INTEGRATED CAPABILITIES: EVOLVING JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR A STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

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Five years of conflict during the Global War on Terror have illustrated strengths and weakness within our military and the application of national power. The application of national power, especially military force, has primarily been combat-centric with mission accomplishment being defined by success on the battlefield rather than the proper application of capabilities. Recently, there has been a concerted effort to define and establish Joint Capability Areas and those capabilities required to meet national, strategic ends. However, these Joint Capability Areas are a result of a Department of Defense effort, that may inhibit the integration of all instruments of national power. Although a positive step, the Department of Defense Joint Capability Areas must evolve to address the demands of the 21st century; a global, integrated environment.
INTEGRATED CAPABILITIES: EVOLVING JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR A STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

We’re in a world where very few things are going to be solved purely militarily. We’re in a world that is going to require interagency cooperation…downplaying the use of force and the need for full spectrum capabilities…

—Peter Schoomaker
General, USA

Traditional thought maintains that war is a continuation of policy by other means, employing military force for the purpose of compelling our enemy to do our will. This assumes that war is used sequentially as an instrument of power for the purpose of achieving policy ends; and by not employing force the consequence may be failed policy. Policy does not require the use of force in order to achieve its end and war is more than an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. The nature of war, and the means employed to execute war, has matured beyond the use of force and traditional practices used in the past.

War may be redefined as the application of kinetic or non-kinetic capabilities in order to achieve a desired effect and to compel one’s adversary to a defined end-state. In this sense, war becomes capabilities-centric and demands holistic methods of thinking and executing. Environmental constraints and the speed of global change are far exceeding our ability to adapt and change. Current Joint Capabilities Areas (JCA) must evolve to suit the integrated global environment.

This paper will focus on the capabilities needed in order to gain a strategic advantage in the twenty-first century. Where maneuver warfare is combat-centric, requiring the successful employment, coordination, and synchronization of combined arms, capabilities-centric warfare demands the coordination, synchronization, and employment of combined capabilities, integrating and coordinating all instruments of national power.

Our Environment

For almost five decades, the Cold War defined politics, policy, acquisition, and lifestyle. Our systems of government, defense, economics, and information exchange were based on a bi-polar relationship. In the international system, the Cold War had its own structure of power: the balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. This balance of power defined spheres of influence between the communist countries, the West, and the non-aligned Third World. The Cold War environment also defined industry and technological development. For geo-political defense organization and development, the technology centered on nuclear
weapons and massed state-on-state armies. The fall of the Soviet Union and globalization have changed the conditions.

Unlike the Cold War, globalization has its own dominant culture, which tends to be homogenizing, is not static, and involves the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before—in a way that is enabling individuals, cooperations, and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before. The environment is no longer segregated, it is integrated. If the symbol of the Cold War was a wall, the symbol of globalization is the World Wide Web, integrating everybody.

The twenty-first century environment is global and the nature of warfare is changing. When sovereign nations determine that their freedom is being threatened, re-defined, or eliminated, they will attempt to exercise influence to regain balance or initiative. Globally, this influence is exercised through the freedom of economic, political, or military means. Whether economic, political, or military, all are dependent on freedom of action or freedom of movement.

Freedom of movement would be defined as freedom of maneuver by military forces. Military units would define this as the movement of forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver, or threaten delivery of direct and indirect fire, and to defeat the enemy by attacking or threatening his center of gravity and shattering the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions. This definition supports force on force with a tactical end state. If war is the application of capabilities, then freedom of movement is the synergy of capabilities in order to achieve a desired effect. For friendly action, this means domain freedom of action and either limiting or coercing adversary freedom of action. Domain freedom of movement is the multidimensional employment of capabilities through all mediums.

Capabilities-centric warfare is more than the employment of military arms, it involves the effective employment of all instruments of national power. If war is defined as combat force-on-force, it will constrain the tactical, operational, and strategic leader. These leaders may only focus on combat, and not fully exercise all instruments of national power.

The art of maneuver warfare offers a prelude to the potential of capabilities-centric warfare. Inherent in maneuver warfare is the speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby complicating his decisionmaking. Therefore, maneuver warfare strives to concentrate friendly strengths against enemy critical vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to the enemy’s ability to fight. Maneuver warfare is opportunistic, actively seeking signs of weakness, against which all available combat power can be directed. To accomplish this concentration,
Martin van Creveld asserts that there are six vital elements inherent to maneuver warfare: tempo, Schwerpunkt, surprise, combined arms, flexibility, and decentralized command. These principles and traits are applicable in capabilities-centric warfare, and they are inherent when employing the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power. Diplomatic, information, and economic freedom of movement is our ability to constantly change our posture in order to gain an advantageous position, keeping the enemy off balance and increasing his friction.

Diplomatically, freedom of movement is articulated through strategic policy and setting conditions that are profitable to US goals and interests. For the last half of the 20th century, diplomatic decisions were played out as a chess match, movement was slow and deliberate, and was based on a bi-polar global environment. Today, diplomatic posturing is multi-dimensional, involving state and non state actors.

Informational freedom of movement, which was once analog, is now digital and more decentralized. Employing the information instrument of power requires flexibility and innovation. We exercise informational freedom of movement by distributing, receiving, analyzing, and crafting information, as well as soliciting indigenous entertainers and journalists.

Today, more than ever, economic freedom of movement is based on a global market. The ability to influence commodity trading, foreign trade and investment, and one’s re-capitalization of export capital within one’s own economy define economic freedom of movement.

When defined and employed independently, instruments of national power can be counter productive. Instruments of national power must be mutually employed if the United States is to be successful in the 21st century. In order to exercise freedom of movement, capabilities dominance requires a reexamination of the operating environment. Currently, the Operational Environment (OE) is the composite of all the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the commander that exists today and in the near future (out to year 2020). During this time frame, threats will be full spectrum extending from high-tech to low-tech and from conventional to asymmetrical. This variance demands a reexamination and definition of our operating environment.

National policy and the development and application of capabilities are not congruent with this global environment. The speed of environmental change is far exceeding our ability to adapt quickly. All of the national instruments of power, and their systems, are products of Cold War systems, including the Cold War environment. The Cold War environment has given way
to a new overarching international system shaping domestic politics, foreign relations, and global policy. \(^{12}\) The new international system is globalization.

With the evolving global environment, tactical and operational units must be capable of achieving strategic ends. Because of this, understanding environmental effects is critical. Preparing and understanding the environment forces one to consider multiple means, not simply combat forces. Our experience in Iraq illustrates a failing in understanding the environment and a combat-first approach when our “efforts to build a legitimate government through illegitimate action - including unjustified or excessive use of force, unlawful detention, torture or punishment without trial – are self-defeating, even against insurgents who conceal themselves amid noncombatants.”\(^{13}\)

The nucleus of capability-centric warfare is the ability to adapt to the environment. Leaders and organizations must have the acumen to measure and interpret effects and to quickly transition between available capabilities dependent on environmental constraints (welfare, socioeconomic, geography to name a few), and the states involved.

Maintaining that war is waged between states, the role of the non-state actor offers a unique problem set to the 21st century operating environment. The challenge may not be an asymmetrical threat or terrorism as much as recognizing and identifying states that sponsor non-state players. The most effective method of defeating a non-state actor is to alter its source, a state. All non-state actors require state support in order to achieve their goals. They do not have the resources to sustain themselves and will not present a viable target to counter. For when the non-state actor begins to resource itself and present a viable target, they then become a state themselves. Success will be defined by one’s ability to recognize the ever-changing environment and the ability to exercise multiple forms of capabilities and all instruments of national power.

**Joint Capabilities**

Five years of conflict during the Global War on Terror have illustrated strengths and weakness within our military and the governments’ ability to apply national power. The application of military power, especially military force, has primarily been combat-centric and mission accomplishment is defined by success on the battlefield with disregard to other environmental factors affecting the condition. Recently there has been a concerted effort to define and establish joint force capabilities. The intent of this effort is to introduce a paradigm shift from a combat-centric culture to a capabilities based joint force.
As an integral part of the evolving Capabilities-Based Planning process, and in response to guidance in the Strategic Planning Guidance, twenty-one Joint Capabilities Areas were developed representing the beginnings of a common language to discuss and describe capabilities across many related Department of Defense activities and processes. The initial Tier 1, twenty-one Joint Capabilities Areas were a key product of the Operational Availability-05 study which responded to a key recommendation of the December 2003 “Joint Defense Capabilities Study,” commonly referred to as the Alridge Study. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, appointed the Joint Chiefs of Staff the lead in executing and managing the continued development of the Joint Capabilities Areas and developing joint definitions for all Joint Capabilities Area terms.

A Tier 1 Joint Capabilities Area is a high-level capability category that facilitates capabilities-based planning and decisionmaking. Tier 1 Joint Capabilities Areas are composed of functional, operational, domain, and institutional based joint capabilities. Functional Joint Capabilities Areas address enduring crosscutting capabilities that enable military operations. Functional Joint Capabilities Areas include Joint Battlespace Awareness, Joint Command and Control, Joint Net-Centric Operations, Joint Interagency/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination, Joint Protection, and Joint Logistics. Operational Joint Capabilities Areas address capabilities specific to a type of military operation or activity that provides a clear link to the Combatant Commands. Operational Joint Capabilities Areas include Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Joint Homeland Defense, Joint Global Deterence, Joint Shaping, Joint Stability Operations: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR), Joint Access and Access Denial Operations, and Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare. Domain Joint Capabilities Areas address force application capabilities unique to land, air, sea, space, and information warfighting environments. Domain Joint Capabilities Areas include Joint Land Operations, Joint Maritime/Littoral Operations, Joint Air Operations, Joint Space Operations, and Joint Information Operations. Institutional Joint Capabilities Areas address the non-warfighting functions of the Department of Defense, and include Joint Force Management and Joint Force Generation. An inclusive list of the Tier 1 Joint Capabilities Areas in Tables 1 -4 provide supporting definitions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 1 Functional JCAs</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Battlespace Awareness</td>
<td>The ability to develop shared situational awareness and to produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains. It is the knowledge and understanding of the operational environment’s characteristics and conditions, friendly, adversary and non-combatant disposition and other natural and man-made effects that enable timely, relevant, comprehensive, and accurate assessments in support of national and military objectives. (Modified from JP 2-01, 7 Oct 04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Command &amp; Control</td>
<td>The ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. A commander performs command and control functions through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (Derived from C2 JFC, Feb 04 and JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Net-Centric Operations</td>
<td>The ability to exploit all human and technical elements of the joint force and its mission partners by fully integrating collected information, awareness, knowledge, experience, and decision making, enabled by secure access and distribution, to achieve a high level of agility and effectiveness in a dispersed, decentralized, dynamic and/or uncertain operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Public Affairs Operations</td>
<td>The ability to plan, coordinate and synchronize U.S. military public information activities and resources in order to support the commander’s operational and strategic objectives through the communication of truthful, timely and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the area of operation (AO) to foreign, domestic, and internal audiences. This capability includes advising the commander on the effects of public information activities on operations, and the effect of operations on foreign, domestic and internal audiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Interagency/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination</td>
<td>The ability to coordinate between elements of the Department of Defense, engaged U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational entities (e.g. partnership states) for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (Derived from JP 3-0800)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Protection</td>
<td>The process, set of activities, or utilization of capabilities by which the Joint Force prevents/mitigates adverse effects on personnel (combatant/non-combatant), physical assets, and information of the United States, allies and friends, required to ensure fighting potential can be applied at the decisive time and place against the full spectrum of threats. The Joint Force will achieve this through the tailored selection and application of multi-</td>
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layered, active and passive, lethal and non-lethal, offensive and defensive measures, within all domains, across the range of military operations, based on assessment of acceptable level of risk. (Modified from Protection Joint Functional Concept (JFC), Jun 04)

Joint Logistics
The ability to provide effective, responsive, and efficient movement and sustainment capacity; exercise control from end to end; and provide certainty to the supported Joint force commander that forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and on time in all domains. (Derived from the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, December 2003)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 1 Operational JCAs</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</td>
<td>Often referred to as Civil Support, DSCA is the ability to provide DoD support, including Federal military forces, the Department's career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. The Department of Defense provides defense support of civil authorities when directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Homeland Defense</td>
<td>The ability to protect U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Global Deterrence</td>
<td>The ability to prevent aggression or coercion threatening vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. It involves activities to convince adversaries not to take courses of action that have grievous results by means of decisive influence over their decision making. (Derived from the Strategic Deterrence JOC, Feb 04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Shaping</td>
<td>The ability to support Joint Force, Interagency and Multinational operations - inclusive of normal and routine military activities – performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. Shaping is executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives and national goals. These activities are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing behavior of both adversaries and allies. Each capability supporting Shaping Operations, to include Information Operations, must adapt to a particular theater and environment and may be executed in one theater in order to achieve</td>
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</table>

The ability to conduct military and civilian activities across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states or regions. Military support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) are Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. (DODD 3000.05 Military Support for SSTR Operations)

Joint Access and Access Denial Operations

The ability to conduct military operations across any domain, opposed or unopposed, to gain or deny freedom of action within a given battle space. (Modified JFEO JIC)

Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare

The ability to conduct operations that apply or counter means other than direct, traditional forms of combat involving peer-to-peer fighting between the regular armed forces of two or more countries. The ability to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations may require low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities that are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently of or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies, and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. (Derived from JP 1-02)

Table 2, Tier 1 Operational Joint Capabilities Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 1 Domain JCAs</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Land Operations</td>
<td>The ability to employ joint forces to achieve military objectives within the Land Domain. Such operations include offensive operations, defensive operations, and/or stability operations. Joint Land operations will require the Regional Component Commander (RCC) to employ joint forces to engage adversaries across the spectrum of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. They are conducted as part of a campaign or major joint operation and extend across the full range of military joint operations (ROMO). Joint land operations can include operational maneuver from strategic and operational distances to directly attack centers of gravity</td>
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</table>
in order to achieve the joint force commander’s desired objectives. Close combat is a fundamental capability for successful joint land operations across the greater part of the ROMO. Joint Land Operations can include maneuver and engagement in order to destroy opposing forces, secure key terrain, control vital lines of communications, or to establish local or regional military superiority. Ultimately, Joint Land Operations seek to control territory, populations, and resources, which may require a long term commitment, in order to achieve national objectives. (Modified from JP 1-02)

Joint Maritime/Littoral Operations

The ability to employ joint forces through the maritime/littoral domain to achieve military objectives. Such operations may include destruction of enemy naval and coastal forces, expeditionary/amphibious operations and support, control of strategic approaches, establishment of local military superiority, control of maritime commerce, and the conduct and support of operations throughout the theater. (Modified JP 1-02)

Joint Air Operations

The ability to employ joint forces to achieve military objectives within and through the air domain. Such operations include those to establish local air superiority, provide missile defense, assault support operations and execute strikes. (JP 1-02, derived from “Air Control Operations”)

Joint Space Operations

The ability to employ joint forces across all domains to achieve national objectives in, from and/or through space.

Joint Information Operations

The ability to conduct operations using the integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities*, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. (Derived from DRAFT DoDD 3600.1)

Table 3, Tier 1 Domain Joint Capabilities Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 1 Institutional JCAs</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Force Management</td>
<td>The ability to integrate existing and future human and technical assets from across the Joint Force to make the right capabilities available at the right time and place in support of the National Defense Strategy. (Derived from Force Management Joint Functional Concept dtd 2 June 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Force Generation</td>
<td>The ability of DOD to man, equip, and organize resources and to develop Joint Force skills necessary to ensure the Joint Force Commander has the capabilities to fulfill the National Military Strategy. Personnel and equipment are</td>
</tr>
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</table>
resourced through recruiting and acquisition programs, and are implicitly linked to Joint requirements. Developing personnel and unit skills to perform military tasks and functions are accomplished through Service and Joint education, training, and exercise programs. (Derived from NMS, 2004)

Table 4, Tier 1 Institutional Joint Capabilities Areas

The evolution of the joint capabilities based process derived from Service focused needs without regard for the other Services or joint interoperability. Prior to 2002, virtually every military system was born from Service doctrine, a Service focused operational need, or an operational disaster. Furthermore, the Services had a unique strategic interpretation of the Defense Strategy, unique operational viewpoints, and unique ways to identify and test solutions. A primary purpose of the “Alridge Study” was to integrate Service needs into Department of Defense needs, identifying a priority list for research, development, and acquisition. This evolution began to finally address the need for interagency cooperation, as articulated in some of the tier 1 JCAs, but they are based primarily on 20th century, Cold War policy. The Department of Defense must move from the interagency cognitive to the practical, incorporating a 21st Century, globalization, interdependent environment.

Evolution and Revolution

Transforming to an integrated capabilities based force, employing all instruments of national power, will ultimately define success or failure in our ability to defeat threats to U.S. sovereignty and national interest. The April 2003 Department of Defense Transformation Planning Guidance defined transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.” However, in order to underpin peace and stability in the world, two actions need to be taken. First, the U.S. needs to address it’s current global security and cooperation arrangements by integrating multiple instruments of national power in a coordinated and synchronized fashion. Integrating multiple instruments of national power will then dictate the second action, a reexamination of required capabilities to meet the demands of the 21st century, globalized, integrated environment.

In order to facilitate the movement and integration of multiple instruments of national power and employ integrated capabilities, the U.S. must reexamine interagency cooperation and employment. The National Security Act of 1947 and title 10 of the United States Code
provide the basis for the establishment of combatant commands, as prescribed by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 redefined the command structure of the United States military. The UCP established missions and responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands, established general geographic areas of responsibility (AOR) and functions. Aside from designating the Chairman as the principal military adviser to the President, this legislation altered Service interaction and functions. The Services and the Secretaries of the Military Departments are to provide resources to combatant commanders with functional and geographic responsibility. The commander of a combatant command that includes a geographic AOR is a “geographic combatant commander,” and they are to coordinate and synchronize all efforts in order to achieve national strategic ends within a specific AOR. Over the last twenty years, and especially the last five years, the Combatant Commanders have become the apex for all U.S. effort, greatly improving joint interoperability but lacking the proper authority to integrate all instruments of national power. If transformation is the transition to a capabilities-based Joint Force, able to leverage all of the capabilities provided by the Services in order to achieve full spectrum dominance through the complementary capabilities of Joint Forces and interagency partners, than we must mature beyond the UCP. The UCP segregates inter-agency synchronization and employment of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military power, and is the genesis of the Department of Defense Tier 1 Joint Capabilities Areas. A security policy integrating multiple instruments of national power is required, leveraging a coordinated and synchronized United States Government (USG) effort, and to define and establish Joint Integrated Capabilities.

A dominant role of the United States in the 21st century, as outlined by National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), will be to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. NSPD-44 identifies the Department of State as the lead governmental agency for reconstruction and stabilization and to harmonize efforts with U.S. military plans and operations including complex emergencies across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. A complete implementation of this plan will require full integration between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. In order to facilitate Department of State and Department of Defense integration, the UCP should be replaced with a Unified Cooperation and Security Plan (UCSP). A UCSP would
integrate multiple governmental agencies and begin to mature the Department of Defense JCAs from joint to integrated.

Although NSPD-44 designates responsibility, it does not have legislative authority. A Unified Cooperation and Security Plan would authorize, at a minimum, Department of State and Department of Defense integration and cooperation. A major function of a Unified Cooperation and Security Plan would be to designate the alignment of Department of State bureaus with Department of Defense geographic combatant commander’s AORs. The assistant secretaries for the respective Department of State bureaus would be the combatant commanders’ equivalent, and together they would ensure security and cooperation in order to achieve U.S. strategic ends. The combatant commander would retain command authority over subordinate military commands and forces, but the Department of State Assistant Secretary would exercise diplomatic authority, on behalf of the United States Government, within a respective Department of State bureau.

In order to harmonize efforts within the United States Government and integrate U.S. military plans and operations (which include complex emergencies across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions) with diplomatic efforts, the Unified Cooperation and Security Plan, at a minimum, would require the geographic combatant commander and the assistant secretary to do the following:

- Carry out assigned missions and tasks and planning for and executing operations, as directed, in support of strategic guidance.
- Plan, conduct, and assess security cooperation activities pursuant to strategic guidance.
- Provide US representation to international and US national agencies. US representation would provide advice and assistance when negotiating rights, authorities, and facility arrangements required in support of US cooperation and military missions.
- Provide a single point of contact for cooperation and security matters within an AOR, excluding the United States.
- When directed, the geographic combatant commander will command US forces conducting peace or humanitarian relief operations, whether as a unilateral US action or as part of a multinational organization; or supporting US forces that have been placed under the authority, direction, or control of a multinational organization.
• Provide the single point of contact for the United States Government within the AOR, excluding the United States, for combating weapons of mass destruction (CbtWMD) activities and the execution of CbtWMD mission.

• Establishing and maintaining a standing joint, integrated force headquarters core element.34

The Unified Cooperation and Security Plan would further define joint military and interagency roles, missions, and required capabilities. A re-characterization of capabilities would refine the current Tier 1 Joint Capabilities Areas into Tier 1 Joint Integrated Capabilities Areas, integrating multiple instruments of national power and capitalizing on the effects of globalization and the integrated environment.

Tier 1 Joint Integrated Capabilities would provide a common capabilities language for use across related Department of Defense and Department of State activities and processes, at a minimum, and would remain a high-level capability category that would facilitate integrated capabilities-based planning, major trade analysis, and decisionmaking.35 Tier 1 Joint Integrated Capabilities would be employed by retaining functional, operational, domain, and institutional realms, assimilating multiple agencies within the United States Government.

Functional Joint Integrated Capabilities would address enduring, crosscutting capabilities that enable security operations, not simply military operations. These capabilities would include Integrated Situational Awareness, Integrated Command and Control, Net-Centric Operations, Strategic Communications, Joint Interagency/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination, Force Protection, and Joint Logistics. Operational Joint Integrated Capabilities would address capabilities specific to a type of military operation or activity, providing a clear link to combatant commanders and re-capitalizing those efforts back into other US government agencies. These capabilities would include Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Integrated homeland Defense, Integrated Global Deterrence, Joint/Integrated Shaping, Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations,36 Joint Access and Access Denial Operations, and Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare. Domain Joint Integrated Capabilities would focus force application capabilities unique to land, air, sea, space, and networks. These capabilities would include Joint Land Operations, Joint Maritime/Littoral Operations, Joint Air Operations, Joint Space Operations, and Integrated Network Operations. Institutional Joint Integrated Capabilities would address functions including multiple agencies within the United States Government. These capabilities would include Force Management and Force Generation, and Force Education.

An interdependent 21st century, where integration and assimilation are no longer an anomaly, will require diplomatic, economic, informational, and military interdependence.
Furthermore, employing multiple joint, integrated capabilities and tiers of national instruments of power will afford the U.S. a strategic advantage unmatched on the global landscape.

Conclusion

Where the use of combined arms for military units increases strength and maneuver, the simultaneous use of capabilities enhances one’s desired effects. The diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of power must not be allowed to act independently. They must be mutually supportive, leveraging respective independent strength in order to strengthen the whole.

In order to achieve strategic unity of effort, national leaders must not eliminate an instrument of power; rather solve the problem by arranging all available capabilities in such a way that they are mutually supportive in order to achieve a desired effect. This is not simply the relationships between military units, but the relationship between civilian and military organizations. This level of understanding will demand flexible, adaptive organizations led by agile, creative, and well informed leaders. Warfare must be full spectrum, not solely within domains, integrating all instruments of national power. Success will began at the tactical level, beginning with individuals understanding and utilizing non kinetic capabilities in conjunction with kinetic capabilities. This is not to imply that combat forces are irrelevant, rather they are reinforcing the combination of all utilities is a force multiplier.

This idea and a joint, integrated capabilities-centric mindset to national security will define the 21st century environment. Strategic, operational, and tactical leaders must be resourced with all instruments of national power, not just force, to compel enemies to do ones will. Military culture must maintain a warrior ethos, but not at the expense of achieving the desired effect. The 21st century environment demands no less.

Endnotes


2 Ibid., 5.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 7-8.

5 Ibid., 8.

7 Ibid., 2.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. 3.


15 Joint Capability Areas (JCA) are intended to provide a common capabilities language for use across many related Department of Defense activities and processes. JCAs are further defined as Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 and below. Tier 1 and Tier 2 lexicon are further articulated in the Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Tier 2 Lexicon.

16 Jason Sherman, “Pace Call for Rapid Adoption of New Joint Capabilities Areas,” Inside the Pentagon, 5 May 2005, 1.


18 Joint Capability Area Management Plan (JCAMP)-Draft, 12 December 2005, p. 1

19 Ibid., 1-7.

20 Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Tier 2 Lexicon, post 24 August 2006 JROC, 21-43.

21 Ibid., 8-38.
22 Ibid., 1-9.

23 Ibid., 37-41.

24 Robert F. Larsen, Jr., *How the JROC Capability Based Process should evolve to provide a Joint Networked Centric Force*, Civilian Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 4 December 2005), 4-5.


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


31 National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 defines the management of Interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization. The purpose of the directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, ink or in transition from conflict or civil strife.


33 Ibid., 2.


35 Joint Capability Area Management Plan (JCAMP), draft, 12 December 2005, p.1