POST-CONFLICT STABILITY OPERATIONS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
Report Documentation Page

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE  
30 MAR 2007  

2. REPORT TYPE  
Strategy Research Project  

3. DATES COVERED  
00-00-2006 to 00-00-2007  

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Post-Conflict Stability Operations and the Department of State  

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER  

5b. GRANT NUMBER  

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER  

5d. PROJECT NUMBER  

5e. TASK NUMBER  

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER  

6. AUTHOR(S)  
Stephen Carrig  

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050  

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER  

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)  

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)  

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited  

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  

14. ABSTRACT  
See attached.  

15. SUBJECT TERMS  

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  

<table>
<thead>
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<th>a. REPORT</th>
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17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  
Same as Report (SAR)  

18. NUMBER OF PAGES  
23  

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON  

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prepared by ASSI Std Z9-18
ABSTRACT

This paper will review the formation and initial activities of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State. The SRP will evaluate the progress of this new office, created to coordinate and standardize USG reconstruction and stabilization mechanisms. The office is intended to serve as the central tasking organization for USG-wide assistance to societies recovering from war or severe civil disorder. The paper will review S/CRS and Department of Defense (DoD) undertakings with the objective of determining whether the new bureaucratic structure has succeeded thus far.
This paper addresses stabilization aspects of the current situation in Iraq and outlines selected U.S. Government (USG) policies and organizations engaged in those reconstruction and stabilization operations there and elsewhere. The position taken is broad brush with Iraq chosen as the most prominent example of several such recent operations. Over the past 15 years, we have witnessed some “truly stellar military victories.” Our Department of Defense (DoD) quickly expelled Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991, assisted in the implementation of Balkans peace operations, overturned the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and overthrew the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with combat operations lasting a mere few weeks. However, we have also experienced some “profound operational failures.” Among them, Somalia, where we did not succeed in our stabilization effort; and, unfortunately, we failed to forestall the post-major conflict insurgency in Iraq. Nor did we properly address the initial needs for Iraq’s reconstruction. “Winning the peace has proven to be much more difficult than winning wars.”

Our shortcomings were the result of perhaps equal portions of poor policy execution and mistaken judgment. They featured flawed vertical and horizontal coordination. Vertically, Washington-derived decisions did not result in implementation in the field. Horizontally, the interagency process did not work; there was insufficient coordination among the several competing bureaucracies which failed to provide a unity of effort with common, shared objectives and processes.

As noted throughout the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report, CSIS, July 2005, the USG does not have an established, interagency doctrine for coordinated operations. It exists in DoD with its integration of cross-service activities and joint operations. The Report notes that each succeeding Administration tends to attempt tackling the interagency coordination problem anew without benefit of previous Administrations’ experience. Each Administration tends to write its own Presidential Directives that in turn may be retired by the incoming bureaucracy.

This paper will outline how the inefficient interagency stabilization program evolved in Iraq and some presidential initiatives that have resulted from that imbroglio, namely the creation of a Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction (S/CRS) within the Department of State. It will describe how S/CRS is preparing to implement its mandate. It will also discuss S/CRS’s international and domestic partners. Most important of these relationships is the coordination with the Department of Defense. The paper will further outline some areas where this coordination needs additional definition.
The State of Play in the Run Up to Iraq Reconstruction

LTG (USA Ret.) John Cushman has written a pointedly critical assessment of the planning for the Iraq invasion. He notes that preparations for post-conflict reconstruction and stability operations were assumed by DoD exclusively, but that no serious plan was discussed until two months before the initiation of the conflict itself. No provision was made for co-opting Iraq’s post-Saddam Hussein military or police forces; U.S. troops had no instructions on what to do after a presumed military victory. It’s not that the need for planning was completely overlooked. In December 2002, the Army War College sponsored an interagency workshop that followed up on a November 2002 similar gathering at the National War College. At the National War College, some 70 experts on national security reached the conclusion that “primary post-intervention focus of U.S. military operations must be on establishing and maintaining a secure environment” (emphasis in the original). They continued that although we might enjoy short-term success, in the longer run we would pay a price for the “resulting chaos and crises that would attend such a failure [to ensure a secure environment].”

The Army War College gathering reached similar conclusions. As presented in its report and quoted by Cushman: “In recent decades, U.S. civilian and military leadership have shied away from nation-building. However, if this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to prepare to dedicate considerable time, manpower and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by and more virulent difficulties.”

The Department of State produced its own “Future of Iraq” project which had been in the works since October 2001. That study commissioned thirteen volumes of reports and recommendations from a variety of scholars and conflict resolution experts. SecState Powell sent these studies to SecDef Rumsfeld along with the names of seventy-five experts available for postwar operations. Rumsfeld nevertheless told his staff to ignore the Future of Iraq project and to rely on the inchoate DoD proposals instead.

LTG Cushman didn’t mince words when discussing what he described as our military’s responsibility for not speaking up prior to the invasion. He opined that “four-star officers in key positions at the time, bear [responsibility] for the near-disastrous state of affairs in Iraq… When one considers the fundamental responsibility of the military professional, especially one of very senior rank, the failure of the key military four-stars to exercise good judgment and to stand their ground over divided command in immediate post-conflict Iraq is profoundly troubling. It was their responsibility to have understood both their duty and the lessons of history and of war and
to have withstood the pressure to commit, or permit, grave lapses in preparation for the war’s second phase … Asking to be relieved of responsibility unless changes were made was an option available to any one of them.”

Where We Stand in Iraq Reconstruction Operations

The United States Government seeks a unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbors and without the sectarian violence that has steadily risen since the occupation began. That might as easily be done as said – at least, that was the Administration’s implication as our forces rolled forward. The first of the reconstruction organizations was led by LTG (USA Ret.) Jay Garner. Perhaps two months of planning went into the preparations establishing his team and setting out the DoD’s understanding of how to manage the post-conflict phase. The failure of this limited post-conflict planning is seen in the four or more wars being simultaneously fought in Iraq right now. In Basra and other regions of the south, three major Shitte factions are vying for political and economic control; next there is the Shitte/Sunni conflict occurring mostly in Baghdad and to the west; third is the international involvement of Al Qaeda; finally we have the Sunni/U.S. fight over the removal of Saddam Hussein. These conflicts are the result of our initial stumbles in failing to shore up an Iraqi-based system of control or even provide an effective and credible coalition substitute for basic governance.

The coalition military assault on Iraq began on 20 March 2003. By 9 April, Baghdad had fallen, and Iraqi security forces ceased to provide any meaningful maintenance of law and order. LTG Garner moved his staff from Kuwait to Baghdad on 18 April. On 24 April, the Secretary of Defense informed General Garner that his operations were to be replaced by a presidential envoy, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. Bremer arrived on 12 May, and set up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). His initial (CPA) “regulations and orders” set the tone for the rest of his tenure, and, some would argue, the basis for the ensuing chaos. While Garner had assumed he would be the interlocutor and senior adviser to a pliant, new Iraqi leadership, Bremer’s Regulation 1 stated “The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily” and that he would control “all U.S. Government programs and activities in Iraq, except those under the Commander, U.S. Central Command.” This Regulation set in concrete the division of authority for reconstruction and stabilization and the subsequent poor coordination of both efforts.

Bremer issued CPA Order 1 on 16 May, removing all Baath party members from office. This move didn’t merely decapitate the government, it effectively abolished it. On 23 May,
Bremer issued CPA Order 2. This order disbanded the Iraqi military and related structures. Within two weeks of arriving in Iraq, the CPA had liquidated the two indigenous structures capable of maintaining law and order, and with perhaps inevitable results. Both orders caught our military by surprise; they were coordinated with neither the Department of State nor Department of Defense. The several Iraqi mini-wars described above were soon underway. Discharged Iraqi politicos, bureaucrats, police and military enlisted in the ever-growing resistance to the occupation as equipped, trained and dedicated indigenous opponents.

**Purpose and Organization of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), Department of State**

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has engaged in at least 17 stabilization and reconstruction efforts with an average of two to three of those activities occurring concurrently. Our rationale and participation, and for most cases, taking the lead in these operations, is that the nature of threats to the community of nations has changed over the past 15 years. Weak, impoverished states, i.e., “failed states” and not militarily robust regimes are seen by many as the new challenge to peace and international order. In the words of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her introduction to “transformational diplomacy,” the greatest threats to U.S. security come from states too weak, or lacking the capacity, to police their societies. She then set out, in a policy statement at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, a new U.S. commitment to focusing on the “intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security.”

Both the 9/11 Commission and the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security reached similar conclusions. The 9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States) was a bipartisan organization created by congressional legislation and endorsed by President George W. Bush in late 2002. Its charter was to determine the circumstances surrounding the attacks and recommend how to avoid future such incidents. The Commission on Weak States was a bipartisan group of 30 former government officials and prominent civilians formed in the fall of 2003. The Commission was tasked with defining a strategy for dealing with weak or failed states. Perhaps the Commission’s most controversial recommendation was the establishment of a Cabinet-level development agency to address such situations. Both commissions concurred in finding that weak states and unsuccessful post-conflict transitions are threats to U.S. and global security. Such states are vulnerable to criminal activities, e.g., human trafficking and drug trafficking. Also, as we have seen in Afghanistan, failed states are ripe for exploitation by terrorist organizations. Further, failed states also are easy prey for “natural” occurrences such as public
health issues, including HIV/AIDS.\textsuperscript{22} This is not a universally shared judgment, however. In January 2006, two think-tank studies questioned whether failed states actually pose significant threats to the United States.\textsuperscript{23, 24} Nonetheless, the evidence presented by the 9/11 and Weak States Commissions raise significant concerns that must be addressed.

In response to the apparent institutional and bureaucratic shortcomings of the then-uncoordinated approach to stabilization efforts, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)\textsuperscript{S} was created by Congressional authorization in July 2004 and confirmed by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44)\textsuperscript{25} signed on 8 December 2005. S/CRS’s official mission statement is clear and straightforward: “To lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”\textsuperscript{26}

The 70-person office is significantly and currently engaged in interagency assessments and planning on Nepal, Haiti, Sudan, Chad, Cuba, Kosovo, Iraq, Lebanon and Zimbabwe, in addition to two classified contingency plans.\textsuperscript{27} Elements of the S/CRS Active Reserve and Standby Reserve are deployed to Lebanon and Nepal. S/CRS was created to organize and prioritize our response to the tragedy of failed states that have shown the propensity, e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq, to devolve to terrorist safe havens. In recent years, it has been recognized that responses to conflict and disorder must engage multiple players across USG agencies and that fundamental change must be the objective in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Assisting other states is not squandering money; indeed the spending is a cost-effective and rational process to ensure order in the face of potential chaos.

NSPD-44 was presaged by a May 1997 Clinton Administration initiative. That Administration delivered Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled \textit{The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations}.\textsuperscript{28} According to the accompanying white paper, PDD 56 sought to address coordination and planning operations. Unfortunately PDD-56’s provisions were never implemented in any formal sense.\textsuperscript{29} The Clinton Administration also issued PDD-71, the white paper for which described a proposal regarding the provision of international civilian police forces, providing guidelines to enhance civilian support for peace operations.\textsuperscript{30} That PDD was not implemented by the Clinton Administration; however, the Bush Administration has used its principles.\textsuperscript{31}

President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-44, replacing PDD-56 of the Clinton Administration. NSPD-44 was written in part to resolve chain-of-command issues between the Departments of State and Defense that clouded our earlier efforts in Iraq,
i.e., LTG (Ret.) Jay Garner’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and those of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer who led the Coalition Provisional Authority. Both organizations reported to Office of the Secretary of Defense, not the Department of State. Specifically, NSPD-44 sets as its goal for S/CRS: “To promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance ... targeting foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”

NSPD-44 set out that it is the Department of State that shall effect interagency policy at the level of the Secretary through the coordination of the S/CRS - “The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities,” and, further, that “the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operation across the spectrum of conflict.” The objective here was to integrate and rationalize USG’s disparate stabilization and reconstruction programs. Specifically, it sought to synchronize military and civilian programs. The need for this was noted during John Hamre’s (President and CEO for the Center for Strategic and International Studies) 3 March 2004 testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations.

NSPD-44, in order to rationalize and coordinate S/CRS activities, established a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, co-chaired by S/CRS and the NSC. An Implementation Working Group is established, reporting to the Stabilization and Reconstruction Policy Coordinating Committee as well as to the Deputies. The working group is comprised of three subgroups addressing Surge Capacity, Framework and Process, and Operational Models to provide the Deputies a clear and comprehensive understanding of short-, medium- and long-term implementation of NSPD-44. This process identifies existing capacity and shortfalls and the priorities that must be met to ensure civilian agencies partner with the military effectively for stability and reconstruction activities.

Under Surge Capacity, the Deputies receive options for deployment of assets and support assistance to failed/failing states. Implicit in this analysis is the presentation of options that have viability in the interagency context, options that we reasonably can expect to employ effectively. Under Framework and Process, the decisions are taken regarding integrated planning for conflict transformation. Under Operational Models, the interagency processes are established for successfully meeting the objective of effective stabilization and reconstruction operations.
S/CRS has concentrated on NSPD-44 deliverables set out in the presidential directive paper. The office has distilled those deliverables as: Preparation of an integrated, cross-disciplinary set of planning and assessment metrics; Development of operational models that integrate the management system for responses; Long-term crisis response, scenario-based “triggers” for government-wide incident response; Identification of new surge programs; A strategy for training and equipping sympathetic target-country domestic players; and Setting out the requirements for systemic analysis of required supportive legislation and budget needs.39

This mandate received the support of the military. In his prepared statement for testimony before Congress in February 2005, General Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the creation of S/CRS “an important step … helping post-conflict nations achieve peace, democracy and a sustainable market economy … in the future, provided this office is given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts … applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations.”40 Similarly, S/CRS, despite some Congressional reservations about funding of the office, received the support of a task force headed by two former Congressmen, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell. In its June 2005 report, the Task Force on the United Nations recommended that the United States engage S/CRS expertise and that Congress should fund its coordination with the United Nations.41

The NSPD-44, replacing earlier mandates, is a bit more proscriptive concerning the relationship between S/CRS interagency coordination and the responsibilities of other executive departments and agencies to support stabilization and reconstruction activities and those agencies’ requirements with their limited resources. Among the responsibilities to be coordinated by S/CRS are to:42

- Develop and approve strategies to support foreign states at risk or in transition from conflict or civil war;
- Ensure program and policy coordination among USG agencies and compliance with applicable law;
- Provide USG decision makers an integrated-response options set to include recommendation on when to establish a PCC-level group for focus on specific problem states;
- Coordinate USG responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense, ensuring harmonization with military operations, including peacekeeping missions; develop guiding precepts and implementation practices for reconstruction and stabilization compatible with military efforts and doctrine;
• Coordinate activities with foreign countries, regional and international organizations to include NGOs;
• Build preventive strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations;
• Work with expatriate and foreign communities to develop relevant ties where reconstruction efforts may prove necessary;
• Develop partnership security capacity abroad, seeking to maximize NGO and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization;
• Prepare USG for a strong civilian surge capability by analyzing, formulating and recommending necessary additional authorities to ensure that we have a sufficient civilian reserve and response capability to respond quickly and effectively.
• Resolve relevant policy, fund and program disputes among USG Departments and Agencies.
• As needed, identify appropriate issues for resolution through the NSC interagency process in accordance with NSPD-1.

S/CRS is a lean organization designed to coordinate across agencies without necessarily assuming command and control responsibilities in all applications of NSPD-44. S/CRS has actively sought personnel from other agencies to fill its positions in order to facilitate this process. S/CRS is currently staffed with personnel from, in addition to State and USAID, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Forces Command. Under the Presidential Directive, the Secretary of State charges the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and his Deputy with responsibility for early warning and prevention, planning, best practices and concomitant sectoral coordination, and resource management for the response strategies. The office has identified a cyclical phase for conflict prevention and mitigation. Key to the effort is prevention, the identification of impending crises and their avoidance. Should that fail, the office foresees, in turn, conflict management (outbreak of violence); post crisis (preventing renewed conflict through peace building reconstruction and stabilization); and, monitoring/encouraging a stable peace to prevent renewed or new conflict.

The office’s objective or goal is to “reach the stage at which the means and motivations for conflict are sufficiently diminished and local institutional capacity is sufficiently strengthened to allow international actors to pass the lead to local actors without the country falling back into conflict.” The objective in all of this is to ensure that supportive, credible local authorities are in charge and that the efforts of the foreign assistance providers are increasingly less necessary.
S/CRS has drawn up a comprehensive list of “Essential Tasks” for post-conflict reconstruction as a score card/roadmap for S/CRS efforts. The Essential Tasks are grouped in five categories. Among the areas of interest:

- **Security**: disposition of armed and other security forces, intelligence services and belligerents; territorial security; public order and safety; protection of infrastructure; protection of reconstruction and stabilization personnel and institutions; security coordination, and public information and communications.

- **Governance and Participation**: national constituting processes; transitional governance; executive authority; legislative strengthening; local governance; transparency and anti-corruption; elections; political parties; public information and communication.

- **Humanitarian and Social Well-Being**: refugees and internally displaced persons; trafficking in persons; food security; humanitarian de-mining; public health; education; public information and communications.

- **Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure**: monetary policy; fiscal policy and governance; financial sector; debt; trade; legal and regulatory reform; agricultural development; transportation; telecommunications; energy; public information and communications.

- **Justice and Reconciliation**: criminal just system; indigenous police; judicial personnel and infrastructure; legal system reform; human rights; corrections; war crime courts and tribunals; truth commissions and remembrance; community rebuilding.

S/CRS developed this list from the “Joint CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict reconstruction Task Force Framework.” It is a comprehensive document establishing benchmarks for Initial Response (short-term), Transformation (mid-term), and Fostering Sustainability (long-term) for each of the subcategories to the five major technical sectors. According to the authors of this “living” document, “Many tasks are cross-cutting and require plans to reference other sectors. While we have cross-referenced some of the tasks in the matrix, we have intentionally limited the cross-referencing in order to avoid creating a cumbersome planning tool. As a result, users of the framework should review tasks in other sectors to ensure issues are considered comprehensively. With experience, we trust future updates will address the interrelationships more elegantly.”
Partners in Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts

S/CRS does not act in an international vacuum. Former NATO Secretary General and Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, spoke to the European Parliament on March 29, 2007, outlining the need for greater EU efforts in stability operations.\textsuperscript{49} Follows are the state actors who have signed on board in partnership for S/CRS and USG efforts:\textsuperscript{50}

- The United Kingdom has established, in supplement to its Department for International Development (DFID) affairs, a PCRU (Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit);
- Canada has deployed a START (Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce);
- Australia has a Fragile States Unit;
- Denmark and Finland have enhanced their stabilization and reconstruction leadership capabilities, e.g., Denmark is a partner in the Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team;
- The United Nations created a Peace Building Commission to improve UN/Donor coordination;
- The European Union set aside more than $600 million for 2007 for coordination, early warning and prevention of conflict operations - also there is a new European Constabulary organization in the design phase;
- The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Regional Banks are gearing their procedures and practices to accommodate conflict resolution efforts;
- The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is pursuing the creation of a standing unit of stabilization police;
- For training, multinational civil-military affairs exercises have included eight countries with NATO, UN and EU, as observers.

Neither does S/CRS act in a domestic vacuum. Two sets of organizations are set out for consideration: Agencies in general and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in particular. Regarding the first, NSPD-44 is quite specific: To enable the Secretary of State to carry out the responsibilities in this directive and to support stabilization and reconstruction activities and requirements with necessary resources, “Executive Departments and Agencies . will:
• Coordinate with S/CRS during budget formulation prior to budget submission to OMB (Office of Management and Budget);
• Identify, develop, and provide the Coordinator with relevant information on capabilities and assets.
• Develop internal capacity for planning, resource and program management critical to crisis mobilization.
• Identify within each agency current and former civilian employees skilled in crisis response, including all contract personnel.
• Identify situations of concern for action and contingency plans to coordinate USG response for a responsive and effective international reconstruction and stabilization effort.
• Designate agency leads as points of contact for relevant task forces.
• Make personnel available on a non-reimbursable basis to work as part of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization with the objective of rationalizing inter-Departmental assignments to increase interoperability. 51

With respect to OSD, NSPD-44 calls for "coordination between the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense… to integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans."52 The document was meant to clarify lead and responsibility for "any given contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, "53 and cites NSPD-1 as the controlling document describing leads and responsibilities for transitions.54 As mentioned above, NSPD-44 also established a Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The Committee is chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. However, nothing in NSPD-44 is to be construed as 1) affecting the authority of the Office of Management and Budget, or 2) limiting or altering the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the Armed Forces’ command relationships.55

There is some confusion regarding funding streams for S/CRS and its financial relationship to Defense.56 The first session of the 109th Congress moved to fund S/CRS and its activities modestly. It set aside $7.7 million ($17.2 million had been requested in the FY2005 supplemental appropriations request (H.R.1268, P.L. 109-13)). The FY 2006 request was for $24.1 million to fund new S/CRS in-house positions and to set up a 100-person ready response corps. Congress turned down the Administration’s FY 2006 separate request for $100 million for a Conflict Response Fund. Notwithstanding that, Congress approved transfer permission for Defense to earmark up to $100 million for Department of State reconstruction operations.57 For
FY 2007, State requested $75 million for a Civilian Rapid Response program and an additional $100 million in transfer authority from Department of Defense. State has calculated the “payoff” from the investment in civilian reconstruction as the equivalent (given S/CRS replacement of military operations) of $7.2 billion for each six months that U.S. division-sized elements are replaced by State operations. In an example of civilian peacekeeping benefits, S/CRS cites U.S. savings of $140 million in the Congo (MONCU) and $108 million in Liberia (UNMIL) peacekeeping operations. Savings to our peacekeeping partners were proportionally greater given the minority financial status USG invested in those multilateral efforts.

Department of Defense Initiatives in Reconstruction and Stabilization Planning

Despite the presumed clarity in NSPD-44, some confusion remains regarding chain of command/responsibility issues. DoD Directive 3000.05 sets out a detailed agenda for military support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. The document defines SSTR activities, establishes policy and cites within DoD, specific elements charged with the conduct and support of stability operations. Noting that “many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals” the Directive states that, nonetheless, “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. The Directive also describes stability operations as a “core” military mission with the same priority given to combat operations. Among the stability operations, DoD cites rebuilding security forces; establishing correctional facilities and judicial systems; rebuilding of the private sector; and developing institutions of government as essential tasks to be undertaken, if not by civilian authorities, then by the U.S. military. DoD sees itself as a promoter of military-civilian teams which are critical for stability operations and prepared to lead and support military-civilian teams in the field. Membership in the teams is “open” to representatives from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, International Organizations, NGOs and private sector participants who are properly trained and skilled. Considering the S/CRS efforts, DoD calls for the sharing of assistance and advice exchanged the Department of State and other appropriate Departments and Agencies, in order to mutually develop stability operations capabilities. The Directive, however, does not concede primary authority to the Department of State as set out in NSPD-44.

Within Directive 3000.5, SecDef has charged that his organization’s under secretaries and assistant secretaries, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inter alia “shall”: 
• Develop SSTR policy options for SecDef.
• Coordinate DoD interaction with the Department of State’s S/CRS or “successor organization.”
• Speak for SecDef in discussions on stability operations policy with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.
• Identify DoD-wide stability operations, capabilities and recommend priorities to the SecDef.
• Develop a list semiannually of potential areas for U.S. military stability operations in consultation with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies.
• In accordance with the requirements of Sections 113 and 153 of title 10 United States Code, incorporate contingency plans in the strategic guidance plans SecDef provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
• Staff a stability operations center for coordination of lessons learned, education and training.
• Facilitate information sharing as appropriate among DoD Components, contributing U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, NGOs and members of the private sector.
• Develop DoD intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities sufficient to support stability operations; ensure the availability of that intelligence to commanders.
• Identify and train suitable responders for stability operations and ensure those personnel are developing requirements in accordance with DoD Directive 1322.18, “Military Training,” September 2004.
• Develop an on-call cadre by the recruitment, selection and assignment of current and former DoD personnel for stability operations.
• Prepare personnel by scheduling tours of duty with appropriate non-DoD programs; and encourage the study of foreign languages and cultures.
• Encourage other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and NGOs to participate in DoD stability operations training.
• Develop pre-conflict indicators of potential instability.
• Ensure that measures of effectiveness are in place and that commanders can contract civilian support rapidly and with accountability.62

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “shall”:
• Assess the development of stability operations;
• Develop, in coordination with appropriate DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign government and members of the private sector, stability operations joint doctrine.
• Provide for appropriate joint military training and venues in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.  

The Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands “shall,” through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
• Assign a qualified military officer as the Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations to plan joint stability operations.
• That officer will set out stability requirements; incorporate appropriate training for exercises, including intelligence support; and, engage the interagency community, NGOs and private sector representatives for coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  

The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:
• Develop new stability operations concepts and capabilities as a part of a joint and experimental program.
• Develop organizational and operational concepts for the military-civilian teams.
• Identify model approaches to stability operations.
• Ensure that assigned USJFCOM forces are properly trained for stability operations.

The Secretaries of Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, “shall”:
• Develop operational capabilities and appoint a senior officer to supervise stability operations initiatives.
• Ensure suitable training curriculum.
• Ensure Foreign Area officers are properly trained before deployment.
• Support concept development, experimentation and capability development for stability operations. 

SSTR responsibilities for DoD are laid out in detail in Directive 3000. The Directive goes to great length (as excerpted and shown above) in listing the particulars for security, local governance, infrastructure development and general economic activity. What remains unclear, however, is the precise relationship between DoD Directive 3000.05 and the Department of State’s responsibilities as set out in NSPD-44. Many of the tasks outlined, in
fact, appear to overlap. The Directive speaks to “military-civilian” teams, activities and efforts. For example, it states that “Military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operation tool. The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams … Assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.”

While there is some tension between the Directive and NSPD-44, they are not necessarily in clear, open conflict. NSPD-44 assigns to SecState the responsibility to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts …” for stability and reconstruction. However, the enumerated paragraphs following indicate that “coordinate and lead” is not to be read as a whole, that to coordinate is one responsibility and to lead is another and that under different circumstances the Secretary will exercise one or the other responsibility. This interpretation is supported by the section entitled Coordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. There, it specifies that “lead and supporting responsibilities for Agencies and Departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1”, i.e., through the National Security Council system. Bottom line: the DoD Directive implies that DoD will take the lead; NSPD-44 appears to confer that responsibility on SecState. The issue remains murky. Currently, S/CRS is not involved in major activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, as these operations were ongoing when the office was created. And current areas where S/CRS is deployed do not involve major military efforts. But, the raison d’être for the office is coordination in joint efforts. The current unclear linkages between DoD and S/CRS efforts leave future efforts too vulnerable to manipulation by strong personalities, particularly in DoD with its much greater resources, immense and complex planning processes, and, in a post conflict period, the clear lead “on the ground.”

Conclusion

The Iraq experience has, thus far, demonstrated to the current administration the requirement for coordinated interagency efforts in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The first steps have been prepared in NSDD-44 and DoD Directive 3000.05. Unfortunately those documents are not fully complementary, and lines of authority, control and coordination must be further defined for clarity in future operations. Funding for reconstruction efforts suffers from the same lack of clarity. Continued focus and support from the President and the NSC, is required as the fledgling S/CRS office shapes the outline of future interagency coordination in this vital area of national security.
Endnotes


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 LTG (Ret.) John H. Cushman, “Planning and Early Execution of the War in Iraq: An Assessment of Military Participation,” paper written for the Program on Information Resources Policy (PIRP) at Harvard University, 14 January 2007, provided with permission of the PIRP for posting to the Army War College website.

6 Ibid., 16.


9 Cushman, 17.


11 Cushman. P. 19.


13 Ibid, 16.


15 Cushman, 18.

16 Ibid., 19-20.

17 Ibid., 19.


27 Lona Stall S/CRS briefing.


Cushman, 16.

NSPD-44., 2.

Ibid, 3.


NSPD-44., 4.

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Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 109th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 February 2005., 31.


NSPD-44, excerpted, 2-5.


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Ibid., 4.

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NSPD-44., 4.


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Ibid., excerpted, 3 and 4.

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Ibid., 9 and 10.

Ibid., 9, 10, 11.

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NSPD-44, 2.

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