DEVELOPING EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: FINNISH STRATEGIC CHOICE

by

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The European Union (EU) is moving toward a more common foreign and security policy (CFSP). To help execute this goal, it has started to create its own military capability to conduct crisis management and peace enforcement operations. A great number of EU-nations are also members of NATO. While the goal of both organizations has been complementary efforts, there is a risk of creating an inefficient competitive situation for financial and military resources between states in these two organizations. The focal point is going to be whether to develop the EU defense policy inside and together with NATO or purely from EU resources.

Finland, being militarily non-allied, is participating in the EU military concept and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)-program, but in her present state is politically unwilling to join NATO. The future development of the EU’s CFSP inevitably forces Finland to evaluate her future position. This project examines these strategic implications for Finland. The examination includes options 1) based on EU resources, 2) based on NATO capabilities, 3) based on practical combinations of both, and 4) describes consequences of each option to Finnish security policy and status. The paper concludes with recommendations based on consequences of each option.
Setting the Stage

For centuries, Europe had been the scene of frequent and bloody wars. In the period of 1870 to 1945, France and Germany fought each other three times, with terrible loss of life. A number of European leaders became convinced that the only way to secure a lasting peace between their countries was to unite them economically and politically. The idea of European Union was initially presented by Winston Churchill, who in September 1946 suggested the establishment of a kind of United States of Europe. After several phases, the statute of the Council of Europe was signed in London, United Kingdom in May 1949, only a month after the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. Concurrently with the development of the Council of Europe, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were preparing another treaty, the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence creating the Western European Union (WEU), which was signed at Brussels in March 1948. This treaty was established largely as a response to Soviet moves to impose control over the countries of Central Europe.

In 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe in an attempt to harness the key military resources of the day. As a result, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established with six members: Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. In May 1952 the six ECSC members (four of them also members of the WEU treaty) signed the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty in Paris, although by 1954 it had failed because of French resistance to its supranational nature. However, building upon the success of the economic deepening created by the ECSC, the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were signed by the Six in March 1957 in Rome. Because the three surviving legal entities shared many institutional bodies (such as the European Parliament) they became the foundation for the “European Community” (EC). Following cycles of stagnation and additional deepening of economic cooperation through modifications of the treaties in the following decades, the member states formalized the EC with the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, which also laid the groundwork for deepening the cooperation in non-economic spheres and established the European Union (EU), which came into existence in November 1993 when the Treaty on the European Union entered into force. Finland joined the EU at the beginning of 1995.
Even if there once was an EDC Treaty, the very short lifetime of it made it quite evident that despite the devastating war Europe had just suffered, there was still no serious will to create a supranational defensive cooperation structure, especially given the concurrent development of the inter-governmental North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The combination of resistance to supranational government and the contribution of NATO (which had the added advantage of keeping the United States involved) resulted in the Union and its predecessors evolving primarily as an economic, commercial, and trade community until the end of the 20th century.

This began to change when Yugoslavia disintegrated in early 1990s and caused a long lasting war and instability in the Balkans, right next to the heart of Europe. Despite the EU’s economic/political efforts and a UN peacekeeping force, this problem was not resolved until the implementation of the Dayton Accords with a large-scale military intervention by NATO, including a significant US military component. When the Balkans erupted in violence again a few years later in 1998, this time in Kosovo, the UN and the EU were once more unable to negotiate an end to the violence. It took another NATO task force with significant US presence to stabilize the region.

The Balkans war and the crisis in Kosovo combined with the failure of both the United Nations and the EU to solve these crises made the leaders of Europe understand what British Prime Minister Tony Blair had initiated in St. Malo Summit on 4 December 1998 when, together with French President Jacques Chirac, they agreed on the need for establishing “appropriate structures” within the EU to acquire “the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military force,” and to contribute to “the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance.”

Prime Minister Blair restated the core of their declaration during NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit on 8 March 1999: “The European Union should be able to take on some security tasks on our own, and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own.” He also stated that Europe’s military capabilities are too modest and called for national will to go beyond the St. Malo declaration and Berlin Plus arrangements, to give Europe a genuine capacity to act quickly in cases where the Alliance as a whole was not militarily engaged. The shift in UK policy eventually led to a change in how European leaders began to consider Europe’s regional security strategy and military capability.

The United States was quite attentive to and generally positive about, developments in the European security and defense policy initiatives. She welcomed Mr. Blair’s ideas of more capable and modern Europe militarily, as long as they improved the two continents’ effectiveness to work together. Then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s main
concerns were what she called “the 3Ds” (decoupling, duplication, and discrimination) so as to allow the effective and reasonable use of resources and organizations and to ensure equal influence for both EU- and non-EU-members in NATO.\(^7\)

The British-French declaration in December 1998 and NATO Summit in March of the following year can be interpreted as the beginning of “European Security and Defense Policy” (ESDP), formally established in 1999 at Helsinki. To address the structural component of ESDP, at Helsinki the European Council created standing committees for civilian and military issues.\(^8\) In addition they directed the creation of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) which remains the only permanent integrated military structure of the European Union, assigned to provide early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning.\(^9\) To address the force requirements, the Council established the “Headline Goal” to have an available force of 50-60,000 troops to execute missions under the ESDP.\(^10\) After numerous conceptual reviews, the original Headline Goal force has morphed into the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), for which the formal founding agreement was agreed on 22 November 2004.\(^11\) To further the capability development and integration effort, the EU has also created a concept for European Union Battle Groups (EUBG), reinforced and generally multinational battalion size formations that provide the basic building blocks of the ERRF.\(^12\)

The development of the EU military effort has resulted in military requirements being placed upon EU member states, most of which are either NATO-members or involved with NATO’s PfP program. The capability requirements of both organizations are generally seen as overlapping, though there remains a significant dependence on the military power of the United States to execute high end combat tasks. While the goal of both organizations has been complementary efforts, this state has created a dilemma in some European NATO-countries: whether to maintain European security by means of NATO or through this new, totally European model. It has also raised a question of how to finance a purely European solution if the resources of the USA were not in use.

Finland, being militarily non-allied after her decades of neutrality, is participating both in PfP and the EUBG-concept, but at least in her present state is politically unwilling to join NATO.\(^13\) It is clearly understood in Finland that there has to be a consistent defense policy in Europe and powerful enough military potential to assure its credibility.\(^14\) While a relatively small nation, as a member of the EU Finland has an opportunity to influence the EU’s decisions on security policy and strategy. The vital question for Finland is which would be the acceptable options from the Finnish point of view in developing the future security of Europe. What kind of solutions would be either satisfactory or on the other hand absolutely unacceptable? This is a
particularly challenging issue for Finland. If NATO remains the main security tool in Europe, what options does Finland have to carry out own security and defense policy? It seems that for the Finnish leadership the issue is how to define “alliance.” NATO is the traditional example of military alliance, while from the Finnish viewpoint the EU, as stated in the Constitutional Treaty, will not become a federation or a military alliance. Given this understanding, and in spite of the EU enhancing collective military capabilities, the Finnish leadership assures themselves, the Finnish public and our neighbors that Finland is still militarily non-allied.

In this study, Finland’s future options are estimated against three different scenarios of possible or theoretical EU solutions for its CFSP, especially related to its intentions to develop its military capability. These scenarios are: 1) an entirely EU based solution, 2) an entirely NATO based solution, and 3) a practical combination of both options. Finland has to take a position on each of these possibilities; as an EU-member state she has no privilege to ignore any of them. In any case, she has to reconsider her foreign and security policy to meet the upcoming decisions over the European security arrangements.

**EU Options for Developing Military Capability**

After recognizing the need to have integrated military capability inside the EU, the preparations and decisions made in the European Council and Commission have led in principal to a split situation between the EU and NATO. Most European NATO-countries believe that there is the clear need for a multi-national security structure in Europe and they see no present, functioning alternative to the Alliance (NATO). NATO is seen as central to European security.15

Simultaneously, Europeans like the idea that the EU should have more influence and a greater role in security matters involving European states and interests. During the last few years this approach has been gaining support, not least because of the common notion among European nations that the United States is the dominant member of the Alliance. This trend has been exceptionally clear since the United States launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The confidence in the U.S. to responsibly deal with world problems declined significantly among some European nations and has only declined more, and spread, in the subsequent four years. In the same timeframe, the confidence in NATO to responsibly deal with world problems has decreased correspondingly, except in Germany, where the confidence has slightly increased.16 This parallel development can probably be explained by the European impression, mentioned above, that the U.S. is the dominant power in NATO.

At the same time, European opinion surveys reflect a growing interest in EU security efforts. The surveys show that the majority of these countries prefer the EU to make most of the
important security decisions, as well as expressing greater confidence in the EU than in NATO (except in Britain). However, when considering the idea of a greater role for European nations in security matters involving Europe and its interests, the concerns about partly overlapping capability requirements and the extra costs it would mean become quite evident. There are currently 27 member states in the EU (Bulgaria and Romania became members in 2007) versus 26 in NATO (of which 21 are also in the EU). The EU member-states collectively spend $229 billion on defense. This amount is spent on national requirements, national and multinational operations and to support Alliance (NATO-countries) structural costs (i.e. NATO budgets). If there now was a third military structure to support the EU, there would be too many sectors competing for the same funds. Having had quite tight military budgets in recent years (a trend likely to continue), there is not much political or military will among European states, especially among those having membership in both organizations, to create duplicative or parallel security and military capabilities. So in spite of the common desire to have a more militarily powerful EU as a balance for the U.S., the economic and financial issues argue against it, at least in the short run.

Another key issue is policy making, where there are some significant differences among EU member states. When examining the attitudes of the leading nations in Europe (i.e. the UK, France, and Germany), there are quite different ambitions at stake. The UK is pro European influence but through NATO while Germany is evenly split. France has adopted a position quite unfavorable to NATO (especially to the U.S.). France more than ever wants a stronger EU defense policy less dependent on Washington.

When considering the factors above and taking into account that not all the EU-members are NATO-members and vice-a-versa, from the Finnish point of view one can draw three simplified scenarios for future options. These scenarios, described later in the study, are the ones that Finnish policy makers either cherish, hope, fear, or doubt depending on their parties’ political views. Because of that, even the least probable (and to most Western countries least desirable) option of non-NATO military policy must also be addressed. The EU can either take the road France is offering and start to create purely (or at least almost purely) EU joint military capability, or it can listen to the UK’s desire to strengthen the EU’s influence and power inside NATO, but to preserve NATO as a main security and military policy organization in Europe. The third option is to grant both organizations the necessary international political authority to take complementary efforts to harmonize the development of capabilities for use in supporting both organizations.
Major Power Positions

France has challenged and questioned the leading role of the United States in NATO and European security issues from almost the very beginning of NATO. In the fall of 1958, the then President of France, Charles De Gaulle, criticized the U.S.’ hegemonic role in the organization and protested what he perceived as a special relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. In a memorandum he sent on 17 September 1958 to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, he argued for the creation of a tripartite directorate that would put France on an equal footing with the other two states, and also for the expansion of NATO's coverage to include geographical areas of interest to France.21

Considering the response he was given to be unsatisfactory, de Gaulle started pursuing an independent defense for his country, including an independent nuclear program. In 1966, all French armed forces were removed from NATO’s integrated military command and all non-French NATO troops were asked to leave France.22 While France disengaged from NATO’s integrated military structure, she remained a member state of NATO. The Balkans crisis in the 1990’s brought France a bit closer to NATO’s military operations, but only at the operational level. She still remains out of the integrated military structure.

The historical Saint-Malo Summit in December 1998 led the leaders of Europe to assume that once the ESDP concept was operational, the strategic security dialogue would without a doubt follow to get European nations to address common security threats in a united manner.23 The events following 9/11, the Global War on Terror and especially invasion of Iraq showed, however, that the European countries were not ready to make joint policy decisions. The EU, both NATO and non-NATO countries, was divided in two different camps by their decisions to support U.S. led coalition forces. This created a profound separation within the EU across several political and security topics, which included the role of soft and hard power, out of area operations versus EU domestic employment, and defining the EU’s security relationship with NATO and the U.S.24

Different approaches of the three leading European NATO-countries (France, Germany, and the U.K.) to the Iraq invasion created room for French arguments for more sovereign European security policy. Because of France’s view that the U.S. is too dominant in relations to Europe, and her position that NATO is only a tool for the U.S. policy, the French approach to NATO also focuses on sovereignty issues. As a result, the French position is that the collective security of Europe is primarily served through the EU and ESDP and that NATO is secondary.25 French leaders believe that Europe will only get a global voice when it can stand on its own militarily.26 France, more so than either Germany or the U.K. is keen to see united Europe
develop into a global power that can rival the United States both regionally and globally in the years to come.27

Balancing this French ambition, the U.K. has maintained a close strategic relationship with the U.S. since the Second World War. Over the decades, the partners have revised their national security relationship and redefined the mechanisms with which they want to guarantee and develop their strategic connection. Throughout these redefinitions, NATO has been the principal tool for these transatlantic partners.28 Even if the British security policy with the U.S. has alternated between most loyal ally and European power balancer, and Britain actively supports EU and independent ESDP, she still relies on the NATO to be the guarantee of her security.29 As a matter of fact, recognizing the overall European willingness to invest a bit more to EU related rather than NATO related defense projects, British senior leaders believe that ESDP is an excellent chance to improve the European defense support to NATO. For the UK, this would mean that the U.S. would take Europe much more seriously in defense issues and the UK, being the agent of this European progress, would increase her credibility with the U.S. and improve her strategic security.30 British planners also discovered during their first major post-Cold War defense review that they simply could not afford all the capabilities that they wanted Britain to have for its own strategic reasons.31 This provided a strong argument to keep and develop the European military capability in NATO, along with the U.S. capabilities.

Germany is the third major European actor in defining how the European strategic security should be organized in the future. For the first time in her recent history, Germany is surrounded by allies and partners and faces no threat to her territory from her neighbors.32 These improved and stable security conditions and the fact that Germany is the largest economy in Europe have allowed the German senior leaders to re-evaluate their strategic security goals and resources to security.33 The present Chancellor, Mrs. Angela Merkel, outlined future German foreign and security policy in fall 2005, a couple of weeks before she won the Bundestag elections. She outlined that European and Atlantic security cannot be separated and that NATO remains the central instrument of security and defense policy for Germany. She acknowledged the need to develop and strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic security partnership and that Germany is in favor of enhancing the EU’s capacities and options for action. She also emphasized the need to avoid unnecessary and costly duplication with NATO.34 This policy statement of current German government’s attitude toward the EU’s security policy and transatlantic relationships shows that Germany is most likely to stay moderate in her approach to developing European security and military policy. Merkel’s election tilted Germany back in the
direction of the U.K. approach - increase the weight of European leaders, and thus the importance of ESDP, in defense issues by strengthening NATO's European dimension.

Because of the U.S.' shared history with Europe, the commitments it has made to Europe, and the importance of transatlantic relations to all European countries, U.S. concerns will likely have a significant impact on how the European security structure looks in the future. There are lots of comments, statements, and recommendations from very high and distinguished political leaders in the U.S., as well as in many U.S. policy guidelines and strategies, which very strongly indicate the support and will of the U.S. to further develop and strengthen the role of NATO and the U.S. relationships to Europe through NATO. Colin L. Powell, the former Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, reiterated in several passages of his 2006 paper “The Craft of Diplomacy” the vital importance of NATO for Europe, to the U.S. and to the global war on terror.  

The U.S. Department of State describes in its mission statement in the Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004-2009 the needs and ways to strengthen alliances and partnerships within NATO and in cooperation with the EU.

In the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush describes the need to act cooperatively with NATO and to develop its capabilities. The Administration has recognized the need to improve the capacity of states to intervene in conflict situations and is working with NATO to achieve this goal. The President also notes that NATO is transforming itself to meet these current and new threats and is playing a leading role in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Perhaps the most important point is his statement that NATO will remain a vital pillar of U.S. foreign policy, while at the same time he sees the need to accelerate the internal reform of NATO to ensure that it is able to carry out its missions effectively.

The Commander, United States European Command, General James L. Jones, USMC, refers to the importance of NATO in the future in his Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee as well. He notes that it is important to further strengthen NATO as the centerpiece of U.S. regional security framework. He also places preserving NATO as the primary instrument for European security as the first of three main pillars formulating the future security environment and military capability of Europe, but acknowledges that this must be done in accordance and cooperation with the EU.

Option Based on Purely European Union Capabilities

This option, or scenario, is the most unlikely to happen, but in order to cover all the possibilities the Finnish decision makers might presume they have, this choice has to be considered.
The trends and ambitions among European nations and especially among the three leading nations, France, the U.K., and Germany, indicate that in principle France has very strong ambitions to create in Europe an arrangement where European states independently, without major outside influence, decide and develop their security interests. The study of U.S. Department of State shows that, in principle at least, France has some support. Majorities of Western elites (British, French, German, Italian, and Spanish) support the development of an EU defense force.\textsuperscript{42} On the other hand, when the relations to NATO come in question, the same elites see that a European defense force should work in conjunction with NATO, or should at least coordinate with NATO.\textsuperscript{43}

In the EU and in Europe in general, the future existence of NATO is unanimously accepted as a fact. There is a common acceptance at the policy level that NATO will remain a central security structure in Europe. No one, not even in France, suggests that NATO should be totally replaced with common European military structure. The moderate, but persistent attitude of the U.K. and Germany, supported by the objectives and security needs of new NATO-members in Central and Eastern Europe are apt to strengthen the existence of the Alliance. In addition, the basic nature of the EU, verified in its Constitutional Treaty (even if not yet ratified), states that it will not become a military alliance. This is of great importance for the present militarily non-allied EU-countries and this approach as a whole probably will be one of the corner stones in further developing the CFSP. EU-members are mainly seeking economic development, common and global well-being and overall prosperity.

Taking into consideration the present global and EU-countries’ economic situation, it does not seem probable that they would invest in creating a whole new military security structure for Europe. This is exceptionally clear when one thinks about the critical strategic enablers that make a military organization a serious international actor, not to mention global influence, with the capability to project force. The necessary capabilities, such as global communications, world-wide intelligence capabilities and strategic transportation, would have an enormous, arguably impossible, economic cost for Europe, at least at the present stage. All this is already available for the European needs, provided through the Alliance by the U.S.

When considering the positions listed above and put together with the concrete and realistic opinions in different European countries, whether members of NATO or not, it is very clear that within the range of vision, or even beyond, there is no reasonable possibility or need to further develop and increase the European security primarily inside the EU, without the influence and means of NATO. NATO along with its most powerful member shall remain the
primary military organization in Europe, at least as long as the U.S. remains the only global military power in the world.

Option Based on Overall NATO Capabilities

When thinking objectively and practically, the easiest way to create more robust European military capability and structure would be the development, enlargement, and update of NATO’s present capabilities. That is, combine EU needs with the ongoing transformation of NATO. This is the approach that is being attempted through so called Berlin Plus arrangements, specifically through adaptation of defense planning. The term “Berlin Plus” is a reference to the 1996 Berlin meeting, where NATO foreign ministers agreed to create a European Security and Defense Identity and make Alliance assets available for this purpose. The “Berlin-Plus” arrangements seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of resources and comprise four elements. These are: assured EU access to NATO operational planning; the presumption of availability to the European Union of NATO capabilities and common assets; NATO European command options for EU-led operations, including developing the European role of NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSACEUR); and adaptation of the NATO defense planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU operations. After this NATO initiative, the two organizations established formal relations in January 2001 but the breakthrough came on 16 December 2002 with the adoption of the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP. Since then, the European Union and NATO have negotiated a series of documents related to the four elements defined in “Berlin-Plus.”

If the future European security structure was created on the basis of NATO, there would be some significant benefits and strengths in it. First and foremost, the Alliance has existed almost 60 years and proved its survivability over the Cold War. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, it remained the world’s only viable standing military alliance capable of taking collective action. During its decades of existence it has created not only a level of deterrent effect across the world but, possibly more importantly in the modern context, an organized forum for research and development (both actual and information exchange), standardization, and even collective potential defense industry sales of both major platforms (like the NATO AWACS program) and a plethora of smaller programs managed through the NATO Management and Supply Agency (NAMSA). Because of its long history it also has an existing command, headquarters, and staff structure as well as an extensive force planning process to organize the force structure, though forces remain under national control until committed to a specific operation. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been evolving from a territorial defense force to a more proactive
structure, most notably with the Balkan operations beginning in 1995 and codified in the “beyond Allies territory” wording in the 1999 Strategic Concept. This process accelerated following the 9/11 terrorist strikes with increasing use of “expeditionary” wording “as and where required” and the more recent focus on creating a NATO with global partners. NATO’s command and control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) shows that NATO is capable of deploying outside its geographic territory. All these facts support the solution to create the “hard” element of ESDP around NATO. It is there already.

There are also some challenges in using the existing NATO structure. First of all, of the 27 EU-members, six are not members of NATO (although four are Partners) and additionally there are five NATO-members which are not EU-members, of which two are European. The main challenge for using mainly NATO assets is the wide and principle view of senior European leaders on having a capable European military power to guarantee Europe’s strategic security that is completely under EU control (i.e. not subject to non-EU veto).

In spite of the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP and “Berlin-Plus” arrangements, this vision of having an independent European military capability has created a “Headline Goal 2010,” which is an update for the 1999 “Headline Goal 2003.” This new plan sets a goal to the establishment of: a European Armaments Agency, development of European Airlift Command by 2010, development of rapidly deployable battle groups by 2007 which can be initially operable within ten days of orders, availability of an aircraft carrier with an air wing and combat escort ships by 2008, development of a compatible network and communications capability by 2010, and a creation of a civil-military cell within the EUMS capable of rapidly establishing an operations center. These objectives show that it is not at all about practicality and the most straightforward way. The growing need of the European leaders to increase the importance of Europe in strategic security issues has created a dilemma for both NATO and the EU - how to efficiently develop the European security structure. This division of opinions culminates in the attitudes of France and the U.K., on security needs of new NATO-members, and in the historical caution of neutral EU-members combined with the dominant position and sometimes quite aggressive attitude of the U.S.

In an attempt to prove its capability to run military operations, the EU has also tested its capability to establish and assume command in military operations by establishing three different operations, first in Macedonia in March 2003 with 400 troops, then in the Democratic Republic of Congo first in June 2003 with 1400 troops and then again in summer 2006, to support UN mission during elections. In December 2004, the EU got a chance to show its competence when it formally replaced NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) with European Union
Force (EUFOR), launching OPERATION ALTHEA in Bosnia. With approximately 7000 troops from 33 nations, it is the largest EU deployment to date and represents the wide unity of effort of the EU in the Balkans. However, there is a difference between OPERATION ALTHEA and the previous missions in the way they were established. OPERATION ALTHEA, being a major operation for the EU, was planned and is conducted according to the framework of ESDP. It is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, on the basis agreed with NATO ("Berlin Plus").

Considering all the facts, plans, and goals presented above, both from the EU and NATO side, it is quite clear that there cannot be a European security solution based on separate solutions in two organizations. The majority of the European NATO-members are EU-members as well. Most EU leaders are committed to complementary cooperation with NATO through ESDP and "Berlin Plus" agreements. On the other hand, the prestige of the European leaders as well as their desire to have more influence in global matters affecting Europe makes it obvious that there will be a European strategic security and military structure in some form. The EU has formulated its basic policy that way and the cachet of the leaders will drive it on. Also, according to the different surveys, European leaders in general do feel that Europe has too little influence because of U.S. dominance in the Alliance. Even if it was just a feeling, it has created a need to build up a European security and military capability and that need is being addressed.

At the same time, the economic and financial facts, the amount of military capabilities available in European countries as well as the importance of transatlantic relationships for the Europe and North-America, and common sense, make it just as obvious that these two structures need to work together, using the shared and mutual assets effectively and flexibly over the whole range of elements of power. In this light, the comments and commitments among most European countries and in the U.S. indicate quite clearly that NATO will remain the central military factor in Europe. However, it is up to the European countries, members or non-members of the Alliance, to determine if it will remain the military structure for Europe as well.

Complementary Capabilities of both the EU and NATO

The crucial factors establishing NATO and the EU were completely different. NATO was established as a political-military organization focused on maintaining the territorial integrity of its member states. While NATO has transitioned to a more expeditionary organization focused on resolving issues before they can affect the territory of its members, it remains primarily focused on addressing purely defense issues due to the positions adopted by some member states. Conversely, the EU and its predecessors were established mainly for economic and
commercial reasons and has only begun the expansion into other security fields - defense and justice - since Maastricht.

Their different origins, coupled with NATO’s development during the Cold War when European nations provided in-place territorial defense forces and the U.S. and Canada had to come to the fight with deployable forces and strategic enablers, resulted in capabilities and competencies that are specialized in different sectors. NATO, if politically unanimous and willing, has the military capacity to manage crises and military conflicts and to do so globally, if the assets of all the member states (particularly US strategic enablers) are in use. It is continuing its transformation into a more deployable and flexible force. In truth, that military capability also means that NATO also has assets to provide humanitarian, economic, and nation building tools if it chooses to do so. The challenge in this issue is that since the EU has addressed these same overarching crisis management means in its own policy, overall political resistance makes it difficult for NATO to take action outside traditional military roles.

Because of its origins, the EU’s organizational structure has developed into a form well suited to deal with the wide range of financial, economic, law-enforcement, and humanitarian issues in the broader security field. As mentioned in previous section, the increasing role of the EU in crisis management is very much based on policy making and desires. These desires, coupled with its extant organizational structure, have been the basis of resistance by some EU actors to a greater NATO role outside of the military field.

In other than military aspects, the EU is a world player. It has a population of 450 million – more than the United States and Russia combined. It is the world’s biggest trader and generates one quarter of global wealth. It gives more aid to poor countries than any other donor. The EU and its member-countries pay out almost $40 billion a year in official aid to developing countries, of which a bit less than $8 billion is channeled through the EU institutions. By doing all that, the EU exercises a wide range of elements of power and constitutes a remarkable part of the efforts for the whole world’s security and stability.

This being the case, the best way forward would be working together. All assets and actors in today’s world crises are valuable, as long as they have common views and goals. The EU has expressed its willingness during the crisis in the Balkans in the early 1990’s to provide forces to humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and peacemaking, and it has adopted these tasks (known as the “Petersberg Tasks”) into its treaty, formulating the basis for the core of ESDP. Bearing in mind the political challenges, different approaches and different capabilities of these two organizations, it would seem to make sense to continue the cooperation and development of partnership between the EU and NATO. When looking at the
way forward, the lower density tasks for the EU listed above would be quite complementary to NATO’s robust military capability.

If the way forward was something else, that would probably mean senseless waste through ineffective use of resources with the lack of combined efforts preventing desirable results. To avoid this, the differences and contradictions at the international policy level among NATO- and non-NATO-members of the EU and the U.S. must be solved. It also means that the position and contributions of those six EU-countries, which at the moment are not members of NATO, can be solved in a way that satisfies the needs and expectations on every side.

Continuing this train of thought, one can make a simplified assumption that, from the European nations’ point of view, the European security concept can be split up in two separate but parallel sections. The first is the hard core of European strategic security, crisis management, and defense capability, based and developed further through NATO. Having only three non-European members (the U.S., Canada, and Turkey), using NATO as the primary military component in the strategic security concept for Europe to use globally if needed would seem to be the most economic, reasonable, and functioning solution. The second one is the stabilizing and nation building capability, which can be channeled and enhanced from the EU’s capabilities. When the EU’s development of its military capacity is included, there is a possibility up to a certain level to use the assets of both organizations as substitutes for each other as the situation requires.

NATO has robust capability and the EU has proved its capability to establish, command and control, and run the military operations lower than open war, which include the elements of nation building. EUFOR in Bosnia, under OPERATION ALTHEA, has provided the policing advisory role, has used the Stability and Association Process and the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization Program to fund and conduct reconstruction, institutional and social development, and rule of law successfully in cooperation with NATO. These activities are directly linked to the Petersberg Tasks included in the basis of ESDP.

The Goals and Means of Finnish Security and Defense Policy

Finland defines her security and defense policy in a White Paper report entitled Finnish Security and Defence Policy, Government Report, every fourth year. The report is prepared in cooperation with all the ministries and those parties that are represented in the government. When it is approved by the Council of State (the Government and the President), it is presented to the Parliament, which gives the final approval, or demands some changes. The latest
document is from 2004, and the next one will be issued in 2008. In the latest document, Finland’s basic strategic security and military decisions are defined as follows:

- Finland maintains and develops its defense capability as a militarily non-allied country and monitors the changes in its security environment,
- Finland’s defense solution is based on a credible national defense capability,
- Finland’s primary channel of influence is the European Union and strengthening the Union’s external capabilities is in Finland’s interests,
- The United Nations continues to be a central source of norms for the international security policy, a negotiation forum and an important operator,
- Finland considers a strong transatlantic relationship to be important for the security of Europe and in efforts to resolve international problems and it will foster transatlantic relations on a bilateral basis with the United States, as an active Member State of the EU and as a partner through Partnership for Peace with NATO,
- Finland continues to advance its cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by actively participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and EU-NATO cooperation, and is developing its cooperative relations with NATO both through the multilateral Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the bilaterally implemented Partnership for Peace program, and
- Applying for membership of the alliance will remain a possibility in Finland’s security and defense policy also in the future.

The basic decisions listed above have remained practically the same since 1995, when Finland joined the EU. The development in attitude has mainly taken place in those sections of the Finnish policy which are directly related to the EU’s security policy and military capabilities. Even in this development and reassessment of attitudes, the enduring approach for Finland has been the presumption that the EU will retain its basic character as a supranational community and an intergovernmental institution simultaneously and, as verified in its draft Constitutional Treaty, the EU will not become a federation or a military alliance, but a more broadly based security community.

After the Balkans war, the question and objective of developing security measures in Europe was mainly to create a European capability to take care of the security issues in European territory and nearby regions. The terrorist attack on 9/11 and the Global War on Terror which was subsequently launched have forced the EU, including Finland, to reconsider the European security concept as it became clear that terrorism had reached a new level that had to be handled globally and with a united front. Finland acknowledges that security threats
and challenges are increasingly transcending national borders and that the answer to these challenges is increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation between neighboring countries, on a regional basis and on a global scale to include establishing legally binding procedures. It is also recognized that the enlargement of both the EU and NATO have extended and strengthened the areas of stable democracy and that the partnership of the EU and NATO is creating more stability. All these changes in the world situation and the development in Europe, as well as the gradually developing role of Europe as a global actor suggest that Finland has to reassess her present standing in Europe. If cooperation with the EU and NATO takes a form of shared responsibility, then it would seem very awkward to continue operating militarily under both the EU and NATO, and still formally remain non-allied.

Finland is dedicated to increase and promote both her and international security through the EU, and she sees the EU and the UN as her primary channels of influence. Before Finland joined the EU, the UN was the most important international factor in Finnish security strategy. This indicates that Finnish security policy can and is willing to adopt new courses of action when the international environment experiences fundamental change.

Finland has quite clearly defined in her latest White Paper that from the Finnish point of view, both the EU and NATO have roles in developing the European security structure. From the Finnish perspective, it seems that the assets in the European security structure are moving on two parallel lines that together meet common goals. On the one hand, the EU is assuming new responsibilities and challenges in security and defense policy, such as the development of instruments to prevent conflicts, respond to the needs of civilian crisis management, and conduct crisis management (including military), all with a rapid response capability. The enhancing of these operational capabilities is done according to EU-NATO permanent arrangements. It is worth noting that the word choice in the military side is crisis management and not the capability to wage wars. On the other hand, Finland recognizes NATO will retain its defense function, although the role of demanding crisis management tasks will become greater in its activities in practice. The Finnish strategy assumes that future participation in high intensity crisis management operations by NATO-countries, especially with the U.S., will increasingly occur on a case-by-case basis (‘coalition model’). This kind of development might make it easier in the future for the Finnish senior policy makers to come closer to the Alliance.

Finland is quite strong in the areas the EU is focusing on with ESDP. Finland has significant experience in peacekeeping and related humanitarian assistance and she is participating in both civil-military operations (CMO) and purely civilian humanitarian and relief operations and training. However, Finland also has created and developed a military force
which is capable of both NATO-led military and peace enforcement operations (IFOR/SFOR, KFOR, ISAF) and EU-led operations and forces (ALTHEA, EUBG).

These crisis management capabilities are likely to remain the focus in the future. Finland also recognizes the EU as a principal actor in civilian crisis management and emphasizes the importance of treating conflict prevention, civilian and military crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction as a single entity in which a range of instruments best suited to the situation at hand are available at the different stages of a conflict. The military crisis management capabilities will also be developed in accordance with changes in the operating environment and Finland’s participation will remain at least at the present level.

Finland has established her relationship with NATO using the cooperative structures of the PfP program. The Finnish government recognizes that the Alliance will remain a vital transatlantic forum linking European and North American countries in their security-policy relationship and cooperation. Finland also sees that while NATO will retain its collective defense function, crisis management has effectively become NATO’s most likely military task and by virtue of its large membership, permanent military structures and capabilities, NATO will remain the organization best equipped to carry out demanding and extensive crisis management operations. This point is illustrated by the announcement of NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the November 2006 Riga Summit that “NATO’s cutting-edge Response Force is at full operational capability. The NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed.”

For quite a long time, Finland has been creating a military crisis management capability to respond to the international needs. This development will continue through further enlargement of present international rapid deployment forces and development of command and information systems, with the objective of establishing a brigade-level lead nation capability. Forces from all Services are included in these plans. Finland also has, as mentioned before, a long experience in coalition crisis management operations under NATO. In practice, the Finnish Defense Forces are more than capable of meeting the requirements set out for NATO members and she continues to develop additional capability. Recognizing that Finland is likely to retain her non-aligned status and therefore will not join the Alliance, she is still capable of supporting a NATO-based security and defense structure in Europe.

On the other hand, Finland emphasizes the importance of treating the whole range of crisis prevention and management as an entity including all the necessary elements of power. These “other than war” tasks in crisis management are the kind where using a primarily military
capability like NATO would be wasting robust capacities. The EU has demonstrated in the Balkans that it can manage these lower level operations, even if it was missing the robust military force, particularly critical enabling capabilities that NATO has. However, it is enhancing its military capability through the EUBG concept aimed at military crisis management combined with other elements. This is the idea Finland has committed to and the direction she is developing for her own crisis management capabilities.

Option Based on Overall European Union’s Capabilities

Taken at face value, statements in the Finnish Security and Defense Strategy might make one think that Finland would be eager to support European security solution based mainly on the EU’s capabilities. However, when studying the official Finnish security strategy, its assumptions and goals, and combining those with serious policies of different member-states of the EU and NATO, it is quite clear that senior Finnish policy makers are not seriously nurturing a wish to create future Finnish security policy in Europe on a model based on the capabilities of the EU only.

The importance of transatlantic relations is clearly recognized in Finnish security policy, Finland has quite strong and established relations with NATO through the PfP-program and she is developing her cooperative relations with NATO also through the multilateral Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In the EU Finland strongly supports cooperation with NATO and she is enhancing her military capabilities to respond to crises together with the Alliance.

The EU has also committed to create and develop its crisis management capabilities in coordination with NATO. In its ERRF and BG concepts it relies quite significantly to the assets available by “Berlin Plus” from NATO. Developing the future Finnish security policy only from the EU’s viewpoints would probably be acceptable and suitable for the Finnish policy makers, but by no means would it be feasible for Finland.

Option Based on Overall NATO Capabilities

There are basically two reasons why the overall NATO option is not suitable for Finland. The first is the present security and defense policy, according to which Finland maintains and develops its defense capability as militarily non-allied. The second is the membership in the EU, which is creating its own security and defense policy.

The option of applying for NATO membership is included in Finnish security policy, and that option is under study every fourth year when the White Paper is updated. The next policy round of developing the Paper will start after the parliamentary elections in March 2007 and end
in 2008. Until then, the present accepted policy prevents building of security option based on NATO.

Being an EU-member, Finland is committed to the goals the Union has set for ESDP. This commitment is stated in the present White Paper as well. Because these goals try to achieve a security and defense structure based more on European capabilities, the Finnish solution based mainly on NATO capabilities would not be in line with the Finnish policy. It would most certainly be feasible, but under present Finnish security policy it would not be suitable and acceptable. When comparing the facts above with those mentioned previously, one may come into conclusion that the reasons why NATO is not a relevant option to Finland are all more or less technical.

Complementary Capabilities of both the EU and NATO

It would seem that all the necessary elements to further improve European security and defense policy and capability are available to European countries. NATO, with its transatlantic partners, has the overwhelming military capability and the EU is more than capable of commanding and controlling the phases from stabilizing and reconstructing to transforming governance back to indigenous inhabitants.

A combination of both the EU and NATO assets tailored to the needs of different crises would give the best results and give the widest range of options to European leaders. The EU’s (combined with other international actors as appropriate) diplomatic, financial and economic efforts could be used in pre-conflict phases to arbitrate possible crisis in emergency areas or hot spots. NATO’s planning capability, command structure and forces could be used to show force, to seize initiative (if necessary), to dominate and stabilize (again, if necessary), and then to hand back over to an EU-led operation in order to disengage the strong military force.

Finland has assets to offer for both military and non-military needs of Europe. Depending on the international situation and the national resources available at any given or specific time, Finland would have options to offer either civilian crisis management assets, limited military assets, more capable military assets, or a suitable combination of all the former options. For the senior Finnish leaders and policy makers, taking any kind of reasonable action in this kind of combined efforts and assets situation would be acceptable, suitable, and feasible to every range of the Finnish political field.

Options and Recommendations

It would seem that Finland has two basic options. Since it appears to be quite clear that there will be no common European security and defense policy solution established on only one
of the two main choices (the EU or the NATO), but rather a compromised and complementary combination of both, Finland has to decide whether she wants to have real influence in both organizations or only be an assets provider after the decisions to use European resources have been made. In other words, Finland has to decide whether to stick to her present role as a member of the EU, but still remain militarily non-allied according to the present national security and defense policy, or to join NATO as well.

The first option, to remain non-allied, has a strong historical and political background. One cannot change the geography, and Finland still has more than 800 miles of common border with Russia. The long and violent history based on that geographical fact has created a pragmatic approach to conduct national security policy. Finland won her independence from Russia in 1917 quite easily, most likely because Lenin wanted to concentrate on the revolution and fighting WWI in Central Europe. There probably was a feeling that it was too easily won and might be taken away just as easily. In order to secure the young nation’s self-determination, the Finnish leaders had to find a way to live in the shadow of the powerful nation who had “benignly” given Finland her freedom, doing whatever was necessary to preserve it. During her history, and especially during the WWII, Finland has learned never to trust outside help, because ultimately she has always been left to fight her wars alone. This is most likely because of the remote location important only to Finns and Russians.

The heavy conditions in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty and the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and Soviet Union further increased the feeling that Western countries had left Finland in the Soviet hands just like the occupied countries in Eastern Europe. In order to avoid occupation, there were not too many radical things to be done, especially when the western Allies were very much focused on the continental Europe. The Cold War era strengthened this way of thinking among the nation’s senior leaders and it created the security policy ideology based on neutrality. From this historical point of view, it is easy to understand why this option has such strong support among the Finnish political leaders. However, while the historical basis for Finnish non-alignment exists, Finland’s very active participation in the EU’s military programs (including EUBGs), her support for an independent crisis management capability for the EU, and her participation in the European Defense Agency (the agency for development, research, and acquisition and armaments)67 bring into question the continued relevance of the neutrality doctrine.

The first option would mean that Finland remains outside NATO’s decision making procedures and would not have direct influence on decisions (or veto power given NATO’s consensus decision making process), even theoretically if the EU, which uses a majority voting
system, offered an EUBG with Finnish participation for NATO use. Her ability to participate in
the planning process of future NATO crisis management operations, which could include the
use of Finnish forces through the EU, could also be limited, though in practice NATO makes
significant effort to include planners from all troop contributing nations. The option would
guarantee the present non-alliance policy, but how credible is that policy in the years to come,
when the common military and defense policy in the EU is increasing? It would also meet the
wishes of Russia not having another NATO member on her borders, but how relevant is this
wish when she already has NATO countries as border neighbors? For Russia, it would remain a
political expression of will that Finland respects her security needs. Another side of this is the
probable international impression that Finland shapes her security policy based partly on the
needs of Russia.

The second option is a very simple copy from the first one -- apply for NATO membership.
Despite Finland’s very strong history of neutrality and non-alliance and the embrace of this
policy by Finnish leadership, discussion of Alliance membership has gained increasing
prominence in recent years. The latest, very insistent discussion happened in fall 2006 when
some leading Finnish politicians, including The President of the Republic Tarja Halonen, stated
their opinions over NATO membership. The Minister of Defense, Mr. Seppo Kääriäinen said in a
press interview on 2 November 2006 that the Defense Forces needed more funding or Finland
must join NATO, noting that "continuing on the current road would lead to a gradual
deterioration of the Defense Forces... and ultimately a dead end.” However, he added “saving
money cannot be a reason for applying for NATO membership. The matter should be
determined by national security considerations and even as a NATO member, Finland would
have to increase its defense budget.”

Less than two weeks after Kääriäinen’s news release, President Halonen revealed her
opinion in a lecture, making it very clear that from her perspective she considered it important to
make a clear distinction between Finland’s current cooperation with NATO and membership
with it, or even a relationship resembling membership. Related to that she stated it would be
impossible for Finland to make a general political commitment to participate in NATO’s rapid
response force even if NATO leaders approved PfP participation, apparently because the
President believes that contributing troops and operating in the NATO structure, even if as a
partner, would endanger the last formal justification to non-alliance. She also made it very clear
that Finland’s security policy is defined in White Papers every fourth year, and that military non-
alliance is the option in the present document. In public political discussions and interviews
after the press, there have been voices both for and against the membership. The most
The interesting aspect of the debate is that the differing opinions do not split upon party lines -- in almost every party, in government or in opposition, the opinions are divided.

There is a need to thoroughly find out the advantages and challenges of the NATO membership. It would seem that the security policy environment and attitudes in Finland are ready for serious political discussions over membership. It is the responsibility of the political parties and the citizens to raise NATO membership into discussion. The issue most likely will be addressed during the elections in spring 2007, or at least it should be. This should lead to public policy discussions in the new Parliament and Government and, after that, taking the membership option into serious consideration when defining the security policy cornerstones and guidelines for the White Paper 2008. One cannot make reasonable decisions about the structures for future security policy if all the options available were not fully studied and addressed.

Conclusion

It is clear that Europe has some major decisions to make over its future security policy arrangements and assets. There is an obvious need to decide how to use all those European tools now organized under the EU and NATO. It is also clear that all the necessary resources are available to Europeans between the two organizations. The challenge is to make, both in NATO and in the EU, the political decisions needed to make the most efficient use of them in creative and complementary ways. A rational way might be to develop the future robust European military capability and deterrence based on NATO and build the other means of the elements of power based on the capabilities of the EU. This would not rule out the military pillar of the Union, because all the crisis management missions need some military capability in terms of force protection; command, control and communications; transportation; and logistics. In order to minimize friction in the decision making process and maximize commitment, this would probably mean that all EU member states ought to be members of NATO as well.

If Finland wants to be a serious and noteworthy European nation in the future and carry her share of responsibilities in the struggle for a safer, more secure and equal world, she should very thoroughly study the national security policy options she has to make in the near future. In order to fully control all the mechanisms that influence European security policy, there is a need for every European nation, including Finland, to be a member in both organizations that define the international policies of the Old Continent. As mentioned by the Speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Paavo Lipponen, on 11 December 2006, Finland should, “in principle, be a member of all organizations comprised by democratic Western countries.” He also added that possible NATO
membership should be thoroughly investigated in Finland, and that such a move would require the support of the people as well as extensive common understanding. He called for a political assessment in the government’s next security and defense policy report.70

Endnotes


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