AMERICA’S CULTURAL AWAKENING

by

Lieutenant Colonel William B. Brents
United States Army

Dr. Sara Morgan
Project Adviser

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Although the collapse of the Soviet Union elevated the United States to a hyper superpower status, globalization in terms of modernity, economics, security and culture would dramatically affect its ascendancy. While globalization extended the reach of modernity and economics, it also fueled an insidious radical Islamic culture that would identify new security concerns extending beyond traditional boundaries. For a short moment America appeared able to implement foreign policy with little external influence. But the events of 9/11 and other acts of terror around the globe would reveal a geo-political climate not easily overcome; and one impossible to overcome without a firm understanding of foreign cultures and languages. If America is to maintain its position of global leader well into the twenty-first century, the development of a national educational framework for understanding foreign cultures and languages is critical. This knowledge of culture and language will prove especially important in the development of US foreign policy. Moreover, the military, and the Army in particular, must genuinely understand the cultures and languages of the places they are sent if they are to successfully carry out US foreign policy.
While the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 revealed a bold and enterprising enemy willing to commit the most egregious acts of terror; the attacks also exposed America to the unprecedented wave of anti-American sentiment taking root throughout the Middle East and in other parts of the world as well. This widespread anti-American sentiment also created a fertile environment for the likes of Osama bin Laden to propagate messages of hate towards the west and the United States (U.S.) in particular. America, as seen through the eyes of radical Islam, became the “leader of the post-Cold War spread of Neo-liberal economic and political values, which they loathe, under the concept of Globalization.”

America’s ascent to a position of principal world power and global leader did not happen overnight, but overnight the U.S. became the primary recipient and focal point of radical anti-western hatred. Recent polling data indicates large segments of the Muslim world now believe the U.S.-led war on terrorism is a war against Islam, and unfavorable views of America reach as high as almost 100 percent in Egypt and 94 percent in Saudi Arabia, the home of the majority of the 9/11 assailants. In Spain public opinion towards America more closely resembles that of Muslim countries and its favorable rating of American people is down to 37 percent, a drop of almost 20 percent over the last four years. Spain’s opinion though does not represent the opinions of other western European nations where public opinion of America is between 60 and 70 percent. Asians typically have a more favorable public opinion of Americans; Japan at 82 percent, India at 67 percent and China at 49 percent. Although public opinion of the American people remains high in some countries, the latest data suggests the war in Iraq continues to diminish public opinion of America in predominantly Muslim countries, Europe, and Asia as well.

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union officially ended the Cold War, the prominent event failed to result in a safer world order or one where America would become more open and receptive to the desires of other nations and its people. Instead, the collapse created a more complex geopolitical environment and exaggerated the alienation of America from the rest of the world. The alienation of America is arguably more complete now than any other time since before WWII, and it occurred at a time when America may need the help of other nations more than ever to meet all its global commitments and obligations. America, in its role as sole superpower or “hyperpower,” has decidedly elected to lead any effort, alone if necessary, to protect what it considers vital to its national interests.
Preeminence in all matters of politics, economics, and military affairs may have engendered a cultural “black hole,” or nearsightedness where America now sees itself without fault and views other cultures only in comparison to its own “correct system.” This ethnocentric perspective held by the U.S. may result in misperceptions concerning an adversary’s likely behavior or response in the context of national-security. This viewpoint has already proved costly in Iraq and the propensity for further miscalculation in countries such as Iran is likely.

In such an uneven geopolitical environment other nations might choose only to align with the U.S. as a matter of necessity when their own security interests become threatened, but are more likely to be critical of American foreign policy when it does not directly support or is potentially harmful to their own interests. This condition, as expressed by a senior Australian official, begins to address the comprehensive or global nature of the problem. The state of affairs also suggests an international environment where poor relations with the U.S. become the norm, especially in less-developed nations where perceptions and cultural sensitivities are most important. As a consequence, the world community now enjoys less influence over US foreign policy considerations and the U.S. can seemingly act without constraint on the international stage.

Samuel Huntington believes that, perhaps as a result of heightened western power, non-western civilizations are turning inward and places like the Middle East are returning to their roots and using religion to distinguish themselves from other civilizations. He points out differences among civilizations are basic and religion is the single-most discriminating factor amongst civilizations. This distinction is consistent with current al Qaeda doctrine that narrowly divides the world into true believers and nonbelievers (the infidels), and attempts to establish a “universalized global Islamist identity.” However, his assertion that “the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or economic,” may overlook or minimize the present Islamic movement attempting to redefine civilization strictly along religion or ideological lines.

In defining America as a particularist sole superpower or one devoted exclusively to its own interests Peter Schwartz also offers some insight to the growing anti-American sentiment throughout the world. He speaks of a subtle yet pervasive global political cultural reversal, where America, which was once a universalist power unilaterally devoted the international rule of law operating in a “particular world”, has now become a particularist nation in a universalist world. He also believes that while U.S. morale authority may be important domestically for America to rationalize or to justify its actions, it means little outside of the U.S. Such views concede a new world order where many “less privileged” countries, societies, world actors, and
even some allies are mistrustful of the U.S. because of its hyper superpower status and ethnocentric characteristics.

Call for National Reform

National security depends as never before on language and intercultural communications skills. America’s well-being requires advanced research and development on the range of theoretical and practical problems facing the nation and cognition.21

America must decide to make a radical change from its own ethnocentric tendencies before it can reach its full potential in matters of foreign diplomacy, economy, and military influence. While hard to bring about, such change is possible through a national strategic communications campaign to underscore the importance of understanding foreign cultures and languages. The call must emanate from the most senior levels of U.S. government and involve a well-coordinated national effort by all agencies of the federal government, the media, and industry leaders in the private sector.22

Before the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989, the “Cold War” aligned two superpowers against one another and the geopolitical climate was much easier to comprehend. Dr. Robert Brecht, Executive Director, University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language, speaking on the Cold War and of the events since proclaimed:

It was a bilateral world. Basically, for national security we focused on Russian, and that was all we had to do...as the world became more complex and globalization became relevant in economic competitiveness, all of a sudden we were dealing with Japan and all the nations of Europe and China; so many more languages became 'relevant' to our national well-being.23

Now, in the complex world of globalization, the need for cultural understanding and language skills becomes increasingly essential to U.S. economic prosperity and national security interests. In GAO testimony on Foreign Languages the Office concluded:

Federal agencies' foreign language needs have grown significantly over the past decade with increasing globalization and a changing security environment in light of such events as the breakup of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attacks of September 11. Foreign language skills are increasingly needed to support traditional diplomatic efforts, public diplomacy programs, military and peacekeeping missions, intelligence collection, counterterrorism efforts, and international trade.24

Because America’s education system does not include foreign languages as a part of its core curriculum, the study of foreign languages is not seriously addressed in elementary and secondary schools. Student proficiency in even the most widely studied languages, such as Spanish and French, is “trivial and quite irrelevant,” according to Dr. Brecht.25 98 percent of
students studying languages at the high school and college level are enrolled in Spanish, French or German, with Spanish comprising two-thirds of the enrollment. Only “two percent study Russian, Mandarin Chinese, and other, more esoteric languages such as Latin and ancient Greek.” And although non-Western language study and the study of Arabic, in particular, increased 25 percent over the last several years, the paltry rise from 3,500 to 4,200 students, nationwide, is abysmally small in light of recent events. “Much more is needed if the United States is to build a core group of skilled linguists ready to aid in the war on terrorism.”

Absent a strategic campaign for educating America on its foreign culture and language needs, there remains little hope for successfully achieving a cultural transformation across the nation. While no small task, two national strategic campaigns have proven successful in the 2d half of the 20th century and both provide important lessons for the 21st century. The Reagan campaign against illicit drugs and the earlier Sputnik crisis both demonstrate how a well-coordinated national strategic communications effort can effectively change American attitudes when the cause is worthwhile and the campaign is adequately resourced.

The highly successful Ronald and Nancy Reagan “Just Say No” Campaign against drugs in the 1980s effectively unified the efforts of the government, media, and the private sector to reduce illegal drug use more than 50 percent. A change in American attitudes on illicit drug use over this same time significantly decreased national crime rates and emergency hospitalization rates, on-the-job drug use, and drug use in the military alone by 67 percent. At the same time, Presidential leadership helped to establish a National Media Advertising Partnership, Drug Free Schools and Communities, and a coordinated national and international effort in the fight against drug trafficking. The campaign was not without teeth and funding for the prevention of drug abuse increased 400 percent between 1981 and 1988, while federal spending on drug treatment nearly doubled over this same period.

The Sputnik crisis offers perhaps an even better example of a national transformation in response to the Soviet Union launch of the Sputnik 1 Satellite. The Sputnik crisis, as it became known, would spawn a series of initiatives that would not only put Neil Armstrong on the moon in less than thirteen years, but would also transform American culture in math, science, and national defense.

In the three and a half years after the Soviets launched the Sputnik satellite in 1957, the U.S. government funded dozens-if not hundreds-of Russian-language and Russian-studies departments not just within the military but in high schools and colleges all across America. Now, three and a half years after Islamic fundamentalists flew airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Department of Defense is three months away from publishing an official “instruction” providing “guidance for language program management.”
Today, nearly six years after 9/11, American leadership has undertaken only incremental measures to penetrate the cultural walls that divide America from most of the non-English speaking world. For instance, the Department of Defense’s Language Transformation Roadmap provided an effort to place foreign language requirements in terms of management systems, but the plan offers no value other than directing the implementation of a program. Fred Kaplan, in his critique of the Transformation roadmap, declares that since September 11, there has only been the establishment of tasks and that “these tasks are simply to set up a management system for improving the military’s language skills— not actually to begin to improve the skills.”

There is no such thing as international business anymore, there is just business. And when American military lives are at stake on foreign soil, or we think about homeland security, then increasing the nation’s foreign language capacity is a vital national security priority.

The Military as Lead Instrument of National Power and its Cultural Implications

The inability to identify culturally with most of the outside world helps explain America’s penchant for independent foreign policy decision-making. This also helps to understand why there is such a heavy reliance on the military to act as the main effort in the projection of national power overseas. While this tendency is not incomprehensible in a culture that so much favors technological advancement over human and cognitive elements, the approach may leave America without the proper resources for implementing a full spectrum of capabilities on a global scale. Now, more than ever, when understanding foreign cultures and languages and establishing global networks are critical for attaining economic advantage and protecting national interests at home and abroad, America has not adequately responded to the challenge.

Rather than emphasize the need for a cultural awakening and subsequent national transformation following the attacks of 9/11, American policy focused almost exclusively on kinetic military solutions in what was referred to as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Now almost six years after 9/11 the present geopolitical environment suggests that even a stabilized Iraq will not end the GWOT and a “Long War” on terrorism (LWT) will continue. While there is little indication to suggest a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will mitigate the crisis there, there is evidence to suggest stability will help contain the spread of “a universalized global Islamist identity.” However, without a full spectrum of capabilities to deal with the situation in Iraq, America and the military must default to kinetic methods, which are the least desirable in winning the support of the people, at a time when popular support is needed most:
Often, the application of overwhelming force has the negative, unintended effect of strengthening the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing recruitment, and demonstrating the "brutality" of state forces.  

Because of these unintended psychological and social consequences, conventional or more traditional military methods will not always achieve the desired effects. This is especially true against an insurgency whose tactic is irregular warfare and the spread of radical Islamic ideology, and where death in battle against nonbelievers makes a martyr and assures one’s reservation in “paradise.”

In recognition of these extremist threats to America’s freedoms and liberties as well as western civilization in general, the U.S. must re-examine its ways and means for fighting this kind of war; not relying almost exclusively on hard military power to accomplish its desired end state. Moreover, as America decides how to accomplish its long-term goals in the war against radical Islamic terrorists, it must also continue to defend against a host of other emerging threats across the globe. While hard to comprehend, many of these emerging threats may become so economically interconnected with the U.S. and its allies that a narrowly focused brute-force strategy would certainly limit the full range of options and work to the detriment of the U.S. Asia’s recent economic explosion, for instance, will provide emerging superpowers such as China with the political and economic means to modernize their military component to a level that drastically narrows present modernization gaps with the U.S. The strong likelihood of China reaching some level of parity over the next twenty years offers ample incentive for the U.S. to seek other more flexible and less expensive diplomatic, economic, and military options.

Military Reform

The strategic implications of a LWT and the certainty of other emergent global threats indicate a new world order where America’s exercise of national power should move away from a military-centric concentration to one of balance. A balanced approach will choose diplomatic, information, and economic tools first, when working within the international framework of mutually supporting agencies and partners. While America might think little of government networks now, when dealing with global security issues, the expanding footprint of a new world order will require access to even the most remote sites.

Immediately following the events of 9/11 the main effort focused on forming a military coalition instead of looking to the global financial, law enforcement, and intelligence networks that would eventually prove essential in defending America and other nations against future attacks. The leverage nontraditional networks now provide in support of the war on terrorism

6
provides clear incentive for improving practices and building relationships that better optimize their use. However, this leveraged approach, too, will require the skill to recognize and embrace cultural differences, familiarity with cultural customs and norms, and the ability to resolve complex social situations. Deal and Prince declare these are all important elements, but they believe, “The skill of cultural adaptability - the willingness to and ability to recognize, understand, and work effectively across cultural differences” is perhaps the most important aspect, and is “an essential competency for leading in a global environment.”

The shift away from a military-centric and kinetic preference is now especially challenging in a geopolitical environment where brute U.S. military power has evolved to become such a dominant influence on the world stage. In this kinetic paradigm the emphasis on technology dominance and weapons superiority has moved way in front of human or cultural investment. Major General Robert Scales, USA (Retired), describes how the military believes that success is best accomplished through superior technology and transformation is seen exclusively as a modernization initiative.

After all, what is wrong with an approach to warfare that achieves swift victory with few American casualties and without a large commitment of ground forces? Without question, Desert Storm resulted in decisive victory with the smallest number of U.S. casualties. Later operation in Somalia, on the other hand, demonstrated how eighteen Americans killed in action collapsed a great nation’s political will overnight. Operations in both Kosovo and early on in Afghanistan showed how superior technology could produce favorable outcomes while using little or no ground troops.

Because of the seemingly infallible advantage in the revolution of military affairs and the recent successes, U.S. leadership could not imagine anything less than a stupendous victory following the attacks of 9/11. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), however, technology dominance and weapons superiority did not achieve the spectacular results of earlier campaigns. A one-dimensional or kinetic approach to warfare did not address the human or cultural context of the situation.

While one can at least understand the military’s recent propensity for kinetic solutions, it is hard to imagine why American diplomatic efforts were so heavily ethnocentric and void of cultural considerations as well. Yet the directives of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the leadership of Paul Bremer were remarkably indifferent to existing socio-cultural factors. For instance, Paul Bremer expressed in memorandum shortly before assuming his role as head of the CPA, “It is desirable that my arrival in Iraq be marked by clear, public, and decisive steps.” These steps included the de-Baathification of Iraqi Society (CPA Order
Number 1) and the dissolution of the Iraqi Army (CPA Order Number 2). On the de-Baathification of Iraqi society, Anthony Cordesman stated:

There wasn’t a single person in the CPA who understood what Order Number 1 meant. Nobody made any effort to survey how many people would be excluded...It created an almost hopeless problem, because it removed the secular core from the government of Iraq and it crippled it economically.

Bremer’s decision to tear down pre-existing institutions before rebuilding was problematical. With a large indigenous labor pool now unemployed there was cause for concern. The CIA station chief in Baghdad believed the de-Baathification alone would drive 50,000 people underground. On the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, Thomas Ricks stated:

The effect of disbanding the military was to tell a bunch of powerful and wealthy people inside the society that you have no future here and you are going to become a non-person. I think it really did spur the insurgency.

His lack of cultural understanding and inability to establish policy without adequately evaluating its implications on the people of Iraq would alienate the key members of Iraqi society who may have been able to smooth a transitional government and create a long-lasting stable Iraq. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would further complicate hopes for a stable Iraq by publicly denying an insurgency even existed until Iraqi and terror factions were heavily divided and better organized. It was not until Lieutenant General Michael Maples’ testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee when he said the insurgency in Iraq was complex, strong, and resilient, and that enemy attacks were at an all-time high that the full scope of the problem was brought to the attention of the American public.

Without a resolute cultural adaptation to embed America into the socio-culture of the peoples and places it intends to influence, situational awareness will remain less than desirable, as will the possibility for developing effective U.S. foreign policy. In an informative article on the relationship between anthropology and counterinsurgency operations, Montgomery McFate asserts how the counterinsurgency in Iraq requires cultural and social knowledge of the enemy and how “none of the elements of U.S. national power explicitly takes adversary culture into account in the formation or execution of policy.”

While there is now more of an effort underway to resolve the situation in Iraq with a better appreciation for Iraqi culture, the damage caused by earlier U.S. policy may be irreversible. For a policy, void of cultural understanding, which measures results with kinetic effects, will strengthen an insurgency and rally many to its cause; it may also strain traditional allegiances as well. This is especially troubling at a time when the U.S. needs considerable international support in fighting the LWT. Even Australia is beginning to pay attention to the risks associated
with its alliance with America and must now anticipate a new world order that includes China as an emerging regional hegemony.\textsuperscript{56}

U.S. Army Transformation

America’s transformation to a culturally adaptable society will require a comprehensive socio-cultural re-education. This is also true for the U.S. Army. Never has the moment been more appropriate for the U.S. Army to affect a cultural transformation movement and establish itself as the premier institution on socio-cultural affairs and foreign languages. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army was not off to a good start following the events of 9/11 and the continued preference for technologic transformation left little room “to create a parallel transformation based on cognition and cultural awareness.”\textsuperscript{57}

Since his arrival as Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld focused almost exclusively on reducing the need for “boots on the ground” in a major modernization effort to create lighter, faster, more agile, yet also more lethal combat forces. His call for a major Department of Defense transformation led to the continued decline in Army end strength. In FY 2000 active Army end strength was down another 5 percent since FY 1995, with a cumulative reduction of 40 percent in the last fifteen years.\textsuperscript{58} The human and cultural dimension received little attention in this transformation.

Before Army transformation began, most conventional Army units were independently organized and equipped to respond to distinctive contingencies around the world. In many instances these forces were already located in the anticipated region of conflict and understood the cultural nuances that would come into play if hostilities were to occur. Army transformation, on the other hand, focused little on regional and cultural factors, yet almost exclusively on the establishing of a common set of system capabilities through the modular construction of identical unit organization and equipment. Under this design each similar Brigade Combat Team would offer the same capability as the other and could respond equally to a crisis anywhere in the world. These units would follow a force generation model that assigns them to a specific theater or combat role based on standard timelines and not on unit-specific characteristics. As the new modular construct and force generation model offers some advantage such as force stabilization, responsiveness and a reduced logistics footprint, it can degrade a unit’s ability to prepare for the cultural aspects of a specific regional deployment.

Responding to Secretary Rumsfeld’s call for a transformation, the Army’s Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, directed a modular restructuring initiative to increase the number of
combat units available to the Army while making those units more flexible, more self-contained, and faster to deploy.\textsuperscript{59} To Congress he reported:

The Army is steadfast in its determination to transform the total force from a Cold War structured organization into one best prepared to operate across the full spectrum of conflict...this transformation includes modernization, modular conversion, rebalancing forces across the active and reserve components, and a force generation model that provides for continuous operations.\textsuperscript{60}

Another key element of this transformation is the rebasing of a significant percentage of Army forces to the continental U.S. from their present overseas locations. An unfortunate outcome of the rebasing initiative is the further deprivation of exposure to foreign cultures. There will also be fewer opportunities for soldiers to study foreign cultures and languages abroad and to build personal relationships with U.S. friends and allies. The 2006 Army Posture Statement calls for the return of 48,500 soldiers from garrisons across the globe and limits U.S. presence in Korea and in Europe, while removing many permanent bases from the Middle East and in the Pacific.

While current transformation initiatives appear to work against the U.S. Army becoming more culturally adaptive, the use of soft or non-kinetic methods will become increasingly important on the asymmetric battlefield. These soft approaches can at times offer the best or the only option in the context of a new global order that may require the approval and support of friends and allies. In responding to these asymmetric threats the Army should embrace the study of anthropology and include foreign cultures and languages as a core competency. After all, anthropology is nothing new to the Army and knowledge of the discipline offers many advantages:

Cultural anthropology started in the U.S. as a tool of the Army to understand Native American tribal systems in order to facilitate frontier warfare. By better understanding the methodological underpinnings of cultural anthropology, the military might be able to put it to better use in their everyday operation.\textsuperscript{61}

Scales discusses the significance of knowing the culture of ones enemy, and how intellect and the cognitive aspects are more important in irregular warfare than transformations that focus almost exclusively on technology.\textsuperscript{62} He references how some senior officers with recent Iraq and Afghanistan experience believe accomplishing “tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation” are essential to winning in war.\textsuperscript{63} He also suggests a shift from a network-centric to a culture-centric Army and recommends a robust cadre of well-educated, culturally and language trained global scouts who are comfortable in a given culture with an established relationship with its indigenous populations.\textsuperscript{64} These soldiers would become regional specialists through educational opportunities that allow
them to live and learn abroad.\textsuperscript{65} His proposal makes a strong argument for building a force pool capable of providing tailored culture and language expertise across the globe. His recommendation offers an insightful way to provide a necessary cultural linkage to some of the most austere people in locations around the world.

The acknowledgement of the existing insurgency in Iraq also moves the U.S. Army closer to a cultural transformation. Shortly after the official pronouncement of the existing insurgency in Iraq the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps co-authored the first counterinsurgency (COIN) manual in twenty years devoted exclusively to COIN operations.\textsuperscript{66} The manual puts forward a cogent framework for understanding COIN while calling attention to the importance of not only integrating civilian and military activities to implement all the elements of national power, but also of considering the socio-cultural dimensions as well.\textsuperscript{67}

In his description of a Pentathlete former Secretary of the Army Harvey called for a leader skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy that understands cultural context and works effectively across them.\textsuperscript{68} He states:

\begin{quote}
The Army’s vision for leaders in this century is that of the Pentathlete – a multi-skilled leader who personifies the warrior ethos in all aspects from warfighting to statesmanship to enterprise management... Above all, our future leaders must be strategic and creative thinkers dedicated to lifelong learning. Only through that commitment will we develop leaders thoroughly comfortable in leading, managing change in large organization as well as skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

A report issued by former Secretary Harvey’s transition team expounded on culture context by recommending basic foreign culture and language proficiency.\textsuperscript{70} Interestingly, the updated regulation on Army Leadership introduces the concept of Pentathlete in its text, but fails to describe the Pentathlete as possessing the requisite skills for understanding foreign cultures and languages.\textsuperscript{71} Basic cultural and language skills will likely prove indispensable in the new world order and cannot be lost in a redefinition of the Pentathlete. Pentathlete characteristics should then be inculcated in every Soldier’s training and “culture-centric” should remain at its core and training in foreign cultures and languages should extend to all Soldiers and not just certain branches and occupational specialties. Despite the popularized Pentathlete character description of the Soldier, the focus of transformation has placed network-centric warfare ahead of culture-centric solutions in the 21st century. A thorough knowledge of foreign cultures and languages must be at the forefront of a long-term plan to close the cultural gap that has been widened by a modernization campaign focused almost exclusively on superior technology and weapons.
With the real commitment of resources and leader emphasis to educate and train the force the prospects of making former Secretary Harvey’s grand vision a reality looks promising. The 2006 U.S. Army Posture Statement supported initiatives to expand cultural awareness and language capabilities by including cultural awareness in all Professional Military Education. The Army now provides online basic language training opportunities to all Soldiers and Army Civilians through the Army Knowledge Online Support System with “Rosetta Stone” language software. During a 2006 news briefing on the 2007 budget, the Department of Defense listed prevailing in irregular operations as one of its four priorities and earmarked $760 Million through Fiscal Year 2011 for this purpose. The proposal specifically called for expanded language and cultural training of personnel. The FY 2007 Army Budget recognized irregular operations as one of the required core capabilities of a full spectrum force and devoted significant resources to the human dimension of war by expanding cultural awareness and language training. In the end it will be up to unit commanders to place the command emphasis in training programs and junior leader development for culture-centric characteristics to become embedded into Army culture.

Conclusion

The continued instability in Iraq is largely a result of earlier policy failures that neglected to view the Iraqi war in proper socio-cultural context. Because of these failures, senior U.S. leaders are now challenged to establish effective measures to stabilize the situation and ultimately transition control back to the Iraqis. The situation in Iraq represents an alarming microcosm of the extensive cultural challenges facing America in the future. America must now begin to embrace foreign cultures through extensive diplomatic and economic efforts and consider military options almost exclusively in cooperation with partners and allies. But before a true cultural embrace is even possible, the U.S. must first educate a new generation of Americans to view the world with an exocentric appreciation for other cultures and languages. Only through such a cultural transformation, that comprises all facets of American society and includes all elements of national power, will America achieve some level of international advantage and solidify its position of strength in the new world order.
Endnotes


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.


8 Bill Hayden, former Governor-General of Australia, suggests the US has grown into a hyperpower with limitless international responsibilities and demands. He speaks of how American material dominance and “strong sense of exceptionalism and manifest destiny plus powerful elements of religious fundamentalism, sometimes incline it to leap out in front, idealizing, moralizing, and incidentally forfeiting international support and respect, as has happened to a large extent in connection with Iraq.” Hayden, 5-6.


11 Hayden, 5-6.

12 Ibid.

13 Macdonald, 53.


16 Ibid., 25.


18 Huntington, 22.
19 Schwartz, 100-101.

20 Ibid., 101.

21 Dr. Richard Brecht, Executive Director, University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language; available from http://www.casl.umd.edu.htm; Internet; accessed 16 March, 2007.

22 The Reagan “Just Say No” anti-drug provides an excellent example of national strategic campaign that proved successful through a well-coordinated national effort using the agencies of the federal government, the media and industry leaders in the private sector. Drug Prevention Network of America, “An Overview of the Successes of the War on Drugs During the Reagan Years,” available from http://www.dpna.org/resources/trends/reagans.htm; Internet; accessed 3 March 2007.


25 Dr. Richard Brecht, Director, National Foreign Language Center, “The Language Crisis in the War on Terror: Speech to the Eisenhower Institute,” 24 October 2002; available from http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/democracy/homelandsecurity/Whitman4.report.htm; Internet; accessed 15 February 2007. In the meeting report of the speech, prepared by Josh Kolchins, he states, “The speaker (Dr. Brecht) explored how inadequacies in language proficiency at all levels of society have impaired the government’s ability to plan for homeland security and to prosecute the war on terrorism. To emphasize the urgency of the issue, his opening remarks observed that the lack of foreign language skills is a number one human resource problem in the intelligence community.”

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.


32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.

34 Some of the US responses to the Sputnik crisis were: the creation of the Advanced Research Project Agency, which was to later become the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or DARPA, the birth of NASA, the genesis of a national education effort to grow engineers, major increases in scientific research and funding, and the closing of the “missile gap” with the Soviet Union.


36 Ibid.

37 Dr. Robert Brecht, Executive Director, University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language; available from http://www.casl.umd.edu.htm; Internet; accessed 16 March, 2007.


39 Macdonald, 39.


42 Ibid., 67.


44 Ibid., 2.

45 Macdonald, 45.

46 Ibid., 7.


51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.


55 McFate, 24.


57 Scales, 33.


62 Scales, 32-33.

63 Scales, 33.

65 Ibid.


67 Ibid., 1-1, 2-1, 3-3.


69 Ibid.


