Full Spectrum Support for the Joint Commander: Incorporating Cultural Intelligence into Joint Doctrine

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JND Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. ABSTRACT
Joint Intelligence doctrine focuses too much on traditional adversaries in combat situations and does not adequately address issues of foreign culture. Additionally, Intelligence doctrine for process and planning does not adequately direct the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) Intelligence establishment to prepare estimates on the characteristic features of foreign peoples that includes items such as their civilizations, beliefs, and social institutions. These flows leave the commander and his forces vulnerable when they must operate in foreign societies or with foreign groups. These groups include the local peoples in the joint operations area as well as the foreign forces in a coalition. In order to better support the commander across the range of military operations the military must expand joint intelligence doctrine to include cultural Intelligence.

This paper analyzes the focus of joint intelligence doctrine and its lack of consideration of foreign culture. It asserts that the JFC should possess the best in-depth and current analysis that provides him understanding of the cultures of the foreign groups with which he and his forces will interact. It also makes specific recommendations on how to incorporate cultural analysis into joint Intelligence doctrine, and it provides a definition of cultural Intelligence.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Intelligence, Culture, Doctrine, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, JIPB, IPP, Operational Functions, ISR, Estimate, Cultural Intelligence, MOOTW, Transition Operations.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
UNCLASSIFIED

17. ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
25
FULL SPECTRUM INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT COMMANDER:  
INCORPORATING CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE INTO JOINT DOCTRINE

by

John P. (Jay) Coles  
LCDR  USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of National Security Decision Making.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _________________________________

14 February 2005

Capt S.R. Neville, USN, JMO Faculty
INTRODUCTION

Joint intelligence doctrine is flawed. The doctrine focuses too much on traditional adversaries in combat situations and does not adequately address issues of foreign culture. Additionally, intelligence doctrine for process and planning does not adequately direct the joint force commander’s (JFC) intelligence establishment to prepare estimates on the characteristic features of foreign peoples that includes items such as their civilizations, beliefs, and social institutions. These flaws leave the commander and his forces vulnerable and reactionary when they must operate closely with foreign peoples and in foreign societies. Many, including Thomas Barnett, assert that prospects for future operations will increasingly include military operations other than war (MOOTW), not conventional force-on-force conflict, in the world’s non-globalized areas. This means interactions with a variety of foreign populations in very diverse geographic, economic, and cultural regions will remain high. In order to better support the commander across the range of military operations that our forces face--today and tomorrow--the military must expand joint intelligence doctrine to include cultural intelligence.

Joint operations are continuing to place U.S. forces in other countries for extended periods. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is just the latest example of how large numbers of troops can quickly shift from traditional, high intensity combat operations to MOOTW such as nation assistance and counterinsurgency support. They can then find themselves in the midst of a society, rather than a battlefield, performing a wide range of tasks required to rebuild an entire nation. In Iraq, U.S. leaders and forces must interact every day with all segments of the local population. Iraq is an obvious example, but operations in Afghanistan, Djibouti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, the Philippines, Lebanon, and Somalia highlight only a few
of the many places where U.S. and U.S. led coalition forces have had troops, airmen, and sailors on the ground conducting operations and interacting with local populations.

To develop the best courses of action for mission success, the operational commander must understand the cultures of the foreign groups with which he and his forces will interact. These groups include the local peoples in the joint operations area as well as the foreign forces in a coalition. The JFC should possess the best in-depth and current analysis that provides him insight on these foreign peoples. The joint force must know how to best interact with the locals. Interactions that cause mistakes and delays may derail achieving an objective, cost precious time, thwart an initiative, or cause the force to miss important local information or intelligence. As the potential for low intensity conflict, MOOTW, and MOOTW transitioning from combat operations remains high, the need for good cultural intelligence remains high too. It would be a mistake to continue to marginalize cultural intelligence in joint intelligence doctrine.

Cultural intelligence can be defined as analyzed social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviors. It helps provide understanding as to why a people act as they do and what they think. Cultural intelligence provides a baseline for education and designing successful strategies to interact with foreign peoples whether they are allies, neutrals, people of an occupied territory, or enemies.

Cultural intelligence is more than demographics. It provides understanding of not only how other groups act but why. It gives the commander as well as the soldier the knowledge to anticipate reactions to selected courses of action. Cultural intelligence is able to provide the commander a cultural framework within which to shape plans and actions. It
provides operational and tactical forces knowledge to guide their actions when working with foreign nationals so they can better achieve objectives. Cultural intelligence products must be built early and ready for the commander and forces prior to the start of operations. Cultural intelligence should provide the foundation of knowledge for all types of operations in foreign lands and for all levels of war. It is especially relevant for the JFC because he must work with coalitions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), host nations, and other regional power brokers. If used properly it will enable U.S. forces to more successfully interact with foreigners, both in their countries or within coalitions, and more successfully achieve mission objectives.

**Plan of Analysis**

The need for cultural intelligence will be shown. Then joint intelligence doctrine in the joint publication series will be analyzed to show that intelligence doctrine is too focused on traditional nation-state warfare and combat adversaries. It does not provide enough detail on how to provide intelligence for true cultural understanding of foreign peoples. It does not explain how cultural intelligence can help the operational commander and his forces. Interestingly, an examination of joint operations doctrine will show that some consideration of culture has been taken into account in MOOTW operations, but it is not nearly detailed enough or linked to joint intelligence doctrine. With the gaps in doctrine identified, recommendations will be made to improve joint intelligence doctrine.

**The Need for Cultural Intelligence**

The need for cultural understanding to conduct successful operations has been stated and written many times. For almost one hundred years the U.S. Marine Corps has considered cultural issues in its MOOTW. It most recently captured these issues and other small
contingency best practices in its *Small Wars Manual* last formally published in 1940. In this manual the need for true cultural understanding is emphasized for the Marines that will be operating in foreign countries. However, the lesson of including cultural intelligence in our joint intelligence effort and doctrine has not been learned. Historical feedback and recent lessons-learned confirm this. In a perceptive article on transforming doctrine with cultural intelligence, George Smith draws fascinating parallels between Napoleon’s campaign in Spain and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In each conflict, conventional military operations were quickly won, but stabilization operations encountered long and difficult problems due to a lack of proper planning for and understanding of the local populations in each country.  

Regarding OIF, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, V Corps Commander in OIF, stated that the value of “cultural intelligence” was a lesson learned. He noted, “If we are going to insert Army formations in a culture that is different than our own, we’ve got to have a much better appreciation for what the impact of insertion of U.S. formations into that culture might have...we need to be a lot more sensitive to that . . .” 

Analysis of other recent operations and wars also highlights the need for good cultural intelligence. Vietnam provided many examples, but operations in Somalia give even more applicable lessons to the varied MOOTW missions we continue to conduct. When conducting stability, humanitarian relief and other MOOTW operations in Somalia, Marine General Anthony Zinni, former commander of Operations *Restore Hope, Continue Hope*, and *United Shield* stated:

> What we need is cultural intelligence. What makes them [the faction leaders and people] tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?...What you need to know isn’t what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you.
General Zinni’s assessments and views on the need for cultural intelligence are well documented. Why do we keep making the same mistakes and relearning the same lessons? Undoubtedly part of the answer lies within our own military culture which is more geared to preparing for and fighting conventional military operations. That culture is clearly expressed in our doctrine.

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE**

Joint doctrine defines intelligence as a “product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas,” and the “information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.”

Examination in more detail of what intelligence is in joint doctrine shows that it centers on combat adversaries and the physical environment. Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, states:

> Intelligence provides knowledge of the enemy to JFCs. Intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. Intelligence assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future course of action.

Joint intelligence doctrine is almost exclusively focused on combat operations and getting the JFC information on combat adversaries and the battlespace. It is interesting to note that the doctrine already includes language that reflects the growing trend of the military operations and fighting construct to support information superiority and network centric warfare. Yet, the age-old need to understand foreign cultures is not given doctrinal emphasis. It is no wonder that we have to relearn hard lessons on the need for cultural intelligence.
Joint doctrine breaks operations into two categories: war and MOOTW. In war, intelligence is focused on support to combat operations adhering to the principles of war. Tasks include things such as defining objectives and centers of gravity, determining orders of battle, and targeting. Cultural issues are not emphasized at all, and this may lead to problems.

In intelligence doctrine for MOOTW, intelligence is supposed to provide assessments that help the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. MOOTW as a set of operations is considered in two categories: MOOTW involving the use or threat of force and MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force. Figure 1 shows how JP 2-0 breaks out the key intelligence requirements. In a dangerous assumption, doctrine states that the intelligence requirements for supporting MOOTW and the use of force “are similar to those required during war.” This downplays the role the local populations play in achieving mission success. In the JP 2-0 construct then, it is intelligence during MOOTW not involving force, where one would then expect to find doctrine supporting the need for cultural intelligence. Unfortunately, as Figure 1 from JP 2-0 shows, it is clear that the requirements listed pertain to developing the physical, threat and...
target-oriented aspects of the situation, not developing a true understanding of local peoples and their culture in the way that General Zinni espouses.

What we get from joint intelligence doctrine are general requirements like, “Intelligence develops knowledge of the environment in relation to the JFC’s questions concerning actual and potential threats...cultural characteristics, medical conditions, population, leadership, and many other issues concerning the operational area.” The intelligence doctrine is geared to support the more physical aspects of the operation. Providing cultural intelligence and insight on the local populations is not the focus. The direction to provide “cultural characteristics” will get the commander some demographic overlays showing data like tribal locations and a geographic chart showing a region’s religious breakdown by percentage. A doctrinal example in JP 2-0 states, “Intelligence helps the JFC determine which forces to employ and assists in estimating the duration of the operation. During disaster relief operations, intelligence can play an important role in surveying the extent of damage and the level of suffering and can assist in planning for the deployment of relief forces.”

Doctrine is telling us that intelligence can do things like use imagery and airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to survey terrain and help in the deployment of forces to “combat” physical, terrain related problems. Unfortunately, there are not other examples provided, and it is not implied that the intelligence officer (J-2) needs to provide intelligence on the people and leaders in the context, understanding and meaning that commanders like Zinni and Wallace are saying they need.

JP 2-0 also addresses intelligence doctrine during peacetime. In a short section, it states:
During peacetime, intelligence helps commanders project future adversary capabilities; make acquisition decisions; protect technological advances; define weapons systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems requirements; shape organizations; and design training to ready the joint force. Intelligence assets monitor foreign states and volatile regions to identify threats to U.S. interests in time for the National Command Authorities (NCA) to respond effectively.12

Thus, in peacetime preparations, intelligence is focused on strategic acquisitions, indications and warning, and training.

JP 2-01, Joint and National Support to Military Operations, focuses on the need for intelligence to quickly support the speed of command functions and the planning process. Obtaining efficiency in the process and effectiveness in support to the JFC are important. Intelligence products are placed in five categories: Indications and Warning (I&W), current intelligence, general military intelligence, targeting, and scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence. While “political, economic and social aspects of countries in a Joint Operations Area” are listed as a part of “General Military Intelligence,” as the title suggests, adversaries and militaries are stressed, and the key products are military capabilities assessments and course of action estimates.13

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) doctrine in JP 2-01.3 is also primarily focused on traditional combat operations. This includes how to prepare products to support analyses of the battlespace, environment and determining enemy courses of action. It is geared “towards preparatory intelligence analysis for operational level force-on-force confrontations.”14 There is a short chapter on JIPB support to MOOTW. It provides a few useful starting points on how to apply elements of the normal process to various MOOTW operations. However, the discussion focuses too much on how to modify normal JIPB products for the MOOTW situation instead of putting real guidance into items that may help
in non-combat, transition or MOOTW missions. Even the chapter wording states, “the primary purpose of JIPB support to MOOTW is to heighten the JFC’s awareness of the battlespace and threat the joint force is most likely to encounter.” There is no provision to truly include the needed, in-depth cultural intelligence into JIPB.

**OPERATIONS DOCTRINE - MOOTW**

The best joint doctrinal requirements for cultural intelligence are found in joint operations doctrine for MOOTW (JP 3-07). The MOOTW focus is on operations deterring war and promoting peace, not large scale combat operations. However, it is recognized that noncombat MOOTW can be simultaneous with combat MOOTW. Intelligence requirements in this publication include understanding culture in order to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government. The doctrine mentions cultural issues important in the planning considerations for the sixteen types of MOOTW missions listed in JP 3-07. Some of the planning considerations include: multinational operations, public affairs, civil affairs, psychological operations, intelligence and coordination with NGOs and IGOs. Each of these planning considerations requires some degree of cultural understanding in order to enable the mission to be planned and carried out effectively. JP 3-07 states,

> Intelligence collection in MOOTW…might require a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. Information collection and analysis in MOOTW must often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered in war. It will require a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. It is only through an understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervener can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy . . . .

The operational MOOTW doctrine almost assumes that the JFC will not have this understanding at the beginning of the operation. It asserts that human intelligence will
probably be the best intelligence source to help the commander gain the understanding he needs. The problem though, is that the JFC may be at a huge disadvantage if he has to wait until he is assigned the mission and is located in the joint operations area in order to start building the cultural understanding he needs. In a similar fashion, it takes time to develop human intelligence sources. The national intelligence structure supporting the Department of Defense (DOD) may be able to provide some baseline intelligence assessments from a strategic level, but neither it nor the Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Center are geared to provide in-depth operational intelligence support to many of the potential areas--areas for MOOTW for example--where we are likely to find our joint forces operating. The military theater augmentation teams and Joint Intelligence Support Elements (JISE) do not include, per doctrine, cultural experts. If the JFC is lucky, regional embassy teams, national intelligence support teams or allies can provide some insight. Essentially, operations doctrine in JP 3-07 levies significant cultural intelligence requirements on joint intelligence that joint intelligence doctrine does not adequately mirror or fulfill.

**ISSUES WITH JOINT DOCTRINE**

Joint intelligence doctrine inadequately accounts for cultural intelligence. Although joint, operational MOOTW doctrine addresses cultural items slightly better, it is still inadequate, and it is not intelligence doctrine. Specific problems that need attention are:

- Joint intelligence doctrine, especially the capstone intelligence document, JP 2-0, is overwhelmingly written for combat operations using combat terms.
- Cultural intelligence is not considered as an important intelligence area for product production, and the JP 2 and JP 3 series are not clearly aligned on cultural requirements.
- Current JIPB and other intelligence products lack the proper level of detail, thought and planning needed to guide J-2’s to successfully plan for and incorporate cultural intelligence into their intelligence estimates.
- Joint doctrine does not provide for augmenting combatant commanders or Joint Task Forces with cultural intelligence experts.
Inadequate joint intelligence doctrine surely factored into problems with the OIF transition phase. The U.S. forces on the ground were not ready to culturally engage the citizens for the range of operations related to stability and security. What has emerged from the field, well after these operations commenced, are the briefs giving follow-on forces the lessons learned. They are being created by the local commanders to overcome pre-operational intelligence shortfalls. Doctrine should have guided the operational commander’s J-2 to develop more detailed cultural intelligence prior to operations occurring in Iraq. Without cultural considerations adequately addressed in doctrine, the military mindset remains on combat operations and not on conducting the less glamorous but equally important MOOTW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

First, doctrinal language needs to reflect wording that recognizes that joint forces interact with more than just adversaries. Below is a recommendation for JP 2-0 to slightly reorganize and add improved wording for what intelligence provides to JFCs. This is an example, the spirit of which should be incorporated throughout the JP 2 series. This example provides a contrast with the description shown above from JP 2-0 [bold font indicates additions]:

Intelligence provides knowledge of the enemy, potential enemy and local foreign populations to JFCs. In combat situations intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. In combat, intelligence assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future course of action. In peacetime operations, transition operations or other MOOTW, intelligence provides the JFC true cultural knowledge of local populations, their leaders and coalition partners. This knowledge will help the JFC and his staff design the best courses of action for the given mission.
Intelligence doctrine must stress that knowledge of all foreign peoples in a joint operations area is a fundamental of joint warfare; it is not limited to the “knowledge of the enemy.”

Second, JP 2-0 and the other joint intelligence doctrine series publications should be updated to include cultural intelligence, as defined in this paper. Cultural intelligence should fall under the category of an intelligence product and requirement in JP 2-0 and be described as such in all joint intelligence doctrine. The joint publication series, especially Operations and Intelligence, should align all cultural requirements. This will allow the JFC and his staff to easily visualize, plan and synchronize cultural intelligence needs within intelligence operations.

Third, joint intelligence doctrine and JIPB products need to incorporate more cultural intelligence guidance. Due to lack of doctrine, JFCs and their J-2s begin many missions culturally “behind,” negatively impacting the operational factor of time. Tactical forces are then forced to build cultural awareness, on the ground, after operations have started. Figure 2 shows how cultural considerations could be visibly depicted in doctrine focusing on both planning and manning as well as getting cultural intelligence to the forces and the decision maker or JFC. The individual services should be consulted for recommendations in order to find the best
practices they have developed, and these should be considered as doctrinal analysis is conducted on the best cultural items to incorporate into JIPB doctrine.

Cultural intelligence must be factored into the JIPB process. Also, a base reference should be kept as a living document for any area where there may be a good chance of operations. The combatant commander’s Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) may possess elements of the cultural intelligence needed, but it needs to be robust and ready. When a warning order is issued, the culturally infused JIPB could then be quickly adjusted to the operational level and flowed to the JTF. Figure 3 shows an example of factors to consider when preparing cultural estimates for the JIPB.21 The figure shows what might be looked at for the insurgency in Iraq. It serves as an example of the type of guidance and level of detail that is needed in doctrine. Factors analyzed will vary from culture to culture and operation to operation. Using cultural intelligence will improve the JFC’s operational analysis of space, and it will allow him to make better force decisions.

It is recognized that the theater commander and his J-2 will not be able to have experts in every country or region in his area of responsibility (AOR). There are many “out of the way” places in the world, and sometimes unexpected crises erupt. To this end, the J-2
must get intelligence outside of DOD and even the intelligence community. In today’s environment inputs can and must be gathered from many sources including traditional intelligence sources, other governmental agencies, academia, embassies, information from NGOs and IGOs, allies and open sources.

Fourth, perhaps the quickest way to help a JFC would be to alter the doctrine in JP 2-01 and thus the composition of deployable intelligence support teams. The JISE, for example, should be amended to include theater augmenters for cultural intelligence. There should be an organizational spot or box showing this dedicated support. In the same vein, continuing to push for support from broader groups such as National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) or the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) may be a way to tap the expertise currently in DOD and the intelligence community.

The DOD initiative to create Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) in each geographic theater as well as a backup at U.S. Joint Forces Command is a step in the right direction. Creating the SJFHQs will allow their members to anticipate and study potential crisis areas, thereby being better prepared to know the crisis area’s people and political situation should they deploy for operations. Gaining this insight, as well as knowing how to quickly act as a JTF, are two goals of having the SJFHQs. However, the combatant commanders will still need more cultural experts as there can be many crises in various areas in one combatant commander’s AOR. The SJFHQ cannot be the in-depth experts required for each area of an AOR. The SJFHQ will improve the crisis response and JTF set-up time for a single contingency, but ultimately it does not provide the amount of in-depth cultural expertise needed.
Combatant Commanders should support the recommended change in intelligence doctrine and levy requirements for increased and highly trained cultural experts to support the doctrine. They should link these requirements to dedicated staff and JIC billets for both civilian and uniformed service personnel. Some billets need to be deployable to a JTF. Essentially the commanders need an operational and strategic foreign area officer cadre created expressly to support the Combatant Commander, the JIC and a JTF. In writing about the need for more cultural awareness, better education and a shift in resource allocation for the U.S. military, Major General Robert Scales (Ret.) stated that the military would be much better off if it spent some of the billions of dollars allocated to marginal technological gains to create a transformation in our peoples’ cultural awareness and ability to think in foreign environments. His research and interviews with commanders that served on the ground in OIF reinforce this need, “Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan . . . are telling us that wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions—all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.”22 Scales proposes large training and educational changes to support making select military people more savvy on how to deal with foreign cultures and be able to quickly think and better interact with them. Then these specialists would be integrated into key planning, analysis, and operational jobs.

To be fair, there are institutional barriers within the military to creating and training these specialists. The barriers arise between the military services whose role is to man, train and equip the forces and the JFCs who must fight with the forces provided. A process must be created whereby the requirement for uniformed cultural experts can be levied and then
met, or the case must be made showing that it is in the best interests of the service and the JFC to possess and effectively manage the specialists.

Finally, military intelligence and particularly joint intelligence need to institute a culture shift. While traditional, adversary and combat based JIPB and intelligence production may be the most “sexy” form of intelligence to provide, intelligence professionals need to readjust their cultures and doctrine to also think in terms gaining and providing cultural intelligence to commanders and forces. This intelligence will give them true cultural understanding of foreign peoples that they will interact with to accomplish whatever mission called to perform. Intelligence professionals should not believe their jobs are complete until they provide their commanders and customers this type of intelligence.

**Alternate Arguments**

Critics of this approach to change joint intelligence doctrine may say that it does not need to be changed. Indeed, as doctrine stands, it adequately addresses non-combat or MOOTW situations. The U.S. military is a combat organization and that must be the emphasis of doctrine. Furthermore, there is nothing in doctrine prohibiting JFCs and their J-2s from acquiring and developing cultural intelligence. A commander will state his priority intelligence requirements and say if he wants cultural intelligence products. Cultural intelligence does not need to be formally incorporated into joint intelligence doctrine.

This paper gives no argument that operational intelligence to support combat operations must remain the first priority in joint intelligence doctrine. It is an argument to say that it is time that the issues of cultural intelligence get more and better doctrinal emphasis. U.S. forces repeatedly find themselves in situations where they must interact with foreign populations whether in transition from combat to stability operations, in non-combat
MOOTW or a combination of both. Joint intelligence doctrine must include cultural intelligence into its lexicon so it will be trained, planned in advance and factored into priority intelligence requirements. Joint intelligence also needs to be prepared to help the JFC understand his ally--a member of his own coalition. As operations in Somalia demonstrated, the JFC’s role can become very political and his forces may operate in very different social environments with a diverse coalition. Furthermore, JFCs are military commanders trained in military arts. Many will not possess true understanding of what is required prior to entering an operation where they must closely work with foreign leaders, forces or populations. This is where the J-2 can provide guidance and expertise in shaping culturally-oriented, priority intelligence requirements for the social and political situations. The J-2 and JFC should not think of foreign peoples simply as adversaries, and attempt to analyze them in combat support terms with intelligence products designed for combat. They should think of the foreign peoples in terms of being from distinct cultures that must be understood in order to design successful courses of action to achieve mission success. An operation will be better poised for early success if the cultural intelligence requirements are included in doctrine and planned early.

It could be argued that the JFC should not focus course of action development around cultural intelligence issues. When the U.S. military begins operations it will possess superior combat power or force, and this must be respected by local populations. The JFC should try to accomplish his mission in a friendly, understanding way when possible, but should not give in to local desires when formulating courses of action.

The use of cultural intelligence to adapt operational strategies and interactions with foreign populations and leaders or even coalition forces is the smart way to develop courses
of action. It does not mean that the JFC should shape a course of action based solely on cultural intelligence considerations. It simply means the commander would possess the best all around knowledge of the foreign peoples to tailor his actions to achieve his objectives. For example, if the commander needs to get rights to use a port to flow forces, then he will need permission from a local or state leader. When his troops on the ground need to protect the logistics shipments and lines of approach from infiltrators or insurgents, they will need human intelligence from a cooperative local population. In each case, cultural intelligence is a must. Without good cultural intelligence as a part of the JIPB, JFCs and their forces may make early mistakes that hinder the success of the operation from the start.

OIF provides a classic example of this case. Bruce Hoffman from RAND presents a compelling case, echoed elsewhere, about how a complete lack of planning for transition to stability operations cost U.S. forces dearly, as many local Iraqis decided to fight the American forces that had just liberated them from Saddam Hussein. While intelligence did predict some insurgent activity, it did not inform operational commanders or policy makers about the scope of the insurgency or educate them as to what the Iraqi public would desire--security. Intelligence did not give the commanders insight on how to act in order to be perceived as liberators and not occupiers. Thus, the transition situation in Iraq was misread and commanders did not develop courses of action to guarantee security and manage local perceptions. When small-scale looting started in Iraq immediately following combat operations, it usually involved regime offices; however, many local institutions with no connection to the regime remained unguarded and were subsequently looted. U.S. and coalition forces did nothing to stop the crime and could not stop the indiscriminate terrorizing of the local population.23 To many Iraqis it appeared that the U.S. forces were occupiers who
could not guarantee security, the key factor of governance Iraqis wanted most—ahead of democracy.\textsuperscript{24} By the time U.S. commanders figured it out, it was too late. The insurgency was out of control and many locals joined the efforts. Hoffman notes that this “lesson learned” has had to be relearned many times.\textsuperscript{25} If cultural intelligence is included, emphasized and used in intelligence doctrine, U.S. commanders might avoid making similar mistakes in the future.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Joint intelligence doctrine must be changed to include cultural intelligence if the JFC is going to possess the best knowledge to make decisions and determine courses of action in his joint operations area. The JFC needs to understand the peoples and leaders in the area where he and his forces will operate especially if the operation involves MOOTW or the possibility of transition from combat to MOOTW. Without cultural intelligence factored into the JIPB and other all-source intelligence products, the JFC and his forces will start the operation at a disadvantage. They may then also choose courses of action that hinder achieving mission success. Good cultural intelligence will help the JFC and his forces avoid being ignorant about how to act with a local population. It will also help them avoid mirror-imaging (thinking that foreign people will act the same way that U.S. people act).

Joint doctrine is the starting point—the baseline guide—for how the U.S. military plans and conducts operations. The weakness with which cultural issues are addressed and the lack of cultural intelligence in joint intelligence doctrine reinforces an incorrect view that the military does not need to plan for or worry about understanding foreign peoples not perceived to be adversaries. However, operations continue to show that U.S. soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen are operating for extended periods in foreign lands. JFCs
frequently operate with foreign coalitions and foreign leaders. The feedback from commanders in recent operations corroborates many historical lessons learned. The U.S. military should begin operations with better cultural understanding of the foreign peoples where it operates. The intelligence organization should provide the needed foreign cultural knowledge. Mission success could depend upon how well U.S. forces work with foreign peoples in their countries and/or coalitions. The tactical commanders in the field should not have to develop baseline cultural knowledge after they are well into an operation in a foreign area. Without cultural intelligence defined and better factored into doctrine, U.S. forces will be at higher risk to keep repeating the same mistakes in working with foreign peoples.

Ultimately, changing joint intelligence doctrine to include cultural intelligence will require a cultural change within the military intelligence community. The military is primarily a combat organization, and the *forte* of military intelligence is combat and adversary related intelligence. Changing joint intelligence doctrine does not mean general military intelligence is pushed aside. It does mean that the doctrinal intelligence requirements will grow, but only to the point where they should already be. Doctrine must be changed, and the accompanying support and training must follow for the change to take root. Not changing and continuing to fail to provide intelligence to support all facets of military operations would amount to dereliction of duty. The commanders and forces deserve excellent, full spectrum, intelligence support. Changing doctrine is the correct place to start the cultural change required.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


NOTES


2 This is my definition of cultural intelligence. In my research I found that various authors espoused a need for better cultural awareness, understanding and training. One group, the Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Cultural Awareness Working Group, defined cultural intelligence in terms of incorporating cultural factors into the Marine Corps intelligence cycle. My goal was to create a “stand alone” definition of cultural intelligence. The cultural aspect hinges upon the definition of the word culture. According to Webster’s New Ideal Dictionary, G.& C. Merriam Co., 1978, it can be defined as, “the characteristic features of a civilization including its beliefs, its artistic and material products, and its social institutions.” The intelligence aspect relates not an intelligence discipline or source (such as human intelligence), but it is a product of analysis and evaluation of various information sources including single source intelligence.


6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 12 April 2001).

7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2–0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 9 March 2000), I-1.


9 Ibid., I-6.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.


15 Ibid., V-3.


Smith, 29-30. Smith makes great recommendations on how the JIPB process needs to be expanded to include people particularly for the transition phase from combat to stability and security. These recommendations and the additional ones I list should be applied to all types of joint operations and conflict.

William Wunderle, “Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power,” (Unpublished PowerPoint Briefing, Santa Monica, CA: RAND: November 2004). This briefing inspired the creation of Figure 2.

Ben Connable, “Groups vs. Motivations 31,” (Unpublished PowerPoint Briefing, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Cultural Awareness Working Group: January 2005). Figure 3 is from this brief. The working group provided several thought provoking briefings and papers that discuss the need for better cultural awareness within DOD.


Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, June 2004), 2-3, 11-12. Hoffman’s work draws on other recent OIF analysis from many authors including Anthony Cordesman and a long history of RAND publications on insurgency, terrorism, and nation-building. Its assertions on the poor stability operations in Iraq includes corroboration from many military officers serving there.


Hoffman, 6.