1. REPORT DATE  
26 DEC 2006

2. REPORT TYPE  
N/A

3. DATES COVERED  
-

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Joint Operation Planning

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER  
-

5b. GRANT NUMBER  
-

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER  
-

5d. PROJECT NUMBER  
-

5e. TASK NUMBER  
-

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER  
-

6. AUTHOR(S)  
-

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
Joint Operation Planning Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, DC 20006

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER  
-

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
-

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)  
-

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)  
-

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
The original document contains color images.

14. ABSTRACT  
-

15. SUBJECT TERMS  
-

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  
a. REPORT unclassified  
b. ABSTRACT unclassified  
c. THIS PAGE unclassified  

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  
SAR

18. NUMBER OF PAGES  
218

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON  
-

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
This edition of Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, reflects the current doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations. This vital keystone publication forms the core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team.

As our Nation continues into the 21st century, the joint operation planning process and supporting capabilities will continue to evolve as our forces transform to meet emerging challenges. The engine for this change in the planning arena is the *Adaptive Planning* (AP) initiative.

*Adaptive planning* is defined as “the joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require.” The Secretary of Defense signed the *Adaptive Planning Roadmap* on 13 December 2005, directing that as AP processes and capabilities mature, it will succeed the Department of Defense’s current planning processes and capabilities. Since the Roadmap was published, the Contingency Planning Guidance, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Joint Programming Guidance, and the Strategic Planning Guidance have all directed that AP processes and capabilities be used for the development of Top Priority contingency plans.

This publication incorporates all AP initiatives currently approved for implementation and complements the AP processes and procedures defined in the latest version of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I*. The next revision of both the JP 5-0 and the JOPES 3122 series (manuals, instructions and guide) will further incorporate AP principles and formally establish the adaptive planning and execution system for planning and executing joint operations.

I encourage all leaders to understand the purpose and intent of the *Adaptive Planning* initiative, to study and understand the doctrinal concepts contained in this publication, and to teach these to your subordinates. Only then will we be able to fully exploit the remarkable military potential inherent in our joint teams. You should ensure the widest possible distribution of this keystone joint publication. I further request that you actively promote the use of all joint publications at every opportunity.

PETER PACE
General, United States Marine Corps
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
PREFACE

1. Scope

Joint Publication 5-0 is keystone doctrine for joint operation planning throughout the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the joint operation planning activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and provides the joint doctrinal basis for US military coordination with other agencies and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs). It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff; to commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and combat support agencies; and to the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0, DATED 13 APRIL 1995
(INCLUDES CONSOLIDATION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 5-00.1,
“JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING,”
DATED 25 JANUARY 2002)

• Reduces discussion of senior leader planning responsibilities

• Conforms to revised Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), by
discussing “contingency” and “crisis action” planning, levels of planning
detail, and other changes

• Incorporates the new construct of “strategic communication”

• Reduces discussion of the Joint Strategic Planning System and related
national systems

• Incorporates the “joint operation planning process” (JOPP) to complement
JOPES

• Incorporates discussion of the estimate process from Joint Publication (JP)
3-0, Joint Operations

• Discusses the use of “effects” as an element of operational design in joint
operation planning

• Discusses the commander’s and staff’s roles in joint operation planning

• Expands the discussion of transportation and deployment planning

• Incorporates a detailed discussion of “assessment”

• Incorporates a discussion of developing a “systems perspective” of the
operational environment

• Incorporates relevant information from JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for
Campaign Planning

• Expands the discussion of elements of operational design consistent with JP
3-0, Joint Operations

• Incorporates a hypothetical vignette to help explain the JOPP steps in
Chapter III and elements of operational design in Chapter IV
Summary of Changes

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Describes the Nature of Joint Strategic Planning
• Discusses Strategic Communication
• Describes the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
• Describes the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP)
• Describes Operational Art, Operational Design, the Design Elements, and the Relationship to JOPP
• Incorporates “Effects” in JOPP and in the Assessment Process
• Provides a Sample Joint Operation Plan Format

Joint Strategic Planning
Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command.

Military planning is performed at every echelon of command and across the range of military operations. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. The military’s contribution to national strategic planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning.

Joint Operation Planning
Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides joint force commanders (JFCs) in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and

...
respond to unforeseen crises.

The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint operation planning or committed to conduct military operations are collectively termed the Joint Planning and Execution Community.

Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military operations using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes — the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the joint operation planning process (JOPP).

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course of action development. The combination of JOPES and JOPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving high-intensity combat operations. JOPES formally integrates the planning activities of the entire JPEC during the initial planning and plan refinement that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an imminent crisis. While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to a foreseen contingency or an unforeseen crisis. JOPP is a less formal but proven analytical process, which provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an organization’s commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs to develop a joint operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) for a specific mission.
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

**JOPES consists of a multivolume set of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unclassified and classified manuals.**

**JOPES Volume I** provides the foundation for joint operation planning. JOPES is used in the development and implementation of OPLANs and OPORDs prepared in response to requirements from the President, the SecDef, or the CJCS. It specifies policies, procedures, and reporting structures — supported by modern communications and computer systems — for planning the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It also contains sample formats for key documents such as the CJCS warning order, commander’s estimate, and OPORD. **JOPES Volume I** provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decisionmaking in two related but distinct categories — **contingency planning** and **crisis action planning (CAP)**. These categories differ primarily in level of uncertainty, available planning time, and products.

A **contingency** is an anticipated situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef. The JPEC uses **contingency planning** to develop plans for a broad range of contingencies based on tasks identified in the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or other planning directive. Contingency planning begins when a planning requirement is identified in the CPG, JSCP, or a planning order, and continues until the requirement no longer exists. The JSCP links the Joint Strategic Planning System to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of joint OPLAN required, and provides additional planning guidance as necessary. A CCDR may also initiate contingency planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities.

Within the context of JOPES, a **crisis** is an incident or situation involving threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests. It typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that the President or SecDef considers a commitment of US military forces and resources to achieve national objectives. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast-breaking and requires accelerated decisionmaking. Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. JOPES provides additional **crisis action procedures** for the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the likely use of military forces in response to a crisis. While contingency planning normally is
Strategic Communication

Strategic communication (SC) is a natural extension of strategic direction, and supports the President’s strategic guidance, the SecDef’s National Defense Strategy, and the CICS’s National Military Strategy. SC planning and execution focus capabilities that apply information as an instrument of national power to create, strengthen, or preserve an information environment favorable to US national interests. SC planning establishes unity of US themes and messages, emphasizes success, accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on US operations, and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals. This is an interagency effort, which provides an opportunity to advance US regional and global partnerships. Coordination, approval, and implementation of a SC strategy and specific information objectives, audiences, themes, and actions will be developed and synchronized with other US agencies and approved by the SecDef. Joint operation planning must include appropriate SC components and ensure collaboration with the Department of State’s diplomatic missions. CCDRs consider SC during peacetime security cooperation planning, and incorporate themes, messages, and other relevant factors in their security cooperation plans (SCPs). During contingency planning and CAP, CCDRs review SC guidance during mission analysis, and their staffs address SC issues, as appropriate, in their staff estimates. CCDRs can brief the SecDef on their SC planning during SCP, contingency planning, and CAP in-progress reviews.

Interagency Planning and Coordination

Integrating the interagency community effectively can be vital to successful military operations, especially during theater shaping and during the stability and enable civil authority phases of an operation when JFCs may also operate in support of other United States Government agencies. JFCs and their staffs must consider how the capabilities of the agencies or other nongovernmental organizations can be leveraged to assist in accomplishing military missions and the broader national strategic objectives. JFCs should coordinate directly with interagency representatives within their operational areas during planning to ensure appropriate agreements exist that support their plans (such as working with US embassies to secure overflight rights with other nations).
Multinational Planning and Coordination

Joint forces should be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or another nation’s leadership. Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in multinational and national channels. Multinational force commanders develop multinational strategies and plans in multinational channels. JFCs perform supporting joint operation planning for multinational operations in US national channels. Coordination of these separate planning channels occurs at the national level by established multinational bodies or coalition member nations and at the theater-strategic and operational levels by JFCs, who are responsible within both channels for operation planning matters. US doctrine and procedures for joint operation planning also are conceptually applicable to multinational problems. The fundamental issues are much the same for both situations.

The Joint Operation Planning Process

**JOPP is an orderly, analytical planning process**, which consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission, develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs), select the best COA, and produce a plan or order. **Operational design** is the use of various design elements in the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint OPLAN and its subsequent execution. The JFC and staff use operational design elements throughout JOPP.

**Commanders direct throughout planning.** This direction takes the form of interaction with the staff, guidance on the development of products, and decisions at key points in the process, such as approval.
The commander is the focal point of decision-making and execution during military operations. Of a COA. In CAP, this interaction typically is continuous as the JOPP steps are compressed and blend together. Commanders ensure that subordinate commands have sufficient time to plan, particularly in a CAP situation. They do so by issuing warning orders at the earliest opportunity and by collaborating with other commanders, agency leaders, and multinational partners as appropriate to ensure a clear understanding of the commander’s mission, intent, guidance, and priorities. Commanders resolve command-level issues that are beyond the staff’s authority.

The role of the staff is to support the commander in achieving situational understanding, making decisions, disseminating directives, and following directives through execution.

JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations.

The staff’s effort during planning focuses on developing effective plans and orders and helping the commander make related decisions. The staff does this by integrating situation-specific information with sound doctrine and technical competence. The staff’s planning activities initially focus on mission analysis, which develops information to help the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders understand the situation and mission. During COA development and comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander’s selection of a COA. Once the commander approves a COA, the staff coordinates all necessary details and prepares the plan or order.

JOPP applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders. This planning process applies to contingency planning and CAP within the context of the responsibilities specified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122 series (JOPES). JOPP also is used by joint organizations that have no specific JOPES responsibilities. Furthermore, JOPP supports planning throughout the course of an operation after the CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues the execute order. In common application, JOPP proceeds according to planning milestones and other requirements established by the commanders at various levels.

JOPP consists of a set of seven steps. JOPP begins with planning initiation, and moves through mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, COA approval, and plan or order development.
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

The operational environment encompasses the air, land, sea, space, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, and others), which are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding this environment has always included a perspective broader than just the adversary’s military forces and other combat capabilities within the traditional battlespace. However, current and future strategic and operational requirements and types of operations can benefit by a more comprehensive view of all systems in this environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand.

A systems understanding of the operational environment considers more than just an adversary’s military capabilities, order of battle, and tactics. Instead, it strives to provide a perspective of interrelated systems that comprise the operational environment, relevant to a specific joint operation. Among other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources from which to gain indications and warning. It also helps analysts with center of gravity analysis and planners with operational design by identifying nodes in each system, the links (relationships) between the nodes, critical factors, and potential decisive points. This allows commanders and staffs to consider a broader set of options to focus limited resources, create desired effects, and achieve objectives.

Using Effects in Planning and Assessment

The use of effects during planning is reflected in the steps of JOPP. The CCDR plans joint operations based on analysis of national strategic objectives and development of theater strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational desired effects and assessment indicators. At the operational level, a subordinate JFC develops supporting plans, which can include objectives supported by measurable operational-level effects and assessment indicators. Joint operation planning uses measurable desired effects to relate higher-level objectives and effects to component missions and tasks. Like end state and objective, joint doctrine includes effects as an element of operational design.
Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions.

Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment helps the JFC and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is “doing the right things” to achieve objectives, not just “doing things right.” The JFC also can use MOEs to determine progress toward success in those operations for which tactical-level combat assessment ways, means, and measures do not apply. Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of performance to evaluate task accomplishment.

Operational Art and Design

Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. It is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state.

In applying operational art, the JFC draws on judgment, perception, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, and character to visualize the conditions necessary for success before committing forces. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and
Executive Summary

Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces.

Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation plan and its subsequent execution.

Planning continues during execution.

assess. The JFC uses operational art to consider not only the employment of military forces, but also their sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose.

While operational art is the manifestation of informed vision and creativity, operational design is the practical extension of the creative process. Together they synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical and logical process of design. The key to operational design essentially involves (1) understanding the strategic guidance (determining the end state and objectives); (2) identifying the adversary’s principal strengths and weaknesses, and; (3) developing an operational concept that will achieve strategic and operational objectives.

Operational design is intrinsic to JOPP. JOPP provides a logical set of planning steps through which the commander and staff interact, and operational design supports JOPP by providing a number of design elements to help the commander and staff visualize and shape the operation to accomplish the mission. These elements of operational design comprise a tool that is particularly helpful during COA determination. Resulting design alternatives provide the basis for selecting a COA and developing the detailed concept of operations.

Planning During Execution

As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current operations.

The joint force plans directorate (J-5) focuses on future plans. The timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of command, type of operation, JFC’s desires, and other factors. Typically the emphasis of the future plans effort is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign).

Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (future operations planning). The timeframe of focus for future operations planning varies according to the factors listed for future plans, but the period typically is more near-term than the future plans timeframe. Future planning could occur in the J-5 or joint planning group, while future operations planning could occur in the operations directorate (J-3) or joint operations center.
Finally, **current operations planning** addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This occurs in the joint operations center or J-3.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It provides fundamental principles and doctrine that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the planning of joint operations across the range of military operations.
CHAPTER I
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING

“‘To a conscientious commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning. By proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the most precious elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks ahead as far as he can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to eliminate as many variable factors as he is able. He has a firsthand look at as much of the ground as circumstances render accessible to him. He checks each task in the plan with the man to whom he intends to assign it. Then — having secured in almost every instance his subordinates’ wholehearted acceptance of the contemplated mission and agreement on its feasibility — only then does he issue an order.”

General Mathew B. Ridgway
The Korean War, 1967

SECTION A. JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING — TYPES AND SCOPE

1. Introduction

Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command. It is performed at every echelon of command and across the range of military operations. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. The military’s contribution to national strategic planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning. This publication discusses each type, but focuses predominantly on joint operation planning.

2. Joint Strategic Planning

   a. Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to the Armed Forces of the United States for security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning (see Figure I-1). Joint strategic planning occurs primarily at the national- and theater-strategic levels to help the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and other members of the National Security Council formulate political-military assessments, define political and military objectives and end states, develop strategic concepts and options, and allocate resources. At the national-strategic level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), performs joint strategic planning to:

      (1) Advise and assist the President and SecDef regarding the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States and the preparation of policy guidance.

      (2) Advise the SecDef on program recommendations and budget proposals to conform to priorities established in strategic plans.

      (3) Transmit the strategic guidance and direction of the President and SecDef to the combatant commands, military Services, and combat support agencies.
b. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means by which the CJCS performs joint strategic planning. The products of the JSPS, such as the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provide the strategic guidance and direction for joint strategic planning by the combatant commander (CCDR) and for the other categories of military planning.

c. CCDRs prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish their assigned missions based on strategic guidance and direction from the President, SecDef, and CJCS. CCDRs develop and modify strategic estimates continuously. They develop strategies that translate national direction and multinational guidance into concepts to meet strategic objectives. Strategic plans provide authoritative direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate assumptions and objectives; establish operational limitations (constraints and restraints), including rules on the use of force and rules of engagement (ROE); and define policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans.

d. Geographic CCDRs (GCCs) focus joint strategic planning on their specific areas of responsibility (AORs) as defined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Functional CCDRs (FCCs) generally accomplish joint strategic planning with a global focus. Strategic planning for possible execution of multiple operations across AOR boundaries requires prioritization of effort by the SecDef or President and coordination with all affected CCDRs. The SecDef may task the CJCS or an FCC to conduct such planning and assign command relationships as appropriate.
Chapter II, “Strategic Direction,” and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System, provide information on the JSPS.

3. Security Cooperation Planning

a. Security cooperation is the means by which Department of Defense (DOD) encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives. Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. Security cooperation efforts also should be aligned with and support strategic communication themes, messages, and actions. The SecDef identifies security cooperation objectives, assesses the effectiveness of security cooperation activities, and revises goals when required to ensure continued support for US interests abroad. Although they can shift over time, examples of typical security cooperation objectives include: creating favorable military regional balances of power; advancing mutual defense or security arrangements; building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and preventing conflict and crisis.

b. DOD’s senior civilian and military leadership — in conjunction with CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and support agencies — focus their activities on achieving the security cooperation objectives identified by the SecDef. Security cooperation planning links these activities with security cooperation objectives by identifying, prioritizing, and integrating them to optimize their overall contribution to specified US security interests. Security cooperation activities are grouped into six categories:

(1) Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs.

(2) Nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities.

(3) Multinational training.

(4) Multinational exercises, including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program.

(5) Multinational education for US personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States.

(6) Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.

c. In response to direction in the DOD Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG), CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and combat support agencies’ directors prepare security cooperation strategies in accordance with SCG objectives for CJCS review and SecDef approval, with the GCCs as the supported entities. These strategies serve as the basis for security cooperation planning. Collaboration among the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies is essential. Equally important is the close coordination
with US agencies that represent other instruments of national power, and particularly with the US chiefs of mission (ambassadors) in the GCCs’ AORs. The functional combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies communicate their intended security cooperation activities to the responsible GCCs, execute their activities in support of approved security cooperation strategies, and assist in the annual assessment of the effectiveness of their security cooperation activities.

_The DOD Security Cooperation Guidance and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A, Responsibilities for the Management of Security Cooperation_, prescribe guidelines and procedures for developing security cooperation strategies and plans. _Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations Volume I_, discusses how to facilitate coordination and cooperation with US Government agencies, and intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations.

### 4. Force Planning

a. At the national strategic level, force planning is associated with creating and maintaining military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Service Chiefs. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. In areas peculiar to special operations, USSOCOM has similar responsibility for special operations forces (SOF), with the exception of organizing Service components. Force planning at this level is outside the scope of this publication.

b. At the theater strategic level, force planning encompasses all those activities performed by the supported CCDR, subordinate component commanders, and support agencies to select, prepare, integrate, and deploy the forces and capabilities required to accomplish an assigned mission. Force planning also encompasses those activities performed by force providers to develop, source, and tailor those forces and capabilities with actual units. Chapter III, “Joint Operation Planning Process,” describes this aspect of force planning in greater detail.

### 5. Joint Operation Planning

a. _Joint operation planning — the focus of JP 5-0_ — is the overarching process that guides joint force commanders (JFCs) in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. Planning is triggered when the continuous monitoring of global events indicates the need to prepare military options. Joint operation planning is an adaptive, collaborative process that can be iterative and/or parallel to provide actionable direction to commanders and their staffs across multiple echelons of command.

b. Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation — the mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. Planners recommend and commanders approve criteria for the termination of joint operations and link these criteria to the
transition to stabilization and achievement of the end state. Planning also addresses redeployment and demobilization of forces.

c. **Section C of this chapter** provides more information on joint operation planning, with a focus on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). **Chapter III.** “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” provides details on the joint operation planning process (JOPP), a less formal but proven analytical process for planning at any organizational level.

6. **The Scope of Joint Operation Planning**

   a. Joint operation planning encompasses the full range of activities required to conduct joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces.

   (1) **Mobilization.** Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. Mobilization may include activating all or part of the Reserve Component. Mobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services in close cooperation with the supported commanders and their Service component commanders.

   *JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, discusses joint mobilization planning in greater detail.*

   (2) **Deployment.** Deployment encompasses the movement of forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific destination to conduct joint operations. It specifically includes movement of forces and their requisite sustaining resources within the United States, within theaters, and between theaters. Deployment is primarily the responsibility of the supported commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the supporting CCDRs and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

   *JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, discusses joint deployment planning in greater detail.*

   (3) **Employment.** Employment encompasses the use of military forces and capabilities within an operational area (OA). Employment planning provides the foundation for, determines the scope of, and is limited by mobilization, deployment, and sustainment planning. Employment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDRs and their subordinate and supporting commanders.

   *JP 3-0, Joint Operations, this publication, and numerous other publications in the joint doctrine system discuss joint employment planning in greater detail.*

   (4) **Sustainment.** Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. The focus of sustainment in joint operations is to provide the JFC with the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can
Chapter I

conduct decisive operations; allowing the JFC to seize, retain and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDRs and their Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies, and supporting commands.

JP 4-0, Joint Logistic Support, JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, and other joint logistic doctrine publications discuss joint sustainment planning in greater detail.

(5) Redeployment. Redeployment encompasses the movement of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area for the purpose of further employment. Redeployment also includes the return of forces and resources to their original location and status. Redeployment is primarily the responsibility of supported commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the supporting CCDRs and USTRANSCOM.


(6) Demobilization. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It includes the return of Reserve Component units, individuals, and materiel stocks to their former status. Demobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services, in close cooperation with the supported commanders and their Service component commanders.

JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, discusses demobilization planning in greater detail.

SECTION B. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

7. General

a. Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by law and directive. This fundamental responsibility extends from the President and SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS, to the CCDRs and their subordinate components and JFCs. Joint force Service and functional components conduct component planning that could involve planning for the employment of other components’ capabilities, such as when the joint force air component commander plans for the employment of all air assets made available. The CJCS transmits the orders of the President and the SecDef to the CCDRs and oversees the combatant commands’ planning activities. The JCS function in the planning process as advisers to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and SecDef.

b. The CJCS, CCDRs, and subordinate JFCs have primary responsibility for planning the employment of joint forces. Although not responsible for directing the combatant commands’ Service forces in joint operations, the Military Departments participate in joint operation planning through execution of their responsibilities to: organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to
the combatant commands; administer and support those forces; and prepare plans implementing joint strategic mobility, logistic, and mobilization plans.

8. Joint Planning and Execution Community

a. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint operation planning or committed to conduct military operations are collectively termed the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Although not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the CJCS and other members of the JCS, the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands, the combatant commands and their subordinate commands, and the combat support agencies (see Figure I-2).

b. In the planning process, the President and SecDef issue policy, strategic guidance, and direction. The President, assisted by the NSC, also issues policy and strategic direction to guide the planning efforts of Federal agencies that represent other instruments of national power. The SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, organizes the JPEC for joint operation planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships among the combatant commands. A supported commander is identified for each planning task, and supporting CCDRs, Services, and combat support agencies are designated as appropriate. Similarly, supported commanders...
establish supported and supporting command relationships among their subordinate commanders. This process provides for unity of command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC.

(1) The **supported commander** has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP, the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, the supported commander prepares operation plans (OPLANs) or operation orders (OPORDs) in response to requirements generated by the President or the SecDef.

(2) **Supporting commanders** provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported commander in accordance with the principles set forth in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Supporting commanders prepare supporting plans as required. Under some circumstances, a commander may be a supporting commander for one operation while being a supported commander for another.

*See CJCSI 3141.01C, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans, for a more complete discussion of the JPEC. See JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for a more complete discussion of supported and supporting relationships.*

### 9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. The CJCS, as **the principal military adviser** to the President, SecDef, and rest of the NSC, is assigned specific responsibilities in the areas of joint strategic planning and joint operation planning. In carrying out these responsibilities, the CJCS consults with and seeks the advice of other members of the JCS and CCDRs.

b. Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the President, the guidance of the SecDef, and pursuant to Title 10, US Code, **the CJCS is responsible for**:

(1) Preparing military strategy and assessments of the associated risk.

(2) Assisting the President and the SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the direction of operations conducted by the CCDRs.

(3) Preparing strategic plans and supporting plans for joint intelligence, logistic, and mobility. Recommending the assignment of logistic responsibilities in accordance with those plans and determining logistic support available to execute the CCDR’s OPLANs.

(4) Providing for the preparation and review of military mobilization plans, security cooperation plans, and joint operation plans.
(5) Advising the SecDef on the critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of OPLANs and assessing the impact of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policies.

(6) Reviewing the CCDRs’ plans and programs to determine their adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine.

(7) Integrating interagency and multinational partners into planning efforts as appropriate.

(8) Issuing the execute order.

*CJCSI 3141.01C, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans, discusses the joint planning and execution community in greater detail.*

10. **Combatant Commanders**

   a. **CCDRs plan at the national and theater strategic levels of war** through participation in the development of NMS, and the development of theater estimates, strategies, and plans. The supported CCDR normally participates in strategic discussions with the President, SecDef, and CJCS, and with multinational partners. The supported CCDR’s strategy links US national strategy to operational-level activities. **The CCDR’s planning efforts guide joint operation planning at the operational level**, which links the operational and tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the employment of military forces to attain strategic objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

   b. CCDRs develop OPLANs for possible contingencies across the range of military operations. When crises arise, or when otherwise directed, CCDRs expand, refine, and adapt existing plans or develop new plans as the basis for OPORDs. When military operations are directed, CCDRs deploy and employ forces and other capabilities to accomplish assigned missions. Their joint operation planning responsibilities are described in the UCP, JSCP, CPG, SCG, and JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Other planning activities of the CCDRs include:

   (1) Conducting strategic estimates, identifying required resources, and identifying, assessing, and managing risks.

   (2) Assisting the CJCS in developing national military strategy and formulating theater and security cooperation strategies in conformance with national strategic plans.

   (3) Identifying and planning for contingencies not specifically assigned by the President, SecDef, or CJCS.
(4) Preparing and executing joint OPORDs.

(5) Advising the CJCS and SecDef of other agencies’ capabilities desired or required for OPLAN execution.

c. Functional combatant commands participate in joint operation planning typically as a supporting command to a supported geographic combatant command. USTRANSCOM and its component commands plan and execute the transportation aspects of global mobility operations and provide centralized traffic management while providing deployable forces to support intertheater and intratheater mobility and in-transit visibility. USTRANSCOM is the joint force provider for mobility forces, and recommends sourcing of mobility forces to geographic combatant commands. It also is the distribution process owner, and synchronizes and integrates distribution-related activities of all force and material providers. US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is the primary joint force provider, joint force trainer, and joint deployment process owner. From assigned forces, USJFCOM provides ready joint forces and capabilities, and recommends global joint sourcing solutions for forces and capabilities worldwide, less designated forces sourced by USSOCOM, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and USTRANSCOM. USJFCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USSOCOM provide assigned functional forces based in the continental United States (CONUS).

d. For joint operation planning, USJFCOM and USSOCOM make recommendations to the Joint Staff regarding the apportionment and allocation of forces and resources. As the DOD intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) manager (although not assigned ISR forces), USSTRATCOM will make ISR force allocation recommendations to the Joint Staff. During execution, the Services, USJFCOM, and USSOCOM will identify the specific units and support to be allocated to source the CCDRs OPLANs. The Services maintain Reserve Component forces for the expansion of Service capabilities and capacity in times of heightened military need, and prepare detailed mobilization, sustainment, and mobility plans containing the identification of the actual forces and support allocated.

11. Subordinate Joint Forces

The commanders of subordinate joint forces perform joint operation planning functions similar to those of the CCDRs for their assigned missions or OAs. They accomplish these functions under the direction of the establishing authority. Their Service component commands conduct joint operation planning both within the chain of command that runs from the President through the SecDef to CCDRs and under the administrative control of the Military Departments.

12. Combat Support Agencies

Combat support agencies are DOD agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, so designated in law or by the SecDef. They are supporting agencies in the same manner as supporting combatant commands. Supported commanders may assign missions and tasks to them consistent with their assigned functions in OPLANs and OPORDs. The intelligence community falls
generally in this category, although there are specific channels for requests and requirements for intelligence support depending on the type of intelligence required.

SECTION C. JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

13. General

a. Joint operation planning is an adaptive process. It occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, which requires dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan development, and collaboration across multiple planning levels. Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promote early understanding of, and agreement on, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. The focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of viable, embedded options for the President and SecDef to consider as the situation develops. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in constantly up-to-date plans. Joint operation planning process also promotes greater involvement with other US agencies and our multinational partners.

KEY TERM

joint operation planning -- Planning activities associated with the preparation of joint operation plans and operation orders for the conduct of military operations by joint force commanders.

b. Planning for joint operations is continuous across the range of military operations using the closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive JOPES and JOPP. JOPES and JOPP share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course of action (COA) development. The combination of JOPES and JOPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving high-intensity combat operations. See Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” for more discussion on campaigns.

c. JOPES formally integrates the planning activities of the entire JPEC during the initial planning and plan refinement that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an imminent crisis. While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to a foreseen contingency or an unforeseen crisis. The majority of JOPES activities and products occur prior to the point when the CJCS approves and issues the execute order, which initiates the employment of military capabilities to accomplish a specific mission.

d. JOPP is a less formal but proven analytical process, which provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an organization’s commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs.
Although the ultimate product is an OPLAN or OPORD for a specific mission, the process is continuous throughout an operation. Even during execution, it produces plans and orders for future operations as well as fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation. JOPP provides an orderly framework for planning in general, particularly for organizations that have no formal JOPES requirements. See Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” for more information on JOPP.

e. The JOPP supports the systematic, on-demand, creation and revision of executable plans, with up-to-date options, as circumstances require. A premium is placed on flexibility. The incorporation of collaboration capabilities, relational databases, and decision-support tools promotes planning with real-time access to relevant information and the ability to link planners and selected subject matter experts regardless of their location. The goal is shortened planning timelines and current, high-fidelity, up-to-date plans.

f. Joint operation planning has the inherent flexibility to adjust to changing requirements for adaptive plans, developed collaboratively and shaped by frequent interaction among key senior leaders. JP 5-0 and JOPES (see paragraph 14) incorporate initiatives to make the planning process more adaptive to an ever-changing world environment. These initiatives — such as levels of planning detail, the requirement for more frequent in-progress reviews between CCDRs and the SecDef, and the use of collaboration technology — provide more and better options during plan development, increase opportunities for consultation and guidance during the planning process, and promote increased agility in plan implementation.

g. Joint operation planning produces a number of products in various levels of detail. Paragraph 14e “Contingency Planning” of this chapter provides information on levels of detail, while paragraph 16 “Types of Joint Operation Plans and Orders” describes planning products. JP 5-0 focuses on the joint OPLAN and the process to develop it. A joint OPLAN is the most detailed of the planning products, and provides a complete concept of operations (CONOPS), all annexes applicable to the plan, and the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) for the specific operation. Joint operation planning also converts these plans into OPORDs ready for execution when required.

14. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Overview

a. JOPES consists of a multivolume set of CJCS unclassified and classified manuals. Three primary unclassified sources for JOPES information are:

1. **CJCSM 3122.01A**, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*, hereafter referred to as “JOPES Volume I.”

2. **CJCSM 3122.02C**, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution)*, hereafter referred to as “JOPES Volume III.”
b. JOPES Volume I provides the foundation for joint operation planning. JOPES is used in the development and implementation of OPLANs and OPORDs prepared in response to requirements from the President, the SecDef, or the CJCS. It specifies policies, procedures, and reporting structures — supported by modern communications and computer systems — for planning the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It also contains sample formats for key documents such as the CJCS warning order (WARNORD), commander’s estimate, and OPORD. JOPES Volume II provides planning formats and additional guidance, while JOPES Volume III provides crisis action TPFDD development information. JOPES applies to joint operations across the range of military operations and to all JPEC members.

c. JOPES Volume I provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision-making in two related but distinct categories — contingency planning and crisis action planning (CAP). These categories differ primarily in level of uncertainty, amount of available planning time, and products. First, the process is highly structured to support iterative, concurrent, and parallel contingency planning throughout the planning community to produce thorough and fully coordinated OPLANs when time permits. Second, the process is shortened in CAP, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. During actual military operations, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities. Contingency planning and CAP share common planning activities and are interrelated.

d. Joint operation planning encompasses a number of elements, including three broad operational activities, four planning functions, and a number of related products (see Figure I-3).

(1) Situational Awareness

(a) This operational activity addresses procedures for describing the strategic environment, including threats to national security. This occurs while continuously monitoring the national and international political and military situations so that emerging crises can be determined and analyzed, decision makers notified, and the specific nature of the threat determined. This activity emphasizes timely, relevant, and accurate information concerning the status of enemy, friendly, and neutral forces (such as enemy capabilities and intentions), and resources. All organizational levels are supported by this activity during contingency and crisis action planning and execution.

(b) Situational awareness encompasses two activities: situation development and situation assessment. During situation development, an event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognized, and is reported. Through continual situation assessment of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, and other factors, those events affecting national security are identified and reported to the National Military Command Center.
The JFC considers possible requirements for military force and initiates reviews of plans within the context of current strategic guidance.

(c) Situational awareness actions support both contingency and crisis action planning. Situational awareness encompasses five related activities — (1) monitoring the global situation; (2) identifying that an event has occurred; (3) recognizing that the event is a problem or a potential problem; (4) reporting the event; and (5) assessing the event. An event is a national or international occurrence assessed as unusual and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

(2) Planning

(a) Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into executable OPLANs and OPORDs for contingency or crisis action response. Joint operation planning may be based on defined tasks identified in the CPG and the JSCP. Alternatively, joint operation planning may be based on the need for a military response to a current event, emergency, or time-sensitive contingency. Contingency planning is normally initiated by a CPG, JSCP, or a planning directive tasking. It is based on assigned planning guidance, derived assumptions, and apportioned forces and combat support activities. CAP is initiated to respond to a current event, emergency, or
Joint Strategic Planning

time-sensitive contingency. It is based on planning guidance, actual circumstances, and assigned and allocated forces and combat support activities. In both cases, planning is initiated from a continuous awareness of global events, recognition of the need for a prepared military response to support the National Security Strategy (NSS), and follows a collaborative, iterative planning process.

(b) Planning Functions:

1. **Strategic Guidance.** This function is used to formulate politico-military assessments at the strategic level; develop and evaluate military strategy and objectives; apportion and allocate forces and other resources; formulate concepts and strategic military options; and develop planning guidance leading to the preparation of COAs. The President, SecDef, and CJCS—with appropriate consultation with additional NSC members, other US government (USG) agencies, and multinational partners—formulate suitable and feasible national strategic objectives that reflect US national interests. The CCDR may provide input through one or more commander’s assessments. The CCDR crafts military objectives that support national strategic objectives with the advice and consent of the CJCS and SecDef. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance such as the JSCP and CPG for contingency planning or a CJCS WARNORD, planning order (PLANORD), or alert order (ALERTORD) in CAP. It includes mission analysis, threat assessment, and development of assumptions, which as a minimum will be briefed to the SecDef during the mission analysis in-progress review (IPR). During this initial IPR, the CCDR should consider discussing USG strategic communication guidance. The primary end product of the strategic guidance function is the supported commander’s mission statement.

2. **Concept Development.** In concept development during contingency planning, the supported commander develops a CONOPS for SecDef approval based on SecDef and CJCS planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in Global Force Management (GFM) guidance and Service documents. GFM aligns force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the national defense strategy (NDS) and joint force availability requirements. In CAP, the supported commander develops, analyzes, and compares alternative COAs based on planning guidance, resource allocations from previously approved OPLANs, and a CJCS WARNORD. In time-sensitive situations, a WARNORD may not be issued and a PLANORD or ALERTORD might be the first strategic guidance received by the supported commander. Using the strategic guidance and the CCDR’s mission statement, planners prepare evaluation request messages to solicit COA input from subordinate units and develop preliminary COAs based upon staff estimates. The supported commander recommends a COA in the commander’s estimate for SecDef approval. The commander also requests the SecDef’s guidance on interagency coordination and makes appropriate recommendations. As a basis for this discussion, the commander could brief the highlights of the OPLAN’s annex V, (“Interagency Coordination”), during one or more of the IPRs. Concept development should consider a range of options to provide greater flexibility and speed transition during a crisis. The concept development IPR should address to the SecDef the CCDR’s estimate, which broadly outlines how forces will conduct integrated joint operations to accomplish the mission. Products from concept development include an approved COA and commander’s estimate containing termination criteria, supportability estimates, and (if time allows) an integrated TPFDD of estimated force and logistic requirements by operation phase. If developed, the TPFDD must ensure forces and mission visibility by phase to accommodate effective force integration and enable rapid adaptation as the situation changes.
3. **Plan Development.** This function is used to fully develop an OPLAN, operation plan in concept format (CONPLAN), or an OPORD with applicable supporting annexes and to refine preliminary feasibility analysis. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, conflict termination, redeployment, and demobilization activities through the six-phase construct. Detailed planning begins with the SecDef’s approval for further planning in a non-crisis environment or when the CJCS issues a WARNORD in a CAP situation. **The primary product is an approved plan or order.**

4. **Plan Assessment (Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute).** During this function, the supported commander refines the complete plan while supporting and subordinate commanders, Services, and supporting agencies complete their plans for review and approval. In general, the supported commander will, when required, submit the plans for the SecDef’s approval. All commanders continue to develop and analyze branches and sequels as required. The supported commander and the Joint Staff continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan refinement, adaptation, termination, or execution. The CDDR will brief the SecDef during the plan assessment IPR of any identified requirements to adapt, terminate, or execute an OPLAN.

(3) **Execution.** Execution starts when the execute order (EXORD) is issued. This component is comprised of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, rotation, and demobilization activities. Protection and operations security are critical throughout. Deployment encompasses all force preparation and movement to support an operation and all redeployment operations. Thoroughly planned, verified and fully documented TPFDD is the basis for force mobility and visibility. Effective command and control (C2) of deployment through the validation process ensures units are prepared and enables adaptability to unforeseen operational events. Those units requiring transportation support must provide planning (movement requirement) information to the supporting command as early as possible and must comply with transportation directives to ensure in-transit visibility and C2 of their movements, to include joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI). Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. Employment incorporates all activities required to complete the assigned mission. It spans the phases of the operation. Situation awareness and planning continue throughout employment. Phase transition criteria and operation assessment processes support situation awareness and enable rapid transition to branches or sequels. Employment continues until the mission is accomplished or as otherwise directed by the SecDef or President. The ability to monitor and compare actual with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment, terminating operations, and conducting redeployment.

e. **Contingency Planning**
(1) **Contingency planning is planning that occurs in non-crisis situations.** A contingency is a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef. The JPEC uses contingency planning to develop plans for a broad range of contingencies based on tasks identified in the CPG, JSCP, or other planning directive. **Contingency planning facilitates the transition to CAP.**

(2) Plans are derived from the best available information, using forces and resources apportioned and allocated per GFM guidance. Contingency planning encompasses the activities associated with the development of OPLANs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of apportioned forces and resources in response to a hypothetical situation identified in joint strategic planning documents. This category of planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when a crisis arises. The transition from contingency planning to CAP and execution should be as seamless as possible. To ensure this, planners must develop fully documented concepts of operation which detail the assumptions, enemy forces, operation phases, prioritized missions and force positioning. Detailed, war-gamed, refined, and fully documented contingency planning supports sound force acquisition and training in preparation for the most likely operational requirements. It also enables rapid comparison of the hypothetical conditions, operation phases, missions and forces of the OPLAN to the actual requirements of CAP. Work performed during contingency planning allows the JPEC to develop the processes and procedures, as well as the analytical and planning expertise that are critically needed during CAP.

(3) Contingency planning begins when a planning requirement is identified in the CPG, JSCP, or a planning order, and continues until the requirement no longer exists. The JSCP links the JSPS to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of joint OPLAN required, and provides additional planning guidance as necessary. A CCDR may also initiate contingency planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities. If a situation develops during a contingency planning cycle that warrants contingency planning but was not anticipated in the CPG/JSCP, the SecDef, through the CJCS, tasks the appropriate supported CCDR and applicable supporting CCDRs, Services, and combat support agencies out-of-cycle to begin contingency planning in response to the new situation. The primary mechanism for tasking contingency planning outside of the CPG/JSCP cycle will be through strategic guidance statements from the SecDef and endorsed by message from the CJCS to the CCDRs.

(4) Plans are produced and adapted periodically to ensure relevancy. Contingency planning most often addresses military options requiring combat operations; however, plans must account for other types of joint operations across the range of military operations. For example, operations during phase IV (Stabilize) of a campaign or operation and most stability operations are very complex and require extensive planning and coordination with non-DOD organizations, with the military in support of other agencies. Contingency planning occurs in prescribed cycles in accordance with formally established procedures that complement and support other DOD planning cycles. In coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and
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establishes submission dates for joint OPLANs. The CJCS can also direct out-of-cycle contingency planning when circumstances warrant disruption of the normal planning cycle.

(5) Contingency planning encompasses four levels of planning detail, with an associated planning product for each level.

(a) Level 1 Planning Detail — Commander’s Estimate. This level of planning involves the least amount of detail, and focuses on producing a developed COA. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander’s estimate, or a memorandum. The commander’s estimate provides the SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the supported commander’s analysis of the various COAs available to accomplish an assigned mission and contains a recommended COA.

(b) Level 2 Planning Detail — Base Plan. A base plan describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes or a TPFDD.

(c) Level 3 Planning Detail — CONPLAN. A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. It includes a base plan with annexes required by the JFC and a supported commander’s estimate of the plan’s feasibility. It may also produce a TPFDD if applicable.

(d) Level 4 Planning Detail — OPLAN. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a TPFDD. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. OPLANs can be quickly developed into an OPORD. An OPLAN is normally prepared when:

1. The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.

2. The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.

3. Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.

4. The feasibility of the plan’s CONOPS cannot be determined without detailed planning.

5. Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements, determine available resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

(6) Contingency planning is a collaborative process that engages the SecDef, CJCS, JCS, CCDRs, and staffs of the entire JPEC in the development of relevant plans for all contingencies identified in the CPG, JSCP, and other planning directives. Contingency planning also includes JPEC concurrent, collaborative, and parallel joint planning activities. The JPEC review those plans tasked in the JSCP for
SecDef approval. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy also reviews those plans for policy considerations in parallel with their approval by the CJCS. A CCDR can request a JPEC review for any tasked or un-tasked plans that pertain to the AOR. In addition, the CCDR can request a JPEC review during any planning function in the process, including plan assessment. CCDRs may direct the development of additional plans by their commands to accomplish assigned or implied missions.

(7) When directed by the President or SecDef through the CJCS, CCDRs may convert Level 1, 2, and 3 plans into Level 4 OPLANs or into fully developed OPORDs for execution. Combatant commands continue contingency planning even when engaged in actual contingency operations. Additionally, many contingency planning resources often are required for CAP, and some contingency planning may be interrupted or delayed until the contingency is stabilized or resolved.

(8) *JOPES Volume I* provides details for COA development and selection as well as for plan review and approval during contingency planning. Details include process information for interaction between the supported commander, the SecDef, and the President and formats for various planning products.

*CJCSI 3141.01C*, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans, governs the formal review and approval process for CONOPS and OPLANs.

f. **Crisis Action Planning**

(1) **A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests.** It typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that the President or SecDef considers a commitment of US military forces and resources to achieve national objectives. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast-breaking and requires accelerated decisionmaking. Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. *JOPES* provides additional CAP procedures for the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the likely use of military forces in response to a crisis.

(2) CAP encompasses the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources in response to an actual situation that may result in actual military operations. While contingency planning normally is conducted in anticipation of future events, CAP is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. There are always situations arising in the present that might require US military response. Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in contingency planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated. The time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, commanders and staffs must develop and approve a feasible COA, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient communications systems support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces.
(3) In a crisis, situational awareness is continuously fed by the latest intelligence and operations reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures that consider time available, rapid and effective communications, and relevant previous planning products whenever possible.

(4) **In a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the CCDR uses CAP to adjust previously prepared OPLANs.** The CCDR converts these plans to executable OPORDs or develops OPORDs from scratch when no useful OPLAN exists.

(5) CAP activities are similar to contingency planning activities, but CAP is based on dynamic, real-world conditions vice static assumptions. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the President or SecDef, and the prompt transmission of their decisions to the JPEC. CAP activities may be performed sequentially or in parallel, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis. Capabilities such as collaboration and decision-support tools will increase the ability of the planning process to adapt quickly to changing situations and improve the transition from contingency planning to CAP. The following paragraphs summarize the activities and interaction that occur during CAP. Refer to *JOPES Volume I* for detailed procedures.

(a) When the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military options, the CJCS issues a planning directive to the JPEC initiating the development of COAs and requesting that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate of the situation with a recommended COA to resolve the situation. Normally, the directive will be a WARNORD, but a PLANORD or ALERTORD may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis warrant accelerated planning. In a quickly evolving crisis, the initial WARNORD may be communicated vocally with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept informed. If the directive contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, SecDef approval is required.

(b) The WARNORD describes the situation, establishes command relationships, and identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It may identify forces and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop these factors. It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment or employment, or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported commander regarding these dates and times. If the President, SecDef, or CJCS directs development of a specific COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the supported commander’s assessment. A WARNORD sample is in *JOPES Volume I*.

(c) In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint OPLANs for applicability and develops, analyzes, and compares COAs. Based on the supported commander’s guidance, supporting commanders begin their planning activities.
(d) Although an existing plan almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development. An existing OPLAN can be modified to fit the specific situation. An existing CONPLAN can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved CONOPS. TPFDDs related to specific OPLANs are stored in the JOPES database and available to the JPEC for review.

(e) The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the JCS and CCDRs, reviews and evaluates the supported commander’s estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection. The supported commander’s COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs may have to be developed to accommodate a changing situation. The President or SecDef selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated.

(f) On receiving the decision of the President or SecDef, the CJCS issues an ALERTORD to the JPEC to announce the decision. The SecDef approves the ALERTORD. The order is a record communication that the President or SecDef has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help resolve the crisis. The contents of an ALERTORD may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published, but it should always describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in collaboration with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy, employ, and sustain forces. However, the ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

(g) The supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD using an approved COA. Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning and the planning time available. The supported commander and subordinate and supporting commanders identify actual forces, sustainment, and mobility resources and describe the CONOPS in OPORD format. They update and adjust planning accomplished during COA development for any new force and sustainment requirements and source forces and lift resources. All members of the JPEC identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations.

(h) The supported CCDR submits the completed OPORD for approval to the SecDef or President via the CJCS. After an OPORD is approved, the President or SecDef may decide to begin deployment in anticipation of executing the operation or as a show of resolve, execute the operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning pending resolution by some other means. Detailed planning may transition to execution as directed or become realigned with continuous situational awareness, which may prompt planning product adjustments and/or updates.

(i) In CAP, plan development continues after the President or SecDef decides to execute the OPORD or to return to the pre-crisis situation. When the crisis does not lead to execution, the CJCS provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action or contingency planning procedures.
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(6) CAP provides the CJCS and CCDRs a process for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the President and SecDef. CAP facilitates information sharing among the members of the JPEC and the integration of military advice from the CJCS in the analysis of military options. Additionally, CAP allows the President and SecDef to communicate their decisions rapidly and accurately through the CJCS to the CCDRs, subordinate and supporting commanders, the Services, and combat support agencies to initiate detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute military options. It also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the operation.

(7) Abbreviated Procedures. The preceding discussion describes the activities sequentially. During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. In some situations, no formal WARNORD is issued, and the first record communication that the JPEC receives is the PLANORD or ALERTORD containing the COA to be used for plan development. It is also possible that the President or SecDef may decide to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing planning activities. No specific length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity. **Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information verbally, including the decision to commit forces.**

15. Global Planning

a. When the scope of contemplated military operations exceeds the authority of a single CCDR to plan and execute, the President or SecDef directs the CJCS to implement global planning procedures and assist the SecDef in the strategic direction and integration of the planning effort. The President or SecDef normally makes the decision to implement global planning procedures as a UCP responsibility delegated to a CCDR or during the assessment of the situation. The commander’s assessment supporting this decision could be either the assessments of multiple CCDRs addressing a similar threat or a single assessment from a CCDR addressing the threat from a global, cross-AOR perspective. Situations that may trigger this assessment range the spectrum from major combat operations to the threat of asymmetric attack that extend across combatant command boundaries and require the strategic integration of the campaigns and major operations of two or more GCCs. One example of a persistent, asymmetric threat that is inherently global and poses risk cross-AOR boundaries is adversary exploitation and attack of DOD computer networks on the global information grid.

b. Per Title 10 of the US Code, the SecDef may assign the CJCS responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands. Such assignment by the SecDef does not confer any command authority on the CJCS and does not alter CCDRs’ responsibilities prescribed in Title 10, US Code, Section 164(b)(2). A CCDR delegated that authority to do so will lead the global planning effort for the purposes of planning, integrating, and coordinating a commander’s estimate from a global perspective, but does not have the authority to execute the resulting plan.

c. **When the President or SecDef decides to implement global planning procedures,** the CJCS or delegated CCDR, with the authority of the SecDef, issues a planning directive to the JPEC and assigns or assumes the role of a supported commander **for planning purposes**
Joint Strategic Planning

only. The CJCS or delegated CCDR performs a mission analysis; issues initial global planning guidance based on national strategic objectives and priorities; and develops global COAs in coordination with the affected combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. The purpose of this global COA is to mitigate operational seams and vulnerabilities from a global perspective. This will be achieved through a recommendation for the optimal allocation, prioritization, or reallocation of forces and capabilities required to develop a cohesive global concept of operation. Global planning procedures will detail how GCCs will employ forces and capabilities within their AOR in support of another CCDR. The threat from transnational terrorists illustrates the need for this unity of effort. The global COA will be largely based on recommendations of the affected CCDRs. These GCC COAs may require reiteration or refinement as initial planning apportionments are adjusted for compliance within the global concept of operation. Planners must be aware of competing requirements for potentially scarce, low-density/high-demand, strategic resources such as intelligence collection assets and transportation and ensure global planning is coordinated with GFM procedures.

d. When the President or SecDef selects a COA under global planning procedures and directs that detailed planning be initiated, the CJCS issues an ALERTORD announcing the decision. The Joint Staff or delegated CCDR expands the approved global COA into a CONOPS or base plan and develops the OPLAN or OPORD and supporting TPFDD in coordination with the affected combatant commands and other JPEC members. When the OPLAN or OPORD is complete, the CJCS or delegated CCDR forwards it to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for review before final approval by the President or SecDef. When the President or SecDef approves the plan, the CJCS directs the affected combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies to prepare and submit supporting plans for approval by the CJCS or delegated CCDR.

e. Global planning procedures are also applicable during CAP. Global-crisis conditions exist when CAP procedures are in progress for situations that threaten two or more CCDRs and competing demands for forces and capabilities exceed availability. The CJCS or delegated CCDR is required to mitigate operational seams and vulnerabilities and resolve the conflict over forces, resources, capabilities, or priorities from a global perspective.

f. When the President or SecDef direct execution of the OPORD or OPLAN, they will also select a CCDR as supported commander for implementation of the global plan. In the case of global operations, there could be more than one supported commander for different phases of the operation and different theaters may be in different phases of the operation. Or one CCDR may be designated as supported commander to ensure cross-AOR coordination and the synchronized employment of forces and capabilities, such as global efforts to support counter proliferation and combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Global planning procedures do not absolve GCCs of assigned roles and responsibilities in their AORs.

16. Types of Joint Operation Plans and Orders

Joint operation planning encompasses the preparation of a number of planning and execution-related products. Some (such as execute orders and deployment orders) are specific to JOPES. Other products (such as OPLANs, OPORDs, and FRAGORDs) are also developed and used by
military organizations that have no specific JOPES planning requirements. Figure I-4 lists a number of these products, and the following paragraphs provide brief descriptions.

a. **Base Plan.** In JOPES, this is a “level 2” planning document (see paragraph 14e) that contains paragraphs one through five of the standard OPLAN format, but does not contain annexes.

b. **Concept Plan without TPFDD.** In JOPES, this is a “level 3” planning document — an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the basic plan, the commander’s CONOPS, and appropriate annexes (A, B, C, D, J, K, S, V, Y and Z) and appendixes. Unless directed in the JSCP, planners do not calculate detailed support requirements nor prepare TPFDD files.

c. **Concept Plan with TPFDD.** In JOPES, this is a “level 3” planning document that contains a TPFDD. It typically requires more detailed planning for the phased deployment of forces than does a CONPLAN without TPFDD. Phasing, identification of centers of gravity (COGs), and commander’s intent enhance a clear understanding of what forces are required and when they have to be deployed in order to achieve strategic objectives. A CONPLAN with TPFDD may also be required where the primary purpose is to plan for force movement in support of multinational operations. In this case, the supporting US commander should incorporate

![Figure I-4. Joint Operation Planning Products](image)

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<th>Planning Products</th>
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<tr>
<td>• COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE</td>
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<td>• BASE PLAN</td>
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<td>• CONCEPT PLAN (with or without time-phased force and deployment data)</td>
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<td>• OPERATION PLAN</td>
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<td>• WARNING ORDER</td>
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<td>• FRAGMENTARY ORDER</td>
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multinational planning considerations to the maximum extent possible. However, the level of detail contained in supporting CONPLANs depends on the detail of the multinational planning that these CONPLANs support.

d. **Operation Plan.** In JOPES, this is a “level 4” planning document. In general, however, the term OPLAN commonly is used to refer to any complete and detailed plan that contains the base plan, all required annexes with associated appendixes, and a TPFDD file if applicable. Among many other requirements, the OPLAN identifies planning assumptions and the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan. It provides estimates for their movement into the operational area. An OPLAN can be used as a basis for rapid development of an OPORD. OPLANs can cover joint operations of any magnitude, from a single engagement, battle, or noncombat operation to a campaign consisting of multiple major operations and phases. Planning for a campaign is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. See Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” for more information on campaigns.

e. **Supporting Plan.** Supporting CCDRs, subordinate JFCs, component commanders, and combat support agencies prepare supporting plans as tasked by the supported commanders in support of their plans. Supporting plans are prepared in OPLAN format and are developed responsively in collaboration with the supported commander’s planners. Supporting commanders or agencies may, in turn, assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. In the absence of instructions to the contrary, supported commanders will specify the level of detail required, and will review and approve supporting plans.

f. **Operation Order.** An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during CAP.

g. **Fragmentary Order.** A FRAGORD is an abbreviated form of an OPORD (verbal, written, or digital), which eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic OPORD. It is usually issued as needed or on a day-to-day basis.

h. **Warning Order.** A WARNORD is a planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military COAs by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate.

i. **Planning Order.** A PLANORD is a planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development before the directing authority approves a military COA.

j. **Alert Order.** An ALERTORD is a planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development after the directing authority approves a military COA. An ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

k. **Execute Order.** An EXORD is a directive to implement an approved military COA. Only the President and the SecDef have the authority to approve and direct the initiation of
military operations. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, may issue an EXORD to initiate military operations. Supported and supporting commanders and subordinate JFCs use an EXORD to implement the approved CONOPS.

1. **Prepare to Deploy Order and Deployment Order.** The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues a prepare-to-deploy order (PTDO) or deployment order (DEPORD) to:

   (1) Increase or decrease the deployment posture of units.

   (2) Transfer forces from one CCDR to another with the gaining CCDR exercising that command authority over the gained forces as specified by the SecDef in the DEPORD.

   (3) Deploy or redeploy forces from one CCDR’s AOR to another.

   (4) In the case of a PTDO, propose the day on which a deployment operation begins (C-day) and the specific hour on C-day when deployment is to commence (L-hour).

   (5) In the case of a DEPORD, establish C-day and L-hour.

   (6) Direct any other activity that would signal planned US military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident.

JOPES Volume I and JOPES Volume II provide the procedures and formats for all JOPES planning directives.

17. **Availability of Forces for Joint Operations**

Joint operation planning uses four terms — assigned, attached, apportioned, and allocated — to define the availability of forces and resources for planning and conducting joint operations.

   a. **Assigned.** Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command authority is required or desired. Assigned forces are listed in the Forces for Unified Command Memorandum or as the SecDef designates. A force assigned to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the SecDef.

   b. **Attached.** In joint operations, attached forces and resources are placed under the operational control or tactical control of a CCDR or other JFCs for a relatively temporary situation. A force attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the SecDef.

   c. **Apportioned.** In the general sense, apportionment is the distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (such as air sorties and forces for
planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, and so forth. The GFM guidance apportions major combat forces for contingency planning. They may include those assigned and those expected through mobilization. They may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for CAP. During force planning, CCDRs assume that apportioned forces will be made available for execution.

d. **Allocated.** In the general sense, allocation is the distribution at execution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (such as air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, and so forth. Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the President or SecDef for CAP. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished in JOPES orders. Allocated augmenting forces become assigned or attached forces when they are transferred to the receiving CCDR. GFM supports allocation in support of specific requests for capabilities and forces as well as allocation in support of combatant command rotational force needs.
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CHAPTER II
STRATEGIC DIRECTION

“In total war it is quite impossible to draw any precise line between military and non-military problems.”

Winston Churchill
Their Finest Hour, 1949

1. General

a. **Strategic direction** is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, SecDef, and CJCS provide **strategic guidance**.

b. The President provides strategic guidance through the NSS, national security presidential directives, and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance from other members of the NSC.

c. The SecDef develops the NDS, which establishes broad defense policy goals and priorities for the development, employment, and sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. For joint OPLANs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) prepares the CPG, which is signed by the President and provides written policy guidance to the CJCS and CCDRs for reviewing and preparing OPLANs.

d. The CJCS develops the NMS and refines OSD guidance through joint doctrine (joint publications), policies and procedures (CJCSIs and CJCSMs) such as CJCSI 3110 series (JSCP) that describes how to employ the military in support of national security objectives.

e. Strategic direction and supporting national-level activities, in concert with the efforts of CCDRs, ensure the following:

1. National strategic objectives and termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable.

2. The Active Component is ready for combat and the Reserve Component forces are appropriately manned, trained, and equipped in accordance with Title 10 responsibilities and prepared to become part of the total force upon mobilization.

3. ISR systems and efforts focus on the operational environment.

4. Strategic guidance is current and timely.
(5) DOD, other US agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), allies, and coalition partners are fully integrated at the earliest time during planning and subsequent operations.

(6) All required support assets are ready.

(7) Multinational partners are available and integrated early in the planning process.

(8) Forces and associated sustaining capabilities deploy ready to support the JFC’s CONOPS.

2. Strategic Communication

a. Strategic communication (SC) is a natural extension of strategic direction, and supports the President’s strategic guidance, the SecDef’s NDS, and the CJCS’s NMS. SC planning and execution focus capabilities that apply information as an instrument of national power to create, strengthen, or preserve an information environment favorable to US national interests. SC planning establishes unity of US themes and messages, emphasizes success, accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on US operations, and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals. This is an interagency effort, which provides an opportunity to advance US regional and global partnerships. Coordination, approval, and implementation of an SC strategy and specific information objectives, audiences, themes, and actions will be developed and synchronized with other US agencies and approved by SecDef.

b. Joint operation planning must include appropriate SC components and ensure collaboration with the Department of State’s (DOS’s) diplomatic missions. CCDRs consider SC during peacetime security cooperation planning, and incorporate themes, messages, and other relevant factors in their security cooperation plans (SCPs). During contingency and CAP, CCDRs review SC guidance during mission analysis, and their staffs address SC issues, as appropriate, in their staff estimates. CCDRs will brief the SecDef on their SC planning during contingency planning and CAP IPRs.

c. The predominant military activities that promote SC themes and messages are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

(1) **PA and IO Relationship.** PA has a role in all aspects of DOD’s missions and functions. Communication of operational matters to internal and external audiences is one part of PA’s function. In

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**KEY TERM**

**strategic communication** — Focused US Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of US Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.
performing duties as one of the primary spokesmen, the public affairs officer’s interaction with the IO staff enables PA activities to be coordinated and deconflicted with IO. While audiences and intent differ, both PA and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences. Many of the nation’s adversaries’ leaders rely on limiting their population’s knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces’ messages to these populations. There also is a mutually supporting relationship between the military’s PA and DSPD efforts and similar PA and PD activities conducted by US embassies and other agencies.

(2) **Synchronization.** Synchronized planning of PA, DSPD, and IO is essential for effective SC. Interagency efforts provide and promote international support for nations in the region and provide an opportunity to advance our regional and global partnerships. CCDRs should ensure that their IO, PA, and DSPD planning is consistent with overall USG SC objectives. Since PA and IO both ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences, their activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid credibility losses for both the joint force and PA spokesmen.

d. Level 3 (CONPLAN) and level 4 (OPLAN) plans include an annex Y (Strategic Communication). This annex will contain a proposed SC strategy, which includes synchronized information objectives, audiences, themes, and actions to deliver these communications for interagency coordination and implementation. The SC matrix in JOPES Volume I offers a worksheet to ensure key SC points are considered.

e. Implementation of a SC strategy requires multiple assets and associated activities to deliver themes and messages. These can include US and international public diplomacy means such as senior communicators and figures at home and abroad, respective US and other foreign embassies in the participating nations, public affairs activities, and specific marketing initiatives.

SECTION A. NATIONAL-LEVEL SYSTEMS

3. **Introduction**

*Four interrelated national-level systems influence and direct* the joint operation planning responsibilities identified in Chapter I, “Joint Strategic Planning.” The four national-level systems are the NSC system, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, JSPS, and JOPES. Chapter I, “Joint Strategic Planning,” summarized JOPES. This section briefly describes the first three systems.

4. **National Security Council System**

The NSC system is the principal forum for the interagency deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. Although the actual structure of the NSC varies among administrations, the system typically includes a hierarchy of interagency committees and working groups. The NSC prepares national security guidance that, with Presidential approval, implements national security policy. These policy decisions provide the basis for military planning and programming.
For additional information, see CJCSI 5715.01A, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

5. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process

PPBE is the defense-wide process that relates resources to strategy. The primary objective of PPBE is the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet the operational requirements of the CCDRs and the provisioning requirements of the Services and combat support agencies. In the PPBE process, the SecDef establishes policies, strategy, and prioritized goals for the DOD, which are subsequently used to guide resource allocation decisions that balance the guidance with fiscal constraints.

CJCSI 8501.01A, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, describes participation by the CJCS, the CCDRs, and the Joint Staff in the PPBE process.

6. Joint Strategic Planning System

a. General. The JSPS is one of the primary systems by which the CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the JCS and the CCDRs, accomplishes contingency planning and provides military advice to the President and SecDef and recommendations to the PPBE. JSPS products — such as the NMS and the JSCP — provide guidance and instructions on military policy, strategy, plans, forces, and resource requirements and allocations essential to successful execution of the NSS and other Presidential directives. They also provide a means to evaluate extant US military capabilities, to assess the adequacy and risk associated with current programs and budgets, and to propose changes for the President’s, SecDef’s, and Congress’ approval. Figure II-1 illustrates the relationship between national strategic guidance and joint operation plans developed in JOPES.

The JSCP and its supplemental instructions, as well as the administrative procedures governing its preparation, are described in detail in CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System.

b. Contingency Planning Guidance. The SecDef provides the CJCS with written guidance for the preparation and review of joint OPLANs. This guidance includes the relative priority of the plans, specific force levels, and supporting resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be effective. The CPG provides this guidance and directs the CJCS to develop plans to carry out specific missions. It is a primary source document used by the CJCS to develop the JSCP. For priority plans, OSD also prepares strategic guidance statements. These statements supplement the CPG with updated information and more specific policy and regional guidance.

c. National Military Strategy. The NMS describes how the United States should employ its Armed Forces in support of the President’s NSS. The NMS defines the national military objectives (i.e., ends), how to accomplish these objectives (i.e., ways), and addresses the military capabilities
Strategic Direction required to execute the strategy (i.e., means). The NMS is designed to guide the development of the JSCP.

d. **Global Force Management Guidance.** The GFM guidance integrates complementary assignment, apportionment, and allocation processes into a single management process in support of the NDS and joint force availability requirements. GFM provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of US military forces and supports senior decision makers with a process to assess quickly and accurately the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces or capability assignment, apportionment, and allocation.

e. **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.** The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance and direction to CCDRs and Service Chiefs for preparation of OPLANs and security cooperation plans based on current military capabilities. It is the primary vehicle through which the CICS exercises responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans. Based on policy guidance and tasks in the CPG, the JSCP is the link between strategic guidance and the joint operation planning activities and products that accomplish that guidance.
SECTION B. INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION CONSIDERATIONS

7. General

Complex security challenges require the skills and resources of many organizations across the interagency community. In addition to direct coordination with the interagency community, the JFC may need to coordinate directly (or indirectly through USG agencies) with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), IGOs, regional organizations, and government agencies of partner nations. Some of the organizations or agencies that might become involved in contingency or stability operations will have different goals, capabilities, limitations (such as policy and resource restraints), standards, and operational philosophies. Despite these differences, the interagency process must bring together the capabilities of disparate organizations in the pursuit of national security objectives; success can only be achieved through close interagency coordination and cooperation.

8. Interagency Planning and Coordination

a. JFCs should begin to coordinate and, when appropriate, integrate their activities with other agencies as early as possible during joint operation planning. Integrating the interagency community effectively can be vital to successful military operations, especially during theater shaping and during the stability and enable civil authority phases of an operation when JFCs may also operate in support of other USG agencies. JFCs and their staffs must consider how the capabilities of these agencies and NGOs can be leveraged to assist in accomplishing military missions and the broader national strategic objectives. JFCs should coordinate directly with interagency representatives within their OAs during planning to ensure appropriate agreements exist that support their plans (such as working with US embassies to secure overflight rights with other nations).

b. At the national level, the NSC with its policy coordination committees and working groups advises and assists the President on all aspects of national security policy. OSD and the Joint Staff, in consultation with the Services and combatant commands, must ensure that any interagency support required outside the OA is fully coordinated to support the joint OPLANs. While supported CCDR’s are the focal points for interagency coordination in support of operations in their AORs, interagency coordination with supporting commanders is just as important. At the operational level, subordinate commanders should consider and integrate interagency capabilities into their estimates, plans, and operations.

c. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unified action. A number of factors can complicate the coordination process, including the agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, procedures, and decision-making processes. Operations in support of civil authorities will be executed by nonmilitary organizations or perhaps even NGOs with the military in support. In such instances, the understanding of end state and termination requirements may vary among the participants. The JFC must ensure that interagency planners clearly
understand military capabilities, requirements, operational limitations, liaison, and legal considerations and that military planners understand the nature of the relationship and the types of support they can provide. **In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve unity of effort.** Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment. The use of effects as a design element in the planning process as a way to describe the conditions necessary to achieve common objectives can promote a common understanding of COAs among agencies. This understanding could help harmonize agencies’ responses in conjunction with joint operations, thus promoting unified action. See Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” for more information on incorporating effects in joint operation planning.

**KEY TERMS**

**unified action** — A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization and/or integration of joint or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.

**interagency coordination** — Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.

d. Because the interagency community is not structured like the DOD, command relationships and lines of authority among them can vary greatly as can interagency planning processes depending on the nature of the mission. Interagency management techniques often involve committees, steering groups, or interagency working groups organized along functional lines. During joint operations, a joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) provides the CCDR and subordinate JFCs with an increased capability to coordinate with other USG agencies and departments. The JIACG, an element of a CCDR’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts assigned to CCDRs and tailored to meet the CCDRs specific needs, the JIACG provides a CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, and security cooperation planning. They provide a collaborative conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of nonmilitary organizations.

e. GCCs (and often subordinate JFCs) are assigned a political advisor (POLAD) by the DOS. The POLAD provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establishes linkages with US embassies in the OA and with DOS. The POLAD supplies information regarding DOS policy goals and objectives that are relevant to the CCDR’s theater strategy and the subordinate JFC’s plans. The POLAD is directly responsible to the CCDR and can assist greatly in interagency coordination.
f. **Planning and Coordination with Other Agencies.** A supported commander is responsible for developing annex V, (Interagency Coordination), for each OPLAN. Annex V should specify for interagency partners not only the capabilities that military planners have determined the military may need, but also the shared understanding of the situation, and common objectives required to resolve the situation. This would enable interagency planners to more rigorously plan their efforts in concert with the military, to suggest other activities or partners that could contribute to the operation, and to better determine any support requirements they may have. The staff considers interagency participation for each phase of the operation (see Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” for a discussion of phases). The shape, deter, stabilize, and enable civil authority phases will likely have the most interagency activity.

(1) The *shape phase* will contain military security cooperation activities to be coordinated with other interagency activities. When contingency and crisis action planning are conducted in a region with security cooperation activities, both military operational and security cooperation planning must be closely coordinated and linked with interagency plans. In addition, early flexible deterrent activities by all instruments of national power may begin during this phase.

(2) The *deter phase* will include a set of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) designed to preclude the use of military force by influencing achievement of a satisfactory national strategic end state short of military conflict. At the same time, planning during these phases must account for the requirements and timeframes needed by DOS to enact previously negotiated agreements and arrangements with foreign nations that permit the overflight and access to sovereign territories in support of anticipated deployment and employment of joint forces.

(3) The *stabilize and enable civil authority phases* generally require a high level of coherent, coordinated interagency activity. The complex nature of the security, transition, and reconstruction operations — and other stability operations conducted during these phases — also normally includes joint force interaction with many IGOs, NGOs, regional security organizations, and host-nation organizations. Continual liaison and sharing of information between the joint forces and these agencies via the JIACG, civil-military operations center, and other venues will be instrumental in accomplishing US national objectives.

g. **Consequence Management (CM).** CM actions are those taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. These actions are often associated with early phases of campaigns or operations that do not involve combat, such as disaster relief. They also can be required later in the phasing construct (stabilize and enable civil authority phases) when combat operations are drawing to a close. CM may be planned and executed for locations within US-owned territory at home and abroad and in foreign countries as directed by the President and SecDef. Military support for domestic CM will be provided through Commander, United States Northern Command, Commander, United States Southern Command, or Commander, United States Pacific Command depending upon the location of the incident. DOS is the federal agency with lead responsibility for foreign CM and the Department of Homeland Security is the “Primary Agency” for domestic CM. US
military support to foreign CM normally will be provided to the foreign government through the combatant command within whose AOR the incident occurs.

For further CM guidance, refer to CJCSI 3125.01, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation; CJCSI 3214.01A, Foreign Consequence Management Operations; JPs 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; 3-26, Homeland Security; 3-28, Civil Support; and 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives Consequence Management.

h. As part of plan refinement, and with approval of the SecDef, the CCDR may present the plan’s annex V (Interagency Coordination) to OSD/Joint Staff annex V working group for transmittal to the NSC for managed interagency staffing and plan development. In advance of authorization for formal transmittal of annex V to the NSC, the CCDR may request interagency consultation on approved annex V elements by the OSD/Joint Staff working group. During this step, the CCDR may present the plan for multinational involvement. The CCDR or subordinate JFC should ensure that SC themes and messages in annex V are consistent with the OPLAN’s annex Y (Strategic Communication).

See JP 3-08 Volume I, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, and CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II: (Planning Formats), for additional information.

SECTION C. MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

9. General

Collective security is a strategic goal of the United States, and joint operation planning will frequently be accomplished within the context of multinational operation planning for multinational operations. There is no single doctrine for multinational action, and each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and OPLANs. US planning for joint operations must accommodate and complement such protocols and plans. JFCs must also anticipate and incorporate planning factors such as domestic and international laws, regulations, and operational limitations on the use of various weapons and tactics.

10. Multinational Operations

a. “Multinational operations” is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Such operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance, although other possible arrangements include supervision by an IGO (such as the United Nations or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Nations usually form coalitions for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow area of common interest. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example of an alliance.
b. Joint forces should be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or another nation’s leadership. “Following,” “contributing,” and “supporting” are important roles in multinational operations — often as important as “leading.” However, US forces often will be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role. The military leaders of member nations must emphasize common objectives and shared interests as well as mutual support and respect. Additionally, the cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships between each counterpart is fundamental to achieving success.

11. Multinational Planning and Coordination

a. Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in multinational and national channels. Multinational force commanders develop multinational strategies and plans in multinational channels. JFCs perform supporting joint operation planning for multinational operations in US national channels. Coordination of these separate planning channels occurs at the national level by established multinational bodies or coalition member nations and at the theater-strategic and operational levels by JFCs, who are responsible within both channels for operation planning matters. US doctrine and procedures for joint operation planning also are conceptually applicable to multinational challenges, and the general considerations for interaction with IGOs and host nation organizations are similar to those for interaction with USG agencies. The fundamental issues are much the same for both situations.

b. **Strategic Integration.** In support of each coalition or alliance, a hierarchy of bilateral or multilateral bodies is established to define objectives, develop strategies, and to coordinate strategic guidance for planning and executing multinational operations. Through dual involvement in national and multinational security processes, US national leaders integrate national and theater strategic planning with that of the alliance or coalition. Within the multinational structure, US participants ensure that objectives and strategy complement US interests and are compatible with US capabilities. Within the US national structure, US participants ensure that international commitments are reflected in national military strategy and are adequately addressed in strategic guidance for joint operation planning. Planning with IGOs and NGOs is often necessary, particularly for foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and other civil-military operations (CMO). Incorporating NGOs and their capabilities into the planning process requires the JFC and staff to balance NGOs’ information requirements with operations security. Additionally, many NGOs are hesitant to become associated with military organizations in any form of formal relationship, because doing so could compromise their stature as an independent entity, restrict their freedom of movement and even place their members at risk in uncertain or hostile permissive environments. One possible mechanism to coordinate this and achieve unity of effort during execution is to conduct daily strategic-level meetings in a CMO working group in the OA. The goal of this group could be to assemble all the participants who have a part in CMO to focus and synchronize their efforts to achieve the JFC’s CMO priorities.

c. **Operational-level Integration.** The commander of US national forces dedicated to a multinational military organization is responsible for integrating joint operation planning with multinational planning at the operational level. Normally, this will be the CCDR or the subordinate JFC responsible
for the geographic area within which multinational operations are to be planned and executed. These commanders function within both the US and multinational chains of command. Within the multinational organizations, they command or support the designated multinational force and plan, as appropriate, for multinational employment in accordance with strategic guidance emanating from multinational leadership. Within the US chain of command, they command joint US forces and prepare joint OPLANs in response to requirements from the President, SecDef, and the CJCS. These tasks include developing joint OPLANs to support each multinational commitment within the CCDR’s AOR and planning for unilateral US contingencies within the same area. In this dual capacity, the US commander coordinates multinational planning with joint operation planning.

d. **Bilateral Planning.** When directed, designated US commanders participate directly with the armed forces of other nations in preparing bilateral OPLANs. Bilateral operation planning involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed and approved plans governing the employment of the forces of two nations for a common contingency. Bilateral planning may be accomplished within the framework of a treaty or alliance or in the absence of such arrangements. Bilateral planning is accomplished in accordance with specific guidance provided by the President, SecDef, or CJCS.

e. **Language and Regional Expertise.** Language skills and regional knowledge are integral to joint operations. Joint forces deployed in the context of multinational operations must understand and effectively communicate with the native populations, local and government officials, and coalition partners when in theater. Lessons learned from Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM have demonstrated that this force-multiplying capability can save lives and is integral to successful mission accomplishment. CCDRs and supporting commanders should routinely integrate foreign language and regional expertise capabilities within security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning efforts, and in meeting day-to-day manning requirements in support of operations.

*CJCSI 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise Planning, provides additional planning guidance and procedures.*

**12. Review of Multinational Plans**

US joint strategic plans or OPLANs prepared in support of multinational plans are developed, reviewed, and approved exclusively within US operational channels. They are not shared in total with multinational partners. Selected portions and/or applicable planning and deployment data may be released in accordance with CJCSI 5714.01, *Policy for the Release of Joint Information.* USG representatives and commanders within each multinational organization participate in multinational planning and exchange information in mutually devised forums, documents, and plans. The formal review and approval of multinational plans is accomplished in accordance with specific procedures adopted by each multinational organization and may or may not include separate US review or approval. Bilateral OPLANs routinely require national-level US approval.
JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations, provide greater detail. CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I, describes review and approval procedures for multinational OPLANs.
CHAPTER III
THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

“War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war or rather, no one ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”

Carl von Clausewitz
On War, 1832

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION

1. General

a. Joint operation planning blends two complementary processes. The first is the joint operation planning process, introduced in Chapter I, “Joint Strategic Planning.” JOPP is an orderly, analytical planning process, which consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission, develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs, select the best COA, and produce a plan or order. The second process is operational design, the use of various design elements in the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation plan and its subsequent execution. The operational design elements are used throughout JOPP and are fundamental to that process. For example, they consider the elements termination, end state, objectives, and effects as early as possible during mission analysis. Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” provides the details on most operational design elements.

b. Chapter III focuses on joint operation planning processes and products, with emphasis on common planning activities that apply at any level of joint command. This chapter highlights and discusses certain elements of operational design where appropriate.

(1) SECTION A discusses joint operation planning considerations, including the JFC’s and staff’s roles in the planning process.

(2) SECTION B covers the relationship of strategic guidance and four elements of operational design: termination, end state, objectives, and effects. These are key elements that the JFC and staff consider early and throughout JOPP.

(3) SECTION C focuses on the JOPP steps.

(4) SECTION D provides information on commander and staff estimates that guide and support the planning process.

(5) SECTION E briefly discusses the transition from planning to execution and the planning that occurs continuously throughout execution.
c. Joint operation planning must be flexible and responsive to dynamic conditions. Commands and organizations must be able to rapidly and accurately process and integrate data to provide actionable information to commanders and their staffs across multiple command echelons. Policies, procedures, and tools related to joint operation planning continue to evolve with the ever-changing operational environment. This provides the JPEC and others with dynamic and integrated collaborative capabilities for all aspects of joint operation planning. Today’s dynamic, fast-paced security environment demands that the JPEC be able to gather, review, integrate, and act upon information rapidly in a knowledge-based, collaborative environment. Distributed, collaborative planning procedures and capabilities allow the JPEC to build a plan in discrete elements or sub-plans in parallel and to synchronize their products. Collaboration also provides JPEC members with a “view of the whole” while working on various sections of a plan and provides them with the means to identify and resolve planning conflicts early.

d. Planning requires cooperation between combatant commands and Services and interaction outside traditional military “stovepipes” with the interagency community, multinational partners, and other interested parties. Enhanced by automation, standardized joint planning processes, procedures, and terminology enable integrated and collaborative plan development and refinement. Collaboration facilitates concurrent COA development, force planning, deployment planning, support planning, and integrated feasibility determinations across multiple commands and combat support agencies.

e. JFCs and staffs should consider how to involve relevant government agencies and other nonmilitary organizations in the planning process and how to integrate and synchronize joint force actions with the operations of these agencies. Regardless of the level of involvement by nonmilitary agencies during the planning process, commanders and staffs must consider their impact on joint operations. The military option may be the least desirable option, and a decision to execute a military option is usually made only after the President and SecDef have determined that nonmilitary options are insufficient or unsuitable. In deciding to develop a military option, the President and SecDef may consider a range of flexible deterrent options, including military FDOs. To assist the President and SecDef in their decisionmaking, the CJCS and supported commanders must explicitly relate military FDOs to nonmilitary FDOs as they develop their OPLANs and orders in close coordination with interagency partners. Appendix A, “Flexible Deterrent Options,” provides examples of FDOs.

f. Effective planning requires sufficient planning time. However, improved processes and technology support can reduce planning time without affecting results, which can help the JFC operate inside the decision cycle of an adversary. As a formal planning system, JOPES provides for iterative, adaptive development of plans that require interaction between joint force commanders and the CJCS, SecDef, and President. The JOPP supports JOPES and provides a generic, logical process that commanders and planners can apply at any level.
2. The Commander’s Role in Joint Operation Planning

a. The commander is the focal point of decisionmaking and execution during military operations. Commanders play a critical role in the planning process. Once given a mission, objective, and/or tasks in the higher headquarters plan or order, commanders form their initial situational understanding using their experience, judgment, and initial staff inputs. From this they develop an initial picture of the military end state and a construct for how to reach it. This provides the basis for their initial commander’s intent statement, planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). The commander continues to refine these during planning until the plan or order is published.

b. Commanders direct throughout planning. This direction takes the form of interaction with the staff, guidance on the development of products, and decisions at key points in the process, such as approval of a COA. In CAP, this interaction typically is continuous as the JOPP steps are compressed and blend together.

c. Commanders ensure that subordinate commands have sufficient time to plan, particularly in a CAP situation. They do so by issuing WARNORDs at the earliest opportunity and by collaborating with other commanders, agency leaders, and multinational partners as appropriate to ensure a clear understanding of the commander’s mission, intent, guidance, and priorities. Commanders resolve command-level issues that are beyond the staff’s authority. Examples of such issues include the close-hold, compartmented planning that occurs with some sensitive operations and the continuing challenge of incorporating other agencies and multinational partners in JOPP given their potentially limited capabilities and restricted access to some information.

3. The Staff’s Role in Joint Operation Planning

a. The role of the staff is to support the commander in achieving situational understanding; in making decisions in a given situation or making decisions faster and better than a thinking, adaptive enemy in an environment of uncertainty; in disseminating directives; and in following directives through execution. The staff’s effort during planning focuses on developing effective plans and orders and helping the commander make related decisions. The staff does this by integrating situation-specific information with sound doctrine and technical competence. The staff’s planning activities initially focus on mission analysis, which develops information to help the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders understand the situation and mission. During COA development and comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander’s selection of a COA. Once the commander approves a COA, the staff coordinates all necessary details and prepares the plan or order.

b. Throughout planning, staff officers prepare recommendations within their functional areas, such as system, weapons, and munitions capabilities, limitations, and employment; risk identification and mitigation; resource allocation and synchronization of supporting assets; and multinational and interagency considerations. Staff sections prepare and continuously update staff estimates that address these and other areas. The staff maintains these estimates throughout the operation, not just during pre-execution planning.
The following vignette is used in Chapters III and IV to illustrate key points and provide examples of processes and products related to joint operation planning and operational design. The vignette is not intended to be comprehensive enough to describe every process step.

This situation requires crisis action planning in anticipation of very near-term commitment of forces.

D-41 (112000Z Jan):

In a fictional Command’s (XCOM’s) area of responsibility (AOR), tensions over a border dispute between Country Red and Country Gray have recently escalated. The combatant commander (CCDR) of XCOM has confirmed that 23 of 36 critical indicators (including three of five national political indicators) have been executed, which project that Red will attack Gray in the next six weeks. Although not an ally, Gray maintains a favorable relationship with the US, including economic trade and military-to-military contacts. Country Gray is a primary supplier to the US of certain minerals important to the production of US military satellite systems. Gray also is strategically located adjacent to Country Green, a US ally which controls a key seaport important both for military purposes and as a significant hub on ocean trade routes. Gray and Green have limited military capability.

Country Red historically has been less than friendly toward the US, although the US and Red maintain embassies and economic trade. The US is the primary supplier of essential machinery components used in Red’s manufacturing industry. However, a recent coup by Red’s military leader deposed the former Red President, who fled the country with his key advisors. US-Red relations have deteriorated during the past six months. During the last three months in particular, Red has sponsored anti-US demonstrations and is suspected of terrorist acts against US and pro-Western facilities in the region. Intelligence sources indicate that the Red leader is attempting to formalize an alliance with certain countries in belief that this will greatly degrade US influence and ability to act in the region. Intelligence analysts believe that Red’s unstated strategic objective is control of Country Green and its seaport.

The President of Green has expressed concern over the deteriorating situation to the US President through diplomatic channels, and the Prime Minister of Gray has requested US military assistance. The US President convenes the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss a response to Red’s anticipated attack against Gray. Commander, XCOM (CDRXCOM) monitors by secure video teleconferencing (VTC).
SECTION B. THE RELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE, TERMINATION, END STATE, OBJECTIVES, EFFECTS, AND THE SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

4. General

This section highlights the importance of understanding strategic purpose as early as possible in the planning process. Strategic guidance should provide a clear understanding of purpose, but could require interpretation and clarification as planning progresses. This guidance helps relate key elements of operational design, such as termination, end state, objectives, and effects. The section also discusses the systems perspective of the operational environment, an approach that supports joint operation planning and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment.

5. National and Multinational Strategic Guidance

a. General. Strategic guidance is essential to joint operation planning and operational design. As Chapter II, “Strategic Direction,” discussed, the President, SecDef, CJCS, and CCDRs all promulgate strategic guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. From the perspective of the military instrument of national power, this guidance should provide the purpose of military operations and define what constitutes “victory” or success (ends) and should allocate adequate forces and resources (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The supported JFC proposes the method (ways) of employing military capabilities to achieve the ends.

b. The National Strategic End State. For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically will establish a set of national strategic objectives. The supported CCDR often will have a role in achieving more than one national objective. Some national objectives will be the primary responsibility of the CCDR, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of other agencies. Achievement of these objectives should result in attainment of the national strategic end state — the broadly expressed conditions that should exist at the end of a campaign or operation. The supported CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state is established when possible. Often this end state is uncertain, difficult to determine with clarity, or an estimate based on assumptions and unpredictable conditions in the operational environment. In some situations, operations must begin before a clear understanding of the end state is determined. For all cases, the CCDR must work to frame the problem with the best information available and be prepared to reassess the situation and reframe the problem, as required. Thinking of this “end state” as an integrated set of aims is useful because national strategic objectives usually are closely related rather than independent. Therefore, consideration of all of the objectives necessary to reach the national strategic end state will help the supported CCDR formulate proposed termination criteria — the specified standards approved by the President or the SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. Commanders and their
staffs must understand that many factors can affect national strategic objectives, possibly causing the national strategic end state to change even as military operations unfold.

D-41 (112000Z Jan):

The President has decided to respond. In the NSC meeting, he provides the following guidance, which contains national strategic objectives (underlined text) that comprise the desired national strategic end state:

“I want to (1) maintain the sovereignty of countries Gray and Green and reestablish the conditions for a secure and stable region. This will require an integrated US government (USG) agency and international effort to diffuse the situation and dissuade the Red leader from attacking Gray. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) immediate contribution to this will be the rapid deployment of forces to the region to assure our allies and friends, deter Red aggression, and respond with military force, if necessary, to defeat Red. If our efforts are successful, we will convene again to discuss a longer-term approach to our relationship and response to Red's future actions.”

“If deterrence fails, we will take steps to protect our strategic regional interests and those of our regional allies. We need to be able to (2) defend Gray and Green from Red attack and defeat or eject Red forces from Gray in the event hostilities commence. Although the military capabilities of Gray and Green are limited, this must be a coalition response to Red aggression, not just a US effort. DOD is the lead for the immediate US military response. I want the Department of State (DOS) to integrate the efforts of USG agencies and coordinate a complementary international response. DOD and DOS must collaborate closely to integrate their agencies' actions throughout this crisis. We must provide sufficient security for Green as soon as possible. The President of Green has not invited US forces in, but we must be in position to respond. Defense of Gray is important, but security of Green is critical to our national interests and the security of the region. I also want to (3) degrade Red's offensive military capabilities to the point that Red is not a significant threat to other countries in the region.”

“If Red attacks, I am inclined to do what is necessary to (4) support disaffected internal groups working to return Red to a representative government. The current Red leader's actions during the past six months are destabilizing the region, and his rhetoric does not indicate he will change his views even if we prevent the attack. I believe we can now substantiate that he directed the terrorist attacks against our facilities in Green and Gray and other Western interests. I want us to (5) identify and degrade terrorist capabilities in Red and elsewhere in the region as much as we can. We need to influence regional opinion against Red through our strategic communication initiatives.”
“We believe that only the current Red leader and a few key military subordinates accomplished the bloodless military coup d'etat six months ago. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director advises that the Red military likely will follow new senior military leaders installed by a new President. While he wasn’t our best friend, the former President of Red ran a reasonably stable government and humane regime. The Secretary of State (SECSTATE) advises that this leader would be the best option for stabilizing Red quickly if there were a change in leadership. We must (6) help reinstate the former leader if the opportunity presents itself. SECSTATE will make the appropriate overtures to the former leader to determine his willingness and powerbase.”

“If Red attacks, we must be ready to (7) support post-conflict operations in both Red and Gray. We won’t know the extent of these efforts in advance, but I want SECSTATE to take the lead now for both planning and executing these efforts. Coordinate with the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), since post-conflict requirements can affect the military’s concept for major combat operations.”

“I want to ensure that the situation is stable in both Red and Gray before we withdraw our military forces, but want to avoid conditions that will require any long-term US military presence.”

“As we deal with this crisis, we need to (8) seek opportunities to strengthen regional nations’ ability to defend themselves from future aggression by Red.”

c. **Multinational Strategic Guidance.** In multinational settings, military committee directives provide the strategic guidance and direction for joint operation planning. In multinational situations, the CCDR and staff, as well as component and supporting commanders and their staffs, must clearly understand the objectives and conditions that the national or multinational political leadership want the multinational military force to attain in terms of the internal and external balance of power, regional security, geopolitics, and so forth. When multinational strategic objectives are unclear or ambiguous, the senior US military commander must seek clarification and convey the positive or negative impact of continued ambiguity to the President and SecDef.

6. **Termination of Military Operations and the Military End State**

   a. **Termination** and **end state** are elements of operational design. Although Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” focuses on operational design, this section discusses termination — along with the design elements end state, objectives, and effects — because the JFC and staff require a clear understanding of these elements as they conduct mission analysis and proceed through the remainder of JOPP steps.

   b. The President or SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS and the supported CCDR, should clearly describe the national strategic end state before committing the Armed Forces of the United
States to an operation. The CJCS or the supported CCDR may recommend a **military end state**, but the President or SecDef should formally approve it. A clearly defined military end state complements and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and objectives associated with other instruments of national power. The military end state helps affected CCDRs modify their theater strategic estimates and begin mission analysis even without a pre-existing OPLAN. The CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined military end state is established. The CCDR also should anticipate that military capability likely would be required in some capacity in support of other instruments of national power, potentially before, during, and after any required large-scale combat. A clearly defined end state is just as necessary for situations across the range of military operations that might not require large-scale combat. **While there may not be an armed adversary to confront in some situations, the JFC still must think in terms of ends, ways, and means that will lead to success.**

c. Effective planning cannot occur without a clear picture of the military end state and termination criteria. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is essential to achieving the national strategic end state. When and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate military operations is a political decision. Even so, it is essential that the CJCS and the supported JFC advise the President and SecDef during the decision-making process. The supported JFC should ensure that political leaders understand the implications, both immediate and long term, of a suspension of hostilities at any point in the conflict. Once established, the national strategic objectives enable the supported commander to develop the military end state, recommended termination criteria, and supporting military objectives.

d. Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States, its allies or coalition partners, and the host nation. In combat operations, the basic element of this goal is gaining control over the adversary. When friendly forces have destroyed an adversary’s ability to conduct armed resistance, the adversary may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other forms of resistance such as terrorism, geopolitical actions, guerrilla warfare, or nonviolent resistance. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

e. **The Military End State.** This end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a **point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives.** While it may mirror many of the conditions of the national strategic end state, the military end state typically will be more specific and contain other supporting conditions. These conditions contribute to developing termination criteria, the specified standards approved by the President and/or the SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. Aside from its obvious association with strategic or operational objectives, clearly defining the military end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the joint campaign or operation. Commanders should include the military end state in their planning guidance and commander’s intent statement.
f. **Termination.** Properly conceived termination criteria are essential to ensuring that victories achieved with military forces endure. When planning a joint operation, the supported JFC and the subordinate commanders consider the nature of the conflict and the type of military operations that will establish the conditions necessary to bring the conflict to a favorable end. The CCDR then will consult with the CJCS and the SecDef to establish the termination criteria. To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, it must be understood that US forces must be dominant in not only the phases that involve major combat operations, but also in the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases to achieve the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution. If the termination criteria have been properly set and met, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities and to dissuade other adversaries from interfering. When addressing conflict termination, commanders and their staffs must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, reconstitution, and redeployment. They must also anticipate the nature of post-conflict operations.

**D-41 (112200Z Jan):**

Although an approved XCOM operation plan (OPLAN) does not exist for this specific contingency, CDRXCOM recently had directed the XCOM staff to begin crisis action planning (CAP) for potential operations in the region. The focus has been on joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPPE) and identifying potential options to deal with Red aggression. The President’s national-strategic objectives will help XCOM focus the planning effort.

After the NSC meeting, CDRXCOM consults with the SecDef, SECSTATE, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). They discuss the President’s objectives and guidance within the context of the overall regional, theater, and global war on terrorism (GWOT) strategies, translating the President’s objectives into a proposed military end state. This focuses CDRXCOM’s process of planning theater operations to achieve this end state. They also begin to identify what actions are needed by other US agencies to set the conditions for military operations and exploit the results. SECSTATE verifies that the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) will be the DOS lead for post-conflict planning and operations.

There is common agreement that the Red leader will not be dissuaded from attacking Gray, but also that Red military capabilities are no match for those of US forces. While the eventual military outcome is not an issue, US forces will be challenged by long lines of communication, force protection issues, and the post-conflict regional security situation. Apparently Country Red’s leader believes the US will not intervene militarily because of this deployment challenge and other US commitments around the world. If Red attacks when anticipated, SecDef agrees that the length of US military commitment will depend primarily on two factors: first, how long it takes to deploy sufficient combat power to defeat Red forces and then stabilize
Red and the region following large-scale military operations; and second, the amount and nature of international support that can be generated and sustained throughout operations. There is common agreement that these considerations need to shape the response force and how it will be employed.

The SecDef agrees that, if Red attacks, the military end state will be reached at a point in time during the enable civil authority phase when Red’s military has been defeated, the regional security situation (Red, Green, and Gray) is stabilized, and US forces are no longer needed as the primary means to achieve national objectives, even though military support to post-conflict stability or reconstruction activities will continue at some level. SECSTATE indicates that early, integrated, post-conflict coordination and planning with S/CRS will be essential to a smooth, timely transition during this phase. As the discussion continues, the CCDR proposes the following termination criteria:

1. Gray and Green borders are secure.
2. A stable security environment exists in Gray, Green, and Red.
3. Red no longer poses a military threat to the region.
4. Non-DOD agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and/or nongovernmental organizations effectively lead and conduct reconstruction and humanitarian assistance operations.
5. US military forces return to shaping and security cooperation activities.

Based on the outcome of earlier planning, the CCDR briefs the SecDef and CJCS on a proposed joint operations area (JOA) for the operation. He also briefs the employment concept for Phase I (Deter), which primarily involves the rapid deployment of forces in support of the President’s first objective and positions forces for Phase II operations (Seize Initiative). CDRXCOM intends to command the operations of XCOM’s components from a forward headquarters (HQ). His concept envisions focusing on defense of Gray, initially with long-range airpower and a carrier strike group if Red attacks earlier than expected. He has already directed that the carrier strike group in the XCOM AOR reposition to be on station within the next week. Current indicators are that Country Red will not attack for at least four weeks, so additional near-term deployments include ground forces that can be in defensive positions in Gray within 14 days. These would deploy from within the AOR. The CCDR also identifies the assistance XCOM needs from DOS, including basing and over-flight rights, coordination with US embassies in Gray and Green, and early activation of the S/CRS lead and staff for post-conflict planning. The SecDef approves the JOA and employment concept, directs the CJCS to issue the deployment order, and agrees to work interdepartmental issues through the NSC and directly with SECSTATE.
7. Military Objectives

a. Objective is another element of operational design. Once the military end state is understood and termination criteria are established, operational design continues with development of strategic and operational military objectives. Joint operation planning integrates military actions and capabilities with those of other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose in unified action to achieve the JFC’s objectives. Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished.

b. **Strategic Military Objectives.** An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed.

(1) Strategic military objectives define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives. This focus on strategic military objectives is one of the most important considerations in operational design. The nature of the political aim, taken in balance with the sources of national strength and vulnerabilities, must be compared with the strengths and vulnerabilities of the adversary and/or other factors in the operational environment to arrive at reasonably attainable strategic military objectives. Strategic objectives must dominate the planning process at every juncture.

(2) Operational- and tactical-level headquarters also use objectives during planning. Tactical objectives often are associated with the specific “target” of an action. In this context, an objective could be a terrain feature, the seizing or defending of which is essential to the commander’s plan; or it could be an enemy force or capability, the destruction of which creates a vulnerability for the adversary. But tactical commanders also can designate objectives in the larger sense — that is, clearly defined goals associated with some aspect of the commander’s mission. The specific use of objective at the tactical level varies by Service.

(3) For situations such as the hypothetical vignette, strategic military objectives could look like tasks. In this vignette, the President’s second objective is to “. . defend Gray and Green from Red attack and destroy or eject Red forces . . .” In the vignette continuation below, the CCDR’s first and second objectives relate directly to the President’s objective. **Although joint doctrine does not prescribe a specific convention for writing an objective statement, there are three primary considerations. First,** they should link directly or indirectly to one or more higher-level objectives; **next,** they should be as unambiguous as possible; **finally,** they should not specify ways and means for their accomplishment.

D-40 (120800Z Jan):

XCOM planning in the past few weeks addressed the possibility of limited military operations against the Country of Red. The current situation has validated some of the initial CAP assumptions, but not others. The CCDR conducts a secure VTC with the key staff and component commanders and provides planning guidance, including the following broad theater-strategic objectives for this operation:
Chapter III

1. Gray and Green sovereignty is maintained
2. Regional terrorism is reduced
3. Regional security and stability are restored

These theater-strategic objectives align closely with the national-strategic objectives and are specific to the crisis at hand. However, they are not identical to the President’s objectives, since DOS and other agencies will be the lead for certain operations, particularly in support of the President’s objectives 4, 6, and 7. Moreover, some of these objectives would change if Red does not attack or if there is a change of government and military leadership in Red should conditions permit. The theater-strategic objectives also support the CCDR’s broader security cooperation goals and President’s GWOT objectives.

The CCDR directs the operations directorate (J-3) to prepare and issue a warning order.

8. Effects

a. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. Throughout this publication, the term “effects” is intended to mean both desired and undesired effects unless otherwise specified.

b. The use of effects during planning is reflected in the steps of JOPP as a way to clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks and help the JFC and staff determine conditions for achieving objectives. Commanders and staffs can use commander’s intent, a systems perspective of the operational environment, and an understanding of desired and undesired effects to coordinate and promote unified action with multinational and other agency partners.

c. The CCDR plans joint operations based on analysis of national strategic objectives and development of theater strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational desired effects and assessment indicators (see Figure III-1). At the operational level, a subordinate JFC develops supporting plans, which can include objectives supported by measurable operational-level desired effects and assessment indicators. This may increase operational- and tactical-level understanding of the purpose reflected in the higher-level commander’s mission and intent. At the same time, commanders consider potential undesired effects and their impact on the tasks assigned to subordinate commands.
Like end state and objective, joint doctrine includes effects as an element of operational design. Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” discusses operational art and elements of operational design.

e. The vignette continuation below shows effects that support CDRXCOM’s theater strategic objectives.

**D-40 (121700Z Jan):**

The XCOM plans directorate (J-5) reorients the current CAP effort to focus on the specific situation and the CCDR’s stated objectives. These will form the basis for detailed mission analysis, collaboration with DOS and other agencies, and development of supporting effects. The J-5 drafts a list of desired effects — the conditions that support achievement of the objectives. The J-5 could add undesired effects to this list if any had been identified. The J-5 distributes the following list for the staff’s review and collaboration prior to the next meeting with the CCDR. The J-5 asks the staff to confirm that these desired effects are nested within the security cooperation plan and regional GWOT initiatives and that each effect is achievable and measurable.
Objective 1: Gray and Green sovereignty is maintained

Effect (E) 1-1: Gray and Green leadership facilitate rapid reception and deployment of US forces
E 1-2: Regional countries do not oppose US deployment
E 1-3: Red does not attack Gray or Green
E 1-4: If deterrence fails, coalition defeats Red’s attack
E 1-5: Coalition restores integrity of Gray’s and Green’s borders

Objective 2: Regional terrorism is reduced

E 2-1: Country Red’s ceases terrorist activities
E 2-2: Regional transnational terrorist networks are disrupted
E 2-3: Regional countries expand their antiterrorism and counterterrorism training, capabilities, and operations

Objective 3: Regional security and stability are restored

E 3-1: Red is incapable of cross-border offensive military operations
E 3-2: Red participates in diplomatic engagement with Gray and Green
E 3-3: Regional countries support actions to oppose Red aggression
E 3-4: Regional countries welcome US intervention

Understanding the behavior of systems in the operational environment supports the use of effects in planning. In the previous vignette, effects E 1-1 through E 1-5 represent conditions for achieving the CCDR’s objective 1, which in turn relates to the President’s second objective. Effect E 1-3 also is a statement about the behavior of Red’s military system, while effect E 2-3 relates to the behavior of other regional countries’ military, law enforcement, and political systems in response to regional terrorism. See Chapter IV for more information on a systems approach to understanding the operational environment.

f. During COA and CONOPS development, understanding desired and undesired effects can help the JFC and staff refine their mission statement and the joint force components’ tasks. For example, the JFC could task the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) to help train regional countries’ security forces to conduct independent counterterrorism operations. This task links back to the CCDR’s second objective and its supporting effects. Likewise, the JFLCC and other joint force components could be assigned tasks to mitigate or avoid undesired effects.

Objectives prescribe friendly goals.

Effects describe system behavior in the operational environment — desired effects are the conditions related to achieving objectives.

Tasks direct friendly action.
g. Although joint doctrine does not prescribe a specific convention for writing a desired effect statement, **there are four primary considerations. First**, each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives; **next**, the effect should be measurable; **third**, the statement should not specify ways and means for accomplishment; **finally**, the effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task. The same considerations apply to writing an undesired effect statement.

h. While strategic and operational desired effects focus on larger aspects of various systems, tactical-level desired effects typically are associated with direct results of offensive and defensive tactical actions, often involving weapons employment. **At the tactical level**, a direct effect is the proximate, first-order consequence of an action — for example, the destruction of a target by precision-guided munitions or restoration of electrical power by military engineers — which usually is immediate and easily recognizable. Direct effects at this level are most evident against structural systems. **Tactical actions also can result in indirect effects — delayed and/or displaced consequences associated with the action that caused the direct effect.** Indirect effects often are less observable or recognizable than direct effects, particularly when they involve changes in an adversary’s behavior. However, an indirect effect often is the one desired, such as delaying an adversary in crossing a river (indirect effect displaced in time) by destroying a bridge (direct effect).

i. The proximate cause of effects in interactively complex situations can be difficult to predict. While desired tactical-level effects in combat operations typically relate to the military system, operational-level and strategic effects often pertain to other systems in the operational environment. Even direct effects in these systems can be more difficult to create, predict, and measure, particularly when they relate to moral and cognitive issues (such as religion and the “mind of the adversary” respectively). Indirect effects in these systems often are difficult to foresee. Where there is sufficient intelligence available to reliably predict the direct effects, some of the commander’s objectives can also be achieved indirectly. Some military objectives can be achieved by influencing political, economic, social, and other systems in the operational environment. **However, indirect effects often can be unintended and undesired if there are gaps in our understanding of the operational environment.** Destruction of the bridge in the previous example could also result in the unintended disruption of electrical power and telephone communications to a nearby community if we were unaware that these utilities were attached to the bridge. This could cause hardship in that community and erode any popular support that might have existed prior to the event. Commanders and planners must appreciate that unpredictable third-party actions, unintended consequences of friendly operations, subordinate initiative and creativity, and the fog and friction of conflict will contribute to an uncertain operational environment.

j. When the commander and staff identify undesired effects, they must consider these in COA development. The commander’s operational limitations can be adjusted to prevent the undesired effect. In the earlier bridge example, the operational limitations could include the restraint, “Do not destroy bridges A, B, and C north of G-town,” assuming this restraint does not jeopardize mission accomplishment. See paragraph 11 for a discussion of operational limitations.
k. The use of effects in planning can help commanders and staff determine the tasks required to achieve objectives and use other elements of operational design more effectively by clarifying the relationships between COGs, lines of operations (LOOs), decisive points, and termination criteria. Once a systems perspective of the operational environment has been developed (and appropriate links and nodes have been identified), the linkage and relationship between COGs, LOOs, and decisive points can become more obvious. This linkage allows for efficient use of desired effects in planning. See Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” for additional information on elements of operational design. The JFC and planners continue to develop and refine desired effects throughout JOPP planning steps. Monitoring progress toward attaining desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout execution.

9. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

a. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is the analytical process to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products. The primary purpose of JIPOE is to support the JFC’s decisionmaking and planning by identifying, assessing, and estimating the enemy’s COG(s), critical factors, capabilities, limitations, intentions, and COAs that are most likely to be encountered based on the situation. Using the JIPOE process, the joint force intelligence directorate (J-2) manages the analysis and development of products that provide a systems understanding of the increasingly complex and interconnected operational environment—the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

b. Although JIPOE support to decisionmaking is both dynamic and continuous, it must also be “front loaded” in the sense that the majority of analysis must be completed early enough to be factored into the commander’s decision-making effort. JIPOE generally occurs in parallel to mission analysis, and supports mission analysis by enabling the commander and staff to visualize the full extent of the operational environment, to distinguish the known from the unknown, and to establish working assumptions regarding how adversary and friendly forces will interact within the operational environment. JIPOE also assists commanders in formulating their planning guidance by identifying significant adversary capabilities and by pointing out critical operational environment factors, such as weather and terrain; the locations of key geography; environmental and health hazards; attitudes of indigenous populations; and potential land, air, and sea avenues of approach. As planning continues, analysts refine their assessment of the adversary’s COGs, potential COAs, and other factors.

c. The operational environment encompasses the air, land, sea, space, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, and others), which are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding this environment has always included a perspective broader than just the adversary’s military forces and other combat capabilities within the traditional battlespace. However, current and future strategic and operational requirements and types of operations can benefit by a more comprehensive view of all systems in this environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand.
d. A **system** is a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole. A systems understanding of the operational environment considers more than just an adversary’s military capabilities, order of battle, and tactics. Instead, it strives to provide a perspective of interrelated systems that comprise the operational environment, relevant to a specific joint operation (see Figure III-2). Based on understanding strategic objectives and the joint force’s mission, the joint force staff analyzes relevant systems in the operational environment. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this analysis. Understanding these systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC’s knowledge of how individual actions on one element of a system can affect other interrelated system components.

e. Among other benefits, a systems perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources from which to gain indications and warning. Although this description of the operational environment is not, itself, an element of operational design, it supports most design elements. For example, this perspective helps analysts with COG analysis and planners with operational design by identifying nodes in each system, the links (relationships) between the nodes, critical factors, and potential decisive points. This understanding facilitates the identification and use of decisive points, lines of operations, and other design elements, and allows commanders and staffs to consider a broader set of options to focus limited resources, create desired effects, and achieve objectives.

*Figure III-2. The Interconnected Operational Environment*
f. The systems perspective is not intended to be a “systems engineering” approach to the conduct of military operations. While some systems (such as infrastructure) are relatively static, many systems in the operational environment are inherently complex and dynamic. Although the systems approach is helpful in understanding the complex nature and composition of a given system or subsystem, this approach cannot account for all variables. Most systems can often exhibit unpredictable, surprising, and uncontrollable behaviors. Rather than being an engineered solution, a military operation evolves as the joint force adapts responsively to systems that also are adapting. This is why the application of operational art emphasizes the importance of the creative imagination, judgment, experience, and skill of commanders and staff.

g. System nodes are the tangible elements within a system that can be “targeted” for action, such as people, materiel, and facilities. **Links** are the behavioral or functional relationships between nodes, such as the command or supervisory arrangement that connects a superior to a subordinate; the relationship of a vehicle to a fuel source; and the ideology that connects a propagandist to a group of terrorists. Links establish the interconnectivity between nodes that allows them to function as a system — to behave in a specific way (accomplish a task or perform a function). Thus, the purpose in taking action against specific nodes is often to destroy, interrupt, or otherwise affect the relationship between them and other nodes, which ultimately influences the system as a whole.

**KEY TERMS**

**system** — A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole.

**node** — An element of a system that represents a person, place, or thing.

**key node** — A node that is critical to the functioning of a system.

**link** — An element of a system that represents a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes.

h. Analysts describe systems with sufficient detail to identify potential **key nodes**. These are nodes that are critical to the functioning of their systems. Some may become decisive points for military operations since, when acted upon, they could allow the JFC to gain a marked advantage over the adversary or otherwise to contribute materially to achieving success. **Key nodes often are linked to, or resident in, multiple systems.** Since each adversary system (infrastructure, social, etc.) is composed of nodes and links, the capabilities of US instruments of national power can be employed against selected key nodes to create operational and strategic effects.

i. A systems perspective can support the concept of achieving unified action in any operation by providing the JFC and staff with a common frame of reference for planning with agencies that represent other instruments of national power. This systems view can facilitate the JFC’s
collaboration with counterparts from other agencies and organizations to determine and coordinate necessary actions that are beyond the JFC’s command authority. A full understanding of the operational environment typically will require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, USG agencies, and nongovernmental centers of excellence. The JFC must consider the best way to manage this cross-functional effort to develop and maintain a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment.

For more information on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for details.

SECTION C. THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS STEPS

10. The Joint Operation Planning Process

a. JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

b. This planning process applies to contingency planning and CAP within the context of the responsibilities specified by the CJCSM 3122 series (JOPES). JOPP also is used by joint organizations that have no specific JOPES responsibilities. Furthermore, JOPP supports planning throughout the course of an operation after the CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues the EXORD. In common application, JOPP proceeds according to planning milestones and other requirements established by commanders at various levels. However, the CJCSM 3122 series specifies JPEC milestones, deliverables, and interaction points for contingency and crisis action plans developed per the formal JOPES process. Figure III-3 shows the primary steps of JOPP as discussed in the remainder of this section.

11. Planning Initiation

a. JOPP begins when an appropriate authority recognizes a potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authority — the President, SecDef, or CJCS — initiates planning by deciding to develop military options. The JSCP, CPG, and related strategic guidance statements (when applicable) serve as the primary guidance to begin contingency planning. However, CCDRs and other commanders may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. The CJCS may also issue a WARNORD. Military options normally are developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. Below the strategic level, crises are reported to the NMCC in an operational report. This initiates analysis at the strategic level and may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS initiating military
planning. Whether or not planning begins as described here, the CCDR may act within approved ROE in an immediate crisis.

b. Particularly in CAP, the JFC and staff will perform an assessment of the initiating directive to determine time available until mission execution, the current status of intelligence products and staff estimates, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The JFC typically will provide initial guidance (not to be confused with the JFC’s planning guidance that is a product of mission analysis), which could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC’s authority, and direct other actions as necessary.

c. Planning is continuous once execution begins. However, planning initiation during execution is still relevant when there are significant changes to the current mission or planning assumptions or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations. The plans directorate (J-5) of the JFC’s staff typically focuses on planning sequels and potential future operations, while the operations directorate (J-3) focuses on branch planning and current operations.

12. Mission Analysis

a. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The primary purpose of
mission analysis is to understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. The JFC and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical steps, such as those shown in Figure III-4. Although some steps occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing of information by the commander and staff, particularly in a CAP situation.

b. A primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the national strategic end state—the broadly expressed political, military, economic, social, informational, and other conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. At some point, the CCDR also must consider multinational objectives associated with coalition or alliance operations.

(1) The supported CCDR typically will specify a military end state. While it will mirror many of the objectives of the national strategic end state, the theater strategic end state may contain other supporting objectives and conditions. This end state normally will represent a point in time and/or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve the remaining national strategic objectives.
(2) JFCs include a discussion of the national strategic end state in their planning guidance. This ensures that joint forces understand what the President wants the situation to look like at the conclusion of US involvement. The CCDR and subordinate JFCs typically include the military end state in their commander’s intent statement.

c. In response to the initiating planning directive, the commander and staff analyze the assigned mission to accomplish the following:

(1) Assess the scope of the assigned mission, end state, objectives, and other guidance from the next higher commander. Determine whether the mission can be accomplished in a single operation, or will likely require a campaign due to its complexity and likely duration and intensity.

(2) Determine military objective(s) and the specified, implied, and essential tasks. Develop a revised mission statement.

(3) Determine initial desired and undesired effects and key assumptions.

**KEY TERMS**

**specified task** — A task that is specifically assigned to an organization by its higher headquarters.

**implied task** — A task derived during mission analysis that an organization must perform or prepare to perform to accomplish a specified task or the mission, but which is not stated in the higher headquarters order.

**essential task** — A specified or implied task that an organization must perform to accomplish the mission. An essential task is typically included in the mission statement.

(4) Analyze the operational environment with respect to mission accomplishment. This analysis should result in understanding operational limitations and other considerations that affect execution and that bear on operational and strategic decisions. A comprehensive systems perspective considers the interaction between the individual elements of a system and across multiple systems (political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and others). This systems perspective is an important consideration as the staff prepares its functional estimates such as logistic, transportation and movement, and force protection. See Section D of this chapter for more information on the estimate process. See Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” for more information on developing a systems perspective of the operational environment.

(5) In a crisis action situation, determine time available from mission receipt until probable receipt of a deployment or execute order. Planning at all levels is complex, so the JFC must allocate a sufficient part of available time for subordinate and supporting commands to conduct
their planning and ensure timely transmission of accurate planning information and instructions to those organizations. While some steps are necessarily sequential, the joint force headquarters and components’ planning activities will be largely parallel, with subordinates involved in collaborative planning with their higher headquarters.

d. **The primary inputs to mission analysis** are the higher headquarters planning directive, other strategic guidance, the JIPOE, and initial staff estimates (see Figure III-5). **The primary products of mission analysis** are a restated mission statement and the JFC’s initial intent statement, CCIRs, and planning guidance.

![Figure III-5. Mission Analysis](image)

(1) **Restated Mission Statement.** The mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how. It forms the basis for planning and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the commander’s estimate, the CONOPS, and the completed plan.
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The XCOM chief of staff convenes the staff to receive the commander’s guidance and provide initial staff estimates. Component commanders participate in person or by VTC. With minor modifications, the CCDR approves the list of operational limitations for immediate separate transmission to component and supporting command headquarters. The intelligence directorate (J-2) briefs the JIPOE, which includes an initial systems analysis of the operational environment. The J-5 briefs the proposed effects to support the operation’s objectives. The CCDR approves these, with the caveat that they may change as the operation progresses. The J-3 acknowledges receipt of the CJCS deployment order and transmission of the warning order to subordinate and supporting commands. The J-5 then presents the following draft mission statement, which the CCDR approves:

MISSION: USXCOM deploys immediately to JOA Blue to deter Red forces from attacking Country Gray. XCOM defends Country Gray and Country Green from Red attack beginning D-Day, H-Hour; defeats and ejects Red forces; degrades or eliminates terrorist activities originating in Country Red; and provides post-conflict support to stabilization and reconstruction operations in Red, Gray, and Green as directed in order to protect the sovereignty of Gray and Green and restore stability in the region. On order, XCOM secures Country Red to enable installation of new government and military leaders.

(2) Commander’s Intent

(a) The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the commander will accept risk during the operation.

(b) The initial intent statement normally contains the purpose and military end state as the impetus for the planning process; it could be stated verbally when time is short. The commander refines the intent statement as planning progresses. The commander’s approved intent is written in paragraph 3, “Execution,” as part of the operation plan or order.

(c) A well-devised intent statement enables subordinates to decide how to act when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in situations where the CONOPS no longer applies. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and desired and undesired effects. The statement also can discuss other instruments of national power as they relate to the JFC’s mission and the potential impact of military operations on these instruments. The commander’s intent may include the commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation.
Following approval of the mission statement, CDRXCOM issues his initial intent statement. He will refine the intent below, which the J-5 will include in the final operation order (OPORD).

The purpose of this operation is to deter Country Red from attacking Country Gray and, if Red attacks, to defend Gray and Green and defeat Red’s military. This will help restore stability in the region, particularly if Red’s current leader is not in power at the conclusion of operations. If Red attacks, the military end state includes a successful defense of Gray and Green; a Red armed force capable only of homeland defense against regional threats; degradation of terrorist activities and capabilities; and sufficient stability in Red that most US forces can disengage and redeploy at the earliest opportunity. We do not want our presence to be a continuous cause of unrest for the populace. New Red political and military leadership would benefit the region, and I want to plan for our support to civil authorities should that possibility become reality.

If Red attacks, the military outcome should not be in question. Our national intelligence says that Red does not possess weapons of mass destruction capabilities; however there are several industries that use large quantities toxic industrial materials that terrorist may have plans to use. Regional country leaders who are friendly to the current Red leader will not be inclined to interfere militarily according to the latest strategic intelligence estimate. Nonetheless, we must watch them closely for any indications.

Stabilizing the situation and enabling civil authority are key to the end state. The military is only one piece of this equation. We’ll be in support of the Department of State for the most part during those phases, and I want to ensure we make it as easy as possible for all other agencies to do their jobs and achieve the President’s objectives. It is important that the regional nations do not oppose US operations in the region and that they understand the possibility of future aggression by Red and will be able to react to Red accordingly. Continue your routine collaboration with the Joint Interagency Coordination Group so that we are not surprised as agency teams arrive. Also, component commanders ensure you personally review the strategic communication annex when you receive the OPORD. There are some key SC themes that are important to US post-conflict goals for this region. We need to speak with one voice on these when we address the press and others.

Questions?

(3) JFC’s Planning Guidance. To ensure focused and effective planning, the commander and staff develop and communicate planning guidance that will accompany tentative COAs to subordinate
and supporting commanders for their estimates of feasibility and supportability. As a minimum, the planning guidance should include the mission statement; assumptions; operational limitations; a discussion of the national strategic end state; termination criteria; military objectives; and the JFC’s initial thoughts on desired and undesired effects. The planning guidance should also address the role of agencies and multinational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations as required.

(a) **The staff assembles both facts and assumptions** to support the planning process and planning guidance.

1. A **fact** is a statement of information known to be true (such as verified locations of friendly and adversary force dispositions), while an **assumption** provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions are necessary to enable the commander to complete an estimate of the situation and select the COA. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. For planning purposes, subordinate commanders treat assumptions made by higher headquarters as true in the absence of proof to the contrary. However, they should challenge those assumptions if they appear unrealistic. **Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure validity.**

2. Commanders and their staff should anticipate changes to the plan that may become necessary should an assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in a plan. A **valid assumption has three characteristics:** it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue. Assumptions are made for both friendly and adversary situations. Commanders and staffs should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume that unrealistic friendly capabilities would be available.

3. OPLANs developed during contingency planning may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a potential crisis develops. In CAP, however, **assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible.** The staff accomplishes this by identifying the information needed to convert assumptions to facts and submitting an information request to an appropriate agency as an information requirement. If the commander needs the information to make a key decision, the information requirement can be designated a CCIR. **Although there may be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the OPORD.**

(b) **Operational limitations** are actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. A **constraint** is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that **dictates an action,** thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead of bypassing it during the 1944 campaign in France. A **restraint** is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that **prohibits an action,** thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War. Many operational limitations are commonly expressed
as ROE. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts, and develop options that minimize these impacts in order to promote maximum freedom of action during execution.

(c) **Mission success criteria** describe the standards for determining mission accomplishment. The JFC includes these criteria in the planning guidance so that the joint force staff and components better understand what constitutes mission success. These criteria are related to the termination criteria discussed in Section B of this chapter. **Termination criteria** typically apply to the end of a joint operation and disengagement by joint forces. This often signals the end of the use of the military instrument of national power. **Mission success criteria**, on the other hand, can apply to any joint operation, subordinate phase, and joint force component operation. These criteria help the JFC determine if and when to move to the next major operation or phase.

1. The initial set of these criteria determined during mission analysis becomes the basis for **assessment** (see Section E, paragraph 15 for details). Assessment uses **measures of performance (MOPs)** and **measures of effectiveness (MOEs)** to indicate progress toward achieving objectives. If the mission is unambiguous and limited in time and scope, mission success criteria could be readily identifiable and linked directly to the mission statement. For example, if the JFC’s mission is to evacuate all US personnel from the US embassy in Grayland, then mission analysis could identify two primary success criteria: (1) all US personnel are evacuated and (2) established ROE are not violated. However, more complex operations may require MOEs and MOPs for each task, effect, and phase of the operation. For example, if the JFC’s specified tasks are to ensure friendly transit through the Straits of Gray, eject Redland forces from Grayland, and restore stability along the Grayland-Redland border, then mission analysis should indicate many potential success criteria — measured by MOEs and MOPs — some for each desired effect and task.

2. Measuring the status of tasks, effects, and objectives becomes the basis for reports to senior commanders and civilian leaders on the progress of the operation. The CCDR can then advise the President and SecDef accordingly and adjust operations as required. Whether in a supported or supporting role, JFCs at all levels must develop their mission success criteria with a clear understanding of termination criteria established by the CJCS and SecDef as discussed in Section B of this chapter.

(4) **Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.** CCIRs comprise information requirements identified by the commander as being critical to timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. CCIRs result from an analysis of information requirements in the context of the mission and the commander’s intent. The two key subcomponents are **critical friendly force information** and **priority intelligence requirements**. The information needed to verify or refute a planning assumption is an example of a CCIR. CCIRs are not static. Commanders refine and update them throughout an operation based on actionable information they need for decisionmaking. They are situation-dependent, focused on predictable events or activities, time-sensitive, and always established by an order or plan.
13. Course of Action Development

    a. A COA consists of the following information: what type of military action will occur; why the action is required (purpose); who will take the action; when the action will begin; where the action will occur; and how the action will occur (method of employment of forces). The staff converts the approved COA into a CONOPS. COA determination consists of four primary activities: COA development, analysis and wargaming, comparison, and approval.

    b. To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key information necessary to make decisions, using the data from mission analysis. The staff develops COAs to provide options to the commander. All COAs selected for analysis should be valid. A valid COA is one that is adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete (see Figure III-6). The staff should reject potential COAs that do not meet all five criteria. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance and positions the joint force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative.

    c. Embedded within COA development (see Figure III-7) is the application of operational art. Planners can develop different COAs for using joint force capabilities (operational fires and maneuver, deception, joint force organization, etc.) by varying the combinations of the elements of operational design (such as phasing, line of operations, and so forth). During COA development, the commander

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**COURSE OF ACTION CHARACTERISTICS**

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**A Valid Course of Action Is--**

Adequate — Can accomplish the mission within the commander’s guidance.

Feasible — Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations.

Acceptable — Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.

Distinguishable — Must be sufficiently different from the other courses of action.

Complete — Must incorporate:
- objectives, effects, and tasks to be performed
- major forces required
- concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment
- time estimates for achieving objectives
- military end state and mission success criteria

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Figure III-6. Course of Action Characteristics
The staff continues risk assessment, focusing on identifying and assessing hazards to mission accomplishment. The staff also continues to revise intelligence products. The adversary’s most likely and most dangerous potential COAs are considered at this point and throughout COA development. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following:

1. Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.

2. Capabilities required.

3. Task organization and related communications systems support concept.

4. Sustainment concept.

5. Deployment concept.

6. Estimate of time required to reach mission success criteria or termination criteria.

7. Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.
14. Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming

See Figure III-8.

a. The commander and staff analyze each tentative COA separately according to the commander’s guidance. COA analysis identifies advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. Analysis of the proposed COAs should reveal a number of factors including:

(1) Potential decision points.

(2) Task organization adjustment.

(3) Data for use in a synchronization matrix or other decision-making tool.

(4) Identification of plan branches and sequels.

(5) Identification of high-value targets.

(6) A risk assessment.
(7) COA advantages and disadvantages.

(8) Recommended CCIRs.

b. **Wargaming** provides a means for the commander and participants to analyze a tentative COA, improve their understanding of the operational environment, and obtain insights that otherwise might not have occurred. An objective, comprehensive analysis of tentative COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Based upon time available, the commander should wargame each tentative COA against the most probable and the most dangerous adversary COAs (or most difficult objectives in noncombat operations) identified through the JIPOE process.

(1) Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the OA, and other aspects of the operational environment. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, counteraction method of friendly and/or opposition force interaction. The basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) can apply to noncombat as well as combat operations.

(2) Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the staff will obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred. This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve.

(3) The wargaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort which describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used. A more comprehensive version is the “sketch-note” technique, which adds operational sketches and notes to the narrative process in order to gain a clearer picture. The most sophisticated form of wargaming is modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation. Figure III-9 provides a sample list of possible wargaming steps.

(4) A set of governing factors is an important output from COA analysis and wargaming. **Governing factors** are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to mission accomplishment. Potential governing factors include elements of the commander’s intent and planning guidance; wargaming results; selected principles of war; external constraints or any criteria the commander desires.

(5) However, the most important element of wargaming is not the tool used, but the people who participate. Staff members who participate in wargaming should be the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of COAs. **A robust cell that can aggressively pursue the adversary’s point of view when considering adversary counteraction is essential.** This “red cell” role-plays the adversary commander and staff. If formed, the cell would work for the joint force headquarters J-2 and typically would reside in either the joint intelligence support element or the joint planning group (JPG). The red cell develops critical decision points relative to the friendly COAs, projects adversary reactions to friendly actions, and estimates adversary losses for each friendly COA. By trying to win the wargame for the adversary, the red cell helps the staff fully address friendly responses.
for each adversary COA. If subordinate functional and Service components establish similar cells that mirror their adversary counterparts, this red cell network can collaborate to effectively wargame the adversary’s full range of capabilities against the joint force. In addition to supporting the wargaming effort during planning, the red cell can continue to view friendly joint operations from the adversary’s perspective during execution. The red cell process can be applied to noncombat operations to help determine unforeseen or most likely obstacles as well as the potential results of planned operations.

(6) A synchronization matrix is a decision-making tool and a method of recording the results of wargaming. Key results that should be recorded include decision points, potential governing factors, CCIRs, COA adjustments, branches, and sequels. Using a synchronization matrix helps the staff visually synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the adversary’s possible COAs. The wargame and synchronization matrix efforts will be particularly useful in identifying cross-component support resource requirements.

15. Course of Action Comparison

a. COA comparison is an objective process whereby COAs are considered independently of each other and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of COAs so that a COA with the highest probability
of success can be selected or developed. The commander and staff develop and evaluate a list of important criteria, or governing factors, consider each COA’s advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability and weigh the relative merits of each.

b. Figure III-10 depicts inputs and outputs for COA comparison. Using the governing factors, the staff then outlines each COA, highlighting advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages relative to each other. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching consensus on the best recommendation, so that the commander can make a decision in choosing the best COA.

(1) The staff evaluates COAs using governing factors to identify the one with the highest probability of success. The selected COA should also:

(a) Mitigate risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level.

(b) Place the force in the best posture for future operations.

(c) Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.
(d) Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.

(2) Actual comparison of COAs is critical. Any technique that helps the staff provide the best recommendation and enables the commander to make the best decision is valid. A common, proven technique is the decision matrix, which uses governing factors to assess the effectiveness of each COA. However, a decision matrix alone cannot provide decision solutions. Its greatest value is in providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, produced success.

16. Course of Action Approval

   a. The staff determines the best COA to recommend to the commander. Figure III-11 depicts the COA approval inputs and outputs. The staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. This briefing often takes the form of a commander’s estimate (see Section D, this chapter). This information could include the intent of the next two higher commanders; the current status of the joint force; the current JIPOE; and assumptions used in COA development. The commander selects a COA or forms an alternate COA based upon the staff recommendations and the commander’s personal estimate, experience, and judgment.

   b. The nature of a potential contingency could make it difficult to determine a specific end state until the crisis actually occurs. In these cases, the JFC may choose to present two or more valid COAs for approval by higher authority. A single COA can then be approved when the crisis occurs and specific circumstances become clear.

17. Concept of Operations Development

   a. Contingency planning will result in plan development, while CAP typically will lead directly to OPORD development. During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed joint OPLAN or OPORD by first developing an executable CONOPS — the eventual centerpiece of the operation plan or order.

   b. The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The CONOPS:

      (1) States the commander’s intent.

      (2) Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to accomplish the mission.
(3) Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including those of multinational and interagency organizations as appropriate).

(4) Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required.

(5) Focuses on friendly and adversary COGs and their associated critical vulnerabilities.

(6) Avoids discernible patterns and makes full use of ambiguity and deception.

(7) Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation.

(8) Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved.

(9) Relates the joint force’s objectives and desired effects to those of the next higher command and other organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders.

Figure III-11. Course of Action Approval
c. The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their supporting plans accordingly. During CONOPS development, the commander determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the OA, providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the TPFDD structure. The structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility as well as the ability to rapidly transition to branches or sequels as operational conditions dictate. Planners ensure that the CONOPS, force plan, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, and are consistent with the JFC’s intent.

D-36: (161400Z Jan)

(NOTE: This concept of operations (CONOPS) example focuses on how the operation should progress based on the joint force commander’s approval of a course of action (COA). An actual CONOPS would contain more detail. This CONOPS supports a subsequent vignette on “phasing” in Chapter IV.)

After considering the staff’s comparison of courses of action and their recommended COA, the CCDR approves COA 3 for detailed development as an executable CONOPS. The CCDR subsequently reviews the CONOPS with the staff and component commanders to ensure a common understanding.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

XCOM HQ is the joint force HQ for this operation, since a joint task force (JTF) (COA 2) is insufficient for this mission.

The operation will be conducted in five major phases, with additional subordinate phases as necessary. The focus of Phase I, Deter, is on deployment, which is already underway. Countries Gray and Green are facilitating this for us, and no other key countries in the region are opposing our entry into the region. The State Department has done a good job with these countries to help set the conditions for maintaining Gray’s and Green’s sovereignty, and also is working related desired effects for restoring regional security and stability (Objective 3). Although the Red leader has spoken out against our deployment, there are no intelligence indications that he has changed the posture of his forces or intends to attack within the next 10 days, so we should have sufficient defensive capabilities in place before we expect Red to attack.

17th Air Force is our primary deterrent capability for the next 48 hours. 12th Fleet’s carrier battle group (CVBG) 80 should arrive in the JOA at 171200Z Jan, and 17th Air Force will become the joint force air component commander (JFACC) at 180800Z Jan. CVBG 80 will increase our visible
presence in the region, and its air and cruise missile capability will enhance our deterrent combat capabilities. Deployment of 10th Army forces and IV Marine expeditionary force (MEF) will begin on Saturday. Two brigades with protection and logistical capabilities from 10th Army and IV MEF’s forward-deployed Marine expeditionary unit should move into defensive positions in Gray by 242000Z Jan if Red has not attacked by then. 10th Army assumes responsibilities as joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and Joint Security Coordinator at 250800Z Jan. SOCX is deploying teams into the western part of Gray for on-order deployment to eastern Red for operations that will be covered in a separate briefing. If first three effects that support Objective 1 are attained when we finish Phase I, we should have sufficient capabilities in place to defend successfully. Then I believe it is only a matter of IF, not WHEN, we achieve Objective 1.

The focus in Phase II, Defend and Seize Initiative, is on defense and setting the conditions for the offense. It is possible, but not likely, that deterrence will succeed and diplomacy will prevail. In that case, we can expect to continue deployment to ensure we have sufficient capability in the JOA, and then continue in a defensive posture until the situation stabilizes and we are told to redeploy. If deterrence fails, Phase II begins immediately when Red attacks with whatever capability XCOM has in place and available. The terrain on the Red-Gray border favors JFLCC’s defensive operations. JFACC’s priorities will be to maintain air superiority and provide CAS at the Red-Gray border, degrade Red’s air defenses, and take out key Red strategic and operational-level command and control (C2) nodes. The JFLCC’s priority will be to maintain the defense and facilitate continued RSOI of forces to enable Phase III. 12th Fleet’s priority will be to maintain maritime superiority and support to JFACC’s air effort.

Key to an early end to this operation once hostilities begin is finding and destroying the Red leader’s headquarters. The Red leader is the strategic center of gravity (COG), and Red operations could come to a quick halt if he and his senior staff are out of the picture. Intelligence sources indicate that he has moved out of the permanent headquarters in Capitaltown and is using a small, mobile headquarters that will be difficult to find. The location of that C2 node is a priority intelligence requirement.

The focus in Phase III, Dominate, will be on offensive action to eject Red forces from Gray, defeat Red forces, and destroy sufficient Red military capability so that Red subsequently can only defend its territory against possible future regional competitors. The main effort in subordinate Phase III-A will be the JFLCC’s operations against Red’s operational-level COG, the armored corps in the north. Success in this phase should cause Red’s military effort to collapse. The supporting effort will be JFLCC’s operations in the south to secure key lines of communication along the coast. In subordinate Phase III-B, the main effort will be JFLCC’s operations in the south along the coast to occupy Capitaltown. Securing the capital will set
the conditions for reinstating former Country Red leaders if this opportunity presents itself, one of the national strategic objectives.

In Phase III I want to destroy, not bypass, the Country Red forces we engage. This is important to the military’s contribution to restoring regional security and stability, because one of our desired effects in support of that objective is that Red must be incapable of cross-border offensive military operations. Intelligence estimates indicate that the Red leader is maintaining two under-strength mechanized divisions in reserve to protect Capitalthown. I do not expect him to commit those units, and I think there is a good chance he will capitulate before we complete Phase III-B if we destroy the armor corps. If the JFACC also eliminates most of Red’s 45 modern fighter-bombers, then I believe Red’s remaining forces will have reasonable defensive capability, but they will not be able to maintain effective cross-border operations. The desired effect will have been attained.

Regardless of whether or not Country Red changes leadership, Phase III will set the conditions for the follow-on Stabilize (Phase IV) and Enable Civil Authority (Phase V) operations. However, The nature of these phases will differ greatly if the current Red leader remains in place compared to how we will conduct these phases in support of new leadership in Red. The J-5 is developing sequels to Phase III, and we’ll reconvene tomorrow to discuss them. Either way, an important requirement during Phases IV and V is to identify and take down as much of Country Red’s terrorist capability as we can in order to set the conditions that Red ceases future terrorist activities and regional terrorist networks are disrupted.

Questions?

d. If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action contemplated to accomplish the assigned mission warrant a campaign, then the staff outlines the series of military operations and associated objectives in a strategic concept. They develop the CONOPS for the preliminary part of the campaign in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the commander’s concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished.

e. During CONOPS development, the JFC must assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. JFCs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated desired and undesired effects that influence planning at every juncture. If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or “nesting” is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross-purposes.

Chapter IV, “Operational Design” contains more information on operational design as it applies to CONOPS development. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), provides detailed guidance on CONOPS content and format.
DESERSTORM

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, in his autobiography, “It Doesn’t Take a Hero,” recounts the events of November 14, 1990, the day he briefed his senior commanders on his plan to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Desert Storm. After asserting that this would be the most important meeting of the war, General Schwarzkopf acknowledges the twenty-two generals who were in attendance, commenting “that no other theater commander in history had ever been blessed with such an array of talent,” and describes his battle plan...

“The first thing that we’re going to have to do is, I don’t like to use the word ‘decapitate,’ so I think I’ll use the word ‘attack,’ leadership, and go after his command and control. Number two, we’ve got to gain and maintain air superiority. Number three, we need to cut totally his supply lines. We also need to destroy his chemical, biological, and nuclear capability. And finally, all you tankers, listen to this. We need to destroy—not attack, not damage, not surround—I want you to destroy the Republican Guard. When you’re done with them, I don’t want them to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don’t want them to exist as a military organization. For the benefit of the Vietnam vets—practically the whole room—I emphasized that ‘we’re not going into this with one arm tied behind our backs. We’re not gonna say we want to be as nice as we possibly can, and if they draw back across the border that’s fine with us. That’s bullshit! We are going to destroy the Republican Guard.’ If we were ordered to go on the offensive, we would be free to use our full military strength and attack across the border into Iraq.

‘I’m now going to tell you all some stuff that not very many people know about, in Washington particularly,’ I said, and described the four phases of attack we’d mapped out for Desert Storm: strategic bombing first; then gaining control of the Kuwaiti skies; then bombing Iraqi artillery positions, trench lines, and troops. At last I turned to the plan for the ground offensive—a fully realized version of the envelopment I’d proposed to [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General] Powell three weeks before. Using the map, I showed the commanders where I wanted them to maneuver their units. The plan covered a huge area: in order to make sure we fought the campaign on our own terms, we had extended the boundary of the battlefield westward so that it encompassed a rectangle roughly the size of Pennsylvania. Saddam’s forces were concentrated at the eastern end, in and around Kuwait. Desert Shield forces would keep them from moving south; to their east was the natural barrier of the gulf; to their north was the Euphrates, which would become a natural barrier once [Joint Force Air Component Commander, Lieutenant General] Chuck Horner’s air force...
dropped the bridges that crossed it; and to the west were hundreds of miles of desert that would become our main avenue of attack.

‘I anticipated,’ I said, ‘a four-pronged ground assault.’ Along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border near the gulf, I wanted two divisions of U.S. (sic) Marines and a Saudi task force to thrust straight into Kuwait, with the objective of tying up Saddam’s forces and eventually encircling Kuwait City. Nodding in [U.S. (sic) Marine Commander in DESERT STORM, Lieutenant General, Walter E.] Boomer’s direction, I said, ‘I’ll leave it to Walt Boomer to figure out how he wants to do that, but it also gives him the capability to come in from the sea with his amphibious forces.’ I’d reserved a second corridor, in the western part of Kuwait, for a parallel attack by the pan-Arab forces led by two armored divisions from Egypt and another Saudi task force. Their objective would be the road junction northwest of Kuwait City that controlled Iraqi supply lines. Eventually they would enter Kuwait City and have the dirty job of fighting the Iraqis house to house if necessary.

Meanwhile from the west would come the U.S. (sic) Army’s power punch. Looking at [Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General] Gary Luck, I indicated a section of Saudi-Iraqi border more than three hundred and fifty miles inland. ‘I am probably going to send the XVIII Airborne Corps very deep,’ I said, showing how I wanted Luck’s divisions to race north from that area to the Euphrates, blocking the Republican Guard’s last route of retreat. Once that sector was secured I told him, he would hook his forces east, ready to join the attack on the main body of the Iraqi army. Finally I turned to [Commander, VII Corps, Lieutenant General] Fred Franks. ‘I think it’s pretty obvious what your mission is going to be’, I said, moving my hand along the desert corridor just to the west of Kuwait, ‘attack through here and destroy the Republican Guard.’ I wanted to pin them with their backs against the sea, and then go in and wipe them out. I couldn’t resist adding, ‘Once they’re gone, be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad. Because there isn’t going to be anything else out there.’ I allowed that taking Baghdad would probably be unnecessary, because by then the war would have ended.

After a question-and-answer session I tried to set a tone for the coming months. ‘Let me leave you with one thought, guys. In order for this to succeed—because the enemy is still going to outnumber us—it is going to take, for lack of a better word, killer instinct on the part of all of our leaders out there.’ I pointed again at the map. ‘What I’m saying is when the Marines hit the wire right here and when the Army forces hit the wire over here …we need commanders in the lead who absolutely, dearly understand that they will get through. And that once they’re through they’re not going to stop and discuss it. They are going to go up there and destroy the Republican Guard. I cannot afford to have commanders who do not understand that it is attack, attack, attack, attack, and destroy every step of the way. If you have somebody who doesn’t understand it, I would strongly recommend
that you consider removing him from command and putting in somebody that can do the job.

‘Because, let’s face it, the prestige of the United States military is on our shoulders. But more importantly, the prestige of the entire United States of America rests on our shoulders. There isn’t going to be anybody else in this thing except us. There are no more forces coming. What we got is what’s going to do the job. And for our country we dare not fail. We cannot fail, and we will not fail. Anybody in here who doesn’t understand that, get out of the way. Any questions? Okay, good luck to you. You know what needs to be done.’

Source: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Pert
It Doesn’t Take a Hero, 1993

18. Plan or Order Development

a. For plans and orders developed per CJCSM 3122.01 (JOPES), the CJCS, in coordination with the supported and supporting commanders and other members of the JCS, monitors planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, and reviews the supported commander’s OPLAN for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine. The supported commander will conduct in-progress reviews with the SecDef to confirm the plan’s strategic guidance and receive approval of assumptions, the mission statement, the concept, the plan, and any further guidance required for plan refinement. If the President or SecDef decides to execute the plan, all three joint operation planning elements — situational awareness, planning, and execution — continue in a complementary and iterative process.

b. The JFC guides plan development by issuing a PLANORD or similar planning directive to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. A number of activities are associated with plan development, as Figure III-12 shows. These planning activities typically will be accomplished in a parallel, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than sequentially, depending largely on the planning time available. The same flexibility displayed in COA development is seen here again, as planners discover and eliminate shortfalls.

c. The CJCSI 3122 series (JOPES) provides specific guidance on these activities for organizations required to prepare a plan per JOPES procedures. However, these are typical types of activities that other organizations also will accomplish as they plan for joint operations. For example, a combatant command which is preparing a crisis-related OPORD at the President’s direction will follow specific procedures and milestones in force planning, TPFDD development, and shortfall identification. If required, a joint task force (JTF) subordinate to the combatant command will support this effort even as the JTF commander and staff are planning for their specific mission and tasks. The entire JTF-specific process for joint planning fits within the overall planning process from the President and SecDef to the CJCS, to the CCDR, and on down to the JTF. This process is especially close-knit between the CCDR and the JTF commander. Steps in the JTF planning process may be combined or eliminated based upon the CCDR’s planning process and the time available.
(1) **Application of Forces and Capabilities**

(a) When planning the application of forces and capabilities, the JFC should not be completely constrained by the strategic plan’s force apportionment if additional resources are justifiable and no other COA within the allocation reasonably exists. The additional capability requirements will be coordinated with the Joint Staff through the development process. Risk assessments will include results using both allocated capabilities and additional capabilities. Operation planning is inherently an iterative process, with forces being requested and approved for certain early phases, while other forces may be needed or withdrawn for the later phases. This process is particularly complex when planning a campaign because of the potential magnitude of committed forces and length of the commitment. Finally, when making this determination the JFC should also consider withholding some capability as an operational reserve.

(b) When developing an OPLAN, the supported JFC should designate the **main effort** and **supporting efforts** as soon as possible. This action is necessary for economy of effort and for allocating disparate forces, to include multinational forces. The main effort is based on the supported JFC’s prioritized objectives. It identifies where the supported JFC will concentrate capabilities to achieve specific objectives. Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. **Area tasks and responsibilities** focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. An example is the assignment of areas of operations for Army forces and Marine Corps forces operating in the same joint operations area. **Functional tasks and responsibilities** focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same domain — air, land, sea, or space — or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. An example is the designation of the Navy component commander as the joint force air component commander when the Navy component commander has the preponderance of the air assets and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations. In either case, designating the main effort will establish where or
how a major portion of available friendly forces and assets are employed, often to attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign.

(c) Designating a main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated employment of the joint force while preserving the initiative of subordinate commanders. After the main effort is identified, joint force and component planners determine those tasks essential to accomplishing objectives. The supported JFC assigns these tasks to subordinate commanders along with the capabilities and support necessary to achieve them. As such, the CONOPS must clearly specify the nature of the main effort.

(d) The main effort can change during the course of the operation based on numerous factors, including changes in the operational environment and how the adversary reacts to friendly operations. When the main effort changes, support priorities must change to ensure success. Both horizontal and vertical coordination within the joint force and with multinational and interagency partners is essential when shifting the main effort. Secondary efforts are important, but are ancillary to the main effort. They normally are designed to complement or enhance the success of the main effort (for example, by diverting enemy resources). Only necessary secondary efforts, whose potential value offsets or exceeds the resources required, should be undertaken, because these efforts divert resources from the main effort. Secondary efforts normally lack the operational depth of the main effort and have fewer forces and capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives.

(2) Force Planning

(a) The primary purposes of force planning are to: influence COA development and selection based on force allocations, availability, and readiness; identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported component commanders’ CONOPS with some rigor; and, effectively phase the forces into the OA. Force planning consists of determining the force requirements by operation phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and operating area. It includes force allocation review, major force phasing; integration planning; force list structure development; followed by force list development. Force planning is the responsibility of the CCDR, supported by component commanders in coordination with GFM and USJFCOM force providers. Force planning begins early during CONOPS development and focuses on applying the right force to the mission while ensuring force visibility, force mobility, and adaptability. The commander determines force requirements; develops a letter of instruction or time phasing and force planning; and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in accordance with the CONOPS. Major forces and elements are selected from those apportioned or allocated for planning and included in the supported commander’s CONOPS by operation phase, mission and mission priority. Service components then collaboratively make tentative assessments of the specific sustainment capabilities required in accordance with the CONOPS. After the actual forces are identified (sourced), the CCDR refines the force plan to ensure it supports the CONOPS, provides force visibility, and enables flexibility. The commander identifies and resolves or reports shortfalls with a risk assessment.

(b) In CAP, force planning focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The supported commander identifies force
requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force packages to facilitate sourcing by the Services, USJFCOM, USSOCOM, and other force providers’ supporting commands. A force package is a list (group of force capabilities) of the various forces (force requirements) that the supported commander requires to conduct the operation described in the CONOPS. The supported commander typically describes required force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances. The supported commander submits the required force packages through the Joint Staff to the force providers for sourcing. Force providers review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before deciding which units to allocate to the supported commander’s force requirements. Services and their component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of non-unit sustainment. The supported commander will review the sourcing recommendations through the GFM process to ensure compatibility with capability requirements and CONOPS.

3) Support Planning. The purpose of support planning is to determine the sequence of the personnel, logistic, and other support required to provide distribution, maintenance, civil engineering, medical support, and sustainment in accordance with the concept of operation. Support planning is conducted in parallel with other planning, and encompasses such essential factors as executive agent identification; assignment of responsibility for base operating support; airfield operations; management of non-unit replacements; health service support; personnel management; financial management; handling of prisoners of war and detainees; theater civil engineering policy; logistic-related environmental considerations; support of noncombatant evacuation operations and other retrograde operations; and nation assistance. Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service component commanders and begins during CONOPS development. Service component commanders identify and update support requirements in coordination with the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and USTRANSCOM. They initiate the procurement of critical and low-density inventory items; determine host-nation support (HNS) availability; develop plans for total asset visibility; and establish phased delivery plans for sustainment in line with the phases and priorities of the CONOPS. They develop and train for battle damage repair; develop reparable retrograde plans; develop container management plans; develop force and line of communications protection plans; develop supporting phased transportation and support plans aligned to the CONOPS and report movement support requirements. Service component commanders continue to refine their sustainment and transportation requirements as the force providers identify and source force requirements. During distribution planning, the supported CCDR and USTRANSCOM resolve gross distribution feasibility questions impacting intertheater and intratheater movement and sustainment delivery. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers identify air, land, and sea transportation resources to support the approved CONOPS. These resources may include apportioned intertheater transportation, GCC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate commands. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers develop transportation schedules for movement requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not necessarily mean that the supported commander’s CONOPS is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules provide the most effective and realistic use of available transportation resources in relation to the phased CONOPS.
The Joint Operation Planning Process

(a) Support refinement is conducted to confirm the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with strategic guidance and to assess the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. This refinement ensures support is phased in accordance with the CONOPS; refines support C2 planning; and integrates support plans across the supporting commands, Service components, and agencies. It ensures an effective but minimum logistics foot-print for each phase of the CONOPS.

(b) Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement of resources that require lift support to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. The supported commander evaluates and adjusts the concept of operation to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility if possible, or requests additional resources if the level of risk is unacceptable. Transportation plans must be consistent and reconciled with plans and timelines required by providers of Service-unique combat and support aircraft to the supported CCDR. Planning also must consider requirements of international law; commonly understood customs and practices; and agreements or arrangements with foreign nations with which the US requires permission for overflight, access, and diplomatic clearance. If significant changes are made to the CONOPS, it should be assessed for feasibility and refined to ensure it is acceptable.

4) Nuclear Strike. Commanders must assess the military as well as political impact a nuclear strike would have on their operations. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the CCDR level is based on national-level political considerations and is influenced by the military mission. Although USSTRATCOM conducts nuclear planning in coordination with the supported GCC and certain allied commanders, the supported commander does not effectively control the decision to use nuclear weapons.

5) Deployment Planning. Deployment planning is conducted on a continuous basis for all approved OPLANs and as required for specific crisis action plans. In all cases, mission requirements of a specific operation define the scope, duration, and scale of both deployment and redeployment operation planning. Unity of effort is paramount, since both deployment and redeployment operations involve numerous commands, agencies, and functional processes. Because the ability to adapt to unforeseen conditions is essential, supported CCDRs must ensure their deployment plans for each OPLAN or OPORD support global force visibility requirements.

(a) Operational Environment. For a given plan, deployment planning decisions are based on the anticipated operational environment, which may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The anticipated operational environment dictates the type of entry operations, deployment concept, mobility options, predeployment training, and force integration requirements. Normally, supported CCDRs, their subordinate commanders, and their Service components are responsible for providing detailed situation information; mission statements by operation phase; theater support parameters; strategic and operational lift allocations by phase (for both force movements and sustainment); HNS information and environmental standards; and prepositioned equipment planning guidance.

(b) Deployment Concept. Supported CCDRs must develop a deployment concept and identify specific predeployment standards necessary to meet mission requirements. Supporting CCDRs provide trained and mission-ready forces to the supported combatant command deployment concept and predeployment standard. Services recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces. The Services’ predeployment planning and coordination with the supporting combatant command must
ensure that predeployment standards specified by the supported CCDR are achieved, supporting personnel and forces arrive in the supported theater fully prepared to perform their mission, and deployment delays caused by duplication of predeployment efforts are eliminated. The Services and supporting CCDRs must ensure unit OPLANs are prepared; forces are tailored and echeloned; personnel and equipment movement plans are complete and accurate; command relationship and integration requirements are identified; mission-essential tasks are rehearsed; mission-specific training is conducted; force protection is planned and resourced; and sustainment requirements are identified. Careful and detailed planning ensures that only required personnel, equipment, and materiel deploy; unit training is exacting; missions are fully understood; deployment changes are minimized during execution; and the flow of personnel, equipment, and movement of materiel into theater aligns with the concept of operation.

(c) Movement Planning. Movement planning integrates the activities and requirements of units with partial or complete self-deployment capability, activities of units that require lift support, and the transportation of sustainment and retrogrades. Movement planning is highly collaborative and is enhanced by coordinated use of simulation and analysis tools.

1. The supported command is responsible for movement control, including sequence of arrival, and exercises this authority through the TPFDD and the JOPES validation process. The supported commander will use the organic lift and nonorganic, common-user, strategic lift resources made available for planning by the CJCS. Competing requirements for limited strategic lift resources, support facilities, and intratheater transportation assets will be assessed in terms of impact on mission accomplishment. If additional resources are required, the supported command will identify the requirements and provide rationale for those requirements. The supported commander’s operational priorities and any movement constraints (e.g., assumptions concerning the potential use of WMD) are used to prepare a movement plan. The plan will consider en route staging locations and the ability of these locations to support the scheduled activity. This information, together with an estimate of required site augmentation, will be communicated to appropriate supporting commanders. The global force manager and USTRANSCOM use the Joint Flow Analysis and Sustainment for Transportation model to assess transportation feasibility and develop recommendations on final port of embarkation selections for those units without organic lift capability. Movement feasibility requires current analysis and assessment of movement C2 structures and systems; available organic, strategic and theater lift assets; transportation infrastructure; and competing demands and restrictions.

2. After coordinated review of the movement analysis by USTRANSCOM, the supported command, and the global force provider, the supported command may adjust the concept of operation to improve movement feasibility where operational requirements remain satisfied. Commander, USTRANSCOM should adjust or reprioritize transportation assets to meet the supported commander’s operational requirements. If this is not an option due to requirements from other commanders, then the supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements or is provided additional strategic and theater lift capabilities using (but not limited to) Civil Reserve Air Fleet and/or Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement capabilities as necessary to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility.

3. Operational requirements may cause the supported commander and/or subordinate commanders to alter their plans, potentially impacting the deployment priorities or
TPFDD requirements. Planners must understand and anticipate the impact of change. There is a high potential for a sequential pattern of disruption when changes are made to the TPFDD. A unit displaced by a change might not simply move on the next available lift, but may require reprogramming for movement at a later time. This may not only disrupt the flow, but may also interrupt the operation. Time is also a factor in TPFDD changes. Airlift can respond to short-notice changes, but at a cost in efficiency. Sealift, on the other hand, requires longer lead times, and cannot respond to change in a short period. These plan changes and the resulting modifications to the TPFDDs must be handled during the planning cycles.

(d) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Planning. JRSOI planning is conducted to ensure an integrated joint force arrives and becomes operational in the OA as scheduled. Effective integration of the force into the joint operation is the primary objective of the deployment phase.

(e) TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI). The supported commander publishes supplemental instructions for time phasing force deployment data development in the TPFDD LOI. The LOI provides operation specific guidance for utilizing the JOPES processes and systems to provide force visibility and tracking; force mobility; and operational agility through the TPFDD and the validation process. It provides procedures for the deployment, redeployment, and rotations of the operation’s forces. The LOI provides instructions on force planning sourcing, reporting, and validation. It defines planning and execution milestones and details movement control procedures and lift allocations to the commander’s components, supporting commanders, and other members of the JPEC. A TPFDD must ensure force visibility, be tailored to the phases of the concept of operation, and be execution feasible.

(f) Deployment and JRSOI Refinement. Deployment and JRSOI refinement is conducted by the supported command in coordination with Joint Staff, USJFCOM, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and supporting commands. The purpose of the deployment and JRSOI refinement is to ensure the force deployment plan maintains force mobility throughout any movements, provides for force visibility and tracking at all times, provides for effective force preparation, and fully integrates forces into a joint operation while enabling unity of effort. This refinement conference examines planned missions, the priority of the missions within the operation phases and the forces assigned to those missions. By mission, the refinement conference examines force capabilities, force size, support requirements, mission preparation, force positioning/basing, weapon systems, major equipment, force protection and sustainment requirements. It should assess the feasibility of force closure by the commander’s required delivery date and the feasibility of successful mission execution within the time frame established by the commander under the deployment concept. This refinement conference should assess potential success of all force integration requirements. Transition criteria for all phases should be evaluated for force redeployment or rotation requirements.

(g) For lesser-priority plans that may be executed simultaneously with higher-priority plans or on-going operations, combatant command and USTRANSCOM planners may develop several different deployment scenarios to provide the CCDR a range of possible transportation conditions under which the plan may have to be executed based on risk to this plan and the other ongoing operations.
This will help both the supported and supporting CCDRs identify risk associated with having to execute multiple operations in a transportation-constrained environment.

(6) **Shortfall Identification.** Along with hazard and threat analysis, shortfall identification is performed throughout the plan development process. The supported commander continuously identifies limiting factors and capabilities shortfalls and associated risks as plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported commander resolves the shortfalls and required controls and countermeasures through planning adjustments and coordination with supporting and subordinate commanders. If the shortfalls and necessary controls and countermeasures cannot be reconciled or the resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS and the Service Chiefs consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, the completion of assigned plans is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls. If shortfalls cannot be resolved within the JSCP time frame, the completed plan will include a consolidated summary and impact assessment of unresolved shortfalls and associated risks.

(7) **Feasibility Analysis.** This step in plan or order development is similar to determining the feasibility of a COA, except that it typically does not involve simulation-based wargaming. The focus in this step is on ensuring the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. The results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, and shortfall identification will affect OPLAN or OPORD feasibility. The primary factors considered are whether the apportioned or allocated resources can be deployed to the joint operations area when required, sustained throughout the operation, and employed effectively, or whether the scope of the plan exceeds the apportioned resources and supporting capabilities. Measures to enhance feasibility include adjusting the CONOPS, ensuring sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves.

(8) **Refinement.** During contingency planning, plan refinement typically is an orderly process that follows plan development and is associated with the plan assessment planning function (see Figure I-3). Refinement then continues on a regular basis as circumstances related to the potential contingency change. In CAP, refinement is almost continuous throughout OPLAN or OPORD development. Planners frequently adjust the plan or order based on results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, shortfall identification, revised JIPOE, and changes to strategic guidance. Refinement continues even after execution begins, with changes typically transmitted in the form of FRAGORDs rather than revised copies of the plan or order.

(9) **Documentation.** When the TPFDD is complete and end-to-end transportation feasibility has been achieved and is acceptable to the commander, the supported commander completes the documentation of the final, transportation-feasible OPLAN or OPORD and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate.

(10) **Plan Review and Approval.** The plan review criteria shown in Figure III-13 are common to contingency planning and CAP. When the final OPLAN or OPORD is complete, the supported commander then submits it with the associated TPFDD file to the CJCS and
SecDef for review, approval, or modification. The JPEC reviews the supported commander’s OPLAN or OPORD and provides the results of the review to the CJCS. The CJCS reviews and recommends approval or disapproval of the OPLAN or OPORD to the SecDef. After the CJCS’s review, the SecDef or President will review, approve, or modify the plan. The SecDef may delegate the approval of OPLANS to the CJCS. The President is the final approval authority for OPORDs.

(11) **Supporting Plan Development**

(a) Supporting commanders prepare plans that encompass their role in the joint operation. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the JFC (CCDR or subordinate JFC) who will direct the forces if the plan is executed. Detailed employment planning may be delayed when the politico-military situation cannot be clearly forecast, or it may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned and executed within a multinational framework.

(b) The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans. However, the CJCS may be asked to resolve critical issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff may coordinate the review of any supporting plans should circumstances so warrant. Contingency planning does not conclude when the supported commander approves the supporting plans. Planning refinement and maintenance continues until the operation terminates or the planning requirement is cancelled or superseded.

d. Transition is critical to the overall planning process. It is an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the CONOPS, promote unity of effort and generate tempo. Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing an order have a full understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander’s intent and CONOPS. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans and future/current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and subordinate commands.

(1) **Transition Brief.** At higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to subordinate or adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising execution of the order. At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition brief provides an overview of the mission, commander’s intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation. It is given to ensure all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by those executing the order. The brief should include items from the order or plan such as: higher headquarters mission (tasks and intent), mission, commander’s intent, CCIRs, task organization, situation (enemy and friendly), CONOPS, execution (including branches and sequels), and planning support tools (synchronization matrix, JIPOE products, etc.).
Chapter III

(2) **Confirmation Brief.** A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate commander after receiving the order or plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their understanding of commander’s intent, their specific tasks and purpose, and the relationship between their unit’s missions and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify potential gaps in the plan, as well as discrepancies with subordinate plans. It also gives the commander insights into how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their missions.

(3) **Transition Drills.** Transition drills increase the situational awareness of subordinate commanders and the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills.
SECTION D. THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

19. The Estimate

   a. The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. The estimate process should be used by commanders and staffs at all levels. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part of this framework will vary depending on the level and type of operation. The estimate process is continuous. Both commander and staff estimates will become more detailed and refined as planning continues. The JFC typically tailors the content and detail of the commander’s estimate based on the situation.

   b. Commander’s Estimate

      (1) The commander’s estimate provides a continuously updated source of information from the perspective of the JFC. Commanders at various levels use estimates during JOPP to support all aspects of COA determination and plan or order development. A supported joint force commander (typically the CCDR) typically will submit a commander’s estimate in a crisis situation to the CJCS in accordance with JOPES. This estimate considers the operational environment, nature of anticipated operations, and national and multinational strategic direction. The CCDR’s estimate is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders. Outside of formal JOPES requirements, a commander may or may not use a commander’s estimate as the situation dictates. The commander’s initial intent statement and planning guidance to the staff can provide sufficient information to guide the planning process. Although the JFC will tailor the content of the commander’s estimate based on the situation, a typical format for an estimate that a JFC submits per JOPES procedures is shown in Figure III-14.

      (2) When a supported commander develops COAs and prepares a plan or order per JOPES in response to a CJCS WARNORD, the commander submits an estimate that analyzes various COAs that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission, and recommends the best COA. Although the estimate prepared at the supported commander’s level may be detailed, the version submitted to the CJCS typically will be abbreviated and contain only the information for the President, SecDef, and CJCS to make relevant decisions. Supporting commanders typically do not submit estimates to the CJCS, but may be requested to do so by the supported commander.

Refer to CJCSM 3122.01A (JOPES Volume I) for the specific format when there is a requirement to submit a commander’s estimate to satisfy a formal JOPES planning requirement.

c. Staff Estimates

   (1) A staff estimate is an assessment of the situation. It includes an evaluation of how factors in a staff section’s functional area can influence each COA. Staff estimates provide the foundation for COA selection. The purpose of staff estimates is to determine which COA best accomplishes the mission and which can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the
commander the best possible information to select a COA. Figure III-15 shows examples of functional areas requiring review during the staff estimate process. See Appendix B, “Sample Estimate Format,” for a sample staff estimate format. In their staff estimates, each staff element:

(a) Reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective.

(b) Examines the factors and assumptions for which it is the responsible staff.

(c) Analyzes and refines each COA to determine its supportability from the perspective of the staff’s functional area.

(d) Concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA may best be supported.

(2) Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the tentative COAs, and potential deficiencies and risks that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the tentative COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands.
## FUNCTIONAL STAFF ESTIMATES

### Mobilization
- Identify and address actions that must occur to integrate and synchronize the use of Reserve Component forces in the tentative courses of action (COAs).

### Personnel
- Identify and address known or anticipated personnel factors that may influence the tentative COAs, including the anticipated need for individual and small-unit replacements; the anticipated use of civilian, contract support, or indigenous personnel; and the anticipated individual and unit rotation policy.

### Intelligence
- Identify relevant information about the operational environment. Provide information about the adversary’s military system, including the anticipated military situation at the beginning of the operation, enemy centers of gravity, limitations, intentions, potential and most likely COAs, and priority intelligence requirements. Provide information on other systems in the operational environment, including the populace, infrastructure, social issues relevant to the military operation, political factors and relationships, information architecture beyond just that of the military, and economic factors.

### Logistics
- Identify and address known or anticipated factors that may influence the feasibility of providing required logistic support to sustain the timing, intensity, and duration of the tentative COAs, including the required time-phasing to position support personnel to receive and integrate required combat forces and to move sustainment stocks.

### Engineering
- Identify and address known or anticipated engineering factors that may influence preparatory tasks, force deployment, force protection, and the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces. Identify construction requirements that may need emergency or contingency construction authority.

### Force Protection
- Identify and examine known or anticipated force protection factors that may influence the tentative COAs.

### Interagency Support
- Identify opportunities for interagency cooperation to facilitate unity of effort. Identify requirements for interagency support of joint operations.

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Figure III-15. Functional Staff Estimates
(3) Collaboration among relevant military, interagency, and multinational staff elements during the staff estimate process facilitates the iterative refinement of COAs. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTIONAL STAFF ESTIMATES (continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Service Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Identify and address known or anticipated medical threat factors that may affect force health protection. These factors include theater patient movement policy; required medical treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization capabilities; preventive medicine, veterinary, and dental support required; health service logistics; and the medical aspects of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defensive operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation and Movement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Identify available transportation capabilities and coordination requirements to support the time-phased deployment, employment, and sustainment of tentative COAs. Include requirements for intertheater and intratheater transportation assets and requirements to protect critical transportation nodes and lines of communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Identify available capabilities and coordination requirements for joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces, including potential external sources of support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications Systems Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Identify and examine the feasibility of providing adequate communications systems support for tentative COAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Technical Operations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Identify and examine factors that may influence special technical operations which support and are integrated with tentative courses of action (COAs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequence Management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Identify and examine factors that may influence consequence management operations which support and are integrated with tentative COAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Host-Nation Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Identify, consolidate, and integrate host-nation support required for the tentative COAs. Include the anticipated transportation and other support that the supported commander must provide to multinational partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Identify legal issues that may affect tentative COAs, including those related to the Law of Armed Conflict, the Geneva Conventions, and status-of-forces agreements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure III-15  Functional Staff Estimates (continued)
expected to indicate which COAs are most likely to succeed and can best be supported. The CJCSM 3122 series (JOPES), contains sample formats for staff estimates.

(4) Not every situation will require or permit a lengthy and formal staff estimate process. For a simple mission or during CAP, the commander may review the assigned mission, receive oral staff briefings, develop and select a COA informally, and direct that plan development commence. However, contingency planning will demand a more formal and thorough process. Written staff estimates are not mandatory, but they are useful because planners can extract information from them to prepare the commander’s estimate and subsequent plans and orders. Although documenting staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the commander’s estimate, they should be shared collaboratively with subordinate and supporting commanders to help them prepare their supporting estimates, plans, and orders. This will improve parallel planning and collaboration efforts of subordinate and supporting elements and help reduce the planning times for the entire process.

(5) Based on the commander’s guidance, subordinate and supporting commanders review the tentative COAs for supportability and begin identifying the forces and resources required to support each tentative COA. Referencing existing TPFDD in the JOPES database can expedite this process. Time permitting, a TPFDD is generated and assessed for each COA. The subordinate and supporting commanders provide their commander’s estimates to the supported commander with their COA recommendations.

(6) USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers review tentative COAs for transportation feasibility and prepare deployment estimates for each tentative COA. USTRANSCOM integrates the deployment estimates from all transportation providers and furnishes a consolidated deployment estimate to the CJCS, supported commander, and other JPEC members as appropriate.

(7) Joint force Service components monitor COA development, deployment planning, and force readiness, and begin planning for deployment.

SECTION E. PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT DURING EXECUTION

20. Execution

a. Execution begins when the President decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis. Only the President or SecDef can authorize the CJCS to issue an EXORD. The EXORD directs the supported commander to initiate military operations, defines the time to initiate operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier. The CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful completion of military operations. Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished or revised. The CAP process may be repeated continuously as circumstances and missions change.
b. During execution, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical, intelligence, and environmental considerations, force and non-unit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required. The JOPES contains the following information, at a minimum, at the time of OPORD execution:

(1) Sourced combat and sustainment capability requirements for assigned forces.

(2) Integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, port of debarkation, and latest arrival date (LAD) at port of debarkation.

(3) Integrated non-unit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and day.

c. The CJCS publishes the EXORD that defines the unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence (D-day) and the specific time an operation or exercise begins (H-hour) and directs execution of the OPORD. The CJCS’s EXORD is a record communication that authorizes execution of the COA approved by the President and SecDef and detailed in the supported commander’s OPORD. It may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. In a fast-developing crisis the EXORD may be the first record communication generated by the CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice announcement. The issuance of the EXORD is time-sensitive. The format may differ depending on the amount of previous record correspondence and applicability of prior guidance. JOPES Volume I contains the format for the EXORD. Information already communicated in previous orders should not be repeated unless previous orders were not made available to all concerned. The EXORD need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as D-day and H-hour.

d. Throughout execution, the Joint Staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary. The CJCS should monitor the situation for potential changes in the applicability of current termination criteria and communicate them to all concerned parties.

e. The supported commander issues an EXORD to subordinate and supporting commanders upon receipt of the CJCS’s EXORD. It may give the detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the CJCS’s EXORD does not cover. The supported commander also monitors, assesses, and reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JOPES database; and re-plans, re-deploys, or terminates operations as necessary, in compliance with termination criteria directed by the President or SecDef.

f. Subordinate and supporting commanders execute their OPORDs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JOPES database. These commanders conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service forces in the OA.
g. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments. Both statuses of movements and future movement schedules are entered in the JOPES database.

h. **Planning during Execution.** Planning continues during execution, with an initial emphasis on refining the existing plan and producing the OPORD. As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current operations as Figure III-16 depicts.

1. **The joint force J-5’s effort focuses on future plans.** The timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of command, type of operation, JFC’s desires, and other factors. Typically the emphasis of the future plans effort is on planning the next phase of operations or **sequels** to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign).

2. Planning also occurs for **branches** to current operations (**future operations planning**). The timeframe of focus for **future operations planning** varies according to the factors listed for **future plans**, but the period typically is more near-term than the **future plans** timeframe. **Future** planning could occur in the J-5 or JPG, while **future operations planning** could occur in the joint operations center or J-3.

3. Finally, **current operations** planning addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This occurs in the joint operations center or J-3.

21. **Assessment**

a. **General.** Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.

1. **The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions** throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. **The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process** by the commander’s need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of commander’s critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component commanders.
(2) The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. During planning and preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force’s ability to execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational environment. However, the discussion in this section focuses on assessment for the purpose of determining the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment.

(3) Commanders and their staffs determine relevant assessment actions and measures during planning. They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis, and include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along LOOs. During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and end state. Normally, the joint force J-3, assisted by the J-2, is responsible for coordinating assessment activities. For subordinate commanders’ staffs, this may be accomplished by equivalent elements within joint functional and/or Service components. The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and determination of CCIRs by incorporating them into the headquarters’ battle rhythm. Various elements of the JFC’s staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.
(4) Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions applied in the operational environment can impact military actions and objectives. When relevant to the mission, the commander also must plan for using assessment to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners—preferably within a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified action. For example, failure to coordinate overflight and access agreements with foreign governments in advance or to adhere to international law regarding sovereignty of foreign airspace could result in mission delay, failure to meet US objectives, and/or an international incident. Many of these organizations may be outside the JFC’s authority. Accordingly, the JFC should grant some joint force organizations authority for direct coordination with key outside organizations—such as USG interagency elements from DOS or the Department of Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence sources in other nations, and other combatant commands—to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.

b. Levels of War and Assessment

(1) Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed. To do this, JFCs and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process. See Figure III-17.

(2) Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses MOEs that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment helps the JFC and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is “doing the right things” to achieve objectives, not just “doing things right.” The JFC also can use MOEs to determine progress toward success in those operations for which tactical-level combat assessment ways, means, and measures do not apply.

(3) Tactical-level assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and strategic progress, so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels.

(4) Combat assessment is an example of a tactical-level assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process (see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting). Combat
assessment is composed of three related elements: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and future targeting or reattack recommendations. However, combat assessment methodology also can be applied by joint force functional and Service components to other tactical tasks not associated with joint fires (e.g., disaster relief delivery assessment, relief effectiveness assessment, and future relief recommendations).

c. Assessment Process and Measures

(1) The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and MOEs to determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives. MOEs help answer questions like: “are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?” MOEs are closely associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions like: “was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?” Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects.

(a) MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment. They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance. These measures typically are more subjective than...
MOPs, and can be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative. MOEs can be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward a measurable threshold.

(b) **MOPs measure task performance.** They are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. MOPs are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since it typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks. But MOPs have relevance for noncombat operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants evacuated). MOPs also can be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type of measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe.

### KEY TERMS

- **measure of performance** — A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.
- **measure of effectiveness** — A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

(2) The assessment process and related measures should be **relevant, measurable, responsive,** and **resourced** so there is no false impression of accomplishment. Quantitative measures can be helpful in this regard.

(a) **Relevant.** MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, the operational environment, the end state, and the commander’s decisions. This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.

(b) **Measurable.** Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured against. To effectively measure change, a baseline measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment throughout the operation. Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective interpretation.

(c) **Responsive.** Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. The JFC and staff should consider the time required for an action or actions to produce desired results within the operational environment and develop indicators that can respond accordingly. Many actions directed by the JFC require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.
(d) **Resourced.** To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced. Staffs should ensure resource requirements for data collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored. Effective assessment can help avoid both duplication of tasks and unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power.

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The J-3 has been considering the latest revision to measures of effectiveness (MOEs) associated with the CCDR’s approved list of desired and undesired effects. The assessment process actually began during mission analysis, when the commander and staff discussed how to measure progress toward producing the desired effects and achieving objectives. COA analysis and wargaming helped refine the MOEs for most effects, particularly with regard to identifying quantitative measures where possible. As an example, the J-3 will recommend the following MOEs to the CCDR for effect E-3-4: *Regional countries welcome US intervention.*

- MOE 3-4-1: Number of key countries granting over-flight rights
- MOE 3-4-2: Number of regional countries that sign United Nations (UN) resolution against Red aggression
- MOE 3-4-3: Ratio of media broadcasts and articles for vice against US intervention
- MOE 3-4-4: Ratio of significant public protests to supportive rallies
- MOE 3-4-5: Number of supportive diplomatic communiqués

The MOEs above represent the measures. The J-3 can determine a positive or negative trend by comparing individual measures over time. The J-3 also should recommend (and the CCDR should approve) a minimum or maximum threshold for each MOE. A threshold represents a level of activity or a proportion of accomplishment that the commander considers acceptable. For example, if nine regional countries are in a position to sign a UN resolution against Red aggression, the CCDR could set a threshold of six countries as a solid indication of regional support. Likewise, the J-3 (advised by the public affairs officer and political advisor) could recommend that a ratio of two-to-one broadcasts and articles in favor of US intervention is a minimum threshold for MOE 3-4-3.

(3) Commanders and staffs derive relevant assessment measures during the planning process and reevaluate them continuously throughout preparation and execution. They consider assessment measures during mission analysis, refine these measures in the JFC’s planning guidance and in commander’s and staff’s estimates, wargame the measures during COA development, and include MOEs and MOPs in the approved plan or order. An integrated data collection management plan is critical to the success of the assessment process, and should encompass all available tactical, theater, and national intelligence sources.
(4) Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks, effects, and objectives, there is a relationship between assessment measures. By monitoring available information and using MOEs and MOPs as assessment tools during planning, preparation, and execution, commanders and staffs determine progress toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state, and modify the plan as required. Well-devised MOPs and MOEs, supported by effective information management, help the commanders and staffs understand the linkage between specific tasks, the desired effects, and the JFC’s objectives and end state.
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN

“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of the campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to the circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country.”

Napoleon
Maxims of War, 1831

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION

1. Operational Art

   a. Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. It is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state.

   b. In applying operational art, the JFC draws on judgment, perception, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, and character to visualize the conditions necessary for success before committing forces. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their staffs order their thoughts and understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle. Without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected engagements.

   c. The JFC uses operational art to consider not only the employment of military forces, but also their sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. This includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities. Operational art helps the JFC overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment. Operational art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic military objectives. Among the many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions.

   (1) What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (Ends)

   (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways)

   (3) What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
(4) What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions?

2. Operational Design

a. Joint operation planning — particularly for extensive operations that require a campaign — uses various elements of operational design to help commanders and staffs visualize the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation plan and its subsequent execution. While operational art is the manifestation of informed vision and creativity, operational design is the practical extension of the creative process. Together they synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical and logical process of design. The key to operational design essentially involves: (1) understanding the strategic guidance (determining the end state and objectives); (2) identifying the adversary’s principal strengths and weaknesses, and; (3) developing an operational concept that will achieve strategic and operational objectives.

b. Operational design — the focus of Section B of this chapter — is intrinsic to JOPP. JOPP provides a logical set of planning steps through which the commander and staff interact, and operational design supports JOPP by providing a number of design elements to help the commander and staff visualize and shape the operation to accomplish the mission. These elements of operational design comprise a tool that is particularly helpful during COA determination. Resulting design alternatives provide the basis for selecting a COA and developing the detailed CONOPS.

c. During execution, commanders and planners continue to consider design elements and adjust both current operations and future plans to capitalize on tactical and operational successes as the joint operation unfolds. Operational design elements are useful when designing either a campaign or single operation. However, their application is broadest in the context of a joint campaign.

3. The Campaign

a. A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated simultaneous or sequential military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Joint operation planning and planning for a campaign are not separate planning types or processes. Joint operation planning encompasses planning for any type of joint operation, such as small-scale, short-duration strike or raid; an operation that typically does not involve combat such as nation assistance; and large-scale, long-duration campaigns. Campaigns are joint — functional components (air, land, maritime, and special operations) and Service components plan and conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

b. The 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict is an example of a campaign with a sequence of two major operations: Operation DESERT SHIELD to defend Saudi Arabia and Operation DESERT
STORM to liberate Kuwait. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of large-scale combat operations such as these, but can be used across the range of military operations. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, joint operation plans for campaigns consider all instruments of national power and how their integrated and/or coordinated efforts work to attain national strategic objectives.

c. JFCs prepare a plan for a campaign in OPLAN format, and this can occur during either contingency planning or CAP. However, plans for campaigns have considerations that set them apart from other plans. Campaigns are often the most complex and extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources. An OPLAN for a campaign typically requires the broadest strategic concepts of operation and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater-strategic objectives. **There are three general types of campaigns, which differ generally in scope.**

1. **Global Campaign.** A global campaign is one that requires the accomplishment of strategic objectives in joint operations in multiple AORs. In this case there could be more than one supported GCC, and planners must be aware of competing requirements for potentially scarce strategic resources such as ISR assets, specialized and unique units and equipment, and transportation.

   (a) A global campaign is the primary means by which the CJCS or delegated CCDR arrange for strategic unity of effort and purpose and through which they guide the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across AOR boundaries. Global campaigns will often establish the strategic and operational framework within which theater and subordinate campaigns are developed. Global campaigns mitigate cross-AOR operational risks.

   (b) A global campaign plan can orient on the adversary’s COGs unrestricted by AOR boundaries. This plan embodies the CJCS or delegated CCDR’s vision of the arrangement of the related major operations of two or more CCDRs necessary to attain strategic objectives as a coordinated effort independent of AOR boundaries. A global campaign will also integrate many interdependent, cross-AOR, mission such as security cooperation, intelligence collection, strategic communication, flexible deterrence, sustainment, and coalition support. The “Global War on Terrorism” is an example of a campaign that spans all AORs.

2. **Theater Campaign.** A theater campaign encompasses the activities of a supported GCC, which accomplish strategic or operational objectives within a theater of war or theater of operations, primarily within the supported CCDR’s AOR. **An OPLAN for a theater campaign is the operational extension of a CCDR’s theater strategy**, and translates theater strategic concepts into unified action. Adjacent GCCs may conduct supporting operations within the AOR of the supported CCDR, or within their own AORs, under the overall direction of the supported GCC. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM comprised a theater campaign in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict.

3. **Subordinate Campaign.** A subordinate campaign plan describes the actions of a subordinate JFC, which accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) strategic or
operational objectives in support of a global or theater campaign. Subordinate JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans if their assigned missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction developed by the supported JFC.

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL DESIGN

4. Strategic Guidance

a. General. Strategic guidance is essential to operational art and design. As Chapter II, “Strategic Direction,” discussed, the President, SecDef, CJCS, and CCDRs all promulgate strategic guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes “victory,” or success (ends) and allocate adequate forces and resources (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The method (ways) of employing military capabilities to achieve the ends is for the supported JFC to develop and propose.

b. The National Strategic End State and Related Strategic Objectives. For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated large-scale combat), the President and SecDef typically will establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achievement of these objectives should result in attainment of the national strategic end state — the broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. Based on the strategic guidance, the CCDR will determine the military end state and strategic military objectives, which define the role of military forces. These objectives are the basis for operational design. See Section B of Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” for a more detailed discussion of the end state and strategic objectives.

5. Operational Design Elements

a. Operational art encompasses operational design — the process of developing the intellectual framework that will underpin all plans and their subsequent execution. The elements of operational design are tools to help supported JFCs and their staffs visualize what the joint operation should look like and to shape the commander’s intent. The emphasis applied to an operational design’s elements varies with the theater’s strategic objectives. The strategic environment is not the only factor that affects operational design. Other factors such as the availability of HNS, diplomatic permission to overfly nations and access en route air bases, the allocation of strategic mobility assets, the state of the theater infrastructure, and forces and resources made available for planning all have an impact on the operational design. In the final analysis, the goals of a sound operational design are to ensure a clear focus on the ultimate strategic objective and corresponding strategic COGs, and provide for sound sequencing, synchronization, and integration of all available military and nonmilitary instruments of power to that end. The fundamental elements of operational design are shown in Figure IV-1 and discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
b. **Termination**

(1) *Termination* is discussed first among the elements of operational design because effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the end state and the conditions that must exist to end military operations. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is key to achieving the national strategic end state. To plan effectively for termination, the supported JFC must know how the President and SecDef intend to terminate the joint operation and ensure its outcomes endure.

(2) In formulating an OPLAN, the supported JFC and staff should, as a minimum, do the following:

(a) Understand that conflict termination is a key aspect of the planning process.

(b) Emphasize backward planning — planning which begins with consideration of conflict termination, reconstitution, and redeployment and works backward to the pre-hostilities phase.

(c) Define the conditions of the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases. The military objectives must support the political aims — the campaign’s conflict termination
process is a part of a larger implicit bargaining process, even while hostilities continue. The military contribution can significantly affect the political leverage available to influence that process.

(d) Consider how efforts to eliminate or degrade an adversary’s C2 may affect, positively or negatively, efforts to achieve the termination objectives. For instance, will adversaries be able to effect a cease fire or otherwise control the actions of their forces?

(e) Incorporate relevant agencies in the planning process, since interagency coordination and actions play a major role in termination activities. The supported JFC and staff should view conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new post-hostilities period characterized by both civil and military challenges that must be worked jointly.

(f) Consider how efforts to eliminate or degrade an adversary’s national infrastructure, institutions, and organizations may affect post-operations military and political objectives. For example, disbanding and disarming a nation’s police force has effects that must be carefully weighed during the planning process.

(3) The JFC and staff require a clear understanding of termination as they begin mission analysis. See Section B of Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” for a more detailed discussion of termination and its relationship to the national strategic end state, the military end state, and strategic military objectives.

End State and Objectives. Once the termination criteria are established, operational design continues with development of the strategic military objectives and definition of the military end state. This end state normally will represent a point in time and/or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power to achieve remaining national strategic objectives. The JFC and staff require a clear understanding of end state and objectives as they begin mission analysis. See Section B of Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” for a more detailed discussion of end state and objectives as they relate to JOPP.

Continuation of Planning Vignette from Chapter III, Page III-38

D-35 (170800Z Jan):

At the previous briefing, CDRXCOM discussed his concept for the first three phases of the operation: Deter, Seize Initiative, and Dominate. The J-5 now summarizes the operation’s phases, which will be covered in the OPORD.
We envision the complete operation to consist of the following five primary phases, with some subordinate phases.

**Phase I: Deter**
- Phase IA: Deploy
- Phase IB: Defend

**Phase II: Defend and Seize Initiative**
- Phase IIA: Defend
- Phase IIB: Attack

**Phase III: Dominate**
- Phase IIIA: COG Operations North
- Phase IIIB: Capitltown Operations South

**Phase IV: Stabilize**

**Phase V: Enable Civil Authority**
- Phase VA: Red Leadership Transition (a branch executed o/o)
- Phase VB: Transition to JTF Support
- Phase VC: Redeploy

The nature of these phases will depend on whether or not the current Red leader remains in power. If he does, we may well move from Phase IV directly into Phase VC (redeploy).

We are in Phase IA now, as you know. We expect to have sufficient combat power in place to conduct a successful ground defense within 10 days, and we don’t expect Red to attack before then. We will continue to deploy, but remain in Phase I until Red attacks. At that point, Phase II begins automatically, and Phase IIA will continue until we have combat power sufficient to go on the offense. This won’t be until deployment of 10th Army’s VI Corps (the main effort for Phase IIIA) and IV MEF (the main effort for Phase IIIB) complete RSOI.

Phase IIIA will focus on operations against the Red armored corps in the north as the commander described yesterday. This will be supported by operations along the coast in the south, which will transition to Phase IIIB as the JFLCC moves to secure Capitaltown. We can expect the normal type of stability operations in Phase IV, but specific requirements will depend on when the Red leader surrenders.

We have planned Phase VA, a branch to the plan, to support the possible transition of new government and military leadership in Red. If the current Red leader remains in power, we will continue with Phase IV as required and transition to Phase VB. SecDef has directed that we decrease our visible
In Phase VB, we will transition C2 for operations to JTF support, formed on the JFLCC HQ. Concurrently, we will begin Phase VC and redeploy forces not needed for support operations.

Questions?

**d. Effects.** Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” discusses the use of desired and undesired effects in joint operation planning as a way to clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks. Effects also relate both to the systems perspective of the operational environment and the application of other elements of operational design. At the operational and strategic levels, it generally is more useful for planners to understand the direct and indirect relationships between and within the systems of the operational environment when considering whether a direct or indirect approach is the best way to attain a desired effect. Thinking in terms of a direct or indirect approach and desired or undesired effects can help amplify the meaning of strategic and operational objectives, determine appropriate tasks and the best sequence of actions to accomplish them, develop more precise assessment measures, and use other elements of operational design more effectively.

**e. Center of Gravity**

(1) One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s staff in the operational design process is the identification of friendly and adversary COGs. A COG is a source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.” A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act. The COG is always linked to the objective. If the objective changes, the center of gravity also could change. At the **strategic level**, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the **operational level** a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities — such as a powerful element of the armed forces — but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. Since the adversary will protect the COG, the COG invariably is found among strengths rather than among weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Commanders consider not only the enemy COGs, but also identify and protect their own COGs.

(2) The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help JFCs and staffs analyze friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost. Friendly and enemy COGs can change over time (due to actions taken by friendly forces and the enemy reaction to those actions) and are based on the end state, mission, and objectives as well as the adversary’s strategy. Planners must
continually analyze and refine COGs. Selection of COGs is not solely a static process by the J-2 during JIPOE. Figure IV-2 shows a number of characteristics that can be associated with a COG.

(3) The essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, defeat, or destroy it. In theory, this is the most direct path to mission accomplishment. However, a COG can change during the course of an operation for a variety of reasons. For example, a COG might concern the mass of adversary units, which has not yet formed. The COG also could change if the objective changes. For example, during the *dominate* phase, the friendly operational COG may be the attacking armored forces. However, once hostilities cease and the objective changes from defeating the adversary to humanitarian assistance for displaced persons, the friendly operational COG may be those responding forces that are providing relief. Given their potentially transient nature, analysis of both friendly and adversary COGs is a continuous process throughout a joint operation.

(4) A systems perspective of the operational environment, mentioned earlier in this section, assists identification of adversary COGs and their critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. In combat operations, this involves knowing an adversary’s physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses and how the adversary organizes, fights, and makes decisions. Moreover, the JFC and staff must understand strengths and weaknesses in other operational environment systems (political, social, economic, infrastructure, informational, etc.) and their interaction with the military system. The
staff, under the J-2’s lead, analyzes the relevant systems in the operational environment based on understanding strategic objectives, desired effects, and the joint force’s mission. This analysis identifies a number of nodes—the people, facilities, individual systems, forces, information, and other components of the system. The analysis also attempts to identify links—the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. Identifying nodes and their links helps the staff assess the systems’ important capabilities and vulnerabilities. This analysis identifies the interrelationship of systems and capabilities within or in support of a given COG. A clear understanding of these relationships will help the JFC and staff in the identification of effective options to defeat the COG.

“One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all of our energies should be directed.”

“The first task . . . in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s centers of gravity, and if possible, trace them back to a single one.”

Carl von Clausewitz

*On War*, 1832

(5) A COG typically will not be a single node in the system, but will consist of a set of nodes and their respective links (relationships). For example, Figure IV-3 shows a notional adversary’s strategic and operational COGs, each consisting of a set of nodes and links. The operational COG in this example resides in the military system, while the strategic COG focuses in the political system but overlaps with the operational COG. However, a COG that appears entirely military on the surface often will have underlying links to key nodes in other systems. A single node might be considered a COG as an exception, such as when the adversary senior military leader is also the political leader and the nature of the adversary’s political and military systems is such that the leader’s demise would cause support for the conflict by other leaders in these systems to collapse. Also, systems are viewed differently at different levels. For example, the CCDR might consider an adversary’s key military capability to be a single node in the adversary’s military system, while a JTF commander who must attack this capability would analyze it as a system of nodes and links in an effort to determine its critical capabilities and vulnerabilities.

(6) Analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step in the JIPOE process. Joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs using an understanding of the various systems in the operational environment. The goal is to determine from which elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), and the will to fight. The J-2, in conjunction with other operational planners, then attempts to determine if the tentative or candidate COGs truly are critical to the adversary’s strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the planning effort. Others on the joint force staff conduct similar analysis to identify friendly COGs. Once COGs have been identified, JFCs and their staffs determine how to attack enemy COGs while protecting friendly COGs. The protection of friendly strategic COGs such as public opinion and US national capabilities typically requires efforts and capabilities beyond those of just the
An analysis of the identified COGs in terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities is vital to this process.

JP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, provides detailed information on the JIPOE process as it relates to campaign planning.

**KEY TERMS**

**critical capability** — a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such, and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s).

**critical requirement** — an essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.

**critical vulnerability** — an aspect of a critical requirement, which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects.

(7) Understanding the relationship among the COGs not only permits but also compels greater precision in thought and expression in operational design. Planners should analyze COGs within a
framework of three critical factors—critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities—to aid in this understanding. Critical capabilities are those that are considered crucial enablers for a COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to become fully operational. Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient, or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results. Collectively, the terms above are referred to as critical factors. In general, a JFC must possess sufficient operational reach and combat power or other relevant capabilities to take advantage of an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities. Similarly, a supported commander must protect friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an adversary.

(8) The most effective method for JFCs and their staffs to analyze friendly and adversary COGs and their critical vulnerabilities is to visualize each COG’s role/function relative to each of the various systems. For example, the leader of an adversary nation could be a strategic COG in the military and political systems as well as a key node in the nation’s social system. Planners also can visualize a COG as a system (nodes, links, functions, etc.) to analyze what elements within this system protect, sustain, integrate, or enable its various elements or components. All nodes associated with a COG are designated as key nodes. This distinction provides visibility to these nodes in the targeting process and emphasizes their potential importance to the operation.

(9) Once the systems analysis is mature, the planners should then try to identify the critical factors within that system. Those elements or functions that enable the COG are its critical capabilities. Once these are identified, planners should determine the critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities. For example, Figure IV-4 expands the COGs in Figure IV-3 to reveal the critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities of the strategic and operational COGs.

(10) When identifying friendly and adversary critical vulnerabilities, the JFC and staff will understandably want to focus their efforts against the critical vulnerabilities that will do the most decisive damage to an adversary’s COG. However, in selecting those critical vulnerabilities, planners must also compare their criticality with their accessibility, vulnerability, redundancy, ability to recuperate, and impact on the civilian populace, then balance those factors against friendly capabilities to affect those vulnerabilities. The JFC’s goal is to seek opportunities aggressively to apply force against an adversary in as vulnerable an aspect as possible, and in as many dimensions as possible. In other words, the JFC seeks to undermine the adversary’s strength by exploiting adversary vulnerabilities, while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from adversaries attempting to do the same.
The XCOM J-2 has determined that the adversary’s armored corps in the north is the operational COG, and the strategic COG is comprised of the adversary’s president, defense minister, the armored corps commander, and a newly identified coalition partner.

The XCOM J-2 and the 10th Army J-2 and planners, working in collaboration, determine that conducting air defense is a critical capability for the operational-level COG. By protecting its maneuver units from air attack, the air defense system provides freedom of maneuver to the armored corps. The air defense system’s critical requirements are its mobile launchers; a sufficient supply of missiles; its command and control capabilities; and its network of radars. Comparing these critical requirements to friendly force capabilities, the J-2 also determines that the air defense system’s primary weakness is its radar network. Since active radar sites are especially vulnerable to high-speed anti-radiation missiles against which Red forces have no effective counter, J-2 analysts deduce that the radar network constitutes a critical vulnerability.
The J-2 collaborates with the J-5, J-3, and 10th Army planners to devise methods of attack — both kinetic and nonkinetic — to destroy or neutralize this critical vulnerability. This approach should ultimately open the armored corps to attack by air, or otherwise weaken it without having to attack it directly.

The J-2 also advises CDRXCOM of indications that Country Brown — a neighboring country sympathetic to the adversary — unexpectedly has agreed to support Country Red with various military resources. The J-2 believes external support represents a critical capability for the strategic COG. Associated critical requirements are identified as the military capabilities Country Brown is willing to provide the adversary; Country Brown’s proximity to the adversary; well developed lines of communication; and the proclaimed neutral or sympathetic status of other regional countries. But Country Brown also maintains significant economic ties with the United States, which the J-2 reasons can be exploited as a critical vulnerability if the US can apply appropriate diplomatic and economic pressure.

(11) A proper analysis of adversary critical factors must be based on the best available knowledge of how adversaries organize, fight, think, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JFCs and their staffs must develop an understanding of their adversaries’ capabilities and vulnerabilities, and factors that might influence an adversary to abandon or change strategic objectives. They must also envision how friendly forces and actions appear from the adversaries’ viewpoints. Otherwise, they may fall into the trap of ascribing to an adversary’s particular attitudes, values, and reactions that mirror their own.

D-23 (290800Z Jan):

CDRXCOM meets with SecDef, SECSTATE, and the CIA Director in Washington D.C. to discuss his J-2’s analysis and conclusions regarding the strategic COG. SECSTATE agrees that economic relations between the US and Country Brown have been good and that diplomatic relations have been fair. The CIA Director confirms the indicators that Country Brown intends to provide support to Red, but adds that military forces likely would not be part of this support and that Brown leaders were sensitive to the conflict spreading to their territory. All meeting participants agree that this is a critical issue from the perspective of preventing this crisis from spreading in the region.

SECSTATE agrees to work this from a diplomatic perspective, first through a demarche delivered by the US Ambassador in Brown to Brown’s Foreign Minister and by meeting with Brown’s Ambassador in Washington. Follow-on efforts will target other countries in the region to bring pressure on Brown to stay out of the conflict. SECSTATE believes that the potential for immediate economic sanctions against Brown will help deter Brown’s involvement. SECSTATE will also engage the UN Secretary General for support through UN channels.
CDRXCOM directs the J-5 to prepare options for military operations against Country Brown if Brown refuses to back away from the conflict.

(12) Before solidifying COGs into the OPLAN, planners should analyze and test their validity. The defeat, destruction, neutralization, or substantial weakening of a valid COG should cause an adversary to change its COA or prevent an adversary from achieving its strategic objectives. If analysis shows that this does not occur, then perhaps planners have misidentified the COG, and they must revise their COG and critical factors analysis. The conclusions, while critically important to the planning process itself, must be tempered with continuous evaluations and reassessments, because derived COGs and critical vulnerabilities are subject to change at any time during the campaign or major operation. Accordingly, JFCs and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances during execution that may cause derived COGs and critical vulnerabilities to change and adjust friendly plans and operations accordingly.

CDRXCOM and his staff also have considered friendly centers of gravity for this operation. If Red attacks, the eventual military outcome is not in doubt because of the significant disparity in Red-Blue combat capabilities. Thus, the Blue operational-level COG is its conventional military forces in general, and more specifically its air combat capability.

However, the operation will be more difficult if Red attacks into Gray before US forces arrive to defend. While this is not expected, it would cause defense of Gray to be conducted from the east part of Gray or the west part of Country Green, rather than along the Red-Gray border. Although JFACC operations can begin within a few hours, the lack of friendly bases within operational reach of the JOA and the natural concealment offered by the wooded terrain in Gray would degrade the effectiveness of air operations. Thus, the CCDR considers the US ability to deploy sufficient ground combat forces in time to defend a Red attack along the Red-Gray border to be a Blue critical vulnerability.

(13) JFCs must also analyze friendly COGs and identify friendly critical vulnerabilities. Long sea and air lines of communications (LOCs) from CONUS or supporting theaters could be a critical vulnerability for a friendly COG. Through prior planning and coordination, commanders can mitigate the potential impact of challenges such as the failure of foreign governments to provide overflight clearances to US or multinational forces. A friendly COG could also be something more intangible in nature. During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Conflict, for example, Commander, US Central Command identified the coalition itself as a friendly strategic COG and took appropriate measures to protect it, to include deployment of theater missile defense systems. In conducting the analysis of friendly vulnerabilities, the supported commander must decide how, when, where, and why friendly military forces are (or might become) vulnerable to hostile actions, and then plan accordingly. The supported commander must achieve a balance between prosecuting the main effort and protecting critical capabilities and vulnerabilities in the OA to protect friendly COGs.
f. Decisive Points

(1) Commanders and their staffs identify decisive points to help them determine where and how to apply friendly capabilities to exploit adversary vulnerabilities. A *decisive point* is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective). This can greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points can be physical in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, WMD capabilities, or an air base; but they could include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or communications and/or intelligence nodes. In some cases, specific key events also may be decisive points, such as attainment of air or maritime superiority, commitment of the adversary’s reserve or opening a supply route during humanitarian operations. In still other cases, decisive points may have a larger systemic impact, such as a node or combination of nodes which, when acted on, can substantially affect the adversary’s information, financial, economic, or social systems.

**KEY TERM**

*decisive point* — A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success.

(2) The most important decisive points can be determined from analysis of critical factors. As part of the node-link analysis associated with a systems perspective, understanding the relationship between a COG’s critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities can illuminate direct and indirect approaches to the COG. It is likely that most of these critical factors will be decisive points, which should then be further addressed in the planning process.

(3) There may often be cases where the JFC’s combat power and other capabilities will be insufficient to rapidly affect the adversary’s COGs with a single action. In this situation, the supported JFC must selectively focus a series of actions against the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities until the cumulative effects of these actions lead to mission success. Just as a combined arms approach is often the best way to attack an enemy field force in the military system, attacking several vulnerable points in other systems may offer an effective method to influence an enemy COG. The indirect approach may offer the most effective method to exploit adversary critical vulnerabilities through the identification of decisive points. Although decisive points are not COGs, they are the keys to attacking or protecting them.

(4) Although OAs may have numerous decisive points, only a few will truly have operational or even strategic significance relative to an adversary’s COGs. The art of identifying decisive points is a critical part of operational design. Normally, there are far more decisive points in a given OA than can be attacked, seized, retained, or controlled with the forces and capabilities available. Accordingly, planners should study and analyze potential decisive points and determine which of them offer the best opportunity to attack the adversary’s COGs indirectly, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. The commander then designates the most important decisive points for further planning and allocates sufficient resources to produce the desired effects.
against them. Afterward, the supported JFC should assign sufficient forces and assets for attacking, seizing, retaining, or controlling these decisive points.

D-23 (291900Z Jan):

As CDRXCOM is meeting in Washington, the XCOM J-5 reviews the J-2’s analysis and tentatively identifies a number of decisive points (DP) from the theater-strategic perspective in preparation for an upcoming collaborative session with component planners. The J-5 knows that they will identify other decisive points relevant to their tasks and that there may be some overlap.

While the JOA will contain many potential decisive points, the focus of the planning session will be on those that address COGs and enable transition between phases of the operation. Among a number of potential decisive points, the J-5 identifies the following as important to the planning session’s focus:

- **Event DPs:**
  - Initial JFACC operations (enable Phase IB)
  - Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of IV MEF (enables Phase IIB)
  - Diplomatic efforts against Country Brown (success prevents regional escalation)
  - Red leader surrenders (affects timing of transition to Phase IV)

- **System DPs:**
  - Red armor corps air defense (neutralization enables direct attack of operational COG)
  - Red armor corps (neutralization of COG enables Phase IIB)

- **Geographic DPs:**
  - Two mountain passes on Red-Gray border (control enables Blue defense (Phases IB and IIA)
  - Three bridges on south line of communication (LOC) (control enables control of south LOC and start of Phase IIB)

**NOTE:** These DPs are not all-inclusive, but representative of DPs that could be identified in an operation such as this.

(5) Decisive points that assist commanders to gain or maintain the initiative are crucial. In direct combat with an adversary, controlling these decisive points in the attack helps commanders gain freedom of operational maneuver, maintain the momentum of the attack, and sustain the initiative. If a defender controls such a point, it can help exhaust the attacker’s momentum and facilitate the defender’s counterattack.

g. **Direct versus Indirect Approach**
(1) The essence of operational art lies in determining how to allocate available friendly resources against an adversary’s COGs to achieve friendly strategic and operational objectives. There are three approaches to accomplish this, so JFCs and their staffs will have to decide between them, given the specific circumstances. The decision facing the commander is whether to attack the COG directly, indirectly, or through combination of direct and indirect approach (see Figure IV-5).

(2) In theory, direct attacks against adversary COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction provide the most direct path to victory — if this can be done in a prudent manner (as defined by the military and political dynamics of the moment). Where direct attacks against adversary COGs mean attacking an opponent’s strength, JFCs must weigh the risk appropriately to determine if friendly forces possess the power to attack with acceptable risk. In the event that a direct attack is not a reasonable solution, JFCs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. In this manner, the adversary’s derived vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its COGs. For example, if the operational COG is a large adversary force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs (including resupply), and defeating or degrading its protection functions, such as air defenses and indirect fire capability. In this way, JFCs employ a synchronized and integrated combination of operations to weaken adversary COGs indirectly by attacking traditional weaknesses (e.g., seams and flanks) and requirements (e.g., military morale and public opinion), which are sufficiently vulnerable.

Figure IV-5. Direct Versus Indirect Approach

"Where direct attacks against enemy COGs mean attacking into an opponent’s strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks.”
Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations
(3) In some situations, the direct approach may entail an attack focused on the bulk of the adversary’s forces with the explicit aim of destroying or annihilating those forces in the shortest possible time. When one’s own combat power is overwhelming or the adversary force is deemed particularly vulnerable, a direct approach can sometimes be the most practical and effective way to decisively attack the adversary’s COGs. However, this approach often depends on the situation.

(4) An adversary’s COGs may not be open to direct attack because of their inherent strength. Their key elements may be too strong, too well protected or concealed or too abstract or intangible in nature. They may be beyond the operational reach of the joint force, or operational limitations may preclude a direct attack on an adversary’s COGs. In these cases, the JFC should seek an indirect approach until conditions exist that permit successful direct attacks. An analysis of an adversary’s critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities can offer indirect approaches to attacking an adversary’s COGs.

(a) At the strategic level of war, indirect methods of defeating the adversary’s COG could include depriving the adversary of allies or friends, emplacing sanctions, weakening the national will to fight by undermining the public support for war, and breaking up cohesion of adversary alliances or coalitions.

(b) At the operational level of war, the most common indirect method of defeating an adversary’s COGs is to conduct a series of attacks against selected aspects of the adversary’s combat power. For example, the supported JFC may sequence combat actions to force an adversary to divide its forces in theater, destroy the adversary’s reserves or elements of the adversary’s base of operations, or prevent or hinder the deployment of the adversary’s major forces or reinforcements into the OA. Indirect methods of attacking the adversary’s COGs (through critical vulnerabilities) could entail reducing the adversary’s operational reach, isolating the force from its C2, and destroying or suppressing key protection functions such as air defense.

h. Lines of Operations

(1) As JFCs visualize the design of the operation, they may use several LOOs to help visualize the intended progress of the joint force toward achieving operational and strategic objectives. LOOs define the orientation of the force in time and space or purpose in relation to an adversary or objective. Commanders may describe the operation along LOOs that are physical, logical, or both. Logical and physical LOOs are not mutually exclusive and JFCs often combine them. Normally, joint operations require commanders to synchronize activities along multiple and complementary LOOs working through a series of military strategic and operational objectives to attain the military end state.
KEY TERM

**line of operations** — 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s).

(2) There are many possible ways to graphically depict LOOs, which can assist planners to visualize the joint operation from beginning to end and prepare the OPLAN or OPORD accordingly. From the perspective of unified action, there are many diplomatic, economic, and informational activities that can affect the sequencing and conduct of military operations. Planners should consider depicting relevant actions or events of the other instruments of national power on their LOOs diagrams.

(3) A physical LOO (see Figure IV-6) connects a series of decisive points over time that lead to control of a geographic objective or defeat of an enemy force. Commanders use physical LOOs to connect the force with its base of operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy is a factor.

(a) Physical LOOs may be either interior or exterior. A force operates on **interior lines** when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate adversary forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the adversary. A force operates on **exterior lines** when its operations converge on the adversary. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent. Figure IV-6 depicts a physical LOO, which is oriented on geographic decisive points leading to securing Capitaltown, the objective of Phase IIIB in the vignette.

(b) Assuring strategic mobility enhances exterior LOOs by providing the JFC greater freedom of maneuver. The relevance of interior and exterior physical lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. Although an adversary force may have interior lines...
with respect to the friendly force, this advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher operational tempo. Conversely, if a smaller force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile adversary forces, the friendly force may be able to defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.

(c) **A joint operation may have one or multiple physical LOOs.** A single line of operations has the advantage of concentrating forces and simplifying planning. Multiple LOOs, on the other hand, increase flexibility and create opportunities for success. Multiple LOOs also make it difficult for an adversary to determine the objectives of the campaign or major operation, forcing the adversary to disperse resources to defend against multiple threats. The decision to operate on multiple lines will depend to a great extent on the availability of resources.

(4) JFCs use logical LOOs to visualize and describe the operation when positional reference to an enemy or adversary has less relevance. In contrast to physical LOOs, a logical LOO focuses more on depicting a logical arrangement of objectives, effects, or tasks. Logical LOOs typically can link multiple decisive points with the logic of purpose to defeat an enemy or achieve an objective. This situation is common in many joint operations, particularly from the theater-strategic perspective. In a linkage between objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of LOOs may be evident. Logical LOOs are particularly useful when working with interagency and multinational partners in either a supporting or supported capacity. For example, a JFC can reflect the tasks and objectives of agencies along separate LOOs and relate these to tasks and objectives along the military LOOs. Logical LOOs also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power and vice versa.

(5) Figure IV-7 shows four notional logical LOOs from the CCDR’s perspective based on an arrangement of tasks necessary to accomplish objectives. A LOO depiction at this level can help the CCDR and staff discuss the relationship and status of key tasks and “drill down” on specific tasks for details as required.

(a) Figure IV-7 is a notional example based on the vignette, and portrays only a small sample of what would appear on an actual LOO diagram. This example shows a LOO with representative tasks for each instrument of national power. Actual LOOs would be much more detailed.

(b) The LOOs appear somewhat independent in this figure, but actually would be closely interconnected and synchronized in unified action toward a common purpose — the accomplishment of national strategic objectives. The dashed arrows between the LOOs reflect this interaction. In some cases, a LOO could portray related military, diplomatic, informational, and economic decisive points, tasks, or effects along a single line.

(c) While each LOO appears to portray tasks in sequence, an expanded view would actually show many tasks occurring simultaneously and would reflect the interdependencies.
(d) Other potential alternatives to the instruments of national power for organizing LOOs include the following: by organization (e.g., joint force air component commander, JFLCC); by objective (i.e., an arrangement of tasks, decisive points, or effects oriented at achieving a specific objective); and by function (e.g., maintain security, develop governance, facilitate civil administration). A subordinate JTF or component commander’s perspective and focus will be different from that of the CCDR, and the LOO methods will vary. Operational-level and tactical organizations typically will focus more on the specific application of military capabilities, even when in support of civil authorities. However, the military commander’s understanding of the purpose, objectives, and activities of the civilian and multinational counterparts is essential to promoting unified action.

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As the J-5 continues planning, he graphically arranges tasks as he expects them to occur in time according to the operation’s phases approved by CDRXCOM (see Figure IV-7). These are predominantly logical lines of operations (LOOs), since the J-5 is not attempting to show the progression of forces along geographical points.
The J-5’s diagram shows four primary LOOs – one for each instrument of national power. This helps the combatant command and component planners maintain visibility of actions or events along those lines, which could affect current or future military actions. The most significant of these at this point is the diplomatic effort to dissuade Country Brown from supporting Country Red. If Brown decides to support Red, this will complicate the planning process and signal an escalation of military operations in the region. The likely result will be greater regional instability and longer-term commitment of US forces. CDRXCOM has directed the J-5 to plan for the possibility of operations against Brown.

NOTE: Figure IV-7 shows a representative sample from the J-5’s LOOs graphic. The complete diagram would reflect a much larger number of activities for each of the four lines, and particularly for the military line.

i. Operational Reach

(1) Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. Reach is fundamentally linked to culmination, the point in time at which the force can no longer attack or defend successfully. Although reach may be constrained or limited by the geography in and around the OA, it may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, increasing the range and effects of weapon systems, leveraging HNS and theater support contracting support, and maximizing the throughput efficiency of the distribution architecture.

(2) The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of lines of operations. The geography surrounding and separating adversaries influences operational reach. Locating forces, reserves, bases, pre-positioned equipment sets, and logistics forward extends operational reach. Operational reach is also affected by increasing the range of weapons, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of LOCs and throughput capability. Some assets — such as air, space, and information operations — maintain a responsive global capability that significantly extends operational reach. Nevertheless, for any given campaign or major operation, there is a finite range beyond which predominant elements of the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations.

(3) Basing, in the broadest sense, is an indispensable part of operational art, since it is tied to the concept of LOOs and directly affects operational reach. Whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or CONUS, basing directly affects the combat power and other capabilities that a joint force can generate. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the ability of the joint force to shield its components from adversary action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows. It also directly influences the combat power and other capabilities the joint force can generate because of its impact on such critical factors as sortie or resupply rates. Political and diplomatic considerations can often affect basing decisions.
(4) US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently based forces to temporary sea basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea basing) are typically selected to be within friendly operational reach of the adversary. To that end, theater assessments must determine whether sufficient infrastructure and diplomatic support exist or can be obtained to support the operational and sustainment requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from adversary attacks. Determining where to locate bases poses certain challenges for planners. Recognizing the critical role basing plays during force projection, potential adversaries may try to develop “anti-access” strategies designed to prevent the build up and sustainment of forces in theater. One such strategy could be a preemptive attack against US forces located outside the adversary’s national boundaries, so planners must also consider the risk of placing US combat capabilities within the adversary’s operational reach. Planners must determine how to mitigate an adversary’s efforts to deny access to the theater and its infrastructure.

j. Simultaneity and Depth

(1) *Simultaneity* refers to the simultaneous application of military and nonmilitary power against the enemy’s key capabilities and sources of strength. Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy’s collapse by placing more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate enemy forces and functions in multiple domains (air, land, maritime, and space) in such a manner as to cause failure of their moral and physical cohesion.

(2) Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles, understanding their relevance to the OPLAN. JFCs set the conditions for battles within a major operation or campaign to achieve military strategic and operational objectives. GCCs integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent interrelationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon, but must understand how their actions contribute to the military end state.

(3) The evolution of warfare and advances in technology have continuously expanded the depth of operations. US joint forces can rapidly maneuver over great distances and strike with precision. Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the OA, creating competing and simultaneous demands on adversary commanders and resources. The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the OA, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources and contributing to the enemy’s speedy defeat. Depth applies to time as well as geography. Operations extended in depth shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle. Strategic attack, interdiction, and some IO capabilities are applications of depth in joint operations. Operations in depth contribute to protection of the force by destroying adversary potential before its capabilities can be realized or employed.
(4) Simultaneity and depth place a premium on shared, common awareness of the operational environment. Consequently, JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a comprehensive, universal common operational picture (COP).

k. Timing and Tempo

(1) The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the adversary’s ability to react. For example, Germany’s 1940 attack on France combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations.

(2) The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both friendly and adversary forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to conduct operations at a reduced pace. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs could reduce the pace of operations, frustrating adversary commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the OA such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, JFCs could conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to overwhelm adversary defensive capabilities. Assuring strategic mobility preserves the JFCs ability to control tempo by allowing freedom of theater access.

(3) JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ and consider the associated timing of their application. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively integrate and synchronize their application in time, space, and purpose based on the timing required to attain a desired effect. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate impact, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be integrated and synchronized.

l. Forces and Functions

(1) Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either adversary forces, functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both adversary forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible friction between friendly and adversary forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent.

(2) JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical adversary functions such as C2, logistics, and air and missile defense. Attack of an adversary’s functions normally is intended to destroy the adversary’s balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. The direct effect of destroying or disrupting critical adversary functions can create the indirect effects of uncertainty, confusion, and
even panic in adversary leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of adversary capability and will. When assessing whether or not functional attack should be the principal design concept; JFCs should evaluate several variables such as time required to cripple the adversary’s critical functions, time available to the JFC, the adversary’s current actions, and likely responses to such actions.

m. Leverage

(1) In joint operations, leverage is a relative advantage in combat power and/or other circumstances against the adversary across one or more domains (air, land, sea, and space) and/or the information environment sufficient to exploit that advantage. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, states that leverage is “the centerpiece of joint operational art.” Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the adversary, increase the adversary’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative.

(2) JFCs gain decisive advantage over the adversary through leverage. Leverage can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against adversary vulnerabilities and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides JFCs with decisive advantage. A principal JFC responsibility is to assess continuously whether command relationships between components enhance to the fullest extent fighting assistance from and to each element of the joint force. Support relationships afford an effective means to weight (and ensure unity of command for) various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same time. The potentially large number of such relationships requires the close attention of both JFCs and their components.

(3) Force interaction with regard to adversary forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against adversary forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs must aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an adversary in as vulnerable an aspect as possible — air attacks against adversary ground formations in convoy (e.g., the air and SOF interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval air attacks against troop transports (e.g., US air attacks against Japanese surface reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against adversary naval, air, or missile bases (e.g., allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of conventional and unconventional forces and capabilities against an adversary.

(4) As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force from adversary symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function
of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action. Full-spectrum superiority, isolation of the adversary, and attack of adversary vulnerabilities can contribute to joint force leverage.

(5) While leverage in combat operations often focuses at the operational level, GCCs can influence theater-strategic leverage by their collaboration with other US and multinational agencies. Collaboration and coordination during planning with these agencies can reveal options using other instruments of national power that could achieve strategic objectives and leverage against the adversary with less risk and requirement for combat operations.

n. Balance

(1) Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as to the nature and timing of operations. Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships to assist in maintaining the balance of the force.

(2) JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an adversary’s balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions and pressing the fight. IO, special operations, interdiction, and maneuver all converge to confuse, demoralize, and destroy the opponent. Denial of adversary intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition activities contributes to the protection of friendly forces. Even as the joint force defeats one adversary force, it prepares to turn and strike another. High-tempo joint operations set the conditions for battle. JFCs must prepare to shift as conditions change and new challenges are presented. Through continuous planning and wargaming, the commander strives never to be without options.

(3) Preserving the responsiveness of component capabilities is central to operational art. Combinations of operations and organization of the joint force should maintain or expand force responsiveness, not inhibit it. Decentralization of authority can contribute to responsiveness by reducing the distance in time and space between decision makers and ongoing operations.

o. Anticipation

(1) Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs must consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with higher headquarters, subordinates, allies, coalition members, and other organizations in the OA. JFCs may avoid surprise by gaining and maintaining the initiative at all levels of command and throughout the operational area, thus forcing the adversary to react rather than initiate; and by thoroughly and continuously wargaming to identify probable adversary reactions to joint force actions. JFCs also should realize the effects of operations and associated consequences on the adversary, interagency and multinational partners, and noncombatants and prepare for their results.
(2) Shared common understanding of the operational environment aids commanders and their staffs in anticipating opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of friendly capabilities; adversary capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs; and the location, activities, and status of dislocated civilians enables commanders to focus joint efforts where they can best, and most directly, contribute to achieving military objectives.

(3) JIPOE assists JFCs in defining likely or potential adversary COAs, as well as the indicators that suggest the adversary has embarked on a specific COA. As such, JIPOE significantly contributes to a JFC’s ability to anticipate and exploit opportunities.

(4) JIPOE is a process that enables JFCs and their staffs to visualize adversary capabilities and potential COAs across all dimensions of the operational environment. In stability operations, the intelligence operation must help to collect — then fuse — political, criminal, economic, linguistic, demographic, ethnic, psychological, and other information regarding conditions and forces that influence the society. This process, combined with the COP, other information, and intelligence products provides the JFC with the tools necessary to achieve situational awareness. The COP is produced by using many different products to include the operational pictures of lower, lateral, and higher echelons. Liaison teams to the JFC from the national intelligence agencies can provide the staff a wealth of information for the COP — including advanced geospatial intelligence products tailored to mission-planning, navigation, and targeting needs of the CCDR.

For additional guidance on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(5) **Anticipation is not without risk.** Commanders and staff officers that tend to lean forward in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and their staffs should carefully consider all available information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information should be employed to reduce risk in the decision-making process.

p. **Synergy**

(1) JFCs employ conventional and unconventional forces and capabilities, as well as the resources of other governmental agencies when made available, across the range of military operations in a synchronized and integrated fashion, resulting in greater combat power and operational effectiveness through synergistic action. Further, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various domains, all culminating in achieving the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. Additionally, JFCs not only attack the adversary’s physical capabilities, but also the adversary’s morale and will.

(2) In today’s joint, multinational, and, interagency operating environment, it is impossible to accurately view the contributions of any individual organization, capability, or the domains in which they operate in isolation from all others. Each may be critical to the success of
the joint force, and each has certain capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any element of combat power, and nonmilitary capabilities in some circumstances, can be dominant — and even decisive — in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each element can support or be supported by other elements. Their contributions will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into joint operations.

(3) The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing the actions of conventional and unconventional forces and capabilities in joint operations and in multiple domains enables JFCs to maximize available capabilities and minimize potential seams or vulnerabilities. JFCs are especially suited to develop joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available in joint forces.

(4) The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational situation. JFCs integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. The JFC’s vision of how operations will be conducted includes not only how to arrange operations but also a clear understanding of the end state.

**KEY TERM**

**culminating point** — The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. For the offense, the point at which effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. For the defense, the point at which effective counteroffensive action is no longer possible.

q. Culmination

(1) **Culmination** has both offensive and defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to offensive culmination, then conduct an offensive to expedite the adversary’s defensive culmination. During stability operations, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties.

(2) The supported JFC must ensure that forces and assets arrive at the right times and places to support the campaign and that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later stages of the campaign. This is a key point, because sustainment is a significant aspect of the campaign. Integration
and synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve military strategic and operational objectives before reaching their culminating points. If the commanders cannot generate these resources, they should revise their CONOPS.

**r. Arranging Operations**

(1) JFCs must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to accomplish the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve full-spectrum superiority and the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement including geography of the OA, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, force protection, distribution and sustainment capabilities, adversary reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose.

(2) A timely and accurate TPFDD is important. However, the dynamic nature of modern military operations requires adaptability concerning the arrangement of military capabilities in time, space, and purpose. During force projection, for example, a rapidly changing adversary situation or other aspects of the operational environment may cause the commander to alter the planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. Therefore, in-transit visibility and theater asset visibility are critical to maintaining flexibility. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose future options.

(3) **The sustainment function is crucial to arranging operations and must be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.** Among many considerations, JFCs and their staffs must think about logistic bases, LOCs, location, potential interagency and multinational support requirements, and security factors as they relate to current and future operations. They also must define priorities for services, support, and common-user logistic functions and responsibilities, to include designation of integrators for base operating support and contracting coordination. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. In any operation where significant reliance on contracted support is anticipated, the JFC and Service component commanders must ensure the requisite contract planning is completed and appropriate controls/guidance are in place in accordance with DOD Instructions 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contract Services During Crises*, and 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.

(4) **Phases.** Phasing is a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Reaching the end state often requires arranging a major operation or campaign in several phases. Consequently, operational design provides for related phases implemented over time. Phases in an OPLAN are sequential,
but during execution there will often be some simultaneous and overlapping execution of the activities within the phases. In a campaign, each phase can represent a single major operation, while in a major operation a phase normally consists of several subordinate operations or a series of related activities. See paragraph 6, “Phasing,” in this chapter for a more detailed discussion of phasing.

(5) **Branches and Sequels.** Many OPLANs require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build flexibility into their plans by developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. They are primarily used for changing deployments or direction of movement and accepting or declining combat. Branches and sequels directly relate to the phasing construct.

(a) **Branches are options often built into the basic plan.** They typically provide different ways or sets of means to accomplish the existing objective of an ongoing operation. Such branches could change the main and supporting efforts, shift priorities, change command relationships, or change the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of adversary action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the OA.

(b) **Sequels anticipate and plan for subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate.** For every action or major operation that does not accomplish a strategic or operational objective, there has to be a sequel for each possible outcome, such as “win, lose, draw, or win big.” Although phases typically overlap, they can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

(c) Once JFC’s and their staffs have determined possible branches and sequels as far in advance as practicable within each phase, they must now determine what or where the decision points (not to be confused with decisive points) should be. Such decision points are often represented by battles or engagements that, despite everything being done to anticipate their outcome, can be either lost or won. **Each branch from a decision point requires different actions, and each action demands various follow-up actions, such as sequels or potential sequels.**
Chapter IV

“To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy’s power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way to operate is along a line which offers alternative objectives.”

B.H. Liddell Hart

(6) Operational Pause

(a) The supported JFC should aggressively conduct operations to obtain and maintain the initiative. However, there may be certain circumstances when this is not feasible because of logistic constraints or force shortfalls. Therefore, operational pauses may be required when a major operation may be reaching the end of its sustainability. As such, operational pauses can provide a safety valve to avoid potential culmination, while the JFC retains the initiative in other ways. However, if an operational pause is properly executed in relation to one’s own culminating point, the adversary will not have sufficient combat power to threaten the joint force or regain the initiative during the pause.

(b) Operational pauses are also useful tools for obtaining the proper synchronization of sustainment and operations. Normally, operational pauses are planned to regenerate combat power or augment sustainment and forces for the next phase, although this will result in extending the duration of a major operation or campaign. Moreover, properly planned and sequenced operational pauses will ensure that the JFC has sufficient forces and assets to accomplish strategic or operational objectives. However, planners must guard against cutting the margin of sustainment and combat effectiveness too thin. Executing a pause before it is necessary provides for flexibility in the timing of the pause and allows for its early termination under urgent conditions without unduly endangering the future effectiveness of the force.

(c) The primary drawback to operational pauses is that they risk forfeiture of strategic or operational initiative. It is therefore incumbent upon the JFC to plan on as few operational pauses as possible, if any, and consistent with the CONOPS, to alternate pauses and tempo between components of the force. In this manner, a major portion of the joint force can maintain pressure on the adversary through offensive actions while other components pause.

6. Phasing

a. Purpose. Arranging operations is an element of operational design, and phasing is a key aspect of this element. Phasing is a useful tool for any type of operation, from those that require large-scale combat to operations such as disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, and peacekeeping. For example, campaigns and single major operations can normally be divided into phases to logically organize a campaign’s diverse, extended, and dispersed activities. Phasing assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit
of phasing is that it assists commanders in systematically achieving objectives that cannot be achieved concurrently by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Phasing can be used to gain progressive advantages and assist in achieving objectives as quickly and effectively as possible. Phasing also provides a framework for assessing risk to portions of an operation or campaign, allowing development of plans to mitigate this risk may be developed.

**KEY TERM**

**phase** — A definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.

b. Application

(1) **A phase can be characterized by the “focus” that is placed on it.** Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another, but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation, as shown in Figure IV-8. Phases are necessarily linked and gain significance in the larger context of the campaign. As such, it is imperative that the campaign or operation not be broken down into numerous arbitrary components that may inhibit tempo and lead to a plodding, incremental approach. Since a campaign is required whenever pursuit of a strategic objective is not attainable through a single major operation, the theater operational design includes provision for related phases that may or may not be executed.

(2) The JFC’s vision of how a campaign or operation should unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, assists in framing the commander’s intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase should represent a natural subdivision of the campaign or operation’s intermediate objectives. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities.

(3) Phasing is accomplished using forward and backward planning methods, simultaneously. **Backward planning** develops phases from the end state to the present; it provides better long-term focus. **Forward planning** develops phases from the present to the end state, focusing on near term objectives; it gives planners a better idea of near term feasibility. A successful plan will mesh backward and forward planned phases.

(4) As a general rule, **the phasing of the campaign or operation should be conceived in event-driven rather than time-driven terms.** However, resource availability depends in large part on time-constrained activities and factors — such as sustainment or deployment rates — rather than the events associated with the operation. **The challenge for planners, then, is to reconcile the reality of time-oriented deployment of forces and sustainment with the event-driven phasing of operations.**
Effective phasing must address how the joint force will avoid reaching a culminating point. If resources are insufficient to sustain the force until achieving the end state, planners should consider phasing the campaign or operation to account for necessary operational pauses between phases. Such phasing enables the reconstitution of the joint force during joint operations, but the JFC must understand that this may provide the adversary an opportunity to reconstitute as well. In some cases, sustainment requirements and political factors may even dictate the purpose of certain phases as well as the sequence of those phases. For example, phases may shift the main effort among Service and functional components to maintain momentum while one component is being reconstituted.

c. **Number, Sequence, and Overlap.** Working within the phasing construct, the actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions. A joint campaign or operation may be conducted in multiple phases simultaneously if the OA has widely varying conditions. For instance, the commander may transition to the **stabilize** phase in areas where he has achieved full-spectrum dominance, while remaining in the **dominate** phase in those areas where the enemy has not yet capitulated.
d. **Transitions.** Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. The activities that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing commander’s objectives, desired effects, MOEs, priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the OA. An example is the shift of focus from sustained combat operations in the *dominate* phase to a preponderance of stability operations in the *stabilize* and *enable civil authority* phases. Hostilities gradually lessen as the joint force begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government; and deters adversaries from resuming hostile actions while the US and international community takes steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary for long-term stability. This challenge demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks; and coordination with a wider range of other agencies and multinational partners, to provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

e. **Phasing Model.** Although the commander will determine the number and actual phases used during a campaign or operation, use of the phases shown in Figure IV-9 and described below provides a flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations. **Within the context of these phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS.** For example, the JFLCC or a subordinate JTF might have the following four phases inside the CCDR’s *seize initiative* phase: deploy, forcible entry, defense, and offense. The JFLCC could use the offense sub-phase as a transition to the CCDR’s *dominate* phase.

f. The general phasing construct can be applied to various campaigns and operations. Operations and activities in the *shape* and *deter* phases normally are outlined in SCPs and those in the remaining phases are outlined in JSCP-directed OPLANs. By design, OPLANs generally do not include security cooperation activities that are addressed elsewhere. CCDRs generally use the phasing model to link the pertinent SCP and OPLAN operations and activities.

**1. Shape.** Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and routine military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. **Shape** phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another. Planning that supports most “shaping” requirements typically occurs in the context of day-to-day security cooperation, and combatant commands may incorporate Phase 0 activities and tasks into the SCP. Thus, these requirements are beyond the scope of JP 5-0. However, contingency and crisis action planning requirements also occur while global and theater shaping activities are ongoing.
and these requirements are satisfied in accordance with the CJCSM 3122 series. Moreover, the JOPP steps described in Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” are useful in planning security cooperation activities as well as developing OPLANs and OPORDs.

(2) **Deter.** The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It differs from deterrence that occurs in the shape phase in that it is largely characterized by preparatory actions that specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the operation/campaign. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of ISR assets to provide real-time and near-real-time situational awareness; setting up of transfer operations at en route locations to support aerial ports of debarkation in post-chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attack configurations; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, transportation, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s concepts of operations. CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with other agencies assist in setting conditions for execution of subsequent phases of the campaign or operation. Many actions in the deter phase build on security cooperation activities from the previous phase and are conducted as part of security cooperation plans and activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.

(3) **Seize Initiative.** JFCs seek to seize the initiative in combat and noncombat situations through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the adversary’s initial aggression and to deny the initial objectives. If an adversary has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat power can dislodge adversary forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight.
during the **dominate** phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis.

(4) **Dominate.** The **dominate** phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of joint force capabilities and continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the OA as quickly as possible. When a campaign or operation is focused on conventional enemy forces, the **dominate** phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an adversary to culmination and achieve the JFC’s operational objectives. Against unconventional adversaries, decisive operations are characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment through a combination of conventional, unconventional, information, and stability operations. Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and relieve suffering. In noncombat situations, the joint force’s activities seek to control the situation or operational environment. **Dominate** phase activities may establish the conditions for an early favorable conclusion of operations or set the conditions for transition to the next phase.

(5) **Stabilize.** The **stabilize** phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, IGO, NGO, or USG agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the population. The **stabilize** phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. Stability operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil authority or, in noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur and/or its effects are mitigated. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously assesses the impact of current operations on the ability to transfer overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase.

(6) **Enable Civil Authority.** This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater. Depending upon the level of indigenous state capacity, joint force activities during phase VI may be at the behest of that authority or they may be under its direction. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region. This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting or supported multinational, agency, and other organization participants; establishment of MOEs; and influencing the attitude of the population favorably regarding the US and local civil authority’s objectives. DOD policy is to support indigenous persons or groups promoting freedom, rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy and opposing extremism and the murder of civilians. The joint force will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the **enable civil authority** phase. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will often begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. The military end state is achieved during this phase, signaling the end of the campaign or operation. Operations are concluded when redeployment is
complete. Combatant command involvement with other nations and agencies, beyond the termination of the joint operation, may be required to achieve the national strategic end state.

“These phases of a plan do not comprise rigid instructions, they are merely guideposts. . . . Rigidity inevitably defeats itself, and the analysts who point to a changed detail as evidence of a plan’s weakness are completely unaware of the characteristics of the battlefield.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
APPENDIX A
FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

“In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a general status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people and the wealth of their nations... We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”

The National Security Strategy, September 2002

1. General

Flexible deterrent options are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right signal and influence an adversary’s actions. The basic purpose of FDOs is to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, — but they are most effective when used to combine the influence across instruments of national power. FDOs facilitate early strategic decisionmaking, rapid de-escalation, and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths. Examples of FDOs for each instrument of national power are listed in Figures A-1 through A-4. Key goals of FDOs are:

   a. Deter aggression through communicating the strength of US commitments to treaty obligations and regional peace and stability.

   b. Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs for their possible aggression.

   c. Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.

   d. Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the AOR without precipitating armed response from the adversary.

2. Description of Deterrent Actions

   a. Deterrence is the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. FDOs are deterrent-oriented response options that are requested and may be initiated based on evaluation of indicators of heightened regional tensions.

   b. FDOs serve two basic purposes. First, they assist in bringing an issue to early resolution before armed conflict by sending an appropriate message to belligerent parties. Second, they position US forces in a manner that facilitates implementation of OPLANs or OPORDs in the event that hostilities are unavoidable. They also facilitate an early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that are carefully tailored to avoid the classic response of
“too much, too soon, or too little, too late.” They are initiated before and after unambiguous warning. Although they are not intended to place US forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails, risk analysis should be an inherent step in determining which FDO to use, and how and when that FDO should be used. FDOs have the advantage of rapid de-escalation if the situation precipitating the FDO changes.

3. Flexible Deterrent Option Implementation

The President or SecDef direct FDO implementation, and the specific FDO or combination selected will vary with each situation. Their use will be consistent with US national security strategy. FDOs can be used individually, in packages, sequentially, or concurrently, but are primarily designed to be used in groups that maximize integrated results from all the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. It is imperative that extensive, continuous coordination occurs with interagency and multinational partners in order to maximize the impact of FDOs.

**Figure A-1. Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options**

- Alert and introduce special teams (e.g., public diplomacy)
- Reduce international diplomatic ties
- Increase cultural group pressure
- Promote democratic elections
- Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
- Identify the steps to peaceful resolution
- Restrict activities of diplomatic missions
- Prepare to withdraw or withdraw US embassy personnel
- Take actions to gain support of allies and friends
- Restrict travel of US citizens
- Gain support through the United Nations
- Demonstrate international resolve
### Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options

- Promote US policy objectives through public policy statements
- Ensure consistency of strategic communications themes and messages
- Encourage Congressional support
- Gain US and international public confidence and popular support
- Maintain open dialogue with the news media
- Keep selected issues as lead stories
- Increase protection of friendly critical information structure
- Impose sanctions on communications systems technology transfer
- Implement psychological operations

*Figure A-2. Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options*
EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED MILITARY FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

- Increase readiness posture of in-place forces
- Upgrade alert status
- Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Initiate or increase show-of-force actions
- Increase training and exercise activities
- Maintain an open dialogue with the news media
- Take steps to increase US public support
- Increase defense support to public diplomacy
- Increase information operations
- Deploy forces into or near the potential operational area
- Increase active and passive protection measures
- Ensure consistency of strategic communications messages

Figure A-3. Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options
Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Freeze or seize real property in the United States where possible
- Freeze monetary assets in the United States where possible
- Freeze international assets where possible
- Encourage US and international financial institutions to restrict or terminate financial transactions
- Encourage US and international corporations to restrict transactions
- Embargo goods and services
- Enact trade sanctions
- Enact restrictions on technology transfer
- Cancel or restrict US-funded programs
- Reduce security assistance programs

Figure A-4. Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options
Intentionally Blank
Commander and staff estimates are central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. Below is a sample format that a JFC and joint force staff can use as a guide when developing an estimate. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands and primary staff sections (manpower and personnel directorate, J-2, etc.) based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. Refer to JOPES Volume I for the specific format when there is a requirement for the supported JFC to submit a commander’s estimate to satisfy a formal JOPES planning requirement.

1. Mission
   a. Mission Analysis
      (1) Determine the higher command’s purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. Determine a clearly defined military end state and related termination criteria.
      (2) Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks and their priorities.
      (3) Determine objectives and consider desired and undesired effects.
   b. Mission Statement
      (1) Express in terms of who, what, when, where, and why (purpose).
      (2) Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.

2. Situation and Courses of Action
   a. Situation Analysis
      (1) Geostrategic Context
         (a) Domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; and international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of IGOs, and other competing or distracting international situations. Similar factors must be considered for noncombat operations.
(b) A systems perspective of the operational environment: all relevant political, military (see next paragraph), economic, social, infrastructure, informational, and other aspects. See Chapter IV, “Operational Art and Design,” for a discussion of developing a systems perspective.

(2) **Analysis of the Adversary.** Scrutiny of the opponent situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders normally will have available a formal intelligence estimate) should include the following:

(a) Broad military COAs being taken and available in the future.

(b) Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).

(c) Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.

(d) Possible external military support.

(e) COGs (strategic and operational) and decisive points.

(f) Specific operational characteristics such as strength, composition, location, and disposition; reinforcements; logistics; time, and space factors (including basing utilized and available); and combat/noncombat efficiency and proficiency in joint operations.

(3) **Friendly Situation.** Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the adversary. At the theater level, CCDRs normally will have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and communications estimates; multinational operations require specific analysis of alliance or coalition partner objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Interagency coordination required for the achievement of objectives must also be considered.

(4) **Operational Limitations.** Actions either required or prohibited by higher authority, such as constraints or restraints, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political or economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues.

(5) **Assumptions.** Assumptions are intrinsically important factors upon which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such.

(6) **Deductions.** Deductions from the above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

b. **Course of Action Development and Analysis.** COAs are based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished. Each COA must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. For a CCDR’s strategic estimate, each COA typically
will constitute an alternative theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following:

(1) Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.

(2) Major forces or capabilities required (to include joint, interagency, and multinational).

(3) C2 concept.

(4) Sustainment concept.

(5) Deployment concept.

(6) Estimate of time required to achieve the termination criteria.

(7) Concept for establishing and maintaining a theater reserve.

3. Analysis of Adversary Capabilities and Intentions

   a. Determine the probable effect of possible adversary capabilities and intentions on the success of each friendly COA (accomplished by a “red cell” if one is formed).

   b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider:

      (1) The potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.

      (2) Conflict termination issues; think through own action, opponent reaction, and counteraction.

      (3) The potential impact on friendly desired effects and the likelihood that the adversary’s actions will cause specific undesired effects.

   c. Conclude with revalidation of friendly COAs. Determine additional requirements, make required modifications, and list advantages and disadvantages of each adversary capability.

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

   a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

   b. Compare with respect to governing factors.
(1) Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of joint operations, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational art).

(2) Other factors (for example, political constraints).

(3) Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

5. **Recommendation**

   Provide an assessment of which COAs are supportable, an analysis of the risk for each, and a concise statement of the recommended COA with its requirements.
APPENDIX C

JOINT OPERATION PLAN FORMAT

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION

Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing a joint operation plan. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. However, joint OPLANs will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as paragraph 3, “Execution”) and their primary subparagraphs (such as paragraph 3a, “Concept of Operations”). The JPEC typically refers to a joint OPLAN that encompasses more that one major operation as a campaign plan, but JFCs prepare a plan for a campaign in joint OPLAN format.

CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), describes joint operation planning interaction between the President, SecDef, CJCS, the supported joint commander, and other JPEC members, and provides models of planning messages and estimates. CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II: (Planning Formats), provides the formats for joint OPLANs when commanders must submit OPLANs in accordance with JOPES policy requirements.

SECTION B. OPLAN FORMAT

a. Copy No. ______________________

b. Issuing Headquarters

c. Place of Issue

d. Effective Date/Time Group

e. OPERATION PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

f. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .

g. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan.)

1. Situation

(This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses [see national intelligence estimate, any multinational sources, and strategic and commanders’ estimates].)
a. **General.** (This section describes the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the OPLAN. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State US policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline political decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US military operations to attain US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

(1) **Environment of Conflict.** (Provide a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context [JSCP, UCP].)

(2) **Policy Goals.** (This section relates the strategic guidance, end state, and termination objectives to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and space dimensions, interests, intentions/criteria for termination.)

   (a) US/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identify the national security, multinational or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the combatant command.)

   (b) End State. (Describe the national strategic end state and relate the military end state to the national strategic end state.)

(3) **Non-US National Political Decisions.**

(4) **Operational Limitations.** (List actions that are prohibited or required by higher or multinational authority [ROE, law of armed conflict, termination criteria, etc.].)

b. **Area of Concern**

(1) **Operational Area.** (Describe the JFC’s OA. A map may be used as an attachment to graphically depict the area.)

(2) **Area of Interest.** (Describe the area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.)

c. **Deterrent Options.** (Delineate FDOs desired to include those categories specified in the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of LAD relative to C-day. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options accomplished by non-DOD agencies that would support US mission accomplishment. See Appendix A, “Flexible Deterrent Options,” for examples of FDOs.)

d. **Risk.** (Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. List the specific hazards that the joint force may encounter during the mission. List risk mitigation measures.)
e. **Adversary Forces.** (Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution and appraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to Annex B (Intelligence) for details. However, this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. Identify the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs and critical vulnerabilities as depicted below.)

(1) **Adversary Centers of Gravity.**

   (a) Strategic.

   (b) Operational.

(2) **Adversary Critical Factors.**

   (a) Strategic.

   (b) Operational.

(3) **Adversary Courses of Action** (most likely and most dangerous to friendly mission accomplishment).

   (a) General.

   (b) Adversary’s End State.

   (c) Adversary’s Strategic Objectives.

   (d) Adversary’s Operational Objectives.

   (e) Adversary Concept of Operations.

(4) **Adversary Logistics and Sustainment.**

(5) **Other Adversary Forces/Capabilities.**

(6) **Adversary Reserve Mobilization.**

f. **Friendly Forces**

(1) **Friendly Centers of Gravity.** (This section should identify friendly COGs, both strategic and operational; this provides focus to force protection efforts.)

   (a) Strategic.

   (b) Operational.

(2) **Friendly Critical Factors.**
(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(3) **Multinational Forces.**

(4) **Supporting Commands and Agencies.** (Describe the operations of unassigned forces, other than those tasked to support this OPLAN, that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in the plan. Also list the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or government agencies that would directly support execution of the OPLAN. For example, USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, Defense Intelligence Agency, and so forth.)

g. **Assumptions.** (List all reasonable assumptions for all participants contained in the JSCP or other tasking on which the OPLAN is based. State expected conditions over which the JFC has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of the plan and supporting plans, and assumptions to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they do not occur as expected, would invalidate the plan or its CONOPS. Specify the mobility (air and sea lift), the degree of mobilization assumed, i.e., total, full, partial, selective, or none.)

(1) **Threat Warning/Timeline.**

(2) **Pre-positioning and Regional Access** (including international support and assistance).

(3) **In-Place Forces.**

(4) **Strategic Assumptions** (including those pertaining to nuclear weapons employment).

(5) **Legal Considerations.** (List those significant legal considerations on which the plan is based.)

(a) International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict.

(b) United States Law.

(c) Host nation and coalition laws.

(d) ROE.

(e) Status-of-Forces Agreements.

(f) Other bilateral treaties and agreements including Article 98 agreements.
2. **Mission**

(State concisely the essential task(s) the JFC has to accomplish. This statement should address: who, what, when, where, and why.)

3. **Execution**

**Annex C (Operations)**

a. **Concept of Operations.** (For a CCDR’s OPLAN, the appropriate strategic concept(s) can be taken from the SCP and developed into a strategic concept of operation for a theater campaign or operation plan. Otherwise, the CONOPS will be developed as a result of the COA selected by the JFC during COA development. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how. It also contains the JFC’s strategic vision, intent and design in the strategic concept of operation for force projection operations, including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment of all participating forces, activities and agencies.)

   (1) **Commander’s Intent.** (This should describe the JFC’s intent (purpose and end state), overall and by phase. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and their supporting effects. It may also include how the posture of forces at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the JFC’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. The commander’s intent, though, is not a summary of the CONOPS.)

      (a) Purpose and End State. (See Chapter II, “Strategic Direction,” for details on determining the end state.)

      (b) Objectives. (See Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” for a vignette example of how objectives can be included in the intent narrative.)

      (c) Effects, if discussed. (See Chapter III, “The Joint Operation Planning Process,” for a vignette example of how desired and undesired effects can be included in the intent narrative.)

   (2) **General.** (Base the CONOPS on the JFC’s selected COA. The CONOPS states how the commander plans to accomplish the mission, including the forces involved; the phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross-Service support. For a CCDR’s OPLAN, the CONOPS should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve Component mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve Component force size requirements. The CONOPS should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans. To the extent possible, the CONOPS should incorporate the following:)}
(a) JFC’s military objectives, supporting desired effects, and operational focus.

(b) Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs.

(c) Protection of friendly strategic and operational COGs.

(d) Phasing of operations, to include the commander’s intent for each phase.

1. Phase I:

   a. JFC’s Intent.

   b. Timing.

   c. Objectives and desired effects.

   d. Risk.

   e. Execution.

   f. Employment.

      (1) Land Forces.

      (2) Air Forces.

      (3) Maritime Forces.

      (4) Space Forces.

      (5) SOF.

      (6) Joint CMO Task Force.

   g. Operational Fires. List those significant fires considerations on which the plan is based. The fires discussion should reflect the JFC’s concept for application of available fires assets. Guidance for joint fires may address the following:

      (1) Joint force policies, procedures, and planning cycles.

      (2) Joint fire support assets for planning purposes.

      (3) Priorities for employing target acquisition assets.
(4) Areas that require joint fires to support operational maneuver.

(5) Anticipated joint fire support requirements.

(6) Fire support coordinating measures (if required).

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for a detailed discussion.

2. Phases II through XX. (Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3a(2)(d) above for each subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new opportunities.)

   b. Tasks. (List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands in separate subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform to fulfill the CONOPS, including operational and tactical deception. If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published separately to receive special handling.)

   c. Coordinating Instructions. (Provide instructions necessary for coordination and synchronization of the joint operation that apply to two or more elements of the command. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments.)

4. Administration and Logistics

   a. Concept of Sustainment. (This should provide broad guidance for the theater strategic sustainment concept for the campaign or operation, with information and instructions broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, transportation, personnel policies, and administration.)

   b. Logistics. (This paragraph should address sustainment priorities and resources; base development and other civil engineering requirements; HNS; contracted support; environmental considerations; and inter-Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and phase of the concept. Note: Logistic phases must complement the operation’s phases. Identify strategic and theater ports of embarkation and debarkation for resupply. Outline transportation policies, guidance, and procedures for all options and phases.)

   c. Personnel. (Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required individual augmentation to command headquarters and other operational requirements.)

   d. Public Affairs. Refer to Annex F.
Appendix C

e. **Civil-Military Operations.** Refer to Annex G.

f. **Meteorological and Oceanographic Services.** Refer to Annex H.

g. **Environmental Considerations.** Refer to Annex L. See JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.

h. **Geospatial Information and Services.** Refer to Annex M.

i. **Health Service Support.** Refer to Annex Q. (Identify planning requirements and subordinate taskings for health service support functional areas. Address critical medical supplies and resources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include them in a subparagraph.)

5. **Command and Control**

a. **Command**

   (1) **Command Relationships.** (State the organizational structure expected to exist during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major C2 organizations and the time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums of understanding used and those that require development.)

   (2) **Command Posts.** (List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the plan provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing each headquarters.)

   (3) **Succession to Command.** (Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific circumstances.)

b. **Joint Communications System Support.** (Provide a general statement concerning the scope of communications systems and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any communications systems or procedures requiring special emphasis.) Refer to Annex K.

/s/
/t/
Rank/Service
Commander

**Annexes:**
Joint Operation Plan Format

A — Task Organization

B — Intelligence

C — Operations

D — Logistics

E — Personnel

F — Public Affairs

G — Civil-Military Operations

H — Meteorological and Oceanographic Services

J — Command Relationships

K — Communications Systems Support

L — Environmental Considerations

M — Geospatial Information and Services

N — Space Operations

P — Host-Nation Support

Q — Medical Services

R — Reports

S — Special Technical Operations

T — Consequence Management

U — Notional OPLAN Decision Guide

V — Interagency Coordination

X — Execution Checklist

Y — Strategic Communications
Z — Distribution

AA — Religious Support

Note: Annexes A-D, K, and Y are required annexes for a crisis action planning OPORD per JOPES. All others may either be required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the supported CCDR.
The development of JP 5-0 is based on the following primary references:

1. **Federal Statutory Laws**
   
   Title 10, US Code, as amended.

2. **Presidential Guidance**
   
   a. Unified Command Plan.
   
   b. Contingency Planning Guidance.

3. **Secretary of Defense Guidance**
   
   a. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *Forces for Unified Commands*.
   
   
   
   d. Strategic Planning Guidance.
   
   e. Security Cooperation Guidance.

4. **Department of Defense**
   
   
   
   
   d. DOD Instruction 3020.41 *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.
   
   e. DOD Instruction 3027.21, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises*. 
Appendix D

5. Department of State

Briefing, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization United States Department of State, Post Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks

6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

   a. CJCSI 3020.01, Managing, Integrating, and Using Joint Deployment Information Systems.
   b. CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System.
   c. CJCSI 3110.01, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
   d. CJCSI 3141.01C, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans.
   e. CJCSI 3401.01C, Chairman’s Readiness System.
   f. CJCSI 5714.01A, Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and Information.
   g. CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.
   h. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).
   i. CJCSM 3122.02, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume III: Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data, Development and Deployment Execution.
   j. CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II: (Planning Formats).
   k. CJCSM 3141.01C, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans.
   l. CJCSM 3150.01A, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions.

7. Joint Publications

   a. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.
   b. JP 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces (UNAAF).
   c. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.
References

d. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

e. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

f. JP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

g. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

h. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

i. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

k. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

l. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

m. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.

n. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

o. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

p. JP 3-0, Joint Targeting.

q. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

r. JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

s. JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning.

t. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

8. Service Publications


b. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare.

c. AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack.

d. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations.
Appendix D

e. AFDD 2-2.1, *Counterspace Operations*.

f. AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*.

g. AFDD 2-6, *Air Mobility Operations*.

h. AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations*.

i. AFDD 2-8, *Command and Control*.

j. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-2, *Campaigning*.

k. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*.

l. FM 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations*.

m. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*.

n. FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*.

o. MCDP 5, *Planning*.

p. Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*.

q. *Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System*

r. *Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan*.

s. *Marine Corps Capabilities Plan and Marine Corps Mobilization, Activation, Integration, Deactivation Plan*.

t. *Air Force War and Mobilization Plan*.

u. *Coast Guard Capabilities Manual and Coast Guard Logistic Support and Mobilization Plan*. 

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Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

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3. Supersession


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PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

acceptability. The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the contemplated course of action is proportional and worth the cost in personnel, equipment, materiel, time involved, or position; is consistent with the law of war; and is militarily and politically supportable. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

adequacy. The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the scope and concept of planned operations can accomplish the assigned mission and comply with the planning guidance provided. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 1-02)

alert order. 1. A crisis action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action. Also called ALERTORD. See also course of action; execution planning. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. See also coalition; multinational. (JP 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distribution for employment of limited forces and resources among competing requirements. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning)
are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. See also allocation. (JP 1-02)

archive. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or “agents.” (JP 1-02)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization when such placement is relatively permanent and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. See also attach. (JP 1-02)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization when such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. See also assign. (JP 1-02)

augmentation forces. Forces to be transferred from a supporting combatant commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported combatant commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the President and Secretary of Defense. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

base of operations. An area or facility from which a military force begins its offensive operations to which it falls back in case of reverse, and in which supply facilities are organized. (JP 1-02)

base plan. In the context of joint operation planning level 2 planning detail, a type of operation plan that describes the concept of operations, major forces, sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes or a time-phased force and deployment data. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

battle damage assessment. The estimate of damage resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also combat assessment. (JP 1-02)

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an activity, which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a smaller scale. Unlike an
annex, a branch is not merely an overflow addition. 3. An arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the base plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. See also sequel. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

campaign. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. Campaign planning may begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. See also campaign. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. See also critical capability; critical requirement; critical vulnerability. (JP 1-02)

collegation. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.
Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of
subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force
commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command
(command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the
combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control
is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant
command; combatant commander; operational control; tactical control. (JP 1-02)

**combatant commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands
established by the President. Also called CCDR. See also combatant command. (JP 1-02)

**combatant commander’s strategic concept.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of
JP 1-02.)

**combat assessment.** The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military
operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage
assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. Also called
CA. (JP 1-02)

**combat support agency.** A Department of Defense agency so designated by Congress or the
Secretary of Defense that supports military combat operations. Also called CSA. (Approved
for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the
accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

**commander’s estimate.** In the context of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
level 1 planning detail for contingency planning, a developed course of action. The product
for this level can be a course of action briefing, command directive, commander’s estimate,
or a memorandum. The commander’s estimate provides the Secretary of Defense with
military courses of action to meet a potential contingency. See also commander’s estimate
of the situation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**commander’s estimate of the situation.** A process of reasoning by which a commander considers
all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course
of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate, which considers
a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions, is called a
commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)
**commander’s intent.** A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (JP 1-02)

**common operational picture.** A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. (JP 1-02)

**completeness.** The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether operation plans incorporate major operations and tasks to be accomplished and to what degree they include forces required, deployment concept, employment concept, sustainment concept, time estimates for achieving objectives, description of the end state, mission success criteria, and mission termination criteria. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**concept of operations.** A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**concept plan.** In the context of joint operation planning level 3 planning detail, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Also called CONPLAN. See also operation plan. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**constraint.** In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. See also operational limitation; restraint. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**contingency.** A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect US interests. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**contingency operation.** A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (title 10, United States Code (USC), section 101 (a)(13). It is a military operation that: a. is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the Armed Forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force; or b. is created by operation of law. Under 10 USC 101 (a)(13)(B), a contingency operations exists if a military operation results in the (1) call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under certain enumerated statues (10 USC 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, 12406, or 331-335); and (2) the call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services
under other (non-enumerated) statutes during war or national emergency declared by the President or Congress. See also contingency; operation. (JP 1-02)

contingency plan. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

contingency planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning activities that occur in noncrisis situations. The Joint Planning and Execution Community uses contingency planning to develop operation plans for a broad range of contingencies based on requirements identified in the Contingency Planning Guidance, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or other planning directive. Contingency planning underpins and facilitates the transition to crisis action planning. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase and the course-of-action determination steps of the joint operation planning process. Also called COA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

course of action development. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning. One of the two types of joint operation planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. See also contingency planning; joint operation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

critical capability. A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). See also critical requirement, critical vulnerability. (JP 1-02)

critical requirement. An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. See also critical capability, critical vulnerability. (JP 1-02)
critical vulnerability. An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. See also critical capability, critical requirement. (JP 1-02)

culminating point. The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which effective counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

decision point. A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. See also course of action. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 1-02)

deliberate planning. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

deployment database. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database containing the necessary information on forces, materiel, and filler and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The database reflects information contained in the refined time-phased force and deployment data from the contingency planning process or developed during the various phases of the crisis action planning process, and the movement schedules or tables developed by the transportation component commands to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

deployment order. A planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between combatant commands by reassignment or attachment. A deployment order normally specifies the authority that the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the transferred forces. Also called DEPORD. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

deployment planning. Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)
**deterrence.** The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (JP 1-02)

**effect.** 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02)

**employment.** The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (JP 1-02)

**employment planning.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**end state.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02)

**essential task.** In the context of joint operation planning, a specified or implied task that an organization must perform to accomplish the mission. An essential task is typically included in the mission statement. See also implied task; specified task. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**estimate.** 1. An analysis of a foreign situation, development, or trend that identifies its major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the prospective results of the various actions that might be taken. 2. An appraisal of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or contemplated course of action. 3. An analysis of an actual or contemplated clandestine operation in relation to the situation in which it is or would be conducted in order to identify and appraise such factors as available as well as needed assets and potential obstacles, accomplishments, and consequences. (JP 1-02)

**execute order.** 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. Also called EXORD. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**execution planning.** The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior contingency planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. Also called EP. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
feasibility. The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

fires. The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP 1-02)

flexible deterrent option. A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to produce a desired effect. The flexible deterrent option is the means by which the various diplomatic, information, military, and economic deterrent measures available to the President are included in the joint operation planning process. Also called FDO. (JP 1-02)

force planning. 1. Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations Command and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services. 2. In the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, the planning conducted by the supported combatant command and its components to determine required force capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission, as well as by the Military Departments, Services, and Service component commands of the combatant commands, to develop forces lists, source and tailor required force capabilities with actual units, identify and resolve shortfalls, and determine the routing and time-phasing of forces into the operational area. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

force projection. The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

fragmentary order. An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. Also called FRAGORD. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

friendly force information requirement. Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations
to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

**functional plans.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**governing factors.** In the context of joint operation planning, those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to the accomplishment of the mission. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**host-nation support.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

**implementation planning.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**implied task.** In the context of joint operation planning, a task derived during mission analysis that an organization must perform or prepare to perform to accomplish a specified task or the mission, but which is not stated in the higher headquarters order. See also essential task; specified task. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**information operations.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also operations security; psychological operations. (JP 1-02)

**instruments of national power.** All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1-02)

**integration.** 1. In force projection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander’s force prior to mission execution. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02)

**intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.** An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 1-02)

**interagency coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)
interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. Also called JIPOE. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-01.3.)

joint intelligence support element. A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. Also called JISE. (JP 1-02)

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02)

joint operation planning. Planning activities associated joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises. Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. (This term
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A system of joint policies, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and computer systems, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. See also joint operation planning; joint planning and execution community. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Joint operation planning process. An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action against criteria of success and each other; select the best course of action; and produce a joint operation plan or order. Also called JOPP. See also joint operation planning. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 1-02)

Joint planning and execution community. Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, mobilization, deployment, employment, support, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of military forces assigned or committed to a joint operation. It consists of the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), the combatant commands (and their Service component commands), the subordinate unified commands and other subordinate joint forces of the combatant commands, and the combat support agencies. Also called JPEC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Joint planning group. A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. Also called JPG. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions limited forces and resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and Secretary of Defense. Also called JSCP. See
also combatant commander; joint. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**Joint Strategic Planning System.** One of the primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews joint operation plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

leverage. In the context of joint operation planning, a relative advantage in combat power and/or other circumstances against the adversary across one or more domains (air, land, sea, and space) and/or the information environment sufficient to exploit that advantage. Leverage is an element of operational design. See also operational art; operational design. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**line of communications.** A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02)

**line of operations.** 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (JP 1-02)

link. 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, which links any two or more routes. See also node. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

maintain. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**major operation.** A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. (JP 1-02)
**maneuver.** 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02)

**measure of effectiveness.** A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. See also measure of performance. (JP 1-02)

**measure of performance.** A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. See also measure of effectiveness. (JP 1-02)

**mission.** 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. See also mission statement. (JP 1-02)

**mission statement.** A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose—a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how. See also mission. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**multinational.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. See also coalition. (JP 1-02)

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also alliance, coalition. (JP 1-02)

**national defense strategy.** A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. Also called NDS. (JP 1-02)

**national military strategy.** A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS. (JP 1-02)

**national policy.** A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)
national security strategy. A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. See also national military strategy. (JP 1-02)

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated. 2. In communications and computer systems, the physical location that provides terminating, switching, and gateway access services to support information exchange. 3. An element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing. See also link. (JP 1-02)

nuclear planning system. A system composed of personnel, directives, and electronic data processing systems to directly support geographic nuclear combatant commanders in developing, maintaining, and disseminating nuclear operation plans. (JP 1-02)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

operation. 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. Also called OA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

operational art. The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. See also operational design. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks,
designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority); tactical control. (JP 1-02)

**operational design.** The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. See also operational art. (JP 1-02)

**operational design element.** A key consideration used in operational design. (JP 1-02)

**operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

**operational limitation.** An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. See also constraint; restraint. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational pause.** A temporary halt in operations. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational reach.** The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 1-02)

**operation order.** A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02)

**operation plan.** 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. In the context of joint operation planning level 4 planning detail, a
complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. Also called OPLAN. See also operation order. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

**phase.** In joint operation planning, a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**planning order.** A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. Also called PLANORD. See also execution planning. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**prepare to deploy order.** An order issued by competent authority to move forces or prepare forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units). Also called PTDO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “deployment preparation order” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**priority intelligence requirement.** An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. Also called PIR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**readiness planning.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)
restraint. In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. See also constraint; operational limitation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

retain. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

risk. 1. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. See also security cooperation planning. (JP 1-02)

security cooperation planning. The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to support the Department of Defense’s security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander’s theater strategy. See also security cooperation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

sequel. In a campaign, a major operation that follows the current major operation. In a single major operation, a sequel is the next phase. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. See also branch. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

special operations-peculiar. Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, special operations forces until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items and services approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission. Also called SO-peculiar. (JP 1-02)
specified task. In the context of joint operation planning, a task that is specifically assigned to an organization by its higher headquarters. See also essential task; implied task. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

strategic direction. The common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance in the form of various strategic products. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)

strategy determination. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the
context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. See also joint operation planning. (JP 1-02)

**supporting commander.** 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. See also supported commander. (JP 1-02)

**supporting plan.** An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. See also supported commander; supporting commander. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**sustainment.** The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

**synchronization.** 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan. (JP 1-02)

**system.** A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 1-02)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority); operational control. (JP 1-02)

**tactical level of war.** The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on
the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war. (JP 1-02)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering commander’s objectives, operational requirements, capabilities, and limitations. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-60.)

termination criteria. The specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. (JP 1-02)

theater. The geographical area for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters of operations normally will be geographically separate and focused on different missions. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Also called TO. See also theater of war. (JP 1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the Secretary of Defense or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. See also theater of operations. (JP 1-02)

theater strategic environment. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

theater strategy. Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. See also national military strategy; national security strategy. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)
unified action. A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization and/or integration of joint or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations) directed by national civilian and military authorities and the commanders of unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 1.)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, that is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

Unified Command Plan. The document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also called UCP. See also combatant command; combatant commander. (JP 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. Also called WARNORD. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 is the Plans keystone publication. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and combatant commands
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and combatant commands
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent.
  Lead Agent can be Service, combatant command or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and combatant commands
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The combatant commands receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised