Making the Mix Work:  
Coalition C2 Interoperability during Recent Operations

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Abstract

This paper analyzes multinational command and control (C2) arrangements since the Second World War with an eye to understanding how such arrangements have been successful. In particular, it considers the development of command relations from developments in the European Theater during the Second World War to modern day crises. Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM were clearly a watershed. Since 1990 operations in Somalia, and Haiti, and subsequent operations in Southwest Asia and Eastern Europe have taught us much about multinational C2. In some ways were have now rediscovered the tools that worked so well in 1944 and learned to apply them to a wider range of operations and participating nations.

Introduction

Coalition military operations are not new, yet modern notions of command and control in a coalition environment are relatively recent. This paper analyzes multinational command and control (C2) arrangements since the Second World War with an eye to understanding how such arrangements have been successful. General Eisenhower’s treatment of command relations in the European Theater shows well the maturation of multinational command arrangements during wartime. The Cold War observed some multinational command requirements, but the greatest development in this area has been since 1990. Following Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM the United States has frequently taken the lead in multinational or United Nations (UN) military efforts. Operations in Somalia taught us much about the impact of C2 weakness. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY showed some improvements in multinational C2, but Operation ALLIED FORCE again tugged hard at alliance and coalition C2 seams. With the advent of Australia’s leadership in East Timor during Operation STABILISE, multinational C2 seemed to have matured even during operations without U.S. dominance. This paper examines the C2 interoperability challenge from a historical perspective with an eye towards integrating lessons learned and improving future command arrangements.

The Second World War Precedent: Joint and Multinational

Multinational C2 is far from new. Some students of military history may forget that this conceptual development was perhaps the significant accomplishment for the Allies during the war, but Eisenhower and his fellow commanders would certainly remind us of its importance. Ike was set on unity of effort from early 1942 when he helped draft the US Army’s first opinion on theater
### Report Documentation Page

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<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>JUN 2001</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
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| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE | Making the Mix Work: Coalition C2 Interoperability during Recent Operations |

| 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER |          |
| 5b. GRANT NUMBER   |          |
| 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER |          |
| 5d. PROJECT NUMBER |          |
| 5e. TASK NUMBER    |          |
| 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER |          |

| 6. AUTHOR(S) |          |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | Naval War College, 686 Cushing Blvd, Newport, RI, 02840 |
| 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER |          |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) |          |
| 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) |          |
| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) |          |

| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT | Approved for public release; distribution unlimited |

| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | 6th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium |
| 14. ABSTRACT |          |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS |          |

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<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
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<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
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Eisenhower had to grapple with two divergent issues as he sought to develop a workable command structure for operations in the European Theater. The most pressing appeared to be integration of U.S. and British views and processes; the sleeper was the need to integrate American and British service perspectives. It took Ike longer to fully integrate the latter problem, if indeed he ever really managed to develop joint perspectives during an ear when the Navy and Air Force were both struggling for independence in different ways.

Once assigned to lead operation TORCH in 1942, Eisenhower put great personal energy in to the development of a combined staff for his Allied Force Headquarters. In this he was fairly successful, even in the press of mounting an operation in less than 90 days. What he had no time to develop was the structure of the forces that would be assigned to him for TORCH. In this Ike inherited a hodge-podge of groupings that were not optimized for warfighting (although he would only learn this through trial and error).

In 1942 Ike had two regional air commanders, three regional ground commanders and a naval component with three regional subordinates (the U.S. navy and the Royal Navy also worked better together than did the other services of the two nations). By January, 1943 – after the failure to rapidly accomplish the TORCH objective and the onset of winter weather – Ike had recast his subordinate structure to better leverage his airpower. This was one of the great lessons of the war. Airpower effects within the battlespace were largely under-appreciated by Americans, but the special problems in North Africa made its focused application a necessity. Although the value centralized control of air forces would continue to rise in its contribution to Allied success and in Ike’s appreciation, it remained poorly understood by many until 1944.

Within three months Ike had to recast his subordinate structure a second time to better employ ground forces in the assault on Tunis. This was driven in part by the delicacy of the link-up with Montgomery’s Eighth Army (Monty being senior to Ike), but also by the increased complexity of the ground fighting in Tunisia. His new land component commander, General Alexander, took his position coincident with the defeat at Kasserine Pass.

At about the same time, Ike began to look to his air component commander for more than command of air forces and advice concerning the integration of air and ground effects. Soon Air Marshal Arthur Tedder was executing decisive air operations to shape the battlespace for the Allied forces. In one example, the domination of the Italian island of Pantelleria, the impacts of airpower demonstrated Eisenhower’s developing appreciation that the air component should share in maneuver tasking. Not so many months later Tedder would be named the deputy commander for OVERLORD and began to exert influence over the command of allied operations.

By January of 1945 General Eisenhower had a fully functioning operational staff and a mature operational command structure with three interdependent dimensional components. The structure he took back into Europe was a version of his TORCH command concept refined over 12 months of combat. It served him exceptionally well during the invasion and breakout and continued to serve him during the repulse of the German winter counterattack in the “Bulge” and through the
final dual axis penetration into Germany in the spring of 1945.

The Allied multinational structure included integration of the intelligence, operations and plans functions and provided for coordination of national sub-sections dealing with personnel and logistics issues. The foundation for this combined staff was a layer of dimensional commanders and their staffs (air, land and sea) which planned and executed operations and coordinated with each other. Supporting these staffs were key cells that focused and integrated component actions (like air coordination cells between the air and ground components) to develop the best possible effect on the enemy. In general, national commitments were matched by command authority and staff representation.

**The Cold War Interlude: Inchon and Decline Elsewhere**

Shock gripped commanders in June 1950 when the North Korean Army invaded South Korea. General MacArthur, the theater commander, had initially underestimated the North Koreans, but as one of the last of the truly experienced operational commanders of the previous war, he understood that multi-dimensional synergy was key to victory, particularly with his vastly superior air and naval forces. While his Army commander, Lieutenant General Walton ‘Bulldog’ Walker, hung on desperately in the South, and his air commander, General George Stratemeyer, employed fast new jets and veteran bombers to shape the fighting, MacArthur marshaled a multinational task force to strike the North Korean line of supply deep in its rear at the critical hub of power that was Seoul.

Operation CHROMITE illustrated many of our current tenets of multinational command. Joint boards, component commanders, decentralized operations, flexible boundaries for joint fires, synchronization of air, land and sea – all of these techniques were used to effect. Unfortunately, these tools began to decay soon after MacArthur left his command, and the allied effort soon decayed to reflect overwhelming US dominance. Although the allied forces were integrated at the tactical level, only the commanders from Republic of Korea were given authority over operations and even they were discounted during efforts to terminate the conflict.

**British and French Efforts**

Elsewhere during the same period there were continuing vestiges of command innovation, but they made relatively little impact. Earl Mountbatten of Burma, General Sir Gerald Templer, General Sir Charles Harrington, as Commander-in-Chief Middle East, and Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, the Commander-in-Chief Far East, conducted highly successful operations where Britain served as the lead nation, normally with commonwealth partners in support through the 1950s. Although these operations reflected some joint command structures, they rarely included significant multinational structures.

French efforts over the same period were also often joint but inordinately less multinational (and also less successful). Generals de Lattre de Tassigny, Salan and Navarre continued unified command and joint operations of increasing scope until Operation CASTOR in 1954 resulted in the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. The long French war in Algeria on the other hand rarely
demonstrated joint employment or techniques. The geography of Algeria and the stranglehold of the French Army over operations there were major inhibitors of joint approaches and little authority was allocated to supporters of the French cause.¹

**Vietnam**

An even greater mystery exists concerning the American operations in Vietnam, which began in earnest in 1965, even as the British and French overseas expeditions were winding down. In Vietnam the US had, but did not fully employ, joint and multinational command structures, eventually leaving operational decisions to a decidedly Army-centric Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) under General Westmoreland.² Air power, and in lesser importance sea power, were restrained from maximum effect for political reasons, establishing a battlefield which did not sufficiently leverage technological or joint advantages. Only late in the game was the full effect of modern air power superiority unleashed. Operations LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II in 1972 amply demonstrated the advantages of air and naval fires, as the US and its allies were leaving Vietnam.

Overall the issue of coalition partner involvement was not well answered in Vietnam. The United States was engaged there alongside the military forces of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and of course South Vietnam. None of those other nations were fully integrated in the command structure above the tactical level and even the host nation, South Vietnam, was not given a significant part in the development of the operational strategy or allocation of forces; it continued unsuccessfully to fight even after its coalition partners departed.

What we have then up to 1970 were joint structures remaining as legacies of the Second World War, which were employed as such in an increasingly irregular and inconsistent fashion. When legendary figures such as MacArthur, Mountbatten and de Lattre passed from command, and with the specter of global nuclear war overhead, the trend was a slow but clear reduction in joint and multinational teamwork.

**Other Operations**

The late 1960s witnessed both the climax of the American experience in Vietnam and the beginning of a joint renaissance. The rebirth began to take shape in some unexpected places. First, the Israelis planned and executed their 1967 war with the full employment of all three services in mind. The Israeli Air Force stole a march on the Egyptian forces along the Suez, destroying the enemy air force on the ground and securing the time necessary for naval and ground forces to meet their opponents on favorable terms. This was a victory in a war of high technology and much new equipment including surface-to-air missiles. Then, in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict, the Indians, led by Army chief General Sam Maneckshaw, brought together significant air and naval power to seal off and dominate the smaller Pakistani force in the east. Although the terrain inside the Bangladeshi region favored the defense, the Indians maximized use of their forces, including carrier air power from the INS VIKRANT, to dictate the contest and win a significant victory in only three weeks. Both of these campaigns employed joint forces against technologically equal opponents and obtained striking results due to well-timed and synchronized
operational maneuver.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war got everyone’s attention, including the Egyptians who found defeat to be an excellent teacher. In 1973, they turned the tables on the Israelis with effective use of air defense and air maneuver in the face of a static defense tactic – the Bar-Lev line. Only at the last moment did the Israelis return to a joint maneuver concept which thankfully reestablished a basis for a cessation of hostilities between the two overextended forces. The Arab coalition in both of these wars became a critical weakness that the Israelis were able to use to their advantage.

With these victories in view interest in joint and multinational procedures in the United States was renewed, yet three flawed operations were to occur before the US armed forces returned to a full commitment to such cooperation. The botched 1975 Mayaguez rescue and the failed 1980 Iranian hostage raid (Operation EAGLE CLAW) demonstrated a serious lack of common tactics, techniques and procedures among the four US services. And the somewhat successful Grenada operation in 1983 (URGENT FURY) finally broke the back of service parochialism in the United States after US forces completely failed to coordinate at the operational level and suffered severe interoperability problems in tactical execution. Post-conflict integration of a regional coalition force into the operation was ineffective at best.

The problems in Grenada occurred only months after the Falklands War had demonstrated so many lessons about joint operations to the world. A great weakness in the Argentine position had been their lack of joint planning and coordination in the face of an unexpected British opposition to Operation ROSARIO. Had the Argentines read their history and placed modern aircraft in Port Stanley, Admiral Sandy Woodward’s task group would have been hard pressed to successfully counterattack. Had they understood the synergy of joint operations and integrated naval maneuver into coordinated air and surface strikes on Woodward’s force, the Argentines might have inflicted much more serious damage on their opponents in the face of the tremendous logistics challenges presented to the British force. The British on the other hand integrated nearly every tool in the kit bag to mount their operation rapidly and win at the knife’s edge of culmination.

Why so little multinational cooperation during this period? Certainly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had retained a combined staff and joint component structure and vestiges of joint and multinational cooperation remained in the structure left in Korea. But the stress of the Cold War had eliminated large scale conventional conflicts – the normal domain of multinational coordination – and few crises seemed to engender multinational cooperation. Operation Dragoon Rouge in central Africa is representative. Four nations were involved (the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the United States) but no multinational structure was developed and very little cooperation, outside humanitarian concerns, was demonstrated.

Paradigm Shift: Desert Shield and Storm

After a practice run in the 1989 operation in Panama (operation JUST CAUSE), the new American emphasis on joint operations began to flower under General Colin Powell. Operation DESERT STORM exemplifies joint force operations for many observers, but it was still overly
controlled and fraught with service competition. The MacArthuresque turning movement in the
desert did not fully integrate component capabilities nor did the CENTCOM staff permit truly
decentralized operations. Even so, a resounding maneuver effect on the entire breadth and depth
of the enemy force was produced. In particular air power was used as a maneuver element in the
first phase of operations to shape the full battlespace and set conditions for decisive combat. And
later, in phases two and three of the campaign, General Chuck Horner’s air component was a
nearly equal member of the team.3 Unfortunately, the ground and naval commanders did not
understand how powerfully air power would affect the battle and were not prepared to take full
advantage of the opportunities it presented in time and space.

Operation DESERT STORM did illustrate the return of multinational command and control
structures. Coalition effectiveness was an early priority and the military commanders understood
that a responsive structure had to be developed that incorporated each national contribution in a
way that maximized its effectiveness and minimized its limitations. General Schwarzkopf shared
leadership of the coalition military forces with Sultan Bin Khaled and the national leaders of the
coalition seemed to have maintained sufficient dialog to maintain a cohesive effort through the
point of liberating Kuwait City. Clearly the support of the United Nations was an important
factor in many national decisions to contribute and the UN mantle (and its legitimizing effect) did
assist in the grouping of forces.

The Good and Bad in Somalia – The United Nations Learns Its Lessons

Since 1990, joint operations have returned to hold a position as a standard bearer in the developed
world. The United States, Great Britain and their allies have employed joint task forces in
Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo.4 In the all of these operations the United States used
joint approaches, but it did not always fully integrate coalition support.

Immediately following the Gulf War, operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq was a
highly successful multinational humanitarian effort, with UN Security Council Resolution 688
bringing together a coalition of 13 nations and contributions from 30 countries under the control
of the Coalition Task Force staff. It seemed then as though UN sponsored operations, particularly
those focused on humanitarian issues might provide a template for the future. Unfortunately, as
operations expanded beyond limited humanitarian responses, the problems of coalition command
and control grew more acute.

In late 1992 the desperate conditions in Somalia caused President George Bush to direct the
deployment of US forces in operation PROVIDE RELIEF. This deployment became the
centerpiece of a United Nations supported effort by many other nations to help the starving
Somalis. Unfortunately, as the mandate for operations in Somalia expanded to include security
operations, protection of convoys and limited policing functions, subsequent operations
PROVIDE HOPE and UNISOM II in Somalia grew out of control and ended in a wake-up call
for command and control reform.

Differing national objectives forced cracks and then breaks within the initial coalition structure.
Some nations withdrew forces and others severely restricted employment policies thus making
operations much more difficult to manage. Finally, as the date for transition to full United Nations control neared serious philosophical differences eroded the coalition’s effectiveness. The transition to UN command was not well accomplished and changes to political and military objectives following the transition eventually broke the cohesion of the coalition. The United States continued to support its objectives and the United Nations goals as the coalition was losing its cohesion and among other factors, this dissipation resulted in the tragic loss of American lives.

The Sequel in Haiti

Following the wake-up call in Somalia, the United States adjusted its approaches, refined its techniques and produced a series of much more successful multinational operations. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti was truly joint from a command and control perspective, even though it could have been simply an Army or Marine operation and it did leverage coalition assets while effectively transitioning from a US-led multinational force (MNF) to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

MNF command and control, commanded by General Hugh Shelton, fully synchronized the efforts of its land, air and special operations component commanders and even coordinated two widely separated major operations conducted simultaneously by its naval and ground components on D-day. Initial coalition force contributions were limited to regional members of the Caribbean Regional Security System, but from its beginning the MNF was backed by British, Dutch and Colombian ships and its force structure quickly grew to incorporate both United Nations observers and other coalition representatives.

Prior to its transition to UNMIH, the MNF expanded to include forces from seven nations and military police observers from eleven others. The transition itself was well managed, with a detailed staff turnover and established transition criteria. The process was helped by the US decision to name the first UN commander. Later UNMIH, which included significant forces from six nations, successfully transitioned to Canadian lead prior to the end of its mandate.

The Ebb and Flow of Operations Against Iraq

The termination of the 1991 Gulf War left significant forces in the field and important issues unresolved. As discussed, operation PROVIDE COMFORT effectively integrated its coalition partners behind a consensus-based mission. Unfortunately, enforcement of the armistice no-fly zone in southern Iraq (operation SOUTHERN WATCH) and maintenance of the northern security zone in Iraq (operation NORTHERN WATCH) soon ran afoul of diverging national objectives from their coalition partners. The once extensive and proud Gulf War coalition dissolved over time as international opinions against Iraq moderated. Although the United States and Great Britain remain strong supporters, and Turkey remains inside the NORTHERN WATCH force structure, subsequent operations, DESERT STRIKE, DESERT THUNDER and DESERT FOX included minimal coalition participation. In part, this dissolution was due to technological gaps – where US strike planning effectiveness parameters generally excluded coalition tactical participation – but most significantly the coalition fell apart because the partners did not agree with the US stated objective of regime change in Iraq. Operations continue, but
their effectiveness has been reduced commensurate with the strength of the coalition.

**A Return to Complicated Europe**

In 1995 the UN backed NATO Alliance executed operation DELIBERATE FORCE in Bosnia. General Mike Ryan conducted over 3500 sorties with nearly 300 aircraft to force the Serbs to agree to a peace settlement. This was a signal that the precision of DESERT STORM could be brought to bear in Europe, but it did not come with adequate multinational involvement, even within the NATO structure.

In Operation ALLIED FORCE air power dominated for a second time, and again not all components of the alliance force played full parts in the team effort (we learned nearly too late to include the ground component in operations.) Generals Clark, Jackson and Short had not only to walk demanding tightropes among diplomatic, political and military requirements, but also deal with real limitations on the coalition due to US operations security and technological restraints. The end result was clear: the alliance successfully achieved a political and security objective while shielding its forces and friendly civilians from the brunt of the fighting, but it was beginning to tear itself apart at the seams as ALLIED FORCE progressed.

Although at the strategic level, ALLIED FORCE found coalition execution trying, at the operational level its subordinates did quite well. Even though most saw ALLIED FORCE as a primarily air effort, NATO did employ several multinational joint task forces to handle subordinate missions of security and resettlement that were required for the desired end-state, and coordinated the actions of all with effect. The Combined (and Joint) Air Operations Center in Vicenza showed how asymmetrical and synergistic joint operations can be executed and the deployment and operations of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) also demonstrated well coordinated multinational ground execution.

**Shift Redux: Operation Stabilise**

With Operation STABILISE it was our Australian partners that provided leadership and the insight to make a difficult operation at best stay distant from what could have been a much more serious warfighting conflict, yet still resolve the fundamental problem. The International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and its commander, General Peter Cosgrove successfully integrated not only all the service tools, but also the perspectives of many nations and the United Nations in a very short time and retained the initiative throughout his operations.

All components of INTERFET built upon the strong relationship that existed between the Australian, New Zealand, United Kingdom and American elements of the coalition. This trust also made for very fluid information transference among the member states of the English speaking nations of Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. Significantly, it was among these nations that the bulk of information was communicated within the coalition and those nations to on a role as the coalition’s backbone for command and control. INTERFET also demonstrated the ability to plan and synchronize the application of the capabilities of the separate services of the contributing nations. Several nations, including among others Australia,
New Zealand, and the United States, deployed elements of land, sea and airpower to East Timor. Due to the dominance of short time scales and demanding space and geography challenges, the commander of INTERFET had to employ fairly robust levels of joint capability to accomplish many of his primary tasks. Although the requirements for joint synchronization varied over time, there can be no doubt that joint planning and execution was an important factor in INTERFET’s operational success.

As a direct consequence of coalition command weaknesses in Somalia and elsewhere, General Cosgrove focused hard on developing criteria and processes for the transition from combat operations to stability operations. The transition from initial stability operations to the establishment of UN operations under UNTAET was accomplished remarkably smoothly, using steady state pre-conditions, a desired end-date, measures of effectiveness for security, and phased execution over a three week period to ensure continuity of effort. This smoothness was largely the result of the regional employment strategy of INTERFET and the phased arrival of UN forces. In any case, the transition process will certainly stand as a model for future coalition ops under the UN mandate.

One of the good ideas that General Cosgrove employed in East Timor harkened back to the structures Eisenhower used during World War II. Within the INTERFET staff, Thailand’s General Songkitti Jaggabatara served as both a national command element commander and General Cosgrove’s deputy. This assignment was designed as a contribution to coalition cohesiveness, and although the complexity of both roles did not always mesh well together in East Timor the effort was beneficial. The key issue is the method of ensuring centralized control of the entire coalition while facilitating the execution of assigned tasks by national elements using their own doctrines and procedures. General Cosgrove alleviated this problem in another way by employing coalition operating regions, but it remained an issue for coalition staff effectiveness.

**Pointers from the Past**

Multinational command and control techniques clearly matured a great deal in the crucible of the Second World War. Without such pressure there was little to keep coalition partners united after 1950. The Cold War constrained multinational cooperation by forced the nations of the world into three camps – the superpowers, their friends and those who feared becoming involved with anyone in the first two groups. This caused the lessons and techniques of the world war to atrophy over the period from 1950 to 1990.

General Eisenhower developed a multinational structure founded on three primary tools: an integrated staff, national functional components, and integration cells. The progression from operation TORCH to operation OVERLORD was truly a story of staff and command development not changes in tactics. Although vestiges of these techniques remained important as long as the commanders who practiced them remained in uniform, they fell from use in the post-war period.

The decline in effective multinational employment was arrested by Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and since 1990 the United States has frequently taken the lead in multinational
and UN military efforts. This has not been an easy road however. The US commitment in Somalia illustrated many weaknesses. Of particular note were the important linkage between mission and task assignment during coalition operations and the difficulty of conducting transitions between operational command.

Having learned important lessons in Iraq, Panama and Somalia, the US response during operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY showed some clear improvements in multinational C2. The force deployed was much more joint in its approach to the problem in Haiti and the integration of coalition partners was well facilitated by advanced planning. A functional component structure easily accommodated coalition partners. Great strides were also made in the relationship between the US government and the UN and the transition process in Haiti was executed skillfully.

Still, learning multinational command and control processes requires a comprehensive and reoccurring regime of training and education. During the 1990s operations in Bosnia experienced some important command and control difficulties despite the alliance structure developed over decades by NATO. Concurrently, the coalition brought together to stop Saddam Hussein fell apart over shifting national objectives and methods. Even in the face of a unifying opponent, operation ALLIED FORCE again tugged hard at alliance and coalition C2 seams because of operational security concerns and technological gaps within the coalition.

One of the strengths in all of these operations was a focus on developing operational cohesion and unity of purpose. Where a combined staff can be used, overall coalition effectiveness increases. When the differences within a coalition are dominant, some version of the parallel structure used during DESERT STORM shows great utility. A second key to maintaining coalition effectiveness is the development and empowerment of coordination cells. The coalition command control and communications integration cell of the Gulf War was followed by civil-military operations centers and coalition air operations centers – all of these tools assist in the development and increased effectiveness of coalition operations.

With the advent of Australia’s leadership in East Timor during Operation STABILISE, multinational C2 seemed to have matured even during operations without US dominance. Even INTERFET showed the key role of a lead nation in any multinational endeavor. In every case where full synchronization effects have been developed a lead nation has provided the integrating vision and leadership to pull other partners together.

The Allied multinational structure of General Eisenhower’s day included integration of the intelligence, operations and plans functions and provided for coordination of national sub-sections dealing with personnel and logistics issues. The foundation for this combined staff was a layer of dimensional commanders and their staffs (air, land and sea) which planned and executed operations and coordinated with each other. Supporting these staffs were key cells that focused and integrated component actions (like air coordination cells between the air and ground components) to develop the best possible effect on the enemy. In general, national commitments were matched by command authority and staff representation. These elements remain key building blocks for an ideal coalition structure.
Development of multinational command structures has been aided by new doctrines and by the exchange of lessons learned in these and other operations but it will remain a challenge as long as national groups do not share a common vision of the desired objective for a given operation. The United Nations has helped a great deal in the development of such international consensus, yet much more work in education and in training has yet to be done. The field is fertile for ongoing study and the results clearly merit our attention as the future certainly will require other multinational responses to deal with an ever shrinking and increasingly interlinked world.

Notes

1 In fact it was only with the appointment of Air Force General Maurice Challe in 1959 that the tactics in that war changed significantly. He added amphibious strikes and improved the effectiveness of air-ground operations in Algeria.
2 General Westmoreland did have officers of all services on his staff and did employ Army and Marine forces, but he did not have real command authority over the naval and air force forces which were really needed to take control of the war at the operational level.
3 General Schwarzkopf retained the role of ground component commander in his deputy after the departure of the Third Army Commanding General. This made it difficult for any other component to get a truly equal hearing before the CinC.
4 The decision not employ a joint task force in Bosnia remains controversial, but given the mission and its expected duration, service component command may have been the only appropriate option.