THE GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT – ARE WE FINALLY THERE?

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The Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) was passed into law over twenty one years ago. Initially it was met with tremendous resistance by the services. The resistance has continued over the years but has been restricted primarily to the realm of Joint Officer Management (JOM). The guidance and oversight concerned with JOM in GNA and follow on legislation has long been an area where Congress felt ignored and the Department of Defense (DoD) felt micromanaged. Over time the situation has definitely improved. There is now a culture of joint awareness within DoD that nurtures unification efforts. No one can argue the effect unification has had regarding combat power. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and the joint acculturation that occurs while serving in joint duty assignments (JDA) has resulted in operating in a unified manner. It is very rare to see a service component operate unilaterally in today’s joint environment. The focus within DoD on joint operations and joint command and control has become the standard. The new focus is to work within coalitions, multinationally, and among the interagency. We assume this is because we have fully met the vision of GNA but are we really there yet?
THE GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT – ARE WE FINALLY THERE?

In the more than twenty years since the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) passed into law, numerous studies have been commissioned, conducted, and reported throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress. The aim of these studies was to determine the efficacy and legitimacy of the legislation as well as progress toward “Jointness” within the Department. Jointness, in this context, is the ability to determine the most appropriate weapon system and weapon delivery platform with a non-Service bias enabling the Combatant Command Commander (CCDR) to conduct decisive direct and indirect action while minimizing collateral damage. In other words, Jointness is the ability for DoD to do the right thing with the right assets at the right time in the right place seamlessly and without regard to historic norms or service bias.

The man credited as the catalyst for the reform legislated by GNA is General David Jones. In 1982 during a closed session to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) General Jones, in the capacity of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, “The system is broken. I have tried to reform it from inside, but I cannot. Congress is going to have to mandate necessary reforms”.1 Another of the biggest proponents of DoD reform was Admiral James Crowe. In 1985, Admiral Crowe, a follow on Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was able to subtly push for reform despite the official Pentagon position opposing such reform.2 Later, in his memoirs, Admiral Crowe admitted, “The detailed legislation that mandated every aspect of the ‘Joint Corps’ from the selection process and the number of billets to promotion requirement was…a serious mistake that threatened a horrendous case of congressional micromanagement.”3 He got the reform he was looking for but he had little control over the orchestration of the reform. The micro-management he was referring to is contained primarily within Title IV of GNA. Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy, legislated dramatic changes to the administration of the DoD’s officer corps in an effort to ensure a more unified approach to defense strategy and employment. Needless to say; in 1986 this concept was met with mixed reactions within the DoD.

The passage of GNA, and subsequent changes made by the DoD through its implementation, has resulted in an integrated combat power unbeatable in today’s operating environment.4 Additionally, continuing advances in battlespace awareness and command and control allow the CCDR to employ the best fit for the situation with little influence from Service Component bias. Given the aforementioned considerations it is easy to accept the success of the GNA and DoD’s compliance. The DoD can proudly proclaim, “We are a Jointly integrated
multi-Service Department.” This proclamation is certainly close to being true when considering the Active Component (AC). The four services AC are educated and conditioned to accept a joint operating environment not only as the norm but as the desired, or more correctly stated, preferred method of employment by the CCDR’s. This conditioning is reinforced by the numerous successful joint operations conducted since the enactment of GNA. Where the aforementioned statement is not yet 100% true is in relation to Title IV.

Title IV of the GNA has been codified in Chapter 38 (Joint Officer Management) of Title X, U.S. Code, sections 661 – 668. Many updates to the original law have been made since its inception in an attempt to facilitate DoD’s ability to comply in a reasonable manner while maintaining Congress’ original intent. The following excerpt summarizes the personnel management requirements enacted by GNA (adjustments to law in italics):

Established an occupational category, referred to as the “joint specialty,” for the management of officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint matters.

Provided that joint specialty officers (JSOs) shall be selected by the Secretary of Defense from nominees submitted by Service Secretaries.

Required that an officer may not be selected for the joint specialty until he/she completes a joint education program and full joint tour.

Required that 50 percent of joint duty positions in grades above captain/Navy lieutenant be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected for the joint specialty.

Directed the Secretary of Defense to designate at least 1,000 (now 800) critical joint duty assignments (JDAs) that must always be filled with joint specialty officers.

Required the Secretary of Defense to establish career guidelines for JSOs.

Required, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that all officers promoted to general or flag rank must attend an education course (“CAPSTONE”) on working with the other services.

Required all JSOs and a high proportion of other officers (50 percent plus one) who graduated from a joint school to be assigned immediately to a joint duty position.

Prescribed, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that joint duty tours shall be at least 3 (2) years in length for general and flag officers and at least 3 ¼ (3) years in length for other officers.

Required the Secretary of Defense to exclude joint training assignments and assignments within the military departments from the definition of “joint duty assignments.”
Specified that each promotion board, subject to waiver for the Marine Corps, that will consider officers who have served in JDAs include at least one joint duty officer designated (as a board member) by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

Established the following promotion review process for officers who are serving, or who have served, in joint duty assignments:

- Requires the Secretary of Defense to furnish to the Service Secretaries guidelines to ensure that promotion boards give appropriate consideration to joint performance;

- Directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review promotion board reports before they are submitted to the Secretary of Defense;

- Authorizes the Service Secretaries, if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determines that a promotion board acted contrary to the Secretary of Defense’s guidelines, to return the report to the promotion board (or a subsequent promotion board) for further proceedings, convene a special board, or take other appropriate actions;

- Directs the Secretary of Defense to take appropriate action to resolve any remaining disagreement between a Service Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to JDAs (to include JSOs not serving in JDAs) are such that the average promotion rates of their service will be achieved or exceeded.

Required, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that no officer may be promoted to general or flag rank unless he/she has served in a JDA.

Required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the joint duty performance of officers recommended for three- and four-star rank.

Required the Secretary of Defense to advise the President of the United States on the qualifications needed by officers to serve in three- and four-star positions.\(^5\)

Title IV also addresses safeguards to ensure equitable promotion rates for officers serving in the joint arena, reporting requirements to Congress, waiver authority, joint education requirements, and a requirement to create similar policies for officers not on the active duty list or Reservists.\(^6\)

Sections 662 and 665 of Title IV focus on the safeguarding and management of officer careers who are involved in joint work. Section 662 requires officers who have served in the joint staff to be promoted at the same rate of a parallel officer serving in the component’s headquarters staff. This section was written this way to help encourage the services to send their most competitive officers to the joint staff rather than keeping them for the service component staffs. What had been happening prior to GNA was the services would keep their
top performers for themselves and send their poorer performers to the joint staff and unified commands. As a result these commands were to be avoided by a service member or the member risked his own career’s future viability.\textsuperscript{7} Section 665 assigns oversight responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure compliance with section 662. Unfortunately, services have continued, on occasion, to use the criteria of “Best and Fully Qualified” to place service component bias above the requirement to select officers in accordance with the requirements as set forth in section 662.\textsuperscript{8} This tactic has met with decreasing success over time.

The reporting requirements and waiver authority have seen the most legislative change since the initial drafting of GNA. These changes to the law were intended to constrain the services to the point that it was too difficult to continue managing their officer corps in the grey area of GNA that allowed for service component bias and comply with Congress’ intent of creating a unified, joint educated officer corps within the various service components. There is a growing pool of unified, joint educated officers within each of the service components. What is not clear is whether the legislation precipitated this result or, as some would argue, whether the officers of the various services began to see the value in joint service, acculturation, and education; and changed from within.\textsuperscript{9} The reason does not really matter however. What matters is the change in perspective has occurred and the intent of GNA is finally being approached by the service components.

One of the key administrative tools which have made joint employment and acculturation possible is the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). The JDAL is the culmination of the vetting of billets assigned to the Secretary of Defense Staff, the Joint Staff, CCDR’s and the Defense Agencies to determine which positions deal with joint matters. Those billets in the JDAL determined to be critical require a JSO designated officer to fill the billet. As previously indicated, originally there was a requirement to have 1,000 of these critical billets. Later the number was reduced to 800.\textsuperscript{10} The reduction was in reaction to the services indicating their inability to field 1,000 JSO’s on a consistent basis. In the past, another managing technique of the services was to shift critical coded billets, those that required a JSO to fill them, from a more senior billet to a junior one. This shift would allow the commander to place the correct leadership in the staff (in his opinion) without regard to the JSO requirement while maintaining the same number of JSO’s filling critical billets in the staff. This allowed for greater leeway in officer management for the services. The tightening of the law combined with the joint acculturation that has occurred, not just with the service members but also with the service
components over the past twenty plus years, has resulted in a desire to create a pool of joint
c savvy officers across all components to support worldwide contingencies.11

A joint education requirement was also created in GNA. Joint education is required for
officers to become JSO’s. The joint education requirement can either be; intermediate (O-3 or
O-4), senior (O-5 or O-6), or capstone (O-7) level depending on the billet. Joint Professional
Military Education (JPME) is currently taught at five levels; Pre-commissioning, Entry level,
JPME Phase I, JPME Phase II, and CAPSTONE.12 Pre-commissioning JPME is taught in the
service academies, ROTC, and OCS. Entry level JPME is taught in the primary service PME
courses. JPME Phase I is taught at the services command and staff colleges, the Navy Post
Graduate School, and select international service colleges. JPME Phase II, as a stand alone
course, is taught exclusively at the Joint Force Staff College. Recent legislative changes
authorized the senior service colleges to begin teaching JPME Phase II as a portion of their
curriculum commencing in academic year 2007-2008.13 To meet the timeline of teaching a
certified JPME Phase II curriculum in the 2007-2008 academic year the senior service colleges
had to redesign their curriculum in time to teach the 2006-2007 students. These students’
learning experience will be the basis for the JPME Phase II certification through the Process for
Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE).14 Three schools within the National Defense University
organization teach both JPME Phase I and II, commonly referred to as full JPME (now known
as single phase JPME)15, as a part of their curriculum. These schools are; the National War
College (NWC), the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the Joint Advanced
Warfighting School (JAWS). NWC and ICAF are restricted to pay grade O-5/O-6 and JAWS is
designed for pay grade O-4/O-5. Work is being done to incorporate JPME into the entire officer
education continuum as well as the senior enlisted professional military education. All services
emphasize JPME as an integral part of a leader’s career progression. In 2005, the Navy was
the final service to make this emphasis by tying intermediate JPME to a career milestone (O-5
CDR Command screening commencing with the Fiscal Year 2009 Selection Board16) as a
prerequisite.

The requirement to create similar policies for officers not on the active duty list comes
from section 666 of GNA. With the exception of a few Active Guard and Reserve (or in the case
of the Navy, Full Time Support) (AGR/FTS) members serving in joint billets, all of the
aforementioned items are specific to the AC. GNA does require a similar process be developed
for the RC but with the exception of what is to be described below, until Fiscal Year 2007,
nothing substantial had been developed. A Joint Duty Assignment List, Reserve (JDAR) has
been referred to as a concept but has yet to be developed.17 The JDAR would maintain a list of
billets within the various Selected Reserve and National Guard Units that directly support OSD, the Joint Staff, CCDRs, and the Defense Agencies and have similar experience and educational requirements as the same billet on the JDAL. The JSO designation is restricted to the AC. In 2001, Congress set forth a pilot program in the Joint Force Staff College (JFSC) wherein RC officers could begin to receive Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME). The course, also referred to as AJPME, consists of thirty eight (38) weeks of blended learning curriculum. The blended learning includes self study, web based instruction using a technology known as blackboard, and two face to face (f2f) in residence periods. Blackboard allows students to come and go from a virtual classroom and participate in the class via a chat room style interaction by leaving postings on a given subject for the professor and other students to respond or add their own comments. The two f2f’s are structured so the cohort of students will travel to the JFSC to interact in a traditional seminar and war game environment. After approximately one third of the curriculum, the first f2f occurs. It is four days long and allows the cohort to put faces to names and continue a more in depth joint acculturation. The second f2f is two weeks in duration and is used as a final battle problem capstone at the end of the course. The legislation requiring the development of the course ultimately known as AJPME was the first real step toward compliance with GNA Sec. 666. More recent legislation, the operational employment tempo (OPTEMPO) since 911 and the use of the RC in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has reemphasized the importance of a total force solution.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there appears to be renewed interest in the progress of GNA and its progress in the operational unification of the DoD. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (NDAA FY 2002) started a series of studies and follow on legislation which has dramatically modified the structure, but not intent, of GNA. NDAA FY 2002 required an independent study be conducted to determine the effectiveness of joint officer management (JOM) and JPME in the context of standing joint task forces. The company Booz, Allen, Hamilton was awarded the contract. Booz, Allen, Hamilton determined the JOM and JPME construct as legislated in GNA was still valid in many aspects but that legislative change would need to follow recommendations made by the services after the services had exhausted all options available to them under the current law. Specific recommendations made by Booz, Allen, Hamilton were:

- DoD develop a more focused, real list of critical JDAs that can and must be supported to ensure operational effectiveness within the joint environment;
- Experience from Joint Task Force (JTF) employment should count toward JSO qualification;
The timing of JTF service and JPME is not critical and therefore should not be legislated. What should remain legislated is that service and education are necessary to be a JSO;

The requirement for one half of JDAs to be filled by JSOs is arbitrary and analysis should be completed to determine if a ratio is required;

Likewise the 800 critical JDAs is an arbitrary number and analysis needs to be completed to determine if a concrete number is required and if so what the number should be;

There is no reason for critical JDAs to be a fixed percentage of JDAs on joint headquarters staffs;

The requirement for percentage of fill in the flag and general officer ranks in critical JDAs should not be changed;

Promotion rates comparisons should continue and JSOs serving in other joint duties need to be reported as well;

JPME II in JFSC is a bottleneck and other venues such as teaching JPME II at the senior service colleges should be investigated;

JPME II should be taught in residence only;

Graduates of JPME II should be expected to do more than one follow on tour in a JDA or critical JDA and be groomed for joint leadership positions including positions in JTFs. Graduates should be assigned to JDAs immediately following the education to maximize the skills learned to the maximum extent possible;

Endorses the full JPME curriculum taught in the NDU schools as most desired;

Distance learning programs should only include JPME I and lower courses not JPME II;

In addition to JPME, functional skills training needs to be developed to prepare all serving in unified staffs and JTFs for their positions. Distance learning lends itself to this type of 'as needed' skills training.20

Additionally, this report identified the growing reality that DoD working in a unified manner was being built upon in the post 911 operating environment. JTFs were the norm and a growing number of Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) were being developed. The ad hoc nature of both JTFs and JIATFs were resulting in more junior and more non-uniformed personnel becoming involved which will require access to joint education in demographics not previously addressed in GNA.21 This report was pivotal in the future treatment of JOM and JPME issues.
All future reports and legislation use it as a cornerstone, or entering argument, for their actions and recommendations.

Two months after Booz Allen Hamilton commenced their study to investigate JOM and JPME, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was commissioned to conduct an independent study initially funded by the Smith-Richardson Foundation. The title of the report is *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* (BG-N), Phase 1 Report. It is the first of three reports that have been published by CSIS under this subject. The BG-N Phase 1 report was published in March 2004. Its entering argument assumes the success of GNA and is meant to address the question “What next?” from a national security strategy/defense reform perspective.22

Funding for BG-N Phase 2 was provided by Congress via the Fiscal Year 2004 appropriations bill for the Defense Department. The scope of BG-N Phase 2 differed from Phase 1 in that its analysis of GNA acknowledged how significantly the world had changed since the conditions which precipitated GNA existed and that there was a need to evolve National Security strategy and policy to support current and future national security needs. As such, the first half of the report focuses on national security and policy making from the broader interagency perspective vice interdepartmental (defense) as GNA did. The second half of the report focused on DoD.23 In this second half of the report, BG-N Phase 2 analyzes the Joint Officer Management System (JOMS) and JPME. During this analysis, BG-N Phase 2 acknowledges the previously discussed Booz Allen Hamilton report of 2003 and the fact that Congress already recognizes that JOM has shortcomings that must be addressed as described in the NDAA FY 2005. NDAA FY 2005 will be discussed in greater detail below. Regarding JOM, BG-N Phase 2 makes four recommendations:

- Expand the scope of what types of service can qualify for joint credit, e.g. JTF, interagency, multi-national, etc.;
- Identify and publish the capabilities or competencies required in a joint officer;
- Make the aforementioned competencies and joint service trackable to allow the correct skills to be utilized when identifying roles of greater responsibility;
- Proposed the potential for a “purple” uniform and joint promotion boards.24

BG-N Phase 2 also makes four recommendations regarding JPME:

- Carry out the CJCS vision as described in CJCSI 1800.01B (Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)) of August 2004;
- Establish a Virtual Joint University which will help facilitate the success of the first recommendation;
• Change the scope of the senior service schools to focus on teaching vice research and only send those who are selected to fill future leadership positions. To ensure return on investment require a five year service obligation from all who attend;

• Convert NDU into the National Security University which will facilitate an inter-agency focus.\textsuperscript{25}

The BG-N Phase 3 report, \textit{The Future of the National Guard and Reserves}, was published in July 2006 and funded by Congress through the Fiscal Year 2005 appropriations bill for the Defense Department. The content of this report does not add to the discussion of this paper and is listed for continuity purposes only.

As previously mentioned, NDAA FY 2005 required a report to Congress by January 2006 that included a plan that addressed JOM and JPME and demonstrated how DoD would ensure it met the requirements to fully support the national military strategy.\textsuperscript{26} This report was published, as the \textit{CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development}, in November 2005. It discusses a vision where a large pool of “Fully Joint Qualified” officers are able to work in a joint or service leadership or staff position seamlessly.\textsuperscript{27} They are “\textit{skilled joint warfighters}, who are also \textit{strategically minded, critical thinkers}.”\textsuperscript{28} JPME will become a lifelong continuum of education which will help facilitate inherently joint colonels/captains.\textsuperscript{29} The CJCS vision, although sweeping in its approach to joint acculturation and qualification, did not produce an actual plan as directed in NDAA FY 2005 Sec. 531. The vision did indicate the DoD was going to create inherently joint officers who work in the joint world throughout their career so jointness will become the standard by which all service members are measured. The NDAA FY 2005 plan criteria appeared to be influenced by the recommendations of the Booz Allen Hamilton report and the CSIS BG-N Phase 2 report. It required an assessment of all of the quantitative reporting aspects of GNA, like the requirement to track and report promotions rates amongst joint officers, and also requires the plan address the feasibility of written testing in NDU and allowing an increased number of civilians to attend NDU.\textsuperscript{30}

The NDAA FY 2005 had other significant changes designed to improve JOM and JPME. Section 531(c) specifically requires the aforementioned strategic plan be developed that is inclusive of the RC. This requirement is the first legislation that specifically reinforces the GNA since the creation of AJPME in NDAA FY 2002. Section 532 creates a completely new chapter, chapter 107, in Title 10 which overhauls the entire JPME construct. Specifically it:

• States JPME must, at a minimum, include national military strategy, joint planning at all levels of war, joint doctrine, joint command and control, and joint force and joint requirements development;
• Requires new flag and general officer to attend a capstone course. There is a waiver process included which is to be administered by the Secretary of Defense;
• Codifies a three phase approach to JPME which includes the previously mentioned JPME Phase I, Phase II, and Capstone course which must be completed in sequence and as of September 30, 2009 no waivers for JPME Phase I will be authorized except in extreme cases.
• Specifically designates the senior service colleges as authorized to teach JPME Phase II;
• Requires JPME Phase II curriculum include national security strategy, theater strategy and planning, joint planning processes and systems, and joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities in addition to the aforementioned subject areas;
• Stipulates the student and faculty ratios in a JPME Phase II program must not exceed sixty percent host service and the other services must have proportional representation;
• Reduces the minimum course length in the JFSC form 12 weeks to 10 weeks;
• Modifies the annual report to Congress by requiring the number of officers who have completed JPME Phase II but were not promoted and the student and teacher ratios at the various service schools. These reports are inclusive of the RC.
• Clarifies the joint requirements for promotion to flag/general officer. The deadline for the JSO prerequisite was extended to September 30, 2008.
• Extended the waiver authority to December 31, 2006 for officers to have significant joint duty experience prior to their selection as a reserve chief or guard director.31

NDAA FY 2005 appeared to be a concerted effort to make the jointness requirements more realistic and reflected the willingness of Congress to use recommendations by those they commission to do studies. Although the CJCS vision fell short of an actual plan as directed by Congress, many working groups throughout the services and the joint staff worked to develop the plan as directed.32

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (NDAA FY 2007) has the potential of providing the remaining legislation required to complete the vision of a unified DoD the formers of GNA had some twenty one years ago. Coincidentally, it also relaxes the micro-management and oversight to a level that is probably closer to what ADM Crowe had in mind when he endorsed the reform in 1985.33 The NDAA FY 2007 fine tunes the JOM
process by replacing three fifths of Sec 661 and removing the term “joint specialty”. Specific changes are:

- Direction to create levels of joint qualification wherein each level contains both joint education and experience criteria;
- The number and level of joint officers will be determined by the Secretary of Defense, not Congress;
- The designation of Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) replaces the JSO as the standard and as such opens the qualification to the RC. The criteria for being designated JQO if the officer is in pay grade O-4 or above, meets education and experience, and meets any other criteria as the Secretary of Defense determines to be necessary;
- The level of joint qualification will be determined by the level of JPME the officer has received and the type and duration of joint experience the officer has. A waiver authority exists for those with significant joint experience but not the requisite level of joint education. The waiver may be granted by the Secretary of Defense if the officer has a demonstrated knowledge in joint matters.
- Waivers for flag/general officers are authorized if the officer has two full joint tours and has been determined to have the breadth of joint knowledge required of a flag/general officer. In any case the waiver will only be granted when a “critical need of the armed forces” dictates;
- Waivers for non flag/general officers have a physical cap of ten percent of the officers by pay grade per FY;
- Only thirty-two flag/general officer serving on active duty at any time may have received a waiver to receive their designation of JQO;
- DoD has a goal of keeping one half of the JDAs filled with JQOs. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense will designate those billets that require an officer well versed in joint matters be designated critical JDAs. Critical JDAs will only be filled by JQOs or previously qualified JSOs. The Secretary of Defense may grant waivers on a case by case basis;
- All officers who are currently designated JSO will automatically be designated JQO when placed in effect on October 1, 2007;
- An implementation plan regarding the redesign of JOM must be submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and House Armed Services Committee (HASC) no later than March 31, 2007. The plan should a process to equitably deal with an officer who would have been able to qualify JQO had the regulations been
changed earlier. The plan must identify any additional legislative changes required to successfully implement the plan;

- Promotions for JQOs are expected to be at a rate not less than that of their services competitive category;
- The term ‘joint matters is redefined as “matters related to the achievement of unified action by multiple military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment, including matters relating to – (A) national military strategy; (B) strategic planning and contingency planning; (C) command and control of operations under unified command; (D) national security planning with departments and agencies of the United States; and (E) combined operations with military forces of allied nations”;

Unless otherwise noted, all of the above listed criteria are to take effect on October 1, 2007.

The plan required to be submitted to the SASC and HASC by March 31, 2007 is titled the Department of Defense Joint Officer Management Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan and has come to be known as the Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan (JQSIP) by the members of its working and senior advisory groups. This plan is intended to create a total force system. The cornerstone to the draft JQSIP (dJQSIP) is the creation of a four level Joint Qualification System (JQS) with an associated points system for joint experience. The tables and explanation below illustrate how this will work.

### LEVELS OF JOINT QUALIFICATION

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| I     | a. Awarded upon joint certification of pre-commissioning and basic officer course completion.  
  -- These courses provide learning objectives dealing with "Joint Introduction and Awareness".  
  b. Junior Officers are focused on Service competencies.  
  c. Qualification points begin to accrue following commissioning via opportune joint experiences, joint training, joint exercises, and other education. |
| II    | a. Awarded upon completion of JPME I, accrual of 18 points, and certification by the CJCS.  
  b. A minimum of 12 points must come from “Joint Experience”  
  c. Additional points may be derived from joint experience, joint training, joint exercises, and other education |
| III   | a. Awarded upon completion of JPME II or AJPME (Reserve Component officers), accrual of 36 total points, and certification by the Secretary of Defense or his designee.  
  b. A minimum of 12 “Joint Experience” points must have accrued since award of Level II  
  c. Additional points may be derived from joint training, joint exercises, and other education |
education
d. Formal designation: Joint Qualified Officer (JQO)
e. Effective 30 Sep 2008, JQO required for appointment as an O-7 (AC Only)

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<td>a. Awarded upon completion of CAPSTONE, accrual of 60 total points, and certification by the Secretary of Defense or his designee.</td>
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<td>b. A minimum of 24 additional “Joint Experience” points accrued from an assignment in a G/FO joint billet in OSD/JS/COCOM HQs/JTF HQs/Defense Agency</td>
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Figure 1

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<th>JOINT QUALIFICATION LEVEL</th>
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<th>+</th>
<th>EXPERIENCE Pts</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>OTHER Pts</th>
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Joint EXPERIENCE Points = Duration (Months) x Environment Factor*
*Combat: 3, Non-Combat: 2, Steady-state: 1

OTHER Points = Education + Training + Exercise

Education / Training = degree or certification related to "Joint Matters" [Pts TBD]
Exercise Points = Role [Participant (1pt), Planner (2pts), Leader (3pts)]

Figure 2

The education may not be waived except as provided for by law. Experience can accrue in the traditional manner by serving in a JDA for a complete tour or by serving in a JTF, exercise, in a multinational organization, coalition, etc. In fact, joint credit is already being granted for select billets within a few JTFs. Select billets were placed on the 2006 (A) JDAL. The baseline for points accrual is one point per month served. Figure 1 illustrates how an officer can become level I joint qualified upon commissioning or level III joint qualified (JQO) upon completion of JPME Phase I, JPME Phase II (AJPME for the RC) and the accrual of thirty six experience points, twelve of which must be earned since level II qualification. Figure 2 demonstrates how points can be accrued at a faster rate than one per month depending on the type of joint service the officer is doing.

The dJQSIP grandfathers the JQS to go back as far as 911 to allow officers who can qualify for JQO, based on education, service, and the new criteria, through a self nomination process. Because they were previously ineligible to qualify for JSO, members of the RC are allowed to go back to the enactment of GNA for JQO qualification. The goal of the dJQSIP is to create a traceable continuum of joint service and education throughout an officer’s career making it the rule vice the exception. Jointness will be the normal way of life for all officers.
The joint way of life will not replace the need for service expertise and currency. Service expertise and currency is the foundation upon which the joint acculturation must be built.

If the dJQSIP is submitted as written, accepted by the SASC and HASC, and goes into effect on October 1, 2007 are we there yet? Has the Congress and DoD truly achieved the level of reform and transformation desired when GNA was passed back in 1986? The short answer is yes. The CCDRs are the priority and all services take a unified approach to every major engagement. JTFs are the normal mode of command and control. To further illustrate that GNA has worked and is fully entrenched, imagine if you will, a scenario where the Joint Chiefs are called into a meeting by the President and the Secretary of Defense and were told GNA had been repealed and that the services were to begin planning unilateral operations again. There would be a highly negative reaction. In other words, the services would not be able to go back to a pre-GNA posture. It would be nonsensical.

The next question to be asked is, What is missing? One thing missing is a new version of JOMS. JOMS was not perfect before NDAA FY 2007 or the JQSIP and it is not perfect now. A robust JOMS, or more accurately the database system within JOMS the Joint Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS), that can share data seamlessly between services throughout the chain of command needs to be developed. Until such a system is fielded, there will always be limitations to the JQS.

Another item that is missing is a JDAR. The JQSIP or follow on policy needs to refer to the JDAR as a prerequisite for proper implementation of the plan. Since the JDAL is still required by law and the stipulation, as directed in Title 10 USC section 666, to have policies for the RC similar to those of the AC is still valid, the JDAR still has a requirement to be created. The plan should also determine a method to valuate the service of a Drilling Reservist (DRILLRES) in a JDAR billet or Reserve Unit which contains JDAR billets to facilitate the RC ability to become a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO). In the current draft there is no formula for point derivation for a DRILLRES. Booz Allen Hamilton argued in their report that there is no need for a RC JSO program. Thankfully the total force approach to JQO’s designed joint credit for the RC.

Require NDU and the senior service colleges to compete seats for educational opportunities on a proportional service and component (AC/RC) basis. The unique nature of RC service should be taken into account while determining proper quota ratios.

A final recommendation would be to have no waiver authority in seven to ten years. Have those authorities expire at the end of a predetermined grace period.
In conclusion, with the changes made in NDAA FY 2007 and the subsequent JQSIP, due to the SASC and HASC no later than March 31, 2007 with an implementation date of October 1, 2007, the DoD will finally meet the intent of Congress back in 1986. Once the implementation plan goes into effect and assuming those few critical items mentioned above are adequately addressed either in the implementation plan or follow on DoD Instruction, the services will have a total force system from which to grow a continuous pool of officers well versed in joint matters. It will be a program that is no longer micro-managed from above but rather a robust system of joint acculturation that is motivated from within because of its known and well understood inherent value.

Endnotes


2 Locher, 103.


7 Locher, 104.


9 Locher, 112.


15 Ibid., 3.


19 Ibid., Sec. 526.


21 Ibid., I-7.

22 CSIS, BG-N Phase 1, 4, 6.

23 CSIS, BG-N Phase 2, 4-6.

24 Ibid., 112-115.

25 Ibid., 117-121


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 3-6, 8.


31 Ibid., Sec 532-536.
The author was a member of a support group to one of the working groups and provided expert advise to another working group both of whom were specifically tasked with developing a portion of the plan as directed by Congress. The work continued beyond the due date.

Locher, 103.


Member Joint Officer Management Working Group, telephone interview by author, 30 January 2007.

dJQSIP, A-2.

Ibid.

John S. Weaver, Joint Staff J-1 Directorate Legislative Program Manager, telephone interview by author, 30 March 2007.

dJQSIP, 2.

Ibid., 5.


A Drilling Reservist (DRILLRES) is a member of the RC who is either in an active drill status (Selected Reservist (SELRES)) or a member of the IRR who drills regularly for retirement point capture. A member of the IRR who drills regularly is commonly referred to as a member of the Voluntary Training Unit (VTU). SELRES + VTU = DRILLRES.

Member Joint Officer Management Working Group, telephone interview by author, 16 March 2007. The JQSIP working group has discussed this point and agreed to cover DRILLRES point valuation in a future DoD Instruction to be published prior to the 1 OCOT 2007 rollout of the plan.

BAH, Recommendations.