

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**REGIONAL CIVIL SUPPORT FORCES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL
SUPPORT MISSIONS**

by

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ABSTRACT

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To protect the homeland, a plan to form ten regional Civil Support Forces (CSF) made up of National Guard forces has been proposed by senior fellow Christine Wormuth of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¹ The National Guard (NG), from its very beginning, has been tasked to respond to civil unrest and disasters. This well-established historic mission warrants an expansion to ensure coordinated military support in the event of a catastrophic national disaster or emergency. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) analyzes three courses of action to provide regional NG civil support. It explains how CSFs would be aligned in regions utilizing the Guard's State Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). Participation in past civil support events reveals the desirability of a future integrated force. Laws and policies are reviewed for their effect on unity of command when multiple agencies have roles in operations. Finally, way-ahead issues are proposed.

REGIONAL CIVIL SUPPORT FORCES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT MISSIONS

The National Response Plan (NRP) was implemented in December 2004 with a three phase implementation timeline. Hurricane Katrina was the first catastrophic event to test the NRP since the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was chartered. The response effort for Katrina in August 2005 clearly revealed the difficulty of achieving unity of effort and unity of command in a complex integrated response. Unity of effort is degraded by “seams of uncertainty [which] exist among multiple HD [Homeland Defense] and [Civil Support] CS stakeholders in terms of roles, responsibilities, authorities and capabilities.”² The complex hierarchy of organizations; failure of initiative from local, state, and federal governments; and unfamiliarity with the NRP, which was technically still in its one-year implementation phase when Katrina hit landfall led to a breakdown in unity of effort and unity of command.³ Unfamiliarity with the NRP procedures and roles, along with poor communication infrastructure following devastating flooding, prompted some supporting agencies to take charge while other agencies relinquished their responsibilities.⁴

Unity of command is facilitated by the clear designation of a primary agency and of supporting agencies. A supported agency thus is designated the lead agency for those aspects of an operation for which it has authority. Department of Defense (DOD) has primary responsibility for Homeland Defense (HD). It is supported by other agencies to supplement its capabilities and assure its effectiveness. DOD is a supporting agency to DHS for CS unless otherwise directed by the President.⁵ DOD provides CS when requested by DHS and approved by the SECDEF or when directed by the POTUS or Secretary of Defense.

Congressional hearings, lessons learned, and after-action reviews should lead to improvement of domestic incident response while providing myriad of ideas on how best to achieve unity of effort and unity of command. The NRP is under revision with no set publication date looming. New agencies have been established in the civilian and military sectors to fill voids. Exercises are being conducted to test emergency response plans and bring to light deficiencies in responsibilities. This SRP reviews the three-tier approach to emergency management. It describes various emergency management agencies and procedures. Finally the role of the National Guard, its structure, and its emergency response capabilities are reviewed to develop two courses of action for regional support.

The Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic incident management. Initial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and local authorities. The Federal Government will assist State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved.⁶

The Tiered Approach

The tiered approach follows the hierarchy of government levels; local, state, and federal—each level’s responsibilities matched with its capabilities. Local jurisdictions — cities and counties — maintain public order and provide essential services such as fire and medical response. Many jurisdictions have mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions to bring more resources to bear on local incidents of greater magnitude than routine emergencies. It is only when an incident requires a resource exceeding the capability and resources of local authorities that a request for assistance is initiated to the state government or its agencies for state level emergency management. The governor has many more assets for response and recovery efforts than mayors and city councils. Typically the governor relies on civilian agencies as first responders before he activates the state’s largest manpower pool, the state National Guard. Finally, when all lower levels of governmental response and recovery capabilities are exhausted or inadequate, the governor relies on assistance from federal agencies. The federal emergency management tier consists of a powerhouse of agencies such as: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the DHS umbrella, Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Departments of Energy, Labor, Transportation, Commerce, Agriculture, and DOD.

State Emergency Management

Governors have complete control of state assets to respond to civil disturbances and to support disaster relief efforts. The governor may deny a request for assistance to a local incident. But once a request is approved by the governor, he may declare a state of emergency and activate the state response plan. Then the state’s Office of Emergency Services facilitates interagency coordination to ensure an appropriate response.

The governor is the Commander in Chief of the state’s militia, the National Guard, while they perform their duties in a State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 U.S.C. status. DOD provides funding for Title 32 soldiers, but the governor is responsible for funding of SAD.⁷ The governor may employ the National Guard as a state asset to assist with a variety of incidents, such as wildfires, floods, or severe storms, without requesting federal assistance. Typical terminology associated with earlier civil support efforts were Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA),

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), and Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.⁸ These terms, still used in certain instances, are being replaced increasingly by two universal terms – Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA) and CS.⁹ If a governor has exhausted state resources or decides that additional support is needed to save lives or infrastructure, he may then rely on mutual aid agreements or compacts among neighboring states to provide additional resources before requesting federal support.

EMAC, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, was established in 1996 to provide mutual aid and state partnerships to respond to disasters, whether they resulted from weather, earthquakes, wildfires, floods, or terrorist attacks. Since being ratified by Congress as Public Law 104-321, EMAC has been adopted by the legislatures of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.¹⁰ Through EMAC, the governors of each state agree to provide mutual aid through sharing resources, personnel, and equipment in response to disasters and emergency incidents. NEMA, the National Emergency Management Association, is a professional association of state emergency management directors, serving as the administrator of EMAC. NEMA facilitates national and regional interagency coordination among states, homeland security advisors, federal agencies, non profit organizations and private sector companies.¹¹ To ensure unity of effort, EMAC coordinates its resource plan with the National Response Plan resources. EMAC has been endorsed by the National Guard Bureau, the Adjutants General Association of the U.S., FEMA, DHS, the Midwestern Legislative Conference, and various Governors’ Associations.¹² Figure 1 depicts the organizational chart for EMAC:¹³




Figure 1: EMAC Organizational Structure

Once a Governor declares a state of emergency, the A-Team is requested by the state representative. The A-Team responding to a request for assistance operates out of the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) of the state requesting assistance. State and Federal personnel operate out of the same EOC. The A-Team works with the requesting state to determine needs, costs, and availability of resources; it also serves as a liaison among states rendering assistance and the affected state.¹⁴ The Regional Coordinating Team, if needed, sets up operations at the DHS/FEMA Regional Coordination/Operations Center; it exercises jurisdiction over the state that declared an emergency. There are 10 FEMA Regional Operations Centers across the U.S.; they will be discussed later.

If it is deployed, the National Coordinating Team operates out of the FEMA National Response Center. The National Coordinating Team (NCT), as the name implies, coordinates with the Regional and A-Teams, the National Coordination Group, and NEMA. The NCT prepares the situation report for all EMAC activities. The state National Guard assigns a NG coordinator or liaison officer to each EOC to enhance unity of effort. Once an incident has required a response at the regional and national levels, FEMA reimburses the Regional and National Coordinating Teams.

Federal Emergency Management

“A secure United States Homeland is the Nation’s first priority and is fundamental to the successful execution of its military strategy.”¹⁵ The Secretary of Homeland Security has authority to declare Incidents of National Significance and is thus responsible for domestic incident management. FEMA manages federal response and recovery efforts. The DOJ is responsible for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or threats inside the U.S.¹⁶ Generally, the Attorney General utilizes the FBI to coordinate the activities of the law enforcement community to counter terrorism within the U.S. DOD provides military support to civil authorities when directed by the President.

FEMA’s headquarters is located in Washington, D.C. In addition, FEMA has ten regional headquarters in the continental United States.¹⁷ One organizational option for Regional Civil Support Forces is to align with the FEMA regions as follows:

- Region I – Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont.
- Region II – New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands.
- Region III – Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia.

- Region IV – Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
- Region V – Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
- Region VI – Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
- Region VII – Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska.
- Region VIII – Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
- Region IX – California, Arizona, Hawaii, Nevada, American Samoa, Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia
- Region X – Washington, Alaska, Idaho, and Oregon.



Figure 2: FEMA Organizational Structure¹⁸

FEMA operates with a force of about 2500 full-time employees and approximately 5,000 part-time employees. The Defense Coordination Officer (DCO) is a Title 10 Colonel under NORTHCOM assigned to the FEMA Regional Operation Center. The DCO provides liaison with the State Coordinating Officer (SCO), the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), and the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) in the Joint Field Office during an incident requiring a regional or federal response.

Role of the National Guard

The National Guard originated with establishment of three Massachusetts militia regiments by the Massachusetts General Court on December 13, 1636.¹⁹ Through the Militia

Act of 1903, also known as the Dick Act, Congress authorized the National Guard to exercise jurisdiction over civil disturbance and disaster relief. Until passage of the Militia Act of 1908, Guard troops could not serve outside of the U.S. borders. Congress has continued to deliberate geographical limitations on Guard services through the 20th Century. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support designates the National Guard, with its Air Force and Army components, as a suitable and experienced force for civil support missions. The National Guard permeates our nation with units, armories, or bases in 3,200 communities throughout the nation.²⁰ Each state has a National Guard senior commander known as The Adjutant General (TAG). To command the states' joint forces, the TAG appoints a commander of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and a commander of the Air National Guard (ANG). Recently the Guard has deployed units and equipment in support of the War on Drugs and the Global War on Terror. Since its inception, the militia has rendered aid to territories, states, and the nation during wars, catastrophic events, disasters, and civil unrest.

The National Guard Bureau facilitates communications among the Departments of the Army (DA) and Air Force (DAF), the states, and the National Guard.²¹ NGB is a joint bureau of the DA and the DAF, serving both as a staff and an operating agency. The President appoints the Chief, NGB to a four-year term with Senate approval. Six appropriations are currently directed by the CNGB, who also receives funding through supplemental appropriations to provide for equipment replacement, among other categories. Appropriations for pay and allowance, operations and maintenance, and construction are directed by the CNGB for both the ARNG and the ANG.²²

NGB is mandated to monitor and assist “the States in the organization, maintenance, and operation of National Guard units so as to provide well-trained and well-equipped units capable of augmenting the active forces in time of war or national emergency.”²³ Further, NGB is mandated to facilitate and support the training of members and units of the National Guard to meet State requirements.²⁴ The governor of a state is the commander-in-chief of the guard. There is no command relationship between NGB and The Adjutant Generals in the states. This means the development of a regional or nation-wide plan for NG civil support for catastrophic incidents depends on consensus, not an executive order. Further, NGB was structured as a policy-making entity, not an operational headquarters. As the NG role progresses in both war-fighting and CS missions, however, Congress may grant greater command responsibility to NGB.

DOD trains and equips the National Guard; therefore the NG can operate around the world in traditional DOD missions – serving in combat operations, combat service support

operations, and stability operations. “For DOD to operate as an effective military force while performing HD [Homeland Defense] and CS [Civil Support] missions...the role and capabilities of non-federalized National Guard (NG) forces must be synchronized and integrated in the overall effort.”²⁵ This recommendation from a DOD HLS Joint Operating Concept document might lead inter-agency personnel to believe that the National Guard routinely trains for HS missions and is equipped with interoperable HS equipment, such as radios. However, the National Guard does not receive routine HD/HS training or equipment for incident response, other than for specialized units addressed later in this paper, or for Full-Time National Guard Duty (FTNGD) status under the authority of Title 32, USC. The National Guard responds to an emergency with the same equipment it uses in its wartime mission.

The NG is mandated to spend federal dollars received for their inactive duty training (IDT) and annual training (AT) days preparing and training for federal missions.²⁶ HD missions under Title 32 are covered in the 900 subsections.²⁷ Subsection 901 defines HD activity as that which is undertaken for the military protection of territory or domestic population of the US or critical infrastructure as defined by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Subsection 902 authorizes the SECDEF to provide funds to a governor for the employment of NG for HD. Subsection 902 further stipulates that required training under section 502 (a) must be performed so that NG members in FTNGD maintain the required training of the member not in FTNGD status so that their military skills are not degraded. Subsection 902 thus assures that any course of action considered for CS regional response would capitalize on the member’s training already funded by DOD for war-time mission. Thus a unit which is trained and equipped to provide air medical evacuation would also assume that duty for CS. Subsection 904 mandates that all duty for HD must be conducted in FTNGD and limits the duration of duty to 180 days, with the option of a 90-day extension allowed. The NG’s manning of airports following 11 September 2001 was facilitated by this law. Subsection 906 authorizes governors to request funds for HD activities conducted by state NG members from the SECDEF.²⁸

“The National Guard in State or Title 32 status possesses many of the characteristics required of an effective Joint Force yet remains responsive to State sovereign authorities free of many of the limitations that constrain federal forces.”²⁹ The NG may perform law enforcement missions while under the control of the state governor. Law enforcement missions have generally focused on protecting life or property, manning roadblocks and traffic control points, and enforcing curfews. NG Soldiers performed these missions during the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of four police officers accused in the beating of Rodney King.³⁰ Therefore, while in SAD or Title 32 status, the NG is not restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act

(PCA) and may provide support to law enforcement.³¹ The NG is limited by the PCA when performing active duty in Title 10 or federal status. Title 10 forces are all limited by PCA. The President of the United States (POTUS) is Commander in Chief of all Title 10 forces – Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force. The Coast Guard is authorized by Title 14 USC and works under authority of DHS, not of DOD.

Sound arguments for limiting the military in its law enforcement actions have centered on jurisdictional roles, responsibilities, and due process – along with training, education, and use-of-force conventions.³² Some authors assert that until recently the POTUS had limited authority for deploying federal military forces under the Insurrection Act of 1807.³³ Others think the POTUS has always had legal authority to quell civil unrest. Since the passage of the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on 30 September 2006, terminology has expanded the text from deployment of federal military for suppression of insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence; “to restore order or enforce federal law after a major public emergency, such as a natural disaster, epidemic, or terrorist attack.”³⁴ In accord with usual practice, the governor or state legislature requested assistance from the federal government when state requirements exceeded state capabilities. However, the POTUS may provide assistance to a state even if it is not requested by the governor. This amendment may further complicate unity of command and unity of effort by undermining the governor’s ability to make the best use his state resources. Efficient and timely response to incidents is dependent on unity of effort. Interagency coordination meetings provide a setting for personnel to network and broaden their familiarity with organizational responsibilities which ensure unity of effort. One of the assets possessed by National Guard personnel is familiarity with the communities where they work and live, along with a broad range of skills acquired through their civilian and military careers.

Civil Support Teams (CST) are specialized NG assets that provide support to civil authorities to identify weapons of mass destruction (WMD) agents and substances to assess current and projected consequences of WMD attacks, and to advise on response measures to such attacks.³⁵ Particularly pertinent to this SRP is that the states with regional FEMA headquarters were the states first equipped with CSTs. Their regional alignment places the CSTs within four hours of 60% of the population base in the state. CSTs consist of 22 full-time Army or Air NG personnel with a variety of specialties – administration, communications, logistics, medical, operations and command sections round out the CST. The governor has control of the CSTs just like other NG forces unless they are federalized by the POTUS. They carry out missions using a wide variety of sophisticated commercial equipment, as well as some standardized active duty equipment. The SECDEF certifies CSTs after they have undergone 18

- 24 months of rigorous training. The CST program, currently supported by an annual \$189 million DOD allocation, is managed by NGB, which coordinates with state adjutant generals, DOD, federal agencies, and other organizations. DOD thus provides NG teams that exceed most civilian response teams for CBRNE identification and communications capability.³⁶

“Because of the lack of clear guidance from NGB on how state National Guard organizations should oversee and support their CSTs, the level and quality of oversight and support for CSTs varies by state.”³⁷ Though CSTs have established themselves as an integral part of the NRP and NIMS, confusion over their missions and management persists. One obstacle that has been overcome is down time for team members. To get time off to train and vacation, the 55 CSTs have established three levels of readiness to ensure adequate coverage for the U.S. CSTs are distributed into six continental U.S. zones: basically zones 1, 2, and 3 are east of the Mississippi River and zones 4, 5, and 6 are west of the Mississippi River. Teams that share geographical zones are classified into gold, silver, or bronze readiness levels. Gold teams are ready to respond to incidents within three hours. Silver teams are ready to respond if needed with a little longer lead time. However, once a gold team is activated, the silver team in the same region assumes a gold level of readiness in the event of another incident within the region. The bronze team is generally in a training or administrative status unless a series of incidents requires them to respond. Personnel in bronze status must be ready to deploy within 72 hours. Teams then rotate through readiness levels so that all get down time.

In addition to the CSTs, there are 12 follow-on teams known as CERFPs – chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages. CERFPs assist in managing the consequences of CBRNE. Each CERFP is made up of 186 ANG and ARNG part-time members who must be mobilized for duty.³⁸

National Guard Bureau (NGB) Joint Operations

The Secretary of Defense directed transformation “to develop portfolios of joint capabilities rather than individual stove-piped programs,” which continues the 2001 initiative to transition from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning.³⁹ Many organizations have subsequently initiated data bases. The NRP Emergency Support Functions (ESF) provides one baseline for capabilities. As functional areas are peeled back, however, gaps are exposed. The California NG has developed a list of 25 functional capabilities; this list is constantly revised as layers are peeled to reveal gaps.⁴⁰

The National Guard Bureau is developing a database called the Joint Capabilities Document (JCD); it will identify capabilities, gaps, and redundancies of NG resources in 10 key

functional areas for all 54 states and territories. The ten key functional areas are aviation/airlift, command and control, communications, engineering, logistics, maintenance, medical, security, transportation, and CBRNE. This systematic identification of National Guard and National Air Guard capabilities will provide the foundation for future planning to ensure adequate coverage and response to the next catastrophic event. Governors and inter-agency planners will be able to effectively incorporate military support into their response plans.

But the JCD must be kept current and relevant. Challenges to the level of detail in the JCD have already surfaced. The JCD could easily be misleading if a resource such as dump trucks were classified as deadlined and therefore unavailable – but they may have needed nothing more than new batteries. The criteria to change a deadlined asset to an operational asset must be known so that easy fixes, such as batteries, could be initiated without waiting for funding approval. Some states' JFHQs, as mentioned earlier, are developing their own capabilities-based planning databases to provide their governors with total capability visibility. The development of universal joint task lists (UJTL) for each capability would provide units with standards for training as well.

The Joint Capabilities State Strategic Plan (JCSSP) is an unclassified, long-range strategic plan that specifies sixteen long-term objectives for each state.⁴¹ Many of the states have prepared first drafts of their JCSSP. The JCSSP provides the vision for each state; it guides future exercises and coordination with other emergency response agencies. The JCD is a component of the JCSSP.

Course of Action Considerations

It is appropriate to cite some published works in support of regional CSFs before presenting three courses of action for their structure. Jill Rhodes, in her thesis, "Breaking the 72 Hour Barrier: The Regional Emergency Management Support System A Regional Approach to Incident Management," makes a strong argument for a Regional Emergency Management Support System (REMSS); she cites after-action reports from 9/11 and Katrina which recommended a regional response approach.⁴² She claims that the Pentagon response was regionally based and therefore much more successful. "When programs operate out of regional offices, closer relationships are developed among all levels of government, providing for stronger relationships at all levels."⁴³ FEMA responded to Katrina by sending headquarters personnel unfamiliar with the region to coordinate Katrina response. This led to gaps in contracts and agreements.⁴⁴

California's Government Code, probably like the majority of states' codes, makes provisions for unity of command when other states come to its aid after the Governor has declared a state of emergency. The emergency or disaster is defined as "arising from natural disaster, technological hazard, man-made disaster, civil emergency aspects of resource shortages, community disorders, insurgency, or enemy attack."⁴⁵ Regional and national responses must be conducted in accord with the code of the requesting state. Therein lies the difficulty for a NG regional headquarters to achieve a consensus on a coordinated regional response. A state adjacent to the requesting state may be reluctant to commit personnel and equipment to a regional response for fear of needing its resources in a delayed or probable follow-on incident. Some states withheld needed resources, such as ambulances, from assisting with Katrina to ensure they were prepared just in case they had an unforeseen requirement.⁴⁶ On the other hand, supported states should be given assurance that once troops come to assist, they won't leave until the emergency is under control or a rotation of troops established.

Reception, Staging, Onward Integration (RSOI) functions were also a major problem with Katrina. No plan was available to receive, stage, and integrate the 50,000 NG personnel who came to help; therefore personnel sent to help with recovery initially only became an additional burden.⁴⁷ Every day of response lost due to organizational chaos meant lives lost or further deterioration of infrastructure. Air National Guard units, in conjunction with Area Support Groups (ASG), match RSOI capability to requirements. ASGs perform RSOI as their war-time mission, and ANG have the flight facilities to receive and process inbound responders and outbound civilian evacuees. Personnel and equipment from supporting states should flow to an ANG airport facility where they will be received and staged. After the unit has been processed and has established command and control of its forces, the unit then moves on to its designated operating base and receives its' missions from the JTFHQs. Prior coordination with surrounding states assures an achievable flow of forces and eliminates bottlenecks. Planning and coordination also specifies the capabilities each state would provide, thereby enabling the right equipment and specialties to be delivered to the right place in a timely fashion.

National Guard assets that reside in the state where FEMA regional headquarters are located may logically be designated the National Guard CSF headquarters for that region. FEMA regional headquarters are aligned with major population bases. An analysis of the Guard's capabilities, resources, experience, and current status in coordinating with the myriad of organizations and agencies that respond to civil emergencies or disasters should determine whether to co-locate CSF headquarters with FEMA regional headquarters. Currently JFHQ are marginally staffed and resourced for eight hours in a five-day work week. Funding for increased

staffing and facilities must be forthcoming from DOD to ensure the Guard's capability to respond to HS incidents.

Personnel and equipment strength available to respond to the Governor's request for action must be considered. The number of available forces in any one year varies, depending on units or individuals mobilized for various federal missions such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), border missions, infrastructure security, counter-drug operations, and other activities. Also a number of Guard members are unavailable due to medical profiles, training status, or legal status. Available resources, such as unit equipment, varies depending on current mission status. Lieutenant General Blum, CNGB, recently reported to Congress that more than two-thirds of NG units are not combat ready.⁴⁸ The Reserve Component is projected to spend over \$2.9 billion in 2007 to replace equipment left or destroyed in Iraq.⁴⁹ Further, more than \$21 billion has been allocated to modernize the NG through 2011.⁵⁰ The current equipment shortfall indicates decreased Guard capability for CS. Further, unavailability of equipment has reduced the number of trained personnel to use similar types of equipment, such as five-ton truck drivers or generator operators.

A regional CS plan will be judged on its acceptability – the balance of cost and risk; feasibility – capabilities provided to meet requirements within needed or acceptable timelines; adequacy – all states and territories can reach consensus; and legality – policy and laws enhance compliance. Governors and emergency personnel of states with frequent natural disasters have developed responsiveness through experience. Units that have war-time experience that enhances CS capability are feasibility multipliers. States with numerous high value targets have experience in detailed planning of evacuations, whereas states with recurrent hurricanes have detailed experience with evacuation execution. Different types of regions – urban and rural, for example – pose unique challenges. Regionalizing CS brings together strengths to overcome weaknesses in individual states and locales.

One disadvantage of any regional response is that regional groups don't have clear lines of authority, shared political loyalties, or shared infrastructure. However, a consensus of goals, objectives, and funding must be reached. Governors and state TAGs must be assured that the RJFHQ is operated in a judicious, competent, unbiased, and responsive manner. EMAC provides a baseline for consensus. Regional response could be formalized in the NRP or facilitated through NGB. The disadvantage to unity of command when battalions from a different state are under operational control of the JTF, may be overcome with training and familiarity.

Many state JFHQs support their Governors with program oversight of counter drug operations, border missions, search and rescue operations, and wild fire operations, among

other missions. The California National Guard responded to the 1992 Los Angeles riots and the 1989 San Francisco earthquake. Additionally, along with the other 53 states and territories, California supported Louisiana's governor during Hurricane Katrina. This experience has enabled development of sound and practiced standard operating procedures, which assist in the transition from normal to crisis mode. Joint publications are providing doctrine to facilitate activities of joint organizations. Organizational plans now exhibit a shared structure. Following Katrina, NGB solicited DOD to be chartered as a joint activity of the DOD to facilitate a more defined role in HS.⁵¹

Courses of Action

The three Courses of Action (COA) presented in this SRP do not resemble an Army solution in that criteria are not defined or weighted for importance. They are rather three general solution sets to be further evaluated by others who would add cost analysis and other detailed information. Once a general concept is adopted, the difficult journey of gathering consensus must follow.

COA 1 projects CS organization response onto the established FEMA regions (see Figure 3). In this COA, the JFHQ in the state where the FEMA regional headquarters resides would be the designated regional JFHQ. CS responsibilities would include coordinating with the FCO, DCO, SCO, and EPLOs as well as with EMAC coordinators and with each state JFHQ in their region. The RJFHQ, as part of emergency preparedness and planning, would maintain lists of all the ARNG and ANG capabilities within their region. The RJFHQ would have oversight of the JTFHQ to ensure planning and training standards are met.

Once an incident occurs or is forecast to overwhelm state resources, immediate communications between the supported governor and the governor with the RJFHQ should be initiated. The supported state, in coordination with their EMAC A Team, should then relay its requirements to the RJFHQ. Activation of the JTFHQ follows transfer of EMAC contracts. JTFHQ would be a biennial responsibility, assigned to a different state in the region every two years. Since every state in a region would eventually host as JTFHQ, this shared responsibility would promote cooperation and cohesion. Rotating the JTFHQ among states provides some flexibility when states experience multiple deployments. The JTFHQ would be minimally staffed until activated. The JTFHQ sends out an advance party, while the main body is established using the regional capabilities list. Functional battalions would be under operational control of the JTFHQ during CS. All states assisting the supported state must sign EMAC contracts IAW statutes.

Coordination channels linking the supporting JTFHQ to the supported JFHQs may alleviate distrust and facilitate consensus. Figure 3 depicts command and control lines of authority as well as dotted coordinating lines. Functional battalions would be formed by matching states' capabilities with specific requirements for the given mission. For example referring to Figure 3, 1st Battalion from State A may be tasked to provide RSOI capability, while 2nd Battalion from State B may carry out search and rescue operations. These units would ideally be tasked to provide capabilities in keeping with their war-time mission so that training for CS promotes efficient and competent execution during overseas deployment and vice versa.




Figure 3: COA 1 – Regional JTF

Using FEMA regional boundaries to organize CS facilitates development of interstate initiatives. DHS has a grant program to access federal funds for – among other activities– formal initiatives to develop coordinated planning and capabilities programs.⁵² Another advantage is the ability to preplan, coordinate, and train with neighboring states, which reinforces existing EMAC and interagency relationships. EMAC involvement facilitates certification of medical and professional personnel in states other than their home states.

While EMAC agreements allow interstate recognition of medical and other professional certification, hospitals and other organizations also require certification before allowing out-of-

state professionals to perform services. Knowing precisely in which states aid may be given reduces the amount of legal documents exchanged during incidents when administrative assets are already overburdened; reciprocal certification also serves to build cohesion between regional interagencies. Designating an alternate JFHQ in the region to backup the primary JFHQ is prudent. Identifying region-wide strengths and areas for improvement facilitates prompt restoration of affected areas through coordinated pre-incident planning and positioning of resources.

One basic advantage of COA 1 is that the regions are divided in line with FEMA regions for continuity of interagency coordination. Further, neighboring states have experience with the same type of disasters so they can anticipate requirements. Another advantage is the stabilization of responding JTFs for two years. Further, the JTFs would be broken down into functional battalions which reinforce wartime missions. Additionally, having one JFHQ per region to coordinate, plan, and oversee training facilitates continuity of command. The decreased manning requirement would also be cost effective. Each state participates with the capabilities it has to meet response requirements, thereby getting training for war-time missions.

Disadvantages to COA 1 involve the cost and training of stand-up JTFs and the ability of the JFHQ to coordinate CS preparedness and response with small staffs. As noted earlier, most JFHQs are minimally staffed for a 40 hour work week. JTFs would have to be funded for training exercises, coordination meetings, and site reconnaissance of the most likely incident locations in their regions. Another disadvantage is connected to the FEMA regional boundaries. Thus, New York and New Jersey in FEMA Region II are associated with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. These territories are a considerable distance from NY and NJ and have a different threat profile.

COA 2 organizes CS response into the six CST Response Management Plan Sectors. Many of the states in these sectors have already established mutual support plans based on their geographical interdependence. The six sectors overlap as many as four FEMA regions, but they are nonetheless geographically grouped. Situational awareness, interagency coordination, and training exercises generate regional cohesion. There are eight NG Division Headquarters which would form the sector JTF for CS. There are two division headquarters in sectors 1 and 2, three in sector 4, one in sector 5, and none in sectors 3 and 6 (see Figure 4). Dividing sectors 1, 2, and 3 into the east regional CSF and sectors 4, 5, and 6 into the west regional CSF, leaves for four division headquarters in each regional CSF. This would allow flexibility for deployments or multiple response headquarters.

Each division headquarters totals more than 900 personnel. The eight division headquarters would work in coordination with the JFHQ for the supported state. These headquarters could perform as operations headquarters to assist the supported state by tasking missions to out-of-state supporting units or to divisional units. The mission approval process would still flow through the normal state channels, with advisory assistance provided from EMAC. Therefore, the advantages of EMAC involvement mentioned earlier would still apply.

Sector 1	Sector 2	Sector 3	Sector 4	Sector 5	Sector 6
PA, NJ, NY, CT, RI, MA, NH, VT, MA	WV, VA, DC, MD, DE, IL, IN, OH, MI, WI	AL, GA, SC, NC, TN, KY, FL, PR, USVI	LA, TX, OK, AR, KS, MO, MN, IA, MS	NM, AZ, CA, NV, UT, CO, HI, GUAM	SD, ND, WY, MT, ID, WA, OR, AK, NE
28 ID (PA) 42 ID (NY)	29 ID (VA) 38 ID (IN)		36 ID (TX) 35 ID (KS) 34 ID (MN)	40 ID (CA)	

Figure 4: CST Response Management Plan Sectors⁵³ and NG Division HQs

For example, Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon – all bordering California would have a 48-72 hour arrival requirement if the division needed augmentation. If these states did not have the capabilities that California requires, California would negotiate with the states in their region identified to provide the capabilities on the JCD. Eventually, non-specialized manpower such as that needed to guard or remove debris would be given arrival timelines to replace exhausted troops or supplement current forces. Units must arrive only during pre-established timelines to keep ANG facilities from becoming overcrowded. The division would have the versatility to split operations between a forward deployed cell and a rear command post.

There are several advantages of COA 2. First, the size of the division headquarters allows for adequate command and control of large forces such as the over 50,000 NG members who responded in Katrina’s aftermath. In addition, the six sectors, similar to the FEMA regions albeit much larger, are clustered with neighboring states that already have EMAC agreements. Another advantage is that each state exercises command and control over forces in its’ state, so the state JFHQ has operational control of the supporting division. Further, divisions possess sufficient full-time staffs to manage a CS program without the additional overhead of a stand-up JTFHQ. In addition, this COA provides viability for the division headquarters during the present ramp up of modular brigades. Lastly, finite number of division headquarters facilitates standardization which would be more difficult with stand-up JTFHQs.

A disadvantage to COA 2 is bigger regions to coordinate with and develop comprehensive plans for that are not aligned with FEMA and established interagency groups. This sector alignment may cause confusion with planners and responders. One of the lessons learned with Katrina was to use coordinators who were familiar with the region. Further, division headquarters can get distracted by a myriad of responsibilities such as inspections, training of subordinate staff, and coordination meetings, to name a few. These distractions may impede the concentrated effort of the division headquarters whereas the JFHQ is able to focus on CS planning and preparedness. Also, divisions would assign tasks to organic battalions that might not be functionally aligned to their war-time mission, impacting standardization and training. Aligning units doctrinally to meet requirements facilitates efficient and effective operations.

This author, having considered acceptability and feasibility, would combine advantages from both courses of action 1 and 2 to mitigate risk thereby creating COA 3, the preferred COA. The risks identified involve remoteness, distractions, and quantity of states in a region for COA 2. It would be difficult for a division headquarters to become knowledgeable about the likely incident locations of all 27 states in its' region. FEMA regions have well-established coordinating lines however not all states in a region are close to each other. The challenge for Region II is the proximity of New York and New Jersey to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. New York has a large number of targets for terrorist activity and can not rely on either of these territories to be close at hand. Therefore affiliating Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands to Region IV accomplishes propinquity and links them with states that face weather-related incidents. New York would rely on New Jersey and Region I for support.

National Guard Division Headquarters would be the JTFHQ and coordinate with the regional JFHQs who would provide program oversight between incidents; however, they would be under operational control of the supported state's JFHQ during an incident. This would eliminate the rotating JTF unless the divisions integrated personnel from states in their region on a rotating biennial schedule to fill out its staff or to perform as the deployed forward cell. Division headquarters would send representatives to state and federal emergency preparedness and operations coordination meetings. There would be four divisions covering the FEMA regions and four divisions participating in some phase of deployment. This mitigates some of the remoteness and quantity risk noted in disadvantages of COA 2 by doubling the number of division headquarters dedicated to CS. Further, managing forces for CS would enhance the division headquarters readiness for its war-time mission. Thus training exercises performed during IDT and annual training would not require additional funding for personnel. Utilizing functional battalions that perform their war-time mission for CS would be emphasized.

The four divisions would be divided into sets of two so that New York (NY) and Virginia (VA) would alternate responsibility for the same regions, as would Pennsylvania (PA) and Indiana (IN), Kansas (KS) and Minnesota (MN), and California (CA) and Texas (TX). CA and alternately TX would be responsible for FEMA regions VI, IX, and X minus the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CWNMI), Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). These territories would be incorporated into PA's and alternately IN's region IV. While it may seem odd to put Pacific and Atlantic Islands in the PA and IN region because of distance, it would require spanning a great distance to respond from any CONUS region or state. While the geographic breakdown may not seem natural, there are several arguments in support of this area of responsibility for PA and IN. Weather related disasters are common to both Pacific and Atlantic Islands. In the event that CA or TX were overwhelmed with response requirements for Hawaii, Guam and American Samoa; PA or IN would be responding to the requirements of FSM, CWNMI, and RMI. NY and alternately VA would be responsible for regions I, II, and III (minus PA). This mix of regions balances out the number of states and territories that a division would be responsible for to 15 for all but NY and VA which have 13. Since IN has its own area of responsibility, it will no longer be included in FEMA Region V. The risk to this COA is the unpredictability of Army Force Generation and the rotation cycles for the division headquarters.

CS Status	42 nd ID (NY)	28 th ID (PA)	35 th ID (KS)	40 th ID (CA)
Mob/Dep Status	29 th ID (VA)	38 th ID (IN)	34 th ID (MN)	36 th ID (TX)
FEMA Regions	I, II, III (-PA)	IV, FSM, CWNMI, RMI, VI, PR,	V (-IN), VII, VIII	VI, IX, X, Guam, American Samoa

Figure 5: COA 3 – Division JTFs

Another disadvantage to regional CS surfaces from precedence set by past practices. CS has usually been provided first by individual NG volunteers; units were activated only when a unit had a particular capability or was assigned a peace time mission to perform CS. Activating units before using Guard volunteers would be a disadvantage to suggested courses of action. Volunteers, however, would be needed to fill vacancies in activated units, since no unit is manned at 100% due to schools, medical issues, etc.

Way Ahead

Emergency preparedness allows responders to be ready when an event happens. The road ahead must be considered in terms commonly used in risk assessments – probability and

consequence. The consequence of a catastrophic event – whether caused by WMD, weather, earthquakes, or nuclear melt-down is high while the probability for any of these events to be catastrophic remains low. Further, the timing is unknown and cannot be interpolated from past events. Who could have anticipated that Hurricane Rita would follow in Katrina’s wake? Consequences of catastrophic events are mitigated through careful planning to employ elements of power to stabilize regions; through response plans to coordinate assistance and recovery efforts; through governmental regulations and oversight to ensure contingency plans are in place. Prior planning in emergency preparedness is the key to swift recovery.

Christine Wormuth, in her report on the “Future of the National Guard and Reserves,” identifies regional planning, training, and exercising as a critical missing link in national preparedness. She “recommends dual-hatting one of the existing Guard state joint force headquarters [JFHQ] in each of the ten FEMA regions” to be responsible for the regional missing link.⁵⁴ While some states have fully functional JFHQ, other states are just organizing their JFHQ. So it will take some time to have roles and responsibilities defined and operational. All options will be subject to consensus of the participating state governors and adjutant generals. Finally, no matter what plan is adopted, funding initiatives for training and exercises to ensure interoperability, command and control, and interagency coordination must be projected into the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle to ensure funding. Money specifically fenced for CS would ensure program vitality and continuity.

Conclusion

Civil Support policy is evolving as new requirements are placed on our military forces. Disaster planners prepare for crises that are unfathomable to most citizens. The Hurricane Katrina aftermath may be considered small in relation to possible future incidents that involve terrorism or some combination of natural and man-made disasters. Since disaster response is primarily a logistical exercise, we should seek improvement through a logistics lens when considering policy changes to smooth unity of command and unity of effort issues. Further, by expanding the JCD so that it identifies capabilities not unit types, units can be tasked to peacetime missions that require their wartime skills thereby increasing overall effectiveness and efficiency. The JCD, for example, does not have a category for RSOL; therefore additional funding is needed to train a JTF to perform this function, instead of relying on an existing resource.

Regional National Guard CSFs provide a missing layer to the graduated disaster response. Neighboring states share commonalities to build a plan that would be irrelevant or

impractical in more distant states. Transitions from routine to crisis mode are smoothed by familiarity with regional interagency organizations and policy. Regional responses are more easily coordinated and timely than federal response, because of proximity and stake in recovery efforts. Further, regional CSFs are best suited to account for geographical considerations when balancing strengths and weaknesses with capabilities. Because Guard forces have two missions, international and domestic, regionalizing forces assures more domestic coverage when NG units are temporarily deployed away from home.

Endnotes

¹ Christine Wormuth, "A Study: 'The Future of the National Guard and Reserves'," ROA National Security Report, *The Officer*, 32 (September 2006), 49-52.

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (Ver 1.9, Draft)* (Peterson AFB, CO: USNORTHCOM Strategy Division (18 September 2006), 24; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/joc.htm>; Internet; accessed 31 December 2006. Hereafter cited as Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (Ver 1.9, Draft).

³ U.S. House of Representatives, *A Failure of Initiative, The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 7 December 2005), 1-5; available from http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm; Internet; accessed 1 January 2007.

⁴ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 23 February 2006); available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/>; Internet; accessed 1 January 2007. Hereafter cited as The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.

⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-28 Civil Support Final Coordination (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 December 2006), I-4. Hereafter cited as Civil Support.

⁶ George W. Bush, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 28 February 2003); available from http://www.nationalincidentmanagementsystem.com/presidential_directives/hspd_5.htm; Internet; accessed 9 December 2006. Hereafter cited as HSPD-5.

⁷ John H. Ebbighausen, *Unity of Command for Homeland Security: Title 32, Title 10, or a Combination*, Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006); available from <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA451789>; Internet; accessed 1 January 2007.

⁸ *Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept*, Annex B.

⁹ *Civil Support*.

¹⁰ Emergency Management Assistance Compact, *EMAC Overview*, 27 December 2003); available from <http://www.emacweb.org/?323>; Internet; accessed on 28 December 2006. Hereafter cited as EMAC.

¹¹ National Emergency Management Association, "NEMA — Past and Present," available from <http://www.nemaweb.org/?980>; Internet; accessed on 28 December 2006.

¹² EMAC.

¹³ National Emergency Management Association, "EMAC Organizational Structure," Figure available from *Who Administers EMAC?*; available from <http://www.emacweb.org/?143>.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Key provisions that lay the foundation for cooperation are: "...licenses, certificates, or other permits...shall be deemed licensed, certified, or permitted by the state requesting assistance; Employees . . . rendering aid . . . shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes; . . . any party state rendering aid . . . shall be reimbursed by the party state receiving aid for any loss or damage to or expense incurred; Each party state shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that state and representatives of deceased members of such forces in case such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to this compact, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within their own state." However, some resources may be recalled by the state rendering aid thus removing capabilities that were provided and now go unfilled ... "the state rendering aid may withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection for such state."

¹⁵ *Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (Ver 1.9, Draft)*, ES1.

¹⁶ *HSPD-5*, No. 8.

¹⁷ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Organization Structure*, available from <http://www.fema.gov/about/structure.shtm>; Internet; accessed on 8 December 2006.

¹⁸ *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, 16.

¹⁹ Michael D. Doubler, *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 130-1 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army National Guard, 2001), 16.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2005), 35.

²¹ *National Guard Bureau, U.S. Code*, Title 10, chap. 1011, sec.10501 (2005); available from <http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/10C1011.txt>; Internet; accessed 2 January 2007. Hereafter cited as Title 10.

²² Kevin Riedler, ed., "Reserve Components," in *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005-2006), 101.

²³ *Title 10*, sec. 10503.

²⁴ *Title 10*, sec. 10503.

²⁵ *Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (Ver 1.9, Draft)*, 15.

²⁶ There are 48 4-hour unit training assembly (UTA) periods in a year usually broken into weekend training events (IDT) of 24 8-hour training periods with some deviation authorized for extended training events. There are 15 days of AT authorized for each Guardsman along with the IDT weekends. One weekend a month and two weeks in the summer refers to this IDT and AT combination.

²⁷ *Homeland Defense Activities, U. S. Code*, Title 32, chap. 9, sec. 900 (2005); available from <http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/32C9.txt>; Internet; accessed 1 January 2007. Hereafter cited as Title 32.

²⁸ *Title 32*, sec. 906.

²⁹ *Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (Ver 1.9, Draft)*, 57.

³⁰ Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots," *Parameters* 27 (Summer 1997), 88-109; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97summer/schnau.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2006. In performance of its counter drug and border security missions, the NG act as observers, provide equipment and transport to civil authorities.

³¹ The Constitution, article I, section 8, mandates "The Congress shall have power... To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." The NG, generally, is not suited to independently arrest or confine civilians without law enforcement personnel present. They have not been educated or trained in state statutes and compliance with Miranda rights. They do act as observers; prevent looting or provide transport for law enforcement personnel.

³² Donald J. Currier, *The Posse Comitatus Act: A Harmless Relic From the Post-Reconstruction Era or a Legal Impediment to Transformation?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 September 2003; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB249.pdf>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2006. Currier presents 3 arguments in favor of the policy behind the PCA on pages 10-11.

³³ *Interference with State and Federal law, U.S. Code*, Title 10, chap. 15, sec. 333; available from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000333----000-.html; Internet; accessed 19 December 2006.

³⁴ Congressional Budget Office, *S.2766: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007: As Reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services on May 9, 2006* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 9 June 2006), 19; available from <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7281/s2766.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 19 December 2006.

³⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges*, GAO-06-498 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2006); available from

<http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA450330>; Internet; accessed 1 January 2007. Here after cited as Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges.

³⁶ Ibid., 16.

³⁷ Ibid., 30.

³⁸ Ibid., 13. Congress funded 17 teams according to GAO-06-498 but not all have completed the required certification training.

³⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 6 February 2006) 4.

⁴⁰ Anonymous state representative, telephone interview by author, 19 January 2006.

⁴¹ Marcell Crawford, "JCSSP Information Paper," 8 May 2006; available from <https://gkoportal.ngb.army.mil/C2/C19/NGB%20J5SI%20Information%20Papers/default.aspx>; Internet; accessed 30 December 2006. For Official Use Only

⁴² Jill D. Rhodes, *Breaking the 72 Hour Barrier: The Regional Emergency Management Support System A Regional Approach to Incident Management*, Thesis (Washington D.C.: George Washington University Law School, 21 May 2006).

⁴³ *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*.

⁴⁴ *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*.

⁴⁵ *Emergency Management Assistance Compact, California Government Code*, sec. 179.5, article 1; available from <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=gov&group=00001-01000&file=179-179.9>; Internet; accessed on 10 December 2006.

⁴⁶ Anonymous state representative, telephone interview by author, 19 January 2006. The state in question is not subject to hurricanes or their effects.

⁴⁷ *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*.

⁴⁸ Meagan Scully, "GAO: Guard may lack gear needed for domestic crises," *GOVEXEC.COM*, 30 January 2007 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=35983&dcn=e_ndw; Internet; accessed 1 February 2007.

⁴⁹ David F. Melcher, Jack S. Stultz, and Clyde A. Vaughn, "Resourcing the Total Army: The Need for Timely, Predictable, and Sustained Funding," *ROA National Security Report, The Officer*, 83 (February 2007), 39-42.

⁵⁰ Scully.

⁵¹ *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*.

⁵² Sharon Caudle, "Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional Partnerships," *Homeland Security Affairs*, 2 (October 2006) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=2.3.7>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2007.

⁵³ *Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges*, 11.

⁵⁴ Wormuth, 50.