A Post-"Leahy Conditions" Theater Security Cooperation Plan for Indonesia

Gregory L. Grady, LCDR, USN

Paper Advisor (if Any): COL Al Bergstrom, USA (Ret.)

Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

Currently, Public Law 115, Section 572 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002, also known as the “Leahy Conditions” for its sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat-Vermont), prevents full military-to-military training and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Programs with Indonesia. The President of the U.S. must submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that show the government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are meeting seven conditions in regards to human rights before assistance can be made available. In the post 9/11 world, Indonesia plays an increasingly important role in the Global War on Terror, and Congress has slowly begun restoring funding towards Indonesia even though the conditions from the “Leahy Conditions” have not been fully met. However, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) must be prepared to re-write its Theater Security Cooperation Plan with Indonesia if and when the “Leahy Conditions” are lifted and full military-to-military and FMF Programs can be instituted. Indonesia’s geo-strategic position and partnership in the Global War on Terror will require a robust plan be ready in order to strengthen Indonesia’s military and help stabilize their growing democratic government.

Indonesian Theater Security Plan

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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By

Gregory L. Grady
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

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Signature:____________________

10 May 2007

Seminar 15 Moderators:
COL George Oliver
CDR Jon Lawler

COL Bergstrom
Faculty Advisor
Abstract

Currently, Public Law 115, Section 572 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002, also known as the “Leahy Conditions” for its sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat-Vermont), prevents full military-to-military training and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Programs with Indonesia. The President of the U.S. must submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that show the government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are meeting seven conditions in regards to human rights before assistance can be made available. In the post 9/11 world, Indonesia plays an increasingly important role in the Global War on Terror, and Congress has slowly begun restoring funding towards Indonesia even though the conditions from the “Leahy Conditions” have not been fully met. However, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) must be prepared to re-write its Theater Security Cooperation Plan with Indonesia if and when the “Leahy Conditions” are lifted and full military-to-military and FMF Programs can be instituted. Indonesia’s geo-strategic position and partnership in the Global War on Terror will require a robust plan be ready in order to strengthen Indonesia’s military and help stabilize their growing democratic government.
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INTRODUCTION

“It is imperative that we support the democratic transition in Indonesia, not only because of Indonesia’s intrinsic importance, but because its experience gives the lie to those who would claim that Islam and democracy are mutually incompatible.”

-Matthew P. Daley

Indonesia, the fourth most populous nation after China, India, and the United States, has assumed greater significance as the largest and most moderate Muslim country in the world. Today, it is struggling to become the world’s third largest democracy. Indonesia’s geo-strategic position between Asia and Australia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans allows Indonesia to play an important role in the region. One very important and unique tool available to the Commander, United States (U.S.) Pacific Command (PACOM) is the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). The TSCP is an effective tool that can be used to gain influence and access to this vital region. Currently, the PACOM Commander is restricted by the U.S. Congress from fully engaging with the Indonesian government and military. These restrictions are known as the “Leahy Conditions”—named after its author, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT).

Public Law 115, Section 572 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002 was written to address Human Rights violations committed by the Indonesian military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), in East Timor in 1999. This law became known as the “Leahy Conditions,” and called for the government of Indonesia and the TNI to bring to justice members of the armed forces and militia groups that committed human rights violations, as well as demonstrating accountability by cooperating with the investigations into human rights violations. Other conditions also include allowing displaced persons and refugees to return to East Timor; allowing United Nations (UN) and other international humanitarian organizations and representatives of recognized human rights
organizations access to disputed areas; and releasing political detainees. The President of the U.S. must submit a report to Congress stating that the Indonesian government and military have met all these conditions before military assistance will be fully restored.

Currently, the PACOM TSCP for Indonesia reflects these imposed restrictions. With Indonesia’s growing importance in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), however, PACOM must have ready a robust TSCP plan that can be quickly implemented if and when the “Leahy Conditions” are lifted. This paper will examine the premise behind TSCP and the current PACOM TSCP objectives and priorities; Indonesia’s geo-strategic position in the region and the threats and challenges it faces; and will explore options that PACOM can implement to strengthen the U.S.-Indonesian strategic partnership after the “Leahy Conditions” are met and lifted.

**Theater Security Cooperation Plan Premise**

TSCP is the means of using the U.S. military in an overall diplomatic engagement strategy “designed to support the U.S. defense strategy, advance regional defense policy goals, and in the immediate term, enable the war on global terrorism.” There are three levels of military contact, with the lowest level being simple military contacts and humanitarian assistance. The medium level of cooperation can vary from International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs to low-level foreign military sales. The highest level of cooperation can include major foreign military equipment sales and financing (FMS and FMF), combined exercises, and the development of military interoperability. Today, PACOM is operating in the low and medium levels of cooperation with Indonesia. The limited and conditional foreign military financing and sales that are available to Indonesia can only be used on non-lethal defense articles.
The goal of TSCP is to gain the trust of the other country. Over the past twenty years, on-again, off-again FMS and FMF have created a high level of mistrust between the U.S. and Indonesia. Examples include: not allowing TNI to purchase ammunition that exceeds 76mm in caliber; limitations on how aircraft will be used if they are purchased from NATO countries; and not allowing TNI to purchase the armament systems associated with the military aircraft. PACOM’s long-term strategy should include rebuilding the trust between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries. By following a long-term strategy that advances shared interests that are specific to Indonesia’s military and its influence, substantial achievements can be accomplished.

**Current PACOM TSCP Objectives and Priorities**

The current theme of the PACOM TSCP for its Area of Responsibility (AOR) is to prosecute and win the GWOT by using TSC activities to create a hostile environment towards terrorism, thereby preventing an Islamic Fundamentalist insurgent movement from taking hold in areas of the AOR, or growing stronger in areas where an insurgent movement has already established itself. The TSCP objectives are:

1. **U.S. Influence**: Build relationships and strategic partnerships, promote U.S. interests, support strategic communication, and establish a secure and stable regional environment.
2. **Access**: Enable forward deterrence and U.S. readiness, support access for future contingencies, and protect logistics lines of communication.
3. **Competent Coalition Partners**: Build partnership capacities, advance partner nation interoperability, and facilitate partner nation military transformation.

The priorities specific to Indonesia are helping TNI, and other agencies where able, contribute to building a competent, participatory government that is transitioning from a past authoritarian rule to one of democracy by:

- Improving the ability of TNI to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy and smuggling.
- Improve TNI’s capability to participate in multinational Humanitarian Assistance, Search and Rescue, and Peace operations.
- Peacefully resolving internal security issues, especially those that have the potential of becoming regional security threats.
- Increase U.S. access to Indonesian ports, airfields and training areas.
- Assist TNI in doctrinal transition from domestic security to external, joint defense.
- Improve TNI’s modernization and defense planning programs.
- Facilitate education of Indonesian civilian leaders with long-term goal of competent civilian control of the Indonesian military.

President George W. Bush and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in a joint statement in November, 2006, agreed that bilateral military ties would be primarily targeted at promoting peace and stability in the region. Both presidents agreed “that such ties would be primarily targeted at increasing coordination on disaster relief, exchanges and training on the role of militaries in democratic societies, increasing mutual professional development and enhancing regional and maritime security.” With some Congressional relief from the “Leahy Conditions,” the U.S. has taken small steps towards normalization of full mil-to-mil relations, but there is so much more that should and needs to be done to strengthen this strategic friendship.

**Why Indonesia is Important**

While the Muslim Middle East has received much of the focus of the U.S. government, Southeast Asia (SEA), in particular Indonesia and the Philippines have quietly become recognized as growing areas of concern in regards to GWOT. This may well be the first potential area where the Islamic Fundamentalist movement can be defeated. As Eric G. John, Department of State Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs pointed out in his testimony to Congress in the fall of 2005:

- *Since the fall of Dictator President Suharto’s 32-year rule that ended in 1998, Indonesia has become the world’s third-largest democracy.*
- *Indonesia has more people of Muslim faith than Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia combined.*
- *The strategic sea lanes that pass through and along Indonesian territory carry one-third of the world’s sea-borne trade.*
- *Half the world’s oil passes through the Malacca Strait.*
• Most importantly, Indonesia is a key player in the dominant ideological struggle of our time: the competition between democratic modernization and the rise of extremist Islam.\textsuperscript{10}

The success of Indonesia’s first direct Democratic national elections in 2004 highlights how Indonesian Islamists favor a secular form of government vice an Islamic government. Its most powerful Islamic clerics and most popular Islamic political parties favor the new democratic government model. More importantly, the moderate nature of Islam in Indonesia creates conditions receptive to U.S. engagement. The success of U.S. responses to natural disasters that have devastated Indonesia in the past three years (the earthquake and tsunami in December 2004 and earthquakes in March 2005 and May 2006) have established a pattern of good will that has overcome past disagreements between the U.S. and Indonesia and led to improved relations between the two countries.\textsuperscript{11} However, many leaders in the Indonesian government and the population at large are opposed to U.S. actions against fellow Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq, and many are still affected by the mistrust generated by past U.S. policies. Still, conditions in Indonesia are conducive to engagement through the PACOM TSCP.

Indonesia and Australia recently signed a bilateral security treaty in November 2006. Australia fully recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty, and understands that a disintegration of Indonesia would adversely affect stability in SEA. Australia also agreed not to support any separatist movements in Indonesia, as well as improving Indonesian capabilities in the defense, law enforcement, combating terrorism, intelligence, maritime security, aviation safety, prevention of mass destructive weapons, emergency response to natural disasters, and cooperation to improve mutual understanding of security affairs between the two countries.\textsuperscript{12}

The growing economy of China is also a potential threat in which Indonesia’s geo-strategic position and its own growing economy can have a powerful effect on the entire region.
In November 2004, China concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on trade in goods, and is looking to expand this agreement to include services and investments. This huge trading bloc, which includes Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar, when combined with China through an FTA will create a market of 1.7 billion consumers with a total trade of $1.23 trillion.\(^{13}\) China would also like to include India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, along with ASEAN, to create what it calls the “East Asia Free Trade Area.”\(^{14}\) Not only will the U.S. stand to lose a great deal economically if this FTA comes to fruition, Taiwan will also be adversely affected. Instead of retaking Taiwan by military force, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could force Taiwan to capitulate by excluding Taiwan from this East Asia FTA. This could, in turn, lead Taiwan to declare its independence, in which China has already stated that it would take military action to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent. The U.S. can reshape this area by establishing alternative agreements with major trading partners in the region that includes both the U.S. and Taiwan. Indonesia’s growing economy can open new economic conditions to both U.S. and Taiwan markets, which can also be used to counter China’s growing hegemony in South East Asian markets.

**TNI Reforms and Politics**

Under President Suharto’s reign, which lasted 32 years and finally ended in 1998, TNI was charged with both external defense and internal social and political control. This came to be known as the “Dwifungsi” doctrine.\(^{15}\) During this time, TNI held appointed seats in the legislature, as well as filling roles in the government such as Minister of Defense. TNI was also able to fund itself through its own private enterprises.\(^{16}\)
In the ensuing period of instability in the post-Suharto period, caused by both widespread dissatisfaction with Suharto’s policies and the Asian financial crisis, the government and judicial and legal systems lost authority in parts of the massive archipelagic nation. During this time, regional insurgencies in Sumatra, Borneo, Spice Islands and Papua took hold. President B.J. Habibie, who replaced Suharto in 1999, allowed East Timor to choose between remaining with Indonesia or independence. The East Timorese chose independence, at which time TNI encouraged and helped pro-Indonesians attack the pro-independence supporters. These actions discredited the Habibie government and TNI in particular. Consequently, these actions led the U.S. Congress to suspend military-to-military contacts and International Military Education and Training (IMET) with Indonesia. IMET had been previously suspended in 1992 due to human rights violations in East Timor, and had been partially lifted in 1995. Adding to U.S. concerns, in 2002, two Americans were murdered in Papua by TNI soldiers. These actions by TNI were the basis for the “Leahy Conditions”. The amendment established benchmarks that Indonesia had to meet in order for defense funding to be restored.

The TNI has undertaken a number of transformational reforms which are in line with the democratic reforms the government has already accomplished. The Indonesian public also took a stand. In 2002, they voted to remove the TNI’s formal role in politics, and in 2004, the practice of appointing military and police to seats in Parliament were put to an end. Another reform was the establishment of a police force separate from the TNI. Then in 1999, and in 2004, legislation took away the ability of the TNI to support itself through its own private enterprises and divest itself from these business interests. Throughout these changes, TNI has maintained a professional attitude and support towards these democratic reforms and civilian oversight of the military.
Today, TNI is continuing its progress towards a civilian-controlled force that is no longer focused on internal social and political control, but on external security from transnational threats. TNI would like to transform the military into one that provides domestic support to the civilian National Police only as necessary. Indonesia’s parliament passed a law in 2004 that makes clear to the military the importance of democratic values, civilian supremacy, and respect for human rights. Today, the Minister of Defense is a civilian. The Indonesian government is currently focused on reforming the government and helping its economy, and TNI will have a difficult transition to make as it gives up its business holdings that supported the bulk of its budget. TNI will be in need of “soft loans or credits” to purchase equipment and fund training and operations. In February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice resumed IMET, and this decision will go a long way towards increasing the professionalism of TNI officers, especially in regards to human rights and civilian control of the military. In November 2005, the State Department exercised a National Security Waiver provision provided in the Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act to remove congressional restrictions on FMF and lethal defense articles. These actions represented a reestablishment of normalized military relations, but only in areas supporting greater reform of the Indonesian military, its ability to respond to national and regional disasters, and promote regional stability.

U.S. Military Involvement in Indonesia

For 32 years, President Suharto ruled Indonesia. During that time, the U.S. supplied an enormous amount of military assistance to Indonesia. After Suharto was replaced in 1998, the internal conflicts that broiled over in Indonesia led to many human rights violations by the TNI. The U.S. curbed its military ties with Indonesia’s armed forces through Congressional oversight in the late 1990s and early 2000s, only to see the need for more military involvement after 9/11.
The attacks on 9/11 convinced U.S. policymakers that confronting all Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist networks was a priority. Unfortunately, the Indonesian population is highly skeptical of U.S. motives in regards to its involvement in Muslim countries. Consequently, the U.S. made small steps in re-engaging Indonesia and helping with the GWOT.

On 26 December 2004, the 9.1 to 9.3 magnitude earthquake that took place in the Indian Ocean, and the resulting tsunami that killed over 130,000 and left over 500,000 homeless in Aceh province, allowed the U.S. Navy to provide Humanitarian Assistance (HA) to the affected areas. The ensuing HA response built an incredible amount of goodwill amongst the Indonesian people that is still prevalent today. The military action taken by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, clouded this goodwill. Yet the Government of Indonesia did not forget the enormous response provided by the U.S. The Government of Indonesia is making strides to meet the requirements the U.S. has set to normalize relations with the U.S. and build a stronger partnership while strengthening its own democratic reforms.

Currently, the security assistance the U.S. is providing to Indonesia consists of six different programs and initiatives:

- **International Military Education and Training (IMET):** This program was suspended from 1999-2002 due to human rights violations by the TNI in East Timor. In 2005, President Bush revived the program, initially providing over $600,000 in funds in order to increase professionalism and strengthen respect for democratic values and human rights within the TNI.

- **Antiterrorism Assistance Program:** Special Detachment 88 (SD-88) is a special Indonesian counterterrorism police unit that was trained and equipped in response to the
Bali bombing in 2002. This unit was commissioned in 2003 and has received over $20.8 million in funding for its operations.

- **Counterterrorism Fellowship Program:** This U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) program funds education in counterterrorism practices and strategies for Indonesian military and intelligence officials.

- **Military Spare Parts for Non-Lethal Items:** Falling under the “Leahy Conditions,” the U.S. allowed Indonesia to purchase spare parts for “non-lethal” items such as spare parts for C-130 aircraft that delivered HA supplies to Aceh province during the tsunami relief efforts in 2004-2005.

- **Foreign Military Financing (FMF):** In 2005, when the U.S. State Department exercised a National Security Waiver provision provided in the Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act to remove congressional restrictions on FMF and lethal defense articles, $6 million was provided to the Indonesian Navy for maritime security in the Strait of Malacca.

- **Economic Support Funds:** These funds are used to bolster Indonesia’s internal police and security forces, and amounted to $23.2 million from 2001-04.26

### Indonesian Threats

Radical Islamic Fundamentalists and separatist movements are the primary internal threats to Indonesia. Due to Indonesia being preoccupied with other internal problems in late 2001, the government paid little attention to the growing Al-Qaeda threat within its population. The U.S. offensive in Afghanistan provided extensive captured documentation that revealed a growing Al-Qaeda movement not only in Indonesia, but in the region. The arrests in December 2001 in Malaysia and Singapore revealed that the masterminds of the operations in those two
areas were in fact Indonesian nationals who fled back to Indonesia before they could be arrested. The main reason the Indonesian government failed to take action was the fear of backlash from supporters of known Al-Qaeda leaders and the resultant widespread public unrest that could have become of it. Until the Bali bombing in October 2002, Indonesia was the known as the “weakest link” in addressing terrorism in SEA.

The bombing in Bali was directly attributed to Jemaah Islamiya (JI), an Islamic Fundamentalist group directly linked to Al-Qaeda. JI is the most powerful of the handful of transnational Islamic Fundamentalist groups operating in Indonesia. The subsequent bombings at the J.W. Marriot in Jakarta in August 2003 and the Australian Embassy in September 2004, caused the Indonesian government to take significant steps in countering Islamic Fundamentalists. Indonesian President Yudhoyono, who was the Security Minister in 2002, stated “this incident has created a turning point, and from now on, the government will not be able to entertain doubts about harsh action.” During the 2002 trials of several Al-Qaeda suspects in Spain, the Indonesian link to Al-Qaeda was highlighted when it was revealed that one of the suspects attended a terrorist training camp in Indonesia. In October 2002, the two largest mainstream Muslim organizations, Nahdatul Ulama (Muslim Scholars Party, NU) and Muhammadiyah (Followers of the Prophet Muhammad), threw their full support behind the Indonesian government’s antiterrorism efforts. These two groups represented one-third of the Muslim population in Indonesia. All of these issues have focused Western attention on SEA, Indonesia and the Philippines in particular, as the “second front” in the war on terrorism.

Another area that Indonesia has long struggled against is the separatist groups that pose a significant threat to the government. President Habibie’s misguided attempt to allow East Timorese to hold a referendum for independence failed miserably when the East Timorese voted
to secede from Indonesia. It gave rise to other secessionist movements in Aceh, Riau, and Irian Jaya provinces. These provinces contain vast amounts of Indonesian natural resources, representing half of the Indonesian oil deposits, the world’s largest gold mine, third largest silver mine, and accounts for 15% of Indonesia’s foreign earnings.\textsuperscript{33} In Aceh province, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement, successfully brought about a peace agreement with the Indonesian government through its effective campaigns against the TNI. This peace agreement in August 2005 provided wide-ranging autonomy to Aceh. In December 2006, Aceh held its first gubernatorial and district administrative elections, the first democratic elections in over half a century in this province.\textsuperscript{34} Today, Indonesia seems to be seeking diplomatic concessions with these separatist movements instead of using military solutions, and in the case of Aceh, has seen success. It is unclear whether this approach will work with the other separatist movements in other parts of the archipelago.

Other areas that are threats not only to Indonesia, but the greater SEA area as a whole, are maritime piracy, illegal immigration, the drug trade, and human trafficking. The most serious of these is piracy. Piracy is rampant in the Strait of Malacca, through which a quarter of the world’s trade and over half its oil passes. Almost 150 pirate attacks take place in the 550-mile Strait each year.\textsuperscript{35} China is also viewed as a long term threat, but one which the Indonesian government believes is manageable through the multilateral ASEAN.\textsuperscript{36}

**Proposed Post-“Leahy Conditions” TSCP**

Members of the PACOM staff currently would like to re-engage to the fullest extent with Indonesia. The November 2005 State Department National Security Waiver provided a window of opportunity through the Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. Congressional restrictions on FMF and lethal defense articles were reduced. However, there are
two significant roadblocks PACOM must overcome in order to fully re-engage. These include the State Department and Congress here in the U.S., and the Indonesian people. Despite the waiver exercised in 2005, the State Department is still “dragging its feet” in regards to pushing for a larger role for Indonesia in the overall Pacific theater. Congress is also still beholden to non-government organizations (NGOs) who are not necessarily passing the correct or current information to key members of Congress.37 The Indonesian people are also incredibly suspicious of the U.S. and its intent in Indonesia due to radical propaganda. The Indonesian president is very much aware of this, and is trying to balance those forces with what he knows is the correct course of action (engaging the U.S.).38 The following are ideas in which PACOM can significantly enhance its TSCP, and greatly strengthen our strategic relationship with Indonesia.

1. Information Operations and Intelligence Coordination Teams

   Right now, the U.S. is losing the information war with the Indonesian people. This is the first area that the U.S. can make significant inroads following the lifting of the “Leahy Conditions.” The current TSCP only mentions facilitating the education of Indonesian civilian leaders with the long-term goal of competent civilian control of the Indonesian military. While this is needed, an effective Information Operations (IO) plan needs to be put in place to counter the radical propaganda currently being passed to the Indonesian people. What is needed is a coordinated Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) team that can address U.S./Indonesian cooperation; determining how radical information flows (i.e. radio, telecommunications, computers, media) and the measures required to staunch this flow; and determining the IO limitations (constraints/restraints), all of which can dramatically effect how Indonesians view the U.S. over the long term.
For the Indonesian fight in the GWOT, the U.S. and Australia have passed actionable intelligence on known terrorist activities that produced results. More could be done if an Intelligence Coordination Team, much like the U.S. Army’s Asian Studies Detachment (ASD) located at Camp Zama, Japan began working in the country. This unit’s mission would synthesize and cite a large number of open source references and produce Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) and daily Force Protection and Situational Awareness Reports (FPSARs). Combining a team of analysts from the U.S. and Indonesia at the Defense Attaché Office in Jakarta can provide three functions: 1) actionable intelligence that can be useful to the IO team; 2) a means for intelligence gathered by other U.S. intelligence assets to be passed to Indonesia’s security forces; and 3) help the Indonesian National Police force manage its Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Intelligence (RSI) program to help them fight JI and other extremist groups.

2. Fully Restore IMET, FMS, and FMF Programs

The most effective means in strengthening the professionalism of Indonesian military officers is the IMET program. Since the restoration of IMET, there has not been a significant increase in the amount of funding over the past three years. The IMET program is designed to educate a core of personnel versed in U.S. doctrine of civil-military relations and international norms of human rights. It is through these educational opportunities, like the international programs at the U.S. Naval War College and others, which Indonesian officers can interact with U.S. counterparts and see for themselves a future democratic model toward which Indonesia can strive.

A new Indonesian TSCP must also include a more robust FMS and FMF program. The TNI is facing severe financial constraints in the upcoming years, and faces a considerable
geographic challenge in monitoring its borders. FMS and FMF should be targeted to enable Indonesia to purchase the military equipment required to build an effective force with a responsive command and control network that can counter international threats. Once TNI can regain the capability of patrolling its own territory, then it can combat the incoming flow of transnational terrorists, piracy, the drug trade, and human trafficking. Not only does this assist the U.S. in the GWOT, it also strengthens Indonesia’s democratic government by proving to its people that it can provide security against international threats.

3. Bilateral and Multilateral Military Training Exercises

Based on the 2006 Security Agreement between Indonesia and Australia, these two countries have agreed to bilateral training exercises which will enhance the working relationship between the two countries’ militaries. Programs that the U.S. can schedule are the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), which is a low level bilateral exercise which provides training for SEA navies, and an extensive exercise based upon the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). RMSI builds multilateral capabilities to combat maritime threats such as terrorism and piracy prevalent in SEA. The program also teaches tactics in patrol and border enforcement which can be handled cooperatively between nations in the region. These exercises, in conjunction with a robust FMS/FMF program, will allow Indonesia to counter the threats it faces while also giving them the ability to operate as part of a coalition in the region.

4. Build on Humanitarian Assistance

After the devastating December 2004 tsunami, Indonesians were grateful for all the assistance the U.S. provided during the relief effort. The goodwill generated by the U.S. response has enabled PACOM to gain access to Indonesia that previously was not available. Today, much of the tsunami relief efforts have been turned over to NGOs, but PACOM should
continue to offer and provide limited assist efforts in the form of Medical Civic Assistance Programs (MEDCAP)\textsuperscript{42}, Civil Affairs (CA) teams and humanitarian reconstruction funds to continue rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures that were destroyed. These efforts will help maintain Indonesian public support and increase goodwill towards a limited U.S. presence.

PACOM must manage the U.S. footprint very carefully in Indonesia to prevent alienating certain sectors of Indonesia’s Muslim population. U.S. SOF forces normally operate under a small footprint, and are the most appropriate choice for long-term training, exercises, and operations within Indonesia. The U.S. Coast Guard and the new Navy Expeditionary Combat Command can also provide small training teams in the areas of coastal patrol and border enforcement. Small Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) from the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force can also be used to develop TNI capabilities. Port visits by larger ships such as cruisers and destroyers can generate goodwill as well as provide a small economic boom for the port city visited, but these should only be for very short durations (3-4 days) due to the high visibility and possibility of stirring anti-American feelings amongst the Muslim population. A small U.S. footprint has a very low probability of alienating the population, so PACOM must balance the desire to achieve greater cooperation with TNI with a long-term strategy that does not expose Indonesia to large U.S. forces.

5. Theater Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Asset

The final proposal is that PACOM propose the use of a conventional-powered aircraft carrier as an HA rapid response asset. With the last conventional-powered aircraft carrier, USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63) scheduled to be decommissioned in 2008, the U.S. has an opportunity to use this asset as a disaster relief platform in which helicopters and cargo aircraft (C-2As) can be used to ferry supplies in to needed areas. One lesson learned from the tsunami relief effort
was that the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72) had to leave the disaster area in order to get outside Indonesian territorial waters to perform required fixed-wing flight operations for its Air Wing’s carrier qualifications. Since the HA rapid response aircraft carrier will only carry helicopters and carrier cargo aircraft, the necessity to maintain carrier qualifications will be minimal, and countries will be more susceptible to approving fixed-wing flight operations in its territorial waters if these flights are only cargo aircraft flying aboard relief supplies.

Another plus for this idea is that NGOs can be based aboard ship in order to synchronize relief efforts since the carrier’s manning level will be minimal without a full Air Wing on board. This has another benefit in that it reduces the U.S. footprint on the ground. Helicopters can fly supplies directly where they are needed. Also, if the carrier is needed for a contingency operation, it can be used as a SOF asset much like KITTY HAWK was used in 2001 during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) while stationed off Pakistan. Helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, as well as U.S. Army Rangers and SOF forces, were able to perform their missions directly from the flight deck at their choosing. The need for this dual capability has been proven in Indonesia and OEF. The PACOM AOR is highly susceptible to devastating natural disasters, and the GWOT requires a platform from which SOF forces can operate in case there are no viable land alternatives to use. With the KITTY HAWK already forward-deployed and in operating shape, it is an asset that can be husbanded in short order to meet the needs of the theater commander.

Conclusion

A robust TSCP that includes full military-to-military relations, FMS, and FMF will only improve the TNI’s capabilities, but the answer is not simply to give money or equipment to the Indonesians. Indonesia offers the world an opportunity to show that democracy can work in a
Muslim-dominated country and that Islamic Fundamentalism will not be tolerated by the Indonesian people and their government. In today’s post-9/11 world, with the Muslim population embroiled in an insurgency with Islamic Fundamentalists, it behooves the U.S. government to fully commit itself to supporting the democratic movement in Indonesia. By remedying the conditions that have caused the JI movement, with U.S. support, Indonesia can be the first of many fronts in the GWOT in which Islamic Fundamentalism is defeated by fellow moderate Muslims. In order to do this, the Indonesian people need to see that the U.S. has a vested interest in their well-being and that the democratic movement that has begun in Indonesia is fully supported by the U.S. This, however, will take considerable time, but it is time well worth exerting.
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