# Title and Subtitle

**Aligning the Mountain and the Molehill:**

How the Combatant Commander Coordinates his Theater Security Cooperation Plan with the State Department

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## Abstract

This paper focuses on the means by which geographic combatant commanders coordinate theater security cooperation initiatives with the State Department. This issue clearly deserves attention, particularly as combatant commanders often provide the most visible face of American power in many regions of the world today. Although there is a well-defined procedure for coordinating the combatant commander's Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) within the Department of Defense, the process of interagency coordination for this critical plan lacks the same clarity. In this regard, the combatant commander must overcome numerous obstacles that prevent him from coordinating with the State Department in an effective manner. While some observers turn to long-term, overarching institutional reforms of the National Security Community as the solution, this paper recommends that combatant commanders focus instead upon initiatives they can implement now with resources currently at hand. These initiatives include establishing standing Interagency Operations Centers, strengthening the Political Advisor's authority and providing increased support to educational exchanges.

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## Subject Terms

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ALIGNING THE MOUNTAIN AND THE MOLEHILL:
HOW THE COMBATANT COMMANDER COORDINATES
HIS THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLAN
WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: __________________________

14 February 2005

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CAPT Fred B. Horne
Abstract

This paper focuses on the means by which geographic combatant commanders coordinate theater security cooperation initiatives with the State Department. This issue clearly deserves attention, particularly as combatant commanders often provide the most visible face of American power in many regions of the world today. Although there is a well-defined procedure for coordinating the combatant commander's Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) within the Department of Defense, the process of interagency coordination for this critical plan lacks the same clarity. In this regard, the combatant commander must overcome numerous obstacles that prevent him from coordinating with the State Department in an effective manner. While some observers turn to long-term, overarching institutional reforms of the National Security Community as the solution, this paper recommends that combatant commanders focus instead upon initiatives they can implement now with resources currently at hand. These initiatives include establishing standing Interagency Operations Centers, strengthening the Political Advisor's authority and providing increased support to educational exchanges.
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INTRODUCTION

Today the combatant commander plays a vital role in the accomplishment of U.S. national security objectives. One of the most significant tools he has to shape his area of responsibility (AOR) in peacetime is his Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). By conducting security cooperation activities, the combatant commander is able to forge personal connections he can use in times of crises, as well as political partnerships that serve U.S. interests. Furthermore, these activities take on increased importance in those areas of the world where the combatant commander's forces constitute the only visible representation of the U.S. government and its interests. In order for a combatant commander's theater security cooperation initiatives to be effective, however, they must work in harmony with other elements of national power.

Despite the importance of coordinating elements of national power, the combatant commander must overcome a multitude of obstacles that hinder him in coordinating his security cooperation initiatives with other agencies. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the obstacles combatant commanders face in coordinating their security cooperation initiatives with the agency primarily responsible for the diplomatic element of national power- the Department of State. After identifying the most significant obstacles to effective coordination, this paper will recommend ways the combatant commander can best overcome these obstacles. The first section of this paper will provide a brief overview of the theater security cooperation planning process. After describing the Department of Defense (DoD) process for conducting theater security cooperation planning, this section will identify how these plans are coordinated with the State Department. The second section of this paper will

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outline the numerous obstacles that the combatant commander faces in coordinating his theater security cooperation initiatives with the State Department. These obstacles include procedural, structural, resource and cultural barriers to coordination. Having articulated the obstacles to effective coordination between the combatant commander and the State Department, a third section of this paper will outline recommendations as to how the combatant commander can overcome these obstacles. Although this section of the paper will concede the value of potential efforts to institute broad, all-encompassing structural reforms, it will focus instead upon the practical steps the combatant commander can implement immediately with his organic resources.

OVERVIEW OF THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING

According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Manual 3113.01A (Theater Engagement Planning), the purpose of theater engagement planning is "to develop a process to globally integrate military engagement activities." This manual further defines 'engagement' (now called 'security cooperation') as "all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime."

The primary document the combatant commander creates to articulate his peacetime theater security cooperation strategy is the TSCP. The Department of Defense develops the

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3 Prior to Donald Rumsfeld's assumption of duties as Secretary of Defense, the US government used the terms 'engagement' and 'Theater Engagement Plan' (TEP) instead of 'security cooperation' and 'Theater Security Cooperation Plan.' Although many current official documents (such as CJCS Manual 3113.01A) still refer to the 'Theater Engagement Plan,' this paper will use the term 'Theater Security Cooperation Plan' unless quoting directly from a source that does otherwise. Likewise, on October 24, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld issued a memo changing the term 'CINC' to 'combatant commander.' This paper will therefore use the term 'combatant commander' unless quoting directly from a source that does otherwise.

TSCP in four distinct phases. In the first phase, the CJCS and combatant commanders receive planning guidance from the Secretary of Defense through the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). Additionally, combatant commanders receive planning tasks and guidance from the CJCS through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The second phase of the development cycle results in a CJCS-approved Strategic Concept that prioritizes the combatant commander's theater, regional and country objectives. In the third phase, the combatant commander identifies specific security cooperation activities, identifies force and resource requirements and synchronizes his plans to produce the TSCP. In the fourth and final phase, the Joint Staff, armed services, supporting combatant commanders and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) review the TSCP and integrate it into the "Global Family of Plans" for the USDP.  

Although the four-step process outlined above clarifies how the combatant commander uses broad policy objectives to develop a specific security cooperation plan for his region, the question remains "how does the combatant commander coordinate this plan with the State Department?" It is precisely this portion of security cooperation planning—arguably the most difficult portion—that is the least clearly defined.

At the national level, the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47) mandates the need for interagency cooperation. In this regard, the National Security Council (NSC) System provides the foundation for interagency coordination by developing national security policy. Unity of effort throughout the interagency community should therefore flow from the national level, as the NSC, under the direction of the President, develops a national security policy.

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strategy (NSS) that employs all elements of national power to achieve national security objectives.\(^7\)

At the operational level, the combatant commander has several in-country points of contact with whom to coordinate. Although not formally incorporated into the security cooperation planning process, the combatant commander's initial focal points for coordination with the State Department are individual countries' Ambassadors and their country teams.\(^8\) In this regard, the Department of State generally assigns geographic combatant commanders a Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) or Political Advisor (POLAD) to serve as the informal linkage between the combatant commander and embassies within his AOR.

**OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE COMBATANT COMMANDER AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT**

Despite the availability of the aforementioned resources and procedures at the national- and operational-level, the combatant commander still faces numerous obstacles that prevent him from effectively coordinating his regional security cooperation initiatives with the State Department. These obstacles include procedural, structural, resource and cultural barriers to coordination.

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Procedural Obstacles

As noted above, the purpose of theater security cooperation planning is "to develop a process to globally integrate military engagement activities." This process, however, provides only a partial solution to the integration of 'global' security cooperation activities. Although the TSCP development process results in a TSCP that is adequately coordinated within DoD, it lacks a central body or mechanism to provide the overarching, truly 'global' oversight and guidance needed to ensure adequate interagency coordination.9

Theoretically, the NSC System should provide this interagency coordination.10 In reality, however, this body is focused far more on national security policy formulation and implementation during crises- when the President focuses his attention on a problem, or when a problem assumes political significance for the President. Relatively few issues ever become politically significant compared to the overwhelming number of issues the combatant commander must address within his AOR.11

Because of this lack of central oversight for more routine security cooperation initiatives, the articulation of clear policy objectives becomes absolutely critical to ensuring unity of effort within the interagency community. At the highest level, these objectives are

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10 The three primary interagency groups from the NSC System are: the NSC Principals Committee, the NSC Deputies Committee and the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs). (Note: JP 3-08 still refers to PCCs as IWGs- Interagency Working Groups). The NSC Principals Committee consists of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor. This is the senior interagency forum for national security policy issues. The NSC Deputies Committee is the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum. The NSC PCCs develop policy as issues work their way to the President, and they ensure proper implementation of policy. The PCC is an important tool for identifying and assessing interests of executive departments and agencies and for disseminating decision, positions and information. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Operations, Vol. II, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), II-2 to II-3.

outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS). If the strategic direction provided by the
NSS is vague, however, it becomes increasingly difficult for the players in the interagency
community to agree upon a unified approach for a particular region. In this regard, General
Zinni, CENTCOM commander from August 1997 to July 2000, did not find the national-
level policy guidance to be adequate. On the contrary, he labeled the NSS and the National
Military Strategy (NMS) as "Pollyannaish- something for everyone."12 In addition to being
too vague, General Zinni argued that he was unable to discern priorities in the NSS and
NMS.13

Another problem that plagues interagency cooperation is the lack of a clear
distinction of who is in charge. As Mendel and Bradford argue, the concept of designating a
lead agency did not always ensure that the designated lead agency actually had the
operational authority necessary to ensure cooperation.14 Without strong oversight from the
NSC, the agency that brings the most resources to the table (frequently the Department of
Defense) is able (and often allowed) to assume control of operations. General Zinni would
likely agree that this is a problem, having characterized the interagency process as "'ad-
hocracy' at its best, with no one truly in charge."15

12 Howard D. Belote, "Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant
13 Ibid.: 7.
14 William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, "Interagency Cooperation: a Regional Model for Overseas
15 Howard D. Belote, "Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant
**Structural Obstacles**

In addition to procedural obstacles to effectively developing and implementing coordinated TSCPs, structural obstacles exist. The most significant structural obstacle that a combatant commander faces when coordinating his TSCP is that he lacks a clear State Department counterpart with whom to work. As Admiral Blair, Commander of PACOM from February 1999 to May 2002, asserted of interagency coordination during his tenure at PACOM, "We are just not set up right for engagement in the world." He further articulated of the interagency structure, "it's a tangled mess of people trying to do the right thing, but we'd never resolved the lines of authority … there was no unified team when it counted."  

As outlined earlier, although not officially responsible for the creation of the TSCP, one of the combatant commander's key points of contact for TSCP development is the Ambassador and his country team. The combatant commander, however, has a regional focus, whereas the Ambassador has a country focus. In order to develop and implement a truly regional security cooperation initiative, therefore, the combatant commander (with the assistance and advice of his POLAD) must coordinate with numerous Ambassadors. Although this is the process the combatant commander typically uses to coordinate his TSCP with the State Department, it is cumbersome and inefficient. As Lincoln Bloomfield, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs\(^\text{17}\) stated of the flow of information between the State Department, embassies and combatant commanders, "It's hard work,

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\(\text{16 Dana Priest, } \textit{The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military} (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Ltd., 2003), 90.\)

\(\text{17 The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs is responsible for coordinating State-Defense interaction around the world.}\)
running all day long, bouncing things off of everyone, accumulating ideas of just what our policy is."\(^\text{18}\)

When looking for a regionally focused body at the State Department with which to coordinate, the combatant commander can turn to the State Department's Regional Bureaus. The Assistant Secretaries of these geographic bureaus guide the operation of U.S. diplomatic missions within their regional jurisdiction. Indeed, it appears that the combatant commanders do make frequent use of the regional bureaus to coordinate their theater strategies. As Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, reports, "I'm always on the phone with the EUCOM commander, coordinating our approach to the region."\(^\text{19}\)

Although the existence of the bureaus gives the combatant commander another tool to further coordination of his regional strategies, this is not the all-encompassing solution to coordination that one might expect at first glance. First, division of geographic regions between the combatant commands and the State Department's regional bureaus is not identical. The Department of Defense has five geographic combatant commands (See ANNEX A), whereas the State Department has six regional bureaus (see ANNEX B). Furthermore, the Department of Defense and Department of State do not divide countries along similar lines. With the exception of SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM,\(^\text{20}\) all other

\(^{18}\) Interviews with General Ralston, former EUCOM Commander, seem to indicate that this process is time-consuming for the combatant commanders as well, as he estimates that he spent about 70 percent of his time on political-military issues. This is particularly significant, considering he had ongoing combat operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia at the time, as well as maritime interdiction operations in the Mediterranean. Howard D. Belote, "Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition, 23 (August 2004): 3, 7.

\(^{19}\) Howard D. Belote, "Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition, 23 (August 2004): 8.

\(^{20}\) All countries within the SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM AORs fall under the jurisdiction of the State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.
combatant commands contain a mix of countries that falls under the jurisdiction of three to four different State Department regional bureaus. (See ANNEX C for a comparison of the AORs of combatant commands and regional bureaus). In addition to dissimilar apportionment of countries between commands and bureaus, the geographic location of the State Department's bureaus poses another obstacle to coordination. Instead of being forward-deployed in their regions, the State Department bureaus are all located in Washington, DC.

**Resource Obstacles**

Another obstacle to effective coordination of regional strategies between the combatant commander and the State Department is the fact that the State Department is not nearly as well-resourced as the Department of Defense. The 1990s ushered in an era that brought at least a 35 percent increase in the budget for each of the regional combatant commands. The budget for diplomacy, on the other hand, saw significant reductions during this period.\(^{21}\) Shane Harris' article in *Government Executive* describes the State Department on January 22, 2001 (the day Colin Powell assumed the duties of Secretary of State) as an "army in tatters."\(^{22}\) He further states that "the department was in a sorry state, lacking staff, funds and equipment."\(^{23}\)

These disparities between the resources of DoD and those of the State Department affect the ability of the State Department to communicate and cooperate with combatant commanders. This is particularly true regarding Internet and E-mail connectivity. A 2001 report by a task force headed by former Secretary of Defense Carlucci found that 92 percent


of overseas diplomatic posts had "obsolete classified networks, some of which have no classified connectivity with the rest of the U.S. government." Furthermore, only two percent of State Department computers had access to the Internet. Although Secretary of State Powell declared technology upgrades a key pillar in his State Department reform plan, disparities in technology resources still prevent the combatant commander and his staff from communicating efficiently with many of their State Department counterparts.

In addition to funding, the Pentagon provides regional combatant commanders with supplementary resources such as long-distance aircraft and a fleet of helicopters for flights within their AORs. The Secretary of State, on the other hand, is the only diplomat who enjoys similarly dedicated aircraft. All other Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) must rely upon commercial airlines or the availability of military planes that are already bound for the FSO's desired location. Undoubtedly, this limits the degree to which the State Department can conduct face-to-face coordination with its military counterparts.

A final resource shortfall poses challenges to the effectiveness of State Department operations. This resource, perhaps the most critical, is manpower. From 1994 to 1997, the State Department was able to hire only enough people to replace half the number it lost. Again, Secretary Powell's reform initiative sought to correct this problem by adding 1,150 Foreign Service and civil service employees (nearly 60 percent more than the previous year) to the State Department by 2004.

23 Ibid..
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
Merely adding numbers to the State Department's manning roster will only solve part of the problem, however, as many career State Department officials lack management and leadership training. Prior to Secretary Powell's assumption of duties as Secretary of State, senior staff took only a two-week seminar that focused mainly on administrative issues. Now officers must attend at least six weeks of management and leadership training. These courses focus on team building but also contain crisis simulations that train how to respond to situations such as an airplane crash or a coup d'etat. Although the State Department will require attendance at these courses as a prerequisite for promotion only after 2006, this initiative will likely greatly increase the capability of State Department officials.

**Cultural Obstacles**

Finally, in seeking to cooperate more effectively with the State Department, a combatant commander must overcome the cultural differences that exist in both DoD and the State Department. Joint Staff Publication 3-08, *Interagency Cooperation During Operations* concedes that "each agency has core values that it will not compromise."28 The State Department, for instance, tends to value the ability to respond flexibly to changing political situations. Accordingly, it places less emphasis on a rigorous planning cycle.29

The Department of Defense, on the other hand, understandably values planning and is often baffled by other agencies' perceived reluctance to plan adequately. In the past, DoD has been quick to point to other agencies as the cause of poor interagency coordination. A

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1961 Joint Staff memorandum, for instance, stated that "in the past it has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental planning for two reasons: other agencies of the U.S. government do not understand systematic planning procedures, and each agency has its own approach to solving problems." Regardless of where the "blame" lies for inadequate interagency planning, however, part of the solution to the problem will lie in understanding the goals and priorities that drive other organizations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

When looking to overcome the wide variety of obstacles to effective coordination between the combatant commander and the State Department, many observers justifiably indicate the need for far-reaching reorganization of the U.S. security community at the highest levels. Indeed, in order to more effectively align State Department agencies with Department of Defense agencies, one could be justified in calling for reform at all levels of government- an interagency reform that would accomplish for the interagency community what the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for the Department of Defense.

At the national-level, for instance, a single interagency body could be created that would bear the responsibility of prioritizing and integrating the combatant commanders' TSCPs with other agencies. Instead of theater security cooperation ending with a TSCP's incorporation into the Department of Defense's "Family of Plans," an interagency body could approve and integrate the TSCP into a truly "global" interagency plan. This body would

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logically reside within the National Security Council, as this is the interagency body currently responsible for national security policy formulation.\textsuperscript{31}

In addition to restructuring the national security apparatus, some observers call for the removal of artificial barriers to communication at the regional level. For instance, combatant commands and State Department Regional Bureaus could be aligned to cover like areas of responsibility. Furthermore, these bodies could be collocated in order to facilitate more effective coordination. The creation of common doctrine, processes, infrastructures, technologies and training could support long-term collaborative efforts such as these.\textsuperscript{32}

Short of such all-encompassing reforms, however, there are several practical ways that the combatant commander can improve the current system of interagency cooperation with the resources he has at hand. Indeed, given the lengthy period of time required to enact the types of far-reaching institutional reforms described above,\textsuperscript{33} commanders would be wise to seek other means to work more effectively with the State Department as it exists today.

First, combatant commanders should establish \textbf{standing} interagency operations centers within their commands. The mission of these centers would be to train and incorporate all potential interagency participants through routine planning and special


\textsuperscript{33} The Goldwater-Nichols Act, for instance, took five years to pass. Furthermore, the Hart-Rudman proposals have not been enthusiastically embraced. Howard D. Belote, "Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders," \textit{Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition}, 23 (August 2004): 12.
exercises, as well as to provide initial cadre during crises. The combatant commander would reap numerous benefits from the establishment of these centers. First, a standing interagency operations center would provide the combatant commander with the pool of subject matter experts necessary to contribute to the development of the TSCP, as well as concept plans (CONPLANs).

Secondly, a standing interagency operations center would bring the combatant commander an increased capability during crises, as his staff would have the benefit of increased access to the interagency community on a day-to-day basis prior to the crisis. The commander's crisis response capability would also be increased because all elements of national power would more likely be engaged during the initial planning of an operation.

Thirdly, the combatant commander could invite representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) into the interagency operations center. This would greatly improve the connectivity between the combatant commander and those NGOs and PVOs active in his AOR. This is important, as the relationship between NGOs and PVOs is currently entirely ad hoc, with no official linkage whatsoever.

The concept of interagency operations centers is not new to DoD. Combatant commanders have long been using Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOCs) and Joint


35 Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) operate outside of both the military and governmental hierarchies. The relationship between Armed Forces and NGOs and PVOs is, therefore, not regarded as 'supported' or 'supporting,' as are the relationships between governmental agencies. Instead, the relationship between the Armed Forces and PVOs and NGOs is an 'associate' or 'partnership' relationship. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Operations, Vol. I, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), vii.
Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) during crises. The CMOC concept, for instance, originated in 1991 during Operation Provide Comfort, the civil-military humanitarian assistance mission to Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey. Ever since that time, combatant commanders and JTF commanders have established one or more CMOCs to support humanitarian assistance, contingency, or crisis response operations.  

Likewise, combatant commanders frequently form JIACGs to cope with interagency cooperation for specific operations. For instance, US European Command (USEUCOM) formed a JIACG in 2002 to "strengthen the relationship with critical U.S. government agencies on terrorist activities." This ad-hoc approach to forming CMOCs and JIACGs, however, should give way to the establishment of full-time interagency operations centers. General Zinni is an advocate of establishing these types of interagency working groups within the regional commands (as well as the establishment of a standing joint interagency group in DC). 

In addition to forming interagency operations centers at the regional combatant commands, combatant commanders should strengthen the process through which POLADs involve ambassadors in planning effective security cooperation initiatives. Commanders should allow POLADs to "act as a clearinghouse and communication center between the command, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and deputy assistant secretaries in the

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regional bureaus. Furthermore, the combatant commander should look to the POLAD to serve as the chief of the interagency operations center. POLADs are generally very senior and experienced Foreign Service Officers. They generally hold the equivalent of flag-officer rank, and some have had experience serving as an Ambassador and leader of an interagency country team. The combatant commander's POLAD, therefore, has already had experience leading an interagency team.

Finally, combatant commanders should support more educational exchanges between the State Department and DoD. As Dana Priest stated, "You have to teach State about the military; there's a total lack of knowledge. I'd ride with State Department guys who knew nothing." Improving coordination between the combatant commands and the State Department will likely start with improving their ability to speak the same language, as well as understanding each other's organizations and priorities.

CONCLUSION

In summary, this paper has focused on the means by which geographic combatant commanders coordinate theater security cooperation initiatives with their State Department counterparts. This issue clearly deserves attention, particularly as combatant commanders often provide the most visible face of American power in many regions of the world today. Although there is a well-defined procedure for coordinating the combatant commander's

40 Ambassador Larry M. Dinger, interview by author, 6 January 2005, Newport, Rhode Island, notes, Naval War College, Newport.
41 As cited in Howard D. Belote, "Proconsuls, Pretenders, or Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition, 23 (August 2004): 11.
TSCP within the Department of Defense, the process of interagency coordination for this critical plan lacks the same clarity. In this regard, the combatant commander must overcome numerous obstacles that prevent him from coordinating with the State Department in an effective manner. While some observers turn to long-term, overarching institutional reforms of the National Security Community as the solution, this paper recommends that combatant commanders focus instead upon initiatives they can implement now with resources currently at hand. These initiatives include establishing standing interagency coordination centers, strengthening the POLAD's authority and providing increased support to educational exchanges.

In conclusion, the importance of interagency coordination will not diminish in the future. As sensor, communication and information processing technologies continue to evolve, the increasingly rapid nature of operations in the modern battlespace will place more demands on the interagency decision-making process. Only when State and DoD operations are more effectively synchronized can both agencies work together in a manner that allows them to keep pace with modern operations.

Bibliography


Annex A: Department of Defense Organizational Chart

- **Military Departments**
  - Central Command (CENTCOM)
  - European Command (EUCOM)
  - Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
  - Pacific Command (PACOM)
  - Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

- **Unified Commands**
  - Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
  - Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
  - Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
  - Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)

- **Chairman of the JCS**
  - Plan & Coordinate

- **Train, Equip & Organize**
  - Geographic Combatant Commands
    - Central Command (CENTCOM)
    - European Command (EUCOM)
    - Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
    - Pacific Command (PACOM)
    - Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

- **Conduct operations**

* The Department of Defense’s Geographic Combatant Commands are highlighted in yellow. (This chart has been modified by the author from the Department of Defense’s organizational charts available on http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101).
* The State Department’s Regional Bureaus (chaired by Assistant Secretaries) are highlighted in yellow. (This chart has been modified by the author from the Department of State’s organizational chart available on http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8792.pdf).
Annex C: Comparison of Areas of Responsibility (Geographic Combatant Commands and Regional Bureaus)

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<th>DOD GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND</th>
<th>STATE DEPARTMENT REGIONAL BUREAU</th>
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<td><strong>CENTCOM</strong></td>
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Annex C: Comparison of Areas of Responsibility (Geographic Combatant Commands and Regional Bureaus)

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Note: This chart was composed by the author from information available on the Department of Defense website: http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/ and the Department of State website: http://www.state.gov/countries/. Both websites were accessed 4 January 2005.