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“People Make the City,”
Executive Summary

Joint Urban Operations
Observations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq

Russell W. Glenn, Christopher Paul,
Todd C. Helmus, Paul Steinberg

Prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command
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Preface

Ongoing operations in the villages, towns, and cities of Afghanistan and Iraq offer the first real test of the United States’ first-ever joint urban operations doctrine, which was published in 2002. This executive summary provides a top-line synthesis of joint urban operations observations and insights taken from thousands of pages of hard-copy and online material and from 102 interviews relating to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Whenever an individual is quoted or otherwise associated with particular remarks, it is with the individual’s explicit permission to be recognized for those contributions. This monograph should provide rich source material for tailoring the new doctrine, as presented in Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, and for the training, acquisition, and force structure initiatives that together must constantly adapt if they are to prepare U.S. forces properly for urban challenges yet to come.

The time frame for the study corresponds to two collection phases. Phase I was conducted from October 2003 to April 2004, while phase II was conducted during three months, from July 1, 2004, through September 30, 2004. The results of a third phase of the study are published under separate cover.

This executive summary provides public access to material from a document not available to the general public, in the interest of

1 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002).
2 Glenn and Helmus (2007).
informing and stimulating further research of value to our personnel in the field.³

This monograph will be of interest to individuals in the government, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and the commercial sector whose responsibilities include planning, policy, doctrine, training, and the conduct of actions undertaken in or near urban areas in both the immediate future and the longer term.

This research was sponsored by the Joint Urban Operations Office, J9, Joint Forces Command and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

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Summary

Introduction

Today’s strategic environment implies an obligation to preserve innocent life when possible and to rebuild that which war destroys. Somalia and East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq: Recent contingencies demonstrate that cities, towns, and villages are the primary focus of that destruction and reconstruction. It is there that national and local economies are centered. It is from those concentrations of humanity that governance originates. It is men and women in urban ports, airfields, or warehouse complexes who distribute aid in times of need. It is from cities that modern communications come and to cities that students go to obtain higher education. Urban areas are the keys to nations “because that’s where all the people are,”¹ and it is people who make nations just as they make cities.²

The objective of this study was to reveal tools that will better enable military and civilian alike to meet national policy objectives best through more effective conduct of urban combat and restoration.

¹ Lau (1998).
² This turn of phrase and the title of this monograph derive from the following quotation: “Men make the city, and not walls or ships with no men inside them” (Thucydides, 1972, p. 530). Thucydides uses “men” to distinguish between his soldiers (and other individuals to a lesser extent) and what are felt to be the less important, nonhuman components of the city that he addresses. “Men” still pertains to coalition soldiers in its modern application (and, by extension, those in other organizations aiding in the recovery and transition of Afghanistan and Iraq), but now the expression encompasses individuals of both sexes who serve in military (and other) organizations.
To do so, the study drew heavily on written material and interviews pertaining to OEF (Afghanistan) and OIF. Written information used includes thousands of pages of hard-copy and electronic material, much of it from military personnel still serving in theater at the time of its writing. Interviews included those with members of the U.S., UK, and Australian armed forces and civilians working to reconstruct Iraq. The military personnel represent the four service arms and both regular and special operations organizations.

The time frame for the study corresponds to two collection phases. Phase I was conducted from October 2003 to April 2004, while phase II was conducted during three months, from July 2004 to September 2004. The results of a third phase of the study will be published under separate cover.

Three Overarching Synthesis Observations

Drawing from both the written sources and the interviews, we present three overarching observations that are particularly relevant in demonstrating the character or influence of joint urban undertakings.

The “Three-Block War” Is the Reality During Modern Urban Operations

Former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles Krulak once described urban operations in terms of what he called the three-block war. A unit operating in a built-up area could find itself providing support to the indigenous population (block one), helping to restore or maintain stability (block two), and fighting an armed foe in force-on-force combat (block three). Further, these events could occur simultaneously and on contiguous blocks. The metaphor was found to be a valid one by those in the field. Marine and soldier, U.S. and UK service representative alike recalled General Krulak’s model and declared that it accurately depicted the scope of challenges that a force finds itself confronting in villages, towns, and cities during combat operations. The difficulty is that military forces are not staffed or equipped to handle concurrently the myriad tasks encompassed by the three blocks.
Therefore, the three-block war not only presents a planning challenge, but also constitutes a resource-allocation nightmare.

**The Importance of Orchestrating Urban Military and Civil Activities in Support of Strategic Objectives Is Fundamental to National and Coalition Success**

Given that these modern ground forces are allocated personnel and materiel sufficient only for combat or supporting forces conducting a fight, the activities of other agencies capable of bringing further elements of national power to bear should be well orchestrated with those in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). This was not the case during early operations in 2003 Iraq. The delineation of responsibilities and orchestration of capabilities between DoD and other federal, nongovernmental, or private volunteer organizations was unsatisfactory. Improvement on the part of all participants is called for.

**Urban Operations Increasingly Characterize the General Character of U.S. and Coalition Undertakings**

World urbanization (approximately half of the world’s population now resides in urban areas) and the force-projection character of the U.S. armed forces increasingly means that virtually any military action will involve activities in built-up areas. Ports and airfields are fundamental to force projection. Urban operations are almost inevitable, as these are often adjacent to, or embedded in, larger urban areas and, in fact, are inherently urban in character themselves. Further, the importance of cities as social, economic, diplomatic, cultural, transportation, and other types of hubs means that coalition objectives will generally require military forces to conduct operations in these areas. The complexity of such undertakings—dealing with heterogeneous demographic groups, maintaining infrastructure support, and coordinating media requirements, to name but three—is far greater in densely packed urban environs. Therefore, this concentration of demands will also come to be the norm for military and other leaders. However, there is good news amid these challenges. Such density and complexity are rarely found in any other type of environment. Thus, a force qualified to meet such demands is likely able to apply its expertise and accomplish its missions virtually anywhere.
Twenty-Five Synthesis Observations and Insights

Beyond the three overarching observations, we provide 25 other observations and highlights organized using the joint urban doctrine operational construct of understand, shape, engage, consolidate, and transition (USECT). These five phases of an urban operation were introduced to joint doctrine in the September 2002 JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*. Their definitions are summarized as follows:

- **Understand**—Understand the nature of the conflict, the enemy, the battlefield, and the nature of the indigenous population and culture.

- **Shape**—Create favorable conditions for the engage and consolidate phases. Influence the strategic setting, control of the physical environment, civilian population, and red options in ways favorable to friendly-force success while increasing blue options.

- **Engage**—Take action against a hostile force or to influence a political situation or natural or humanitarian predicament favorably.

- **Consolidate**—Protect what has been gained. Restore security and infrastructure.

- **Transition**—Return control to civilian authorities.

Here, we list the observations and insights in list form; the main document expands on each one.

---

3 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002).
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002, pp. II-8–II-10).
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002, pp. II-10–II-11). The authors found that shaping activities are better envisioned as beginning before the initiation of operations and continuing through the transition phase rather than being seen as supporting only the engage and consolidate elements of the USECT framework. *Red* and *blue* refer to enemy and friendly forces, respectively. The nomenclature is drawn from the colors used to represent the adversarial forces during most U.S. military exercises.
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002, p. II-12).
7 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002, pp. II-12–II-13).
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002, p. II-13).
Observations and Insights: Understand

- At a minimum, transition to civil authority, not actions on the objective, should be the point from which to initiate backward planning; it will often be necessary to look even deeper in time.
- It is essential to consider the second- and higher-order effects of actions taken during urban operations. Those effects can be counterintuitive.
- Studies of former urban operations, most notably OEF and OIF, demonstrate that there is a need to modify U.S. joint and service intelligence processes and organizations, acquisition, training, support procedures, and doctrine.
- Irregular warfare, like urban operations, is very much influenced by noncombatants. Lessons from the former can be of value in addressing the latter.
- Decentralization, and therefore good junior leadership, is essential to urban operations mission accomplishment. However, decentralization can make it more difficult to gain compliance within one’s own force, especially in the normally highly heterogeneous urban environment.
- Urban combat operations confront commanders with a “dilemma of force.”

Observations and Insights: Shape

- Shaping of noncombatant, enemy, and other urban perceptions should be designed, war-gamed, and conducted as a campaign.
- Management of expectations is critical to successful shaping.
- Cultural understanding is key to every aspect of urban operations success.
- The extent to which the military is to be a social-engineering tool should be determined prior to operations.
- There is a call for an effective way of measuring shaping effort effectiveness.
The United States needs to assess initial indigenous population perceptions better. Its forces should be prepared to react appropriately to changes in attitude.

**Observations and Insights: Engage**

- “Speak softly and carry a big stick” is sometimes good advice during urban operations, though the stick has to be applied with good judgment.
- Regular–special operations force fratricide in urban areas remains a significant threat.
- Contractors play a fundamental role in urban operations. Their status and roles require better definition.
- The effects of urban environments on vehicle design, aviation operations, and system acquisition in general have for too long received insufficient attention.

**Observations and Insights: Consolidate**

- The greatest obstacles to accomplishing strategic objectives may come after urban combat.
- The U.S. military could better capitalize on the expertise of coalition members.
- Money and its management are key to urban operations success.
- The organization or alignment of military and civil reconstruction organizations should parallel that of their indigenous counterparts.
- Consolidation should begin when urban operations are initiated, which, given the prevalence of urban operations, is cause to reconsider the traditional perceptions about command functions.

**Observations and Insights: Transition**

- Coalition members should be aware of possible “mutinies” by some indigenous elements as established departure dates or other critical events approach.
• Though it may not be feasible because of political constraints, urban stability operations should be driven by an end state, not an end date.
• Beware the insurgency-to-criminal evolution.
• Balance short- and long-term perspectives. The challenges of today may be veiling those of tomorrow.

Selected Tactical Observations and Insights

The focus of this analysis is at the operational and strategic levels. However, some tactical observations have direct operational or strategic impact; in fact, in some cases, they underlie the operational and strategic implications discussed. The full list of such observations is included in the main document organized by the USECT construct; here, we highlight one example from each, with the exception of Transition:

• Vehicle tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) differ in an urban environment (understand).
• Maneuver units need to be more comfortable with human exploitation teams (HETs) and psychological operations (PSYOP) capabilities (shape).
• Urban engagement ranges are short; training should reflect this (engage).
• The intimidation value of any method erodes quickly with use (consolidate).

The Street Ahead: How the Past Should Influence Preparations for the Future

This concluding section considers how the joint urban doctrine, integrating concept, master plan, and those events might be modified given the observations and insights collected and analyzed in this research effort. It covers three areas: (1) the concept and master plan for fundamental conceptualizations of urban operations and related approaches
to addressing the future; (2) how those approaches influence service, joint, multinational, and interagency cooperation and what changes might be beneficial; and (3) specific elements meriting inclusion in future drafts of the concept and master plan.

**Concept and Master Plan Conceptualizations and Approaches**

JP 3-06 is generally well conceived, but its orientation is too adversary-centric. We are not arguing for devoting less attention to finding ways to defeat an urban foe. Rather, we suggest that the scope of the concept be expanded to account better for those aspects of the three-block war (or, at the operational level, of stability and support operations) that may not include a foe or in which enemy activity is not of preeminent importance.

A second area that would benefit from such broadening is that involving conceptualization of the urban environment itself. The doctrine, concept, and related materials recognize the mutual importance of the physical topography (used here to refer to inanimate elements of the environment, such as buildings and infrastructure hardware) and urban human features, but the focus is too great on the former.

Third, the doctrine as outlined in JP 3-06 and the concepts created for implementing it and carrying it forward in time (USECT) are little alike, even though they have a lot in common. A superior construct may come along. But until that time, it would be helpful to employ the USECT construct to simplify what is inherently an already extremely challenging undertaking, given the inherent complexity of urban environments.

Finally, urban areas are nodes, center points with tentacles that reach out to influence areas beyond their limits. Those tentacles range from physical manifestations (such as roads, tracks, and air routes) to less concrete manifestations, such as economic influence and political governance. Although this is common knowledge, few military sources investigate the nature of these beyond-the-city relationships and their influences on combat and postcombat operations. Recent events in Brčko, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Baghdad offer excellent case studies that would serve both joint urban doctrine and future concepts well.
Orchestrating Service, Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Resources

The importance of interagency cooperation is directly related to these dual elements of human primacy and cities as network components. However, there is too little guidance for the numerous agencies that have vital roles in seizing, controlling, and restoring urban environments. Although the lack of interagency guidance is frequently little more than an annoyance or point of disgruntlement in other environments, it is a crippling shortfall in towns and cities.

Many of the changes suggested by urban operations during OEF and OIF, such as making major modifications to current intelligence procedures, should be joint and interagency cooperative efforts. In particular, the full development of shaping campaigns as a concept and the actual writing of those campaign plans requires service and interagency collaboration. Developing concepts for determining and modeling second- and higher-order effects and fielding those concepts facilitating backward planning from an end state as defined in terms of strategic and transition-driven objectives will likewise demand knowledgeable oversight and involvement by multiple agencies and services.

Specific Areas in Need of Attention

Drawing on the research, we highlight five specific areas in need of attention:

- There is a need to expand the concept of consolidation to one that overlaps all aspects of preparation, execution, and postcombat activities during an urban operation.
- Shaping campaigns should incorporate the capabilities of entire commands in support of civil affairs and related efforts to win the indigenous population’s trust and confidence.
- Military training and education should be expanded to include greater instruction on phase 4 responsibilities.9

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9 Phase 4 incorporated the postcombat aspects of U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) campaign plan, with phase 3 being the primary combat phase. Use of “phase 4” in discussions about OIF therefore generally refers to stability or support matters related to Iraq’s recovery.
• Command and staff functions should be adapted to meet the demands of urban operations complexity and density better.
• Systems should be designed, developed, and acquired that are better suited for urban operations. Specifications should keep urban operations in mind.
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<td>joint urban operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOUT</td>
<td>military operations on urbanized terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>meal, ready to eat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OODA</td>
<td>observe, orient, decide, act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>private volunteer organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAD</td>
<td>suppression of enemy air defenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USECT</td>
<td>understand, shape, engage, consolidate, transition</td>
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Introduction

Background

Although it would seem rather obvious that the people in urban areas are a prime consideration in thinking about urban warfare, only in the past several years has the U.S. military formally recognized the fundamental importance of human occupants in urban areas. As recently as 1998, both the U.S. Army and Marine Corps wrote of such undertakings in terms of military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT), defined as “all military actions planned and conducted on a topographical complex and its adjacent terrain where manmade construction is the dominant feature.”

However, U.S. understanding of urban operations has undergone a dramatic, fundamental, and yet largely unnoticed transition since then. The term MOUT is now passé doctrinally, having been replaced by the term urban operations and an inherent understanding that “manmade construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features” in such operations. Physical topography—

1 U.S. Marine Corps (1998, pp. 1–2). The equivalent U.S. Army publication referred to MOUT slightly differently:

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain include all military actions that are planned and conducted on a terrain complex where manmade construction impacts on the tactical operations available to the commander. (U.S. Department of the Army, 1979, p. I, emphasis in original)

2 This entry (emphasis added) is taken from the joint definition as it appears in Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002, p. vii). The complete definition is “Joint urban operations (JUO) are all joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on, or against
constructed by humans or the underlying, once-natural terrain—has an impact to be sure, but it is rarely of preeminent importance. Every aspect of an urban area’s character, including its “manmade construction,” is fundamentally linked to its human residents. Infrastructure clearly consists of inert system components, such as power generation plants, communication centers, medical care facilities, and ribbons of highways, railroad tracks, or subway tubes; however, the infrastructure is much more than such inert system components—it also consists of the engineers who maintain the infrastructure; the doctors, nurses, and other staff who render the health services in medical care facilities; and the men and women who operate the equipment that enables the infrastructure.

This more holistic awareness of urban environments has profound implications for those conducting urban operations. To conceive of physical infrastructure without considering its social component is to misunderstand completely the fabric of municipal life. As such, the well-intentioned coalition that preserves electrical plants so that hospitals have power fails if the same force destroys the fuel resources that medical personnel need to commute to their places of work.

The density and critical role of such noncombatants—engineers and medical personnel, among others—most distinguishes urban operations from others. Clearly, buildings, trees, mountains, swamps, deserts, and other terrain features interfere more or less with weapon system effectiveness, line of sight, and tactics. But civilians rarely have a decisive impact other than in urban areas. Policy and strategy that define the purpose of war lend civilians their newfound influence. Today’s strategic environment implies an obligation to preserve innocent life when possible and to rebuild what war destroys. Somalia and East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq: Recent contingencies demonstrate that cities, towns, and villages are the primary focus of that destruction and reconstruction. National and local economies are centered there. Governance originates from those concentrations of humanity. Men and women in urban ports,
airfields, or warehouse complexes distribute aid in times of need. It is from cities that modern communications come and to cities that students go to obtain higher education. Thus, urban areas are the keys to nations “because that’s where all the people are.”

**Objectives and Approach**

Ongoing operations in the villages, towns, and cities of Afghanistan and Iraq offer the first real test of the United States’ first-ever joint urban operations doctrine, which was published in 2002. The objective of this study is to reveal tools that will better enable military and civilian alike to best meet national policy objectives by more effectively conducting urban combat and restoration. To do so, RAND’s Urban Operations Team, at the request of U.S. Joint Forces Command J9 Joint Urban Operations Office, compiled and analyzed joint urban operations observations and insights of value to members of the U.S. armed forces.

The monograph conveys observations and insights primarily by those with recent experiences in the mud-walled villages of Afghanistan, the metropolitan cities of Iraq, and all those nations’ urban areas of various densities and populations between the extremes. The monograph encompasses the spectrum of conflict from support operations to force-on-force combat against regular and irregular competitors. The emphasis is predominantly on the operational and strategic levels of war. Tactical observations of notable significance are included on a by-exemption basis.

The result should help both those still deployed on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as well as others who will confront future challenges in urban areas over the years to come.

This executive summary provides a top-line synthesis of joint urban operations observations and insights taken from thousands of pages of hard-copy and online material and from 102 interviews relat-

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3 The quotation comes from an interview with Jeffrey Lau (1998).
ing to OEF and OIF. It should provide rich source material for tailoring the new doctrine, as presented in Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, and for the training, acquisition, and force structure initiatives that together must constantly adapt if they are to prepare U.S. forces properly for urban challenges yet to come.

The time frame for the study corresponds to two collection phases. Phase I was conducted from October 2003 to April 2004, while phase II was conducted during three months, from July 1, 2004, through September 30, 2004. The results of a third phase of the study are published under separate cover.4

Sources draw heavily on written material and interviews pertaining to OEF and OIF. Written information used includes thousands of pages of hard-copy and online material, much of it from military personnel still serving in-theater at the time of its writing. Interviews include those with members of the U.S., UK, and Australian armed forces and civilians working to reconstruct Iraq. The military personnel represent the four services and both regular and special operations organizations. A complete list of written resources and those kind enough to be interviewed (bar one who desired to remain anonymous) appears in the references.

**Organization of This Document**

This executive summary provides a synthesis of findings and recommendations, presenting them in the form of three overarching observations (Chapter Two) and 18 others organized using the joint urban doctrine operational construct of understand, shape, engage, consolidate, and transition (USECT)—Chapters Three through Seven. These five phases of an urban operation were introduced to joint doctrine in Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002). Their definitions are summarized as follows:

- **understand**: Understand the nature of the conflict, the enemy, the battlefield, and the nature of indigenous populations and cultures.

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4 Glenn and Helmus (2007).
• **shape**: Create favorable conditions for the engage and consolidate phases. Influence the strategic setting, control of the physical environment, civilian population, and red options in ways favorable to friendly force success while increasing the blue options.5

• **engage**: Take actions against a hostile force or to influence a political situation or natural or humanitarian predicament favorably.

• **consolidate**: Protect what has been gained. Restore security and infrastructure.

• **transition**: Return control to civilian authorities.

Chapter Eight provides a similarly organized assemblage of notable tactical joint urban observations; Chapter Nine discusses recent urban operations implications for the future of joint operations doctrine and force preparedness. As noted earlier, the full document and its accompanying CD provide the detail that underpins this executive summary.

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5 The authors found that shaping activities are better envisioned as beginning before the initiation of operations and continuing through the transition phase rather than being seen as supporting only the engage and consolidation elements of USECT.

6 Nicias uses “men” to distinguish between his soldiers (and other individuals to a lesser extent) and what are felt to be the less important, nonhuman components of the city that he addresses. “Men” still pertains to coalition soldiers of both sexes in its modern application (and, by extension, those in other organizations aiding in the recovery and transition of Afghanistan and Iraq).
In culling through the voluminous amount of material collected for this effort—both primary and secondary sources—we identified three overarching synthesis observations that are particularly relevant in demonstrating the character or influence of joint urban undertakings. We discuss each in this chapter, noting that echoes of these observations will resurface in the lower-level observations throughout the remainder of the document.

Three Overarching Synthesis Observations

The “Three-Block War” Is the Reality During Modern Urban Operations

Former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles Krulak once described urban operations in terms of what he called the three-block war. Based on the metaphor, a unit operating in a built-up area could find itself providing support to the indigenous population (block 1), helping to restore or maintain stability (block 2), and fighting an armed foe in force-on-force combat (block 3). Further, these events could occur simultaneously and on contiguous blocks.

Those in the field found the metaphor to be a valid one. Marine and soldier, U.S. and UK service representatives alike recalled General Krulak’s model and declared that it accurately depicted the scope of challenges that a force finds itself confronting in villages, towns, and cities during combat operations. OIF ground force members and those supporting them from above found themselves repeatedly transitioning between firing on an armed adversary and having to establish vehicle
checkpoints or conduct other activities directed toward maintaining urban security and civilian welfare.

The difficulty is that military forces are not staffed or equipped to handle concurrently the myriad tasks encompassed by the three blocks. Commanders can, at best, aggressively address the immediate concerns of defeating the enemy and preserving their forces while mitigating the longer-term consequences of those actions, consequences sure to include inadvertent civilian casualties. The three-block war therefore not only presents a planning challenge, but also constitutes a resource allocation nightmare.

Orchestrating Urban Military and Civil Activities in Support of Strategic Objectives Is Fundamental to National and Coalition Success

The need to conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and support activities simultaneously in close physical proximity—the three-block model—leads to a natural increase in the importance of effectively orchestrating military and civil actions. This is especially true in urban areas where the density of enemy and friendly forces, activities per unit time, and noncombatants needing aid far exceeds that generally found in other environments. It naturally follows that there is a similar increase in the importance of interagency cooperation at all stages of preparing for and executing an operation or campaign.
Unfortunately, such cooperation between military and civilian seems a notably high hurdle to overcome.

Whether during urban operations or security undertakings in a more generic sense, gaining support for combined arms, joint, and multinational participation has met little resistance (although the reality, at times, falls short of professed beliefs). The same was not true for interagency actions, whether those civilian agencies were part of the U.S. government or others affiliated with private volunteer organizations (PVOs) or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Military personnel interviewed frequently expressed frustration about their dealings with civilian agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Evidence supports the conclusion that there was similar aggravation with the military from the civilian agency perspective. These nonproductive antipathies were especially notable in relation to urban areas, because, in urban areas, the pressures for action were often most immediate and the extent of demands the greatest.

Possible solutions that emerge from the observations include (1) better integrating postcombat activities with combat action during prewar planning and the conduct of hostilities; (2) enhancing military organizations so that they can more readily assume responsibility for recovery in areas affected by military operations; and (3) improving military and civil cooperation to speed the assumption of relevant responsibilities by coalition civil authorities, NGOs, and PVOs.

In actuality, all three must play a role. With notable exceptions, it is difficult to believe that civil governmental agency representatives or NGO or PVO representatives will be able to conduct their much-needed business when combat is ongoing in the immediate vicinity or when other threats make the operational environment similarly dangerous. Military organizations will therefore have to provide some stability and support capability in the period between initiation of operations and that time when the security situation allows for assumption of those activities by other agencies. That transition will be much more effective and smoother if the military organization is likewise able and willing to conduct a survey of requirements and communicate them to the incoming civil organizations so that they can tailor their personnel and supply input to best meet needs. These requirements—that
We need to co-locate our civilian and military headquarters. Even in Basra, where they are only a few hundred meters apart, they are not properly located. There should be a single, regional government.

—Andrew Alderson
Economic Planning and Development Officer
Multi-National Division
—South East

An opportunity was missed to “manage” the situation in accordance with an established plan. We were generally too reactive, rather than pro-active, and we were shy of taking on responsibility. . . . But few people are as well placed as [military engineers] to establish what is technically feasible, to identify where the greatest impact can be made with minimum effort or to understand the resources and time implications of an activity.

—Colonel N. M. Fairclough
Force Engineer, Operation Telic

the military even temporarily assume responsibility for governance activities and that it help the coalition civil authorities assume those activities—still place a considerable burden on armed forces organizations, a burden that may be too great given current force structures.

There is no question that military and civil cooperation during and after armed conflict has long been and still is in dire need of improvement. Combatant command campaign and contingency plan creation should include significant and sustained participation by civilian agencies. Civilian organization leaders will likely be in charge during some phases and therefore should lead planning at those times. Planning, wargaming, and the conduct of rehearsals should include all relevant players. Modification of standing plans in preparation for actual operations has to incorporate the same slate of participants.

Greater cooperation before operations would help all participants identify requirements and orchestrate assets and capabilities to meet those needs. Procedures also need to be in place to incorporate other participants. Such preliminary identification of essentials will allow for allocation of responsibilities and definition of what is possible, thereby precluding surprises such as requests for security that over-task military organizations not structured to conduct combat and civil agency escort actions simultaneously.
Urban Operations Increasingly Characterize U.S. and Coalition Undertakings

Approximately half of the world’s population now resides in urban areas, and the force-projection character of the U.S. armed forces increasingly means that virtually any military action will involve activities in built-up areas. To insert the forces necessary to tactical success into a theater, most such enterprises rely on ports or airfields that are in or near significant concentrations of population. Virtually all have one or more built-up areas as military objectives. Cities, towns, and villages are transportation hubs. They thus serve as natural foci for stability or support operations conducted during and after operational phases dominated by force-on-force combat.

Military personnel, and those who accompany or follow them, inevitably find themselves interfacing with urban populations and their leaders to address international, coalition, and indigenous objectives. Thus, not only are the skills pertinent to fighting among urban buildings key, but so also are those talents needed to translate victory in combat into civil success. The challenges and need for immediate action are frequently greater in built-up areas, but it is fortunate that many of the capabilities essential to success there are similarly valuable in addressing rural requirements.

These overarching considerations imply that virtually every major military operation of the future (and many of the minor ones) will demonstrate the following characteristics: (1) they will have a significant urban component, and the urban environment may well dominate activities; (2) effectively establishing security and support for urban noncombatants will demand interagency cooperation across functions and at every echelon; and (3) demand will exist immediately on a military force’s initiation of operations.

The complexity of such undertakings—dealing with heterogeneous demographic groups, maintaining infrastructure support, and coordinating media requirements, to name but three—is far greater in densely packed urban environs. This density of demands will therefore also come to be the norm for military and other leaders.
When I'm on patrol and a crowd forms, am I pushing Somalis or pointing my weapon at them? If the answer is yes, we aren't accomplishing our mission.

—Excerpt taken from message by Maj. Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander, Marine Forces Somalia
January 12, 1993

However, there is good news amid these challenges. Such density and complexity are rarely found in any other type of environment. Therefore, a force qualified to meet such demands is likely able to apply its expertise and accomplish its missions virtually anywhere. Further, the observations, insights, and related recommendations on the following pages will similarly often have applicability to environments beyond those urban.
CHAPTER THREE
Observations and Insights: Understand

There are six understand synthesis observations, each of which is discussed below.

At a Minimum, Transition to Civil Authority, Not Actions on the Objective, Should Be the Point from Which to Initiate Backward Planning; It Will Often Be Necessary to Look Even Deeper in Time

Backward planning—determining what the conditions should be at the end of an action and determining in reverse order back to the present time the activities needed to achieve those conditions—is a traditional military planning procedure. Military forces of all services tend to define a desired end state as the starting point for planning and then work backward to the present to best determine the resources and timing of events necessary to achieve that desired end.

Too often, the end state used is a purely military one chosen without sufficient attention given to transition requirements and coalition objectives beyond those military. The appropriate end state from which to plan is not the defeat of the enemy or actions on an objective. It is, at a minimum, considerably later: the handover of responsibility to an indigenous government or a transition governing body, for example. Often it will be deeper yet in time, e.g., the restoration of a stable and secure environment and its maintenance for some reasonable period of time.
To focus on the military end alone means that targets like communication towers and power plants may be destroyed, given the benefits they offer the armed foe. However, a longer-term perspective reveals that such assets are crucial to rapid and successful recovery of the indigenous society, making the sparing of such resources or finding a less damaging means of neutralizing them than total destruction attractive alternatives.

There is some evidence that backward planning focused more frequently on the transition to civilian authority in the 2003 conflict in Iraq than it did during the first Gulf war 12 years earlier. Plans and their execution in 2003 did demonstrate greater cognizance of phase 4 concerns. Unfortunately, the education was an imperfect one, and both planning and targeting were still too frequently shortsighted. U.S. Army V Corps planners initiated their backward planning from the point of having destroyed Iraq’s Republican Guard ground force as they readied for 2003 operations, just as planners in many units did in 1991.

**Considering Second- and Higher-Order Effects of Actions Is Essential—Those Effects Can Be Counterintuitive**

That an action taken during an urban operation (e.g., destruction of the enemy’s command-and-control, or C2, capability) has impacts beyond that which motivated it (for example, interfering with coalition deception plans in addition to disrupting the foe’s ability to fight effectively) is commonplace during military undertakings. However, these second- and higher-order effects tend to be more widely felt in a shorter period of time in an urban versus a rural environment because of the increased density of individuals and physical objects. Therefore, plans and war games involving built-up and densely populated locales

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1 Phase 4 incorporated the postcombat aspects of U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) campaign plan, with phase 3 being the primary combat phase. Use of “phase 4” in discussions about OIF therefore generally refers to stability or support matters related to Iraq’s recovery.
need to consider both the consequences of these effects and their speed of transmission.

The potential immediacy and broad scope of additional effects when actions are taken in urban areas suggest that decisionmaking processes need to include greater attention to these “knock-on” influences of military and civil actions. The greater density of indigenous personnel, media, and communication modes in these environments additionally increases the potential that a minor event will have consequences that are out of proportion to the act itself. The quotations in the margin provide a simple but effective example. Iraqi children have been killed running out to get food tossed from vehicles by passing coalition personnel. The consequent ill will very likely destroyed any favor gained from giving youngsters the well-intentioned offerings.

**Studies of Former Urban Operations Show a Need to Modify U.S. Military Capabilities**

**Joint and Service Intelligence Processes and Organizations**

No functional area has received more attention during the revitalization of urban thinking than has intelligence. Not only did the USECT construct as originally conceived present the valuable construct of five overlapping phases; its creators emphasized that it also represented a fundamental shift in thinking. Historically, a military force has tended to focus on lethal contact with the enemy—the engage in

*Children ran along the side of the vehicles and some soldiers, not yet aware of the prohibition not to, rewarded their effort with candy or Meal, Ready to Eat (MRE) snacks.*

—Officers of Task Force 2-7 Infantry (Mechanized) 2003

*Yesterday we were coming back from Baghdad and several children saw us coming along the road. . . . Of course I wave and say, “hello” like any friendly guy should. Yesterday, one of the kids had part of an MRE in his hand that someone had given to him. He called out to me: “Give Me!” I put my hand out the window to wave. He must have thought I was going to throw him something and he began to leap into the road into the path of an oncoming car. . . . He was so excited to get whatever he thought I was going to give him that he nearly got killed. I rolled up my window and didn’t wave at any more kids.*

—Bob Zangas Coalition Provisional Authority representative
USECT. The new doctrine in no way denigrates the importance of infantry or the primacy of the work at the “tip of the spear.” However, it recognizes that today’s people on the ground cannot accomplish their objectives in the urban environment at other than unacceptable cost in military and civilian lives and destroyed infrastructure unless their leaders better understand the threat and noncombatant situation. Engaging without this enhanced understanding would result in the grinding attrition that characterized such urban fights as those in Stalingrad, Hue, and Grozny. The preservation of friendly force lives and service to the objectives for which those men and women ultimately fight demand that they not be sent into urban areas in near blindness. Effective intelligence provides the vision required.

While all forms of intelligence are critical, there is a greater reliance on human intelligence (HUMINT) in urban operations. This preeminence comes at considerable cost. HUMINT, unlike more technologically based collection means, takes time; careful shaping of civilian attitudes; a willingness to interact with members of the urban population; and an understanding of social, cultural, and other local conditions. These many resources are rarely in abundant supply.

High-density, HUMINT-intensive environments make demands that current processing and distribution systems are sometimes ill structured to meet. Enhancements in personnel capabilities may be more critical than technological improvements. At least in the near term, the human mind is a far better tool for predict-
Observations and Insights: Understand

Understanding how an enemy will adapt its combat tactics or modify the way in which it emplaces improvised explosive devices (IEDs). After all, one of the best modern descriptors of a combat analysis process, the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, applied to pilots rather than to their aircraft. Observations and insights from Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that fundamental changes to current intelligence approaches would offer significant benefits during the full spectrum of operational contingencies. Modifications would address the ever-growing relevance of civilian casualties and collateral damage as well, because the same systems and processes that help to target the foe will, in many instances, assist in reducing collateral loss. The result is improved service of both short- and long-term national strategic objectives.

Acquisition

Regardless of the realm—ground, air, or sea; maneuver, support, or intelligence—the acquisition process too often neglects to consider the urban environment sufficiently. The list of systems ill suited to urban environments is unfortunately a long one. Examples include the following:

- Operations in 1993 Mogadishu and those in 2004 Iraqi urban areas demonstrate the difficulty of moving vehicles quickly through town and city streets or approaching the right urban target from the right angle at the right time from the air.
- Similarly improving ammunition or adding rounds to the inventory that better meet urban needs could enhance a wide range of existing systems. Soldiers in Iraq traded M4 carbines for M16s because of the M4’s limited capability to penetrate cinder block and other construction materials.
- Much work remains to be done in improving air-ground coordination.
- Problems with communications in cities are well known. Those between special operations forces (SOF) and regular units seemed to be especially difficult during OIF, a condition that might have been as much the result of unfamiliarity with nearby unit frequencies, systems, and call signs as of technical failures.
The other thing about the force protection thing is that someone can put down a mortar tube and the quick reaction force can’t get out there in time, winding through the streets.

—LT COL Andrew T. Condon
Australian Army

Radios and other C2 systems received many comments during interviews. Blue Force Tracker (BFT), a friendly force location tracking system, received generally high marks. But while widely praised, users also noted its limitations. While it might help mitigate the risk of fratricide, it was not considered a fratricide prevention tool.

Training
Recent military operations in the world’s built-up areas have demonstrated that current training does much to meet these demands while simultaneously revealing areas in serious need of improvement. Given that training can never cover every contingency, the best that can be hoped for is (1) inculcating the drills and basic procedures from which one can quickly adapt and (2) providing the military man or woman with the skills to make good decisions even when he or she is confronted with a situation never before contemplated.

In this light, training on the whole needs to be far less predictable than is currently the case. Urban training facilities should be designed such that no two iterations of a unit’s passage through a site are identical. In other words, urban training should vary in its physical traits from iteration to iteration, never becoming predictable.

It should likewise differ in the nature of the threat. A representative of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Bagram finds current training center urban adversaries too pat. He suggests that a force conducting urban train-
ing be pitted “against a thinking versus a scenario-driven enemy . . . a thinking enemy that inflicts casualties, a flexible enemy. . . . He’s not just going to stay and die. He’s going to do other things to survive.”

Urban operations training must also vary in condition. The situation changes not only from city to city and town to town in terms of local threat conditions, but also in mission, structure type, willingness of noncombatants to assist the friendly or enemy force, and in many other ways. Similar differences will exist within the same urban area in larger towns and cities. It is a three-block war; good training is designed accordingly.

Training needs to challenge those trained by altering the tempo of operations. Tedious calm should joltingly become a life-and-death struggle, requiring leaders to coordinate their units’ ground fire even as they secure fire support that tasks joint assets to coordinate suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), aviation, fixed-wing air strikes, and ground-based supporting fires.

Finally, urban training should vary in character. Units should have to transition suddenly from rural to urban environments and back. Lengthy convoys that might be the norm when haul distances are long and traffic is light will become much smaller when the environment is one with dense traffic and many turns, each guaranteed to tempt at least one of the drivers in a lengthier column to go astray.

The demands of effective urban training are numerous, ever changing, and resource-

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intensive. Well-conceived training incorporating the above-noted qualities of physical traits, threat, condition, tempo, and character will go a long way toward achieving that effectiveness. Such training must constantly adapt, just as opposing forces (and noncombatants, for that matter) in the field do. Several of those interviewed noted that much of the urban preparation now received by units meets many of the demands of lower-echelon maneuver units. Some of this training is quite good. It is seldom if ever good enough to address fully all the challenges confronted by a force operating in a village, town, or city.

**Combat Service Support**

Whether offensive, defensive, or stability operations, urban action in Iraq during OIF/Telic demonstrates that it is essential to equip, staff, and train every ground force unit for the likelihood that it will have to fight. Lessons from Mogadishu, Northern Ireland, and Baghdad further validated a basic truth: Every unit must be capable of coming to the aid of another in densely packed urban environments in which a threat can strike from any direction. Combat service support (CSS) units are too often unprepared to defend themselves, much less to be a part of the ground combat team on which others can call in a time of need.

Equipping and provisioning are part of it. CSS units have too long been neglected, short of radios, heavy weapons, and the other “niceties” such as BFT that are allocated to maneuver units first, combat support (CS) units next, and CSS only as an afterthought, if at all. Staffing is also part of it, and staffing includes not only ensuring that vehicles, convoys, and units have sufficient personnel to provide defenders, but also that they are allocated capable leaders. The discipline and quality leadership that make CSS soldiers reliable in battle are no different than those demanded by other units with dissimilar missions.

Training too is fundamental in preparing for urban contingencies. In addition to modifications to weapon training, CSS soldiers need better instruction on urban navigation and reaction to ambush. They will likely have to establish roadblocks and interview indigenous noncombatants. Their leaders need to know how to call for fire and coordinate air support on city streets.
The tasks are many, as are the talents needed to accomplish them. Every driver, supplier, maintainer, and other sustainer must not only be a world-class CSS soldier or marine, but also a skilled warrior in his or her own right. These men and women cannot be so unless they are better staffed, better equipped, better resourced, and better trained.

**Doctrine**

JP 3-06\(^3\) was a milestone document when published as the first U.S. joint doctrinal manual dedicated exclusively to urban operations. As valuable as that progress has been, the manual can be considerably improved by incorporating insights gained since its writing.

While the combat orientation of JP 3-06 is commendable, future versions should complement it with far greater provision of guidance about stability and support operations, military governance, and the orchestration of activities conducted by military and non–U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) organizations (whether interagency or multinational) that would better give the manual a capstone character.

The increasingly frequent occurrence of urban operations, including combat, suggests that greater efforts should be made to develop planning tools in support of such contingencies. Current casualty estimate tools do not provide input for calculating urban loss rates.

Explaining the primary role that HUMINT assumes during many urban actions is largely the responsibility of intelligence man-

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\(^3\) Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002).
As our enemy grows, we’re going to have to be a learning organization as well. . . . I don’t think we forecasted the types of fighting we found ourselves in. I don’t think our doctrine covered it, but our doctrine is still sound.

—LTC J. B. Burton
4th Infantry Division G3
Operation Iraqi Freedom

Irregular Warfare Lessons Can Be of Value in Addressing the Urban Warfare Challenges

The urban insurgent requires the support of a “sea” (civilian population) just as did Mao’s guerrillas in China, the Vietcong in Vietnam, or irregulars elsewhere during the many uprisings and rebellions that took place in the latter half of the 20th century. That sea is, in fact, far denser when it is an urban one; there are more individuals to provide support to insurgents, but more are also likely to know of the activities of such groups. Depriving the urban foe of support and capitalizing on the greater density of potential intelligence collectors are but two ways of taking advantage of this greater density.4

4 For a further discussion of removing support for irregular forces in urban areas, see Glenn (2002).
Considered from the perspective of urban areas’ unique characteristics, the many studies of irregular warfare conducted a half-century ago offer similar lessons that are very pertinent today. As one example, whether it is infantry, a bomb dropped from the air, or some other source that causes damage to civilians, there are many advantages to be gained by addressing the damage done. Following up an attack with a civil affairs team that explains why the harm was necessary or providing near instant restitution if it is appropriate, can have long-term benefits for future HUMINT efforts, mitigating ill will or otherwise winning resident trust and confidence.

Decentralization Is Essential to Accomplishing Urban Operations Missions—but Is Not Risk-Free

The heterogeneity inherent in many urban environments means that subordinate commanders will often be better acquainted with local demands than will leaders at higher echelons. No one will better know neighborhoods or influential personages and be able to make insightful decisions about them than will those most intimate with local conditions. Relying on them precipitates better choices by seniors and instills those so trusted with greater legitimacy in the eyes of indigenous residents when they see the subordinates’ judgments bear fruit. It also provides the forces with leaders able to

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5 Mao and Schram (1969, p. 289).
People Make the City,” Executive Summary

respond quickly to confront difficult situations effectively as they arise. Such “local knowledge” argues for decentralized decisionmaking.

At the same time, junior leaders must be trained and disciplined such that they respond appropriately when centralized control is necessary or uniform standards must be enforced throughout an urban population.

Urban Combat Operations Confront Commanders with a “Dilemma of Force”

Today’s military commanders, regardless of service, find that urban combat operations challenge them with an inherent tension between the need to (1) defeat their enemy while minimizing casualties in their own force and (2) keep noncombatant casualties and infrastructure damage to a minimum. The dilemmas are many: the soldier or marine who hesitates to pull the trigger because the foe is using civilians as a shield, the pilot concerned about the hospital next to which the enemy has positioned air defense systems, and the commander foregoing a tactical advantage because the opposition is firing from a mosque. All require the exercise of extraordinary restraint. The actions are commendable. They serve the ends of achieving coalition strategic objectives and maintaining a degree of humanitarian compassion in keeping with civilized standards in the oft-uncivilized environment of combat.

War, however, is the realm of destruction. There will be instances in which these men and

In urban areas, ground operations tend to become decentralized. It is therefore highly important that C2 be flexible, adaptive, and decentralized as well. Essential to decentralized C2 is the thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command. To further enhance decentralized C2, commanders at all levels should issue mission-type orders and use implicit communications wherever possible.

—Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002)
women will have to put innocents and their property at risk. In such cases, there may be no good outcome, no alternative that promises to benefit all desired ends—only an outcome that is less undesirable than its alternatives. A pilot might select the alternative of engaging only a few rooms instead of destroying an entire building, the appropriate airframe and munitions being called on for the task. In lieu of devastating a town, a ground force commander could find that a limited number of enemy concentrations provide the opportunity to wreak destruction over only a few blocks. There are times when minimizing unfortunate loss still demands considerable destruction; the difficult decisions in this regard will be influenced by the mission, strategic objectives, moral implications, and other factors that are situation-dependent. Leaders making the difficult decisions must find an appropriate balance between restraint and devastation and train their subordinates to do the same.

[Thomas] Jefferson observed, when Washington besieged Yorktown, “He leveled the suburbs, feeling that the laws of property must be postponed to the safety of the nation.” . . . This discretion does not belong to low-level officials, however, but only in those “who accept of great charges, to risk themselves on great occasions, when the safety of the nation or some of its very high interests are at stake.”

—Daniel Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution
There are six synthesis observations under shaping; each is discussed below.

**Shaping Noncombatant, Enemy, and Other Urban Perceptions Should Be Designed, War-Gamed, and Conducted as a Campaign**

There is a need to orchestrate *all* aspects of military operations to address desired ends consistently. This entails including players that represent every civilian and military organization that might be even remotely associated with the unit responsible for the deception. Further, it requires that every one of those elements needs to know, understand, and support the story that it is supposed to bolster, even if it puts the element at risk or does not fully support its own agendas. Add to that the fact that the time constraint for maintaining the story extends from days or weeks to months or years, years in which personnel and entire units move in and out of the theater of operation even as the need to support the desired end continues without interruption. Finally, suppose that the desired end is also known to every adversary or other person or group that has a vested interest in whether the friendly force succeeds. Such a situation captures the extent and level of difficulty confronting an organization that seeks to establish and maintain a consistent and coherent shaping campaign, one that seeks to win the trust and confidence of a people, set the conditions for long-term stability, or achieve some other highly desirable end.
Currently, there is rarely any such concerted effort to attain universal oversight of shaping efforts. The complexity of the problem is not at fault, nor is lack of a desire to create such a shaping campaign. It is simply something generally not conceived of on the scale necessary. It implies a gentle yet firm touch, constant yet largely unobtrusive management, a mix of direct orders and diplomatic cajoling, and an unwavering commitment to staying on track no matter how frequently one hits bumps in the road and or how far off course progress is thrown by those jolts.

Making such a campaign work requires creating a shaping campaign plan that establishes guidance for consistent shaping, seizing opportunities as they present themselves, and adapting to minimize the effects of negative events.

Managing Expectations Is Critical to Successful Shaping

There is evidence that the disappointment of Iraq’s urban residents with the current state of affairs is, in part, attributable to coalition nation efforts to win worldwide and domestic support for a 2003 war. In today’s world of mass and rapid communication, a message meant for one audience finds many others. Promises of a better Iraq made to citizens of the United States, Great Britain, or other NATO nations find their way to the Middle East, where they are taken as truth. Expectations are formed,
molded by rumor, unfamiliarity with Western-style politics, and natural human optimism.

In particular, many Iraqis heard Western leaders’ claims that life in Iraq would be better after the removal of Saddam Hussein. They were therefore unbelieving when told that their infrastructure would take months or years to repair after the cessation of regular force-on-force hostilities.

Major Stuart Tootal, second in command of the British 1st Parachute Battalion during its operations in and around Al Basrah, remembered,

> There was a failure of expectations because they didn’t immediately go from three hours to 24 hours [of electricity a day]. But when they only got three hours a day before the war and then they didn’t even have three hours, they’d say “Well, even under Saddam Hussein we had three hours a day.” A local came up and said “Saddam used electricity to punish us, and people might think you are using electricity to punish us.”

Ideally, messages with such shaping consequences would be consistent across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. That will rarely, if ever, be possible, but a well-conceived shaping campaign can include elements to address the inevitable inconsistencies and thereby minimize their potentially adverse impact.

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1 Tootal (2003).
Cultural Understanding Is Key to Every Aspect of Urban Operations Success

Shaping, education, intelligence collection—these are but three of the functions that cannot succeed unless they incorporate a good understanding of local urban cultures. Errors in understanding the many cultures found in large towns and cities are inevitable.

For example, Major Tootal noted that the coalition “made lots of tiny little own goals that we could have avoided.”² Inadvertent mistakes can alienate those who, in turn, spread dissatisfaction.

Leaders need to seek whatever means they can acquire to minimize misunderstandings that will delay progress toward the long-term strategic goals driving their operations. Better to limit the mistakes to a few “tiny little own goals” than larger ones that cripple forward progress.

In this context, developing effective means of recruiting indigenous personnel and taking advantage of additional resources to better interpret information of intelligence or other value should be a priority.

How Much the Military Will Be a Social Engineering Tool Should Be Determined Before Operations

A military force introduced during times of crisis becomes a tool of social engineering. During the

² Tootal (2003).
period between the restoration of some sense of order and the handing over of responsibilities to civil governance, soldiers and marines (and sailors and airmen, but to a lesser extent because fewer of them are in contact with the urban population) establish policies that have both immediate effect and longer-term impact. For example, they may set salaries. By so doing, they either reinforce previous economic standards of payment for given services or alter them by paying more or less than was the norm.

Social standards should not be left for individual commanders to establish without the help of guidance from above. Such objectives are a fundamental part of a shaping campaign, which have direct impact on the ultimate attainment of strategic objectives. They should be determined and promulgated through a shaping campaign plan, itself a part of the larger, overall campaign plan that should be the product of interagency discussion, wargaming, and rehearsal. Only through such a unified effort can strategic goals be addressed coherently and can coalition policies be seen as having some consistency from the perspective of those who benefit from or suffer under them.

There Is a Call for an Effective Way to Measure Shaping Effectiveness

The importance of shaping noncombatant attitudes to aid in achieving ultimate strategic success requires rigorous measurement of shaping effort effectiveness. This need has been recognized, but early evidence suggests that the
approaches being favored are too quantitative and may be too inflexible in nature. In urban environments especially, the pace of adaptation by parties interested in combating U.S. or coalition shaping campaign initiatives argues for creating measures of effectiveness that at once include man-in-the-loop evaluations and that adapt to changing local conditions.

Measures of effectiveness cannot be “black boxes,” the results of which are the product of some series of unknown algorithms with assumptions invisible to the users. Quantitative models can help in measuring the impact of shaping efforts, but they must be constantly updated to keep pace with changing conditions and can at best serve as only a component of a larger measurement system. The variables used as measures themselves have to be adaptable; the assumptions behind them should constantly be revalidated and challenged, as should the validity of the measures themselves.

The United States Needs to Better Assess Initial Indigenous Population Perceptions—with Forces Prepared to React Appropriately to Changes in Attitude

The U.S. military and its interagency partners enter virtually any Muslim nation with the proverbial two strikes against them. Armed forces members have no control over either. The first is the result of Arab and, to a lesser degree, other Muslim support for the Palestinian cause, and their perception that the United States has lined
up on the Israeli side of this dispute. Second and related to the first is the product of years of U.S. demonization by leaders and media in the region. Thus, urban shaping campaigns start from a disadvantaged position, one that must be taken into account when designing such campaigns and the IO that support them.

Therefore, it is somewhat ironic that current coalition adversaries in Iraq’s cities and, to a lesser extent, those in Afghanistan choose to perpetrate terrorist attacks that wound and kill members of the indigenous population. There is evidence that those publics and their leaders are coming to realize that the insurgents have nothing to offer beyond continued death and misery. This significant shift in civilian attitude away from support for or tolerance of the terrorist should not be left to its own progress. Coalition forces need to capitalize on the opportunity with IO and civil affairs initiatives that substantiate their stated policies of supporting indigenous governments and the welfare of the nation’s citizens.

In virtually every province, terrorism ultimately alienated the population. . . . The guerillas could offer little positive inducement to avoid cooperating. . . . Effective army counterinsurgency methods, and exactions and abuses by the revolutionaries—caused a progressive alienation of popular support.

—Brian McAllister Linn

The Philippine War, 1899–1902
(2000)
There are four overarching engage observations and insights, each of which is described below in more detail.

**While “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick” May Sometimes Be Good Advice, Good Judgment Must Be Used in Applying the Stick**

The proper balance between force application and restraint needs to be maintained during periods of failed civil authority or replacement of a standing regime by a coalition force. Minimization of noncombatant loss of life and collateral damage is desirable, but there may be instances in which demonstrations or the actual application of force serve sought-after objectives.

Theodore Roosevelt’s strategic soft-talking, big-stick policy may therefore be of value in addressing this strategic and operational conundrum. There may be instances of urban combat in which brutal and destructive forces are called for. But there may also be some instances in which military might needs to be exercised only when the opposition fails to respect its potential.

This argues that commanders have yet another series of difficult decisions with which to struggle—those involving the extent to which they want to authorize and use force, decisions with immediate and long-duration influences on security and strategic success. It will be a tough course to navigate, another of those requiring constant monitoring, cor-
“The lads would have been well within their rights to shoot him dead,” said Captain Shay Marsh. “Instead it was clear that he was simply afraid and, with any luck, now he will be impressed with the British Army and with the fact that we didn’t slot him.”

—Matthew Campbell

“Quiet Britons Outpace U.S. in Taming Iraq”

reccion, and adjustment when unfavorable events impinge on progress or as the environment inevitably evolves.

Regular-SOF Fratricide in Urban Areas Remains a Significant Threat

Fratricide is a tactical event in which one element in a coalition, alliance, or other mutually supportive relationship inadvertently engages another, resulting in casualties. Although fratricide is a tactical event, its impact in a social environment in which each instance of loss of life or wounding is exceptional gives the event potentially strategic consequences. Casualties attributable to fratricide gain greater attention as technology, good leadership, and better training decrease the losses suffered that enemy fire caused.

Technological advances can also increase the chances of one friendly force element detecting another without recognizing it as friendly—and killing after detection. The speed with which technology improves means that forces that once operated without significant chance of being spotted are now acquired, unbeknownst to themselves, at ranges far exceeding what was possible only a few years ago. The problem cuts in every possible way: regular-SOF, air-ground, joint, multinational, and interagency.

In terms of the regular-SOF, improvements in long-range sights and other means of acquiring targets mean that detections of friendly SOF once virtually undetectable are increasingly commonplace. Failure to inform
other regular force coalition members of the presence of special operators can pose a greater danger to the latter than the risk of operational compromise from wider dissemination of SOF locations.

Good practice offers partial solutions. Use of liaison officers is the traditional procedure taken to ensure that adjacent or unlike units synchronize their activities, but the density of units and of ongoing actions in urban environments makes such exchanges of personnel costly in terms of resources, especially for smaller, less robustly staffed units. Simple passage of information is critical. Members are likely to show greater restraint before engaging “marginal” targets if a unit knows that others are in its area of operation.

**Contracts Play a Fundamental Role, but Their Status and Roles Must Be Better Defined**

The success of urban operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and of operations in general is linked to contractor support as never before in U.S. history. They support critical system maintenance, provide security for personnel and vital sites, and are otherwise ubiquitously interwoven throughout U.S. operations in that challenging environment. For example, contractors providing traffic-control personnel and enemy prisoner-of-war handlers could free military police for assignment to crime-control duties. Contractors could be a key way to fill some of the vacuums that exist in the interim between

*In Afghanistan [there were difficulties in hitting] time sensitive targets. [The issue] was disposition of Special Forces. . . . Getting disposition of American Special Forces was impossible.*

—Squadron Leader Brian James
Royal Air Force

*We are experiencing this now. We have another task force down range that doesn’t operate with us. They have relaxed grooming standards and operate out of uniform. They don’t coordinate with us. . . . Eventually they’re going to get someone thwacked. . . . This [task force] has a tendency to operate on [its] own. . . . We’ve overcome that somewhat with liaison officers, but not completely. . . . The British pass through our area and don’t coordinate with us and eventually one of them is going to get capped.*

—Representative of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Bagram Afghanistan
military assumption of an urban area and the time that non-DoD agencies or indigenous capabilities assume responsibility for governing functions.

Their increased role pushes military leadership to determine the extent to which it might expand or, alternatively, whether limits should be established. For example, contract police could both fill the gap between the time that military forces are responsible for local governing and that in which indigenous security forces are able to assume policing and similar roles and train local police forces. But there would be a need to work out challenges, including the propriety and legality of private organizations’ employees using lethal force to contain looting before it became virtually uncontrollable.

However, contractor services and responsibility for their outcomes involve other issues. For example, contractors are currently by and large responsible for their own protection, this despite having, in many cases, jobs that require them to potentially put themselves in harm’s way on urban streets. They are frequently not privy to the intelligence available to the military units they support, nor are their actions integrated into armed forces’ rapid-reaction force plans. While military or other government officials might decry the lack of control and regulation to guide contractor actions, the contractors themselves have ample reason to demand greater assurances of protection for the risks they run.

“These folks [contractors supporting the coalition] were going wherever they wanted to go without boundaries,” he said. “They don’t do so so freely anymore; they are disciplining themselves from within. Many of them learned that the hard way.”

—BG Scott West
Norfolk, Virginia,
August 31, 2004
How Urban Environments Affect Vehicle Design, Aviation Operations, and System Acquisition Has Not Generally Received Enough Attention

It is commonplace to use mines, ambushes, and improvised means of attacking vehicles in the urban environment. Yet appropriate armament for soft-skinned systems, adequate shielding of their occupants, and simple recognition that the demands of operations in villages, towns, and cities require special consideration during the design of vehicles have been lacking. Soldiers and marines fabricated more or less effective protection for their trucks in the absence of standard guidance during the early urban fighting in Iraq. Communications within convoys and weapons in sufficient numbers to protect vehicles during urban movements both lagged requirements. That helicopters are vulnerable over cities was repeatedly demonstrated in Mogadishu. Russia’s similar experiences in Grozny in 1993 should have dispelled final doubts. Nevertheless, aviation tactics, equipment, and training involving urban contingencies received only limited attention before 2003 action in Iraq. The best-shielded USAF airframe, the A-10 Warthog, has long been neglected when it comes to funding, yet OIF seems to have demonstrated its utility as an urban close support system (though the tactics and tasks to which it was assigned also need reviewing).

The failure to plan and execute sufficiently well in the security field has probably been the coalition’s greatest failing. Although officials say that they had planned for looting, it is clear from Garner that they had not planned for the scale of looting that did occur. . . . The looting of locations such as Saddam’s palaces had been expected, but in 2003, ministries, hospitals, UNICEF offices and even nuclear research centers were also ransacked. This proved to be a particular problem when it came to government ministries. Garner had planned on using 20 of the 23 ministries for his new administration, but found that 17 of those 20 had been destroyed. By Garner’s own estimate the looting delayed the process of getting ministries up and running by up to a month and a half.

—Gordon Corera
Jane’s Intelligence Review
The Kiowas were fabulous platforms. We took the balls off the top of half of them, and the wire-cutters off some of them too. [Interview Question: Why?] They made the aircraft too heavy.

—LTG David Petraeus
Baghdad, July 27, 2004

How do you run wire in all these buildings? Running wire in the desert is easy. How do you do it when you have a foot and a half of marble. . . . We thought their infrastructure was going to be good for wire. It was terrible. You have to keep cables separated, which further complicates issues. . . .

—LTC Barry R. Hensley
Commander
57th Signal Battalion
Baghdad, July 26, 2003
CHAPTER SIX
Observations and Insights: Consolidate

There are five synthesis observations pertaining to consolidation; they are discussed below.

The Greatest Obstacles to Accomplishing Strategic Objectives May Come After Urban Combat

Military and civilian leaders alike focus great effort on defeating an adversary in war. But operations in Iraqi urban areas demonstrate that resistance beyond regular force-on-force combat can be no less challenging and even more costly than are pre–phase 4 operations. Loot ing is the exemplary case, but there were many other challenges (e.g., sabotage; inoperable energy, water, or medical infrastructure; unemployment). A military force is simply not staffed to conduct combat operations aimed at simultaneously defeating an armed adversary and preventing the theft, revenge killing, and other forms of instability that anarchy precipitates.

This reality lends further credence to the necessity of looking beyond “purely military” end states during backward planning. Part of the issue, a considerable part, is the needed improvements in interagency relations. Another part is retaining the flexibility necessary to make rapid adjustments to postwar conditions when the situation differs from the expected. Just as training at the tactical level must ready military personnel for the unexpected, so should planning, training, wargaming, and rehearsals similarly challenge individuals at higher echelons and throughout government.
The early coalition policy was to disband Iraqi Army units and deny employment to any at or above a certain position in the Baath Party—a policy that is now recognized as one that might have been better considered. Would it in retrospect have been wiser to have immediately hired some Iraqis, military or otherwise, to maintain order? There would have been risks, but they seem worthy of consideration when combined with a promise of continued employment and the threat of severe retribution for trust betrayed.

Discussion of solutions that might be applied during future similar scenarios should begin immediately. In the case of hiring indigenous police, solutions need to include identifying who will assume responsibility for hiring, who will set salaries and pay wages, and what penalties should be incurred by those who turn on their new employers (as well as determining what punishment any who threaten or harm the new police should receive). Alternatively, hiring civilian security firms could be part of a solution. And alternatively (or complementarily), the arriving military force can plan and prepare to manage the expected instability itself.

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1 One of many articulations in this regard:

“We created that insurgency when we dismantled the Iraqi army. . . .” said one Army officer. . . . “We had plenty of Iraqi officers who did exactly what we wanted them to do: Not fight and cooperate with us. We could have rewarded them by putting them to work.” (Hedges, 2004)
The U.S. Military Could Better Capitalize on the Expertise of Coalition Members

The United States possesses the premier military force in the world. That has unfortunately led some to act as though the nation’s military is derivatively the most knowledgeable and best able to accomplish any mission, regardless of character. The attitude both reflects hubris and is incorrect. Fortunately, it is by no means universally held, because much smaller militaries have expertise and professionalism from which Americans can learn. The same is equally true of those in governmental agencies other than those military: There is much to learn from allies, coalition members, and others with relevant knowledge.

Whether at the lowest tactical levels or at the strategic (the British, after all, seized Baghdad in 1917 during World War I), coalition members, allies, and even enemies have lessons to offer that are of value in meeting the many challenges of urban operations. The British Army serves as an apt and valuable example, and a generally positive one. But the authors could have instead demonstrated the point using Australian experiences in Dili, East Timor; the Russian military in Grozny, Chechnya; the Israel Defense Force in the West Bank and Gaza; or others elsewhere.

The British approach worked and is worthy of some attention.

—Michael R. Gordon
“Five Ways to Take a City”

After the capture of Saddam by American forces on December 13, all British patrols in the city were cancelled in the knowledge that there would be celebratory shooting.

“We didn’t want misunderstandings and accidents,” said an officer in the Royal Regiment of Wales. “We have previously distributed leaflets explaining that firing in the air is dangerous, that what goes up must come down, but on this occasion we thought, well, why not let them blow off a bit of steam.”

—Matthew Campbell
“Quiet Britons Outpace U.S. in Taming Iraq”
Money and Its Management Are Key to Urban Operations Success

Coalition policies about funding have been less than consistent in their effects, and the authority to release funds to commanders was sometimes belated. Comments from those interviewed suggest that there needs to be an uninterrupted flow of funds after the termination of phase 3 combat, regardless of the source from which it comes. What appears to happen instead is that the rapid distribution and disbursement of funds to points where they can make a difference in the stability situation become mired in bureaucratic procedures that stop the flow and undo what favorable progress had been made. Better to follow that initial distribution with others that spread the release out over time so that there are few if any gaps. While funding short-, medium-, and longer-term projects to maintain a steady flow might be less efficient than would dedicating all funds to important infrastructure projects completed a year hence, the money buys some degree of security and stability, beyond its more tangible purchase. In the short term, at least, the population’s perceptions are more important than the actual physical benefits derived from expenditures with longer-term effects.

Use of funds to abet success in these many areas can require skill beyond those taught in military institutions. Fiscal policies need to be developed before conflict initiation. They need to involve orchestration between short-, mid-, and long-term economic initiatives. Shaping campaign plans should include procedures that seek to better address strategic success (versus bureaucratic recordkeeping). Further, the military-to-civilian agency transition should be accompanied by a continuation of wise fund allocation that is seamless from the perspective of those whom the coalition is attempting to shape.

Part of the solution may be to develop a reservoir of those skilled in designing and applying these and other initiatives. Officer education (and that for noncommissioned officers, for they too were given fund distribution authority in some instances) should familiarize students with the challenges inherent in handling and allocating financial resources. The U.S. military currently pays for medical personnel’s education in return for later service in the armed forces. Considering
a similar program for sending individuals to graduate school for such needed skills as financial management and infrastructure development should be considered.

The Organization and Alignment of Military and Civil Reconstruction Organizations Should Parallel Their Indigenous Counterparts

The apparently seamless transition will be much abetted by insightful alignment of incoming agency organizations with their indigenous counterparts. Molding coalition assistance structures to parallel those in place within the indigenous urban government eases the passage of information and works to reduce avoidable friction.

Both domestic and international lessons from the past recommend aligning incoming military or civil governance organizations with those already or previously in place. If a coalition agency that normally uses a three-tiered organization desires to help an indigenous agency with four echelons, it is the coalition agency that should adapt (barring any extraordinary cause to do otherwise). The indigenous authorities are likely dealing with social crises and personal turmoil in addition to language and other cultural issues as they seek to rebuild their capabilities. They do not need to be performing unessential bureaucratic restructuring at the same time.

Giving money to . . . tactical units has been one of the most critical tools here.

—COL Robert Baker
Commander, 2nd Brigade
1st Armored Division

During July and August, we were able to out-spend the FRL [former regime loyalists] and foreigners in most of the theater—more particularly in the 101st [area of operation]. It was simply more economical to work with and for the Americans because we were disbursing more money into the local economy than Saddam had ever done, and the FRL could not keep up. Additionally, the benefit of the money was all local in the form of infrastructure rebuilt, schools and clinics back into operation or upgraded. The benefits from U.S. occupation during those two months were tangible to the average Iraqi. Why risk getting killed by shooting at Americans when you can work for them or with them and get paid more in the long run?

—Lt. Col. Henry Arnold
Commander
2nd Battalion
187th Infantry Regiment
3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne
Consolidation Should Begin When an Urban Operation Begins and Is Cause to Reconsider Traditional Perceptions About Command Functions

The ongoing confirmation of the three-block war as an accurate depiction of urban combat operations drives one to conclude that consolidation of success in villages, towns, and cities cannot wait for the cessation of major combat or recovery operations. Shaping programs, including robust civil affairs efforts, need to capitalize on the favorable circumstances that victory in combat often brings. Providing necessities for those in need, demonstrating an effort to restore urban areas to some semblance of normalcy, and intolerance of vendettas and criminal behavior are all parts of successful consolidation.

The difficulty is that commanders and their staffs are fully committed to the execution of combat operations. The multiplicity of responsibilities—offensive, defensive, stability, and support—proves beyond the resources available to many commands. Traditional approaches to support, e.g., leaving relevant tasks to civil affairs units, have similarly fallen short in Iraq, primarily because of the dearth of such assets. Intelligence staffs were challenged not only to determine likely actions by the Iraqi Army, but also to gauge insurgent capabilities and determine the critical personalities in the noncombatant population who would influence mission success after the worst of combat ended.

The density of challenges inherent during urban contingencies requires reevaluating conventional methods of dealing with them. Cur-
rent decisionmaking processes, intelligence structures, and allocations of responsibilities for civil affairs are among the areas worthy of review.

Brigade commanders were in charge of civil affairs, not civil affairs [organizations]. In Nineveh province, nobody did a project without the brigade commander knowing it.”

—LTG David Petraeus
Baghdad, July 27, 2004

These dual responsibilities extended down to the smallest detachment commander, becoming official policy in May 1900 when Manila directed that “not even those left on duty with troops can wholly escape the character of civil administrators... As the work of reconstruction of civil duties must become more and more exacting and ultimately assume a first importance.”

—Brian McAllister Linn,
The final of the five joint urban operations phases, transition, provides the basis for four operational and strategic-level synthesis observations, which are described below.

**Coalition Members Should Be Aware of Possible “Mutinies” by Some Indigenous Elements as Established Departure Dates or Other Critical Events Approach**

Transitions are inevitably times of risk. They are the more so when the defining event is the departure of a force that some perceive as one of occupation. Such a change can leave those who have aligned themselves with the departing powers in the difficult position of either continuing to support their soon-to-be-gone sponsors (and thereby risking being perceived as lackeys) or taking some demonstrative action to establish themselves as legitimate authorities in their own right. The latter can express itself in the form of violence directed at the military and civilian representatives of the departing entities, as was the case when indigenous members of the Aden police force mutinied against their erstwhile partners, the British.

Many factors influence whether a transition will be peaceful or otherwise, but the historical precedent and ways of dealing with the darker potential should be contemplated. That there is potential danger in this regard is evident in the Iraqi security forces’ actions during April 2004. Major General Martin Dempsey estimated that “about 50 percent of the security forces that we’ve built over the past year stood tall
How do you manage an exit? In . . . Aden, the police mutinied and killed the British as they prepared to leave. . . . When they see we are leaving, what will the indigenous security forces do? . . . The moment the occupying forces leave, what choices do the security forces have? . . . It is always a mistake to set an exit date [which results in] putting indigenous security forces on the spot.

—Major General Jonathan Bailey
British Army

Though Not Feasible Because of Political Constraints, Urban Stability Operations Should Be Driven by End State, Not End Date

The discussion in the preceding observation highlights the risks involved when a government establishes a specific withdrawal date. The result can unduly constrain the leaders of that government and ease the planning and preparation for postdeparture operations of those who might seek to benefit from the withdrawal. Further, progress toward strategic goals is as susceptible to interruptions and delays as are other initiatives in life.

If it is indeed achievement of those objectives that drives both military and civilian actions (as one would generally suppose is the case), then it should be the attainment of those objectives, or, at a minimum, the establishment of the preconditions for that accomplishment, that should trigger critical events during any urban operation. Within the bounds of that logic, establishing a firm terminus date for any strategic activity is justified only if such a designation in some way serves the attainment of strategic ends.

Beware the Insurgent-to-Criminal Evolution

Given some evidence that Iraqi urban residents are tiring of insurgent violence, it is necessary to consider how the insurgent forces are likely to adapt to a possibly reduced level of support (or tolerance) in the nation’s cities. Among the possible responses is a movement toward criminal enterprise as a means of supporting continued violence. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and elements once professing dedication to revolution in Northern Ireland have both completed this transition. Despite propaganda efforts that state otherwise, the groups have left the vestiges of insurgent fervor far behind to become full-fledged players among world organized crime syndicates.

The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq are unclear in this regard as of this writing, in considerable part because of the heterogeneity and number of such groups, especially in Iraq. Former criminal elements are among the insurgent ranks, but some insurgent groups have punished criminal activities by other factions, such as kidnapping for ransom. Then again, in Afghanistan, a return to opium production has met little effective resistance. Differences are likely to continue, but a shift toward more groups focusing on outright criminal activity is a possible evolution that coalition elements should seek to interdict early.

I believe that CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] made one fatal mistake. They are driven by an end date instead of an end state.

—Andrew Alderson
Economic Planning and Development Officer
Multi-National Division—South East

The brigade area of operations included representatives of opposing forces and partially functioning local governments. Economically the region was having difficulties due to the criminal activities of various military groups and representatives of the city at large and the breakdown of habitual economic relationships both locally and at higher levels.

—Colonel Gregory Fontenot, speaking on his experiences as a brigade commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995–1996
Balance Short- and Long-Term Perspectives—Today’s Challenges May Veil Tomorrow’s

Fighting against insurgents dominates the media’s and the public’s attention. Iraq’s cities are where the bomb blasts most kill and maim. They are the sites of kidnappings and beheadings. Urban insurgents seek to gain and hold the attention of the world, and, to a considerable extent, they succeed. Urban insurgency is the Iraqi Stalingrad of today, in the sense that eyes focus, perhaps too much, on the irregular enemy and its defeat rather than on the more important and longer-term objectives that will better serve Iraq. A nation of defeated insurgents is not the ultimate end state. Security and stability in Iraq’s urban areas, and the nation at large, are the conditions necessary for sustained economic, social, and political maturation. Defeat or suppression of the insurgents is but one facet of achieving those objectives.

There is a need to resist the temptation to become infatuated with the problem at hand. Coalition and emerging government leaders alike must address the issues that will bring about the greater goals. The same shaping campaign objectives of promoting the legitimacy of indigenous governments, encouraging cooperation in the rebuilding of the nation, and others essential to overcoming an insurgency also in part address antipathies underlying other internal conflicts.
Although the focus of this analysis is at the operational and strategic levels, some of the tactical observations that emerged from the interviews have direct operational or strategic impact. Table 8.1 compiles selected offerings, categorized as understand, shape, engage, or consolidate, as appropriate. No transition-oriented observations and insights were selected for inclusion. The offerings are self-explanatory.
### Table 8.1
Tactical Observations and Insights: Selected Offerings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Observation</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Understand | Speed kills, but it also saves lives.  
Never become predictable.  
Vehicle tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) will differ in urban environments.  
Any vehicle can pose a threat to a convoy.  
Convoy briefings should be more than going through the motions. Treat them like an operations order and rehearsal.  
Urban communications are difficult 1: The number and nature of challenges can be daunting.  
Urban communications are difficult 2: Plan for redundancy.  
Train as you will fight 1: Support does not always make it on time, and what you need is sometimes different in urban areas.  
Train as you will fight 2: Urban training has to be dirty—more debris, more noise, more distractions. |
| Shape | The urban fight or operation is a combined arms one, although the arms combined are often not those employed in previous wars—maneuver, psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs (CA).  
Maneuver units need to be more comfortable with human exploitation team (HET) and PSYOP capabilities. |
| Engage | Urban engagement ranges are short—training should reflect this.  
There is no “administrative movement” during urban combat.  
The urban ground or fight operation is a combined arms one—one that needs to include both light and heavy vehicle forces.  
The current means of determining friendly ground force locations lacks the “granularity” that air support deems necessary.  
Armor and mechanized vehicles have their place in urban stability operations.  
Artillery may have to fire in direct-fire mode during urban contingencies.  
Pushing medical care forward could save the lives of urban casualties.  
Rehearse IED ambush drills. Have multiple responses so as to not become predictable. |
**Table 8.1—Continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft systems may be insufficiently accurate for urban targeting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidate</td>
<td>Stability operations require not only a certain number of troops, but also certain kinds of troops or a higher proportion of troops with certain kinds of training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective influence on the civilian population starts with the behavior and attitude of every military member, as well as every coalition, PVO, or NGO civilian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A single translator may be insufficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any method’s intimidation value erodes quickly with use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military police may need more protection than a high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) offers during urban combat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Anticoalition forces] are using motorcycles and sedans to stalk USMC convoys. Sedans often stalk for a little while and then race by and stop on the side of the road with trunk open.

—Comment by a U.S. armed force service member, Iraq, 2004

Develop your techniques before you go to Iraq. Beat up your boss so you can train with tactical human intelligence teams and tactical psychological operations teams before you deploy. I know this will be difficult because most of these units are either Army Reserve or National Guard. These soldiers can keep crowds back with their speakers, and their translators will help you sort out good guys from bad guys. They can identify the difference between deeds to homes and instruction manuals for mortars. Unless you can read and write Arabic, you are just plain out of luck.

—CPT John B. Nalls,
“A Company Commander’s Thoughts on Iraq,”
*Armor*, Vol. 113, No. 1, January–February 2004

Combined arms worked. . . . It should always be a combined arms fight. Armor proved its worth. It has its place. . . . It is still the gold standard in the Middle East.

1st Marine Expeditionary Force,
December 17, 2003

U.S. ends will benefit the more that members of the indigenous population “see that the GIs don’t start anything, are by-and-large friendly, and very compassionate, especially to kids and old people. I saw a bunch of 19-year-olds from the 82nd Airborne not return fire coming from a mosque until they got a group of elderly civilians out of harm’s way. So did the Iraqis.

—“Message from Iraq,”
email message from Mark [unidentified Army Green Beret CPT], forwarded by David S. Maxwell, July 1, 2003
This concluding chapter considers how the joint urban doctrine, integrating concept, and master plan might be modified given the observations and insights collected and analyzed in this research effort. It covers three areas: (1) the concept and master plan for fundamental conceptualizations of urban operations and related approaches to addressing the future; (2) how those approaches influence service, joint, multinational, and interagency cooperation and what changes might be beneficial; and (3) specific elements meriting inclusion in future drafts of the concept and master plan.

Concept and Master Plan Conceptualizations and Approaches

JP 3-06’s eight principles that “guide planning, preparation, deployment, employment, and sustainment for urban operations” are generally well conceived, but their orientation is too adversary-centric. We are not arguing for devoting less attention to finding ways to defeat an urban foe. Rather, we suggest that the scope of the concept be expanded to better account for those aspects of the three-block war (or, at the operational level, of stability and support operations) that

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1 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2002).
may not include a foe or in which enemy activity is not of preeminent importance.

A second area that would benefit from such broadening is that involving conceptualization of the urban environment itself. The doctrine, concept, and related materials recognize the mutual importance of the physical topography (used here to refer to inanimate elements of the environment, such as buildings and infrastructure hardware) and urban human features, but the focus is too great on the former.

Third, the doctrine as outlined in JP 3-06 and the concepts created for implementing it and carrying it forward in time (USECT) are little alike, even though they have a lot in common. A superior construct may come along. But until that time, it would be helpful to employ the USECT construct to simplify what is inherently an already extremely challenging undertaking, given the inherent complexity of urban environments.

Finally, urban areas are nodes, center points with tentacles that reach out to influence areas beyond their limits. Those tentacles range from physical manifestations (such as roads, tracks, and air routes) to less concrete manifestations, such as economic influence and political governance. Although this is common knowledge, few military sources investigate the nature of these beyond-the-city relationships and their influences on combat and postcombat operations. Recent events in Brčko, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Baghdad offer excellent case studies that would serve both joint urban doctrine and future concepts well.

**Orchestrating Service, Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Resources**

The importance of interagency cooperation is directly related to these dual elements of human primacy and cities as network components. However, there is too little guidance for the numerous agencies that have vital roles in seizing, controlling, and restoring urban environments. Although the lack of interagency guidance is frequently little more than an annoyance or point of disgruntlement in other environments, it is a crippling shortfall in towns and cities.
Many of the changes suggested by urban operations during OEF and OIF, such as making major modifications to current intelligence procedures, should be joint and interagency cooperative efforts. In particular, the full development of shaping campaigns as a concept and the actual writing of those campaign plans require service and interagency collaboration. Developing concepts for determining and modeling second- and higher-order effects and fielding those concepts facilitating backward planning from an end state as defined in terms of strategic and transition-driven objectives will likewise demand knowledgeable oversight and involvement by multiple agencies and services.

**Specific Areas in Need of Attention**

Drawing on the research, we highlight five specific areas in need of attention:

- There is a need to expand the concept of consolidation to one that overlaps all aspects of preparation, execution, and postcombat activities during an urban operation.
- Shaping campaigns should incorporate the capabilities of entire commands in support of CA and related efforts to win the indigenous population’s trust and confidence.
- Military training and education should be expanded to include greater instruction on phase 4 responsibilities.

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*Had proper steps been taken in peace to study the possibilities of a war in Mesopotamia, a large number of mistakes and much loss of life would have been avoided.*

—“Report on the Mesopotamian Campaign”
Major General B. D. Fisher and Major General C. C. Armitage
October 13, 1931

*[Consolidation] calls for an ongoing process of organizing and strengthening the joint force position with respect to the city. . . . The nature of [urban operations] ensures that the [Joint Force Commander] will have to contend with issues concerning physical damage, noncombatants, and infrastructure as part of consolidation.*

—Joint Chiefs of Staff
(2002, pp. II-12–II-13, emphasis added)
References


Lau, Jeffrey, then–Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, First Infantry Division, interview with Russell W. Glenn, Wurzburg, Germany, August 31, 1998.


