The purpose of this monograph is to determine the applicability of the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) COMPSTAT crime control model to restoring order in Iraq. The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) performs similar police functions to those executed by the NYPD. Although different in scope and scale, the conditions in Iraq today are comparable to those that existed in pre-1994 New York City. The cycle of violence is the prevailing condition in Iraq and the central challenge to IPS efforts to restore order. Like the current MOE used by the IPS today, the NYPD concerned itself with procedural evaluations. Through the COMPSTAT process, the NYPD produced dramatic reductions in crime over a decade, achieving the FBI label as the US’s safest big city. The identification of meaningful measures of effectiveness inherent in the iterative nature of the COMPSTAT process coupled with effective crime control strategies contributed to the reduction in crime. The goal of this research is to provide useable lessons from the success of the NYPDs COMPSTAT process to further the effectiveness of the IPS in its efforts to restore order in Iraq.
Title of Monograph: The Iraqi Police Service and COMPSTAT: Applying the NYPD Crime Control Model to Restoring Public Order in Iraq

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Abstract


The purpose of this monograph is to determine the applicability of the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) COMPSTAT crime control model to restoring order in Iraq. The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) performs similar police functions to those executed by the NYPD. Although different in scope and scale, the conditions in Iraq today are comparable to those that existed in pre-1994 New York City. The country is inundated with firearms and explosives which are used in a continuous cycle of violence in order to achieve political, religious or criminal objectives. The cycle of violence is perpetrated by Sunni rejectionists bent on restoring their pre-invasion power base. They attempt to achieve this goal through attacks on coalition forces as well as Iraqi Security Forces and the majority Shia population. Foreign fighters seeking a caliphate in Iraq exacerbate the Sunni-Shia tensions. Shia militia groups avenge attacks on their members by conducting sectarian attacks against Sunni neighborhoods. In many parts of the country this cycle of violence has overwhelmed the IPS. These rival groups, armed with a seemingly endless supply of firearms and explosives, transit through public spaces to carry out their attacks. The IPS offers little protection in these public spaces, thus allowing the cycle to continue. The bulging, disenfranchised youth population in Iraq provides a ripe recruiting pool for all groups and many have taken an active role in the cycle of violence. Beset by fear and disorder, the Iraqi population cannot turn to the IPS due to a perception of corruption, militia infiltration or general incompetence. This cycle of violence is the prevailing condition in Iraq and the central challenge to IPS efforts to restore order.

Pre-1994 New York was a city plagued by skyrocketing firearms related homicides and extensive fear and disorder. Disorder emanated from a loss of control of public spaces to criminal elements. These criminal elements often utilized truant youths to carry out firearms related crimes, contributing to even further disorder. Like the current MOE used by the IPS today, the NYPD concerned itself with procedural evaluations. How fast did an officer respond to a crime? How many arrests were made? The police approach to this problem was centered on the notion that police cannot reduce crime, only respond to it.

In 1994 William J. Bratton assumed duties as Police Commissioner in New York City and developed the COMPSTAT process. A management process that centered on outcomes instead of internal procedures, the NYPD produced dramatic reductions in crime over the next decade, achieving the FBI label as the US’s safest big city. The identification of meaningful measures of effectiveness inherent in the iterative nature of the COMPSTAT process coupled with effective crime control strategies contributed to the reduction in crime.

The framework behind the “Getting Guns Off the Street”, “Curbing Youth Violence”, “Reclaiming Control of Public Spaces”, and “Restoring Organizational Integrity in the NYPD” crime control strategies offer the most applicable models for adaptation by the IPS. The IPS could develop order control strategies that address the major forces of disorder in Iraq listed above. Specifically, “Firearms/Explosive”, “Control of Public Spaces”, “Youth Violence”, and “Organizational Integrity” order control strategies support MOE that will determine if order is restored in Iraq. These public order MOE range from the number and type of homicides/attacks, to the number of actionable tips received from the population.

The goal of this research is to provide useable lessons from the success of the NYPDs COMPSTAT process to further the effectiveness of the IPS in its efforts to restore order in Iraq.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

The development of host nation security forces during post conflict operations is vital to creating stability in a particular country. Local police forces trained and equipped to maintain public order are a key element to achieving security and stability. The same is true for Iraq. Therefore, since the fall of Saddam’s regime, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) have undertaken the role of organizing and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to include the Iraqi Police Service (IPS).

To facilitate the effort, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commander, GEN George W. Casey tasked LTG David H. Petraeus with the responsibility of creating the ISF, through the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). Within MNSTC-I, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) would work in close coordination with the Ministry of Interior (MOI). CPATT and the MOI agreed on a target goal of 135,000 police officers, responsible for the stability and security of the 27 million Iraqis, a ratio of 1 policeman to every 200 Iraqis.¹

CPA advisors debated the philosophical approach to policing in Iraq. Would the IPS be a community based force that would ultimately serve the needs of its citizens or would the force resemble a paramilitary organization capable of fighting insurgents and terrorists?² The CPA compromised and created separate organizations that would address both of these concerns. The IPS was divided into five regions (Baghdad, Northeast, Northwest, Central South, Southern), with subordinate provincial headquarters and individual stations.³ The IPS performs duties similar to those of the local police within the United States. Their missions include law enforcement, public

³ Winston P. Brooks,.61.
safety and internal security at the local level. They are organized into patrol, headquarters (station) and traffic sections within all of the major cities and provinces in Iraq.  

MNSTC-I developed MOEs to assess the capabilities and performance of the IPS, and the US Congress, in its oversight role, enacted legislation to track the progress of this and other initiatives in Iraq.

**Current IPS MOE**

Public Law 109-148, Department of Defense Emergency Appropriations, requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a comprehensive set of “performance indicators” and “measures for progress” focused at political and military stability (Stability and Security Report) in Iraq every 90 days.  

Indicators of a stable security environment include engagements per day, “numbers of trained Iraqi forces, and trends related to numbers and types of ethnic and religious based hostile encounters.” The law also calls for a report on the numbers of trained recruits, absenteeism, and the overall effectiveness of the Iraqi police officers and the chain of command.

Using the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq as a foundation, the Stability and Security report describes the top goals in the security environment as “breaking the cycle of violence, promoting reconciliation and transitioning security responsibility to the Government of Iraq.” In order to achieve these goals, the US, the Government of Iraq and coalition partners focused on the following objectives:

- Neutralizing enemy effectiveness, influence and ability to intimidate
- Rapidly reducing sectarian violence and eliminating death squads

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6 Ibid., 2739.

7 Ibid., 2740.


9 Ibid., 25.
Increasing the capacity of the Government of Iraq and its security structures and forces to provide national security and public order

Helping Iraq strengthen rule of law capabilities in the areas of law enforcement, justice and the corrections system

In order to measure these objectives the report lists the following as indicators of the security environment:

- Composition, strength, and support groups for groups that threaten security and stability: anti-government and anti-coalition forces
- Activity, support and efforts to disband, disarm and reintegrate militias
- Attack trends (including number of attacks and their effectiveness)
- Levels of sectarian violence

Public Law 109-163 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2006) also requires the DoD to report to Congress on the current political, military and diplomatic measures taken to complete the mission in Iraq (1227 report). In terms of the IPS, this report solely addresses the number of IPS currently trained and the number of CPATT elements embedded in the organization. Little in this document addresses the outcome of IPS efforts, focusing primarily on procedural efforts. There is no discussion of IPS impact on sectarian violence, the elimination of death squads or how they can strengthen the rule of law. Interestingly, the report describes 2006, as the “Year of the Police” and highlights that no established threshold exists for the number of trained IPS units capable of independent operations that would influence a reduction in US force levels. The 1227 report references the Stability and Security Report as a source for greater explanations of ISF status and effectiveness.

Similar to the 1227 report, Public Law 108-106, (Emergency Appropriations Act for Iraq and Afghanistan) requires the DOS to submit a quarterly report (2207 report) that outlines how funds appropriated to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) have been spent. The 2207 report breaks down IPS funding in terms of training and technical assistance as well as those rule

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10 Ibid., 25.
of law enablers such as witness protection program spending, facilities repair, penal facilities and public safety measures. The report does not measure IPS effectiveness (levels of sectarian violence, law enforcement, elimination of death squads), although the funding directed at institutional support for establishing the rule of law is a necessary measure of performance. The DOS maintains a weekly Iraq Status Report on its Near East Asia desk website which, in terms of security, only addresses procedural measures. At the time of writing, this report listed the current strength of the IPS at 135,000 trained personnel. Originally established as a milestone, the 135,000 end strength for the IPS is not accompanied by any measure of effectiveness for this force.

Much of the data captured in the reports listed above emanates from the Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) completed by Police Transition Teams (PTT) within CPATT. The TRAs cover seven areas: personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, leadership and a subjective assessment. Each of these seven areas requires the PTT to report a green, amber or red status. The end overall assessment is measured as a level 1 through level 4. A level 1 unit can perform counterinsurgency operations independently while a level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations. Nowhere, like the other assessments listed above, except for the subjective assessment area, does the form address the outcome of the IPS operation.

One report, prepared by the Inspector General did address outcome based evaluations. The report stated that the IPS performed well at the January 2005 elections as indicated by

15 Ibid., 23.
minimal disruptions by insurgents and, at the time, a growing respect for the IPS among Iraqis. However, the study also pointed out that the emphasis on numbers overshadowed the qualitative shortcomings of those officers who completed training. This assessment was based on early reports of officers abandoning posts in the face of attacks and an inability to protect themselves.¹⁶

The Problem

In summary, the three reports that address security in Iraq do not address the relationship between the IPS and the stated goals, as listed in the Security and Stability Report. The reports list levels of sectarian violence and attack trends as security environment indicators, but the data used to measure IPS effectiveness are not tied to these events. These reports do address IPS measures of performance in terms of procedural growth and development, but they make it difficult to discern the effectiveness of the IPS on the external environment. Does the IPS contribute to a reduction in the levels of sectarian violence and assist in establishing a culture that adheres to the rule of law? The framing of the Iraqi public order problem can be summarized as follows: *the perpetual cycle of violence in Iraq is not currently being addressed by the IPS due to a history of incompetence and corruption coupled with present day measures of effectiveness that do not address public order.*

MNF-I has made tremendous progress in equipping and training the Iraqi Security Forces, particularly the IPS. However, the focus on train and equip has not led to restoration of public order. The open source measures of effectiveness (MOE) used to assess the capabilities and performance of the IPS revolve around internal procedural, not outcome based, evaluations. Little literature addresses the ability of the police to create and maintain public order. Public order could be achieved through the adaptation of certain facets of a proven crime control model, such

as the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) COMPSTAT process. Therefore, the goal of this research is to identify applicable lessons from the success of the NYPD COMPSTAT process and apply them to the IPS’s ongoing struggle to restore public order in Iraq. Specifically, this research investigates NYPD COMPSTAT procedures to identify measures of effectiveness applicable to the restoration of public order in Iraq.

Why the NYPD? As a police force responsible for public security, the NYPD serves as an applicable model for comparison to the IPS. After decades of ineffective performance management and rising levels of violence, the NYPD, like the current IPS, was forced to change, as disorder and fear reigned supreme. Additionally, the NYPD transformed in 1994 from a crime reaction force to a crime prevention and reduction organization. A crime reaction based police force worries about how it abides by procedure, not how it affects its external environment. Similarly, the IPS assessments focus on training status, not how it affects order among the population. The NYPD executed this philosophical shift in its approach to policing by establishing measures of effectiveness designed to tell both precinct commanders and department officials whether or not crime control strategies were working. In essence, the department transitioned from a procedural organization to an outcome organization. The transformation produced an organization that could reduce crime and regain public confidence.

The NYPD’s COMPSTAT (Computerized or comparable statistics) model provides a methodology to address the establishment of measures of performance and effectiveness that determine the commander’s progress in restoring public order. COMPSTAT can be described as a goal oriented "strategic management process that uses information technology, operational strategy and managerial accountability to control crime and police neighborhoods. Its mission is

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17 Public Order: defined as “the state of peace, freedom from confused or unruly behavior, and respect for law or proper authority.” Merriam-Webster online dictionary.
the reduction of crime and the continued enhancement of a community’s quality of life.”

Therefore, the NYPD’s COMPSTAT process offers a model for the nascent IPS to transition from a procedural based organization to an outcome based organization. For Iraq, the desired outcome is public order, where Iraqi society can thrive, free from disorder and fear.

**Methodology for Applying COMPSTAT to IPS Operations**

The first step in this research is to examine the conditions facing the IPS today and the NYPD prior to 1994. The IPS contends with a cycle of violence sparked by jihadists who seek to destabilize the Iraqi government by inciting sectarian violence. Violence between Sunni and Shia organizations consists of a combination of firearms and explosive based attacks carried out on rival forces turf. Inevitably, Iraqi youth are drawn into the problem due to idleness and lack of educational or employment opportunities. A legacy of police corruption and incompetence contributes to the cycle of violence as Iraqis perceive the police as either unwilling or unable to disrupt sectarian attacks. Therefore, the cycle continues.

The pre-1994 NYPD faced an alarming homicide rate due to an overabundance of firearms. The loss of control of public spaces where citizens convened and conducted business factored in to the decline of order in the city as well as an enormous growth in youth crime. Similar to the IPS, the public lost confidence in the NYPD, who did not view crime reduction as its primary responsibility. Fear and disorder drove the need for a new approach to policing, thus COMPSTAT emerged. Change was prompted by learning that a traditional approach to policing did not reduce crime and that counting internal procedural measures did not contribute to order. Similarly, the IPS train and equip approach has not yielded substantial decreases in attacks on the populace. Since COMPSTAT was instrumental in reducing crime in New York, certain aspects of

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the process could assist the IPS in restoring order in Iraq. COMPSTAT must be understood to determine the applicable aspects of the process.

The next portion of this paper describes COMPSTAT and how the NYPD implemented this process. The COMPSTAT process is a statistical based police model that is continuously analyzed and modified in order to reduce crime and maintain public order. The NYPD experimented with several police approaches over the past century that all generally failed to reduce crime. Central to all pre-COMPSTAT models was an aversion to the notion that police could reduce crime. This chapter will explore this evolution and examine the central principles of the COMPSTAT process. Central among these principles is the requirement to conduct continuous assessment and follow up.

The strength of the COMPSTAT process lies in its iterative nature. Chapter 3 covers the linkage between NYPD objectives, measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Constant assessment of its external environment allows the NYPD to adjust crime control strategies in order to become more effective. Since 1994 the NYPD instituted over ten major crime control strategies. Each strategy consists of indicators and performance measures that all are assessed by monitoring weekly crime statistics. While the NYPD terminology is different, the development of useful MOE is addressed in the Army’s current and emerging doctrine, which is utilized by PTTs and CPATT advisors. The importance of understanding MOE and being an outcome based organization is critical to discuss the transformation of the NYPD from a crime reaction to a crime reduction force. This section will also discuss specific performance indicators and measures of effectiveness used by the NYPD. The IPS would benefit from a similar process based on order control strategies. The most applicable NYPD crime control strategies involve gun control, public space control, control of youth violence and restoration of police organizational integrity. The linkage of objective to MOE to MOPs that exist in the crime control strategies offers a framework for adoption by the IPS.
Having gleaned what is pertinent in the COMPSTAT process to IPS operations, the next step is to develop applicable MOE for establishing public order in Iraq. This section of the monograph will link NYPD crime control strategy to public order problems in Iraq such as firearms and explosives proliferation, loss of control of public spaces, youth violence and organizational integrity within the IPS. Four order control strategies will be examined: firearms/explosives, public space, control of public spaces, youth violence and organizational integrity. Within each order control strategy exists relevant MOP and MOE, all linked to objectives established in strategic level documents.

The methodology for this monograph is based on both theoretical understandings of the importance of determining success in outcome based organizations and in the actual data collected by the street level bureaucrats. The goal of this monograph is to provide useable tools gleaned from the success of one organization, the NYPD, and apply them to the US Army fight in Iraq.
Chapter 2: Iraq’s Security Environment and the Pre-1994 NYPD

In order to draw lessons from COMPSTAT for the IPS, comparable conditions between current day Iraq and pre-1994 New York must be established. Disorder in present day Iraq emanates from a cycle of violence between Sunni, Shi’a and jihadist organizations over control of critical areas, prevention of rival enclave establishment and implementation of political and religious agendas. Disorder in pre-1994 New York was not categorically arranged as it is today in Iraq. However, criminal elements and their associated accomplices contributed to the disorder. The conditions in both locations allowed forces of disorder to disrupt normal and productive life. These conditions are:

1. Proliferation of Firearms
2. Loss of control of public spaces
3. Disenfranchised Youth
4. Corrupt and Ineffective Police

The enemy of the Iraqi people is both complex and varied. The cycle of violence is characterized by a preponderance of weapons and explosives, which are readily available to rival factions who freely move to rival turf to carry out attacks, free of police interference. Additionally, a disaffected youth population provides a potential source of recruits. Terrorists and foreign fighters seek to force a coalition withdrawal as a means to establish the caliphate while Sunni rejectionists also seek a coalition withdrawal, but to regain ground lost since the invasion of 2003. Shi’a militias and armed groups counter Sunni rejectionists and in many cases offer protection for the population in lieu of the IPS. The criminal element links many of these groups together. Having emerged from the post-invasion security vaccum, the criminal element can move freely between militias to Sunni rejectionists and even to Al Qaeda in Iraq, providing much needed services in the form of kidnappings, extortion, assaults, car jackings and black

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Organized crime is as much a threat to post-Saddam Iraq as those previously mentioned groups because it does not seek publicity, simply revenue collected from the exploits of terrorists, rejectionists or militias. Additionally, organized crime smuggling routes and networks that existed before the regime change still form the logistical architecture utilized by the majority of the rival factions today.22

Similarly, pre-1994 New York City dealt with urban decay despite several periods of police reform. Not politically or ideologically based, the spiral of decline in New York City grew from an indifference to order, or allowing “broken windows” to exist. The “Broken Windows” theory states that:

Police and other enforcement officials believe that certain types of street conditions such as the number, type and frequency of street solicitations, the number of individuals loitering in doorways and storefronts, and their hours of operation do contribute to, or have the potential to contribute to, serious crime.23

A causal link between disorder, fear and crime flowed where disorder leads to citizen fear, which then leads to both social and physical withdrawal; which increases predatory behavior, which increases crime, instituting the “spiral of decline.”24 Therefore, in 1993 alone, the city counted 1,946 murders, 86,000 robberies, 99,000 burglaries and 112,000 car thefts.25 Unlike Iraq, no identifiable city wide syndicates sparked the violence, instead it rose from disorder. However, the point remains that both locations experienced high levels of continuous violence due to the prevailing conditions listed above.

The current violence in Iraq captures headlines through spectacular bombings and horrific acts, but grounds for a comparison of violence and disorder between the two locales

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exists. In 1990, New York City, with a population of nearly 8,000,000, a resident had a .02% chance of being murdered while in 2005 in Iraq, a person had a .03% chance of being killed.26 Having established the real threat to personal security in Iraq and pre-1994 New York, the common conditions that sustain the cycle of violence and spiral of decline require further explanation.

The Proliferation of Firearms

The most obvious form of disorder in post war Iraq manifests itself in the number of attacks on the civilian population. While car bombings and improvised explosive devices receive much of the media’s attention, this is not the leading source of deaths among the civilian population. Between June 05 and June 06 the leading cause of death (56%) was due to gunfire. Twenty-seven percent of deaths were due to car bombs or other explosive devices.27 Targeted sectarian killings claimed nine times more lives than car bombs and execution style murders increased 86% since the bombing of the Askariya mosque in early 2005.28 Similar to the situation in Bosnia, the prevalence of firearms and explosives allows rival organizations to flourish and seek greater gains, regardless of criminal or tribal motivations.29

New York registered over 1500 firearms related murders in 1993, accounting for nearly 80% of city homicides. Additionally, New York criminals shot 5,861 people the same year.30 Even more dramatic, between 1960 and 1992 homicides committed with handguns grew by

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I Iraqi data is based on the Brookings’ Iraq Index, p. 11, 17 Aug 06 version, which provides an upper and lower bound of deaths per month since the war began.


30 Bratton, 218.
1900%. Consequently, hospital bills for gunshot related wounds in 1992 topped $12 million.\(^{31}\)

Uncontrolled access to firearms posed the number one threat to order in pre-1994 New York.

Understanding that firearms caused the most homicides in both Iraq and New York, how do attackers carry out attacks? How do rival factions, separated along tribal and religious lines physically continue the cycle of violence? Or, how do criminals gain access to target areas to commit murder?

**Loss of Control of Public Spaces**

Unfiltered access to public spaces (roads, markets, neighborhoods) allows perpetrators to conduct attacks. Access is the rival’s or criminal’s ability to move from secure neighborhoods, where they plan and resource operations, to a rival neighborhood. Movement requires transportation, a departure of “friendly” lines, a potential crossing of other non-targeted areas, an entry into a rival area, or “enemy” lines, and finally a movement to the target area. Included in this movement is the transport of the means to commit attacks. The perpetrators may either carry their firearms with them or collect them from a cache. The target area may be a private residence, yet it requires transit through public spaces. The target area may also be a true public space such as a market, park or other recognized place where groups of citizens gather.

Attackers in Iraq gain access because residents or police fear identifying or reporting patterns of disorder. In Iraq today, squatters, abandoned vehicles, abandoned houses and unsupervised roads and structures represent various forms of disorder. In many cases, trash, graffiti, and unfamiliar vehicles and people exist because of this disorder. These conditions allow attackers to execute their operations almost unmolested.

Once in the target area the attackers generally commit their acts with firearms or explosives. Kidnappings normally occur in public spaces also. The MOI reports that since

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December 2005 an average of 30-40 Iraqis are captured each day.\textsuperscript{32} One Ministry report stated that up to 5,000 Iraqis may have been kidnapped prior to 2005.\textsuperscript{33} Ideal conditions, weak police and an abundance of firearms make Iraq a fertile ground for public space violations, represented in the form of murders and kidnappings, political or criminal in nature.\textsuperscript{34} Current MNF-I operations in Baghdad highlight the importance of regaining control of public spaces. Coalition forces reestablished outposts throughout the city and began a removal of squatters who illegally occupied homes during recent surges in violence.\textsuperscript{35} Based on this analysis and recent events, control of firearms, explosives and public spaces are fundamentally linked as a means to establish public order in Iraq.

NYPD loss of public space control also led to disorder, in the form of drug or firearm related homicides. However, the precursor to serious crime in public spaces normally begins with low level, or nuisance crimes. NYPD nuisance activities include “boombox cars” that play unbearably loud music at all hours of the night as well as illegally parked cars that create gridlock. Overly aggressive panhandlers, prostitutes, graffiti artists and disorderly drunks contribute to public space disorder. Former New York Senator Patrick Moynihan described this behavior as “defining deviancy down”, meaning that behavior normally stigmatized becomes tolerated, through indifference.\textsuperscript{36} Indifference towards low level crimes breeds greater disorder which represents itself in more serious crime, such as assault or murder. Invariably, loss of control of public spaces in pre-1994 New York created an environment rich in firearms.

In both Iraq and New York, the incremental loss of public space control evolved from low level disturbances to loss of life and property. However, without control, rival organizations

\textsuperscript{33} Haifa Zangana. “Blair Made a Pledge to the Iraqis Once” The Guardian (April 2005) 22.
flourish, creating an environment of disorder, where citizens fear for their safety. Fearing for their safety, citizens become reluctant to participate in normal social activities, or they prevent their children from participating in school or other youth oriented activities. This in turn, creates a pool of disenfranchised youth, ripe for exploitation.

**Disenfranchised Youth**

In many ways the insurgency in Iraq has become a youth issue as younger Iraqis are frequently both the victims of prolonged violence and in many cases the perpetrators. UNICEF states that almost half of Iraq’s population is under 18 years old. The deteriorating security situation has kept nearly 3.4 million school age children from attending class on a regular basis. These out of school youth provide an ample supply of recruits for competing militias, rejectionists or criminal elements. With no political aspirations or a defined ideology, youth in Iraq are ripe for exploitation.

Various groups offer children between $50 to $100 to plant an IED, fire a mortar or shoot at coalition soldiers. Iraqi cities may not be ready for truancy police due to the current situation and much lower mandatory school age laws, but the documenting and soft targeting of the 18 and below population is a must to restore order. Iraqi school enrollment is growing but even today only 50% of eligible high school age males attend school and only 34% of girls are enrolled. Age specific statistics on Iraqi youth violent or criminal activity is not yet available but with over half of young males out of school, the potential exists for tremendous exploitation.

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39 Cheryl Benard, 111.
40 The Iraq Index. (December 2006): 36.
The NYPD captured startling data on youth and crime. In 1993, on average, 150,000 students missed school every day. In the same year, one third of all robberies, where victims described the perpetrators as appearing under the age of 15, occurred between 9 AM and 3 PM (school hours). Additionally, youth aged from 7 to 19 accounted for almost a third of all firearms related arrests in 1993, representing only 6% of the city’s population. Consequently, homicide was the leading cause of death among New York youth between the ages of 15 and 24.

Without school or jobs, youth generally become exposed to disorderly behavior. Conditions in Iraq and New York prevented traditional youth activities. Fear of traveling through public spaces to get to school, or the allure of making quick, easy money contributed to the disorder. The prevalence of firearms, the loss of control of public spaces and disenfranchised youth sustained social dysfunction in Iraq and pre-1994 New York. The police represent the first line source of security capable of dealing with these problems yet in both cases they were either incapable or unwilling to address these challenges.

**Corrupt and Ineffective Police**

Problems with actual and perceived organizational integrity challenged both the NYPD and the IPS. As stated earlier in this section, the Iraqi people long identified the local police with regime brutality. A quarter of the population now view the IPS as either incapable of protecting the population or that they have been infiltrated by the militias. Early IPS failures contributed to this perception although recent polling indicates Iraqis hold the IPS in greater regard. However, hesitancy or weakness on the part of the security forces to deal with the threat against the
populace contributes to the disorder.\textsuperscript{44} Much of this perception results from the predecessor to the IPS, the Iraqi National Police.

Prior to 1968, the Iraqi National Police (INP) performed the duties currently performed by the IPS. They maintained a positive relationship with the public until the Baath Party militarized the organization and linked them with the Army. Their internal security responsibilities were taken over by organizations such as the Baath Party Security Agency and the General Security Directorate, which were primarily concerned with rooting out anti-Baathists.\textsuperscript{45}

The decreased prioritization of the INP led to a diminished role and forced the INP to rely on other security services to perform the majority of internal security operations. Saddam’s 30-year rule created a “firehouse mentality” among the INP where officers remained in their stations until the more favored security services ordered them to make arrests.\textsuperscript{46} In many instances the security services prevented the INP from performing their duties as the predominance of crimes committed were by their own members. As a result of this neglect in both funding and modernization, INP officers turned to corrupt practices in order to survive. This led to a great distrust among the population who viewed the once proud and effective INP as another oppressive tool of the regime.\textsuperscript{47}

Now the first line of defense against criminal, insurgent and sectarian operations, the people must view the IPS as a credible force. Although fifty-two percent of the nation feels that conditions are worsening and 78% of the population believes corruption exists within the current government, 71% of Iraqis feel the police can best provide for their security.\textsuperscript{48} Without this

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{44} MG Sir Charles W. Gwynn. \textit{Imperial Policing}. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (1934): 15.
\end{flushleft}
confidence, the population must side with extremist factions due to self-preservation, because of government inability to protect them either through compliance with the perpetrators or unwillingness to confront the threat.49 Saddled with a history of brutality and corruption, the population thus becomes unwilling to accept the actions of the government, the police in particular, which they view as showing favor to another sect, despite of violence or nefarious affiliation.50

Organizational integrity issues also challenged the NYPD. Previous anti-corruption initiatives also uncovered a “police culture of silence, scandal-avoidance, mutual protection, and a hostile, “we versus they” mindset” toward the public.51 Academics label the NYPD corruption history as a twenty year cycle. After a period of corruption, the department responds with anti-corruption measures, which after time slowly become less enforced, until new corruption practices arise. An example of this cycle arose from the Knapp Commission in the 1970s which discovered some officers received pay offs from various bars or pubs on their beat. As a result, the department then prohibited officers from responding to these low level offenses in bars to prevent the corruption. This spawned unregulated bars and associated activities, contributing to disorder.52 Unscrupulous officers then turned toward more lucrative enterprises, especially those involving narcotics. In the 1990s, the Mollen Commission found that certain precincts systematically “robbed drug dealers of drugs and money, beat up suspects, engaged in drug trafficking” and committed civil rights violations.53 Although a small minority, crooked officers

53 Bratton, 249.
tarnished the public image of the entire department until 1994 reform. Without the public’s trust, police cannot contain the forces of disorder.

Although the scale and scope of the conditions in Iraq differ markedly from those in New York City, the near endless supply of firearms, uncontrolled public spaces, disenfranchised youth and legacy of police corruption in both locations offers grounds for comparison. There is much to glean from the stunning success of the NYPD. The NYPD adopted COMPSTAT because previous policing models failed to reduce crime. The current IPS approach to policing does not address restoring order. Using the NYPD as a model, the IPS could also experiment with this proven approach to policing.
CHAPTER 3: NYPD and COMPSTAT

The acronym COMPSTAT is often misunderstood. The term COMPSTAT is actually the name of the crime database file saved on one of the Chief of Patrol’s computers, specifically, Computerized Comparative Statistics.\(^{54}\) Since its inception, COMPSTAT has been characterized as a computer program, a mapping program or even just a police emphasis on nuisance crimes. The term has evolved to encapsulate the dramatic transformation of not only the NYPD, but the city itself to a model of public order and effective governance. This section of the monograph will examine the COMPSTAT model with the goal of showing how an iterative approach to crime control produces meaningful and measurable results, for both New York and Iraq. Before examining the process it is first necessary to outline the major events that led to this fundamental shift in police management in New York City.

Pre-COMPSTAT Crime Control Models

Traditional police work centered on arrests. The better police departments made more arrests. The underlying concept behind this philosophy was based on the three Rs of policing:\(^{55}\):

- Rapid response to calls for service
- Random patrol
- Reactive investigations

The three Rs dominated the NYPD’s approach to crime for most of the 20th century, despite periodic reform. Unsatisfied with intra police patronage practices and ramped corruption, early 1920s civic, religious and commercial groups pressured large city departments like New York to reform.\(^{56}\) Key among these institutional reforms was accountability, specifically in the

area of transparency and anti-corruption activities, all directed at instilling greater public confidence in the police.

The second period of reform occurred between the late 1930s and the 1960s. Instrumental among these reforms was the specialization of duties within the department and the development of improved organizational and professional procedures.\textsuperscript{57} Included in this theme was the emergence of forensics and investigative practices as well as the development of professional education for officers. Unlike the NYPD, the pre-invasion IPS did not embrace police education, leaving investigations and forensics to state agencies closer to the regime.

The next period of reform centered on community policing. Police departments created community policing programs to foster a positive police-community relationship. By including civic and community leaders in various efforts, police officials hoped they would address troubled areas within the city. However, the community policing model failed to reduce crime in New York City.\textsuperscript{58} Inclusion does not replace responsibility. IPS officers face similar challenges within their communities as popular allegiance may be to a tribal sheik or cleric. IPS reform must emphasize community involvement, but not at the expense of the rule of law. Community leaders and the general public facilitate police efforts to restore order, not vice versa.

Convincing a police department of its central role in addressing the social issues it combats in life and death situations presents an enormous challenge for police leadership. This conflict can stifle initiative and reduce risk taking for fear of prosecution or serious personal injury. However, in 1994, despite these concerns, incoming Mayor Rudolph Guiliani’s administration and his new Police Commissioner, William J. Bratton, felt they could combat these challenges. Drawing on lessons from his experience as the head of the city’s Transit Police, Bratton drew on a 1978 analysis, called “Broken Windows Theory”, by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling that specifically related public order and serious crime. Based on this premise that

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 16.
addressing the conditions that disrupt public order can in fact reduce serious crime, Bratton led the reforms, organizational and personnel changes that spawned the emergence of COMPSTAT.

The COMPSTAT Process

COMPSTAT is both a management process and a philosophical approach to crime management. The process centers on the underlying premise that police can reduce crime. COMPSTAT as a crime control model developed as a forum to increase the dissemination of information between the department’s executives and the tactical level commanders, focusing on crime and quality of life information. On a weekly basis, representatives (commanders) from all 76 precincts, 9 Public Service Areas and 12 Transit Districts compile a summary of the week’s complaint, arrest, and citations as well as current and emerging crime trends and police activities. All of this data is received by the NYPD’s COMPSTAT unit which captures all the data in a centralized database. From this database, management and commanders view trends and compare activities across precinct and borough boundaries.

This process is not about crime statistics, but rather crime control. The philosophical basis of COMPSTAT provides the rationale for its principles. In fact, the creation of these principles occurred during a dinner conversation between incoming Police Commissioner William J. Bratton and his deputy commissioner, Jack Maple, where Maple scribbled these simple, yet meaningful principles on a dinner napkin:

1. Specific Objectives
2. Timely and Accurate Intelligence
3. Effective Strategies and Tactics
4. Rapid Deployment of Personnel and Resources
5. Relentless Follow Up and Assessment:

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58 Henry, 42.
59 Vito, 188.
60 O’Connell, 157.
Officially, only principles two through five are recognized as part of the NYPD’s crime control model. However, the inclusion of specific objectives presents a logical flow from departmental goals to the continuous assessment through meaningful measures of effectiveness.

The linkage of the objective to the crime control strategy to the indicator and measure of effectiveness is the cornerstone of the COMPSTAT process. The COMPSTAT Report presents crime complaints and arrests at the precinct, borough and city levels and presents a summary of these and other important performance indicators. The COMPSTAT unit presents this data on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis, with comparison to previous years’ patterns. The statistical analysis of the COMPSTAT report allows commanders to see crime trends and determine what strategies are working or need adjustment. In summary, COMPSTAT is a “comprehensive, continuous analysis of results for improvement and achievement of prescribed outcomes.”

Specific Objectives

Designating specific objectives allows subordinates to clearly see what is important to the department and the city. In the COMPSTAT model, the Chief of Police selects three to five objectives for a specific period of time. He makes selections based on input from department heads and precinct commanders. Examples of clear concise objectives include: decreasing youth homicide, drug sales to juveniles, car jackings, etc.

When William Bratton assumed duties as the NYPD commissioner he used sensing sessions, interaction with street level police and community leaders to develop departmental goals. From this collaborative process the following objectives were established that eventually evolved into crime control strategies:

1. Get guns off the streets
2. Curb youth violence in the schools and on the streets

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62 Official website, NYPD COMPSTAT Unit
63 MacDonald, 7.
64 Ibid., 227-229.
3. Drive drug dealers out of NYC
4. Break the cycle of domestic violence
5. Reclaim public spaces of NYC
6. Reduce auto-related crime in NYC
7. Root out corruption and build organizational integrity in the NYPD
8. Reclaiming the roads of NYC
9. Courtesy, Professionalism and Respect
10. Bringing Fugitives to Justice

These objectives provided direction for the COMPSTAT process. Since 1994 the crime control strategies have been modified and adapted to respond to shifting patterns. The next step was to determine how to collect and assess data on these objectives.

**Accurate and Timely Intelligence**

In order to obtain accurate and timely intelligence, the police establish the appropriate collection management architecture. The NYPD collect information from various sources such as the general public, prisoner debriefs, interagency cooperation, investigative reports and confidential informants.\(^65\) Collection from these sources requires integration into the overall crime database of the COMPSTAT system.

Prior to 1994, crime data was available only on a quarterly level through the FBI’s national crime report. Therefore, as part of the department reengineering, internal crime mapping and analysis was made available in order to analyze patterns geographically throughout the city, in a timely manner. Crime mapping identified recurring problem areas, or “hot spots.”\(^66\) While this may seem obvious to practitioners of pattern analysis, the implementation of this at the NYPD was instrumental in creating organizational change. If commanders were to be held accountable for meeting the seven objectives, then they had to be supported and resourced properly. The COMPSTAT report did not simply generate a report card; it instituted a

\(^{65}\) The COMPSTAT Process, Commanders College at the NYPD Police Academy. (November 2002): 7.

\(^{66}\) MacDonald, 11.
synchronized, collaborative approach to fighting crime by developing and modifying tactics and strategies.

Effective Tactics and Strategies

Effective tactics are designed to reduce crime, and they are instituted based on the analysis of the crime data. The goal is not simply to flush or displace the criminal or quality of life issue; it is to bring about real change. Therefore the tactics must be able to adapt to fluctuating crime patterns.\textsuperscript{67} In the COMPSTAT crime control model, the precinct commander is held responsible for his/her geographic area while enablers at the department level are allocated to that commander in accordance with their activities.\textsuperscript{68}

For example, in 1996, reports in one precinct described an increase in the use of bicycles to distribute drugs, commit robberies and even conduct murder. Based on this information, legal advisors attached to the precinct uncovered current bicycle laws regulating their operation. The commanding officer then implemented a series of checkpoints where lawful bicycle inspections were conducted and the net result was the apprehension of nineteen handguns in a month period.\textsuperscript{69} The linkage in this vignette is clear. The objective, clearly defined as “get guns off the streets” was achieved through timely intelligence (the use of bicycles) and effective tactics (checkpoints and bike inspections). The precinct commander did not target drug dealers or robbers. He targeted a nuisance activity. Additionally, the allocation of legal advisors to the precinct commander also improved the tactical proficiency of the precinct by clearing up any doubt as to the legality of these bicycle check points.

\textsuperscript{67} MacDonald, 12
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 13
\textsuperscript{69} Silverman, 190.
By instilling ownership in precinct commanders, the NYPD fostered a tactical environment that allowed for decentralized execution with both their own and external resources. Commanders requested various resources ranging from transportation based capabilities through non-violent crime organizations. While culturally it was difficult to subordinate some of these organizations to patrol based units, the common goal of reducing crime and maintaining order can invoke high degrees of cooperation.\textsuperscript{70} This degree of cooperation, whether mandated or voluntary requires further elaboration, specifically in the fourth principle of COMPSTAT, rapid deployment of personnel and resources.

The section above outlined the various resources that can be allocated to a precinct commander to perform specific tactical operations. Precinct commanders have to justify the effect they are trying to create through briefs at the weekly COMPSTAT meeting. Much like a targeting meeting, the weekly COMPSTAT meetings involve the review of patterns as well as resource allocation. Key for precinct commanders at COMPSTAT meetings is to come prepared with a clear definition of the problem (objective), the accurate and timely intelligence that supports the problem statement, and then the justification for a particular resource.\textsuperscript{71}

The COMPSTAT meeting broke down the bureaucratic, hierarchical nature of the NYPD. By enabling precinct commanders and giving them the resources to fight their plan in their district, the NYPD empowered the people in the best position to reduce crime. Bratton described the role of the precinct commander and resources as follows:

Precinct commanders are in a far better position than Headquarters executives to appreciate and meet the particular needs of their communities and to direct the efforts of the 200-400 officers they manage. They are also in a better position than beat officers to understand and harmonize the agency’s policies with the social dynamics operating

\textsuperscript{70} MacDonald, 17
\textsuperscript{71} The COMPSTAT Process, Commanders College at the NYPD Police Academy. (November 2002): 23.
within their geographic area…the corollary of that expanded authority, responsibility and
discretion is increased accountability.\textsuperscript{72}

The linkage between effective tactics and allocation of resources is critical in the
COMPSTAT process. Without the proper authority and tools to reduce crime, precinct
commanders will be unable to perform their assigned mission. In order to truly determine if they
have in fact reduced crime, department officials must conduct thorough relentless assessment and
follow up.

Relentless Follow Up and Assessment

Although listed last in the NYPDs COMPSTAT principles, relentless follow-up and
assessment is critical in determining the merits of intelligence operations, tactical planning and
execution, resource allocation, and their linkage to departmental objectives. The COMPSTAT
Process handbook states that the evaluation component of the process permits the department to
measure the viability of particular tactical responses. By delineating which elements of the
tactical operation worked most effectively, department leaders construct and implement effective
actions for similar problems in the future. The follow-up and assessment process also allows the
force to redeploy resources to meet newly identified challenges once a problem has been
addressed.\textsuperscript{73}

In summary, the central principles of COMPSTAT foster the identification of crime
trends or “hot spots” in real time. With this intelligence, commanders call for the execution of
multi-echeloned tactical operations based on prior experience combined with emerging tactical
concepts. Then they ensure that appropriate personnel, equipment and capabilities are mustered to
address this trend or threat. Following the operation, agency directors, commanders and tactical
level officers conduct thorough assessment to ensure that the concept was carried out effectively

and that it did address the central problem, or objective.\textsuperscript{74} Addressing the central problem or objective requires the organization to “count” the right things. Is success for a police organization the response time to calls for service or is it the reduction in crime over a period of time? Likewise, does an IPS focus on train and equip address order in Iraq? The central theme in applying COMPSTAT mandates that the organization focus its efforts on the outcome of its performance, not the performance itself.

With training the IPS can adopt a similar process. Much of the collection apparatus and data exists through coalition forces’ pattern analysis, PTTs and unit after action reviews (AARs). Like the NYPD, the IPS can become outcome focused if it can collect and share data throughout the entire Iraqi security architecture. The relentless follow up and assessment step of an Iraqi style COMPSTAT process must contain public, visible measures. While there is value in using the metrics in the final step for accountability purposes, the primary reason for assessment is to “improve operational effectiveness.”\textsuperscript{75} IPS leaders must understand this point. While the NYPD established the COMPSTAT unit at departmental level to assess precinct performance, the MOI may establish an external body to collect and audit provincial and lower IPS operations to avoid politicization of results. Without this fidelity and willingness to assess its external environment, the IPS will not be able to see the true outcomes of its efforts.

\textsuperscript{74} Henry, 45.

CHAPTER 4: COMPSTAT and Outcome Based Organizations

The question posed at the end of the preceding chapter addresses the reliance on procedural based evaluation processes versus outcome based systems. COMPSTAT is a system for outcome based organizations, which is evident in the fifth principle of COMPSTAT: relentless follow up and assessment. This section will explore this principle through a discussion of three areas. First, it is necessary to outline what is an outcome based organization. The second portion of this chapter will explore how outcome based organizations identify if they are successful. Here the Army’s definition of measures of effectiveness and measures of performance will be covered. The introduction of Army doctrine provides a bridge to PTTs and CPATT advisors who assist the IPS on a day to day basis. Having examined the meaning of an outcome based organization and how it measures success; the next section of this chapter will walk through the NYPD’s performance management system embedded in COMPSTAT. This discussion is pertinent to the IPS because it provides a theoretical and doctrinal framework for IPS transformation.

While the private sector uses profit to determine whether it is performing effectively, the public sector’s role in creating public value can be extremely difficult to measure. James Q. Wilson offers two choices for government officials to select from when developing their performance measurement models. The first choice is to allow constituents to execute their evaluation of the provided service through the vote. While practical at the city leadership level it is not a viable course of action for administering and developing police programs. For the IPS this idea poses an even greater challenge due to its history of patronage and corruption. Therefore, the second choice is based on the creation and development of programs through experimentation. Much like experiments performed in a lab, Wilson calls on public managers to have the courage to experiment, in order to see if outcomes change. This experimentation is critical during the
planning process so that the organization is not restricted to solely conducting operations that appear to lead to the ultimate goal without truly exploring underlying causes. Unfortunately, all too often in the public sector, managers only measure those things that are easy to count, whether by design or inadvertently. In other words, “work that produces measurable outcomes tends to drive out work that produces immeasurable outcomes.” This was definitely the case in the NYPD prior to 1994, as COMPSTAT emerged from the “realization that the police were measuring the wrong things…the number of arrests…when the result that the citizens wanted was less crime.” Similarly, CPATT assessments that solely address train and equip functions, measure necessary, but not sufficient items.

Leaders ensure that organizational goals are supported by organizational activities. If a manager can observe organizational activities but cannot see the end result of those activities, then the organization is procedural based. This point is highlighted above and in the previous chapter when precinct commanders assessed their unit’s performance based on response times and arrests. But a procedural measurement alone tells nothing about the outcome of these efforts. Tied with the crime rate over time, these measurements could provide commanders insight into their effectiveness while alone they serve as bureaucratic signposts for budgeting and statistical minutiae. Therefore, an outcome based organization is one that through modification of its internal activities can effect a change in its external environment. Basically an outcome based organization, or production agency, differs from a procedural agency in that it can measure not only the outputs of its own members but the change in society based on those outputs.

78 Wilson, 161.
80 Wilson, 162.
81 Wilson, 159.
The notion of performance management creates anxiety for members in the organization because when executed effectively, the data points clearly to who is successful and who is not. This is a problem in Arab culture due to the notion of maintaining face. Therefore, IPS leaders must understand that outcome measurements exist to improve performance, not assign blame. However, this anxiety is necessary for an organization to create public value; and the best performance management systems uncover not only what happened but also why things happen and offer solutions as to how people can go about addressing organizational shortcomings.\footnote{David Osbourne and Peter Hutchinson. *The Price of Government: Getting the Results We Need in the Age of Permanent Fiscal Crisis* (New York: Basic Books, 2004): 188.}

Outputs (what organizational members do) must produce change in the outcome. The transition from a procedural based organization to an outcome based organization requires the development of tools and systems to measure internal performance as it relates to external results (outcome). The outcome must also range beyond solely those things that the agency or department controls, otherwise they are not addressing the external environment.\footnote{Rich Kowalewski. *Using Outcome Information to Redirect Programs.* United States Coast Guard. Office of Maritime Safety, Security and Environmental Protection. (April 1996): 16.}

The Army utilizes the terms measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to capture this concept. Army doctrine is relevant because it also offers a framework to develop outcome based organizations and CPATT advisors utilize this doctrine as they train and advise the IPS.

**US Army Assessment Doctrine**

FM 6-0, Command and Control of Army Forces covers Army assessment doctrine. While FM 6-0 does not address MOE or MOP, it provides a definition of assessment which is particularly relevant to step five in the COMPSTAT process, relentless follow up and assessment. FM 6-0 defines assessment as “the continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation and execution—of the current situation and the progress of an operation and the evaluation of it
against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments."\textsuperscript{84} Continuous assessment must be integral to all IPS order control strategies.

FM 5-0.1, the Operations Process modifies the definition of assessment somewhat by making a clearer link to performance management. Specifically, the manual describes assessment as a deliberate comparison of “forecasted outcomes to actual operations to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment.”\textsuperscript{85} This definition is clearly in line with Wilson’s description of an outcome based organization as well as the COMPSTAT model. Outcome based organizations must continuously monitor the output of its members (units, tasks, etc for military operations) to determine if there is a measurable change in outcome. The definitions of MOE and MOP are as follows\textsuperscript{86}:

A \textit{measure of effectiveness} is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

A \textit{measure of performance} is a criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.

MOE correspond to changes in the outcome of an organization’s efforts, such as the crime rate or reduced attacks in a certain sector of Baghdad. MOE answer the question, “Are we doing the right things?” Similarly, MOP correspond to a particular tactic, such as bike inspections along suspected drug routes and the number of arrests made, or the number of IEDs identified during route clearance operations in the same sector mentioned above. MOP answer the question, “Are we doing things right?”\textsuperscript{87}

To summarize, an outcome based organization uses a performance management process that continuously monitors its outputs (MOP (arrests, patrols, raids conducted, etc)) to discern a

\textsuperscript{86} FM 5-0.1, 1-14 to 1-15.
change in outcome (MOE (reduction in crime rate, attacks, etc)). These two terms are used in conjunction to determine the success of an organization. Understanding this concept, the next step in this process is to examine how NYPD restored public order in New York by linking objectives to associated MOE and MOP.

**COMPSTAT Objective-MOE-MOP Linkage**

Based on the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniformed Crime Report for 2005, among cities with populations over 100,000, New York City ranked 211 and was labeled the safest “big city” in the United States. While this is extremely general, the following statistics extracted from the 26 November 2006 COMPSTAT report are much more dramatic. The table below (figure 1) represents the seven major categories tracked through the FBI Uniformed Crime Reports.

![Figure 1](http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pct/cspdf.html)

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88 New York City Police Department Mayor’s Management Report, 1st quarter FY 2006.

Crime reductions ranging from 47% to 87% in the various categories demonstrates that COMPSTAT works. Regardless, it is essential to explore how the COMPSTAT process was instrumental in achieving these results in order to demonstrate utility for developing an IPS framework.

As an agency of the City of New York, the Police Department is responsible for “key public services areas.” These are represented in the Mayor’s Management Report and are as follows:

1. Enhance the safety and security of the public through a multi-faceted approach to crime reduction
2. Improve the quality of life for City residents
3. Enhance traffic safety for City residents
4. Improve police/community relations by providing courteous, professional and timely services

These public services areas best parallel logical lines of operation common in stability operations where commanders link objectives and actions in order to produce the desired effect, which in the case of the NYPD was to restore public order by reducing crime. Like the goals in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the bolded areas in the key public service area represent possible lines of operation that could be utilized to develop linkages between the available forces and the desired objectives. Therefore, as stated in the first principle of the COMPSTAT process, the designation of specific objectives is essential for achieving success in these public service areas.

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NYPD Objectives

Similar to the security objectives in the Stability and Security Report, the NYPD’s critical objectives are:

1. Reduce the incidence of crime
2. Develop and implement counterterrorism strategies
3. Address quality of life violations
4. Reduce the number of injuries and fatalities from aggressive driving and other hazardous violations
5. Ensure that police services are provided in a professional and timely manner

Based on these objectives, the department, in coordination with the reporting requirements from the FBI developed a series of performance statistics that can be counted, assessed and then applied back to the validity and effectiveness of the designated crime control strategy or tactic.

NYPD MOE

For the crime reduction objective, the NYPD developed nine measures of effectiveness. Principal among these MOE are capturing major felony crime statistics (murder, forcible rape, robbery, felonious assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny auto). Additionally the NYPD broke down felony crimes for specific areas to include crimes committed in the transit system and in housing developments. There are also categories for domestic violence, juvenile arrests, gang violence and school safety. Included in the school safety profile is a further breakdown of crime by the seven major crimes listed above. These MOE are all based on reported crime. Using the reports of crime instead of the response to crime provides NYPD executives with a true assessment of outcome. Additionally, the geographic breakdown of COMPSTAT reporting across the city also permits the focused distribution of departmental assets. The only area of this report that does not truly represent a measure of effectiveness is the counterterrorism public service area. The Department reports the number of hours of training

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93 Mayor’s Management Report, 104.
undertaken by its personnel in its report to the mayor. This is more representative of a measure of performance. However, the remaining public service areas display clear, quantifiable MOE.

The effectiveness of quality of life and traffic safety public service areas are captured in more quantifiable terms. While the traffic safety public service area’s measurement tool is extremely clear (number of fatalities (motorist and bicyclists) the quality of life area requires further elaboration. The NYPD bases its assessment of quality of life on summonses issued. These summonses result from calls to the city’s 311 system, where residents can call the police without tying up the 911 system. The quality of life area has seen a steady increase in the issuance of summonses over the past three years, although this may not represent a shortcoming on the part of the police. In effect, it may be a result of confidence among residents that their complaint will be addressed. While quality of life summonses are not part of the seven major crime areas they do represent a viable way to prevent the emergence of more violent activities. By addressing quality of life issues the police gain public support. The IPS can gain credibility by being responsive to what the population feels is disruptive to daily life. In turn, this can lead to deeper insights into more serious crimes and violence.

In summary, the NYPD’s crime reduction measures of effectiveness focus on the change in reported crimes, issued summonses, and public confidence in the police performance. In accordance with the principle of relentless follow up and assessment, the department captures crime data on a weekly basis through the COMPSTAT report and breaks it down to the precinct level. Knowing how the NYPD determines if it is being effective or “doing the right things” the next step is to examine how they assess if they are “doing things right” or how they measure their own performance.

In a discussion with Dr. Paul O’Connell, who has performed extensive research on the adoption and evolution of COMPSAT, he discussed the concept of the linchpin in the reduction

\[94\] Ibid., 104.
of crime in New York City. While it is difficult to identify one thing in a complex environment like New York City, he made it clear that when William Bratton assumed the leadership of the NYPD, the central theme and link to all policing strategies had to revolve around getting guns off the street.\textsuperscript{95} Broken windows theory, nuisance abatement theory and getting squeegee men off the street created fanfare in the media and in some academic circles. However, the main problem with the skyrocketing pre-1994 crime related to uncontrolled access to firearms, similar to present day Iraq. When the department developed its central crime control strategies, while they had different titles, they all were focused at either directly controlling guns on the street or creating the conditions where firearms could not be used. This next section will discuss these crime control strategies and how the NYPD linked them back to the control of firearms.

**NYPD MOP (Crime Control Strategies)**

The first crime control strategy developed as a means to reduce crime through the COMPSTAT process was called “Getting Guns off the Street.” The motivation for the preeminence of this strategy is simple. In 1992, 1500 homicides (and over 4,000 wounded by firearms) were committed with handguns in the city, representing 75\% of all murders, like the 56\% in Iraq.\textsuperscript{96} The strategy called for expanded investigative resources to the precinct level, refocused patrol resources, revised and expanded training, firearms specific technological tracking items and a public information campaign focused at the danger of illegal firearms. From these central principles of the strategy, the department developed the following measures of performance measures which help determine if these principles are being performed correctly. Precinct level operations centers collected shooting victim reports, shooting incident reports, firearms search warrants issued and guns seized during arrests.\textsuperscript{97} From these categories, officers determine correlations between the reduction in firearms related crimes and the numbers of

\textsuperscript{95} Telephonic conversation with Dr. O’Connell on 20 November 2006.

\textsuperscript{96} Police Strategy No. 1: Getting Guns off the Street.(7 March 1994):-3.

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shooting incidents and firearms seized. All of the remaining crime control strategies are linked to getting guns off the street because invariably youth problems and public space issues often involved illegal firearm access. Officers must integrate the performance measures found in crime control strategy number one when responding to a domestic incident or a traffic safety event.98

Within the youth violence crime control strategy, officially labeled, “Curbing Youth Violence on the Streets and in the Schools”, is the requirement for the government to “guarantee the opportunity for a sound basic education to all its children. This requires that every child is able to learn in an atmosphere largely free of fear and disorder.”99 This document also references the interconnected nature of illegal guns, drugs and youth violence and how these strategies are reliant on each other for success. The key elements of this crime control strategy centered on making schools the focal point of youth violence reduction efforts. The plan required the creation of Borough Level Task Forces to specialize in truancy and the return of students absent from school.100 Iraqi educational systems do not currently provide the array of resources present in New York but drawing police attention to idle youth is a first step in preventing their exploitation.

The youth violence strategy also called for a refocus of patrol services to outreach and prevention efforts, a refocus of investigative personnel to exploring links between youth violence and firearms, greater coordination between NYPD and the Chancellor of the Board of Education, increased training for patrol on youth culture and youth arrest procedures, creation of a juvenile database and a public information campaign calling for partnerships between parents, educators and police.101 Within the area of youth violence the NYPD used the following performance measures to determine if it was doing things right: the number of truants returned to school, the

97 Mayor’s Management Report, Performance Indicators, 63.
100 Ibid., 11.
101 Ibid., 11-12.
number of youth referral reports (referral to city, state agencies by patrol or other police agency) and the number of juvenile reports (crimes committed by youth).\textsuperscript{102} The nested nature of this crime control strategy with getting guns off the street allowed precinct commanders to synchronize efforts both in and out of schools in order to reduce crime by getting guns off the street and curbing youth violence.

Crime Control Strategy number five, “Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York” addresses the perception of residents that their quality of life has been in rapid decline and that it is “moving away from rather than toward the reality of a decent society.”\textsuperscript{103} The contributors to this perception were the explosion of violent crime as well as disorder in public spaces in the city. This crime control strategy captures the “Broken Windows Theory” developed by George L. Kelling. The notion that disorder is the initial step toward the “downward spiral of urban decay” is the driving force behind this plan.\textsuperscript{104} Supporting this premise from a 1993 Manhattan Institute study is that of the 59\% of people who recently left New York, 22\% stated that if their neighborhood had been cleared of graffiti and litter it would have impacted their decision to move while 17\% said that if the Police Department addressed minor or nuisance crimes more diligently that also would have made an impact on their decision to move.\textsuperscript{105} Nuisance crimes in Iraq may not be forcing people to move to safer neighborhoods, but sectarian intimidation and attacks are forcing the ongoing exodus. The Iraqi government claims that since February 2006, over 234,000 Iraqis have moved to more homogenous neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{106} This internal migration exacerbates the public space problem through overcrowded housing, squatter communities and an overall perception of disorder.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{102} Mayor’s Management Report, 63.
  \item \textsuperscript{103} Police Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York,(6 April 1994): 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 5.
\end{itemize}
The actual crime strategy refers to control of public spaces as the linchpin of crime reduction but alludes to the linkage of violent crime and disorder. O’Connell’s description of illegal firearms as the linchpin seems more appropriate with public space control as a necessary but insufficient condition. Regardless, the public space crime control strategy called for the following practices:107

1. Empower precinct commanders to respond to disorderly and persistent quality of life conditions (attorney allocation, acoustic equipment, direct liaison authority with local bar, liquor store owners, etc)
2. Refocus Department Resources (focus organized crime control bureau resources (such as anti-prostitution) based on precinct commanders evaluation)
3. Revise Department Directives and Procedures (increased personal identification requirements of offenders, recidivist prevention measures)
4. Revise and Expand Training (undercover operations at precinct level, technical training (acoustics))
5. Secure Passage of New Legislation (increased fingerprinting for low level crimes, empower tenant organizations, increased seizure powers to police (cars, bikes))

Based on the principles in the public order strategy the NYPD developed measures of performance to specifically address the myriad of practices contained in the document. Principal among those included the number of prostitution arrests, patronizing prostitution arrests, graffiti arrests, illegal peddling arrests and unreasonable noise summonses.108 By responding and preventing these seemingly low level crimes, the police strove to prevent an environment where more serious and violent crimes could flourish. The additional focus on the arrest and detention of offenders also had the potential to lead to individuals wanted for or involved in greater crimes. Control of public spaces, like curbing youth violence, supports the overall effort to get guns off the street in order to reduce crime.

The preceding crime control strategies and their associated measures of performance primarily dealt with the relationship between the police department and its external environment. The emphasis on these areas by the NYPD produced stunning results. But to maintain that high level of performance over an extended period of time mandates internal crime control strategies

107 Policy Strategy No. 5, 31-33.
also. Crime Control Strategy number seven, “Rooting Out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Police Department”, addresses the internal long term requirements to maintain a highly trained force built around integrity and responsibility to the community. Since one of the central themes that occurred during the transformation of the NYPD in the mid 1990s was decentralization and delegation of authority and resources to lower levels, it became even more imperative to also transform internal accountability standards for department personnel. Central to the theme of empowerment present in all other facets of the COMPSTAT process, this crime control strategy’s main concept was based on involvement. Internal affairs prior to 1994 were overly secretive and responsibility was taken away from precinct commanders. In order to root out corruption, the entire force has to recognize its responsibility in maintaining standards of ethical behavior.

Much like previous crime control strategies, anti-corruption procedures had to be measurable. In order to reduce crime, fear and disorder, the department requires officers to execute their duties in accordance with the law. Police must remain credible in the eyes of the judicial system, reduce the number of complaints from the population and lower the number of officers apprehended through internal affairs operations. Crime Control Strategy number nine, “Courtesy, Professionalism and Respect (CPR)”, addresses the reduction of citizen complaints against the police and includes a laundry list of community based programs ranging from Drug Awareness Resistance Education (DARE) to representation on the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB). While the number of complaints and public assessment of police performance is the measure of effectiveness for this strategy, the measure of performance centers on departmental training and complaint review procedures. The continuous monitoring of complaints against officers is essential to the success of this strategy. Much like the “relentless follow up and

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108 Mayor’s Management Report, 63.
assessment” principle present in the previous crime control strategies, the total departmental involvement in intra-organizational behavior and relations with the community serves to create an environment where the public respects the police force and values it as the prime agency for reducing crime, fear and disorder.

The NYPD currently operates with twelve crime control strategies all geared toward reducing crime, fear and disorder, but the four discussed here offer the greatest potential for application to the development of pertinent performance measures for the IPS. The prevalence of illegal firearms in New York City may be likened to the overabundance of firearms and explosives in Iraq. Similarly, the loss of control of public spaces in New York prior to 1994 compares to the varying degree of insecurity Iraqi citizens display in their efforts to live a “normal” life. Intercommunal warfare waged in public spaces coupled with attacks and kidnappings of civilians in markets, streets and restaurants represents a loss of control. There is also a loss of control of young people present in Iraq that inundated New York. Much of the youth violence in New York was linked to the proliferation of firearms while much of the youth involvement in anti-stabilization activities in Iraq is also a result of easy access to weapons and disenfranchisement with normal “youth activities.” The final crime control strategy that offers parallels to the IPS revolves around the organization itself. The internal review procedures performed by the NYPD are just a fraction of what must be done to reform and create similar institutions in the IPS. The public must have the confidence that the police force is not part of the crime, fear and disorder.

While the dissimilarities between New York and Iraq are numerous, the crime control strategies listed above provide a framework for further modification. Conditions existing in Iraq today reflect the challenges faced by the NYPD in prior to 1994. The understanding of how the NYPD transformed from a procedural organization to an outcome based police force speaks to

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110 Police Strategy No. 7; 10.
the inwardly focused IPS. Finally, the linkage of objectives to MOE/MOP inherent in COMPSTAT provides a framework for developing IPS order control strategies for Iraq.
CHAPTER 5: The IPS and the COMPSTAT Process

The development of the Iraqi Security Forces, particularly the IPS, has been labeled as the decisive operation of the current fight. The purpose of this section is to establish links between the COMPSTAT process and the development and employment of the IPS based on the discussion of the prevailing conditions in Iraq comparable to New York and how the NYPD developed crime control strategies to address those conditions. Modeling Iraqi specific order control strategies after the four strategies listed in the previous section (guns, youth, public spaces and organizational integrity) potential MOE can be developed. These MOE must be part of a COMPSTAT like model to be truly meaningful. The IPS has to be willing to not only create and disseminate order control strategies but have the courage to change course when the desired outcome is not achieved. The COMPSTAT principles discussed in chapter 2 are directly applicable to restoring order in Iraq. However, this section will address the concept of relentless follow-up and assessment. The first step is to identify security objectives to focus IPS operations.

IRAQ Security Objectives

Using the DoD’s Stability and Security report, Iraq security objectives are:

- Neutralizing enemy effectiveness, influence and ability to intimidate
- Rapidly reducing sectarian violence and eliminating death squads
- Increasing the capacity of the Government of Iraq and its security structures and forces to provide national security and public order
- Help Iraq strengthen rule of law capabilities in the areas of law enforcement, justice and the corrections system

Loosely defined, these objectives amount to public order, where civil institutions and essential services can prosper. However, the outward link between these objectives and how the IPS measure their success as it relates to these objectives is not clear. While the NYPD used crime control strategies with embedded measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to conduct follow up and assessment, the IPS does not. The IPS should develop order control strategies with similarly embedded MOE and MOP that correlate to these objectives.
IPS Public Order MOE

The four order control strategies are tools for the IPS to conduct continuous follow up and assessment of its practices, similar to the NYPD. The essential areas that require documentation and evaluation are:

- The number of homicides/attacks committed with firearms/explosives (relates to the firearms/explosives order control strategy)
- The number of homicides/attacks committed in parks, streets, markets (public spaces)
- The number of kidnappings committed (public spaces)
- The number of crimes/attacks committed by Iraqis under age 18 (youth violence)
- Complaints against the IPS (organizational integrity)
- Actionable Tips from the public (organizational integrity)

These measures of effectiveness may be part of the daily activities of various IPS stations but without national transparency, police planners cannot effectively plan and adjust tactics and resources.

Firearms/Explosives Order Control Strategy

The linchpin for success in crime reduction in New York was the removal of guns off the street. As evident by the study conducted by Johns Hopkins on casualties in Iraq, firearms are the primary cause of homicides in Iraq. Therefore, the first order control strategy is labeled firearms and explosives. (Explosives are defined as munitions and accessories involved in the creation and implementation of improvised explosive devices including car bombs). Critics may consider a “get guns off the street” policy in Iraq naïve, but the following performance measures and indicators may be useful in reducing firearms related homicides. IPS stations should report the number of weapons seized, the amount of explosives seized, the amount of ancillary equipment (remote controls, excess batteries, etc) related to IED development seized, and the number of arrests related to possession of these items. Follow up investigations should focus on associations and past activities of all detained personnel. These tasks are most likely being performed, but the
cataloguing and registering of weapons and equipment is necessary to ensure a continuous follow up and assessment by the IPS.

The measure of effectiveness for the firearms/explosive order control strategy is a reduction in firearms and explosive related homicides. This may seem simplistic, but in an outcome based organization, outcomes are the only way to measure if the strategy is effective. Like in the COMPSTAT process, IPS stations should report weekly to their provincial chiefs the number of homicides in their jurisdiction, by type and by what means. Transition Readiness Assessment reporting should also capture these statistics to provide an outcome based evaluation of their assigned IPS units. The increase or reduction of homicides in a given sector will provide advisors a more pertinent evaluation tool for determining effectiveness. This will also allow further allocation of Iraqi National Police and Iraqi Army forces to locations requiring greater support, vice even distribution. The weapons and explosives order control strategy is the most urgent requirement, but it will rely on the implementation of the succeeding order control strategies as they are inextricably linked and set the conditions for more violent crimes, insurgent attacks.

**Control of Public Spaces Order Control Strategy**

In order to commit either criminal or politically motivated attacks on the Iraqi populace, the perpetrators must have access to their target area. The second order control strategy, control of public spaces, centers on the regulation and control of streets, markets, parks and communal spaces where citizens gather. As part of a counterinsurgent force, the IPS often performs checkpoint or cordon duties in support of either the National Police or the Army. However, attacks against the civilian populace still tend to result from the infiltration of one group from one region or neighborhood into a rival neighborhood. This order control strategy is most associated with the identification and management of lower level crimes which in many cases serve as a harbinger to greater violence. The lower level crimes faced by the NYPD included noise
violations, solicitation and aggressive pandering. The bicycle example cited previously was an example of targeting low level crime (bicycle safety violations) to disrupt drug trafficking and firearms use. It was also an example of “hot spot” policing, where police established control in an area plagued by disorder to regain control. Resources, personnel and attention centered on the hot spot, with the goal of reducing crime. By focusing on these crimes the NYPD reduced disorder and fear among the population, and they also received leads to more serious crimes. For Iraq, the blurring of criminal and insurgent activity contributes to the collection challenge, as terrorists or insurgents will engage in criminal activity to raise funds.\(^{111}\) Since Iraqi Police traditionally do not collect crime statistics on a nation wide level due to their politicized heritage, this will pose an additional challenge for advisors.\(^{112}\) However, the IPS could adapt some nuisance abatement techniques used by the NYPD to control public spaces.

To effectively control public spaces the IPS must know who generally utilizes those areas. The introduction of a national census coupled with photo-identification cards serves as a MOP for controlling public spaces.\(^{113}\) Understanding it is near impossible to regulate individual movements between neighborhoods, certain actions can be taken to regain control of public spaces. In order to control public spaces, the IPS have to enforce local laws and regulations. Enforcement of curfews, highway and local traffic laws disrupts insurgent or militia use of public spaces. The IPS can register violators to punish that crime and identify links to more nefarious acts.

IPS targeting of low level offenses generally associated with violent acts assists in regaining control of public spaces. Digging along city and provincial roads, disrupting existing signage and graffiti represent actions linked to IED attacks. The IPS must know what “normal”


looks like in their sector in order to spot these offenses. Aberrations such as abandoned cars that may become sniper nests or IED observation posts can then be disrupted. The IPS can enforce laws against illegal trash dumping, illegal parking and driving unregistered vehicles. Similarly, random checks and inspections disrupt criminal or insurgent attacks.

The IPS must have the ability to stop and frisk people who are either known not to be local residents or who are suspicious. By intercepting the movement of perpetrators or weapons through public spaces, the IPS could reduce crime, just like the NYPD. Standardized questioning for personnel detained for violations should be designed to determine association with criminal or insurgent groups. The IPS must be able to identify people and vehicles not from their particular jurisdiction and maintain knowledge of their whereabouts and activities through questioning and cataloguing.

In summary, to control public spaces the IPS must identify those activities that disrupt the movement of daily commercial and social activities in their jurisdiction. Then they must arrest those individuals who contribute to the disorder. The measure of effectiveness for this order control strategy is the number of attacks in those public spaces. By addressing first the violators of order in public spaces, the IPS can then contribute to the overall reduction of kidnappings, homicides and IED or car bomb activities in their assigned sector.

Youth Violence Order Control Strategy

Along with focusing on controlling the proliferation of weapons and explosives and their transit through public spaces, the IPS must assist civic leaders in the isolation of Iraqi youth from criminal and extremist forces, through the third order control strategy, youth violence. With less than half the school age population enrolled, the IPS must engage the youth in their jurisdiction.

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The NYPD saw a direct link between firearms related crimes and the school age population. This also appears to be the case in Iraq as younger Iraqis are turned away from school and productive activity because of security, financial or ideological reasons. Obviously the institutional apparatus to maintain school rosters may not yet be available, but this approach can serve as a point of departure. The documentation of local youth affiliations, school attendance could prompt the IPS to identify young people ripe for exploitation. To measure the effectiveness of this approach to addressing youth violence in Iraq, the IPS must track the number of crimes and attacks committed by Iraqis under the appropriate age that the average Iraqi is considered a minor. Additionally, the MOI should assist the Ministry of Education’s efforts to reduce truancy and increase enrollment by being aware of documenting school age children who do not appear to be enrolled in school.

**Organizational Integrity Order Control Strategy**

The final area where the IPS must continue to develop public order MOE is captured in the organizational integrity order control strategy. The IPS appears to be further along in this area than the three previously mentioned subjects. The use of public opinion polls is one way to measure public perception of the police. Additionally the IPS must also track the number of complaints against its officers and practices. The next vital measure of effectiveness for assessing its organizational integrity relies on public participation in the reporting and investigative process. Tips on criminal or insurgent activity received from the public are a clear sign that the IPS is valued as an institution with the desire and capability to maintain order. An IPS that can protect individuals from rival or criminal threats regardless of ethnicity or vulnerability can create a positive climate even when broader political discussions continue. The IPS must also have the capacity to protect those individuals who do collaborate. Maintenance of a witness protection

program and support to key informants are supporting MOP for the organizational integrity order control strategy.\textsuperscript{116} The IPS also faces challenges not encountered by the NYPD. The power maintained by tribal leaders and religious leaders in Iraq dwarfs those in similar positions in New York. The IPS cannot continue to be implicated in the political power struggle. Buy-in from these leaders is essential to restoring order and a willingness to confront those who refuse requires courage beyond that required of a precinct commander in New York.

The four public order control strategies listed in this section are MOP tied to the MOE listed in the opening section. However, they cannot exist alone. These strategies must be part of a nation wide IPS program to document and record both police activity and the outcome. Army doctrine provides a bridge for the adoption of COMPSTAT like measures of effectiveness. The Army definitions of MOE and MOP support the IPS transition to an outcome based organization through PTT and MNSTC-I mentoring. Restoring order requires the IPS to reduce the murders of the people it is obligated to protect. These strategies, like COMPSTAT, are iterative in nature. While disposable cell phones today may the indicator of potential IED activity, tomorrow the initiation may be linked to an MP3 player. IPS leaders must be willing, like the NYPD, to conduct relentless follow up and assessment. By establishing a learning model like the COMPSTAT process the IPS could restore order in Iraq.

\textsuperscript{116} Combating Serious Crimes in Post Conflict Societies, 59-63.
Conclusion

The success of the NYPD in reducing crime since 1994 provides an example of how to develop crime control strategies, assess them and make adjustments to meet the desired endstate. The COMPSTAT process is the tool that the NYPD uses to reduce crime. The five primary principles of COMPSTAT provide a model to combat crime and reduce fear and disorder. The fifth principle, relentless follow up and assessment is in many ways the most crucial principle because it forces the department to produce results through continuous reflection. Essential to the success of COMPSTAT is the identification and management of pertinent measures of effectiveness. By measuring whether crime rises or falls and categorizing it by the most pressing strains on order and fear among the citizenry, the NYPD developed effective tactics to reduce crime. The NYPDs ability to reduce crime is attributable to its transformation from a procedural based organization concerned with internal practices to an outcome based organization, focused on behavioral changes in its external environment.

The challenge for public sector institutions is to develop outcome based performance measures. A procedural based organization focuses on how it operates and functions rather than on what it produces or what results are generated. The pre-1994 NYPD measured its performance based on how fast it responded to crime and how many arrests it made. The Department did not view crime reduction as its responsibility but deferred that task to social and civic institutions. The transformation from a procedural based department to an outcome based organization began with the belief that the NYPD could reduce crime. From this philosophical shift arose a new appreciation for how to fight crime. By determining what problems plagued the city the department created and manipulated crime controls strategies to reduce crime. The primary crime control strategies were based on getting guns off the street, reclaiming public spaces, curbing youth violence, and restoring organizational integrity in the NYPD. While over ten crime control strategies were eventually developed, these are most applicable to the study of disorder in Iraq.
The challenges faced by the IPS in current day Iraq are remarkably different than those faced by the NYPD. However, certain underlying conditions that contributed to disorder in New York are also extremely disruptive in Iraq. The prevalence of firearms and explosives left over from the war present daily challenges to the IPS similarly to how the NYPD officers faced a preponderance of firearms in the early 1990s.

Both Iraq and New York lost control of public spaces. Streets, markets, parks and any non-privately owned venues were subject to criminal or insurgent infiltration in both locations. Having free access to conduct criminal activity or plot attacks on civilians or security forces contributes to creating fear and insecurity among the population. This in turn reduces the normal activities of daily life and results in economic and social decay. Both New Yorkers and Iraqis want to feel safe in their own neighborhoods. Fear also begins a cycle of violence, especially in Iraq.

A bulging disenfranchised youth population was endemic to New York and poses great risks to Iraq today. Although the institutional support available for the NYPD is much greater than those services available for the IPS, both forces see an ample pool of recruits available for criminal or insurgent activity. The Iraqi government must arm the IPS with the supporting legal structure to shape appropriate behavior through stronger educational requirements and economic opportunities.

The final challenge encountered both by the NYPD and the IPS is one of organizational integrity. Public opinion polls and complaints against the police marked a low point for the NYPD in pre-1994 days while the IPS is viewed today by many to be an accessory to sectarian violence. Without the support of the population it is very difficult for the police to regain control of their jurisdictions. The population will inevitably side with who can secure them and provide those essential services necessary to survive.

Tremendous progress has been made with the creation of the IPS through the use of advisory teams. The documentation of the growth of this force and the resources expended to
enable the IPS is enormous. However, the preponderance of open source data addressing MOE and MOP is procedural based. Little attention is given to their effect on their community, as MOE need to be outcome based.

Drawing from lessons from the NYPD and the applicable conditions this paper recommends the IPS adopt four order control strategies. They are: firearms/explosives, control of public spaces, youth violence and organizational integrity. Like the data produced in the weekly COMPSTAT reports, the IPS must rely on firearms/explosive homicides to determine its true effectiveness as it relates to public order. The police have to regain control of public spaces by increasing security and reporting on crimes/attacks committed in these common areas. To assist in the control of public spaces and the reduction of firearms/explosives based attacks the IPS must also target the youth population. With a youth population that represents over 40% of the entire Iraqi population the control of this group is essential to controlling order. Finally, the IPS must continue to develop itself so that it is viewed as a source of stability in the country and not part of sectarian politics. Through relentless follow up and assessment, the IPS can shape police operations toward restoring order, measured through the items listed above.

These measures of effectiveness are simplistic in nature. The purpose is to offer a starting point for measuring the outcome of IPS operations based on a proven model, the NYPD COMPSTAT process. Counting crimes and attacks will not lead to order and reduced fear among the population in and of themselves. However, improved measures of effectiveness and measures of performance will allow the IPS to answer the two key questions essential for restoring order, “Am I doing this right?” and “Am I doing the right things?”
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