INTERAGENCY EFFORTS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

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U.S. government success in its prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) depends on an interagency approach. The U.S. government must "organize for combat" less parochially at both the national and regional level to effectively defeat terrorism. Paradigms within the Washington, D.C. security apparatus must change. A joint interagency organization focused operationally and located regionally must be institutionalized for the U.S. to succeed against the violent extremists dedicated to destroying the Western way of life. This interagency organization must be given the responsibility to develop counterterrorism plans and most importantly the authority to execute them.

The events of 11 September 2001 energized the Secretary of Defense to mandate the implementation of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) at Combatant Commands. Each command organized somewhat differently as defined by the regional threat. The U.S. Joint Forces Command developed the JIACG concept under the rubric of "Full Spectrum" with the intention of participation from representatives of organizations that include all the elements of national power. This model can serve as the template for interagency cooperation at the national level and form the basis for a regional interagency organization to execute the Global War on Terrorism.
INTERAGENCY EFFORTS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The events of 11 September 2001 and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have forced the United States government (USG) to develop processes and procedures to combat terrorism that had heretofore been conducted through ad hoc or informal mechanisms. Moreover, the GWOT galvanized the move toward organizational innovation and reform to improve interagency coordination for the specific purpose of rationalizing and harmonizing limited resources to achieve efficiencies and effects unattainable through the previous ad hoc efforts. In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have developed guidance for the Combatant Commander (CCDR) designed to assist in all facets of prosecuting and winning the GWOT. This guidance was made manifest in the mandated formation of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). An efficient process and a core group of appropriately empowered combating terrorism experts are absolutely essential to prosecute and win the war on terrorism. This effort does not and cannot stop with the DOD since interagency cooperation is critical to success in the GWOT. There is no shortage of “good ideas,” but the organization and execution thus far have failed.

Coordination at the highest levels is essential if the nation as a whole is going to be successful at not only policymaking, but subsequent implementation. The USG has great experience at policymaking, but is lacking in the coordination, synchronization, and execution of that policy. It is time to consider new directions for the interagency process in which the National Security Council (NSC) plays a primary role. The NSC’s advisory and policymaking process is now confronting new challenges brought on by lessons learned in interagency operations and a dramatically changing security environment. The DOD has made an attempt to coordinate interagency activities on the regional level and has established a template that can be adapted at the national level. However, like the national level parochial roadblocks to success, the regional commanders are relegated to “asking” vice “tasking” when it comes to execution of agreed upon activities by the other elements of national power.

The same scenario exists at the national level with the added hindrance of effective organization and authority. Policymaking is properly maintained at the national level, but execution and accountability for policy implementation must be at the regional level. The USG must organize accordingly, and most importantly, someone must “be in charge.” Good policy is only as good as its application. Policy application is only effective if someone is both accountable and responsible. The DOD JIACG model forms a suitable template that can be expanded to the interagency for regional execution.
National Level Interagency Process

The current interagency decisionmaking apparatus resides in the executive branch represented by the various Secretaries with oversight from the National Security Council. The NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 - 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.

The President chairs the National Security Council. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.

The National Security Council is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the function of the Council has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.¹

In recent years, Congress has created new or substantially revised national security structures – a Homeland Security Council and Director of National Intelligence – to join the interagency space between departments and agencies and the President which the NSC previously occupied alone. In addition, the NSC’s policymaking process is under pressure to incorporate broader responsibilities such as more detailed planning and oversight of interagency operations in response to the problems of failed states, post-conflict stabilization, proliferation of nuclear and other WMD technology, and international terrorism.

The 9/11 Commission Report highlighted the President’s fundamental challenge in governing the Executive Branch: integration of effort. While focused on improving the coordination and management of intelligence, the Commission’s broader message is the need for fundamental reforms in the interagency system supporting the President. Other recent
studies of U.S. and coalition performance in complex contingency operations are reaching the same conclusion: the U.S. needs new ways of coordinating, overseeing, and implementing policies and operations in the national security community across individual departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{2} Coordinating policies and operations in the national security community is fundamental and the DOD has already adapted a plausible model. DOD has concentrated its efforts at the regional level, but this concept has potential application at the national level.

**JIACG Model**

The U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has experimented with the interagency-related issues since mid-2000. USJFCOM introduced the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) as a “prototype” model to focus on improving joint warfighting capabilities. Specifically, the JIACG is an advisory element on the combatant commander’s staff that facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community.

Although not explicitly stated in any official publication, the JIACG concept and prototype is a transformational capability designed to better enable the conduct of effects-based and network-centric operations. Both these operations derive much of their effectiveness and efficiency from the integrated application of selected instruments of national power. The magnitude and rapidity of global change (and its accompanying uncertainty) demands far greater interagency cooperation to gain and sustain United States influence in world events. This fact, coupled with the tyranny of resource constraints, suggests that the interagency community must become more unified in actions, if not in organizational structure. Thus, the JIACG represents yet another evolution in the fusion of interagency capabilities needed to create the synergistic effects mandated in United States’ national security strategy.\textsuperscript{3}

The JIACG is a Commander’s designated lead organization for the interagency community providing oversight, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of agencies’ activities within the command. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance the interchange among various civilian and military organizations spanning the entire range of national security activity whether expressed by international cooperation or conflict. It provides each combatant command with a trained and equipped staff element specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of civilian organizations, their relationships, and potential contributions to joint operations. Should diplomacy fail, the JIACG also provides a mechanism, through habitual relationships with civilian planners, to expeditiously integrate multi-agency operation planning that implements political-military missions and tasks. In short, the JIACG provides the requisite interagency perspective to the CCDR in both joint planning and operations.
The JIACG is a fully integrated participant within the CCDR staff that has a daily focus on planning (theater security cooperation, deliberate, crisis, transition, recovery, and reconstitution) and operations. It provides each CCDR with a standing capability specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of civilian agency activity and to keep civilian and military agencies informed of each other's efforts to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated USG activity.4

Each commander may incorporate the JIACG into the command differently, but regardless of the structure the primary tasks will remain the same. The JIACG will be a key member of Joint Planning Groups and can support both the deliberate planning process and crisis action planning. The diverse make-up and contributory membership from the various other agencies provide extensive coordination and collaboration among government and non-government agencies, international organizations, and commercial activities. These relationships provide the ideal environment to coordinate transition from military operations to post-conflict activities or in the case of stable, sovereign nations, the capabilities to provide long-term assessment of USG policy and then be able to make suggestions for adjustments as necessary.5

In summary, the JIACG organizational design is centered on acquiring, vetting, and managing the flow of information and knowledge to enhance joint planning and operations by offering a broader decisionmaking context that includes civilian agencies both in Washington and in the area of responsibility. This embedded interagency element provides unique capabilities because of its internal relationships within the CCDR staff, its habitual relationships with civilian organizations, and its in-depth understanding of the region.6

From Theory to Practice

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1, issued in February 2001, redefined interagency arrangements under policy coordination committees to manage development and implementation of national security policy. Replacing most interagency working groups, committees reflect earlier regional and functional organizations by providing recommendations based on the consolidated input of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, among other agencies.7

The issuance of NSPD 1 was an early step in the realization that the USG suffered from a less than optimum interagency policymaking and execution process. Even before the events of 11 September 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the JCS had made observations consistent with the Presidential Directive. The attacks of 9/11 were the catalyst
needed to make changes within DOD that would promote interagency cooperation in fighting the GWOT.

In the wake of 9/11, Admiral Dennis Blair, who was then Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, was concerned that military power alone would have limited effects against decentralized non-state terrorist groups. Thus he proposed organizing the Joint Interagency Task Force-Counterterrorism Asia Pacific, with a broad interagency mandate as well as coordinating authority. Other combatant commands submitted similar proposals for some sort of coordination mechanism.

The Joint Staff considered these proposals and then submitted a concept paper on JIACG to the NSC deputies committee that approved it. In February 2002, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff instructed the CCDRs to implement a Joint Interagency Coordination Group along the lines described by USJFCOM. “JIACGs will be organized to provide interagency advice and expertise to Combatant Commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation efforts.”

The combatant commands had already responded by forming joint counterterrorism offices. They were officially renamed JIACGs in spring 2002 following an instruction by the Joint Chiefs, except for U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), which retained the title of Joint Interagency Task Force. Although each group has the same focus, their structure and activities vary with the area of responsibility. This paper will highlight the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) as one example of an operational Geographic Combatant Command JIACG based on research and more than two years of firsthand experience.

**USPACOM JIACG/CT**

Like all "good ideas," the establishment of the JIACG/CT took time. More correctly stated, the implementation of the JIACG/CT happened very quickly. Its acceptance and the understanding of its role and mission by the staff and others took longer. Overcoming staff paradigms, cultural biases, and human nature were all factors that hindered the development of an effective and efficient interagency coordination division.

Unfortunately, within USPACOM and to a certain extent within the JIACG/CT itself, there was a lack of understanding of the JIACG/CT role and how to best organize to maximize limited resources. The initial JIACG/CT structure was largely based on the need to fuse the specific functions appropriate to the task of providing “actionable intelligence” to the Commander –
combining information gathering, analysis, and passing intelligence to operators for rapid planning and execution.

Even after years of fighting the GWOT, USPACOM continued to be embattled by institutional biases and lack of clear direction regarding priorities and coordination. Prosecuting the GWOT is not unlike the synchronizing of the global anti-communist campaign during the Cold War. Synchronizing the activities of the USPACOM staff directorates, the various service components, and the many agencies involved in the GWOT requires a voice in policy and a voice in implementation. The very nature of coordinating this unconventional war inherently extends into operations.

For this reason, JIACG/CT was established as an operational division functionally in the Operations Directorate (J3). However, JIACG/CT was only one player on the GWOT prosecution team. The tasking authority must cross all directorates to be effective. This issue in the microcosm of the combatant command is comparable and critical to the crisis the U.S. faces today at the national level.

The presumption driving the JIACG structure was that having all functional and various USG agencies in one area will improve the USG decision cycle time, thus getting into or ahead of the terrorist “decision cycle” – the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop. Although the idea of increasing the speed of the USG OODA Loop is still valid, it was quickly apparent that within the USPACOM theater, it was highly unlikely that kinetic actions such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Horn of Africa would ever be appropriate. Moreover, knowledge of the strategic environment quickly led to the conclusion that individual nation states had to deal with terrorism using their own means. As a result, the USPACOM JIACG/CT was reformulated in an attempt to capture the functional nature of the threat. It went from being functionally organized into branches for intelligence, operations, and training to a sub-regional organization with branches responsible for all mission aspects in their assigned geographic area.

Traditionally, coordinating policy decisions through the Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) and implementing via the J3 has been effective and would seem like a logical approach. However, combating terrorism activities are not so easily divided. The line separating the two is inherently fuzzy and the political sensitivities extend to methods of policy implementation. The JIACG/CT approach to cross-directorate coordination invades traditional spheres of influence. This demonstrates the need not only for strong senior leadership, but also for a synchronizing mechanism.

To meet this need, the J3 JIACG/CT instituted the War on Terrorism (WOT) Synchronization Board co-chaired by the Deputy J3 (J30) and the Deputy J5 (J50). Although far
from fully integrated and effective, the WOT Synchronization Board holds the potential of properly aligning and prioritizing USPACOM activities to best support the effective prosecution of the theater GWOT campaign plan.

In its simplest form, the USPACOM JIACG/CT mission is to strengthen interagency coordination and the sharing of information between civilian and military agencies in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Barring a significant improvement in the organizational structure and the enforcement of the roles and functions of the staff, previous efficiencies gained in the interagency staff process will be lost. Although the processes for coordinating combating terrorism efforts for USPACOM have been in place for several years, the USPACOM leadership has not resolved the fundamental challenge of coordination – how the task should be structured in USPACOM.

In the years of its existence, JIACG/CT has undergone five significant changes to structure and numerous changes to personnel. However, the most important change has been the quiet attempt to shift focus from its initial raison d’être to something else as yet undefined – a “full spectrum JIACG.” This latest reorganization was under discussion in July 2006 and a new structure became effective in October 2006 when the JIACG was relocated to the Plans and Policy Directorate (J5).

While the concept of a “full spectrum JIACG” is theoretically sound, the formula by which USPACOM has so successfully fought the GWOT thus far does not support this idea. The USPACOM decision to focus the JIACG on combating terrorism has been overwhelmingly successful. Repeatedly, USPACOM has led the planning and concept development for several national and DOD-level plans. The work supporting the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) and its metric incorporation has been lauded by the Joint Staff. Based on the success of its programs, USPACOM is one of only two geographic combatant commands (GCC) that have been approved by the FBI to maintain a full time staff representative.

The explanation is simple – USPACOM designed an organization that is responsible for the spectrum of effort at the strategic and operational level. JIACG/CT has been a “one-stop shop” or a focal point for GWOT planning within the USPACOM staff. Moreover, JIACG/CT has developed or overseen unique programs and activities specifically targeted at the GWOT. Many of these functions have traditionally resided elsewhere within the command (or ideally with service components), but the fusing of these activities into one office has improved the efficiency and economy of force in prosecuting the GWOT in the USPACOM AOR.
For USPACOM to work effectively on the interagency level, assets must be reallocated to meet specified and implied tasks. The J3 JIACG/CT provided the focal point to coordinate actions by operators, intelligence analysts, and planners with expertise in special operations, intelligence, information operations, and civil affairs as well as general staff support. Moreover, JIACG/CT seamlessly involved other government agencies focused on the GWOT including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency and a host of other combat support agencies.

The main point in the USPACOM example is that the interagency entity designated to prosecute the GWOT must be properly organized, manned, and empowered. Despite these challenges, the USPACOM J3 JIACG/CT was responsible for many successes in the regional portion of the GWOT. The USG can apply these lessons learned and properly implement an interagency process at the national level that can be effective in policymaking and execution of activities that support these policies.

The Problem

Proper and successful execution of US policy suffers from two primary problems. First is the proper organization of the USG. The bureaucracy created to direct policy implementation cannot be so complicated that it detracts from its effectiveness. Even organizational problems can be overcome with proper leadership. Most importantly, even beyond the organizational structure, remains the fact that someone has to be in charge. The fundamental flaw in the interagency process is not in the development of the policy. The proverbial missing piece at the national level is negligence in assigning a senior decisionmaker to make the hard calls when departments are at odds over resource allocation.

Organizationally, the United States has fundamentally mismatched its national security structure to today’s complex problems. Biologist E.O. Wilson, who wrote that humans generally divide knowledge into component parts, illustrated the mismatch using the example of environmental policy, ethics, biology, and social science. While each subject is closely connected, each also has “its own practitioners, language, modes of analysis, and standards of validation,” which results in confusion when people attempt to pass knowledge or inference from one subject area to another.11

Wilson postulated a center point where the four quadrants meet, where most real world problems exist, and where fundamental analysis is most needed. He indicated that the most fundamental need in analysis in this intersection of various subjects is imagination. This observation eerily foreshadowed complaints of the 9/11 reports about a lack of imagination in
the USG approach to terrorism. According to Wilson, only with imagination can one move between these disparate topics and develop soundly based policies.

If Wilson’s quadrants are relabeled economics, diplomacy, military, information, intelligence, law enforcement, or any other national security-related field, concentrating analysis on this intersecting area represents a first step in addressing conflated problems. Unfortunately, rather than seeking to unify knowledge and expertise, the USG as currently structured does the opposite, continuing to divide knowledge into component parts by first deconstructing national security issues and then parceling most of the parts to individual departments and agencies. Even before allocating problems, it is clear that some portions of these problems do not neatly parallel the national security structure and, therefore, are not addressed as part of an integrated and comprehensive strategy.

This stove-piped decisionmaking results in a piecemeal U.S. response to most international issues. Under the current arrangement, these independent solutions vary in sequence and intensity and sometimes conflict. After surviving the intradepartmental process, these separate solutions enter the interagency process and eventually make their way to the highest levels of government.12

Even at the highest levels of government the debate continues. The debate is systemic to the successful implementation of policy. At some point, the argument must end, a lead must be designated and the rest of the interagency must comply with the decision. The designated decisionmaker must arrive at a solution and then ensure there is an implementation process.

The most glaring shortfall in U.S. policy implementation is the designation of a regional organization that can translate national level policy into regional application and then have someone held accountable for its implementation. There are several recommendations to incorporate these improvements in the current organization.

Recommendations for Change

Recommendations for change include actions by the President, Congress, and new organization. It is incumbent upon the President to be the leader. The President must articulate both the threats to the nation and a vision of how to respond. Equally important is the need for executive-legislative cooperation for any proposal to change the national security system.13 The congressional power of the purse must be used to incorporate adequate funding streams to address developing, unconventional issues that do not neatly fall into current fiscal categories. Finally, the government agencies must be organized in a way that can be most effective in
combating terrorism and other issues. That organization would be best located in the region—
not in Washington, D.C.

In addition to Presidential leadership, Congress will have a significant role to play in
establishing a national level security mechanism that not only formulates policy, but also has the
means to direct its implementation. Separate and appropriate funding of the new interagency
organizations is critical. Congress would need to create a system to authorize and appropriate
the budgets to make these organizations both successful and relatively independent of the cur-
rent departments and agencies. As such, the role of the interagency organization leaders
requires clarification, and careful consideration must be given to what authorities are granted to
the leadership, whether the Senate confirms them, and how they interact with the departments
and agencies.

Congress must consider establishing and funding a process that bundles together
education, interagency rotations, and promotions over the course of a career in national
security. Much like career military officers, national security personnel should attend
professional education and be assigned inside interagency organizations and outside their
departments or agencies. In particular, promotion for certain types of careers should be based
on meeting these objectives. In support of this cultural change, a professional education
infrastructure for national security professionals must be created—equivalent to the military’s
professional military education system.

Finally, Congress must examine how to adapt itself to the changes proposed here and
improve its appropriate oversight of national security so as to be more efficient and effective.
While the 1947 and 1986 acts represent models of change, the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
which created the Department of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, which created the Director of National Intelligence, might represent models of
less successful reform, particularly in regard to congressional involvement and oversight.14

Fundamental to coordinating interagency cooperation is the establishment of a common
USG wide framework for defining the regions of the world. The NSC should lead an interagency
review of how various agencies divide the world into regions for the purposes of policy
execution, with the aim of creating a common regional framework that could be used across the
USG. The resulting framework should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure it
adapts to changes in the international security environment.15

The most significant error in contemporary issue resolution is the difference between the
DOS and the DOD boundary lines. The latest Unified Command Plan (UCP) divides the military
structure in five distinct regional areas: Europe (USEUCOM), Southwest Asia (USCENTCOM),
Asia and Pacific (USPACOM), South America (USSOUTHCOM), and North America (USNORTHCOM). Meanwhile, the State Department divides the world into six bureaus that include Africa (AF), East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Eurasia (EUR), Near East (NEA), South and Central Asia (SCA), and Western Hemisphere (WHA). The U.S. Pacific Command alone has interests in three of the State Department bureaus. There will continue to be confusion and friction until the USG can refer to one map and speak from a common understanding. Regardless of whether it is the DOD map, the DOS map or a combination thereof, the USG must start with a common reference.

In a Center for Strategic and International Studies report, Murdock and Flournoy suggest that the regional interagency council is a longer-term goal. However, the U.S. government should consider establishing standing Regional Security Councils sooner rather than later. These regional councils, composed of senior representatives from all of the national security departments, would coordinate U.S. policy execution on a day-to-day basis and seek approaches to shape the regional environment in favorable ways. Once the regional organization is established, the director of a given region should convene on a regular basis, on behalf of the National Security Adviser and the President, a summit of the senior USG officials with policy execution responsibilities in the region, including (but not limited to) the relevant ambassadors and the CCDRs. These summits would review current and planned activities in the region in light of the President’s priorities, policies, and planning guidance. They should also identify ways to improve unity of effort and develop strategies by which the United States could shape the environment and possibly prevent crises.

The last hurdle to reforming the organizational structure of the national security apparatus concerns communications and location. Information flow among agencies of the U.S. government operating around the world remains remarkably constricted. The barriers to information sharing and collaboration on an interagency basis stem from a combination of legal separation, policy constraints, cultural barriers, and technological inadequacies. Similar obstacles hamper information sharing with U.S. partners and allies. Achieving greater unity of effort in day-to-day policy execution requires improving how the U.S. government manages and shares information internally and with its partners. Building on initiatives such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the combatant commands and proposals to make the DOD regional centers more interagency in character is a useful starting point.

Building on the current JIACG initiatives is key and the ideal location for the new regional centers is at the CCDR headquarters. The DOD is the only U.S. department that currently establishes significant headquartered forces in respective regions. The physical infrastructure
that already exists would expedite the regional interagency restructuring to better fight the war on terrorism or any other pertinent issue. The boundaries can be redrawn as desired and the combatant command may be renamed, but regardless, the infrastructure should remain in place and will provide a suitable regional interagency headquarters.

Lastly, the most important point is that leadership matters. This does not refer to individual character traits, but to legitimate authority of the one person charged with the authority, the responsibility, and the accountability of mission accomplishment. Interagency cooperation is just that—cooperation, not direction. Some may argue that the various department representatives are peers and a lead-follow relationship is contrary to the current design. This argument leaves a significant void between a “good idea” and its implementation, but this paradigm shift is critical to interagency success. Lest all hope be lost, a contemporary model of success does exist— with one flaw.

The establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is a classic example of an organization that has the capability to discern terrorist intentions, that can plan activities critical to protecting our nation against terrorist acts, but has no power to direct activities or operations based on the information they hold. The NCTC is explicitly forbidden from directing any counterterrorism operational activities. Perhaps this is the right answer, but if not the NCTC, then who? No one in the USG has been designated as the decisionmaker below the President when interagency disagreements arise. For combating terrorism activities to be effective in the current global environment, decisions must be made, and if not in the D.C. arena, then definitely at the regional level.

The regional security councils as described previously would serve to implement national policy appropriate to its respective region. These regional councils would be empowered to develop policies in line with national guidance and be empowered to implement this policy and approve actions deemed necessary to enforce it. The key difference from current organization aside from the regional structure is the designation of a regional senior official charged with unquestioned authority over the various departments and agencies.

The regional expertise gained by “living locally” cannot be overemphasized. American Embassy officials throughout the world would agree. Ideally, the regional Director would be a senior civilian official with an established interagency background committed to national and regional issues. Ideally, current employment by the DOD or the DOS would be avoided to mitigate parochial bias between the two most significant players within the interagency.
Conclusion

Throughout the world, U.S. national security policy is executed daily by a host of players on the combatant command staff, the U.S. country team, and representatives from various agencies and organizations of the USG. With the exception of the combatant command, there is currently no standing mechanism for implementing national policy at the regional level. This organizational disparity must be eliminated to begin synchronizing all U.S. government activities in a given region. For the vast majority of interagency organizations, this coordination only takes place in Washington, D.C. As a result, U.S. government programs and activities in a region are often uncoordinated and potentially run counterproductive – not out of malice, but because of poor communication and coordination. The link between the policymakers in Washington and implementation requires greater integration of U.S. government programs and activities on a regional basis. The decisionmakers in departments other than the DOD need to establish a permanent presence in respective areas of responsibility.

Finally, given the reality of future budgetary and fiscal constraints, the new organization provides a framework to eventually streamline the entire national security apparatus. Once expertise is collocated and a new cadre of strategic practitioners is developed, the need to replicate roles across departments and agencies will be reduced and resource sharing will be enhanced. In order for the USG to go forward in any interagency endeavor the leadership must establish a cogent, coherent, and effective process in Washington, D.C. This process must then extend to the regional level for implementation in an environment where all U.S. elements of national power recognize a single, unequivocal voice of power.

Endnotes


4 Ibid., 5-6.

5 Ibid., 11.

6 Ibid., 8.

8 Directions for establishment of a CCDR JIACG were contained in four sequential classified messages


10 Ibid.


13 Ibid., 56.

14 Gorman and Krongard, 57


18 Murdock and Flournoy, 38.

19 Ibid.

20 NCTC was established by Executive Order 13354 to serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting purely domestic counterterrorism information.


22 Gorman and Krongard, 58.