Your Turn to Run Your Country Just Ended: Global-Reach Regime Replacement

A Monograph
by
Maj Paul J. Scott
USAF

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 06-07

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
# Your Turn to Run Your Country Just Ended: Global-Reach Regime Replacement

## ABSTRACT

Global-Reach Regime Replacement, alternately referred to as GR3, is a proposed method to forcibly remove an existing regime from power, replace it with a new government, and conduct appropriate levels of stability and reconstruction operations in the aftermath. Within the context of the contemporary operating environment, the monograph examines the hypothesis that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) should assign responsibility for GR3 to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Drawing upon analysis of regime replacement operations in Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the monograph evaluates the GR3 concept against the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. In each case, GR3 meets the criteria and frequently provides comparative advantages to current capabilities. The resulting primary recommendation is that the JSCP should task USSTRATCOM to develop GR3 into a supporting plan ready for implementation by the regional Combatant Commanders.

## SUBJECT TERMS

Regime Replacement, Regime Removal, Stability and Reconstruction Operations

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global-Reach Regime Replacement, alternately referred to as GR3, is a proposed method to forcibly remove an existing regime from power, replace it with a new government, and conduct appropriate levels of stability and reconstruction operations in the aftermath. Within the context of the contemporary operating environment, the monograph examines the hypothesis that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) should assign responsibility for GR3 to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Drawing upon analysis of regime replacement operations in Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the monograph evaluates the GR3 concept against the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. In each case, GR3 meets the criteria and frequently provides comparative advantages to current capabilities. The resulting primary recommendation is that the JSCP should task USSTRATCOM to develop GR3 into a supporting plan ready for implementation by the regional Combatant Commanders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

## 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASS</td>
<td>UNCLASS</td>
<td>UNCLASS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

## 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, US Army

---

## 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

913-758-3302
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Maj Paul J. Scott

Title of Monograph: Your Turn to Run Your Country Just Ended: Global-Reach Regime Replacement

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

___________________________________ Director,
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR
School of Advanced Military Studies

___________________________________ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Graduate Degree Programs
Abstract

YOUR TURN TO RUN YOUR COUNTRY JUST ENDED: GLOBAL-REACH REGIME REPLACEMENT by Major Paul J. Scott, United States Air Force, 47 pages.

Global-Reach Regime Replacement, alternately referred to as GR3, is a proposed method to forcibly remove a threatening regime from power, replace it with a new government, and conduct appropriate levels of stability and reconstruction operations in the aftermath. As the name implies, GR3 is designed for prompt action with global operational reach. The monograph examines the hypothesis that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) should assign responsibility for GR3 to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

Within the context of the contemporary operating environment, the GR3 concept is evaluated against the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. GR3 fully satisfies each of the criteria. No investment is required other than the time required to develop a standing GR3 plan. Additionally, GR3 provides comparative advantages over military methods that require the build-up of conventional forces before the commencement of operations.

In the last twenty years, the United States has employed military means to force regime change in Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Drawing upon analysis of these operations, the resulting primary recommendation is that the JSCP should task USSTRATCOM to develop GR3 into a supporting plan ready for implementation by the geographic combatant commanders.

No plan for GR3 currently exists. Yet in an environment of uncertainty where threats from far-flung regimes may quickly surface, it is a capability invaluable to the security of the United States. The flexibility and agility of GR3 provide a method for swift action against regimes that threaten the vital interests of the United States. Additionally, it also brings the capability to expand legitimate governance should regime replacement become necessary.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 1  
The Aim of GR3 .......................................................................................................................... 3  
Is the GR3 concept worthy of pursuit? ..................................................................................... 4  
Structure and Methodology ....................................................................................................... 5  
CHAPTER ONE: IS GR3 FEASIBLE? .......................................................................................... 7  
Capabilities and Force Structure ............................................................................................... 9  
   Operation JUST CAUSE, Panama in 1989 ............................................................................. 9  
   Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti in 1994 ............................................................ 12  
   Today’s Force ......................................................................................................................... 13  
   Force Training ....................................................................................................................... 19  
   Current Operations Tempo ................................................................................................. 22  
   The Upper Limits of GR3 .................................................................................................... 23  
   Removing the Existing Regime ......................................................................................... 23  
   Restoration of Legitimate Government ............................................................................. 26  
   Summary of the Question of Feasibility ............................................................................. 28  
CHAPTER TWO: IS GR3 ACCEPTABLE? ................................................................................ 29  
Manpower, Materiel, and Time ................................................................................................. 29  
Law of War ............................................................................................................................... 30  
Military and Political Supportability ......................................................................................... 33  
Summary of the Question of Acceptability ............................................................................. 36  
CHAPTER THREE: IS GR3 SUITABLE? ................................................................................... 36  
Accomplishing the Mission: Achieving the Political Objective .............................................. 37  
Which Combatant Command is Best Suited for GR3? ............................................................. 39  
   Functional Rather Than Regional...................................................................................... 39  
   Comparative Advantages of USSTRATCOM ..................................................................... 40  
   Summary of the Question of Suitability .......................................................................... 44  
CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................... 44  
RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 46  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 48
INTRODUCTION

In the African country of Winderia, diplomatic attempts to remove General Zaco from power have not progressed. Two months ago, Winderia’s elected president died unexpectedly of congestive heart failure and Zaco seized control of the government. Zaco openly bypassed Winderia’s constitutionally established chain of succession, claiming it was his obligation to maintain internal stability. To his credit, General Zaco quickly followed through on his promise for free elections. United Nations (UN) observers in the last election had been pleased to report no irregularities. But as exit polls revealed Winderia’s current Vice President Mitchelian would defeat General Zaco’s party for the presidency, Zaco’s intent to maintain control was revealed. He ordered all ballots seized, annulled the election, and jailed five UN observers for “interfering in internal Winderian affairs.”

At present, nearly two months have elapsed since the annulment. Two UN resolutions have had little effect on the regime and two of the five UN observers continue to be held. Financial forensics show definite links between members of the Zaco regime and Winderia’s resurgent drug trade. Reports of trafficking in persons by Winderian gangs continue to surface. While denouncing trafficking in drugs and persons to the media, the central government has taken little substantive action. Refugees escaping the country report that General Zaco’s security forces are arresting rival political leaders and coercing confessions. These reports corroborate claims by human rights groups that the government is using torture to crack down on perceived dissidents.

Eleven days ago, arms shipments violating UN resolutions were intercepted en route to seaports in Winderia. The crisis was punctuated when General Zaco’s spokesman responded to appeals for UN intervention, mentioning several American and European cities and hinting that Winderia could release biological agents abroad if intervention is attempted.

The President of the US now urgently seeks potential solutions. The Secretary of Defense has directed US European Command (USEUCOM) to develop plans to remove General
Zaco’s regime immediately. Initial planning guidance includes three primary objectives—bring General Zaco and his lieutenants to justice, restore democracy to Winderia, and isolate biological agents. Time is of the essence. USEUCOM is the supported command; other combatant commands are preparing supporting plans.

Among the on-the-shelf options is the concept plan for Global-Reach Regime Replacement (GR3). This plan was developed to rapidly replace a regime that threatens US vital interests or those of its allies. It differs from other operational plans in response time. While a traditional attack is generally time-consuming even when pre-positioned assets are employed, GR3 is designed for promptness. Utilizing assets and airborne and/or amphibious troops originating as far away as the continental US (CONUS), joint forces are packaged to quickly defeat an existing regime and remove it from power. GR3 is designed for regime replacement, not just regime removal; it encompassing both the swift projection of combat forces, and very importantly, the reestablishment of a government.

Crisis action planning has molded the GR3 concept plan to accomplish the objectives established by the Secretary of Defense. Interagency coordination, as described within the construct of the plan, has gone well despite several major reconstruction issues that must be resolved to support restoration of democracy in Winderia. The military is poised to execute its role in GR3. Airlift and air refueling support are in place to transport elements of the 82d Airborne Division directly into combat. Two Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and an expeditionary strike group (ESG) are now in position off the coast of Winderia. A Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is ready to accomplish its portion of the plan. Military logistics and support elements are also in place, and agencies of the US government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DoD), are ready to execute their pre-planned roles for the reconstruction of a functioning government in Winderia.

With Presidential direction, the US launches GR3 operations. Airpower from the two CSGs, fixed bases in theater, and bomber bases in the CONUS converge to open the way for
troops who will execute the airborne operation. The strike achieves the desired operational surprise. The Winderian military suffers operational shock as the attack unfolds. Several battalion-size units recover sufficiently to provide organized resistance. After three days, however, the fighting has reduced to localized regime loyalists attempting to protect former leaders from capture. The search for evidence of biological agents has turned up nothing; rather, it appears the regime was bluffing in an attempt to bolster national security. As stability is established, reconstruction begins. After two weeks, General Zaco is still at large and believed to have fled the country. Several of his henchmen are dead, and two top lieutenants are in a Navy brig pending return to Winderia for trial. President Mitchelian has been sworn in and interagency reconstruction has begun. Concluding the scenario, Winderia appears to be making increasing strides toward recovery in the long process of rebuilding.

**The Aim of GR3**

The preceding scenario presents a situation in which GR3 is a desirable option. Yet there is currently no such plan. Although the building blocks are present, the capability for rapid implementation does not exist. The missing piece is a standing GR3 concept plan.

GR3 is designed to fuse the capabilities necessary to achieve the political objectives that necessitate regime replacement. While high-intensity military action is likely to attract the most attention, the ability to achieve the desired political or strategic outcome rests in integrating the expertise, operations, and influence of all government agencies to bring the situation to the desired long-term solution. This is the aim of GR3. It involves high-intensity military action up front, but the operation is incomplete until the political objective is achieved. The US is likely to face a broad range of challenges in the future and they may not unfold in close proximity to the

---

1 Actions surrounding Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama provide an example. Though not without serious flaws, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, the reconstruction plan for Panama, was fully underway within hours of the invasion. See John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992).
US, as was the case in Panama and Haiti. Since 9/11, the US has removed and replaced the ruling regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. These instances support the argument for codifying pre-planned methods to replace regimes, regardless of location, which openly threaten US vital interests.

**Is the GR3 concept worthy of pursuit?**

The US has employed military power for the express purpose of regime change four times in the past 20 years. In Panama, the US military replaced Manuel Noriega’s regime with a government led by Guillermo Endara, the legitimately elected president. In Haiti, the launch of invasion forces from the US was sufficient to compel General Raoul Cedras to comply with the UN resolution calling for President Aristide’s return. In 2001, Northern Alliance fighters, supplemented by US special operators and air power, drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. The 2003 invasion of Iraq removed Saddam Hussein from power and ended the ambiguous threat associated his weapons of mass destruction programs.

As 9/11 underscores, threats may abruptly surface from unexpected areas. A US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) study of the present security environment stresses the fact. Its introduction quotes the Defense Planning Guidance. “Adopt a capabilities-based approach. US planning will focus less on where and when a conflict will occur and more the broad set of capabilities US military forces need to deter, deny, and defeat adversaries.”\(^2\) The GR3 concept aligns with this DoD guidance. Additionally, GR3 supports the National Security Strategy (NSS) aim of promoting democracy throughout the world, providing capability to “take vocal and visible steps on behalf of immediate change.”\(^3\) In sum, the demonstrated actions and policies of the US, and specifically the DoD, support the underlying idea of GR3.

---
Good ideas are not enough. The next step is to determine the most suitable way to develop GR3 into a mature concept plan. Such a concept plan necessitates deliberate planning by one of the nine Unified Combatant Commands established under the Unified Command Plan. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is the vehicle to assign responsibility for planning. The question becomes which combatant command should be responsible for GR3. Because GR3 could be executed worldwide, it would logically belong to a functional combatant command rather than a geographic combatant command. Considering the responsibilities of those four combatant commands, GR3 is functionally similar to Global Strike, the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) capability to rapidly strike targets around the globe. For this reason, the following hypothesis will guide the research and development of this monograph: the JSCP should assign responsibility for global-reach regime replacement to USSTRATCOM.

**Structure and Methodology**

Before assigning GR3 responsibility to a combatant command, it must meet screening criteria. Viewing GR3 as a potential course of action implies it must be feasible, acceptable, and suitable (FAS). If GR3 cannot withstand the FAS test, the concept is not worthy of pursuit and should be discarded. The FAS test will be used to examine GR3, forming the backbone of the monograph.

Feasibility is first. By definition from Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, feasibility judges whether assigned tasks are within the capability of available resources. Assuming a fiscally constrained environment, the first three aspects of feasibility GR3 will be evaluated against are

---

4 The FAS test is an adaptation of the five standard screening criteria applied by the US Army to test a possible solution: feasibility, acceptability, suitability, distinguishability, and completeness. Distinguishability is not used for screening because this monograph focuses on GR3 and does not develop other COAs. Completeness is not used because the FAS test determines whether GR3 should be fully developed into a complete plan. For screening criteria, see Department of the Army, FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, D.C., 2005), 2-9 to 2-10 and 3-29 to 3-30.

whether it can be executed with existing weapons systems and force structure, whether it requires
dramatic shifts in force training, and if it would consume a disproportionate amount of force
structure. The fourth and final aspect of feasibility is the characteristics of an individual country
that might limit GR3’s applicability. This fourth section first estimates what would make military
regime removal unfeasible and then examines factors that could cause the restoration of
legitimate governance, in the aftermath of regime removal, to be so difficult that it presents a
greater long-term problem than dealing with the existing government. Feasibility is a
foundational aspect of GR3 and a significant portion of the monograph is dedicated to its study.

Acceptability is the second standard against which GR3 will be measured. Again using
the definition from JP 1-02, acceptability requires GR3 to meet three sub-criteria: it must be
worth the cost in manpower, materiel, and time, it must be consistent with the law of war, and it
must be supportable from both military and political standpoints.6

Suitability is the third standard GR3 must meet. Because joint doctrine does not define
suitability, the Army Field Manual (FM) 5-0 definition will be used. To be suitable, GR3 must
accomplish the mission and comply with planning guidance.7 For GR3 to accomplish the
mission, the desired political objective must be achieved. In other words, GR3 must be able to
accomplish the strategic end state, meshing military and interagency action to remove the existing
regime and establish a new government under terms that meet the strategic intent. Before GR3
can “comply with planning guidance,” responsibility for planning must be assigned. Attributes of
existing combatant commands will be analyzed to determine which, if any, should be given
specific responsibility for GR3. Consequently, suitability is perhaps the most critical portion of
the FAS test—unless responsibility for GR3 is assigned to a combatant command, the capability
to execute GR3 will not come to fruition.

---

6 Ibid., 1.
7 Department of the Army, FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production (Washington, D.C.,
2005), 3-29.
The final portion of the monograph is dedicated to conclusions and recommendations. Based upon conclusions drawn from the FAS test, recommendations are made regarding the initiation of GR3 planning. The final intent is to recommend actions which will fully develop GR3 capability, and thus further enable the US to meet anticipated threats.

To begin the analysis, GR3 is first tested for feasibility.

**CHAPTER ONE: IS GR3 FEASIBLE?**

To be worthy of pursuit, the GR3 concept must be feasible. Per the definition in JP 1-02, feasibility is a “determination as to whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources.”8 The question becomes what resources are available. Given enough resources, almost anything scientifically possible could be considered feasible. Such was the case on July 20, 1969, when the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) proved the feasibility of President John F. Kennedy’s intent to put a man on the moon before the end of the decade. The feat was incredible and overcame numerous daunting challenges, including the development of technology that did not exist at the time of President Kennedy’s declaration. Ultimately, the nation accomplished the goal with five months to spare. In this case, feasibility and possibility virtually merged as vast financial and manpower resources were put at the disposal of NASA to meet the national objective. But GR3 is not the Apollo space project. Just because GR3 is possible does not imply it is feasible.

To address the question of feasibility, it is necessary to clarify which resources truly are available. Because resources fluctuate depending on circumstances and the relative importance of the desired outcome, ambiguity with respect to available resources is a potential problem. To illustrate, a person experiencing a splitting headache in an airport may be willing to spend more dollars (resources) for two acetaminophen tablets than an entire bottle would cost at a corner

---

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 198.
drugstore. That which is reasonable in one circumstance is entirely out of the question in another. It becomes a question of which resources could reasonably be available to pursue GR3.

Today’s military is stretched to a degree unseen in recent years. Actions taken in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) consume significant portions of military funding, manpower, and materiel. The stretch is likely to remain constant for the foreseeable future. During his tenure, and with the support of the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sought to prepare Americans for the scope of commitment by alternately referring to the GWOT as “The Long War.” Yet even in the unlikely case of a near-term solution in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current operational environment remains replete with threats and uncertainty. A draft USJFCOM white paper delves into the challenges. Instability, friction, and intense competition among nations, religions, cultures, and individuals will characterize the next twenty years. “The realities of this environment will force the Nation to remain engaged in a wide variety of missions, as increasing competition between states and groups leads to conflicts involving the United States.” It is unrealistic to expect a decrease in the operations tempo. Requirements will continue to stretch finite resources thin. The implication is clear—the US military cannot dedicate resources solely to GR3.

The most conservative approach then is to assume that GR3 must come “out of hide.” In practical terms, GR3 must therefore meet the following three criteria to be militarily feasible. First, it must be possible to execute GR3 with existing capabilities and force structure. Second, it must not require dramatic shifts in force training that result in additional demands upon training

---

budgets and schedules. Third, GR3 must not consume a disproportionate amount of the force structure needed to conduct ongoing steady-state operations. The monograph addressed these criteria for military feasibility in the following pages.

**Capabilities and Force Structure**

To determine whether the US could accomplish GR3 with existing capabilities and force structure, it is first necessary to estimate the necessary assets. In the fictional introductory scenario, it was necessary to project significant combat power across intercontinental range. In broad terms, the military forces were required to overcome the existing regime, seize control of the governing apparatus, and provide security for the new government until it could establish order. In the real world, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan attest to the difficulty of such a mission. Yet successful precedents do exist. Operation JUST CAUSE removed Manuel Noriega from power in Panama in 1989. In 1994, the threat of military force caused the military dictatorship in Haiti to comply with UN resolutions and return power to the democratically elected leadership of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.12 Although there is a significant difference between executing such operations at global range rather than “in our own back yard,” the Panama and Haiti precedents suggest the baseline of capabilities and functions necessary to achieve successful the replacement of the regime.

**Operation JUST CAUSE, Panama in 1989**

On December 20, 1989, President George H. W. Bush announced Operation JUST CAUSE and articulated the overarching political guidance. The four stated objectives were to protect American lives, ensure the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties, restore 12 OPLAN 2370 to intervene by force and OPLAN 2380 to intervene peacefully were planned concurrently and became respectively known as Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. With elements of OPLAN 2370 in the air to seize control of Haiti, General Raoul Cedras backed down and agreed to peaceful transition. See Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 76-77.
democracy in Panama, and bring Manuel Noriega to justice.\textsuperscript{13} The 26,000 military personnel involved were organized into numerous task forces, organized along service and functional components. The US Army provided the majority of ground combat power, drawing the bulk of conventional elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, 82d Airborne Division, and 7th Infantry Division. The US Marine Corps organized Task Force Semper Fi and provided additional conventional strength. A JSOTF was established, under which the 75th Ranger Regiment and additional special operations forces of the US Army and US Navy operated.\textsuperscript{14} The US Navy and US Air Force supported the effort with wide-ranging responsibilities, including conducting initial strikes and rapidly transporting forces to the fight.

The heart of the plan involved seizing Noriega and eliminating his ability to control Panama. To remove him from power, initial operations focused on isolating him from the 15,000-plus member Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and the various paramilitary units he used to exercise and maintain power.\textsuperscript{15} A central aspect of the attack included rapidly establishing ground combat power at decisive points. To induce operational shock and paralysis, speed and surprise were of the essence.

At 0100 local time on December 20, 1989, air strikes and air assaults signaled the beginning as US forces sought to overwhelm Noriega and his loyalists. The opening hours included assaults on Noriega’s residence, two airports, PDF garrisons, and other command installations throughout Panama. Episodes of intense combat quickly added up in favor of the US and Noriega was on the run. Within several days, the PDF collapsed. Operations turned to mopping up remnant fighters, searching for Noriega, and quelling violence and looting. Noriega

\textsuperscript{13} John T. Fishel, \textit{The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama} (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 4.
surrendered to US forces on January 3, 1990, and was transported to the US to stand trial. US military casualties included 23 killed in action and 324 wounded.16

Operation JUST CAUSE was not, however, the only key element in restoring legitimate governance in Panama. Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was rushed into action and commenced the same day. This civil-military recovery plan had lagged far behind combat planning. A two-day crash effort in the final days before Operation JUST CAUSE was necessary prior to presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.17 Hours prior to combat operations, Guillermo Endara, the rightful winner of the May 7, 1989 Panamanian presidential election, was sworn into office.18 As they ousted Noriega, American forces simultaneously began to build the new government around Endara. Aided by the underlying situation in Panama and fortunate circumstances, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was sufficient. It was deemed a success, and stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) effectively concluded in January 1991 when primary elements of the Military Support Group leading the operation returned to the US.19

This brief survey highlights key elements for executing forceful regime replacement in Panama. Looking broadly at the military aspect, the ability to rapidly project ground and air power is essential to paralyzing the forces of the current regime and unhinging its leadership. As the operation progresses, sufficient forces must be available to provide security as control shifts to friendly forces. As in any operation, intelligence and logistics must not be overlooked. The command structure must enable unity of command and unity of purpose, integrating myriad pieces of the military operation into a coordinated effort structured to maximize freedom of action while limiting the potential for friendly fire incidents. Yet much is needed beyond the military

---

16 Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, *Operation Just Cause*, 135-390. Many of the casualties were the result of friendly fire.
17 Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 32. Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, known as Operation BLIND LOGIC during planning, was the post-conflict plan for Panamanian reconstruction. Because of classification and compartmentalization, agencies outside of the US military did not know of its existence.
aspects of the operation. As Fishel notes, “termination of small wars has often been messier than the actual fighting.”

The planning staff belatedly developed a transition plan that solidified the successes of the operation, and returned democracy to Panama in accordance with the strategic directives of the President. Although it was rushed into action and lacked coordination with other agencies responsible for implementation, conditions in Panama were such that long-term success was achieved without multiple prolonged military deployments.

**Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti in 1994**

Turning to Haiti, General Raoul Cedras repeatedly rebuffed efforts to return power to the UN-recognized government of Jean Bertrand Aristide. After the USS *Harlan County* was unable to unload 225 observers peacefully in Port-au-Prince, US plans to employ military force began under the code name Jade Green. These plans grew to become OPLAN 2370. At the same time, a political-military plan for Haiti was under development. This plan was considered a first because many government agencies planned alongside the military. As the situation progressed, diplomatic efforts to return Aristide to power were continually frustrated by Cedras and his junta. On September 19, 1994, with 62 aircraft airborne to insert elements of the 82d Airborne Division, former President Jimmy Carter brokered an agreement in which Cedras and his ruling cabinet would leave Haiti no later than October 15. The mission was no longer a forcible entry.

Although the mission changed on the brink of execution, the capabilities and functions necessary for OPLAN 2370 have much in common with operations in Panama. While power projection was most visible, the necessity of intelligence, logistics, follow-on security, and unified command and control were readily apparent. Interagency planning progressed to a new level. In contrast to Panama, “U.S. government officials produced a tangible interagency plan

---

22 Ibid., 76.
that set forth America’s political-military policy in the crisis.\textsuperscript{23} Although interagency execution did not unfold as planned, the top-level cooperation was unprecedented, setting a foundation for coordinated and complementary action.\textsuperscript{24}

Addressed broadly, regime replacement in Panama and Haiti required a limited set of capabilities and functions. At the outset, rapidly projected power achieved operational shock in Panama and likely would have had the same effect in Haiti. Existing regimes lost control and military forces established and maintained security within the country. As the new leaders and internal institutions became capable, governing power was transferred. Planning and executing were the responsibility of the military command structure assigned to the operation. Gladly, these necessary building blocks of capabilities and force structure remain resident in today’s military.

Today’s Force

But does today’s military possess the capabilities and force structure to execute similar operations at global range? The necessary effects upon the targeted regime are unchanged, but intercontinental range introduces challenges. The first problem is how to accomplish the initial strikes that open the door for the insertion of ground troops. Evidence indicates the military has already solved the problem. Air operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq make clear that an appropriate mix of strike power is available from CSGs, fixed bases in theater, and bomber bases in the CONUS. The essential element is a robust fleet of air refueling tankers that extend their range to virtually anywhere in the world. While the current fleet is capable of enabling worldwide operations and should remain operational through the year 2040, steps are underway to ensure the capability remains strong. In October 2006, the US Air Force made new air refueling tankers its top procurement priority.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 186.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 186.
Getting to the operations area is also crucial for the ground forces. Following on the heels of strike missions that enable access to the heart of the regime, ground troops are essential to controlling the country until they can turn security over to the follow-on government. For amphibious troops, the ESG may require additional time to sail to the joint operations area. Once the ESG is loitering off the coast, however, amphibious operations to move ashore do not require additional time. The logistics tail is longer, but distance from the US does not affect the timeline to project the force ashore.

Transporting parachute troops over the required distance and directly into operations is a greater challenge. The XVIII Airborne Corps mission “is to maintain … a strategic crisis response force, manned and trained to deploy rapidly by air, sea and land anywhere in the world, prepared to fight upon arrival and win.” They are prepared to fight and win, but require transportation to the battlefield. Since 1980 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff levied the requirement for strategic brigade airdrop (SBA), the US Air Force and Army have jointly pursued the capability. It allows rapid deployment of ground troops directly into hostilities. Two of the major challenges that face SBA are the ability to put sufficient troops on the ground in a short time span and the necessity to maintain a sufficient logistical flow to the force. The C-17 transport is a major workhorse in SBA. The insertion of an entire brigade requires approximately fifty C-17s to airdrop the first echelon of the brigade, followed shortly by approximately fifty more C-17s that land to unload the remainder of the brigade equipment. This places a significant demand on a C-17 fleet still growing to its expected final size of approximately 190
At expected ranges from Fort Bragg, the air refueling, which allows C-17s to proceed directly to the objective and then land at a nearby air base, potentially requires in excess of 300 tankers. Such an operation would rival the scope of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), designed in the Cold War to employ large numbers of bombers to deliver nuclear weapons. While potentially executable, the scope of the operation would virtually stop all other C-17 transport movements and the Air Force would likely run short of the tankers necessary to support strike aircraft opening the way for the C-17s. Additionally, if the requirement for airlift and air refueling are not showstoppers, the challenge of resupplying a brigade of ground troops would remain to be solved.

That does not mean, however, that the US should discard the concept of intercontinental parachute assault. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003, over 1000 soldiers of the 173d Airborne Brigade parachuted from twelve C-17s into northern Iraq. The event occurred eight days after the beginning of hostilities while airlift and tankers were in high demand. In the subsequent four days, additional C-17s landed to insert the second echelon of forces, delivering over 2000 more troops, 400 vehicles, and 3,000 tons of equipment. Thus, a scaled down version of SBA is executable, even amid the operating tempo associated with major combat operations. While it is worthy to note that the forces originated in Europe, thus resembling the relatively short-range missions executed in Haiti and Panama more than the global vision of GR3, operations in Iraq demonstrate the feasibility of a moderately large SBA. If the need for similar operation arose again, the US military possesses the essential elements. The XVIII Airborne Corps, specifically the 82d Airborne Division, maintains ground forces capable of parachuting directly into hostile territory. Sufficient C-17 aircraft can be made available to transport.

---

31 O’Connor and Fought, “Strategic Brigade Airdrop,” 5.
personnel and equipment. As with the strike force which opens the door for ground troops, tankers enable the C-17s to operate at intercontinental range.

Near-simultaneous strike and parachute and/or amphibious operations at intercontinental range necessitate the capability to synchronize joint forces. The requirement is not new. This critical capability exists at the joint force headquarters and continues to be adaptable to the situation. Based upon the current joint warfighting construct, the US military is capable establish headquarters that are structured, manned, and equipped to accomplish the given purpose. Whether the combatant command retains responsibility or forms a subordinate Joint Task Force (JTF), the headquarters provide the staff functions to support the joint force commander. The joint force headquarters is able to choreograph air, naval, and ground forces, while simultaneously ensuring the correct mix of support forces are available to support and focus the collective combat power. Though no immediate parallels for GR3 by a JTF exist, joint operations reflect that JTFs have the ability to assemble and fuse joint capabilities to accomplish the mission. Command and control (C2) structures are readily available and possess the ability to execute *coup de main* at intercontinental range under the C2 of a joint force commander.

In the wake of regime change, the focus will shift to SRO. Although senior civilian leaders of the US military once eschewed SRO and nation building, the DoD is now heavily invested in SRO in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In November 2005, the DoD promulgated new policy stating “[s]tability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities.”\(^{32}\)

The events of 9/11 caught the nation by surprise. Although establishing the follow-on government certainly concerned the Bush administration, little time was available to prepare for

the aftermath resulting from the overthrow of the Taliban. Because of a dearth of plans for
conflict in Afghanistan, the vast majority of planning focused on the immediate task—removing
the Taliban government providing safe-haven for al Qaeda terrorists. Restoration of a functioning
government would be addressed in the midst of high-paced operations to destroy al Qaeda and the
Taliban. In contrast to the vision for GR3, there was no pre-planned structure for SRO.

In the case of Iraq, far more planning time was available. In 1998, President Clinton
signed Public Law 105-338, establishing the overt goal to replace Saddam Hussein’s regime with
a democratic government. But as time ticked down to the initiation of regime removal by force
in 2003, plans for postwar Iraq were painted in broad strokes. Details were vague or non-
existent. Senior civilian leadership drove military planning to focus almost exclusively on the
removal of Saddam Hussein and gave short shrift to conflict termination and reconstruction. US
ground forces were to be liberators and not occupiers. Each time planners raised the requirement
to secure postwar Iraq, decisions were deferred. It was eventually decided that the US would
draw upon the UN and utilize the existing Iraqi police and military security apparatus. US troop
presence would be minimal. Days after Baghdad fell and with many parts of Iraq still not
secured, General Tommy Franks directed planners to take as much risk in removing troops from
Iraq as was taken in seizing control of Iraq from Saddam. When UN support did not
materialize, the importance of using the Iraqi military to secure Iraq became critical. But then
without warning, senior officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the civilian
organization responsible to the DoD for the transition of Iraq, directed that the Iraqi military was

---

34 *Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, U.S. Code*, vol. 22, sec. 2151 (1998). Section 3 states: “It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.”
to be rebuilt from the ground up after being disbanded.\textsuperscript{37} It was in this void of security that the limited number of US troops would attempt to conduct SRO.

Shifting constructs from senior echelons repeatedly thwarted military attempts at realistic planning for security during SRO. Whether security forces came from the US, the UN, Iraq, or anywhere else, they had to come from somewhere. In retrospect, Iraq does not suggest a lack of military capability for SRO as much as it suggests that senior leaders underestimated the security requirements in the wake of toppling the existing government.

Panama and Haiti stand in contrast to Afghanistan and Iraq. While underlying national characteristics are a factor (addressed later in this chapter under “The Upper Limits of GR3”), the planning and forces available for post-hostilities security were markedly different. Given planning time and forces sufficient to establish security, the military set the conditions for political success in a comparatively short amount of time. In Panama, the Military Support Group responsible for SRO after Operation JUST CAUSE was withdrawn after slightly more than a year. In Haiti, US forces arrived on September 19, 1994, maintained security throughout the transition of the government. Control of peacekeeping operations transferred to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) on March 31, 1995, less than seven months after arrival.\textsuperscript{38} These examples highlight the military’s ability to conduct SRO, conclude the transition of power, and set conditions in which the US can withdraw forces.

The pre-planned nature of GR3, designed to include security and reconstruction, sets an environment in which the post-hostilities may also be pre-planned as they were in Panama and Haiti. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the US possesses the capabilities and force structure to execute regime replacement, including SRO, as envisioned under GR3. The first of the four sub-criteria established for feasibility is met. Of the three remaining sub-criteria, the

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 483.
\textsuperscript{38} Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”, 214-227.
monograph next addresses the question of whether GR3 would require specialized training and lead to a requirement for additional funding.

**Force Training**

When the US stormed Panama to seize control and remove Manuel Noriega, the military overwhelmed the enemy. Recognizing the entire Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) could not be physically targeted simultaneously, Operation JUST CAUSE was designed to deliver a knockout punch, severing Noriega’s ability to command and control the PDF and shattering organized resistance. In effect, the goal was to induce operational shock, a combination of physical and psychological factors resulting from both the force and pace of operations. The effect was largely achieved, arguably “securing an entire nation within eight hours.” Whether it was due to PDF ineptitude, the skill and competence of US forces, or a combination thereof, the PDF could not withstand the onslaught and disbanded rather than face destruction. The US quickly achieved tactical and operational objectives.

The capability to induce operational shock remains resident in today’s military. At the tip of the spear, military forces are prepared for major combat operations. Naval strike forces train to project power quickly from the sea, to not only the littorals, but also deep inland. The Air Force stands ready to establish air superiority against both air- and ground-based defenses and strike tactical, operational, and strategic targets throughout the depth of the battlefield. In the latest iteration of amphibious power, the Navy and Marine Corps created the ESG, designed to

---

41 Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, *Operation Just Cause*, 401.
quickly deploy strike capability and amphibious troops. As previously discussed, the 82d Airborne Division is trained and equipped to parachute directly into hostile territory.

Logistics and other support forces are likewise prepared. Initiatives broadly grouped under the umbrella of transformation stress the ability to project combat power quickly, and to maintain the force throughout deployment and steady state operations. Across the services, the logistics tail has become lighter and leaner as it continues to provide the means to sustain forces anywhere in the world.

When the time comes, SRO requires broad capabilities. Iraq gives a glimpse of the expertise that may be necessary. Though US forces could deal immediately with many issues, war damage and extensive looting caused problems. Rickety infrastructure suffered further in war. The Iraqis shut down an unstable electrical grid and then discovered they could not restore it. Coalition forces deliberately incapacitated Iraq’s communications facilities during combat to sever command and control. Plundering left sewage treatment plants in shambles. Looters ransacked police stations, removing anything of value, including electrical wire, phones, light fixtures, and even doorjambs. Throughout the country, the Army Corps of Engineers was in high demand. At Haditha Dam, engineers consulted experts in the US to develop ideas to ensure the long-term safety of the dam. Elsewhere, engineers moved from critical project to critical project, working to restore essential services. The need for these services was not fully understood until US forces saw firsthand the dilapidated conditions of Iraqi infrastructure.

43 The expanding role of US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) reflects the critical nature of logistics. Established in 1987 to consolidate transportation, its charter expanded in 1992 to include both peace and war. In 2003, it was designated the Distribution Process Owner, making it “the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution system.” See “United States Transportation Command: A Short History,” available at http://www.ustranscom.mil/history/history.cfm.
44 Security is of primary importance. Once security is established by the military, the SRO capabilities of other government agencies can be brought to bear on the myriad problems in reconstruction.
Current force training points to two conclusions regarding GR3. First, US military forces possess the ability to remove an enemy regime. Rather than rely on specialized training, GR3 relies on operational art to determine the correct mix of forces necessary to accomplish the task in the target country. Second, reconstruction presents its own problems. Specialized capability will almost definitely be necessary. Though the Army Corps of Engineers brings much capability, the expertise of other government agencies is critical. The specialized skills available through the interagency cooperation are essential and GR3 must incorporate that expertise.

This is the strength of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG). Drawing upon military experts and civilians from the range of USG agencies, these groups are “tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander” and provide “the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments.” Members of the JIACG participate throughout planning. By design, they “help synchronize [JTF] operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments” and “complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the [National Security Council System].” The JIACG conduit to specialized skills means the military does not need to develop organic capability to be “all things to all people.” Rather, the JIACG provides the means to coordinate the efforts of the full range of government agencies. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that the vision for the reconstruction phase within GR3 does not introduce new force training requirements beyond those already required by current DoD policy, which as previously noted, identifies stability operations as a core mission of the US military.

Since GR3 does not require additional skills outside those already resident in today’s military, it meets the first two sub-criteria for feasibility. Next, GR3 is examined to determine whether it would preclude units from conducting other missions with which they are tasked.

47 Ibid., II-14.
Current Operations Tempo

To be within the capability of available resources, GR3 must not consume so much force structure that it interferes with other tasks. This is especially important because the US has significant portions of the military strength dedicated to ongoing operations. Because situations vary, it is impossible to determine the generic force structure needed for GR3. Furthermore, commanders may redeploy forces to support higher priorities. As a result, problems exist in determining the force structure GR3 requires and in estimating the forces that would be available for employment. What is definite, however, is that if regime replacement becomes a desired option, there is benefit to accomplishing the mission with a limited portion of military capacity.

This represents an inherent strength of the GR3 concept. Rather than requiring a time-consuming buildup of military force, GR3 presents the capability to achieve regime replacement using rapid response. There are two benefits. First, agility and political flexibility are increased. The requirement to begin moving forces ahead of the decision to execute is reduced, meaning fewer forces are inside the deployment pipeline and therefore unavailable for immediate action. Second, should execution become necessary, GR3 is likely to require less force structure than would be required for a conventional invasion, thus allowing the US to protect its vital interests while preserving combat power that may be needed elsewhere.

Planning staffs would feel the up-front impact. The fungible asset necessary to develop the GR3 concept is planning time. Time expended on GR3 is time that is unavailable for other responsibilities. Implementation may never occur and any time spent on planning may seem lost. Yet this is the general nature of all existing operation plans. In fact, it is their expressed purpose. These plans “can be used as a basis for development of an operation order” enabling rapid, efficient, and effective response.48 They provide structure that staffs can modify as necessary.

---

during crisis action planning. In the end, the time invested in peacetime deliberate planning pays dividends when the US needs an appropriate response for a time-sensitive or emergency situation.

GR3 is suited to the current operations tempo. The nation gets the capability for rapid regime replacement without placing heavy demands on existing force structure. At the outset, it does require the investment of time by a planning staff. Should execution become necessary, GR3 gives added agility to the responses available to US leadership. As highlighted in the previous sections, GR3 does not require additional military capabilities and force structure, nor does it require training beyond that which is already resident within US military.

GR3 meets the first three sub-criteria for feasibility. But GR3 is not a silver bullet—it faces limitations. It may not be applicable in all situations where regime change is desired. The extent of the forces loyal to the regime may make it unfeasible. Additionally, the investment to re-establish a functioning government may be so great that although regime removal is possible, subsequent SRO would be cost-prohibitive. Such concepts suggest that GR3 has upper limits.

The Upper Limits of GR3

If GR3 is feasible for some but not all circumstances, it becomes necessary to bound the limits. By definition, GR3 has two fundamental characteristics. First, GR3 must remove the existing regime from power. Second, it must plan for the restoration of legitimate governing authority. Each of these two major steps presents limits to feasibility.

Removing the Existing Regime

When considering factors that could make decapitation unfeasible, the primary factor is the military force loyal to the regime. Both Panama and Haiti were vulnerable to GR3-style

49 Political supportability necessitates the restoration of legitimate government, rather than simply collapsing a regime. Colin Powell is said to have referenced the Pottery Barn rule (if you break it, you own it) during months before the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, alluding to the fact that if the US broke the Iraqi government, it would become responsible for governing Iraq’s 24 million people. See Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 71.
decapitation. Although sufficient to maintain control of their respective countries, the forces of Noriega and Cedras were not capable to withstand a concerted US attack aimed at *coup de main*. In Panama, intelligence estimated Noriega’s forces at more than 15,000 uniformed personnel. These “were organized into thirteen military zones totaling two battalions, ten other independent infantry companies, the cavalry squadron, the Doberman riot control company, and a special forces command.” Of these forces, the steadfastly loyal were concentrated in three units—the “Macho de Monte” infantry company, the “Battalion 2000,” and the 1st Cavalry Squadron.\(^50\)

Assaults in the opening hours targeted these units and prevented the movement of reinforcements. US forces quickly achieved military success, later capturing Noriega and sending him to the US for trial and imprisonment. In Haiti, assault was not required. The loyalists that Cedras could muster were no match for the military power the US could quickly project. Once he understood the US would indeed use force to back UN demands, Cedras chose negotiated abdication.\(^51\)

Military circumstances are country specific. Rapid regime removal in Panama and Haiti was well within the capability of the US military. Characteristics of other countries, however, may limit the ability to accomplish the same effect. Of these factors, the most important is the size of the loyal military. Risk mounts if US assault forces cannot quickly outmatch the enemy. Forces must also be able to withstand counter-assault. Estimating the threshold is difficult. Factors such as the size and distribution of forces within the country, the chain of command, its ability to quickly respond, lines of communication, and myriad other details will affect whether existing forces are sufficient to make GR3 militarily unfeasible for a US assault.

Consideration of Iraq in early 2003 reveals a case where GR3 decapitation could be unfeasible. Even if well equipped, GR3’s comparatively small strike force would risk decimation as the Iraqi military reacted. The sheer bulk of the Iraqi military, the air defenses surrounding

\(^50\) Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, *Operation Just Cause*, 72-75.
Baghdad, and the distance from friendly support units almost certainly called for greater combat power than could be delivered via GR3.

Afghanistan presented a different set of military challenges. In the midst of civil war, conventional Afghani forces were virtually non-existent. Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters enjoyed firm control over much of the country. The Northern Alliance controlled only a small fraction of terrain. The landlocked country left no amphibious options for the introduction of US troops. Everything had to go in by air, covering significant distances in the process. The projection of a US ground force sufficient to seize and hold control of the government would have been daunting. Yet operations in Afghanistan were functionally similar to GR3. With US personnel embedded to synchronize ground actions and coordinate air strikes, the Northern Alliance was essentially a surrogate for the ground forces envisioned under GR3. Their rapid-pace warfare overwhelmed the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Afghani government crumbled as leaders fled.

While objective determination of situations within current or future US capability requires country-specific analysis, Table 1, Factors Affecting Military Feasibility of GR3, lists subjective factors. Historical areas of conflict fit many of the favorable criteria. With the expectation that many areas of potential future conflict will also fit these same criteria, a capabilities-based GR3 concept plan could be applicable in numerous areas of interest.

It is unlikely that a given country will perfectly match the favorable criteria. Even Panama, the archetype for GR3, possessed some unfavorable factors. The readiness of various units that responded to a previous internal Panamanian coup attempt came as a surprise to the US military and complicated the task of planners. Additionally, Noriega loyalists were not centralized. In the words of then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, the plan grew to involve “many moving parts.” So although the US military was able to overcome

---

52 This author-developed summary lists considerations that affect the feasibility of GR3.
53 Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, Operation Just Cause, 72.
54 Ibid., 86.
unfavorable factors and execute Operation JUST CAUSE, decapitation becomes increasingly
difficult as adverse factors accumulate and may necessitate a different course of action.

Table 1. Factors Affecting Military Feasibility of GR3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Military</td>
<td>Large Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractured Loyalty</td>
<td>Solid Loyalty to Existing Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Air Defense</td>
<td>Strong Air Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Military</td>
<td>Irregular Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Readiness</td>
<td>High Readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Population</td>
<td>Large Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Nation</td>
<td>Landlocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Proximate to International Waters</td>
<td>Capital Distant from International Waters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Land Mass</td>
<td>Large Land Mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized Loyal Forces</td>
<td>Loyal Forces Widely Dispersed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Restoration of Legitimate Government

Once forces remove the existing government, SRO takes center stage. The feasibility of
reconstruction is largely based upon the investment the US is willing and able to make. These
operations require significant investments of lives, time, and money.55 Disrupting an existing
government is often easier than restoring legitimate governance. Table 2, Comparison of Time
Required for Regime Replacement, shows that in the last two decades, the time necessary to
remove an existing regime is a scant fraction of the time required for SRO.

Creation or rebuilding is generally more difficult than destruction. The same holds true
for governments. Even in the relatively small nation of Haiti, rebuilding a legitimate government
was “an immense task” with enormous challenges.56 In his 1992 analysis of the reconstruction of

55 The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2004 that the total projected cost of operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan would range between $179 and $400 billion, in addition to the $100 billion already
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2005), 17.
56 Gabriel Marcella. “Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs,
Panama, Fishel notes that since World War II, “the US has disengaged from conflicts in Korea, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon (on two occasions), Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and most recently in the Persian Gulf. In none of these cases has the termination process gone easily nor has it gone as much according to plan as the warfighting itself.”

Conflict termination is complicated. Maintaining a vector toward the desired political objectives is challenging.

**Table 2. Comparison of Time Required for Regime Replacement.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regime Removal</th>
<th>Post-Removal SRO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Less than one week</td>
<td>13 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Negotiated</td>
<td>21 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Approximately two months</td>
<td>Over five years and continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Less than one month</td>
<td>Over three years and continuing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question of whether reconstruction is feasible is largely a question of how willing the nation is to invest the required resources. Estimation of the cost is difficult. The reconstruction of Iraq was grossly underestimated. Because underlying problems ran deep, the strategies adopted for reconstruction did not match the realities of the situation.

Currently, there is no method to accurately measure the feasibility of reconstruction. This is no surprise given the Clausewitzian uncertainty of war. Methods are in place, however, to develop an understanding of the unique challenges that any given situation may present. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is currently developing a system “to both describe a country’s level of fragility and instability and, in formal models, predict which countries are at greatest risk for violent conflict or other forms of political instability” (emphasis

---

59 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 499. From the start, it became clear that Iraq was not a conventional war that would come to a sudden end when the Iraqi government was toppled.
The evaluation framework incorporates political, security, economic, and social dimensions of the country and addresses the current government’s effectiveness and legitimacy within those dimensions. While USAID did not design the system to predict the difficulty of reconstruction, it provides structured methodology to examine the depth of challenges unique to a specific country. This model, and others like it, may be used to develop educated estimates of the necessary investment. The resulting information is a realistic baseline for determining whether reconstruction is feasible based on the investment the US is willing and/or able to make.

Concluding the discussion of the limits of GR3, the concept will find its upper limits in the circumstances of each individual country. First, regarding removal of the existing regime, if the enemy possesses a combination of the unfavorable factors shown in Table 1, the necessary combat power may exceed that which would be available under the proposed GR3 construct. Such a situation was seen in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which required massed ground invasion forces to seize control of the country. Second, with regard to the restoration of legitimate government, the scope of the problem may be so great that reconstruction is unfeasible. While neither of these two broad categories rules out the feasibility of GR3, they highlight that GR3 is not a panacea. Instead, GR3 feasibility will depend upon the context of the situation.

**Summary of the Question of Feasibility**

Four sub-criteria were established to evaluate the feasibility of GR3. To be judged feasible, GR3 must be within the capabilities of the current force structure, it must not require a significant shift in current force training, it must not consume so much force structure that it is incompatible with the current operations tempo, and it must be acknowledged that there are upper limits to the application of GR3. The preceding analysis demonstrates that GR3 meets the first three sub-criteria. The question of the upper limits of GR3 is resolved by recognizing that GR3

---

will not be feasible in two circumstances. First, the strength of enemy forces loyal to the existing regime may be so great that a different approach, such as a conventional build-up of an invasion force, may be required to remove the regime. Second, the defects of the current government may run so deep that it would be unfeasible to expect SRO to be successful based on the resources that could be made available. Neither causes GR3 to be unfeasible. Rather, these limits are an honest recognition that while GR3 is feasible in many situations, it may not be suited to all circumstances in which political leaders decide upon regime replacement. With feasibility resolved, the evaluation now shifts to whether GR3 can endure the question of acceptability.

CHAPTER TWO: IS GR3 ACCEPTABLE?

The second step of the FAS test is acceptability. Relying on the JP 1-02 definition, acceptability is a “determination as to whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, materiel, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and is militarily and politically supportable.”61 These three criteria form the basis to judge GR3’s acceptability and the monograph addresses them sequentially.

Manpower, Materiel, and Time

Two standards are available to measure whether GR3 is worth the cost in manpower, materiel, and time. First is an absolute scale, which evaluates whether GR3 is better than not intervening. Second is a comparative scale, comparing whether GR3 is preferable over another course of action. The absolute scale is problematic. Determination of whether regime replacement is worth the cost, whether conducted via GR3 or any other method, is a political judgment subject to debate.62 Further complicating the problem, such judgment must be made


62 American and Panamanian citizens largely view Operation JUST CAUSE as a success. See Fishel, The Fog of Peace, 63, and Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, Operation Just Cause, 390. There are critics as well, with Latin American countries among the most vocal detractors. See Bruce W. Watson and Peter Tsouras, Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 182.
before the final tally of costs. Yet because regime replacement was deemed worthy of pursuit four times in the past twenty years, namely in Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the key implication is that regime replacement may again be necessary to protect US vital interests. For this reason, the comparative scale is far more valuable.

Comparing GR3 to the conventional massing of forces, the potential advantages in manpower, materiel, and time are readily apparent. First, far fewer personnel are necessary to decapitate the existing regime and establish the conditions for the orderly arrival of the forces needed for SRO. Because GR3 requires fewer personnel and employs light forces, materiel savings accrue to the advantage of GR3. Finally, the agility and rapid response capability also compare favorably against massed forces.

The immediate cost of developing a standing GR3 concept plan should be considered as well. Even if execution is never directed, development of a GR3 plan under an existing combatant command has its own costs. For example, although the SIOP for nuclear weapons delivery was never executed, mental reflection reveals the certainty of cost with respect to the manpower, material, and time needed for plan development. Yet the benefit of GR3 is likely to far outweigh the cost. When GR3 becomes a capable option, it will potentially be an invaluable method for resolving crises predicted for the future.63 While there is a cost to developing a standing GR3 plan, the relatively small investment of planning time allows decision makers to reap the benefits of a standing plan that crisis action planners may quickly tailor to provide rapid response.

**Law of War**

Two concepts summarize consistency with the law of war, *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum*. *Jus in bello*, or just conduct in war, is the personal responsibility each individual maintains for his

or her own actions during war, whether as a commander or as a subordinate. In essence, *jus in bello* is comprised of two requirements—discrimination and proportionality, placing “limits on who can be deliberately attacked and on how war can legitimately be conducted” (emphasis original). Although GR3 offers a new operational construct, it does not alter the fundamental legal standard that the US military expects of its members, both in planning and in execution.

Because these expected aspects of behavior stand unchanged, GR3 is not at odds with the US military’s high standards for *jus in bello*.

*Jus ad bellum* is the justice for going to war. This concept deals primarily with the political decision to resort to war. “[T]he *ad bellum* tests of war are meant to prevent too easy a recourse to force and violence” and “to impose a restraint on the decision to go to war.” The criteria for *jus ad bellum* can be summarized in eight elements: just cause; legitimate authority; public declaration; just intent; proportionality; last resort; reasonable hope of success; and an end state of peace. Based on the *jus ad bellum* criteria, there are two prominent counterarguments against GR3.

The first counterargument involves the question of legitimate authority. Because GR3 envisions a US capability that is independent of military support from other nations, it gives the US additional capability to act unilaterally. Unilateral action runs contrary to the UN Charter, which states “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” Following the process established in the Charter, nations should attempt to resolve problems by “peaceful means of their own choice,” and if necessary, bring disputes before the UN Security Council for

---

65 Ibid., 28.
66 Ibid., 28.
resolution.\textsuperscript{68} The Security Council provides the legitimate authority to determine which actions, including military force, are “necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{69} Because the US is a signatory to the UN Charter, it has agreed to the purposes and processes of the UN. It is no surprise then that international reaction to Operation JUST CAUSE was somewhat negative, and almost uniformly negative in Latin America.\textsuperscript{70} The US took military action against Panama’s government without a thread of a UN mandate. On December 30, 1989, a UN General Assembly resolution deploring the US action passed 75-20, with 40 abstentions.\textsuperscript{71} Because Operation JUST CAUSE was a short-range version of GR3, GR3 may face the same objections. Yet while debate about the legitimate authority behind Operation JUST CAUSE is important, GR3 should not be condemned solely because of its potential to be used unilaterally. Similar short-range capability proved to be very useful to the international community when the US employed it in Haiti to remove Raoul Cedras from power under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 940.

The \textit{jus ad bellum} test of last resort is a second prominent counterargument, based on GR3’s pre-emptive nature. GR3 is, however, merely a method for accomplishing regime change. It could be implemented only after deliberations are complete and political authorities make the decision for war. An argument against GR3 based on last resort conflates the political decision for war with the selection of operations to be employed in war.\textsuperscript{72}

Critics may raise additional counterarguments against GR3 on the basis of justice for going to war. The recurring flaw with these counterarguments, however, is the same flaw found

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., Chapter VI, Articles 33 and 35.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 182.
\textsuperscript{72} Two compelling precedents for pre-emptive war include the 1967 “Six Day War” and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In both cases, the national leaders considered their actions to be a last resort. Israel ran the risk of national annihilation if it delayed action. The Bush Administration believed Iraq was a nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With seeming evidence that UN sanctions served more to extend the plight of the Iraqi people and rather than end Saddam Hussein’s WMD capability, invasion of Iraq was considered the last resort.
in the two preceding arguments. Each sidesteps the fact that war is always a political decision and GR3 is but one option toward the desired political ends. Once the decision for war is made, GR3 is acceptable from a law of war perspective.

**Military and Political Supportability**

As the final criteria for acceptability, GR3 must be supportable from both military and political standpoints. Military supportability, from a capabilities perspective, was largely established by the feasibility study of Chapter 1. Looking at military supportability from an institutional perspective, GR3 is consistent with the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS emphasizes a proactive national defense. It states that “[i]t is unacceptable for regimes to use the principle of sovereignty as a shield behind which they claim to be free to engage in activities that pose enormous threats to their citizens, neighbors, or the rest of the international community.”

It also recognizes that “[t]he United States cannot influence that which it cannot reach.”

The National Military Strategy (NMS) implements the NDS within the context of the current and anticipated security environment. Recognizing the inherent uncertainty, the NMS identifies agility, decisiveness, and integration as the strategic principles that must guide the development of the joint force. These principles “support simultaneous operations, application of overmatching power, and the fusion of US military power with other instruments of power … allowing US commanders to exploit an enemy’s vulnerabilities, rapidly seize the initiative and achieve endstates.” Furthermore, the NMS places top priority on protecting the US with a line of defense that is well forward and capable of “countering threats close to their source.” Taken in sum, the themes of the NDS and NMS demonstrate the military supportability of GR3.

---

72 Ibid., 6.
74 Ibid., 9-10.
Turning to political supportability, GR3 is also consistent with both the policies of President George W. Bush and those of previous US presidents, regardless of party affiliation or whether they embrace a realist, liberalist, or idealist view of international relations. The NSS of 2006 reflects President Bush’s idealist objectives and a willingness to pursue them via all suitable means. Emphasizing “democratic freedom” throughout, President Bush enunciates the “ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” and the “non-negotiable demands of human dignity.” Toward such goals, the US “will take vocal and visible steps on behalf of immediate change … employ[ing] the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal.” These themes remain consistent with the principles promulgated in the 2002 version of the NSS.

The NSS under President William J. Clinton presented a decidedly liberalist outlook with the aim of “harnessing the forces of global integration” via an international “network of institutions and arrangements.” Yet it also stated “[t]he United States will not allow a hostile power to dominate any region of critical importance to our interests.” Specifically addressing military activities, deterrence was the centerpiece of policy. Adversaries ranged from hostile states to terrorists and criminals. “[T]hey must believe that any type of attack against the United States or its citizens will be attributed to them and that we will respond effectively and decisively to protect our national interests and ensure justice is done.”

---

77 See Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy 145 (November/December 2004): 52-62, for a comparison of the three leading international relations theories: realism, liberalism, and idealism. Summarizing Snyder, the core of realism is competition for power and security. Military force and state diplomacy are the primary instruments of power. The core of liberalism is the spread of democracy via interconnected governments and economics. International institutions and global commerce are the primary instruments of power. The core of idealism is persuasive ideas, values, culture, and identity. In idealism’s purest form, ideas and values are the primary instruments of power.

78 Office of the President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., 2006), 1, 2. The language of the NSS tends toward idealism although realism and liberalism are also reflected.

79 Ibid., 6.


81 Ibid., 5.

82 Ibid., 12.
Prior to President Clinton, President George H. W. Bush’s foreign policy was predominately realist. Along with the primary emphasis to deter any aggression that would threaten US security, it also sought to “strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights.” These words were not hollow. When Manuel Noriega and his authoritarian regime created hostile circumstances in Panama, President George H. W. Bush directed re-establishment of Panamanian democracy via military means.

Looking broadly across the chronicles of US foreign policy up to 2004, historian John Lewis Gaddis notes,

Concerns about “failed” or “derelict” states, then, are nothing new… So when President George W. Bush … warned that Americans must “be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives,” he was echoing an old tradition rather than establishing a new one. Adams, Jackson, Polk, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson would all have understood it perfectly well.

GR3 certainly has application in the history of US foreign policy. During the last twenty years, the US has effected regime replacement four times under the leadership of three presidents, each with markedly different views of international relations. Looking across the broader scope of US history, the capability for regime replacement would find a welcome reception as well. Although care must be taken when extrapolating, GR3 should enjoy US political supportability in the future, especially within the security environment that anticipates a high degree of uncertainty.

An added dimension of political supportability is the issue of duration. Given adequate cause and clear objectives, the American public does not shy away from war. But limited wars “tend to lose support as they lengthen or as they exact increasing sacrifices, especially in

---

84 Ibid., 11.
Perhaps this is why Americans typically regard Operation JUST CAUSE and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY as success stories. Despite casualties, these operations quickly ousted offensive dictators, conducted appropriate levels of SRO, and removed nagging problems from the nightly news. Political supportability should not ignore the fact that Americans like fast solutions which provide a sense of accomplishment and allow a quick return to normal life. From this perspective, GR3 is likely to enjoy political supportability from the American public.

**Summary of the Question of Acceptability**

By doctrinal definition, three sub-criteria measure the acceptability of GR3. To be acceptable, therefore, GR3 must be worth the cost in manpower, materiel, and time involved, be consistent with the law of war, and be militarily and politically supportable. The preceding analysis demonstrates that despite the potential for debate, GR3 is acceptable from all three perspectives. With acceptability resolved, the analysis moves forward to examine suitability.

**CHAPTER THREE: IS GR3 SUITABLE?**

The final phase of the FAS test is suitability. To satisfy the FM 5-0 definition of suitability, GR3 must accomplish the mission and comply with planning guidance.\(^{87}\) This final chapter individually addresses these two halves of the suitability requirement. To accomplish the mission and thus meet the first half of the suitability requirement, GR3 must achieve the desired political objective. This implies GR3 must be able to mesh military and interagency action to remove the current regime and return governing responsibility to the host nation under final terms that meet the strategic intent. To meet the latter half of the suitability requirement, it is necessary to assign the responsibility for GR3 to a combatant command for planning. Attributes of existing

---


\(^{87}\) Department of the Army, FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, D.C., 2005), 3-29.
combatant commands will be analyzed to determine appropriate responsibility for development and execution of GR3.

**Accomplishing the Mission: Achieving the Political Objective**

If the mission was only to forcibly remove an existing regime, responsibility would predominantly belong to the military. But mere removal of the existing regime could create chaos in the resulting power vacuum. Such chaos would likely provide safe haven for the same activities that likely triggered the decision for regime change. When political objectives include long-term stability, a complete GR3 plan must include the establishment of an effective government and the return of responsibility to the host nation.88

Regime replacement missions in Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq point to the need for other USG agencies during SRO. The expertise of these agencies is critical to establishing much of the infrastructure that is essential to effective government. In December 2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 to “promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states … in transition from conflict.”89 The directive assigned responsibility to the Secretary of State to lead and coordinate the actions of US agencies during SRO. It highlighted the need for the Department of State (DoS) and the DoD to “integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans.”90 Furthermore, President Bush used NSPD-44 to establish a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, alongside the existing PCCs already established

88 See Pierre Lessard, “Campaign Design for Winning the War . . . and the Peace.” *Parameters* vol XXXV no2, (Summer 2005): 36-50. The author proposes a model of campaign design that “acknowledges the wider purpose of major military operations, reunites operational art with strategy, and harmonizes military operations with other instruments of national power.”


90 Ibid., 1.
within the National Security Council System by NSPD-1. Thus, upper-echelon avenues are theoretically in place to coordinate the transition from military victory into the realization of political objectives.

While such coordination should smooth the path from operational success to achievement of the political end-state, the existence of a JIACG is a key ingredient to the final success of GR3. Located at the combatant command, the JIACG draws expertise from various government agencies throughout planning and execution, facilitating collaboration at the operational level. The conduits provided by the JIACG bolster the integration effort, complementing interagency coordination efforts conducted by the PCCs at the strategic level.

Comparing the SRO portion of GR3 against other methods of regime replacement that involve widespread combat operations to overthrow the existing regime, GR3 may offer a distinct advantage. Because of GR3’s rapid tempo and focus on the country’s leadership, there exists the potential for less disruption in the valid activities of the subject nation. This offers the opportunity to re-establish more quickly the pre-war baseline of legitimate endeavors. This does not imply that GR3 negates post-war security requirements, but it does offer the potential to more quickly return to “normal,” as was the case in Panama when SRO forces were withdrawn thirteen months after the initiation of Operation JUST CAUSE.

Thus, when GR3 is properly planned and executed, it provides the means to swiftly remove a regime that threatens the vital interests of the US or its allies and replace it with a legitimate government. As noted previously, GR3 is not a silver bullet. Yet it does provide US leadership with an agile response option that the US can quickly employ in support of national security. The key link is the development of a standing deliberate plan that fuses the capabilities necessary for implementation. If the JSCP assigns planning responsibility for GR3 to a

---

91 Ibid., 1.
combatant command, the US will possess the capability. The most important question, then, is to which combatant command the JSCP should assign GR3.

**Which Combatant Command is Best Suited for GR3?**

GR3 is an inherently joint and interagency concept, intended for execution anywhere in the world. For this reason, the task to develop a capabilities-based plan for GR3 should not be a single service responsibility, but should belong to a combatant command. The combatant commands, via the JSCP, possess the capability and authority to develop plans that harness the appropriate attributes of the various services.

**Functional Rather Than Regional**

To determine which combatant command should get responsibility for GR3, evaluating functional versus geographic combatant commands is the starting point. The unpredictability of the current operational environment leads to the inference that threats could materialize from unexpected areas, as was the case with Afghanistan in 2001. The global nature of GR3 implies that the selection of a single functional combatant command for responsibility is probably the best choice. The alternative course, assigning GR3 to geographic combatant commands, would result in the tasking of multiple combatant commands to develop a GR3 concept plan. Such duplication of effort provides a strong argument for centralizing GR3 planning at a functional combatant command.

The counterargument is that actions of a functional combatant command may upset unity of effort in a geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility. In typical combat situations, the geographic combatant command is the supported commander. Exceptions do exist, such as US Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) lead role in the GWOT, which spans virtually every AOR. Unity of effort in regional conflicts, however, is often best when the geographic combatant command is supported.
Rather than debate which argument is more compelling, the best solution is to combine them. Directing a single functional combatant command to develop GR3 as a supporting plan for the geographic combatant commands capitalizes on the strength of each. If GR3 is developed as a supporting plan by a functional combatant command, the “heavy lifting” to create the plan is not duplicated. At the same time, maintaining the geographic combatant command as the senior military authority in the area of responsibility helps ensure unity of effort.

The question then becomes which of the four functional combatant commands is best suited for bringing GR3 capability into existence. The four possibilities are USJFCOM, USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USTRANSCOM.

Comparative Advantages of USSTRATCOM

Two functional combatant commands are eliminated as candidates for the lead role in operational planning and execution of GR3. First, USTRANSCOM, as its name implies, focuses on transportation.\(^{93}\) Its strength lies in global mobility, making it better suited in a supporting function, rather than in the lead role of supported combatant command. Second, USJFCOM is a force provider and integrator whose mission areas include joint innovation, experimentation, training, and capabilities development.\(^{94}\) As such, USJFCOM is the proper choice for the joint concept development and experimentation activities that would lay the foundation for the GR3 concept and lead to the completion of a standing concept plan.

Eliminating USTRANSCOM and USJFCOM from consideration, the remaining candidates are USSOCOM and USSTRATCOM. The following evaluation compares USSOCOM and USSTRATCOM on the bases of four criteria: mission, capabilities, ability for interagency coordination, and the similarity of GR3 to their other operations.

---


USSOCOM “leads, plans, synchronizes, and as directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks [and] trains, organizes, equips, and deploys combat ready special operations forces to combatant commands.”  This statement emphasizes USSOCOM’s focus on the GWOT and its Title 10 responsibility as a force provider. In comparison, USSTRATCOM provide[s] the nation with global deterrence capabilities and synchronized DoD effects to combat adversary weapons of mass destruction worldwide [and] enable[s] decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects through the application and advocacy of integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; space and global strike operations; information operations; integrated missile defense and robust command and control.  

This broad statement reflects USSTRATCOM’s wide range of responsibilities. Clearly, USSOCOM’s absolute priority as a warfighter is to operate against terror networks. It is the lead combatant command for combating terrorism and the military should be wary of anything that dilutes USSOCOM’s focus. In contrast, USSTRATCOM’s mission statement reflects greater latitude in its mission areas. While this does not mean that additional missions should be piled on, it does suggest that USSTRATCOM may be the better choice to assimilate the GR3 mission.

Turning next to a comparison of capabilities, all special operations forces (SOF) are organized, trained, and equipped for nine core tasks: “direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and information operations.”  USSOCOM integration of many of these capabilities would certainly prove useful in GR3 planning and execution. Yet in comparison, USSTRATCOM also presents many capabilities that will likely be necessary. These include “global strike, space operations, computer network operations, [DoD] information operations, strategic warning, integrated missile defense, global [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

---

Reconnaissance], combating weapons of mass destruction, and specialized expertise.”

Though the comparative capabilities of USSOCOM and USTRATCOM are very different, each fills niche capabilities that are likely to be essential during GR3 execution. It is difficult to determine which of the two has the advantage. What is undeniable, however, is that the planning staffs of both combatant commands possess the ability to integrate the capabilities of the other in a supporting role. Because comparative analysis does not establish an advantage for either combatant command, the question of relative advantage remains unresolved.

Turning next to ability for interagency coordination, USSTRATCOM does not have a JIACG. While this gives a definite advantage to USSOCOM, it may not weigh as heavily as expected. Returning to the discussion of whether a functional or geographic combatant command is the better choice for GR3 responsibility, the evaluation concluded that a functional combatant command should develop the GR3 concept plan as a supporting plan for geographic combatant commands. Under this construct, the geographic combatant command maintains responsibility for final integration of GR3 into regional plans. This implies that the geographic combatant command’s JIACG would always have the central role in the SRO portion of GR3, and therefore the role of the functional combatant command’s JIACG is diminished.

The final point of comparison between USSOCOM and USSTRATCOM is the similarity of GR3 to their other operations. It is here that USSTRATCOM gains the advantage. While the DoD has focused USSOCOM on terrorist networks, USSTRATCOM is tasked with planning operations that bear similarity to GR3. “Full-spectrum global strike” is the first responsibility listed on USSTRATCOM’s fact sheet. This encompasses the “capability to deliver rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space

99 COL Thomas Gregory, telephone interview by author, 17 October 2006, Fort Leavenworth, notes, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth.
and information operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives.”

In practical terms, it is a global-reach strike capability, accomplishing the weapons delivery without putting military personnel on the ground. It involves not only dropping bombs, but also the enablers that suppress enemy defenses, provide air refueling, and command and control the force. According to the commander of 8th Air Force, aircraft maintain the capacity to “plan and execute global strikes,” and are ready to execute on short notice.

Functionally, GR3 is very similar to the global strike mission. Instead of focusing on bombers, the core of GR3 would be airlifters. Instead of dropping only weapons, GR3 would insert the forces necessary to seize control of the government. The necessary enablers that allow global range and global access to hostile areas are very similar to those of global strike. Currently, USSTRATCOM develops global strike plans in support of the geographic combatant commands, who then integrate the forces and establish C2 relationships of forces operating in the region. Although USSTRATCOM currently has no airlift, air refueling, or ground forces currently assigned, this counterargument is not significant. The JSCP, which would assign responsibility for GR3, also would apportion the necessary forces for planning.

Concluding the comparison of USSOCOM and USSTRATCOM, the factor that definitely favors USSOCOM is interagency planning. The factors in favor of USSTRATCOM are its mission and the similarity to its other operations. The capabilities factor is unresolved.

Table 3, Summary of Comparison, depicts the relative advantages.

In the final analysis, this study concludes that USSTRATCOM is the most suitable choice for GR3 responsibility. While interagency coordination is important, especially during SRO planning and execution, this factor does not outweigh the advantages of USSTRATCOM.

102 Ibid.
103 LTC John Overend, interview by author, 7 November 2006, Fort Leavenworth, notes, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth.
Because of its assigned mission and the functional similarity of GR3 to USSTRATCOM’s other operations, assigning GR3 to USSTRATCOM is the best avenue for creating a standing plan for rapidly executable global-reach regime replacement.

Table 3. Summary of Comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Category</th>
<th>Advantage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Coordination</td>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity to other the combatant command’s other operations</td>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of the Question of Suitability

Recapping the requirements for suitability, GR3 must accomplish the mission and comply with planning guidance. The aim of GR3 is not simply to accomplish regime removal, but to replace the regime with a legitimate government and complete SRO under terms that meet the strategic intent. To bring the capability to fruition, the JSCP must assign GR3 responsibility to a unified combatant command. Analysis demonstrates that the JSCP should assign GR3 responsibility to a functional combatant command for development as a supporting plan to the geographic combatant commands. Of the functional combatant commands, USSTRATCOM is the most suitable.

CONCLUSIONS

During the last twenty years, the US has employed military power four times for the express purpose of regime change. In the uncertain contemporary environment, the US may need the capability again. As the events of 9/11 highlight, threats may arise from areas which are not currently covered by a plan for military action. GR3, with its inherent agility, fills an existing gap in US strategic capability.
**GR3 is feasible.** It can be accomplished using available resources. Existing weapons and force structure are sufficient to support its planning and execution. GR3 would not require dramatic shifts in the force training, nor would it consume a disproportionate amount of the current force structure. Far from levying more demands on the US military or other government agencies, it provides potent, rapid, global-reach capability while consuming a comparatively small amount of combat power. GR3 is not a universal remedy, but the capabilities it represents are well suited for defeating a regime that threatens the security of the US or its allies, and then restoring legitimate governance in its place.

**GR3 is acceptable.** It is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time, especially when compared to conventional massing of forces. GR3 is also in harmony with *jus in bello*, justice in war, and *jus ad bellum*, the justice for going to war, and is thus consistent with the law of war. Additionally, GR3 is supportable from both military and political aspects. The feasibility study demonstrated that the underlying military capabilities necessary to support GR3 already exist—the missing piece is the plan that fuses joint assets into a rapidly executable and coherent concept. From an institutional perspective, the NDS and NMS provide ample military support for the development of GR3. Finally, GR3 provides national decision makers with an agile means to defend national security. GR3 enjoys strong support from the current NSS, from previous versions of the NSS, and from the precedent of US actions around the world.

**GR3 is suitable.** It presents unique capability to accomplish the mission and achieve the political objective. With a holistic aim to restore legitimate governance, GR3 provides continuity of intent throughout planning and execution of both combat operations and SRO, and incorporates the expertise of government departments and agencies. To bring the capability into being, the JSCP must assign GR3 to a combatant command for planning. Comparative analysis leads to the conclusion that USSTRATCOM is the best choice for the responsibility.

In summary, GR3 does more than meet the FAS criteria, it passes the test with flying colors. GR3 fuses existing capabilities to achieve political objectives through rapid regime
replacement. With no investment required other than the time and manpower necessary to develop a coordinated plan, the time for adding GR3 to US capabilities is now.

RECOMMENDATIONS

No plan for GR3 currently exists. Yet in an environment of uncertainty where threats from far-flung regimes may quickly surface, it is a capability invaluable to the security of the US. With it comes not only the capability to confront and remove hostile regimes from power, but also the ability to restore capable, legitimate governance. As such governance expands, safe haven for terrorism and other destabilizing influences will shrink. The analysis within this monograph leads to five straightforward recommendations regarding GR3.

First, the DoD should acknowledge the capabilities gap that Afghanistan brought to light. Threats can abruptly surface from distant regions. Foreign governments may yet again choose to provide safe-haven for terrorists capable of mounting a large-scale attack on the US. The threat of a 9/12 sequel to the events 9/11 is a real possibility, and the threat may develop unexpectedly. Political leaders may again call upon the military to act quickly in an unforeseen area.

Second, the DoD should develop GR3 as a measure to fill the capabilities gap. Once in place, a standing GR3 concept plan would provide a strong countermeasure to the threats of the anticipated security environment. In addition to its ability to rapidly resolve a crisis, GR3 also would stand as a deterrent to regimes which otherwise might consider providing tacit support to terror groups. In other situations, GR3 it may be the impetus which causes bad actors such as Raoul Cedras to back down without a fight. The net result is greater homeland security.

Third, the DoD should recognize the comparative advantages of GR3. GR3 does not require lengthy build up of conventional forces. Similar to operations in Afghanistan, the US military can achieve regime replacement without putting a division-size force on the ground. The agility of GR3 provides greater speed and flexibility in responding to a crisis. Operations that minimize the duration of conflict typically enjoy stronger political support from the American
public. Finally, GR3 can be scoped to match the situation, applying force as necessary to topple the existing regime and then implementing the desired level of SRO to achieve political ends.

Fourth, USJFCOM should accomplish joint concept development and experimentation necessary to lay the foundation for the completion of a standing GR3 concept plan. The innovation and integration capabilities inherent in USJFCOM make it uniquely suited to prepare GR3 for full implementation.

Fifth and most importantly, the DoD should bring the GR3 concept to fruition. Preceding analysis leads to the recommendation that the JSCP should assign responsibility for GR3 to USSTRATCOM. Similar to global strike, USSTRATCOM should develop GR3 as a supporting plan that geographic combatant commands could implement to effect rapid regime replacement without a massive build up of forces prior to the beginning of operations.

Capabilities to deal with threats to the global security environment are essential. GR3 fills a current capabilities gap affecting both the US and its allies. Beyond filling the gap, it also brings the capability to expand legitimate governance if regime replacement becomes necessary. Ultimately, in situations which required the threat or actual use of force, GR3 directly supports the goal of US statecraft, “help[ing] create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”104

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Franks, Frederick M., Jr. "Full-Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine for an Era of Change." *Military Review* LXXIII, no. No. 12 (December 1993): 5-10. [Statements on page 4 of the article support the argument that GR3 planning should be Joint, not a Service responsibility. Also states “Post combat operations require the same planning effort as does the conduct of war.” pp 7-8]


