. To reinforce the line’s effectiveness, in 1958 and 1959 the French relocated over seventy thousand Algerians from the frontier to settlement camps farther in the interior of the country. This created a buffer space, devoid of civilian population, that ranged from six to thirty miles from the Morice Line to the interior. Any civilian found inside this zone was assumed to be an infiltrating insurgent and shot on sight.

The only other military technique the French used to interdict insurgent movement, aside from their naval blockade and the Morice Line, was to target an ALN base in Tunisia. The French Air Force bombed an ALN camp in the town of Sakiet, both due to the presence of ALN fighters in the town and due to the fact that anti-aircraft fire from Sakiet had shot down two French airplanes. The bombing was received with widespread international condemnation by governments and the media as civilians were
also reportedly killed in the bombing. As a result, the French never again attempted to destroy the ALN in their base camps in either Tunisia or Morocco.

Overall, French attempts to interdict the movement of weapons and trained insurgents were extremely successful. French intelligence estimated that the ALN had an available manpower pool of twenty-eight thousand men inside Algeria in 1960. Most of these fighters had very little training and many were unarmed. In order to outfit all of their potential fighters inside Algeria, the ALN would have had to smuggle between four and five tons of weapons (680 individual weapons) and an additional twenty-two tons of ammunition every month. The ALN did not come close to this figure; from 1960 through the end of the war, the weapons possessed by the ALN inside Algeria actually decreased, despite possessing approximately 74,000 weapons in various bases and depots in countries outside Algeria. Just as harmful to ALN efforts was the loss of manpower due to the Morice Line. High estimates of ALN strength place the manpower available to the ALN inside Algeria as approximately forty thousand and another twenty thousand outside Algeria (as of mid-1957, after the completion of the line). Not only could the ALN not move the trained fighters back into Algeria, they could not send the untrained men out of the country to receive training.

Tactically and operationally, the French were able to keep the Algerian insurgency in check. Militarily, the insurgency was basically broken by 1960. In addition to the effects of the Morice Line upon the FLN, the Algerian insurgency had been further weakened by the campaign of General Maurice Challe, the commander of all French forces in Algeria from December 1958 to April 1960. This campaign, known as the Challe plan, involved the blanketing of Algerian towns with static security forces (known
as the *quadrillage*), the establishment of a large reserve used to pursue insurgent concentrations, and the use of locally recruited Muslim soldiers (known as *harkis*) for gathering intelligence and tracking insurgent movements.\(^{48}\) By the end of 1960, FLN resistance in Algeria had been scattered into small and militarily ineffective pockets.\(^{49}\)

What the French could not do, however, was offer Arab and Berber Algerians a future in which they had equal status with the European *colons*. This was in no small measure due to the *colons’* absolute refusal to grant non-Europeans any concessions. If the military situation on the ground alone was the deciding factor, President De Gaulle would have been in position to broker a peace deal favorable to French interests. However, the *colons’* intransigence, which culminated in an open rebellion in Algiers in January 1960, inspired the Algerian resistance to continue their cause. Faced with the prospect of continuing a massive counterinsurgency effort indefinitely just to maintain a status quo for the recalcitrant *colon* population, the French agreed to a referendum on independence in 1962. Algerians voted overwhelmingly for independence, which the French granted in the same year.

**Rhodesia**

Like the French experience in Algeria, the Rhodesian government’s efforts to stem insurgent interdiction across Rhodesian borders from 1965-1980 show a successful example of how the interdiction of insurgent men and materiel contributed to a militarily successful counterinsurgency campaign. During these years, the Rhodesian government sought to preserve its system of white minority rule over a black majority population. The key difference between the France’s experience with interdiction in Algeria and the
Rhodesian experience was the amount of resources, both men and materiel, available to the government to affect interdiction.

On 11 November 1965, the government of Rhodesia broke from the British government when it announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The declaration was a reaction to moves by the British government towards majority rule in Britain’s colonial holdings in southern Africa. In 1965, Rhodesia was ruled by a white minority government and white farmers enjoyed the fruits of Rhodesia’s best farmlands. The black majority enjoyed neither voting rights nor ownership of comparable farmlands. After the Rhodesian government rejected majority rule and declared independence from Britain, black African nationalist leaders switched tactics from urban protest to armed struggle against the Rhodesian government. These leaders split and formed two movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). The armed wings of these movements became known as the Zimbabwe African National Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), respectively. Both groups initially hoped to insert groups of insurgents into Rhodesia and foment sufficient violence to force the British government to intervene in the country. In the early 1970s, ZAPU changed its focus from guerilla warfare in Rhodesia to preparing a conventional army for an eventual invasion of Rhodesia from Zambia. ZANU maintained an insurgent struggle in Rhodesia throughout the war.

Both ZANU and ZAPU established headquarters in Zambia and sent their fighters around the globe for training. ZAPU’s insurgency was sponsored by the Soviet Union and ZIPRA recruits received training in Russia, Cuba, Algeria, Bulgaria, North Korea, and Zaire. ZANU was sponsored by China and ZANLA recruits received training in
China, Cuba, Ghana, and Egypt. Later in the war, both ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters would receive training from a variety of foreign militaries at camps in Zambia and Mozambique.

From their camps in Zambia, ZANLA and ZIPRA conducted clumsy incursions into Rhodesia from 1965 to 1968. Both organizations failed to precede these initial infiltrations with any proselytizing to create popular support for the guerillas before the guerillas arrived. En route to their destinations within Rhodesia the guerillas had to pass through the forbidding and relatively under-populated territory of the Zambezi River Valley. What little population did live along the Zambezi was hostile to the insurgent cause. Thus insurgents attempting to infiltrate in these years were handicapped by four key factors. First, the terrain through which insurgent moved their forces made it easy for Rhodesian security forces to spot or track insurgent movement. Second, the population in those areas was likely to report on the insurgents’ movements. Third, when the insurgent reached his destination (northeast of Salisbury) he found little in the way of infrastructure in place to support him. Fourth, the insurgents themselves made infiltration more difficult by attempting to move in large groups typically seventy-five to one hundred fighters.

In the 1970s, Zimbabwean insurgents expanded their external operations to Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, Botswana and Namibia. Until 1974, Mozambique was a Portuguese colony. The Portuguese security forces’ tenuous control over the southwest portion of Mozambique allowed ZANU to use Mozambique first as an infiltration lane and later as an area for staging camps. ZANU fighters moved through Mozambique with assistance from insurgents of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, or FRELIMO, who were fighting the Portuguese. By 1969, Rhodesian
security forces found it necessary to patrol the border of Mozambique in addition to Zambia. In 1974, Portugal’s government fell to a coup that was largely inspired by the economic pressures of Portugal’s colonial wars in Africa. The Portuguese quickly abandoned their African colonial holdings. In Mozambique, FRELIMO leaders took power. This allowed ZANU insurgents to openly use southwestern Mozambique as a staging and training area with the full consent of the Mozambique government.

Insurgent infiltration efforts and Rhodesian security force attempts to stem the tide of infiltration expanded from 1974 through the end of the war. While ZAPU focused on building a conventional military capability in Zambia, ZANU insurgents expanded their infiltration routes. By the war’s end, the Rhodesian government faced the threat of insurgent infiltration through Zambia, all of Mozambique, and parts of Botswana (see Figure 2 for a map of insurgent infiltration routes). This put significant stress on counterinsurgent resources, primarily manpower.

Zimbabwean insurgents, both ZANU and ZAPU, relied on their external camps for a variety of tasks. First, the insurgents had to transport all of their weapons and ammunition across Rhodesia’s border. The insurgents were unsuccessful at stealing or capturing weapons from Rhodesian security forces and lacked the ability to manufacture weapons or ammunition inside Rhodesia. Secondly, insurgents used their external camps as training camps, since pressure from Rhodesian security forces prevented them from training inside Rhodesia. ZANU and ZAPU fighters were recruited (or in some instances kidnapped) in the tribal reserve areas of Rhodesia, spirited across the border, trained in camps in Zambia or Mozambique and eventually infiltrated back across the
border with arms from China (in the case of ZANU fighters) or the USSR (in the case of ZAPU fighters).

Figure 2. Map of Insurgent Infiltration Routes into Rhodesia

Rhodesian security forces were significantly constrained by a lack of materiel and manpower. The Rhodesian air force consisted of only 168 aircraft, of which seventy-seven were helicopters and twenty-five were ground attack jets. It was manned by only 1,300 personnel. The ground forces, when totaled, equated to less than a division in size. Conventional forces consisted of the Rhodesian Light Infantry Regiment of one thousand men, the Rhodesian African Rifles with 2,800 men, two batteries of artillery, an armored car regiment, and Grey’s Scouts (a battalion of horse-mounted infantry). Rhodesian
special forces, consisting of the Special Air Service and the Selous Scouts, added the equivalent of another battalion to the total manpower. Rhodesian police, known as the British South African Police (despite being neither British nor South African), also participated in the counterinsurgency campaign. At the height of the war (and during the peak of Rhodesian security force size), the Rhodesian security forces could mobilize no more than sixty thousand men, and only for a short duration. This force faced an insurgent army estimated by the Rhodesians to number just fewer than six thousand in 1974. While most of these fighters were outside the country, their numbers would continue to grow through the war’s end in 1980.

The Rhodesian government was considered by much of the outside world to be rulers of a pariah state because of their policies that denied the black population the right to vote or own land in the more productive parts of the country. Rhodesia was in fact the subject of an international embargo for much of its existence. As a result, the Rhodesian government was limited in its use on nonmilitary means to combat insurgent infiltration. The Rhodesians did, however, make some use of their economic, diplomatic, and informational elements of national power.

The Rhodesians had limited economic power that they could exert upon their neighbors in an effort to encourage those neighbors to curb Zimbabwean insurgent activities. Rhodesia was a land-locked country and as such relied upon its neighbors for the import and export of goods. Only on one occasion did the Rhodesian government shut off trade with one of its neighbors, when in January of 1973 Rhodesia closed all of its border crossings with Zambia. The government forbade all trade with Zambia, with the exception of copper (a critical shortfall in Rhodesia). The Zambian government did
nothing to move against the Zimbabwean insurgents encamped in southern Zambia and the economic cost to Rhodesia proved too high. Within a month, the Rhodesian government re-opened the border crossings to all types of trade.64

The Rhodesians were slightly more successful in using diplomatic power. They were able to cast their struggle in a light similar to their neighbors’ conflicts. By portraying their struggle as sharing the common goal of preserving the white man’s way of life in southern Africa, the Rhodesian government was able to secure assistance from both South Africa and the Portuguese in Mozambique. The Portuguese, already hard pressed in their fight against FRELIMO insurgents, were able to offer little more than intelligence sharing to Rhodesia. Rhodesian security forces actually operated inside Mozambique with the approval of the Portuguese government. The South Africans were able to offer substantially more support, deploying up to 1200 police and para-military forces to Rhodesia to interdict insurgents in the Victoria Falls area.65 Additionally, South Africa deployed twenty helicopters and their pilots to support Rhodesian efforts.66 The South African government also provided Rhodesia with substantial economic aid. In doing so, the South African government was not merely helping a state operating with a familiar system of white rule, but it also was acting within its own interests since fighters backed by the African National Congress (the opposition movement to South Africa’s government) were operating in Rhodesia and transiting to South Africa after receiving training to the north.67

To disrupt infiltration, the Rhodesian government used its informational element of national power to notify Zimbabwean insurgents that Rhodesian security forces knew specific details about planned insurgent incursions. The aim of these operations was to
deceive the insurgents into believing that Rhodesian security forces had more information about insurgent intentions and capabilities than the security forces actually possessed. For instance, in December of 1968, Rhodesian intelligence received indications that ZAPU insurgents were preparing to cross the Zambezi in a fresh incursion to the Rhodesian interior. Acting on the information, Rhodesian planes equipped with loudspeakers flew over the Zambezi, broadcasting an “invitation” from the Rhodesian army to the insurgents. The effect remains unknown, but there was no known incursion after the broadcasts.68

With their other three elements of national power constrained, the task of countering border incursions fell almost entirely upon the Rhodesian security forces. Unlike the French, the Rhodesians actually had some doctrine with respect to border control operations. This doctrine, however, consisted of little more than a few pages from the *Rhodesian Security Forces Counterinsurgency Manual*.69 This is not surprising since the Rhodesians had so little manpower to devote towards interdicting insurgents along the border. For the same reason, it is no wonder that the Rhodesians saw “border control operations” as little more than a deterrent to insurgent operations, with the true work of counterinsurgency operations to be performed by patrols that worked in depth throughout the interior of the country.

Rhodesian security forces excelled at patrolling. The small unit patrol was perhaps the most effective tool that the Rhodesian security forces employed to intercept insurgent movement. Rhodesian border patrols were kept small, most consisting of five or six men who would hunt for traces of the enemy throughout the day and settle into ambushes at night.70 These patrols displayed incredible endurance, staying out of their...
base camps for up to twenty days at a time. If these patrols detected insurgent movement, they would call for ground or helicopter-borne reinforcements that would then seal off the area and hunt down the insurgents.71

The tactic of reinforcing the reconnaissance patrols with helicopter-borne troops proved so successful at locating and killing insurgents that in 1973 the Rhodesian security forces combined their limited helicopter assets at two bases and permanently associated two companies of the Rhodesian Light Infantry with the helicopter groupings. These groups of helicopters and the associated infantry companies became known as “Fireforces.”72 The helicopters used by the Fireforces were Alouettes, each of which had four seats for ground troops. This led to a team of four soldiers becoming the basic tactical unit of Rhodesian ground forces. The Fireforces increased their killing efficiency by equipping every fifth helicopter with a twenty-millimeter cannon. These gun-equipped helicopters would be used to kill the insurgents fleeing from the troops inserted by Fireforce troop-carrying helicopters. The Fireforce troops proved to be highly effective and claimed to kill ten insurgents for every soldier they lost to enemy action.73

Another method the Rhodesian government employed to combat insurgent infiltration was “strategic resettlement,” which entailed moving large sections of the tribal population away from areas where the population could aid insurgent movement.74 The strategic resettlement program revolved around moving villagers along the borders into “protected villages” farther inland. Each protected village was surrounded by a fence and located along a road that led to the interior of the country. A small detachment of Rhodesian security forces provided security for the village and attempted to eradicate contact between the villagers and insurgents. A village would typically have two
checkpoints for entry and exit, one at each end of the road as it passed through the village. This allowed a relatively small contingent of Rhodesian security forces to both observe the population and control traffic along operationally significant roads.75

The Rhodesian government conducted the first resettlement in 1973 along the border with Mozambique and in the Zambezi River Valley, the primary corridor for insurgents infiltrating from Zambia. From October of 1973 to January of 1974, eight thousand villagers were moved from areas along the borders.76 The protected villages program was greatly expanded from 1974 to 1976 and grew to include tribal areas deep in the interior of Rhodesia. This expanded program was called Operation Overload and eventually involved the resettlement of almost fifty thousand villagers.77 Many of these protected villages were created less for inhibiting insurgent movement and more to remove threats to white farmlands and Rhodesia’s capitol, Salisbury. However, resettlement continued in the Zambezi River Valley through 1976, further eroding the insurgents’ ability to support their cross-border movements while making it easier for security forces to track and capture him.

Ostensibly, the protected villages were built in order to protect the population from the insurgency. However, the key motive behind the first months of the strategic resettlement program lay in creating areas along the border that were depopulated, making the Rhodesian army’s job of hunting insurgents in these areas easier.78 Any settlements left behind by the villagers were destroyed as were wells and any crops.79 Rhodesian security forces then declared these areas to be “no-go” areas and portions were defoliated. The problem of tracking insurgent through the area was simplified for security forces, since after re-settlement any trace of human movement could be presumed to be
made by insurgent activity. Likewise, anyone found in the no-go areas could be assumed to be an insurgent and shot or detained.

Thus, the security forces’ concept for deterring insurgent movement became a multi-layered approach. The insurgent would first have to cross a minefield and border obstacle system (this was the Cordon Sanitaire, which is discussed below). If the insurgent crossed the minefield unscathed, he would then have to cross an area that was devoid of vegetation, either through defoliation or bulldozing. In crossing this area the insurgent would potentially leave tracks for security forces to detect. The insurgent then faced a march of several dozen miles through an area where the population had been removed, crops destroyed, and wells filled. If he was spotted by security forces while moving through this area, he would be shot on sight. Finally, in order to reach a friendly population the insurgent had to pass through an area dotted with protected villages that were under the control of security forces.

The first obstacle listed above that an infiltrating insurgent would have had to surmount was the Cordon Sanitaire. The Cordon Sanitaire was an obstacle belt consisting of wire and anti-personnel mines that was laid along the border between Rhodesia and Mozambique. Rhodesian engineers started work on the Cordon Sanitaire (or “Corsan,” as it became known) in May of 1972 and continued for two years. The original Corsan stretched 179 kilometers between the Msengezi and Mazoe Rivers and consisted of little more than two game fences twenty-five meters apart with mines spread between the two fences (see Figure 3 for a depiction of the Corsan’s locations). Despite a density of up to 5,500 blast mines per kilometer of frontage, insurgents found it relatively easy to penetrate the Corsan. The ease with which insurgents penetrated the Corsan is
unsurprising since the mines were laid in three rows with one to three mines placed in every meter of the rows. The narrow width and relatively symmetrical pattern of the Corsan would have made it easy for insurgents to detect the location of mines relatively quickly.

Like the Morice Line, the Corsan was intended to detect insurgent movement rather than block it altogether. In this mission the Corsan failed since the Rhodesians lacked sufficient manpower to cover the length of the Corsan. The original concept for the Corsan included a reaction post every ten kilometers along the line, but the Rhodesians did not have enough men to fill all of the planned outposts. Instead, the Rhodesians covered the ground using long-range patrols which could not adequately provide reaction forces to the point of penetration if the insurgents were detected (insurgents could be detected either by detonating a mine or tripping an alarm fence that was used along selected sections of the line). While not perfectly effective, the Rhodesians’ system of long-range patrolling was likely the best means available due to their manpower constraints. If the Rhodesians had manned the Corsan with twenty men every ten kilometers, the Corsan would have required 360 men. A modest estimate of the required logistical troops to support these garrisons would increase the number to well over four hundred. This would have represented an investment of approximately 10 percent of Rhodesia’s active army to cover less than 6 percent of the country’s borders.

To make up for the shortfalls of the Corsan, the Rhodesians added layers to the minefield system, creating a modified Corsan (or “Mod Corsan”) and later a Modified Mod Corsan (the “Mod Mod Corsan”). Improvements included adding additional rows of mines, using more sophisticated mines such as fragmentation and trip wire directional
mines. Despite modifications, Rhodesian engineers could never compensate for the Corsan’s two weaknesses: manpower to patrol the line and maintenance to keep the Corsan intact. Eventually the Rhodesians forsook building a perfect system in order to cover more of the border areas. By 1978, Rhodesian engineers reverted to the original Corsan design, although these late iterations were built with directional mines and constructed along preexisting roads rather than along the trace of the border.

Figure 3. Map of Cordon Sanitaire Locations

Despite its weakness the Corsan was not a complete failure. By the war’s end, most of Rhodesia’s border with Mozambique was mined as was the Victoria Falls area
along the border with Zambia. While insurgents were in some areas able to infiltrate through the mines, the minefields encouraged many insurgents to make longer and longer trips in order to avoid the hazards of such an infiltration. By 1976 ZANU insurgents resorted to a circuitous infiltration route, entering Rhodesia through the Zhou game park (located in the southeast corner of the country; this area too was eventually mined).\textsuperscript{86} ZAPU insurgents were driven to infiltrate through Namibia and Botswana in order to avoid minefields planted in the Victoria Falls area. The Corsan still plagues residents of the border areas, since over 1.5 million mines are still in place along present-day Zimbabwe’s borders. To date they have caused several hundred civilian casualties and rendered eight thousand square kilometers of land unusable.\textsuperscript{87}

One of the more unique aspects of Rhodesian interdiction was the frequency with which Rhodesian security forces crossed their borders to destroy insurgents at their base camps in neighboring countries. During the course of the counterinsurgency campaign, Rhodesian security forces launched forty-two cross-border raids, killing hundreds of insurgents and destroying tons of enemy materiel.\textsuperscript{88} The first of these raids were concentrated in Zambia and Mozambique, but later included Botswana and Namibia. Rhodesian ground forces further supported five air strikes in Mozambique by locating targets and providing terminal guidance for the bombing aircraft. These operations cost Rhodesian security forces a total of nineteen killed or wounded.

Until 1974, members of the Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Special Air Service operated across the border in Mozambique on a regular basis in order to gather intelligence on insurgent activities.\textsuperscript{89} They did so with the consent of the Portuguese government, which was unable to contain their own internal insurgent movements.
Rhodesian security forces were also authorized to conduct “hot pursuit” of insurgent groups across the Mozambican border.\textsuperscript{90}

While many of these operations were conducted by the Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Special Air Service, the unit that most fed the success of Rhodesian external operations was the Selous Scouts Regiment. The Selous Scouts were formed in 1973 for the purpose of “clandestine elimination of ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists, both within and outside Rhodesia.”\textsuperscript{91} The Selous Scouts contributed to the counterinsurgency campaign by more than just killing insurgents; they provided some of the best intelligence on the location of infiltration routes and insurgent base camps. The Selous Scouts obtained their intelligence by infiltrating insurgent groups, either by using captured and “turned” insurgents or by inserting their agents along known infiltration routes to be “recruited” by insurgent groups. These “pseudo-ops teams” would pose as insurgents returning from Rhodesia to recuperate in a base camp. Along the route they would collect intelligence from the groups of insurgents they would encounter and often kill the insurgents before moving farther up the infiltration route.\textsuperscript{92}

The intelligence produced by the Selous Scouts and other sources led to dozens of cross border raids to kill insurgents, destroy their supplies, and sever their lines of communication. Because of the relatively small size of the Rhodesian security forces, these operations relied on audacity as a matter of course. An example is \textit{Operation Long John}, conducted in June 1976.\textsuperscript{93} In the operation, fifty-five Rhodesian soldiers, most of them white members of the Selous Scouts disguised as ZAPU insurgents, drove sixty kilometers into Mozambique to destroy a guerilla camp at Mapai. The raiding force used vehicles disguised to look like Mozambican armored cars and buses. The Selous Scouts
killed or wounded only thirty-seven insurgents, but destroyed a significant quantity of insurgent weaponry and materiel, in addition to severing rail and telephone lines.

Even more daring was Operation Eland, a raid to destroy a ZANU staging camp at Nyadzonya, Mozambique that housed as many as five thousand fighters.\(^9^4\) As in Operation Long John, Rhodesian soldiers disguised as Mozambicans drove to the base and obtained entry from the gate guard without firing a shot. The soldiers pulled up to a morning formation of eight hundred men and announced over a loudspeaker “We have taken Zimbabwe!” As the men in the formation swarmed the vehicles in celebration of the “news,” the Rhodesians opened fire with machine guns and 81mm mortars, killing over six hundred insurgents.

Not all of the external operations were as dramatic as Operation Eland. Most of the operations aimed at killing insurgents and destroying equipment in their camps. These operations were conducted not just by the Selous Scouts, but by the Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Special Air Service. These forces inserted to their objective areas by foot, vehicle, helicopter, parachute, canoe and even bicycle.\(^9^5\) Other operations were conducted to ambush insurgents, especially leaders, along roads in Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana.

Rhodesian security forces went to considerable trouble to cut insurgent lines of communication. These external operations included laying mines on roads, destruction of rail and road bridges, disabling a power station in Mozambique, destruction of communications stations, sinking a ferry in Botswana, and destroying dredging ships in Mozambique.\(^9^6\)
In addition to the raids and strikes that Rhodesian security forces conducted in neighboring countries, Rhodesia maintained a continual military presence outside her borders for the purposes of intelligence gathering and fomenting foreign insurgency. The Special Air Service conducted most of the intelligence gathering and was outside the country so much that Lieutenant General Walls, the Commanding General of Rhodesian security forces was able to say in 1978, “There is not a single day of the year when we are not operating beyond our borders.”

The Rhodesian government also attempted to slow insurgent movement by creating an insurgent movement against the government of Mozambique in 1977. The Rhodesian government sponsored this movement, the Resistancia Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), in the hopes that the Mozambican government would be less able to support anti-Rhodesian insurgents if faced with an insurgency of their own. While RENAMO did develop into a full insurgency, its effect on reducing insurgent movement into Rhodesia was limited. RENAMO’s largest contribution was to destabilize the area with a civil war that lasted until 1994 and killed over one million people.

In the end, interdiction, combined with aggressive small unit actions in the interior of the country and extensive police intelligence networks in urban areas, worked. Major urban areas such as Salisbury and Bulwayo were kept safe from insurgent threat, as were the majority of white-owned farms. Arguably, the Rhodesian government could have held the status quo through military means indefinitely.

However, the Rhodesians were reliant upon support from South Africa, both economic and military. In particular, almost all of the helicopter pilots that the Rhodesians needed to execute Fireforce tactics were South African. The South African
military, through involvement in her neighbors’ wars, was over-extended. By the late 1970s, the South African government found its military fighting in five different countries. By 1978, the South African government viewed a moderate black-majority government to the north was a better alternative to continued conflict across southern Africa. When the South African government withdrew its military and economic support, the Rhodesians could no longer sustain their interdiction efforts. Even when the Rhodesians enjoyed the South African support, successes gained by military forces could not be consolidated with a force to remain and conduct the long-term pacification efforts vital to counterinsurgency. After attempting to form a coalition government with moderate black leaders, Prime Minister Ian Smith consented to a “one man, one vote” election in 1980, ending white minority rule.

Iraq

Problems with Infiltration in Iraq

The United States and its Coalition partners invaded Iraq in March of 2003 after Saddam Hussein refused to comply with demands that he disclose the full extent of his alleged long-range missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. After a remarkably rapid advance on Baghdad, Coalition forces captured Baghdad on 9 April. Although the President of the United States declared the end of major combat operations after landing on the deck of the USS Independence on 1 May 2003, a determined insurgency formed and grew in strength during the latter half of that year. The Iraqi insurgency continued until the time of this writing (2007). While most insurgent actions consisted of extremely short-duration attacks, insurgents did manage to muster enough
force to take control of and hold Iraqi cities such as Fallujah, Tal Afar, and numerous smaller cities in western Iraq until the insurgents were expelled or driven to ground in those cities from November 2004 to late 2006.

Iraq’s borders remained a problem for Coalition forces throughout the counterinsurgency campaign. Iraq has over 3,600 kilometers of border, of which almost one-half is with Iran (1458 kilometers) and shorter distances with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan. The border Iraq shares with Kuwait poses little problem, because Coalition forces maintain a sizable presence in northern Kuwait. Similarly, the borders with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan do not pose a major problem of insurgent infiltration, since these governments are relatively friendly to the United States and maintain some control of the movement across their borders. In northern Iraq, the borders are controlled by the Peshmerga, a Kurdish militia force that is recognized by the Iraqi constitution.

To date, Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran caused the largest infiltration problems for Coalition forces. Foreign fighters, expertise, and money entered Iraq from both countries and sophisticated ground weapons crossed from Iran into Iraq. According to the US State Department, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) of the Iranian Army trained the Badr Organization, the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). General Casey (the commander of U.S forces in Iraq from June 2004 to February 2007), Donald Rumsfeld (former Secretary of Defense), and General Pace (the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), all made assertions that the IRGC supplies weapons and explosives to Shia militia groups. While Iran remains the primary source of smuggled weapons, Syria has been the primary conduit for foreign
foreign fighters seeking entrance into Iraq. The US State Department estimated that foreign fighters contribute between four and ten percent of the estimated twenty thousand insurgents in Iraq and that these insurgents are responsible for a disproportionate amount of the suicide attacks in Iraq.\(^{103}\) Between April and October of 2005, Coalition forces captured 311 foreign fighters in Iraq, the majority of which entered Iraq through Syria.\(^{104}\) In November 2006, Major General William Caldwell, the chief spokesman for Coalition forces in Iraq, estimated that up to seventy foreign fighters were entering Iraq from Syria each month.\(^{105}\)

While from 2004 to 2006 the US government focused attention on foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria, in 2007 it also provided evidence of Iranian support and weapons ending up in the hands of Iraqi Shia militias. The most public and detailed display of evidence came on 11 February 2007, when military intelligence officers displayed a variety of weapons captured in Iraq with Iranian markings.\(^{106}\) Included in the weapons displayed were TNT (with Farsi markings) seized on the Iraqi border in December of 2005, Misagh surface to air missiles (SAM) used by insurgents in 2004, 81-millimeter mortar rounds seized in 2006, and Iranian anti-tank rocket propelled grenades seized in Baghdad in early 2007. Coalition forces also seized numerous explosively-formed penetrators (EFP), a particularly effective type of improvised explosive device, in numerous locations throughout Iraq.\(^{107}\) The EFPs lack Iranian markings, but are similar to weapons supplied to Palestinian insurgents by Iran. Coalition officials believe that the EFPs (especially those found with passive-infrared triggers)\(^{108}\) are beyond the manufacturing capabilities of insurgents inside Iraq. The fact that EFPs have predominately been used and captured in Shia areas circumstantially supports the
evidence that these weapons are being supplied by Iran. Officials at the same February 2007 brief contend that Iraqi extremists (presumably Shia extremists) cross into Iran and receive training from the Qods Force of the IRGC.

US Use of Nonmilitary Elements of Power to Counter Infiltration

The United States made considerable use of nonmilitary means of power in attempts to stop the flow of weapons and fighters into Iraq from neighboring countries. The earliest and perhaps most visible of these means was the use of economic power to influence Syria. The United States recognized Syria as the primary conduit for foreign fighters entering Iraq and, in May of 2004, imposed economic sanctions on Syria. At the time US companies held approximately $500 million of investments in Syria, most of which was in the oil industry. The cost of withholding these assets (and forbidding US companies from doing business with Syria) was not high for either the United States or Syria. However, what caused Syria significantly more pain was the requirement by the US government for all US financial institutions to cease dealings with the Commercial Bank of Syria. This move effectively ended Syria’s ability to conduct most international transactions.

The economic sanctions imposed by the United States not only put economic pressure on the Syrian government to act against foreign fighters and facilitators, but it also hampered the ability of individuals in Syria to funnel money into Iraq. Assets flowing into Iraq include money that was spirited out of the country by Baath party officials shortly before the invasion and money from private financiers of the insurgency. The US government lacks exact figures on the amount of money flowing across the
border to fund the insurgency, but estimates put the magnitude in billions each year, according to Daniel Gallington, an aide to former Secretary Rumsfeld.\textsuperscript{110} A conservative estimate of Iraqi Baath party money held in Syrian banks is $200 million.\textsuperscript{111} The former deputy commander of US Central Command stated that Coalition aircraft saw caravans carrying “Tons of cash” out of the country as the Iraqi regime fell in 2003.\textsuperscript{112} The US military estimated that millions of dollars of that money came back into Iraq to fund the insurgency each week.\textsuperscript{113}

Diplomatically, the United States attempts to stem the flow of arms and foreign insurgents into Iraq by both reducing the world-wide supply of arms and by applying direct pressure on Iraq’s neighbors. On a macro level, the United States actively participates in international efforts to reduce the illicit trade in small arms. The United States’ goals in this area include attempting to curb black market transfers, attempts to raise the export standards of other countries, increasing the accountability of US arms exports, and supporting the destruction of excess stockpiles in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{114} The United States’ actions to support these goals include signing conventions, participating in international forums, and assisting ten countries with the destruction of excess stockpiles. All of these actions combined could only indirectly affect the amount of weapons and fighters moving into Iraq from neighboring countries, since only in one instance did these efforts specifically reduce the amount of arms in Southwest Asia (and in this case it was in Kuwait).

Other efforts targeted specific countries in the region through diplomacy. The United States, in concert with the Iraqi government, placed diplomatic pressure on Iran and Syria. As early as April of 2004, Richard Boucher, spokesman for Secretary of State
Colin Powell, stated that “[Syria] needs to control the transit of its borders by terrorists and people supporting the insurgents in Iraq.”

The United States was hard pressed to take direct diplomatic action with Syria, due to the previously reduced diplomatic relations between the two countries. The United States did, however, participate in tripartite border security talks with the Syrian and Iraqi governments in November of 2004. These talks, aside from an “ongoing dialogue” maintained by the US embassy in Damascus, were the only talks between the United States and Syria for over a year. In September of 2004, William Burns, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, met with Syrian officials to discuss a variety of issues, the most pressing of which was Iraqi border security. A brief “side meeting” between Secretary of State Powell and Syria’s foreign minister, Farouk al-Shara, followed three weeks later during a conference of twenty countries at Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt. Meetings between representatives of Syria and the United States continued in 2005, with a visit by Senator John Kerry to Damascus in January. Direct meetings ended in the wake of the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. After that assassination the United States withdrew its ambassador to Syria back to Washington.

As with its relations with Syria, the United States has not maintained normal diplomatic relations with Iran. The United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran in 1980 after Iranian students held US citizens hostage for over a year. Trade between the United States and Iran is limited to small amounts of food, medical supplies, and carpets. The only official direct diplomatic contact that the US government made with Iran was a regional conference on solving Iraq’s security problems held in Baghdad on 10
March 2007. This was the first direct contact between US and Iranian diplomatic official since prior to the 2003 invasion.

With little in the way of diplomatic and economic ties, the United States has little in the way of direct leverage on Iran to induce Iran to cease from providing arms, money and training to Iraqi extremist groups. Instead the United States chose to apply pressure to Iran through public diplomacy. One such measure was the 11 March 2007 Baghdad briefing on Iranian arms captured in Iraq. Another was the publicly announced detention of five members of the IRGC in Irbil in January of 2007. The arrests and the February press briefing followed in the wake of multiple accusations, by senior US military officers and the Secretary of Defense, of Iranian support to Shia extremist groups.

One remaining economic weapon left for the United States is to build sufficient support for strict international economic sanctions against Iran that would inhibit Iran’s ability to participate in the international baking system. Such sanctions would restrict Iran’s ability to purchase expensive machinery needed to maintain its industry and would severely impact Iran’s economy. The United States is unlikely, however, to build the support necessary for such sanctions unless the US government can tie those sanctions to other Iranian actions (such as Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons). China and Russia, both trading partners of Iran, would likely oppose tough sanctions, but even the weight of joint US and European sanctions alone would hurt Iran’s economy.

**US Doctrine Pertaining to Countering Infiltration**

As with the French and Rhodesian governments in the previous case studies, the United States used military means more than nonmilitary means to interdict cross-border
insurgent movement of fighters and weapons. Surprisingly, the United States has little
document on this subject. The lack of doctrine on the subject is surprising when one
considers how much doctrine the US military produces (as an example of prodigious
document, the US military rewrote its doctrine on the use of donkeys and other pack
animals in 2004). The new counterinsurgency manual for the Army and Marine Corps
(FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency) mentions border security in only two sentences on two
pages. FM 3-24 lists securing national and regional borders as one potential task as
part of a possible combat operations line of operation. In Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint
TTP for Foreign Internal Defense, “training personnel at entry and exit points” merits a
one sentence mention. A search of Army, Marine, and Joint doctrine finds few
references greater than one sentence long that deal with stopping cross-border movement.
Army FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations gives the following
guidance:

Restricting the flow of goods across international borders is accomplished
by using OPs, dismounted and vehicular patrols, and aerial surveillance integrated
with checkpoints. Unauthorized or contraband supplies and equipment are
confiscated or destroyed. Units must be prepared to stop individuals involved in
illegal activity and turn them over to the civil authority.

The above doctrinal guidance is given, not in reference to interdicting insurgent
movement of personnel and weapons, but in a chapter on peace operations. The Marine
Corps Small Wars Manual (1940) also contains a brief mention of border interdiction
with two paragraphs dedicated to the subject.

The longest US doctrinal treatment of countering cross-border movement is in
FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations. FM 90-8, written in 1986, devotes four pages to
the subject and lists two techniques for controlling borders. One technique is the creation
of a “restricted zone” by defoliating the border and erecting obstacles with detection devices. The other technique is to create a “population buffer” by redistributing the civilian population in border areas (either by moving populations sympathetic to the insurgency away from the border or moving populations hostile to insurgency to the border area).

**Military Operations to Secure Iraq’s Borders**

In execution, the US military’s actions in securing Iraq’s borders from infiltration have resembled the creation of a “restricted zone” as described in FM 90-8. The FM 90-8 advocates using host nation forces to secure the borders, which was the United States’ plan for Iraq’s border areas from the initial stages of planning to eventual execution.

Because the Coalition’s initial invasion force was relatively small and not expected to grow during the occupation, the US Central Command planned to keep members of the Iraqi army on the payroll in order to perform tasks for which there were not enough Coalition troops to perform. Securing Iraq’s borders was one of these tasks. Unfortunately, the “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number Two,” issued two months after the invasion, dissolved all of Iraq’s former military, to include border guards. With neither border guards nor the Iraqi Army guarding the border, and with Coalition troops concentrating on securing urban areas (or redeploying to the United States), Iraq’s borders were largely left unguarded and uncontrolled. This condition continued for months, in part because the Coalition Provisional Authority’s plan for border guards was to create border police under the Ministry of the Interior, vice the Ministry of Defense. While the US military closely supervised the Ministry of Defense,
they did not have a mission to supervise the Ministry of the Interior. In May of 2003, the only Coalition entity to supervise Ministry of Interior forces was a thirty-four man assessment team that had the responsibility to evaluate the capability and requirements for all of Iraq’s police forces, to include any border police.

Iraq’s border areas remained poorly addressed until the fall of 2003. Initially in western Al-Anbar province, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment was assigned responsibility for both the border and the populated areas of western Al-Anbar. Despite conducting sweeps of border towns and employing Air Force and Navy aircraft to observe the border, the 3rd ACR had more ground (both towns and border area) to cover than they could manage with their forces available. In northwest Iraq, the border was more firmly controlled by elements of the 101st Airborne Division, but as in Al-Anbar, the 101st had too few troops to both maintain order in the urban areas and supervise the border. The 101st and the 3rd ACR held responsibility for over 560 kilometers of Iraq’s border with Syria, in addition to securing the Mosul and Anbar provinces. While the 82nd Airborne Division relieved the 3rd ACR, resulting in an increase in the number of troops in Al-Anbar, just one Stryker Brigade Combat Team relieved the 101st, resulting in a drastic drop in the number of troops available. The forces in both cases were insufficient in number to both control their respective provinces and supervise their borders.

Along Iraq’s border with Iran, the Coalition had even fewer troops. During Saddam Hussein’s regime, the mission of guarding the Iran-Iraq border fell upon five divisions of the Iraqi Army (about seventy thousand men). The CPA Order Number Two effectively ended border security along this section of the border. After the initial
invasion, control of these areas (Iraq’s borders with Iran in the Wasit, Maysan, and Basrah Provinces) largely fell upon the United States partners in the Coalition. The number of Coalition troops in these areas was lower than in areas controlled by United States troops. On the border, the Coalition maintained only enough troops to monitor the official points of entry (a situation similar to that found in areas controlled by the US military). In the spring of 2004, the United States closed sixteen of nineteen points of entry along the border with Iran in order to reduce the number of spots at which Iranian agents could potentially enter the country. This left three points of entry and fifteen manned “denial points” to control the border. These positions were undermanned and inadequate to the task of stopping border traffic entering from Iran. However, traffic was still able to cross the border in areas not controlled by border guards. Even at the controlled points of entry, border guards allowed Shia pilgrims headed to Najaf and Karbala to pass without passports. According to Iraqi border officers, Shia political parties (SCIRI and Dawa) paid guides to circumvent official points of entry and carry Iranian pilgrims across the border. Many of the men brought across the border as pilgrims may have actually been Iranian agents entering Iraq to provide support for Shia extremist groups.

In March of 2004, the CPA announced measures to control movement across Iraq’s borders. The CPA restricted the number of crossing sites and stated that all visitors were required to present a passport upon entry into the country. Additionally, the Coalition would track all visitors on a centralized database. It is unclear if anyone in the Coalition ever built such a database, since as late as 2006 US battalions in Iraq had no access to such a database to ascertain whether detainees were foreigners.
March, the US Air Force announced that it planned to use U-2 surveillance planes and E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar Systems (JSTARS) “around the clock” to observe cross-border movements.145

The Coalition also placed more visible measures into effect by March of 2004. Along Iraq’s border with Syria in Anbar Province, the 82nd Airborne Division completed the construction of a ten to twelve foot earthen berm along two hundred miles of the border.146 However, this berm was inadequate to stop cross-border traffic. Iraq’s fledgling border police lacked both the manpower and vehicles to effectively patrol the border areas covered by the berm.147 Additionally, smugglers and foreign fighters were eventually able to traverse the berm in four wheel drive vehicles.148 Even if border police detected them, they were unable to catch the infiltrating vehicles since the border police at the time lacked four-wheel drive vehicles.

Across Iraq, the border police had just over 8200 border police on duty in March of 2004.149 At the time, the US government estimated that one to three thousand foreign fighters were in Iraq (with fewer than three hundred in custody in US detention facilities in Iraq), with more entering each month.150 In addition to those potentially coming across the Iranian border, many foreign fighters entered from Syria, transported by their facilitators from mosque to mosque along the Euphrates River Valley.151

The responsibility for supervising and coordinating with Iraqi border police rested with the US Department of State until October of 2005.152 From 2003 to 2005, the size of the Iraqi border guards slowly increased and the Coalition contracted the construction of several dozen border forts from which the border police would eventually work.153 In August of 2003 the Coalition created the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement. The
CPA originally planned for the department to have a troop size of nine thousand.\textsuperscript{154} These numbers were entirely insufficient, since one-half of the force would need to perform logistical functions and the points of entry required another sixteen hundred men, leaving less than three thousand (of which one fourth would be on leave at any given time) to man the remaining observation posts and to patrol the border.\textsuperscript{155} Since the Department of State maintained overall responsibility for oversight of the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement, Coalition military units and border police units conducted only informal coordination at the small unit level.

In October of 2005, the Coalition transferred responsibility for oversight of border security forces from the Department of State to the Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I).\textsuperscript{156} The mission of MNSTC-I is to train, equip, and supervise Iraqi security forces. Since its inception, MNSTC-I’s responsibilities included primarily the Iraqi Army. After October of 2005, MNSTC-I’s responsibilities expanded to include Ministry of Interior Forces. Ministry of Interior forces on the Iraqi border included two separate entities, the Department of Border Enforcement and the Border Patrol. Additional Iraqi personnel served at the points of entry: Customs Inspectors, Customs Police, and Customs Security Battalions.\textsuperscript{157}

The MNSTC-I plan for border security moved along several tracks: increase the size of the Iraqi border forces with trained troops, equip the border units, supervise them with Coalition-manned transition teams, and complete work on border fortifications. While some of this work started before MNSTC-I assumed the responsibility for Iraq’s border forces, progress accelerated for the Department of Border Enforcement once MNSTC-I was involved.
By late 2006, the Department of Border Enforcement grew to its full size of 28,100.\textsuperscript{158} The Department of Border Enforcement forces were divided into thirty eight battalions (organized under twelve brigades) working in five regions. Coalition troops trained (and continue to train) Department of Border Enforcement troops in three different academies throughout Iraq. According to an August 2006 Department of Defense report to Congress, the Department of Border Enforcement received 81 percent of its equipment,\textsuperscript{159} with the remainder expected to be delivered by the end of the year. A later Department of Defense report did not mention whether the rest of the equipment was delivered, but did state the department was experiencing problems with logistical support, to include slow issuance of equipment.\textsuperscript{160}

Coalition troops supervised and facilitated the operations of the Department of Border Enforcement at the battalion and brigade level through the use of eleven-man border transition teams (BTT). As of November of 2006, twenty eight BTT were serving in Iraq.\textsuperscript{161} These BTT are manned mostly by US servicemen from the Army and Marine Corps, although some are manned by Coalition partner militaries. The BTT assist and supervise Border Enforcement unit staffs in logistics, training, operations, personnel, and communications.\textsuperscript{162} The BTT at official points of entry have been augmented by US Department of Homeland Security border protection agents (customs agents). These augmented teams are labeled “border support teams.”\textsuperscript{163}

In addition to training and supervising border forces, the US military expends considerable effort contracting the construction of the border forts from which the Department of Border Enforcement operates. To date, The United States funded the construction of 258 border forts along Iraq’s borders. Work on these forts started in
March of 2004 when a Marine engineer group hired contractors to build the first of the forts in Anbar Province. Work progressed slowly, with fifty-one of the forts completed in January of 2005 and 160 completed by the end of the same year. Iraqi contractors completed all but three of the forts (in the Sulaymaniah, Diyala, Wasit, Maysan, Basrah, Muthana, Najaf, Anbar, and Ninewa Provinces) by August of 2006.

The Department of Border Enforcement uses the forts as “mini forward operating bases” with twenty to forty border police working from each fort at any given time. Each 500 square meter fort contains the basic necessities that an Iraqi border unit needs to exist for a multi-week rotation at the fort: living quarters, kitchen facilities, generators,
The forts resemble castles in the desert, with a sixteen-inch masonry and rock wall, rooftop guard posts, and an anti-vehicular berm surrounding the post (see Figure 4 for a photograph of a typical Iraqi border fort). The forts were built twenty to thirty kilometers apart, depending upon the terrain between sites. These distances require vehicular patrolling to cover all of the ground in between the forts.

The forts cost relatively little to build using contracted Iraqi labor. While each individual fort cost $250,000, the overall construction contract for all 258 forts cost $161 million, a small amount in light of the overall cost of the war in Iraq. The construction of the forts was not without challenge, as contractors were threatened (insurgents actually beheaded two contractors in Husaybah), subcontractors were slow to deliver material, and two forts were destroyed by insurgents while under construction.

In fact, the overall cost for the Department of Border Enforcement is tiny in comparison to the overall costs of the war effort. To date, the United States has spent $437 million of Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Funds on the department (including three million for stipends to 150 Iraqi former weapons of mass destruction experts). This total includes the money required to both build the facilities and to train, equip, and pay the salaries of the Iraqis manning the department. The sum of $437 million is just over one tenth of one percent of the full $318.5 billion appropriated by the US Congress (from 2001 to 2006) to pay for Operation Iraqi Freedom. This total does not include the costs of the border transition teams or other US government employees supporting the department. Even if the cost of the border transition teams and other government employees doubles the cost of creating the Department of Border enforcement, the total cost is still slightly under three tenths of one percent of the overall war expenditure.
However, it seems unlikely that the cost of the transition teams (and other associated government employees) is this high due to the low number of personnel involved.

Thus the United States started late, but by the end of 2005 took border interdiction in Iraq seriously. The US approach is an economy of force measure, using mostly Iraqi troops to patrol Iraq’s borders. These troops, working from the newly constructed border forts, represent a minute expenditure in the overall cost of the war effort. The military efforts along the borders, combined with diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran and Syria, have had an unknown effect upon the course of Iraq’s insurgency. As of the time of writing no open source information is available on the effectiveness of these efforts to date.


7Shrader, The First Helicopter War, 174.

8Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 101; and Faivr, L’ALN Extérieure Face Aux Barrages Frontaliers.”


11 Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 100.


13 Ibid., 139.


15 Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 201.


O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection, 118-120.

Horne, A Savage War of Peace Algeria, 266 and Delmas, “Évolution Générale des Barrages Frontières.”

O’Ballace, The Algerian Insurrection, 118-120; and Delmas, “Évolution Générale des Barrages Frontières.”

Ibid.


O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection, 120.

Faivr, “L’ALN Extérieure Face Aux Barrages Frontaliers.”

Multrier, “Le Barrage en Zone Est-Constantinois.”


Multrier, “Le Barrage en Zone Est-Constantinois.”
40 *Wadi* is a term for a desert stream bed that remains dry except during and immediately after rainfall.


42 Multrier, “Le Barrage en Zone Est-Constantinois.”

43 Faivr, “L’ALN Extérieure Face Aux Barrages Frontaliers.”


46 Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 184-188.


49 Ibid., 339.


55 Maxey, *The Fight For Zimbabwe*, 44.

57 Cilliers, J.K.C. *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia* (Dover, NH: Croom Helm, 1985), 19.


59 Ibid., 35-36.


62 MacDonald, “Rhodesia War,” 774.

63 Maxey, *The Fight For Zimbabwe*, 121.

64 Ibid., 125.


68 Bell, “The Frustration of Insurgency,” 5.


71 Maxey, *The Fight For Zimbabwe*, 44.


73 Cilliers, *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia*, 21-22.


75 Ibid., 217-218.

76 Cilliers, *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia*, 88-89.

77 Ibid., 84.


Cilliers, *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia*, 90-91.

Ibid., 20 and 205.


Ibid., 7; and Cilliers, *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia*, 105-106.


Cilliers, *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia*, 176.


Daly and Stiff, *Selous Scouts Top Secret War*, 14.


Daly, and Stiff, *Selous Scouts Top Secret War*, 178-222.


Ibid.


102 Ibid, 33.


107 Ibid, 6-9.

108 A passive infra-red trigger is essentially a motion detector that is used to activate an improvised explosive device (IED). When a vehicle crosses the beam of the passive infra-red trigger, the trigger closes the circuit to detonate the IED’s blasting mechanism.


Wilson, “US Pressing Syria on Iraqi Border Security,” A16


Ibid.


Ibid.

Wilson, “US Pressing Syria on Iraqi Border Security,” A16


Background Note: Syria, US Department of State website. www.state.gov/r/pa/ ei/bgn/3580.htm viewed 03 March 2007.


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127 Department of the Army, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December, 2006), 5-5 and 5-12.


133 Paul Bremer, *Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2* (Baghdad, 23 May 2003), 4.


135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.


141 Ibid.

Based on author’s experience as a USMC infantry battalion operations officer in Iraq from July 2005 to February 2006.


Ibid.

Ibid, 46.


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Vandenberg, LT J. N., CEC Report 15 November 2004, 1 and Jones, “Iraq’s Western Border Becoming More Secure.”

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section summarizes the reasons for the success or failure of the French and Rhodesian border interdiction efforts. The second section summarizes the major lessons learned from the three case studies. The final section makes recommendations for future border interdiction efforts and border security doctrine.

Successes and Failures in Border Interdiction

The success of French border interdiction resulted from three factors. First, the French had sufficient manpower to maintain observation and quick reaction forces along the borders that the insurgents attempted to cross. Second, the French did more than merely build a border system; they also invested the forces and money necessary to maintain the Morice Line. Third, and more importantly, the French built a border interdiction system that attempted more than merely blocking insurgent movement. Instead, the Morice Line worked to delay insurgents and to detect the location of the insurgent penetrations in time for reaction forces to track down and destroy the infiltrating force.

In contrast, the Rhodesians built a border fortification system (the Cordon Sanitaire) to counter insurgent infiltration that was far less effective. While the Cordon Sanitaire resembled the Morice Line in terms of physical layout, the Rhodesian manpower problem prevented the Cordon Sanitaire’s success. The Rhodesians had far more border to cover and fewer men with which to do so. Their lack of manpower made
it far more likely that an insurgent could slip through the line undetected and the size of the Rhodesian frontier made it impossible for the Rhodesians to build the Cordon Sanitaire across all of the possible insurgent infiltration routes. The Rhodesian system of relying primarily on the highly mobile Fireforces to destroy insurgent penetrations was the best means available to the Rhodesian military, given their available assets.

Lessons Learned

The most obvious lesson to draw from the three case studies is that border interdiction costs the counterinsurgent relatively little. In all of the case studies examined in this work the counterinsurgent force spent relatively little money building border fortifications. Neither the Algerians, Rhodesians, nor Coalition Forces in Iraq spent more than 1 percent of their yearly military expenditures on border fortifications. The Algerian fortifications of the Morice Line were remarkably effective at preventing the cross-border movement of men and weapons. The Rhodesian Cordon Sanitaire, while not as effective as the Morice Line, was also relatively cheap when compared to the overall Rhodesian security effort. The Coalition border forts in Iraq, inexpensive to build and man, have yet to prove their efficacy.

The second lesson is that the amount of manpower and materiel required to block insurgent penetration far exceeds the amount of manpower and materiel required to detect insurgent penetration. General Multrier, the commander of the Morice Line along the Tunisian border in 1961-1962, stated this well in his summary of the Morice Line’s value at interdicting insurgents:

A barrage is not a fortification. . . . Indeed, the barrage only aims at detecting a crossing. A fortification aims to prevent it, or to make it very expensive. The advantage of the barrage is that it is, in theory, light, built easily
and with few expenses, quickly carried out and that it requires only weak manpower to implement it. . . . To a commander of a zone, detecting a crossing only has worth if one then manages to catch up with the enemy who crosses and destroy him.\textsuperscript{1}

The Rhodesians, while they possessed considerable mobility, were unable to “catch up with the enemy who crosses” because they often failed to detect the insurgent crossing in the first place. Even the French, who employed in excess of thirty thousand men to cover the Morice Line, recognized that they could not man the line in sufficient strength to observe its entire length (which is why the detection capability of the electrified fence was the line’s key feature).

However, this is not to say that the counterinsurgent should just build a detection system and then wait to launch quick reaction forces to interdict the detected penetrations. The adage that an obstacle is only worthwhile if covered by fire is still true. If the border systems are not kept under observation or at least patrolled several times a day, the enemy (or in some cases civilians) will degrade the system. The enemy will sabotage the system and civilians will likely pilfer wire and other materiel from the system.\textsuperscript{2}

The third lesson is that the aim of border interdiction must vary according to the insurgent threat. In a counterinsurgency campaign, the counterinsurgent force must conduct some form of border interdiction, except in the infrequent case where the insurgents receive little support from outside the country’s borders. The object of the interdiction will vary based upon the needs of the insurgent. In Algeria, the ALN lacked weapons and trained men. The French were able to interdict both ALN needs with the Morice Line. In Rhodesia, ZANU and ZAPU insurgents had similar requirements and the Rhodesians had less success with their interdiction efforts. In Iraq, however, the insurgent
has little need to smuggle weapons across the border. Before the 2003 invasion, there were between one and seven million weapons (small arms) in the hands of private owners in Iraq. Likewise, thousands of tons of explosives disappeared from arms depots in the wake of the invasion. Thus, insurgents in Iraq have access to a ready supply of weapons, ammunition, and explosives already within Iraq’s borders. Iraqi insurgents do not need to smuggle weapons across the border, except to gain more sophisticated weapons such as explosively-formed penetrators. However, in order to perform suicide attacks, Iraqi insurgents need a steady supply of foreign fighters, since they have found foreign fighters more willing to perform such attacks than Iraqi recruits.

Fourth, the timing of interdiction is critical. Regardless of whether the counterinsurgent targets personnel, weapons, or money in his interdiction operations, the sooner in the campaign these operations start the better. Because the French were able to build and man the Morice Line relatively early in their campaign, they were able to greatly reduce the amount of weapons and fighters available to the FLN in Algeria. Conversely, the United States’ slow establishment of border controls from 2003 to 2005 in Iraq undoubtedly allowed an influx of foreign fighters, money and in some cases more sophisticated weapons to reach Iraqi insurgents.

Finally, the amount of effort that planners should devote to border interdiction depends upon the conditions in the country prior to attempts to “seal the borders.” If, as was the case in Algeria and Rhodesia, the insurgent force lacks sufficient weaponry or trained manpower, the counterinsurgent stands to reap tremendous gains from a successful border interdiction campaign. When the relatively low cost of border interdiction is considered, border interdiction gains even more appeal for the
counterinsurgent. The low cost of border interdiction will allow the counterinsurgent to concentrate his assets and efforts where he needs it most, aimed at the security of the local populace, while knowing that the insurgent is unlikely to grow in strength due to an external influx in weapons or fighters. However, if the insurgent already has ample access to weaponry and fighters inside the country, as has been the case in Iraq from the start of the insurgency, then physically sealing the borders holds less importance. In this instance, the counterinsurgent may best aim his interdiction efforts at the insurgents’ other essential need, money. Cutting the insurgent’s funds is often less a physical line of operations that the military can pursue, but an important line of operation that must be acted upon by agencies wielding the nation’s diplomatic, informational, and economic power. Examples of interdiction of funds include sanctions on a country’s banking system, international investigations to suppress money laundering, and regulations to seize or freeze bank accounts of groups supporting insurgents.

**Recommendations**

This thesis has four major recommendations. They pertain to US doctrine, inter-agency action, the incorporation of new technology, and suggestions for further research.

First, the United States should rewrite its doctrine with respect to border interdiction. As of the time of this writing (2007), hundreds of US servicemen are serving as advisors to units within the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement. These servicemen are daily attempting to interdict insurgents and weapons crossing Iraq’s borders. Other US servicemen serve in similar roles in Afghanistan. The US military’s one doctrinal manual on the subject of border interdiction, however, is obsolete (it is no longer used as doctrine despite containing potentially useful information). The United
States possessed doctrine for foreign border security, in the form of FM 31-55, *Border Security/ Anti-Infiltration Operations*.\(^4\) FM 31-55 was written during the Vietnam War and was never revised.\(^5\) The FM contained fairly detailed guidance on the planning and conduct of border interdiction operations. Most of the information in FM 31-55 is still relevant and should be revised as a publication to guide Army and Marine Corps forces assigned border security missions. Additionally, the Department of Defense should produce a joint publication for border security, with a recommended title such as: *Joint Border Security Operations*. *Joint Border Security Operations* should cover the following subjects:

- Operational Environment
- Infiltration Tactics and Vulnerabilities
- Border Security Planning
- Border Operations
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to Border Operations
- Logistics Support to Border Operations
- Integration of Nonmilitary Elements of National Power in Border Operations
- Use of Indigenous Forces in Border Operations

Equally useful would be a publication detailing joint techniques, tactics and procedures for border security.

Second, in order to properly integrate all of the national elements of power and use the capabilities of different government agencies, future border security operations should be interagency operations. At a minimum, future border security operations should include the US Customs and Border Protection from the Department of Homeland Security. Due to its enduring task of securing the United States’ borders, this agency will remain the best source of border security expertise. Border operations conducted by the US military could also incorporate elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Agency, the Coast Guard, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the US Treasury. In order to incorporate the various agencies that can contribute to border security operations during a counterinsurgency campaign, the joint force commander would need a Joint Interagency Task Force for border operations. The model for such a task force already exists in the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), an organization created to integrate multiple agencies in the fight against drug smuggling within US Southern Command’s area of responsibility. JIATF-South contains representatives from nine different federal agencies who operate a Joint Operations Command Center at Key West, Florida. The center coordinates the activities of ships and airplanes from the US Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Customs (in addition to ships and planes of allied nations) to interdict the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.⁶

Third, the US military should continue to experiment with new technologies related to border interdiction. The most obvious technology to apply to border interdiction is the role of unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the Army’s Warrior, an unmanned system with a loiter time in excess of twenty-four hours.⁷ The unattended ground sensors planned as part of the Army’s future combat system⁸ also merit investigation for incorporation into border detection systems. Technology not originally intended for ground surveillance may also prove useful to forces conducting border interdiction operations. An example is the joint land attack cruise missile defense elevated netted sensor system (JLENS). The JLENS, originally intended to detect cruise missile threats to friendly ground units, consists of a tethered aerostat (a balloon) with an array of sensors and a ground station. Units conducting border operations would find the
JLENS useful since it can remain aloft for up to 30 days and possesses both electro-optical sensors and a moving-target indicator.

Just as important as investigating technology for the detection of insurgents, the US military must investigate a means to delay or apprehend insurgents as they cross the border. While the French system of an electrified fence combined with barbed wire and land mines was particularly successful at slowing Algerian insurgents in the late 50s and early 60s, it is difficult to imagine the United States employing a similar system in the twenty-first century. One can imagine the negative impact of televised and Internet-shared images of dead civilians along a US-constructed, electrified border fence. With the constraints placed on the US military by the impact of media images, the Department of Defense needs to investigate less than lethal means of slowing insurgent incursions along the border. The ease with which Iraqi smugglers and insurgents breached the 101st Airborne Division’s border berm along the Syrian border highlights the need for more permanent, yet easily constructed barriers. The most obvious place to look for such barrier systems is along the US border with Mexico, where US Customs and Border Protection have employed various barrier systems for years.

Fourth, the Department of Defense should study other countries’ conduct of border security operations in counterinsurgency campaigns. The most obvious example to study is the Israeli Defense Force’s border operations to prevent the infiltration of Palestinian insurgents. The Israeli use of a border fence in particular merits further study. The Israelis have used security fences along their borders with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon for decades and have built additional fences around the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Since the construction of the fences around the Gaza Strip and West Bank, attacks
by Palestinian suicide bombers from the fenced-in areas decreased by 90 percent. Since
the Israelis use much of the same technology as the United States and operate under the
same moral constraints (i.e. they will not use minefields or other lethal barriers as part of
their border security systems), their systems may be a model for US border systems in
future counterinsurgency campaigns. The typical section of Israeli border fence contains
a wire fence with electronic sensors, an anti-vehicular ditch, a concertina wire obstacle,
surveillance cameras, and a paved road for border police patrols. The fence costs on
average two million dollars per kilometer.

Planners and doctrine writers must continue to study border interdiction as a
component of counterinsurgency campaigns. Despite the frequent use of border
interdiction in counterinsurgency operations, border interdiction remains under-addressed
in doctrine. The US Army’s old doctrine pertaining to border security in FM 31-55 must
be re-written and incorporated into joint doctrine and eventually into inter-agency
procedures. Future interdiction operations must take advantage of new and emerging
technologies while profiting from the lessons of other nations’ border interdiction efforts.

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1M. Multrier, “Le Barrage en Zone Est-Constantinois,” La Revue Internationale
partenaires/cfhm/rihm/76/rihm_76_tdm.htm; Internet; accessed 19 November 2006.

2For example, during the author’s deployments in Iraq, farmers quickly
dismantled any wire obstacle that was not observed by Coalition forces and used the
materiel to build pens for their livestock. While the obstacles in discussion were not
border fortifications, one can imagine the same scenario unfolding along a border system.

3Rhea Myerscough and Rachel Stohl, “Uncontrolled Small Arms Perpetuate
Insecurity in Iraq” (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 6 December 2006),
[article on-line] available at http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?
document ID=3743; Internet; accessed 27 March 2007.

5Copies of the FM 31-55 are now so rare that this author could only find one on microfiche at Ft Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research Library.


8Ibid, 12.


10Ibid.
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