WHAT CAN MONGOLIA LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES THAT HAVE SET UP SYSTEMS FOR DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING?

by

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   Around the world, the defense policies and security priorities of all countries require review and revision that reflects the changing political environment. The end of the Cold War and the initiation of the War on Terrorism are two examples of this. It is uncertain as to which next world event will precipitate necessary revision and review of defense policies. Although for established democracies, such planning is difficult, for new democracies, this challenge is even more problematic. Instead of adopting another country’s defense policy or structure directly, it is necessary for the new democratic country to analyze and adjust a version which is appropriate for its individual defense needs and interests. This thesis examines the defense policy planning processes of selected democratic countries in order to ascertain if there are any common processes, characteristics or experiences, and to identify contemporary debates and challenges. To that end, the United States will be the model of an established democracy and Estonia and Mongolia will be considered as the newly democratic countries. Analyzing these cases comparatively will enable Mongolia as a new democratic country to review its current defense policies and to opt for further improvements for its planning system. The thesis will attempt to answer the question, “What lessons can Mongolia learn from the experiences of other democratic countries which have already set up systems for defense policy planning?” Since defense policy planning process is a broad area of study, this thesis will focus on the basic form of the defense policy planning process, the key actors and their responsibilities, and defense policy documents at the national level such as National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy or National Military Strategy documents.


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This thesis examines the defense policy planning processes of selected democratic countries in order to ascertain if there are any common processes, characteristics or experiences, and to identify contemporary debates and challenges. To that end, the United States will be the model of an established democracy and Estonia and Mongolia will be considered as the newly democratic countries. Analyzing these cases comparatively will enable Mongolia as a new democratic country to review its current defense policies and to opt for further improvements for its planning system. The thesis will attempt to answer the question, “What lessons can Mongolia learn from the experiences of other democratic countries which have already set up systems for defense policy planning?”
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I. INTRODUCTION

Around the world, the defense policies and security priorities of every country require review and revision that reflects the changing political environment. The end of the Cold War and the initiation of the War on Terrorism are two examples of this, and it is uncertain as to which next world event will precipitate such necessary revision and review of defense policies. Although for established democracies, such planning is difficult; for new democracies, this challenge is even more problematic. Even though defense issues are similar for all democracies - the war on terror, protecting one’s homeland - newly democratic countries cannot just transplant an established democracy’s defense structures and procedures into their own defense or security environment. Instead of adopting another country’s defense policy or structures directly, it is necessary for the new democratic country to analyze and adjust for a version which is appropriate for its individual defense needs and interests. For whilst it is impossible to compare a small country’s defense policy with that of a large country, but there are practical and valuable lessons of experience which can be used to help to shape a new democratic country’s defense policies and structures. Therefore, the institutional arrangements, fundamental structures, and basic functional processes of a larger democracy can be used as examples for the new democracy.
A. THESIS QUESTION

This thesis examines the defense policy planning processes of selected democratic countries in order to ascertain if there are any common processes, characteristics or experiences, and to identify contemporary debates and challenges. To that end, the United States will be the model of an established democracy and Estonia and Mongolia will be considered as the newly democratic countries. Analyzing these cases comparatively will enable Mongolia as a new democratic country to review its current defense policies and to opt for further improvements for its planning system. The thesis will attempt to answer the question, “Which lessons can Mongolia learn from the experiences of other democratic countries which have already set up systems for defense policy planning?”

Jeanne Giraldo argues that “no one model fits all”¹ in the relationships between the executive and the legislature on defense policy. This thesis will argue that even though there is no one model that fits every situation regarding the security establishment, basic defense interests, policy procedures, and individual actors’ actions, there are common processes in defense policy planning to follow when a country shifts from its former political form to a democratic model.

Since defense policy planning process is a broad area of study, this thesis will focus on the basic form of the defense policy planning process, the key actors and their

responsibilities, and defense policy documents at the national level such as National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy or National Military Strategy documents.

1. Importance

Mongolia has been in the process of transitioning to a democratic system for over a decade. During this period, Mongolia has established fundamental legislation to govern its new democracy. Establishing new legislation was difficult and implementing these laws has been even more difficult. Mongolian defense-related laws define the structure, organization, functions of the armed forces, and the defense objectives for the country. What’s next? As Thomas Young notes, “a sound defense planning and force development system can only be successfully implemented if there is a stated and clear government policy to guide planners.” In December 2004, the Mongolian Parliament approved the new government action plan on defense. The government action plan stipulated that the Mongolian Parliament provides guidance on defense, and it states that,

The defense system will be adapted with a new security environment and regional development concept and consistent with military reform in accordance with state military policy. Military organizations will be upgraded to meet modern

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3 The Mongolian Government Action Plan directs what the Government will do in its four-year term, and it provides a framework of actions, directions, and intentions for the following branches: Public Administration and Civil Participation; Social Policy; Economic Policy; Urban Development, Regional and Rural Policies; Environmental Policy; Defense and Disaster Preparedness Policy; Foreign Policy; and Strengthening Law Enforcement Agencies.
requirements and the participation of armed forces in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping activities and other international missions will be expanded.⁴

After study of the experiences of other democratic countries, and consideration of the current level of Mongolian defense resources, defense planners needed to follow these guidelines and prepare a strategic plan. In September 2006, Mongolian defense planners initiated a long-term strategic plan named “Armed Forces Transformation Program through the year of 2015.”⁵ The program goal is that the Armed Forces shall be prepared for participating in international peace or other military operations while maintaining their main objectives, such as self-defense, providing military support to civilian authorities, etc. the current capabilities, new objectives, and limited economic resources all resulted in challenges to the establishment of an efficient defense policy planning system.

The practical importance of this thesis is that Mongolia can learn from other democratic countries that have set up defense policy planning processes for their defense structures and institutions. It is also helpful to define the current Mongolian defense policy planning

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⁵ Presentation of Mongolian MOD, presented in the “National Security, Interagency process, Civil Military Relations, Public Affairs and National Military Strategy” seminar and roundtable discussion. The seminar was conducted by the Office of the National Security Council of Mongolia, the Center for Civil-Military Relations in Monterey, California (NPS, USA), the Embassy of the United States of America in Ulaanbaatar, and the Ministry of Defense of Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, Sept, 2006).
process, identify the strengths and weaknesses, and suggest how it might be adjusted to evolving requirements. The conceptual importance of this thesis is that it attempts to describe “common processes” in a defense policy planning environment, based on comparative case studies.

2. Methodology

Using a comparative case study method, this thesis investigates what should be improved in the case of Mongolia. What can Mongolia learn from the defense policy planning processes of other countries? Are the experiences in defense policy planning of the selected countries applicable to other countries such as Mongolia? The reasons for choosing the United States as a model, and the Estonian and Mongolian examples of new democracies in the thesis are as follows: first, the United States has unarguably the most sophisticated defense structure in the world and its policy planning is broadly considered as a model; and second, Estonia re-established its independence and democracy in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the country faced challenges that are similar to Mongolia’s: it was a post-communist country that underwent a transition to democracy.

B. THESIS CONTENTS

The thesis consists of the introduction, three chapters, and the conclusion.

The Introduction presents the thesis question, its importance, research methodology, and chapter summaries.

Chapter II identifies the U.S. defense policy planning process as a basic democratic defense policy planning
process. To analyze the whole process in one single thesis is impossible; therefore, the thesis will focus on two main defense policy documents, the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America and the National Military Strategy of the United States of America. It will briefly describe the basic process of planning these documents; it will describe who does the planning, and it will describe what the challenges are.

Chapter III describes the fundamentals and the experiences of the Estonian and Mongolian defense policy planning process and explain those parts of the defense policy planning process that are specific to each of the countries. The chapter will also discuss the challenges and issues of each country’s defense policy planning process.

Chapter IV will outline what should be changed or improved in Mongolian defense policy planning and study how Mongolia can learn from other democratic countries. The outline will be based on those discussed in the subsection of issues and challenges of Mongolia in the previous chapter. The chapter also discusses some supporting arguments and counter arguments on Mongolia’s current defense policy doctrines.

The Conclusion summarizes the previous chapters’ findings with final thoughts. Based on the comparative case study, what commonalities can be found in the democratic countries’ defense policy planning, and what specific differences exist?
II. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING PROCESS IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

A defense policy planning process requires the completion of key tasks by several organizations. Every one of these producing organizations has its own procedure for developing this process. An operation of many separate organizations, or agencies, and different types of procedures and outcomes always leads to a more complex environment in the defense planning process. Therefore, a democratic country’s defense policy planning is based on the international environment, its country’s national security interests, democratic institutional structure, and the individual roles of its leadership.

Douglas Porch points out that “in peacetime, as in war, politicians define threats, determine political objectives, set the broad parameters of strategy, build coalitions, and provide resources. The task of the soldiers ideally is to argue their case, take the resources allocated them, and apply force to achieve the political goals as defined by the leaders. In return, . . . the soldier must have a voice in ‘setting the strategy . . . he must understand political constraints, but have a free hand’ in the operational and tactical direction of war unhampered by political micromanagement.” ⁶ Sam Sarkesian, John Williams, and Stephen Cimbala argue that “the decision making process is always problematical and often

controversial. The process requires the interaction of people with differing personal, political, and institutional perspectives on policy issues. By design and evolution, the system promotes rivalry among the branches of the government and within those branches as policy questions move toward resolution.”

This chapter will describe the defense policy planning process, the role of actors, and issues and challenges that relate to this process, based on the United States defense policy.

B. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY

Defense policy planning in a democratic country depends on a wide range of political and defense interests, security and defense organizational structures, institutional and organizational tradition, operational strategy, and leadership’s role in the planning process. Richard Kugler defines defense planning as a part of the process of developing a functional strategy in his book, *Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New methods for a New Era*: “defense planning is preparing military forces to carry out national strategy.” Sam Sarkesian, John Williams, and Stephen Cimbala agree that differences of policy and strategy are clear: “policy refers to goals and strategy is the means to reach these goals. It follows that


strategy or strategies cannot be realistically designed and implemented if policy is unclear or vacillating.”

The word “strategy” comes from Greek word “stratēgia” which means generalship. In the modern world, the word “strategy” is used in policies and doctrines, as Edward Earle defines it:

Strategy deals with war, preparation for war, and the waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the art of military command, of projecting and directing a campaign . . . only the most restricted terminology would now define strategy as the art of military command. In the present-day world, then, strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation . . . to the end that its vital interest shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies.

Specialists in the field of defense policy planning find that recent international defense-related activities and world defense policy priorities, in the defense planning process for the new century, have been changing from the old traditional objectives to more current issues such as combating global terrorism, protecting the homeland, and contending with future defense challenges and uncertainties. Matthew Bogdanos points out that the September 11, 2001, event tested the American security system and only its effective use of intelligence and

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9 See Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, “The International Landscape,” 36.


interagency cooperation can defeat today’s threat. Some academics also point out that defending a country itself is not a popular case for today’s world; instead, countries often strive to join coalitions or make alliances to defend themselves and their interests. Therefore, the discussion is not about an individual country, but rather it is about regional, institutional and global stability and its participation and involvement in these higher purposes. Holger Molder agrees when he points out that “the key elements for the success of the Baltic Sea security complex – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – may be overwhelmingly shared liberal democratic values and the international regime of democratic peace generally followed around the Baltic Sea.” The 2006 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review Report also supports the idea of international cooperation, partnership, and alliance systems by arguing that “alliances are clearly one of the nation’s greatest source of strength . . . alliances make manifest the strategic solidarity of free democratic states, promote shared values and facilitate the sharing of military and security burdens around the world.”


C. U.S. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING AS A MODEL

The point to creating models is to simplify realities and variables. There are many variables and policy selections for creating a defense policy in today’s democratic countries. Obviously, there are similarities as well as differences among the varying countries; however, the issue concerns which choices are made and the path to be followed by each country. For example, “in 1992, the DOD described and discussed seven possible future scenarios, which might lead to military action by the U.S. After lengthy discussions the scenario, which stipulated the occurrence of two regional crises situations at a time, was selected as the basis for the planning of the military forces, including the size and the structure of the forces. The ‘two regional contingencies’ scenario became part of the ‘National Security Strategy’ presented by the President to the Congress.”\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, there are several policy options to be considered before the actual documents are formulated. Smaller planning units or larger institutions can participate in a higher level of security or defense policy making process. In the case of the American example above, two options became the policy guidance and strategy of the leading entities in the country because it allowed its institutions and armed forces to plan and implement accordingly.

In the following subsections, the United States’ method for shaping its defense policy, the actors involved and the resulting challenges and issues will be discussed.

1. Defense Policy Planning Process and Actors

Collins Shackelford points out in his co-edited book, *American Defense Policy*, that,

The contemporary American defense policy process developed as institutions evolved, . . . it has faced challenges of national security by developing policies and programs that directly affect military/defense organizations, agencies, training, doctrine, weapons applications, weapons development, manpower issues, and a myriad of issues related to the Total Force. The processes associated with today’s American defense policy, although never imagined by the Framers of the Constitution, have their roots in the words of the Constitution.16

In short, the fundamentals of defense came from an early establishment of the power of the American legislature, and over time the American defense system improved and toughened, and it built the most powerful defense system in the world today. Today, the U.S. defense policy planning systems focuses on global issues, and although these systems are not appropriate for a small country or new democratic country, they can be an example of lessons learned.

A creation of the National Security Council and the Department of Defense (DOD) by the National Security Act of 1947 and its reform under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 constitute the key structural changes in the American defense institutional history. The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council which is responsible for the national foreign and defense policy; it

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established a National Military Establishment (replaced by
the DOD under the 1949 Amendment to the National Security
Act, headed by a Secretary of Defense) which was a
unification of the Department of War, the Department of the
Navy, and the newly established Department of Air Force,
and it gave more political power to the Secretary of
Defense.17 The Act also determines the comprehensive
description of the President’s annual National Security
Strategy which he’s required to submit annually to
Congress.18

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the next largest
structural change for the DOD. Congress declared eight
purposes for the act: strengthen civilian authority;
 improve military advice; place clear responsibility on
combatant commanders for accomplishment of assigned
missions; ensure that the authority of combatant commanders
is commensurate with their responsibility; increase
attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning;
provide for the more efficient use of resources; improve
joint officer management; enhance the effectiveness of
military operations; and improve DOD management.19 The main
problems identified for this reform include the following:
imbalance between service and joint interests, inadequate
military advice, inadequate qualifications of joint duty
military personnel, imbalance between combatant commanders’

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17 Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and
NSC (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 75.
2007, available from http://www.intelligence.gov/0-
natsecact_1947.shtml.
19 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
authority and responsibility, confused and cumbersome operational chains of command, ineffective strategic planning, inadequate supervision and control of defense agencies and DOD field activities, confusion on service secretaries’ roles, unnecessary duplication in military department headquarters, and congressional micromanagement.\textsuperscript{20} These problems seem to be very common problems in other countries, also. Of course there were many counter arguments. Peter Feaver points out that “one of the main goals of the Goldwater–Nichols Act was to weaken interservice rivalry by strengthening the ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a joint military viewpoint.”\textsuperscript{21} Even though this goal is directed to strengthen the jointness of the armed forces, it has encountered another goal of civil-military relations and interservice rivalry, that of effectiveness.

In order to identify defense policy planning actors and their roles and responsibilities in the policy planning process, this thesis looks to a country’s legal documents. According to the U.S. Constitution, the President and the Congress have a separate authority to formulate a national defense policy. The President is designated by the Constitution as the Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article II, Section 2) and the Congress is empowered by the Constitution to “provide for the common defense”; to “declare war”; to “raise and support armies”; to “provide


and maintain a Navy”; and to promulgate rules and regulations governing the armed forces (Article I, Section 8).

The U.S. defense organizational structure and its responsibilities are specified in the U.S. Code, Title 10. The Code specifies the relationships and objectives of each defense organization and the key actors in defense policy planning. For example, the U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 7, Section 171 specifies the personnel of the Armed Forces Policy Council and its objectives which is that, “the Armed Forces Policy Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.”

Because of the objectives specified in the Code, the responsibilities of actors and organizations are straightforward and become obligations for these actors and organizations. For effective defense policy planning, the participation and interaction of each actor and organization are required in every step of the planning process.

According to Glenn Hastedt, the participation of the Secretary of Defense within the defense policy is twofold. First, he plays the role of the DOD representative in defense policy: he coordinates and integrates the judgments he receives from military professionals. He also plays the

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role of a military functionalist who consolidates management and policy control in the office of secretary of defense.23

In the process of the U.S. defense policy formulation, four committees of Congress play primary roles. They include the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee and the two appropriations committees with their subcommittees on defense. Additionally, the Pentagon, major lobbyist groups, think tank organizations, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the RAND, and the United States Institute for Peace, and privately owned policy analysis institutes, such as the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, and individual members of the Congress express their opinions freely about incoming defense policies or released defense policies. Werner Feld and John Wildgen point out that “in the formulation of defense policy, it is fair to assume that the Pentagon may be very influential, but, since Congress holds the purse strings, individual representatives and senators, especially those who have acquired expert knowledge in the area of defense, may also inject their particular views on security policy and strategy.”24 The power of purse is the most influential tool in American defense policy making. In this sense, politicians’ involvement in presenting their views, business parties’ participation in promoting their interests, and independent

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researchers and analysts make the American defense policy planning process unique in that puts the creation of defense policy in every one’s hands. Even the general public can have a voice on the matters of defense policy.

The following two figures on the U.S. defense policy planning process and actors at the national level describe the level of each policy document and the relationship of each actor in the U.S. defense policy planning environment.25

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25 The author created the following two figures, based on the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Code, Title 10, and other Acts, as well as the official websites of the Congress, the White House, and the U.S. DOD.
2. Defense Policy

The United States has the following three defense policy documents at its national level: the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy. This section will briefly present these documents in order to describe the U.S. defense policy planning.

The National Security Strategy is the basis for all national security, foreign, and defense policy documents,
and it is the document that the President uses to plan policy in order to fulfill its constitutional obligation: “to protect the security of the American people.” The National Security Strategy promises to protect the security of the American people, advance American interests, enhance global security, and expand global liberty and prosperity. The strategy is founded upon two pillars: the first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity in order to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies; and the second pillar is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.

Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said in the DOD briefing on the release of the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy that

The National Defense Strategy is the guidance that the secretary provides to the department on how to — on what the department has to do to implement the president’s National Security Strategy — in giving the department its direction, the National Defense Strategy outlines the broader National Security Strategy of the United States, so that you will see that there are things discussed in the National Defense Strategy that are not DOD responsibilities or missions, but they’re included because it’s necessary for people in the department to see the

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broader strategy to be able to understand it and understand what we need to do to fulfill it.

The National Defense Strategy defines four strategic objectives. The first is securing the United States from direct attack. The second is securing strategic access and retaining freedom of action for key regions and lines of communication and the global commons. The third is strengthening alliances and partnerships . . . and the fourth is establishing security conditions conducive to a favorable international order.28

The main planner or actor of this document is the Secretary of Defense.

Rear Admiral William Sullivan, Vice Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in the DOD briefing on the release of the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy that

The National Military Strategy takes the broad strategic guidance that is contained in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy and operationalizes that guidance for the services and for the combatant commanders . . . it talks about protecting the homeland, about preventing conflicts and surprise attacks, and about prevailing against adversaries, in the event that we actually need to get into conflict.29

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He also stated that the development process of these two documents is parallel, and “as the Office of the Secretary of Defense worked through developing the National Defense Strategy, the Office of Secretary of Defense staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked closely together to make sure that the two documents were aligned and synchronized and that there were no conflicting guidance contained in the documents.”\(^{30}\) Another DOD official news release clarified the timeframe for these strategies: “the National Defense Strategy is issued periodically, and the National Military Strategy is updated every two years.”\(^{31}\)

The main planner or actor of this document is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The DOD organizational structure, policy guidance, and operational objectives which, guided by the National Security and the National Defense strategies and the reform Acts, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, are included in a defense review document every four years in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). The document is significant, because it also presents an assessment of the DOD strategy and capabilities for executing the defense of the nation and its recommendations for future changes. The QDR report was managed and authored by military senior leaders, such as the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy


Secretary of Defense; the head of the Joint Staff, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman; the Service Chiefs, the Service Secretaries and the Service Vice Chiefs; and the combatant commanders. The QDR becomes an implementation plan or particular action to the Department and to the Services and each of the agencies and offices of the Department are responsible for the full implementation.


The American defense planning system needs to accomplish complicated objectives. The planning system is massive and the process is extensive. Interagency involvement, policy options, and new global challenges make it even more complicated. After each QDR (1997, 2001, 2006), U.S. defense strategy has been revised and developed to be more aligned with current global challenges and new security environments. The major debates in the 2006 QDR concern the war against terrorism, the dual theatres of operations abroad (Iraq and Afghanistan), and homeland security issues. It updates the American defense planning system which reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the DOD and it describes the transformation of the DOD and the views of its senior leaders as well as the shift of emphasis on a new strategic environment. The new environment, which is characterized by uncertainty and surprise, created the shift in emphasis

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from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning, and from peacetime planning to rapid adaptive planning.\textsuperscript{33}

Threat-based planning was needed during the Cold War. Threats were identifiable, as well as largely quantifiable. However, the Cold War is over and a new direction for uncertain security and defense environment is needed within the U.S. defense policy planning. Countries other than the United States have formed their own defense policy planning utilizing a defense planning solution that was considered to be capability-based planning which is a means of identifying needs, creating choices, developing solutions, and providing capabilities.\textsuperscript{34} The United States, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and other larger democratic countries have capability-based planning.

According to Paul Davis, “Capability-based planning is the planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.”\textsuperscript{35} The U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was directed to organize the Joint Defense Capabilities Studies Team to examine possible recommendation for the DOD in March 2003 and the team reached the following conclusion:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} Paul Davis, “Summary” Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation (Santa Monica: RAND, April 2003), xi.
\end{itemize}
A capability-based approach elevates the discussion of joint needs to a more strategic level, centering on desired effects rather than specific weapon systems and platforms. In this approach, strategic objectives frame the desired effects, which in turn define the needed capabilities . . . Because a capabilities-based approach begins at the strategic level, top-down guidance is easier to incorporate—the entire process is more responsive to senior leader decisions. Another advantage to a capabilities-based approach is that each capability has a materiel and non-materiel aspect to it. Every capability can be divided into doctrine, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities elements. As a result, all resources are considered when planning for capabilities. This holistic approach considers enterprise needs simultaneously with warfighting needs, supporting a fiscally constrained resourcing process.36

The U.S. capability based planning which, as reflected in the 2001 and 2006 QDR, is directed to improve the gaps in the interoperability and the joint forces’ transformation. The 2006 QDR raises some challenging questions, concerning whether the Government is providing sufficient funds and forces to support its dual theatre missions abroad and homeland security mission at the same time.

David Ochmanek and Steven Hosmer of the RAND Corporation, suggest that, “U.S. defense strategists and force planners would be well advised to begin now to broaden the conceptual basis for planning and assessing forces and to reflect that broader conceptual basis in

their public statements. In addition, to hedge against the possibility of severe budget cuts in the future, planners will need to design force structures, acquisition programs, and research and development efforts that can maintain the nation’s most essential military capabilities in lean times, while preserving a foundation for rapidly reconstituting forces when a triggering event or widely perceived deterioration in the international environment prompts a renewed defense buildup.”

What was the trend or pattern of the U.S defense planning system before the first QDR in 1997? Ochmanek and Hosmer pointed out that, “. . . history shows that even the most experienced observers frequently fail to predict major events in their areas of expertise. Misreading the future can be a problem, given that many decisions, such as whether to develop a certain weapon system, can affect force structure and capabilities for decades. For some defense planners, the ‘uncertainty’ of the world that has evolved since the end of the Cold War constitutes a major impediment to effective planning. This concern over uncertainty is frequently overdone. In fact, there are good reasons for believing that the uncertainties inherent in today’s world need not stymie defense planning.”

Definitely, ‘uncertainty’ will always be a major problem for today’s defense planners. Situations such as the possible possession of WMD by rogue states or terrorists become the impetus of policy, strategy, and planning.

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38 Ibid., 46.
changes. However, no one can predict when and if such things will happen or set priorities for change. As such, traditional defense planning systems are not applicable to today’s environment. Uncertainties, global security postures, or a country’s defense interests can occur spontaneously without anyone’s intention or consensus or anticipation, so the challenge for today’s defense planners is to be prepared for these.

The question of the perfection of the United States’ defense policy planning system and institutional cooperation is also debated among defense planners, specialists, and academics. Michael Coss points out that,

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 moved the force dramatically forward by providing the organizational structure and joint officer management system, but it is now time to create a better process for developing and managing joint capabilities and doctrine and for prosecuting joint missions.39

Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard argue that,

A fundamental mismatch exists between the international threat environment and the current national-level joint interagency organizations undermines the ability of the United States to develop appropriate policies and implement comprehensive strategies . . . when the Government confronts conflated or melded problems that are beyond the capacity of any single department or agency to solve, it rarely develops comprehensive policies; instead, it poorly

coordinates its actions, badly integrates its strategies, and fails to synchronize policy implementation.\textsuperscript{40}

The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) comprehensive work on defense reform entitled, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a new Strategic Era, Phase I Report of 2004; Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase II report of 2005; and Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report: The Future of the National Guard and Reserves of 2006.\textsuperscript{41} The reports point to the next era of defense reform using a problem-centric approach, which means if the problem is identical the report will recommend the reform.\textsuperscript{42} The main goal of these reports is to develop a set of recommendations for reforming the U.S policy planning structure in a coming strategically uncertain era. The recommendations oversaw the achievements of Goldwater-Nichols’ objectives, unintended consequences in the Act and unforeseen challenges that have arisen since 1986 which the authors of Goldwater-Nichols did not anticipate, namely, the global war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{43}


D. CHAPTER FINDINGS

The case of the U.S. defense policy planning process and accompanying academic work on this matter would suggest to a newly-formed democracy that the defense policy planning process is a complex and challenging one. The President’s National Security Strategy is interpreted as policy guidance to the entire Federal Government, the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy is understood as policy direction to the DOD and lower level defense institutions, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy operationalizes the above mentioned strategies and clarifies the responsibilities and objectives of the combatant commanders at the operational level. The completion of the planning process is done via the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which identifies capabilities and challenges of the past years, in order to chronicle lessons learned, ensure the efficacy of the current organizational structure for fulfilling its goals and recommend necessary changes for the future. These suggested recommendations for the future can form the basis for the upcoming National Security, National Defense, or National Military Strategies. This U.S. defense policy planning process appears to be a cycle that provides guidance, becomes a policy or strategy, assesses the process and makes recommendations to the guidance of it.

The U.S. defense policy planning process begins with the National Security Strategy (NSS). The U.S. Government defines this document in terms of national interests, goals and priorities, integrating instruments of national power, and national security directives. Based on the NSS, the DOD
defines the National Defense Strategy with strategic context, strategic objectives, the process for accomplishing its objectives, implementation guidelines, and strategic risk management. The next level is at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff defines the National Military Strategy in terms of national military objectives, missions, tasks and end states, desired capabilities and attributes, priorities, strategic and military risk assessments, and regional assessments.\(^4^4\)

The strategic guidance of the U.S. defense policies is interpreted as a logical, conceptual, and operational flow that supports the U.S. military activities on a daily basis.

Even though, the U.S. defense policy planning process case can be a good example for a new democracy, it also has issues and challenges that demand attention. Today’s unexpected and unpredictable global challenges within a country’s national security and national defense environment demands a higher degree of thinking and planning from the U.S. defense planners, as well as from other democratic countries’ counterparts. Because of the complexity of the U.S. defense policy planning, issues and challenges are produced. For example, in interagency cooperation, there are many issues, such as duplicating agencies’ roles, spreading efforts in unnecessary places, allocating defense resources inefficiently, etc. Thomas Ricks points out in his book, *Fiasco: the American Military Adventure in Iraq*, that the 2003 invasion to Iraq proved that a weak national security bureaucracy, an oversight

failure of Congress, and a confused intelligence apparatus cost many American soldiers’ blood and their families’ tears “for the failures of high officials and powerful institutions.”

New democracies can learn some important lessons from the United States, such as defining policy guidance and strategies, formulating and operationalizing strategies, recommending its defense institutional reform, conducting defense policy and operational assessment, reviewing its defense organizational effectiveness, allocating its defense resource, etc. Options and lessons are open to all.

In summary, in terms of the making the most effective defense policy planning, the issues of uncertainty, capability-based planning, institutional jointness, and the contribution to global security stability are the main challenges for the U.S. defense policy planning environment. In spite of the effective use of its institutional structure and operational coordination, interagency cooperation is a major concern.

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III. ESTONIAN AND MONGOLIAN DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING PROCESS

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Both Estonia and Mongolia began their journey to democracy about the same time in the 1990s and share many security and defense policy challenges of the 1990s: how to create an effective defense system by discovering what to do, how to do it, and who will do it. Since then, these two countries followed different paths in terms of defense policy planning. That said, Estonia has some similarities with Mongolia: it has been a geographic buffer zone between two giant powers with other Baltic States during the Soviet years46 - Germany and the Soviet Union - and has experienced a total change from communism to democracy. Mongolia is geographically located between two large and ambitious militaristic powers - Russia and China. Although Mongolia needs to have its own defense planning system which fits Mongolia’s requirements, it can learn lessons from the Estonian defense planning system and can determine whether it has something advantageous and applicable to itself.

The purposes of this chapter is to describe the experiences of the Estonian and Mongolian defense planning processes, to view the specific differences between these processes, to understand the reasoning behind each country’s choices, to ascertain whether the chosen policy suits each country’s defense interests, and to discover if there could be any similar challenges for each country.

B. ESTONIAN DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING

After the disintegration of the Soviet block, the political and economic conditions of all of the post-communist countries were similar. Estonia and all other post-communist countries faced the same problem of securing their sovereignty in the international arena, establishing democratic institutions for the country, and defining their policies on common purposes - such as national security, foreign relations, defense, economy, and public service, etc.

According to Charles Perry, Michael Sweeney, and Andrew Winner,

at a broad, conceptual level, Estonia perceives its security as resting on two pillars, the first of these, drawing on the Danish model, focuses on the benefits derived from international cooperation . . . the second pillar, following the Finnish model, is a strategy of total defense in which Estonia ideally would resist or delay an attacker through mobilization of the populace as wartime reserves.47

However, another source, Kai-Helin Kaldas, says the security policy option for Estonia after regaining independence in August 1991 was that “there were roughly three main policy options open to Estonia at this point: remaining a neutral country; cooperating regionally with Finland and the other two Baltic states in security matters; or striving for integration with Western security

institutions."\textsuperscript{48} Joining the EU and NATO, in terms of independence, territorial integrity, national security, and defense interest, was a good decision for Estonia at that historical moment. The main impulse to join the EU and NATO was assuring its security under large institutions, securing its independence from a Russia-threat\textsuperscript{49}, and guaranteeing its newly acquired sovereignty.

The Estonian Defense Development Priorities of 2003 states that,

NATO’s defense planning, including the planning for defense of NATO’s territory, is included in the general NATO planning process. This process also creates a basis for the development of the means and military capabilities needed for the defense of Estonia’s territory. In order to insure her proportional contribution and to make known Estonia’s national interests, Estonia must participate in the NATO Defense Planning Process and harmonize her national policies accordingly. Estonia is aiming to obtain an integral understanding of NATO. As this broader understanding is based on many different integrated factors, participation in the planning process foresees the knowledge of Allies’ defense plans, as well as those of future members. During the planning process, Estonian defense planners should clarify the force structure of the Estonian Defense Force.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{48} See Kaldas, "Conclusion."

\textsuperscript{49} One of the main causes of small country to join a larger alliances system is to protect itself from larger adversaries. The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States after the Soviet Union collapse would seem to be the direct predecessor of the Soviet Union with another name. Estonia does not want to lose its newly acquired independence to Russia and sees Russia as a threat.

This called for a great deal of change. Without a doubt, Estonia’s membership in NATO in March 2004 and the EU in May 2004 played a significant role in its defense policy planning. The requirements\textsuperscript{51} for membership into such large organizations were complex and were key factors that enabled Estonian advancement in its defense policy planning. Naturally, all Estonian security and defense policy planning conforms with the EU and NATO’s policy planning procedure which diminish Estonia’s own role in the policy planning process.

After two years of membership in the EU and NATO, the Estonian Ministry of Defense sees its 2006 defense policy direction as one in which,

The security of Estonia has been ensured, at the same time our responsibility regarding stability and security in Europe, in the Euro-Atlantic co-operation and in the whole world has increased considerably . . . our aim is to maintain the credibility earned during the accession process and two years of membership and to conclude the re-structuring of our defense forces to meet NATO and EU requirements . . . our performance in NATO and EU is and will be based on efficient and cohesive co-operation between Estonian inter-

\textsuperscript{51} The requirements for membership onto the EU and NATO each have a different set of criteria. As for the EU, the “Copenhagen Criteria” defines what a country needs to be achieved in order to become a member. On-line, internet, 27 January 2007, available from \url{http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm}. As for NATO, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) offers sound advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. On-line, internet, 27 January 2007, available from \url{http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html}. 


governmental agencies, information exchange and readiness of our officers and civil servants to participate in NATO and EU assignments.  

Because of the larger organizations’ planning requirements, the Estonian defense policy planning process is somewhat simplified, but going along with the larger institution and doing what is required of it creates complications for the smaller country. Even though joining with these larger institutions was its ultimate goal, Estonia’s obligation to the EU and NATO has greatly increased.

Looking back at its historical breakthrough, Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip defined its defense policy development at the opening of one of senior level defense courses, the Fourteenth Higher Defense Course, in April 2006, by saying:

I consider the will of defense to be the most important basis for Estonia in the development of the national defense policy . . . the state and the people must inevitably make sacrifices to improve the defense apparatus. History has taught us that simply understanding this is not enough. Action is needed. After regaining its independence, the Republic of Estonia has proceeded precisely from this in the development of its defense policy. We have worked very hard for the development of a safe framework of foreign and defense policy around us . . . Our task is to be continually watchful and not to let

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ourselves be disillusioned by the thought that the work is done and now is the time to reap the benefits.\textsuperscript{53}

Estonian defense planners agreed that “a planning system and series of procedures that are based upon indigenous practices and realities, in addition to being developed in a consensus-building manner, is more likely to be maintained and improved upon over time than an imported system. Moreover, a responsive defense planning system will make civilian defense leadership aware of the clear costs / benefits implications of their decisions that must balance effectiveness and efficiency.”\textsuperscript{54} As a result, the new Estonian defense planning system is based upon military capabilities-based\textsuperscript{55} and consists of planning, programming, budgeting, and reporting. The question of how effective and optimal a system it is going to be is the next issue for the Estonian defense policy planning development system to consider.

1. Defense Policy Planning Process and Actors

Before the establishment of the Estonian Ministry of Defense in 1992, the Estonian Defense Force and Defense

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\item[55] Ibid., 10. “Military capability” is defined as the quantitatively measurable capacity of each EDF structural elements to perform a given task under specified conditions up to established standards. Each structural element may have more than one capability and each capability may be carried by more than one structural element.
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League\textsuperscript{56} were already formed by the Estonian nationalists who had a Soviet military education. The General Staff leadership with the Soviet military education did not understand well the principles of civil-military relations in a democracy. In consequence, there were many problems for dealing effectively with a civilian-led Ministry of Defense that was to lead defense reform.\textsuperscript{57} The reform focused on the Estonian defense planning and management system and it was begun under U.S. technical assistance from the Center for Civil-Military Relations. This technical assistance program became a project that guided the Estonian defense planners from March to December 2002.\textsuperscript{58} The product of this project was the Defense Planning Manual of 2002 and other defense related strategic documents. These defense policy planning documents were important pieces in the process of becoming a member of the EU and NATO.

In order to identify defense policy planning actors and their roles and responsibilities in the policy planning process, one must look at a country’s legal documents.

\textsuperscript{56} The Defense League (National Military Strategy definition) is the part of the national defense system. It is a national defense organization that has a military structure, possesses armaments, carries out military exercises and operates under the Ministry of Defense. It is a voluntary force, organized on a national basis, that provides military means for achieving defense policy objectives within its assigned tasks, and fosters military culture and the nation’s will to protect Estonia’s independence and constitutional order. The Defense League is divided into a military component and three special organizations – Women’s Home Defense, Young Eagles, and Home Daughters. (The Defense League is equal to the American National Guard or Territorial defense force of Poland – the author.)


\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 74.
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the President is the Supreme Commander of the National Defense of Estonia (Chapter V, Section 78) and the Riigikogu (the Parliament) is empowered to “pass laws and resolutions”; to “elect the President of the Republic, pursuant to § 79 of the Constitution”; to “authorize the candidate for Prime Minister to form the Government of the Republic”; to “appoint to office . . . the Commander or Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, on the proposal of the President of the Republic”; to “establish state awards, and military and diplomatic ranks”; to “decide on the expression of no confidence in the Government of the Republic, the Prime Minister or individual ministers”; to “declare a state of emergency in the state, pursuant to § 129 of the Constitution”; and to “declare a state of war, and order mobilization and demobilization, on the proposal of the President of the Republic” (Chapter IV, Section 65).

Along side the President and the Riigikogu, the Government of Estonia, the National Defense Council, the National Defense Committee of Riigikogu, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff of Defense Forces are the main players in the defense policy planning environment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense along with other relevant ministries and entities set Estonian security policy (Statutes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs § 8, 2004 and Statutes of the Ministry of Defense §8, 2004) and defense policy is formulated by the Ministry of Defense (Statutes of the Ministry of Defense §6, 2004).59

59 See Kaldas, “Conclusion.”
The National Defense Council functions as an advisory body to the President of the Republic in matters of national defense. The Council consists of the Chairman of the Riigikogu, the Prime Minister, the Chairmen of the National Defense Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Ministers of Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Justice, and the Commander of the Estonian Defense Forces.\(^6^0\)

In the process of Estonian defense policy formulation, one of the standing committees of the Riigikogu, the National Defense Committee, provides guidance and direction. The Committee participates in the process of shaping the security and defense policy of the state, initiates drafts of defense policy, and involves itself in the necessary proceedings of defense legal policies and acts.\(^6^1\) Also, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu has the authority to share its views on defense policy planning and to formulate process in issues of national security and foreign policy matters.


International Military Cooperation Act, 2003 specify the Estonian defense organizational structure and their objectives in various situations.

The following two figures on Estonian defense policy planning process and actors at the national level describe the level of each policy document and the relationship of each actor in the Estonian defense policy planning environment.62

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62 The author created the following two figures, based on the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the National Peace-time Defense Act, and other defense Acts, as well as the official websites of the Riigikogu and the Estonian Ministry of Defense.
2. Defense Policy

Estonian defense policy at the national level begins with the National Security Concept of 2004 and is supported by the National Military Strategy of 2004.

As in the United States, the National Security Concept is the key document in Estonian security and defense policy, but the main difference is that this policy comes from the Government, not from the President. Another interesting difference is that the document has been drawn up and adopted on the basis of the Peace-Time National
Defense Act. In June 2002, the Riigikogu approved the Peace-Time National Defense Act, which defines the responsibilities of the main defense organizations for national defense, the tasks of the Defense Forces, rules related to preparedness for national defense and general principles of defense planning.

The main focus of the Estonian security and defense policy in the National Security Concept is to preserve Estonia’s independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, public safety, and to participate in international peace operations led by the various international organizations, such as UN, EU, and NATO, as well as to ensure its “total defense” system.

The National Security Concept is a mid-term perspective of the Government and it will be updated accordingly in case of security environment changes, and possible new options for ensuring and enhancing Estonia’s security.

The National Military Strategy is the title of the document for Estonian defense and military policy planning.

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65 The National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia, 2004. The Concept defines total defense as the permanent readiness of the mental, physical, economic, and other capabilities of the nation’s civilian structures, local governments, the Defense Forces (Kaitsevagi) and Defense League (Kaitseliit), as well as the whole population for solving crises, for carrying out coordinated and united action to prevent and repulse aggression, and for ensuring the survival of the nation. On-line, internet, 17 January 2007, available from http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_177/4665.html.

66 Ibid.
The strategy is updated every five years, but in cases of security and defense environment changes, it can be revised as necessary. The main planners or actors of this strategy are the Ministry of Defense with the experts of the General Staff of the Defense Forces under the consultation of the National Defense Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu. The Strategy assesses the security threat and risks in its first chapter, sets the principles of defense policy in its second chapter, defines the capability-based planning for national military defense in its third chapter, describes the Defense Forces and National Defense League in its fourth chapter, specifies military readiness and mobilization in its fifth chapter, identifies the organization of command and control in its sixth chapter, and directs development of national defense priorities for enhancing defense capability in its last chapter.

Both the National Security Concept and the National Military Strategy had previous versions, which were named the National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2001) and the Basic Guidelines of the Estonian National Defense Policy (1996) which came into being before the accession to the EU and NATO. The context and organization of these previous documents mainly concerned joining the EU and NATO, and the achievement of these goals created a new security environment and new requirements which caused these documents to change later.

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68 Ibid.

Kai-Helen Kaldas points out that “Estonia’s accession to membership in the EU and NATO fulfilled the country’s long-term security policy objectives. Currently, Estonia faces a situation where it has attained its security policy goals and has not yet set new security policy objectives.” This means that membership in the EU and NATO does not allow for Estonia to independently set its security and defense policy. The EU and NATO guide their member countries to general security and defense policy over the European and trans-Atlantic hemisphere, but each member retains responsibility for its security and defense policy settings, as well as its obligation to European security and its defensive posture. The EU battle group concept and NATO’s Response Force are the main drivers for the member countries’ national security and national defense policies. Estonia signed into the Nordic battle group in 2005, comprised of Sweden, Estonia, Finland, and Norway – and the

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69 See Kaldas, 53.


Battle Group is supposed to be operational in January 2008.\textsuperscript{72} Estonia has also participated in NATO’s Response Force with a naval ship and mine clearance experts since 2005.\textsuperscript{73} Planning and participating in two separate operations of two different institutions is challenging.

Colonel Peter Faber, Researcher at the Academic Research Branch of the NATO Defense College, discusses national level issues and dilemmas in long term defense planning for NATO’s smaller members thusly: “stable or lower national level budgets plus increased operating costs mean less investment capital for defense. At the same time, a growing and more complex range of NATO missions and tasks will require a broader ‘toolbox’ which provides a broad range of capabilities, and leads to mounting running costs; it spreads out capital; and it typically stints on training, maintenance, and readiness costs. The results are thus a toolbox that can become unaffordable and, worse yet, militarily irrelevant.”\textsuperscript{74} It would seem that, if the expense under the membership of larger institutions grows, continues, and pressures the national economy, one might wonder whether the Estonian government can continue under these conditions. It may create concerns among top


politicians and the public, unless the larger institutions allow some kind of financial assistance or support.

The Defense Planning Manual is a policy planning document produced with the assistance of the CCMR, but it has not yet been fully implemented as a system. “It takes a time,” said the Advisor to the Commander of the Estonian Defense Force, Dr. Jaan Murumets, “the challenges remain the same ones that initiated major reform effort in 2000, such as the disconnection between policy and military planning, outdated operational planning methodology; and underdeveloped resource planning and management.” Dr. Murumets responded the author’s question that asked what challenges Estonia currently faces under the EU and NATO membership as a small country, by saying that “there are three groups of problems for strategic-level defense planners: first, how to balance, within existing resource constraints, development of initial self-defense capability and contributions to allied/international crisis response efforts; next, how to balance potentially competing requirements of the NATO and the EU in terms of participating in NATO-led vs. EU-led operations; and then, how to develop and sustain a Force Structure capable of providing initial self-defense and a supporting multinational crisis response.”

Estonia faces its next large challenge, that of shifting from a General Staff system to a Joint Staff

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75 Dr. Jaan Murumets (Advisor to the Commander of the Estonian Defense Force, Deputy Director of the Center for Applied Studies), in discussion with the author on the Estonian defense policy challenges (NPS, Monterey, CA, January, 2007).

76 See Murumets, discussion.
planning system. So, there are plenty of lessons, experiences, and problems that can be good examples to other countries, such as Mongolia. Dr. Murumets says that "the basic principles for this change rests on strong political support of the Defense Minister and firm professional leadership of the Chief of General Staff and a shared vision of the expected outcome - everyone should be part of the change, not 'victims' of the change." The greatest challenges to encounter would be in the complete changes of regulations, standing operational procedures, and training and education of the personnel. According to Dr. Murumets, "in the context of shifting from a Prussian-type General Staff to NATO-type Joint Staff, there are two main challenges: to implement NATO-compatible Operational Planning Process (OPP) as the primary operational planning methodology; and man the key staff department with officers who have knowledge of OPP from Western Staff colleges. Secondary concern would be integrating OPP into all levels of curricula taught in national military academies and colleges." 78

According to Perry and others, Estonia would quite likely face difficulties in implementing an effective strategy of its total defense planning and in filling the arsenal with the necessary table of equipments - due to the shortage of funds, and in manning the specialized personnel. 79 Planning a comprehensive coordination of

77 See Murumets, discussion.
78 See Murumets, discussion.
nationwide civil military structures is among the most difficult tasks. It requires effort and time. Estonian total defense planning and its strategies are being operationalized in the National Military Strategy of 2004 and planned in the Force Structure and Development of the Estonian Defense Forces 2010 of 2004. The existence of National Defense League has an important role in the implementation and comprehensive coordination of a nationwide territorial defense system.

C. MONGOLIAN DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING

In the early years of the Mongolian transition to democracy in the 1990s, Mongolia found itself needing to change its national security and national defense policies. There were three reasons for Mongolia to have a new defense policy: the collapse of the Soviet block, the security environment changes in the region after the Cold War, and domestic political and social reforms to democracy.80

In the last seventeen years, Mongolia has been transforming itself into a democratic system, and has established the legal standards for its new democracy and new democratic institutions. As in the case of the United States and Estonian counterparts, Mongolian defense and defense related laws specify the defense organization and structure, functions of the armed forces, and the defense objectives for the country. According to the Constitution of Mongolia, “Mongolia shall have armed forces for self-defense. The structure and organization of the armed forces and the rules of military service shall be determined by

law” (Article 11, Section 2). This statement makes it clear that within the Mongolian defense policy environment, all defense related activities, operations, relations and actions must be covered by law in order to perform functionally and legally.

Additionally, Douglas Porch points out that,

With the demise of its major ally and protector the Soviet Union, Mongolia determined that its army, composed of heavily armored units, could no longer guarantee its security. China may continue to constitute a distant threat, but the best way to guarantee Mongolia’s security, is to build credibility within the international community by engaging in peacekeeping operations.81

It is true that Mongolia has been left with no “umbrella” or “collective” protection and pursued self defense and territorial defense policies in its new security environment after the Cold War. A state centralized plan is not appropriate in today’s Mongolian defense policy planning system. The old pattern of defense policy was vested in the Soviet security vision which can be described as follows: “the major strength of the Soviet decision-making process lies in its centralization of power. Once a decision is made, it can be executed swiftly.”82 Historically, Mongolia did not plan its national security policy and its military strategy; the Soviets provided Mongolia with a military protection plan, security policy, and weaponry and techniques. Therefore, its

81 See Porch, 113.
national security and national defense policy planning was totally new for Mongolian defense planners in the 1990s.

Because of a definite influence by global and regional security environmental change, as well as political and economic transition inside the country, Mongolia shifted its military from the old collective defense system to one based on self-defense and a territorial defense system with nontraditional objectives, such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and international peacekeeping operations which were given priority. Planning for these new objectives proved to be a challenging one to ensure its national security interests, as well as national defense interests.

Bold Ravdan has described the defense policy of small states by stating that “the defense system of all small nations is based on a civilian society, flexibility, and numerous partners. In this sense, Mongolia’s defense mentality vastly differs from that of its two neighbors which give priority to the militarization of the society, that are on excessive guard against anything new and that believe in numbers.” Therefore, Mongolian defense policy needs to be designed within the structure of “small nations, with vast territory, small population, limited resources, and that conduct a non-aligned policy in times of peace, and that do not have the independent military capability to repel foreign aggression and intervention, are forced to rely on local defense (territorial defense)
structure.” The Constitution of Mongolia declares the country will have a self-defense force; the Law on Defense is tasked with building a territorial defense force; and the Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia affirms that an integrated defense system is the main direction for Mongolian defense policy planning.

The national security and national defense situation described in the Estonian case pretty much existed in the Mongolian case, but Mongolia was not encouraged to join any of the larger security institutions that Estonia was; instead, it opted for establishing self-defense and a territorial defense system and searched for third neighbors for assuring its national security and defense interests and international cooperative purposes. The 2001 Mongolian Defense White Paper states that,

Grounds for protecting the political-military security of Mongolia, is hoped to be accomplished through active participation in multilateral security dialogues, creating a military confidence with other nations and providing transparency in military affairs . . . specific feature of the security of a small state is that it is highly vulnerable and dependent on the external situation, especially on changes occurring in politics, economy and military of larger neighboring nations. Therefore, the basic means of ensuring favorable external environment for Mongolia’s national security rests in political and diplomatic measures.”

In terms of defense policy planning, the system that is currently installed within the Mongolian defense policy

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planning environment still needs to be developed. Why it is not quite good enough, what it needs to fulfill, and what the challenges will be are discussed in the next few subsections.

1. Defense Policy Planning Process and Actors

Mongolia has made considerable changes within all of its major military elements in the last decade or so. These changes would include its defense legal system, defense policy basis, force structure, training objectives, and the usage of the armed forces. It has reduced the number of military installations, established new military installations for peacekeeping training, and developed training doctrines and manuals for fulfilling new objectives of military operations other than war.

The creation of the Mongolian Ministry of Defense (MOD) in 1992 was an important institutional development toward achieving Mongolia’s democratic transition and enabling the armed forces to reform. The MOD had to redefine Mongolia’s military role in democracy, initiate military reform programs; and most importantly, it needed to establish a defense legal basis in its developmental transition. The first Mongolian Defense White Paper, published in 1997, states that “the MOD has been restructured to become a policy ministry which executes Government defense policy, establishes priorities for defense activities, programs, objectives, and mission and administers civilian control over the armed forces.”

basics are pretty much established, then, Mongolia should re-consider the effectiveness of its defense institutions and defense planning process.

Concerning actors and institutions, according to the Constitution of Mongolia, the President is designated as the Commander-in Chief of the armed forces of Mongolia (Article 33, Section 2) and the State Great Hural of Mongolia (the Parliament) is empowered to “enact laws, make amendments to them”; to “define the basis of the domestic and foreign policies of the State”; to “determine and change the structure and composition of the Standing Committees of the State Great Hural, the Government and other bodies directly accountable to it according to law”; to “pass a law recognizing the full powers of the President after his/her election and to relieve or remove the President”; to “appoint, replace or remove the Prime Minister, members of the Government and other bodies responsible and accountable to the State Great Hural as provided for by law”; to “supervise the implementation of laws and other decisions of the State Great Hural”; to “declare a state of war in case the sovereignty and independence of Mongolia are threatened by armed actions on the part of a foreign Power, and to abate it”; and to “declare martial law if public disorders in the whole or a part of the country's territory result in an armed conflict or create a real threat of an armed conflict, or if there is an armed aggression or real threat of an aggression from outside” (Article 25, Section 1 and 3). The State Great Hural defines the basics of state military policy, structure and organization of the armed forces and other
troops, regulations governing their replenishment, and number of military personnel in peacetime.\textsuperscript{87}

The National Security Council, headed by the President and consisting of the Speaker of the State Great Hural and the Prime Minister, has a primary role in national security and national defense policy making. The President submits proposals on the basics of state military policy, structure, and organization of the armed forces to the State Great Hural, and supervises the implementation of defense policy and military doctrine.\textsuperscript{88} According to the Law on Defense, the Ministry of Defense initiates a national defense policy and submits it to the National Security Council for the Council’s approval. The Council makes its recommendation and submits it to the President or the State Great Hural for approval, and then, the policy is approved by the President or the State Great Hural. A defense reform program has the same procedure for approval.

The Standing Committees on Security and Foreign Policy, on the State Structure, on budget, and on Legal Affairs are responsible for representing, initiating, and determining defense and defense-related policies in the State Great Hural. The Standing Committee on Security and Foreign Policy has the leading role among others on defense policy, and it is responsible for issues of National Security of Mongolia, Defense and Armed Forces of Mongolia, and Foreign Policy. The Standing Committee on the State Structure has the second main role and it is responsible


\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
for the issues regarding the State Administrative and Executive Organizational Structure. The Standing Committee on budget has the main role for the budgetary issues of defense. The Standing Committee on Legal Affairs has the main role on legal policies of Mongolia.\textsuperscript{89} It would seem that, because of the diverse participation of the Standing Committees on defense policy matters, it has both a positive and negative impact. The positive impact on defense policy planning would be that of wide spectrum civil-control over the military. The negative impact would be that of weak understanding regarding defense and military activities and often being an obstacle for further development, especially on budgetary issues for transformation.

The Government is required to provide leadership of central state administrative bodies and to strengthen the country’s defense capabilities.\textsuperscript{90} Similar to the U.S. Code, Mongolia has specified the objectives and relationships of each defense organization and their actors in the Law on the State Great Hural, Law on the President of Mongolia, Law on the Government of Mongolia, Law on Defense, Law on Armed Forces, and Law on Border. The Government implements the state defense policy, forms and replenishes necessary material reserves, takes measures for strengthening the armed forces, provides mobilization preparedness of the


The following two figures on the Mongolian defense policy planning process and actors at the national level describe the level of each policy document and the relationship of each actor within the Mongolian defense policy planning environment.\footnote{The author created the following two figures, based on the Constitution of Mongolia, the Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia and other defense laws, as well as the official websites of the State Great Hural, the Government of Mongolia, and the Ministry of Defense.}
2. Defense Policy

Because of its stable external and internal security environment, “Mongolia is able to conduct an independent and neutral defense policy in harmony with its national interests and self-defense principles and norms.”\textsuperscript{93} The key documents for Mongolia’s defense policy environment are the Concept of National Security, the Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, the Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia and other defense and defense-related laws and acts. Mongolia has both concepts and policy basics of its defense policy, but it does not have any documents for the National Security, the National Defense, and the National Military Strategies similar to the United States.

The Mongolian defense policy planning process begins with the Concept of National Security of Mongolia. It was adopted by the State Great Hural in 1994 and defined the National vital Interests of Mongolia, Goals and Priorities, Factors Affecting National Security, Way and Means of Ensuring National Security, Security Guarantees, and System of Ensuring National Security. The Concept of National Security of Mongolia is the basis for all other security and national defense policy documents, as well as the Law on National Security of 2001. The Law on National Security of 2001 is not a policy document; it is an Act or Law, which specifies the objectives and responsibilities of certain institutions and individuals. Therefore, the Concept of National Security of Mongolia is mainly discussed in this subsection. The Concept states not only traditional goals of national interests, such as independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of State frontiers, but also, the existence of the Mongolian people and their civilization, relative economic independence, sustainable ecological development and national unity.94 While “the definition of national security has broadened, so have the ways and means to secure these goals. Political and diplomatic methods are prioritized rather than military methods.”95 This idea is also expressed in the Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy.

94 The Concept of National Security of Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar, 1994).
The Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy was adopted in 1994 and defined the national foreign policy directions. The Concept states that,

In its foreign policy Mongolia shall uphold peace, strive to avoid confrontation with other countries and pursue a multi-base policy . . . Mongolia shall seek to guarantee its interests in the international arena through bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements . . . as a member of the world community Mongolia shall strive to make active contribution to the common cause of settling pressing regional and international issues.\textsuperscript{96}

The Concept enables Mongolia to have friendly multi partners’ relations, a bilateral or multilateral security guarantee, and defense cooperation with other larger or developed countries. The Concept’s main value is in introducing multi-pillar foreign policy and foreign policy consistent with Mongolia’s national interests.\textsuperscript{97}

The Mongolian Parliament adopted “The Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia” in 1998, which is a direct predecessor of previous document called the Fundamentals of State Military Policy, and this policy states that,

The state military policy is the official view of the state defining the attitude of the state inter alia armed aggression, averting the threats of wars and armed conflicts, safeguarding the country from external armed intervention, organizational development of military, and on

\textsuperscript{96} The Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy (Ulaanbaatar, 1994).

\textsuperscript{97} Tsedendamba Batbayar, Mongolia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: New Identity and New Challenges (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 12.
conducting armed struggle, and it shall be based on the self-defense principles of the Constitution of Mongolia."  

"The Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia" is the basis of all Mongolian defense and defense-related laws and acts. The National Security Council of Mongolia oversees how this document relates to other defense and defense related laws. The Basis will be adjusted accordingly by the State Great Hural with the proposal of the President if the international and regional military situation changes. This document and the Law on Defense, the Law of the Armed Forces, the Law on Military duties of Citizens and the Legal status of Military personnel, the Law on Mobilization, the Law on the State of War are the main laws concerning defense matters of Mongolia and are considered as the framers of the Mongolian defense policy.

The Concept of National Security of Mongolia, 1994, the Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, 1994, the Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia, 1998, gives doctrinal and conceptual guidance to the Mongolian military establishment as well as defense civilian institutions. Based on these doctrines and concepts, a number of laws and government directives were adopted to coordinate military and civilian institutional relations and to organize their institutional structure. Upon the adaptation of these legal documents, the Mongolian Armed Forces moved toward building

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
a professional Armed Forces in a new era. In order to achieve this main goal, these Mongolian defense and defense-related laws, policies and concepts are directed to improving its defense capability, identifying its problem areas, seeking an appropriate and capable force structure, changing the roles of traditional military capabilities to more international military operational capabilities and domestic disaster relief operational capabilities, and preparing for any future uncertainty. In other words, to bring the armed forces closer to the standards of a professionally-oriented army by making fundamental and qualitative changes in its legal establishment, force structure, organization, technical condition of equipment, personnel, military training system, logistics, civil-military relations, and civil control over the armed forces.

The Mongolian Government, specifically the Ministry of Defense, initiates defense developmental programs through “Development Program for the Armed Forces” of 1993-1997, “Military Reform Policy” of 1997-2001, the “Development program of the Military Establishment till 2005” of 2002, and “Armed Forces Transformation Program through the year of 2015” of 2006 with Military Objectives, Missions, Tasks, Priorities, Structural Developments, Force Structure Improvements, and Force application, and the President approves them. These programs were all mid-term strategic programs that aimed to develop professional-oriented Armed Forces, to manage the available defense resource effectively, and to keep the continuous qualitative development of programs. Moreover, Concepts of National Security and Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, the Basis of the
State Military Policy of Mongolia, Defense and Defense related laws, and these mid term Strategic Programs are broadly considered as a National Defense Strategies among the Mongolian defense planners.

Mongolia assesses each reform program regarding its military structure and organization, personnel developments, renovations of the armaments and equipment, improvements of its military training objectives, and its operational capabilities. The results of the assessment present the challenges that need to be addressed in the future: improving the capability of leadership, planning and managing to stay abreast with the training of permanent staff members, improving the performance of special duties and combat missions, and improving the training and readiness of the territorial defense system.

In May 2004, May 2006, and September 2006 through January 2007, the U.S. Institute for Defense Analyses and the Mongolian MOD conducted a joint assessment on the Mongolian defense resource management, a joint defense technical assessment, and a defense resource management simulation exercise. The first joint assessment team produced a set of recommendations for Mongolia and the second assessment team assessed the implementation of those recommendations and proposed further improvements. The joint defense technical assessment report recommended further work in the area of cost analysis and program development and planning. The role of the joint assessment team was to guide the Mongolian defense planners.

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to a direction of understanding as to defense resource
management, how to relate defense resources to defense
policy planning, and how to coordinate mid term and long
term defense programs within the available financial
sources and budget. The main learning point from the serial
joint assessments was the understanding that resource
management links strategy and policy to future military
capabilities through the development and implementation of
affordable mid-term program plans and annual budgets.\textsuperscript{103}

The next subsection will discuss some arguments and
counter arguments that relate to current Mongolian issues
and challenges on defense policy planning and look for
possible solutions and options, based on the experiences of
other democracies.

3. Issues and Challenges in the Mongolian Defense
Policy Planning

As in other democratic countries, “the government of
Mongolia is adjusting its defense policy and structure to
meet the new challenges of the contemporary world,”\textsuperscript{104} but
some points need to be considered in terms of defense
policy planning. For example, are the 1994 Concept of
National Security, the 1994 Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign
Policy, and the 1998 Basis of the State Military Policy of
Mongolia still up to date to world current security and
defense issues, or are these needing to be updated? The
explanation of why these doctrines and concepts are still
standing might be defined in the following terms:

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. The Study team presentation “Defense Resource Management:

\textsuperscript{104} Charles Morrison and Richard Baker, “Mongolia,” Asia Pacific
- A small country’s defined policy of self-defense and neutral position remains until its independence and security is in danger.
- Since the end of the Cold War, Mongolia’s two large neighbors, Russia and China, have had relatively secure and stable relations with Mongolia and both have bilateral treaties with Mongolia: the “Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Mongolia and the Russian Federation” of 1993 and the “Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Mongolia and the People’s Republic of China” of 1994, ensured a climate of no immediate threat.
- These Concepts are the basics, fundamentals, and principles of national security and national defense policy. All defense-related laws and documents have to be developed upon these Concepts.

The counter arguments to these explanations might be defined in the following terms:
- Although the possibility of future danger for Mongolia is uncertain, Mongolia should not remain in the position of neutrality. Mongolia needs to prepare for any uncertainty that might come. For example, in a worst case scenario, Mongolia would need immediate protection from any one of a number of possible alliances against possible adversaries, but it might be impossible if Mongolia is not a member of that alliance. The United Nations would intervene, but the heavy bureaucracy and procedures could not provide
protection within 60-90 days.\textsuperscript{105} Joining alliances takes much longer, maybe for four or five years, maybe ten. In the case of Estonia, it took thirteen years, 1991-2004.

- Mongolia’s two neighbors have stable security policies with Mongolia, but these two countries are in their transitional periods. Both countries have had issues of ethnic separation struggles for many years now – in Russia, Chechnya, and in China, Tibet and Taiwan. If the internal conflicts of two countries spill over to neighboring provinces and other ethnic groups, like the Domino Effect,\textsuperscript{106} the reactions could be unpredictable and devastating for Mongolia. Mr. Ganbold G., the Secretary in the Office of National Security Council, said in a discussion on National Security matters in the Journal of Defense Studies of Mongolia, “in the last ten years or so, the situations and factors of national security matters are

\textsuperscript{105} Lecture statement by Professor Kenneth Dombroski from Seminar in Military Operations other than War, at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 22 February 2007. In general, the UN is incapable of a rapid military response; 60 to 90 days is usually the minimum time needed to get an operation organized and on the ground. East Timor required immediate intervention, but it was Australia leading a coalition of the willing that intervened initially rather than the UN. Smaller observer missions are capable of moving in quicker, and if there is another mission nearby that can be used to siphon off some troops, then that will reduce the initial response time.

greatly changed. The old traditional national security issues may be gone, but new, more dangerous ones might occur”

- These Concepts are the basis of national security and national defense policies and based on these Concepts, Mongolia should define its National Security and National Defense Strategies. Why? Because Mongolia does not have the means and strategies to achieve these conceptual basics and fundamentals. Colonel Suzanne Gehri points out that “the lack of an effective National Security Strategy and planning process adversely impacts Mongolia’s defense and intelligence capabilities . . . the older National Security Concept and Defense Laws and the mindset of senior military leaders, lock the military into the traditional missions of territorial and air defense – missions which are barely possible with 100K Soviet-era force and literally impossible with the current 11,000 man force operating with Soviet-era equipment . . . it is difficult to see how the reforms advocated in MOD 2015 can be achieved without simultaneous attention to developing the capabilities for strategic planning in the NSC, MOD, and General Staff.”

Mr. Ganbold G. said that “some analysts stress that the National Security Concept is a complex mid term policy concept. It has been several years since this document was

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108 Colonel Suzanne Gehri, e-mail message to author. 26 February 2007.
adopted and I will not deny that there is a reason to amend accordingly to the current situational changes.”

A transitional democracy’s common challenges continue to exist in Mongolian defense policy planning; good examples would include weak military knowledge among top civilian authorities, lack of interest for defense issues, coherent civil-military relations on defense policy, and shortage of funds, etc. The 2001 Mongolian Defense White Paper states that “emerging favorable external security environment for Mongolia allows the nation to limit the defense budget and cut it down to the very necessities in order to maintain its Armed Forces and other troops. Therefore, the entire defense budget is comprised of two items: salary for personnel and current expenditures. No investment of funds has been made for development, equipment renovation or repair since 1988.” Currently, the new defense policy direction of military diplomatic relations with third neighboring countries is creating fruitful outcomes to the newly developing Mongolian Armed Forces. Other democratic countries, such as the United States, Germany, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Great Britain, etc., are offering various programs for professional military education and training. The United States is the biggest contributor among them. Since 1992, Mongolia has been actively supported by the United States with programs such as the Asia Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building Program, the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program, the Multinational Planning

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109 See Ganbold.

Augmentation Team program, the International Military Education and Training program, and others. The latest assistance from the United States tops off at $18 million - the Global Peace Operations Initiative ($4.5 million) - which offers great support for Mongolian peacekeeping training.111

The U.S. Center for Civil-Military Relations has also conducts seminars on National Security, Interagency processes, Civil-Military Relations, Public Affairs and National Military Strategy since 2001. The Center presented seminars to top Mongolian political civilian leaders and military leaders, as well as to the Office of National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense personnel and became a significant contribution for the Mongolian national security and national defense policy planners. The last seminar was conducted in September 2006 and discussed some issues and challenges that are most likely to face Mongolia in the future. The challenges were mainly constituted of the implementation of the program entitled “Armed Forces Transformation Program through the year of 2015.” This program is a direct continuation of earlier defense development and reform programs of 1993, 1997, and 2002. Frankly, these defense development and reform programs are the most current defense policy documents. Even though, the previous programs were not fully implemented, because of the shortage of the funds and weak political support from the top civilian authorities at the decision making levels,

these programs are significant documents for the transformation and development of the Mongolian Armed Forces’ challenge of fulfilling its new objectives of peacekeeping and other issues over the last few years of the new democracy’s development.

D. CHAPTER FINDINGS

Both Estonian and Mongolian national security and national defense policy planning began for the same reasons and objectives in the 1990s. Over time, Estonian defense policy planning headed toward securing its national security and defense interests through the protective membership of larger institutions; however, Mongolia chose to establish a self-defense and territorial defense system for itself and looked toward its “third neighbors” for assuring its national security and defense interests and for international cooperative purposes.

The process of Estonian defense policy planning went through tough challenges in order to become a member of the larger institutions and it still needs to accomplish more complicated policy planning for assuring and strengthening its continuing membership. The defense policies and strategies, the National Security Concept and the National Military Strategy, have similar content to that of the United States.

From an independent country’s point of view, the Estonian defense policy planning has both advantage and disadvantage. The advantageous side concerns the idea that it is now part of large organizational structures, the EU and NATO. Estonia has no need to worry about its security, either internally or externally. However, the
disadvantageous side of it is that it sustains itself as an independent country in its defense field. In 1956, Charles Lerche wrote, in his *Principles of International Politics*, that “by choosing membership in a larger political community, the small states sacrifice complete self-determination but gain in return the greater protection and more solid economic foundation that flows from membership in a broader organization.”

From now on, Estonia needs to play by these large institutional rules. However, one could argue that this way is the best for a small country to protect itself, or one could argue that globalization will lead in this direction anyway, so it does not matter what specific interest that small country may have. The next largest challenge that might be faced would be that of its obligation to both large institutions at the same time. Providing forces to the EU Battle Group and NATO Response Force and other international military operations will challenge its capabilities to the fulfillment of its commitment to the EU and NATO. Estonian defense policy planning has completed the critical phase of its development. Its further defense policy planning depends on its ability to cooperate with larger institutions for the purpose of manipulating them for providing for security its national security and national defense.

As for the Mongolian defense policy planning, Mongolia needs to look back at its defense policies once more. The question that needs attention is this: is the 1998 state military policy still an appropriate response for the current world defense issues and challenges? Perhaps

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Mongolia should address the state of affairs of 2007 and align its needs to those changing and evolving issues. Instead of having static doctrines, Mongolia should develop National Security or National Military Strategies that could be more flexible and reflective to world current security and defense issues and challenges. Comparing its defense policy planning with its Estonian counterparts might mislead the results of a comparative case study because of Estonian membership into the EU and NATO; but, it is certainly one lesson from which Mongolia can learn.

The processes of identifying Mongolian defense capability needs, establishing priorities, and examining options for meeting those needs constitute the framework for its defense policy planning development. In spite of the fact that Mongolian economic capability, limited funds, and an insufficient budget are the major difficulties for implementing these direct development programs and needs, Mongolia continues to strive to build a more manageable and professional Armed Forces within its available resources.

Both countries have accomplished the initial phase of democratic transition successfully and have reached certain objectives in their defense policy planning. The next phase of democratic transition rests solely with Mongolia and Estonia.
IV. WHAT CAN MONGOLIA LEARN FROM OTHERS’ DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING?

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The Mongolian defense policy planning process is stable because there are no threats from its two neighboring countries and there is little interest by key decision making political actors in Mongolia. The 2001 Mongolian Defense White Paper states that “building of the Armed Forces of Mongolia is not connected with the problem of possible threats only but more with the existence of core national values and interests, and peaceful desire of the people to protect and inherit them.”\textsuperscript{113} The status of this statement has not changed much since the publication of this document, but world-wide current issues and challenges regarding national security and defense have changed drastically since then.

The issues and challenges of the Mongolian defense policy planning environment which was discussed in the previous chapter’s subsection are the main discussion points in this chapter.

What can Mongolia learn from other democratic countries, especially concerning the planning process? Lessons learned, defense policy planning techniques, and issues and challenges regarding this matter are open to adaptation into the Mongolian defense policy planning practice; however, the most critical lessons and processes that would be favorable or appropriate for the current Mongolian situation is discussed in the following sections.

B. WHAT CAN MONGOLIA LEARN ON PROCESSES OF DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING?

The world is evolving and things are changing; Mongolia needs to get in tune with it in terms of its defense policy planning. Estonia found its way to plan its defense policy by joining the EU and the NATO. From now on, Estonia enjoys a great deal of protection, as well as responsibility.

What should Mongolia do? Does it need to join large institutions for securing its defense policy interests or retain neutrality, or actively participate in international military operations in order to protect Mongolian existence?

This chapter section raises some arguments about Mongolia’s current defense policy planning, and based on these identified issues and challenges, possible options and solutions for Mongolia will be reviewed.

1. Conceptual Doctrines and No Strategies

If the National Security Concept of 1992 and the Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia of 1998 are the basis of the fundamentals of concepts and legislature, Mongolia has to have a defense policy and strategy on how to support its conceptual basis of the Concept of National Security and the Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia. These two documents are broad concepts or principles, not a strategy of how to achieve objectives. Policy and strategy need to be adjusted according to current national security and defense interests of the country, as well as its resources. It is true that it is almost impossible to follow certain doctrines or concepts
for many years in today’s rapid development of information and technology, revolution of military affairs, unpredictable challenges of terrorism, and globalization, especially in national security and national defense policy environment.

The Mongolian defense policy planning process has a missing link in the middle of the planning process of top to bottom planning. The system currently installed in the Mongolian defense policy planning process is based on its Government Action Plan and defense developmental reform programs. Every four years, a new government announces its action plan for a whole four-year term and the State Great Hural approves it. Based on the approved Action Plan, the Mongolian Government brings its implementation plan to the ministries. Each ministry has a responsibility for planning its implementation plan accordingly. At the operational level, all agencies are also responsible for making their implementation plan. This process seems a simple process, but there is a missing link between policy guidance, the Government action plan, and the implementation plan, which would be a defined strategy of how to achieve its policy goals using whatever means (resources). The aforementioned Government implementation plan, or the Ministry of Defense’s implementation plan, can’t constitute strategy. Because these implementation plans direct who does what and when, but say nothing about how to achieve the given objectives and obtain the resources needed, a strategy must be created between a policy guidance plan and an implementation plan and then linked together as a policy planning system.
Even the Government Action Plan and its Implementation Plan are very constricted for consideration as policy guidance. The Action Plan is quite similar to the list of objectives which directs who needs to do what and when. The Implementation Plan is a little detailed list, but offers no resource-related guidelines. From here, another major problem occurs. How will these implementation plans, without specifically authorized resources connect with the budgeting cycle and further policy planning development? Perhaps the reason why some defense development and reform programs could not be fully implemented is due to this policy planning gap. Even though the programs are approved by the President, some objectives and goals of these programs, such as the renovation and overhaul of some weaponry systems, couldn’t be implemented due to weak political support from the top civilian authorities as well as the nation’s economic priorities for other public services. The series of Mongolian reform programs\textsuperscript{114} since 1992 helped to change the military’s thinking, but not that of the civilian authorities, who approve the budget. Due to a low interest and little understanding of the military from higher civilian authorities, the Mongolian defense policy is not been given importance and significance. The outcome of this lack of interest could cause severe damage or setbacks to Mongolian defense. The point is that these plans and programs can not substitute for national defense or national military strategies.

It’s important to note that not only Mongolian defense policy planning, but also other Mongolian public services and ministries, have to plan according to this model. The Government forms this plan through its administrative structure. It would seem that this model is reminiscent of the old Soviet-type of centralized planning system, but not often implemented fully.

Mongolia should fill this missing link with a necessary strategy that can lead to a complete defense policy planning system. If defense policy is set clearly at the national level, being given guidance as what to do, being linked with strategies that define strategic
objectives, being understood at the lower level as how to perform, and being assessed the whole defense policy planning process that recommending possible changes back to the policy, Mongolia would have an ideal type of policy planning process.

This issue opens the way to the next issue of defense institutional structure.

2. Actors and Institutions

Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze point out in, *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, that based on their observations and experience in the United States, Portugal, Spain, and several other newer democracies, there are three initial requirements which will allow an institution, such as the Ministry of Defense to be successful, “in the first, the Ministry of Defense managers must build workable structures and processes, supported by a firm legal status and resources, in the second, the Ministry of Defense must be staffed with informed and responsible professional civilians who can expect some degree of permanence of their position, and in the third, the Ministry of Defense will need a mechanism to incorporate military officers and utilize their professional backgrounds and expertise to support ministry policymaking.”

In the case of the Mongolian Ministry of Defense, the first requirement can be seen as half-implemented, conforming events were the impetus for the creation of the

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Ministry of Defense and the creation of basic legal documents. The only problem here is that the Mongolian Ministry of Defense doesn’t actually control the full budget that’s allocated from the government. The portfolio is under the name of the Minister of Defense, but the Chief of General Staff has the full authority to spend its operational expense. This means that the Ministry of Defense has four agencies, including the General Staff. According to the Law on Management and Finance of Government Agencies, the agency’s manager (in case of the General Staff, the Chief of General Staff is the agency manager) and his share in the Defense Minister’s portfolio is \( \frac{3}{4} \), which enables him to spend three times more than the minister itself. The second requirement for staffing the Ministry of Defense with professional civilians needs to be performed fully. Currently, the civilian personnel situation is very difficult, especially for young defense experts. Their salary is relatively low compared to the private sector and their work status is lower than the former military and retired officers who are not specialized in that position, but appointed by political appointees or others. For these reasons the result is that civilians seek out jobs within the private sector. The last requirement for choosing professional military officers for support ministry policymaking, is working very well in the current Mongolian Ministry of Defense, because of the low number of personnel in the ministry and heavy workload.

The Ministry of Defense is one of the main institutions primarily responsible for Mongolian defense policy planning, but the source of the main problem might be at a higher level of political decision making. The
Ministry of Defense can not set a policy or strategy for the country if there is no clear policy guidance and direction from the Government, the President, the State Great Hural, or the National Security Council of Mongolia. Even though the Ministry of Defense works hard and introduces a new national defense strategy or military strategy it is unlikely to earn support at the level of political decision making. Politicians are supposed to set political guidance, policy direction, and strategies, and to provide resources that military can implement and use. In this case, the military needs to attract the politicians’ attention about defense policy. How? In the last few years, Mongolian peacekeepers have played a significant role in promoting the Mongolian military at the international level. This could be one factor that might attract politicians to take an interest in defense policy matters.

3. Lessons Learned

Besides knowing how other democratic countries set up their defense policy plans, it is important to critique their defense policies.

In the case of Estonia, its defense policy planning system has just been installed and its membership in larger institutions is only three years old. Perhaps not enough time has passed to review or assess the success of the whole process yet. These issues will be considered in their renewal of the National Military Strategy in late 2007.

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117 Jaan Murumets, e-mail message to author. 26 February 2007.
In the case of Mongolia, it is difficult to say that it has a formal review process. It would seem that the current review procedure is an evaluation process of the aforementioned Implementation Plans for reprimanding and punishing, but it does not give recommendations or suggestions for policy guidance. The Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia, the Institute for Defense Studies, and the Academy of Defense Management at the Defense University should pay more attention to the development of a policy review and assessment process.

In the case of the Unites States, it has plenty of lessons on this matter. They would include QDRs, the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, II, and III reports, other think tank organizations’ and institutes’ reports and analyses, and individual analysts’ work. These institutions’ and individuals’ recommendations for reform are valuable comments and ideas for American national security and national defense policy planners.

C. CHAPTER FINDINGS

The thesis discusses a wide range of defense policy planning aspects of actors and institutions, and issues and challenges in the case of the United States, Estonia, and Mongolia. In this chapter, based on the definition of Mongolia’s current defense policy planning environment, how Mongolia can learn from other democracies’ defense policy planning, what the hindrances are to solving current issues and challenges, and what the possible recommendations are for Mongolia have been discussed.

The current peaceful and friendly relations with its two neighboring countries is great, but no one knows what
will happen in the next five or ten years in Asia, especially in this uncertain time of security issues, such as Taiwan’s intention for independence, North Korea’s possession of nuclear capability, and a rise of new regional power in the region – China, Japan, India, etc. All of these events and this chapter suggest that Mongolia should not wait for something to happen in terms of national security and national defense, and Mongolia should prepare for uncertainty.

The 1994 and 1998 Concepts and Basis are the policy fundamentals and principles. Based on these Concepts and in accordance with policy guidance, the Government Action Plan, Mongolia should develop its strategies in order to achieve the goals and objectives of these Concepts and guidance. The available lessons to learn from other democracies are plenty, but only dedicated research, analysis, and study can lead Mongolia toward effective defense policy planning.
V. CONCLUSION

A defense policy planning process for a democratic country depends on a country’s democratic organizational structure, institutional tradition, leadership roles, and specific defense needs. The key processes are decision-making, who makes the decisions, how to allocate resources, what investments to make, and how to set guidelines and strategies in order to get jobs done. Charles Hitch pointed out in the early 1960s that the “national security, from the point of view of an economist, may be said to depend on three things: (1) the quantity of national resources available, now and in the future; (2) the proportion of these resources allocated to national security purposes; and (3) the efficiency with which the resources so allocated are used.” Even though, world security and defense issues have changed over time, the use of defense resources and the need for its effective allocation has not changed much.

Defense policy planning in democratic countries varies, but some main policy doctrines have similarities; for example, almost all democratic countries have their own concepts or policy documents for their national security and foreign or defense matters. They are similar in that all doctrines and strategies seek to ensure a country’s national interests, defense needs, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and necessary institutional arrangements to achieve these. Differences can be found in the

international relations environment, its democratic institutional structure, the way of founding or establishment, individual roles of its leadership, and the challenges of each. In order to have a strategy, an institution or a nation has to have a clear policy which leads the institution or the nation to discover what it will do. Then the strategy comes after the policy, which leads the institution or the nation to discover how it will do it.

Ochmanek and Hosmer point out that in the presence of uncertainty, “planners must ensure that the scenarios they use to shape and assess their programs capture a broad range of potential challenges. But strategy is more than just coping with a fixed set of conditions and fitting available resources to a given environment. A key function of strategy is to shape that environment in directions helpful to one’s own interests.”119 From their point of view, uncertainty can be manageable “while we may be uncertain about the future course of events, we can identify with great clarity those things that we do and do not want to happen, and our strategy is, in part, directed toward ensuring that desired outcomes occur and undesired ones do not occur.”120

The lessons from the United States, Estonia, and Mongolia present three different cases. The first case, the United States, is an established democracy with powerful defense capabilities and complicated defense policy

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120 Ibid.
planning systems. The U.S. case also suggests that its defense policy planning system gets larger as it confronts challenging issues. Correcting the system itself is a huge process and effort within the Government interagency process can not be easy. Moreover, CSIS’s Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 1, 2, and 3 Reports recommended that the Cold War-constructed Industrial Age structure and processes were not appropriate in a new Information Age. The United States defense policy planners would do well to pay more attention to its interagency cooperation and national security institutional structure for effective planning.

The second case, Estonia, is a new democracy with a newly established defense force, but the membership within larger institutions help Estonia to enjoy the initial transitional period with speed. The Estonian case suggests that its initial success, however, does not fully release Estonia from its further defense policy planning responsibilities. Estonia needs to strengthen its role through membership within larger institutions, to enhance its capability through participation in international military operations, and to keep its commitment to the EU and NATO, as well as to other member countries.

The third case, Mongolia, is a new democracy that seeks its next solutions for a defense policy planning process. The thesis aims to define the Mongolia’s current defense policy planning process and to ascertain possible lessons for further development if needed. The overall

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findings in this thesis suggest that Mongolian defense policy planning is needed to set and define its strategies, which enables it to support its capabilities, to maintain its development, and to plan effectively in order to manipulate or manage its capabilities within available defense resources. In order to set its defense strategies Mongolia should develop National Security or National Defense Strategic planning documents at the upper-most political decision-making levels. Even though, Mongolia has stable security relations with its two neighboring countries, it is time for Mongolia to awake and move forward, strengthen its capabilities, and advance its initial achievements in democracy by preparing for today’s uncertain and unpredictable world. Mongolia should also be aware of current world national security and national defense issues and challenges and their review, assessment, or recommendation documents, such as the U.S.’s QDR. These documents give insightful guidance, comment, and observation, and explain reasons and motivations which can be critical for Mongolia’s learning curve.

The thesis concludes that a country must have a defense policy that represents that country’s basic defense needs and interests, assures security guarantees, and provides strategies for achieving the goals of defined defense policies. A country must first set its security and defense policy. It must then define the strategies to achieve its security and defense policy. Finally, it must provide support to its institutions and services with strategies to operationalize its security and defense policy. Based on implementation and operational process, a review process is needed, which leads to recommendation
back to the policy guidance. This policy planning process is common for any democratic country, whether large or small, wealthy or poor, powerful or weak.
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