PROFESSIONALISM IN THE USAF: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS WITH NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

THESIS

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THESIS

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Abstract

Decades ago, military sociologists predicted a rising trend among officers away from traditional institutional military values and toward more economically-based occupational values due to the effects of the transition from a conscription-based military to an all-volunteer force. Subsequent empirical research resulted in data that supports such predictions. More recent researchers have suggested that in addition to the all volunteer force, an increase on technology may also accelerate the trend toward occupationalism and away from traditional institutional military values and the warrior ethos that typically define successful military organizations. The officer corps may be particularly vulnerable to occupationalism due to increased technical specialization and the corporate mindset that is evolving within the service, potentially resulting in reduced organizational commitment and a greater reliance on extrinsic motivational incentives.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of rank structures on professionalism in the context of Moskos’ institutional versus occupational (I/O) professionalism model. Previous studies utilizing the I/O model have been primarily limited to Air Force officers and suggest a trend toward occupationalism among this group. This study proposes that a much broader sample of Air Force personnel is required to determine the magnitude of this trend, both in the officer ranks as well as the NCO ranks. This study analyzes the roots of military professionalism, considers the impact of recent transformations in the military, and makes recommendations about enhancing professionalism within the Air Force among all ranks.
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PROFESSIONALISM IN THE USAF: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

I. Introduction

I go anywhere in the world they tell me to go, any time they tell me to, to fight anybody they want me to fight. I move my family anywhere they tell me to move, on a day’s notice and live in whatever quarters they assign me. I work whenever they tell me to work…I don’t belong to a union and I don’t strike if I don’t like what they’re doing to me. And I like it. Maybe that’s the difference (Webb, 1983).

Professionalism is defined as the professional character, spirit or standing, practice or methods of a professional (Steinmetz, & Barnhart, 1980). While the essence of professionalism can be described in ideal terms such as character, integrity, and commitment, the desired output of professionalism is performance. Performance provides the incentives to do well and fuels the professional’s drive toward excellence (Sorley, 1998). The values necessary to consistently perform at a high level can best be internalized through identification with a profession and a complete understanding of the profession’s requirements (Grier, 2004).

Innumerable definitions and theories have been developed over the years by social scientists attempting to describe military professionalism (Huntington, 1959; Janowitz, 1960; Millett & Murray, 1987; Moskos & Wood, 1988). Although they may differ on the details, they all agree that the military professional must possess characteristics unique from general society in order to effectively “manage” the violence inherent in warfare. In particular, Moskos’s (1977) Institutional/Occupational (I/O) model attempts to rationalize military professionalism within a continuum of civil-military interactions ranging from a military entirely detached from society to one closely
aligned with civilian structures.

Moskos (1977) characterizes an institutional military member as having a high level of commitment, strong service identification, and willingness to sacrifice with little regard for economic considerations. According to Moskos’ (1977) definition, an institutionally oriented military member perceives professionalism through intangible, intrinsic factors; the very act of “serving” in the organization often results in personal satisfaction even under difficult circumstances. The institutional member views the military as a “professional calling,” rather than a job, and would be less likely to separate simply for higher pay or better working conditions. At the opposite end of the Moskos (1977) I/O spectrum, an occupation is legitimized in terms of the marketplace. Salary and careerism are paramount as occupational military members focus on extrinsic factors such as economic benefits and rewards (Moskos & Wood, 1988). Attaining rank or status and building a résumé for post military service would be characteristic of an organization dominated by individual concerns (Moskos & Wood, 1988).

The I/O model is particularly relevant to the Air Force due to the service’s reliance on technological specialization and relative lack of tradition when compared to the other services (Smith, 1998; Vest, 2000). Studies conducted from the late 1970s through the late 1990s to determine the level of occupationalism in the Air Force, focused primarily on the officer corps. The results indicated that the Air Force officer corps has trended toward a more occupational orientation, which according to Moskos (1977) is not preferable (Moskos & Wood, 1988; Smith, 1998; Stashevsky & Koslowsky, 2006; Thomas, 2004).

Moskos (1977) and retired Air Force colonel, Frank Wood (1988), believe the
results of ‘creeping occupationalism’ will have a negative impact on military effectiveness. They identified three key areas—mission performance, member motivation, and professional responsibility, that rely on institutional values. Other factors aside, a military with a strong institutional orientation has always been more effective than a mass of individuals collected temporarily for the purpose of conducting a war (Snider, 2003; Thomas, 2004; Trim, 2003). A pervasive, AF-wide shift toward occupationalism could prove particularly damaging to mission accomplishment (Shields & Hofer, 1988; Sivasubramaniam, Murry, Avolio, & Jung, 2002; Snider, 2003).

A sense of institutional dedication is important for all members of a military organization. Commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and airman alike, should adhere to the same standards of conduct and commitment that enhance military effectiveness as stipulated by AF Core Values (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). NCOs in particular, occupy a unique position in the hierarchical rank structure between the officer corps and the enlisted airmen. NCOs execute leadership and management duties very similar to those of officers and are often required to perform a greater amount of interpersonal supervision with subordinates. This direct, ‘face to face’ contact is often necessary to modify and correct the behavior of less mature subordinates and to control the large numbers of airmen involved in support of mission goals. Consequently, the professionalism of the NCO corps may be as influential, if not more so, on the performance of the AF. History is replete with wars and battles that may have been won by sheer luck, overwhelming forces, or exceptional leadership, but when both sides are equal in tangible assets, it seems reasonable to expect the military organization with the greater level of professionalism should have the superior commitment to winning
Despite the suggested decline of institutional values among Air Force officers (Moskos & Wood, 1988; Moore, 1998; Stahl, Manley, & McNichols, 1978), the service has consistently fulfilled mission requirements in recent conflicts. This continued military effectiveness is difficult to explain considering an apparent erosion of professionalism among AF officers. Perhaps there is a stabilizing force that has counteracted this negative trend. Considering the typical hierarchical pyramid structure of the Air Force, a large proportion of AF members are supervised by NCOs at lower levels, thus emphasizing the important role of the NCOs as leaders. A study conducted in 1978 among Air Force personnel indicated that senior NCOs are significantly more institutional than junior enlisted, while senior officers are only slightly more institutional than junior officers (Stahl et al., 1978). Enlisted members experience a greater rate increase in institutionalism over time when compared to officers and may conceivably impart a stabilizing influence on the AF as the institutionalism among the officer corps gradually decays (Moore, 1998; Snider, 2003; Stahl et al., 1978). The officer corps may indirectly rely upon this institutional foundation for the performance of tasks at the operational level.

Institutionalism among NCOs is no doubt influenced by the indoctrinization process that begins at basic training and is continually reinforced in the enlisted professional military education program as well as incentivised in the enlisted promotion process (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). NCO development involves constant indoctrination and familiarization with fundamental principles of military service emphasizing AF doctrine, tradition, and standards of conduct (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). In particular,
the promotion system requires a great deal of general military knowledge to attain higher rank.

The Air Force officer corps is initially subjected to indoctrinization in the various commissioning programs and basic training, but formal indoctrinization significantly tapers off, thus relying on the individual initiatives of officers to maintain their knowledge on AF doctrine, traditions, and standards of conduct (Davis & Donnini, 1991). In addition, the officer promotion process is based almost purely on job performance, which may indirectly involve a subjective evaluation of professionalism, but lacks any objective criteria related to knowledge of or appreciation for Air Force doctrine, tradition, and standards of conduct (Davis & Donnini, 1991). Considering this drastic difference between the indoctrinization approaches of the officer and NCO corps, is it reasonable to expect a variation in their respective levels of institutionalism.

The purpose of this study is to examine the potential differences in institutionalism between commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers, and investigate possible causes of the trend toward occupationalism observed among officers (Stahl et al., 1978; Smith, 1998; Snider, Nagl & Pfaff, 1999) as initially reported by Moskos (1977). Despite subsequent research studies (Cotton, 1983; Moskos & Chambers, 1993; Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000; Smith, 1998; Stahl et al., 1978), none has considered the differences between commissioned and non-commissioned officers using the I/O model. This study will attempt to build an argument that justifies alleviating this research gap by applying the I/O measure to AF officers and NCOs simultaneously.
II. History of Military Rank Structure

Foundations

Since the beginning of civilization, nations that were able to organize and field superior combat forces have enjoyed great success, typically at the expense of their neighbors. In ancient times, warring factions generally created armies on a temporary basis, relying on ordinary citizens to fill out the ranks. These forces typically united just long enough to participate in a campaign, usually following a predictable cycle aligned with the seasons (Keegan, 1993). Following battle, armies quickly disbanded and returned to more immediate pursuits (farming, construction, administration, etc.) indispensable to daily life. It is hardly a coincidence that civilizations able to organize and maintain military forces on a more permanent basis began to expand their boundaries and dominate neighboring populations.

Advances in military organization led to several great early civilizations, such as those in Mesopotamia, Greece, and Egypt and perhaps reached a zenith in Italy where the Romans dominated the known world for centuries (Keegan, 1993). In fact, it is the Romans that are often credited with laying the foundation for the modern military forces of today. The Romans created a highly effective combat force primarily through superior administration and organization. They certainly enjoyed many technical advances over their rivals, but their true advantage is generally attributed to the quality of the average soldier and the institutionalism of superior tactics and battlefield management (Gibbon, 1946). Roman recruits enjoyed many ‘perks’ in return for their service, including good pay, adequate medical care, guaranteed citizenship, and perhaps most importantly, high status within a society that embraced conflict and honored individuals that excelled at
warfare. The attributes of the typical soldier almost certainly contribute to the historical perception of the Roman military as a highly ‘professional’ organization; certainly Roman military success has rarely been matched in the course of history (Keegan, 1993).

**Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps**

All NCO ranks are based on the title ‘sergeant’ which is derived from the Latin phrase ‘who serves’ (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). Some historians draw parallels with the Roman ‘Centurion’ and the 17th century ‘sergeant’ of Gustavus Adolphus’s Swedish Army, while the American version was certainly founded with the first Continental Army in 1775 (Keegan, 1993; Cross, 2006). Regardless of their exact origin, the NCO ranks arose chiefly out of organizational necessity. As armies continued to expand and battlefield maneuver became increasingly complex, senior leaders found it difficult to exercise adequate tactical command (e.g., fog of war). The solution was an ‘intermediate’ level of leadership within the military hierarchy able to control massed formations and ensure the directions of senior leaders could effectively be translated into actual military action. These leaders would serve as liaisons between the senior commanders and the regular soldier and also provide close supervision, discipline, and training for new conscripts.

NCOs serving in this capacity were forced to concentrate on the ‘art of war’ and tended to become experts in military matters. In ancient times this arrangement was particularly important due to the fact that many senior leaders had little or no actual combat experience or appreciation for the intricacies of tactical warfare (Keegan, 1985).
Commanders, generally appointed for social and political considerations, relied heavily on NCOs to provide leadership, direction, discipline, and training for the largely unskilled mass of troops. Perhaps most importantly, NCOs ensured the leader’s vision could be transformed into operational results. Even if the senior commander (officer) possessed awesome leadership skill and/or charisma that inspired great deeds, the operational leader (NCO) was still necessary to ensure the average soldier’s enthusiasm could be converted into actual combat effectiveness (Lee, 2005).

The Officer Corps

They looked upon themselves as men who lived by higher standards of behavior than civilians, as men who were bearers and protectors of the most important values of American life, who maintained a sense of discipline while civilians abandoned themselves to hedonism, who maintained a sense of honor while civilians lived by opportunism and greed (comments regarding the professionalism of pilots selected to be America’s first astronauts; Wolfe, 1979).

It may be surprising to note that the Roman’s awesome military achievements were accomplished without the presence of an officer corps in the modern sense. ‘Regular’ soldiers ascended to higher leadership positions through outstanding performance and battlefield prowess. In particular, the Roman ‘Tribune,’ who exercised operational leadership and direction over the Legion, has been likened by some historians (Gibbon, 1946; Keegan, 1993) to the modern officer. The Tribune’s expertise in warfare contributes to the notion that the average ‘rank and file’ of the Legion comprised the true ‘professional’ body of Roman formations; commanders were often assigned through political appointment with no consideration of military aptitude and generally devoid of
any practical battlefield experience (Gibbon, 1946). The ‘commander,’ officially titled as ‘Consul,’ just pointed the army in the right direction and expected the highly trained soldiers to do the rest (Gibbon, 1946; Keegan, 1995; Cross, 2006). While this arrangement proved successful in most situations, the questionable military ability of most political appointees could also prove disastrous. For example, Consul Varro, against the strong objections of his generals, led the Roman Army to its single greatest defeat in history at the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C. The Carthaginian Army led by Hannibal (raised as a soldier) slaughtered perhaps as many as 70,000 Roman soldiers in a single day and nearly brought the Republic to its knees (Keegan, 1993).

The need for a dedicated body of long serving professional managers really manifested itself during the Middle Ages as military forces became larger and more difficult to control. During this period, the Feudal system so prevalent in Western society, ensured nearly every significant military leadership position would be filled by individuals of ‘noble birth,’ wealth, or otherwise high social standing (Keegan, 1993). This tradition continued to some extent well into the 20th century, though the French Revolution and Napoleon’s subsequent rise from a mere corporal to Emperor of France, may have been instrumental in attenuating the practice (Cross, 2006). In fact, Napoleon is often credited with recognizing that advances in technology and the logistic requirements of large armies necessitated the creation of specialists not directly involved in battle (Cross, 2006). Though less glamorous than traditional combat roles, the army couldn’t adequately function without them. Many ‘officers,’ as they were now known, specialized in operational matters while others focused on support and administration (Sorley, 1998; Trim, 2003). The modern officer corps was born in reaction to the new
realities of warfare and represented a significant step in the evolution of armed conflict.

In conjunction with the Industrial Revolution of late 18th through early 20th centuries, great strides in weapons technology, transportation, and communication systems significantly increased the capability of nations to wage war. This unprecedented ‘killing power’ coupled with rapidly expanding armies gave rise to ‘modern warfare’ (Cross, 2006). The primary goal of many emerging industrialized nations was to create a highly trained nucleus around which the massed conscript armies could be rallied in times of rapid growth or national emergency. Warfare was becoming so complicated, various military academies were created to educate officers on the proper conduct of war and to instill basic operational doctrine. Military academy graduates would share a common outlook and could be expected to react in an appropriate and predictable manner in a given situation. These early military institutions were dedicated to teaching the ‘art of war;’ other, more ‘academic’ subjects were only taught to specialists, like engineers, cartographers, and the like (van Creveld, 1990). In particular, the Prussian Kriegsakademie, whose graduates would form the much praised ‘General Staff,’ is considered one of the most successful military institutes in history and the model for all subsequent Western military academies (van Creveld, 1990). Lessons learned from actual battlefield experience were incorporated in the Kriegsakademie curriculum as instructors were drawn from operational units and placed on special assignment. Such an assignment was considered extremely prestigious within the Prussian (later German) military and often represented the pinnacle of an officer’s career.

While the initial selection criteria for officers still relied primarily on social standing rather than aptitude or proven performance, the military academies introduced
strict controls on attendees. Candidates were selected from the existing officer corps to attend an academy on a highly competitive basis; the difficulty of the mandatory entrance exam and other rigorous entrance standards ensured most officers would never be selected. The average length of training was also much longer—generally two years or more, and the graduation rate was not the 100% so common in contemporary institutions. Graduates of military academies constituted an ‘elite’ cadre of officers destined for coveted leadership positions at the highest levels of command (van Creveld, 1990).

While the level of formal training and education may have varied among individual officers, with only limited numbers receiving the prestigious military academy training, the overriding theme of officership was acceptance into a ‘professional’ military fraternity dedicated to the needs of the nation at large. Officers were expected to act with absolute integrity in all situations while maintaining the highest level of professional competence possible. Differentiating themselves from the mass of ‘regular’ conscripts, officers served as role models for subordinates and were expected to be capable of great acts of courage—they led from the front and endured the same risks and hardships as the common soldier. In fact, it wasn’t unusual, even well into the 20th century, for officers to suffer appalling casualty rates due to this particular creed (Keegan, 1985).

**Academics**

Possession of a bachelor’s degree has become the most objective criteria for officer program qualification; however, the concept that officers require an academic degree is actually a fairly recent phenomenon. Throughout the centuries preceding the industrial revolution, armed conflict was thought of as anything other than a learned
affair to be mastered through study. One did not attend school, study books or take examinations to be an officer. Officers were typically appointed based on social position, family tradition, or exceptional performance in combat. In fact, the U.S. military still regularly bestowed ‘battlefield commissions’ on enlisted members as late as the Korean conflict (Keegan, 1993). Learning tactics and strategy directly relating to warfare and actual battlefield experience were considered the proper foundation for officership.

As warfare evolved toward the latter 18th and early 19th centuries, the idea that officers required formal instruction began to take hold. However, the curriculum at military academies wasn’t academic in nature; it focused almost exclusively on the art of warfare and students didn’t receive academic degrees upon graduation. The concept of college educated officers really gained momentum in the U.S. during the period immediately following WWII. That the U.S. military had so many college educated officers really occurred by accident. During the massive buildup preceding and during the war, recruits were required to take aptitude tests to determine rank and specialty. Predictably, the more educated the applicant, the higher the score. Thus, the more academically qualified applicants systematically became officers. This method, while logically relying on intelligence as a predictor of performance, may not have been as effective a measure of leadership potential (Bass, Jung, Avolio, & Berson, 2003).

The officer corps in America was basically transformed through an expedient selection process necessitated by WWII, which may have resulted in certain individuals not possessing the optimal combat leadership qualities entering the officer corps. Leadership is a multidimensional construct that relies on many factors other than intellect—empathy, character, communication skill—just to name a few, and sociologists
and psychologists are continually developing and testing theories that predict an individual’s leadership potential (Zaleznik, 1977; Goldberg, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1995). Perhaps a selection criteria favoring intelligence over all other considerations, may not be the most effective for a military organization attempting to identify and cultivate individuals destined for leadership positions.

Regardless, during the 1950s America became enamored with the idea that professionals in any discipline required a college education, and the officer corps was no exception. Officers that didn’t possess degrees often found themselves at a disadvantage when dealing with civilian counterparts engaged in the nation’s growing ‘military industrial complex.’ Thus, an evolution spurred by the need for social equality and the increasing complexity of weapon systems resulted in the requirement for officers to hold academic degrees. “In a world that had abandoned God in favor of science, a degree came to be widely regarded as the next best highway to heaven” (van Creveld, 1990: 70).

Military academies of the late 18th through early 20th century, with their extremely rigorous selection procedures and curriculum focused on ‘military art,’ have largely become relics of the past. The very limited number of elite, operationally experienced staff officers they produced— true experts in the art and execution of war—have basically been replaced by large numbers of college educated ‘technicians’ who likely have little or no operational experience (Snider, 1999). This is particularly true of the Air Force, as opportunities for actual combat experience (excepting pilots) are limited, and job specialties are perhaps the most technically demanding of the armed forces (Smith, 1998).

Despite the continued overall trend toward technical specialization, the armed
forces can’t realistically rely solely on college educated applicants to fill the ranks. The vast number of support and administrative specialties required to effectively operate a modern military organization necessitate minimal instruction and training to ensure troop levels can be maintained in the face of typical wartime attrition. The enlisted force provides the manpower to fill these positions without the requisite four year ‘lead time’ typically required for college graduates. In addition, the skills and training necessary to perform these specialties can be obtained after enlistment in the service.

Enlisted recruits attend various technical training courses specific to their specialty immediately following basic military training. The duration of the formal training varies with the complexity and nature of the specialty, but most require less than eight months of instruction. Upon initial assignment, airmen continue job proficiency training through a combination of formal, written instruction and informal ‘on-the-job’ training. Qualification status is reflected through the use of certain ‘skill’ levels (3, 5, 7 9) commiserate with technical ability and rank. Most airmen are considered ‘fully qualified’ when the 5 skill level is attained, usually within three years of enlistment.

It may be worthy to note that officers in the German Bundeswehr, though qualified and selected for commissioning prior to enlistment, must complete basic and advanced military training with their battalion and not in a specialized academy (van Creveld, 1990). They are required to endure the same hardships as their future subordinates before being allowed to attend officer training school. In addition, only officers that successfully gain a commission and agree to serve a full twelve year term are subsequently permitted to apply for advanced academic training (van Creveld, 1990).
III. Military Professionalism

The military leader who views his oath of office as merely a contractual arrangement with his government sets the stage for a style of leadership critically different from the leader who views that oath as a pledge to contribute to the common good of his society. For the former, “duty, honor, country” is a slogan adopted temporarily until the contract is completed, for the later, “duty, honor, country” is a way of life adopted for the good of all and accepted as a moral commitment not subject to contractual negotiations (Wakin, 2000).

Defining Professionalism

A profession is defined as “a vocation requiring knowledge of some department of learning or science,” a professional as “one who follows an occupation as a means of livelihood or gain, or one who is engaged in one of the learned professions,” and finally, professionalism as “professional character, spirit or methods or the standing, practice, or methods of a professional as distinguished from an amateur (Editors of The American Heritage Dictionaries, 1993).” Professionalism is possibly an overused term, but most organizations still desire professional status to add credibility to their respective enterprise (Bonen, 1982; Hebert, 2005). Professions have codes, guidelines, creeds, oaths, commitment statements, belief statements—such as statements on ethics and professionalism (Adams, 1985). Professionals in many professions are licensed, certified, and have specific initial and advanced education, as well as requirements for continuous education (Barnhart, 1994; Sarkesian & O’Connor, 1999). In addition, many professions require both initial and ongoing testing for admission and maintaining membership (Barnhart, 1994). The military professional, while not possessing a specific degree or certification in warfare has long been considered an integral part of society and
The Military as a Profession

Although its nature and composition has evolved over time, the military is considered one of the traditional professions (Huntington, 1959). Definitions of professionalism are extremely diverse and often difficult to apply to all the occupations that have earned professional status, especially if factors other than skill and training are considered. Despite the lack of a universal definition for professionalism, it is certainly an important concept for military members, particularly those that occupy leadership positions (Janowitz et al., 1985). Regardless of specific individual perceptions of professionalism, many military members appear to ascribe a great deal of importance to professional behavior (Daskevich, & Nafziger, 1980).

A 1980 study measuring the attitudes of Air Staff and Command School (ASCS) students toward military service revealed that while there was no consensus on the meaning of professionalism, 87% felt that professionalism is important and 96% considered themselves professional officers (Daskevich & Nafziger, 1980). While the officers apparently identified with the concept of professionalism within their occupation, there was low identification with the officer corps as a major social grouping. Sixty-eight percent identified more closely with their respective career field and immediate peers than with the officer corps as a whole (Daskevich & Nafziger, 1980). A subsequent Air University (AU) study conducted in 1997 involving students attending various officer professional military education (PME) courses identified a ‘lack of cohesion’ and a ‘fractionalization’ of the Air Force officer corps around specific specialties (Smith,
The significance of these findings may be more apparent if military service is considered distinct from typical civilian professions. While frequently lumped together with other occupations, there are certain characteristics of military service that make it unique. Members are technically on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and subject to recall even while on vacation. Leaders frequently make life and death decisions as a matter of routine and then must deal with the consequences. The stress can be enormous not only for the member, but for family and loved ones as well. Perhaps most significantly, the ‘unlimited liability’ clause (Fogleman, 1995) inherent in military service requires members be willing to sacrifice life and limb without hesitation and as a matter of basic expectation, especially during times of war.

When these factors are considered, the nature of military service in the Air Force may not be classified as a profession in the same manner as a physician, lawyer, or engineer. These occupations are generally considered professions primarily because their practitioners are paid for a highly specialized skill desired by the general populace. These occupations often have a code of ethics or a moral contract with society, and while certainly scrutinized, they rarely receive the level of attention the ‘life and death’ struggles of the military demand. Transgressions by physicians, lawyers, and engineers can have a catastrophic impact on individuals, such as wrongful incarceration, malpractice, faulty construction, etc., but the consequences of such failures are usually less grave for society as a whole. If the military loses a war, the results can range from humiliation to subjugation, or in extreme cases, outright annihilation of the nation’s population (Cross, 2006; Keegan, 1993).
Superior technical ability and the application of specialized training to perform a given task for monetary gain may not completely describe the attributes necessary to be considered a military professional (Janowitz, 1960). While military members are paid for practicing certain skills, it is difficult and perhaps unrealistic to describe the military profession in purely economic terms. “At its heart, the military profession is a calling that requires a devotion to service and willingness to sacrifice at levels far beyond that required in the marketplace” (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005:171). Innumerable definitions and theories have been developed over the years by social scientists (Huntington, 1959; Janowitz, 1960; Moskos, 1977; Sarkesian & O’Connor, 1999) attempting to describe the military and its interaction with society. Their works are useful for understanding the complex relationship between society and military organizations. They provide insight into various intrinsic and extrinsic factors that shape military culture and identify various elements and behaviors considered necessary for organizational effectiveness and performance of the duties unique to military service.

**Huntington**

Dr. Huntington’s (1959) book, *The Soldier and the State*, is considered an archetypal study of civil-military interaction and provides an extensive analysis of military professionalism. Huntington (1959) considers a group ‘professional’ if it exhibits three key characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Huntington’s (1959) work was primarily focused on the relationship of the officer corps with civilian society in economic, social, and political terms. He perceived a blurring of the distinction between the historical warrior ethos and the modern military specialist. Military officers manage violence somewhat like bankers manage money.
Huntington (1959) views the first characteristic of professionalism, expertise, to be comprised of three components: technical, theoretical or intellectual, and broad-liberal. He describes the technical component as ‘learning the tools of the trade.’ The theoretical component involves understanding the ‘how and why’ of the technical component. Huntington (1959) considers the broad-liberal the most complex, yet critical component to expertise. Professionals must understand their overall role in society in an economic, societal, political, and cultural context. Members should be aware of the broader traditions of society as a whole and how their application of expertise must be utilized within strict standards of conduct and for the nation’s general welfare.

The next characteristic Huntington (1959) identifies, professional responsibility, deals primarily with ethical behavior. The professional may possess a skill that is not fully understood by the general populace; it may be difficult for the average citizen to know whether the professional is performing proficiently or behaving ethically. The profession must police its own members and society must put a great deal of trust in the professional. Huntington (1959) stipulates that this ‘client-professional’ relationship demands the client accept the professional’s expertise at face value, while the professional maintains absolute integrity.

The final ingredient Huntington (1959) believes a profession must possess is corporateness. Corporateness may best be described as cohesion, unity, and a ‘shared sense of belonging.’ This attribute may be the result of the bond that typically forms through the rigorous training necessary to attain professional status. The ‘common bond of work,’ especially in the military context, has a powerful effect on cohesion. Surviving hardship tends to build stronger relationships among members of a profession; war
creates the greatest hardship of all (Reardon, 1994). The formation of professional organizations to communicate, share knowledge, and relate significant experiences often contributes to cohesion and provides an interface to the general populace. Although somewhat dated, Huntington’s (1959) description of military professionalism is still pertinent today. It is difficult to argue that expertise, responsibility, and corporateness are not desirable attributes for all Air Force members.

**Millett**

Dr. Allan Millett (1977) also determined that similar qualities define a military professional. In the retired Marine colonel’s famous briefing at Ohio State University, *Military Professionalism and Officership in America*, he listed six attributes found in most professions. Millett (1977) contends that a profession should: be a full-time job, be a lifelong calling, control performance standards and recruitment, have a theoretical education, have standards and loyalty to client needs, and have autonomy granted by society. According to Millett (1977), military organizations satisfy the requirements of professionalism if most or all of these attributes are present.

**Janowitz**

Morris Janowitz (1960) took a slightly different approach when describing military professionalism. In addition to recognizing certain key characteristics of professionalism, he also views military organizations and their members as extensions of society. The need for strong institutional values and adherence to military tradition is downplayed. Under this concept, military members more closely resemble the society from which they come. This pragmatic approach requires ‘more flexibility in the beliefs and values’ of its members as their actions are determined by the immediate demands of
society and their behavior is primarily shaped by what is tolerated by the general populace.

This convergent arrangement, which basically relies on a close blend of civil-military relations, could theoretically have adverse consequences. A military that isn’t adequately distinguished from the civilian populace may be unable to effectively perform due to unnecessary constraints and interference. The American experience in Vietnam may demonstrate this situation (Cross, 2006; Henderson, Moskos, & National Defense University, 1985; Keegan, 1993). Many senior military commanders blamed the excessive involvement and poor decision making of civilian leaders on the conflict’s unsatisfactory outcome (Henderson et al., 1985; King & Karabell, 2003). In particular, civilian leaders selecting specific bombing targets and stipulating restrictive rules of engagement often placed them at odds with Air Force commanders and arguably reduced the effectiveness of the air campaign (Cross, 2006; Millett & Murray, 1987).

The German and Japanese forces engaged during the Second World War may represent the other extreme of convergent civil-military arrangements. Military organizations completely unencumbered by lucid civil authority or generally accepted standards of moral and ethical behavior can be quite successful in a military context, however, the consequences of this complete civil-military alliance can also be quite grave. Military triumph can be difficult to sustain and regimes advocating unprovoked hostilities traditionally attract effective, unified opposition (Cross, 2006). Undoubtedly, these circumstances contributed to the ultimate demise of Germany and Japan in WWII. While they certainly possessed highly professional armed forces by any definition; misguided leadership enabled through an ill advised civil-military arrangement, led them
down a path of destruction with dramatic consequences (Keegan, 1993). Defeat transcended the battlefield and exacted a toll on the non-combatants within their societies much greater than would normally be expected or deemed acceptable by rational societies (Keegan, 2001; Keegan, 1993).

**Moskos’ Institutional-Occupational Model**

During the transition from a conscript military to an all volunteer force and in the wake of the Vietnam conflict, Moskos (1977) attempted to explain military professionalism in terms of organizational commitment and identification with traditional values. Moskos’ (1977) I/O model refers to a number of levels of analysis to more fully define organizational professionalism. On one level, he is speaking about shifts in individual attitudes and behaviors. At another level, he is addressing changes within the social organization of the armed forces. At a third level, he is interested in how broad historical and societal trends affect civil-military relations. Together, these multiple levels interrelate to enhance the descriptive capacity of the I/O thesis (Moskos & Wood, 1988).

Moskos (1977) stressed the unique attributes of military service and advocated a reasonable separation between the military and general society. This institutional/occupational I/O model assumes a continuum of civil-military arrangements ranging from a military entirely separate from society to one contiguous with civilian structures (Moskos, 1977). “An institution is legitimized in terms of its value and norms that encourage individuals to transcend self-interest and sacrifice for the common good because of a deep rooted belief in the organization’s mission” (Moskos & Wood,
Members of an institutional organization would be characterized by a high level of commitment, strong service identification, and willingness to sacrifice with little regard for economic considerations. Institutional members value intrinsic rewards and view the military as a “professional calling,” rather than a job.

Occupational organizations on the other hand, would have members who focus on economic benefits and rewards, identify more with specific jobs or roles, and are less inclined to sacrifice for the common good. Occupationally oriented members would primarily be interested in extrinsic, tangible motivational factors and would place little value on the concept of ‘service before self.’ Table 1 summarizes some of the fundamental differences between institutional and occupational characteristics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Occupational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basis of compensation</td>
<td>Rank and seniority, decompressed by rank</td>
<td>Skill level and manpower shortages; compressed by rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of performance</td>
<td>Holistic and qualitative</td>
<td>Segmented and quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female roles</td>
<td>Limited employment; restricted career pattern</td>
<td>Wide employment; open career pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal system</td>
<td>Military justice; broad purview over military</td>
<td>Civilian jurisprudence; limited purview over members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Normative values</td>
<td>Marketplace economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of compensation</td>
<td>Much in noncash form or deferred</td>
<td>Salary and bonuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-service status</td>
<td>Veteran’s benefits and preferences</td>
<td>Same as nonservant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment appeal</td>
<td>Character qualities; life-style orientation</td>
<td>High recruit pay; technical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference groups</td>
<td>“Vertical” within Armed Forces</td>
<td>“Horizontal” with occupations outside the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Work and residence adjacency; military housing; relocations</td>
<td>Work and residence separation; civilian housing permanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role commitments</td>
<td>Diffuse; generalists</td>
<td>Specific; specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal regard</td>
<td>Esteem based on notions of service</td>
<td>Prestige based on level of compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>Integral part of military community</td>
<td>Removed from military community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Institutional Versus Occupational Variables (Moskos & Wood, 1988:16).

**Transformational Leadership**

The Air Force generally advocates inspirational leadership over strict management practices to achieve organizational goals (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). A leadership theory that closely resembles the I/O model involves transformational versus transactional leadership styles. Transformational leaders motivate others to do more than
they originally intended and often more that they ever thought possible (Bass, 1985; Deci & Ryan, 1985). Transformational leadership stresses intrinsic rewards; it builds personal and social identification among its members with the mission and goals of the leader and organization.

Transactional leadership on the other hand, emphasizes extrinsic rewards; it relies on the transaction or exchange that occurs among leaders and followers. The exchange is based on conditions and rewards and what will be received if extrinsic requirements are fulfilled (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Cameron, Pierce, & Ebrary, 2002). An occupational military would be dominated by transactional leadership while an institutional military would be more closely aligned with a transformational style. In a military context, experience would indicate that effective leadership cannot thrive in a purely occupational environment (Bonen, 1982; Moskos & Wood, 1988; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2002). A transformational leadership style emphasizing institutional values has shown to be more predictive of organizational performance (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Bass, Jung, Avolio, & Berson, 2003).

Of course, the conflicting mindsets of institutionalism and occupationalism are at the extreme ends of the spectrum. While a purely institutional atmosphere may seem ideal for a military organization, according to Moskos (1977) it isn’t realistically possible. He contends that both conditions co-exist within the military, but the mix should lean toward the institutional side for optimal effectiveness. Moskos (1977) explains the danger in placing too much reliance on occupational motivators to perform a military mission is that these purely extrinsic rewards may create behavior that will not be performed in the future except for even greater extrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards,
moreover, can weaken intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1973; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Mastroianni, 2006; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2002).

In the extreme, this could mean that a military member expecting monetary reward for performing a critical task might be reluctant to perform that task if those extrinsic incentives are reduced or eliminated. Perhaps even worse, according to cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), once an extrinsic reward is provided, it may significantly reduce the motivation or intrinsic reward previously enjoyed by the individual (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989; Mastroianni, 2006; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2002).

**An Occupational Shift**

Some researchers have suggested that a gradual shift toward occupationalism as predicted by Moskos (1977) and as measured by several researchers (Daskevich & Nafziger, 1980; Cotton, 1983; Stahl et al., 1978) could lead to over-identification with the civilian sector, possibly affecting senior military leader’s decision making (Bonen, 1982; Carroll, 2003; Snider & Carlton-Carew, 1995). If military leadership eventually functions and thinks like the larger society, decisions requiring a uniquely military point of view may be increasingly difficult to make, as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam may so aptly illustrate. A compromised military could result in a weakening of U.S. prestige and marked deterioration in the ability to defend vital national interests.

Moskos (1977) and a number of other experts on military affairs (Wood; 1988; Smith, 1998; Snider, 2003; Thomas, 2004) are concerned that the overall trend the past few decades is towards a more occupationally centered military. While this may merely
reflect societal fluctuations, the implications for national defense are serious. Moskos and Wood (1988) believe the results of ‘creeping occupationalism’ will have a negative impact on military effectiveness. They identified three key areas—mission performance, member motivation, and professional responsibility—that are at particular risk from the occupational outlook.

Effective organizational performance benefits from having motivated, enthusiastic individuals willing to sacrifice personal comfort or ambition for mission accomplishment (Butler, Lardent, & Miner, 1983; Cantrell & Andrews, 1993; Moskos, 2001). Members motivated by institutional values based on intrinsic factors may possess a greater level of commitment and perform at a higher level when compared to individuals motivated primarily by occupational factors (Bass & Riggio, 2006). Occupationalism may set boundaries on performance based on economic considerations and actually attenuate an individual’s true capability (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lee, 2005). Moskos and Wood (1988:5) state that, “An effective manager in an occupation prevails on workers to do what they are supposed to do; an effective leader in an institution motivates members to do more than they are supposed to do.” If members only complete tasks within quantifiable measures, the removal of the extrinsic reward may result in those with strong occupational tendencies to not perform at all (Moskos & Chambers, 1993; Shields & Hofer, 1988; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2002; Thomas, 2004).

The final consequence of excessive occupationalism is potentially the most damaging and the major focus of this paper—the undermining of military professionalism. If one accepts the military as a profession, then the I/O model provides a way to predict the military’s future based on traditional measures of effectiveness.
(Moskos & Wood, 1988). Moskos & Wood (1988:5) observe that, “If military functions can be reduced to dollars, then ultimate decisions on the military organization and military personnel become the province of cost-benefit analysis; decisions are removed from the military professional.” On the other hand, an institutional affiliation acknowledges the military as a unique organization deserving of the public trust and capable of fulfilling the unparalleled responsibility of national defense. Members are viewed as ‘exceptional individuals’ ready and willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for the common good. It may be difficult to assign a price tag to the level of commitment required to serve in this capacity.

It is interesting to note that several historians (Bury, 1923; Gibbon, Bury & Piranesi, 1946; Heather, 2005) attribute the fall of the Roman Empire not only to general societal decay, but also to its influence on the enthusiasm of the average citizen to serve in the military. The professional ‘citizen-soldier’ of the empire’s glory days, was gradually supplanted by indifferent mercenaries or those citizens motivated solely by personal gain. The empire had to begin hiring soldiers recruited from the unemployed city mobs or worse from foreign countries or conquered provinces. This weakened the military organization and created a vicious cycle whereby defeats in foreign lands and increasing domestic strife further contributed to indifference for military service. Frustrated Romans lost their desire to defend the Empire and became increasingly apathetic toward military service. Thus, the army not only proved unreliable on the battlefield, it was also very expensive to create and maintain (Heather, 2005).

Considering that the U.S. military is currently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan and global terrorism remains a constant threat, the personal risks faced by service
members are as tangible as ever. A trend toward occupationalism could prove even more detrimental in times of war than in times of relative peace. Military members losing their motivation to perform due to a perceived imbalance between the level of danger and monetary incentive could have a very real effect on readiness and mission accomplishment (Rangel, Bando, Moskos, & Scales, 2004; D. M. Snider & Carlton-Carew, 1995; Sorensen, 1994).

Despite the suggested decline of institutional values among Air Force officers (Moskos, 1977; Cotton, 1983; Snider, 2003), the service has generally continued to meet mission requirements in recent conflicts. This military effectiveness seems somewhat contradictory considering the notion that officer professionalism is in a gradual state of decay (Moskos, 1977). Perhaps there is a stabilizing influence that has counteracted this seemingly harmful trend. Considering the typical hierarchical pyramid structure of the Air Force, a large proportion of AF members are supervised by NCOs at lower levels, thus emphasizing the important role of the NCOs as leaders. NCOs are typically in the best position to create enthusiasm for organizational objectives and to motivate performance at the operational level. It is the NCOs’ responsibility to transform orders from above into operational tasks that support mission accomplishment. A professional NCO corps helps ensure the directions of senior commanders are fulfilled at the lowest levels. While wars and battles can be won by luck, superior tactics, or even divine intervention, it is reasonable to expect the outcome between evenly matched forces to be decided by the professionalism and commitment of the individual soldiers (Cross, 2006; Hudson, Millett & Murray, 1988; Reardon, 1994; Ullman & Getler, 1996).
Contemporary Issues

The past few centuries have yielded incredible advances in civilization and technology that have served to ‘shrink’ our world as never before. Modern communication infrastructures enable an almost unimaginable level of interconnectivity spanning all nations motivating trade and commerce on a truly global scale. Perhaps counterintuitive to this level of unprecedented cooperation, the destruction and death wrought by warfare remains a reality all modern societies are forced to acknowledge. Nations continue to maintain significant military forces, not only for security purposes, but also to further political interests on the world stage; the United States is no exception.

Good leaders are people who have a passion to succeed. To become successful leaders, we must first learn that no matter how good the technology or how shiny the equipment, people-to-people relations get things done in our organizations. People are the assets that determine our success or failure. If you are to be a good leader, you have to cultivate your skills in the arena personal relations (Fogleman, 1995).

To help support these national security interests, the Air Force is in the process of a force transformation where leaders have indicated a need to reduce manpower to pay for upgrades to aging weapon systems. This effort has initiated a significant downsizing in personnel in exchange for cutting edge technology. This latest strategic focus on technology intended to better equip personnel for future engagements, may also have subtle unintended consequences on Air Force culture. Technology alone rarely guarantees success in conflict; even the greatest innovations are useless without dedicated and professional individuals willing to sacrifice everything to accomplish organizational objectives (Reardon, 1994). Air Force leaders are imbued with the notion that "our people
are our most valuable resource,“ and consequently, they want personnel who are committed to the Air Force and are motivated intrinsically by the core values and a strong desire to serve their country.
IV. Thesis Argument

NCO Institutionalism

A sense of institutional dedication is important for all members of a military organization (Carroll, 2003; Ginsburgh, 1964). Commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and airman alike, should adhere to the same standards of conduct and commitment that enhance military effectiveness as stipulated by AF Core Values (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).

If you would be successful in our profession in the United States Air Force, then take your lead from those who have gone before. Make unflinching honesty and integrity the hallmarks of your performance. Aggressively pursue excellence in all you do. And place Service before self (Fogleman, 1996)

If the only thing that distinguished Air Force members from their civilian counterparts was a uniform, then there would be no need for elaborate rules, regulations, standards of conduct, customs and courtesies, etc., that exist within the service (Davis, & Donnini, 1991). In particular, standards of conduct, moral principles, and the concept of unhesitating self-sacrifice distinguish Air Force members from the general populace (Fogleman, 1995). The adherence to and enforcement of these various standards is integral to mission accomplishment (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).

NCOs occupy a unique position in the hierarchical military rank structure between the officer corps and the enlisted airmen. NCOs must accept and execute all duties, instructions, responsibilities, and lawful orders in a timely, efficient manner; lead subordinates and exercise effective followership in mission accomplishment; and place the requirements of their official duties and responsibilities ahead of their personal
desires (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). When new recruits enter the service, it is incumbent on NCOs to properly indoctrinate them into the organization. NCO leadership and the sharing of general knowledge are crucial to ensure new members are effectively integrated into the service. It is also during the early stages of development that airman must understand and adhere to many rules and regulations that define acceptable conduct within the Air Force.

If NCOs allow new members to discount traditional military values or standards of conduct in favor of societal norms, then the institutional foundation will be weakened and acceptable principles of behavior gradually modified to reflect general culture (Moore, 1998). In a Utopian society, this may not create a problem, but in the absence of such, the consequences could be detrimental to good order and discipline and ultimately affect mission accomplishment. NCOs are the first line supervisors expected to maintain traditional Air Force culture and encourage professional behavior through the enforcement of various standards of conduct.

NCOs must adhere to Air Force core values at all times and serve as role models for more junior NCOs and airman. As the front line supervisors for new recruits, NCOs and are in the best position to shape behavior and instill the institutional values necessary to perform in the AF. Conversely, NCOs who don’t epitomize recognized standards of conduct and behavior may adversely affect a new recruit’s perspective on the AF. This may create a vicious cycle whereby generations of recruits, improperly indoctrinated, continue this negative trend when thrust into supervisory positions. The responsibility for instilling the proper military virtues into airman may be the most important function performed by NCOs at all levels of leadership.
NCOs are primarily responsible for leading and managing teams to complete mission requirements. NCOs must be technical experts and well as effective leaders, managers, and mentors. This becomes more apparent as NCOs progress through the enlisted ranks. As rank increases, responsibility and span of control also increase requiring greater reliance on more junior NCOs to accomplish routine activities and perform direct leadership roles. Senior NCOs, particularly those filling group level or higher positions, often direct and manage a significant amount of personnel and material resources. While always subordinate in rank to any officer, the functions accomplished by some senior ranking NCOs may rival that of many officer positions. Conceivably, performing duties at higher levels of the military hierarchy may align senior NCOs more closely with the officer corps than with the typical body of NCOs.

NCOs are involved in the entire life cycle of a military member’s development, from officer and enlisted recruitment, enlisted basic military training, and technical school instruction for enlisted members. NCOs conduct frequent on-the-job-training sessions and interact with airmen on a daily basis. Officers typically have infrequent contact with airman and normally interact with senior NCOs as the chain of command dictates. NCOs must maintain loyalty to the officers appointed above them and the airman they supervise. They must follow lawful, reasonable orders without hesitation or complaint to preserve the integrity of the chain of command. If junior members perceive that an NCO disagrees with an officer’s orders or if NCOs openly criticize an officer’s decision-making ability, the results on organizational cohesion and effectiveness can be detrimental (Millett & Murray, 1987).

The NCO corps is not an entry level position. NCOs must earn their position
through a gradual process involving promotion and time in service. For this reason, the NCO corps may represent the traditional corporate superlative of ‘climbing the ladder’ or ‘paying one’s dues’ in a military context. Having emerged from the trenches, NCOs may gain a greater appreciation or level of empathy for the plight of subordinates than would otherwise be possible; it has been suggested by some that the ‘best’ officers are prior enlisted.

NCOs may conceivably impart a stabilizing influence on the AF as the institutionalism among the officer corps gradually decays (Moskos & Wood, 1988; Moskos, 1977; Snider et al., 1999). A cohesive NCO corps may provide a sturdy foundation on which operational concepts are translated into actual mission performance despite a more occupationally oriented officer corps. The average airman may interact more with and be influenced to a greater extent by their immediate NCO supervisors than by officers at higher levels and thus perform the mission without compromise. The officer corps, while issuing directives, may indirectly rely upon on this institutional “buffer” NCOs provide for the performance of tasks at the operational level.

A study (see table 2 below) conducted in 1978 among Air Force personnel suggests that senior NCOs are considerably more institutional than junior enlisted, while senior officers were only slightly more institutional compared to junior officers (Stahl et al., 1978). However, the most interesting thing to note may be the difference in increase in institutionalism between junior/senior officers and enlisted. While the officer mean increases by 1.01, the enlisted mean increases by more than twice that rate at 2.44. Figure 1 illustrates the difference in the rates of institutionalism as rank increases for both officers and enlisted. The greater slope of the enlisted line suggests that some aspect of
the enlisted career experience enhances intuitionalism at a more significant rate than for officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>F^a</th>
<th>Eta^2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Sergeants</td>
<td>3,022</td>
<td>17.37</td>
<td>11.92</td>
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<td>Junior Enlisted</td>
<td>2,806</td>
<td>14.93</td>
<td>12.83</td>
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<td>Senior Officers</td>
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<td>16.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior Officers</td>
<td>2,163</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>12.43</td>
<td>92.20</td>
<td>4.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regular Commission</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>15.68</td>
<td>11.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve Commission</td>
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<td>15.13</td>
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<td>12.51</td>
<td>6.70</td>
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<td>Physicians</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>15.03</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10,576</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>12.52</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^* F(2, ∞) = 4.61, p = .01

Distributions of Institution-Occupation Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Mdn</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>4 - 24</td>
<td>15.83</td>
<td>15.49</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>4 - 20</td>
<td>12.52</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Stahl et al., 1978)
Enlisted PME

Institutionalism among NCOs may be strongly influenced by an indoctrination process consisting of continuous enlisted profession military education (PME) and incentivised through the enlisted promotion system (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). NCO PME begins with basic military training which involves intensive indoctrination and familiarization with fundamental principles of military service emphasizing AF doctrine, tradition, and standards of conduct (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). The basic enlisted PME philosophy demands all members to attend in residence programs, with successful completion a mandatory requirement to assume the ranks of E-5, E-7, and E-9 respectively. The typical enlisted PME timeline is as follows: senior airmen with approximately 3-4 years time in service (TIS) attend airman leadership school; technical sergeants with 7-12 years TIS attend the NCO academy, and master/senior master sergeants with anything from 15-22 years TIS attend the senior NCO academy (SNCOA). The SNCOA can be completed via correspondence; however, in-residence attendance is still required for promotion to E-9. There can be quite a gap between programs, and the majority of NCOs will never attend the SNCOA due to rank restrictions. In fact, discounting BMT, most NCOs will only complete two in-resident PME programs during a twenty year career. Despite any lack of frequency in the formal PME program, NCOs must maintain a working knowledge of AF doctrine and regulations to perform mission requirements and properly train subordinates on a daily basis. NCOs are often relied upon by superiors and subordinates alike to interpret and enact AF doctrine, customs and courtesies, and especially various award and decoration programs and ceremonies.
Officer PME

The Air Force officer corps is also subjected to initial indoctrination in the various commissioning programs and basic training. Each commissioning source (OTS, ROTC, and USAFA) has an individual BMT program, while the Air and Space Basic Course (ASBC) is the first officer PME attended by all. A general timeline for subsequent officer PME programs is as follows: squadron officer school (SOS) at 4-7 years TIS, air command and staff college (ACSC) at 12-14 years TIS, and air war college (AWC) at 17-21 years TIS. SOS, ACSC, and AWC can be completed via correspondence, but in-residence completion is more highly regarded. As with enlisted PME, there can be a significant gap between programs, and quite possibly, an officer could attend only one in-residence program (ASBC) during a twenty year career. As formal indoctrination significantly tapers off, the study of AF doctrine, traditions, and standards of conduct increasingly relies on the individual initiative of officers to maintain knowledge on these subjects (Davis & Donnini, 1991).

The Profession of Arms

Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country (MacArthur, 1950).

The profession of arms is still an important concept and a primary focus of Air Force PME; some attempt is still made to instill a ‘warrior spirit’ in all airmen, despite the lack of a real combat mission for most AF specialties. Both officer and enlisted PME begins with some type of basic military training (BMT) program designed to provide
initial indoctrination into the military lifestyle while providing instruction and training in basic concepts necessary to perform in a military environment. Subsequent officer and enlisted PME curricula are not substantially different, focusing primarily on professionalism, leadership, and management. Whether or not AF PME programs receive adequate attention and support from the highest levels of leadership, and whether or not attendees take it seriously has been a source of controversy and discussion for decades (Mosier, 1988; Ullman, 1990). Despite any perceived lack of legitimacy or enthusiasm, PME can be considered the primary source for teaching the traditional military values and ideal standards of conduct and behavior that promote institutionalism (Mosier, 1988). It seems reasonable to assume that the longer an individual remains in service, the more PME will be completed, and theoretically, the more institutionalized the member will become. While the substance and frequency of PME programs may not differ significantly, one factor may differentiate enlisted from officer PME and have an appreciable impact on its effectiveness—the relationship between enlisted PME and promotion.

**Enlisted Promotion System**

In conjunction with PME, the enlisted promotion system may also encourage NCOs to attain an even more detailed level of general military knowledge in order to earn higher rank. The enlisted system relies on certain objective measures in the form aptitude tests, decoration points, and enlisted performance report (EPR) points (see appendices C and E). Enlisted members competing for promotion in the ranks of staff sergeant – master sergeant must take two written tests designed to measure job proficiency and
general AF knowledge. The specialty knowledge test (SKT) is air force specialty code (AFSC) specific and includes 100 multiple choice questions geared toward measuring an individual’s job proficiency. The professional fitness examination (PFE) is also a 100 question multiple choice test, but it is based on AFPAM36-2241, and entails general Air Force knowledge and military subjects (see appendix F). NCOs who score poorly on enlisted promotion tests are at a great disadvantage when compared to peers who score well. In addition to any intrinsic motivational factors, the obvious advantage of possessing a comprehensive understanding of AF doctrine, traditions, regulations and standards of conduct, motivates NCOs to devote a significant amount of effort preparing for the PFE. The extensive knowledge of general AF functions gained through this preparation, is not only necessary to attain higher rank, but also enables NCOs to adequately perform fundamental tasks and may contribute to an overall sense of ‘well-being.’

**Officer Promotion System**

The officer promotion process is based almost purely on job performance, which may indirectly involve a subjective evaluation of professionalism, but lacks any objective criteria related to knowledge of or appreciation for Air Force doctrine, tradition, and standards of conduct (Davis & Donnini, 1991). Officer promotions are based more on intangible factors such as experience, location, and perceived level of responsibility and less on actual doctrinal or specialty knowledge when compared to enlisted standards. An officer can attain higher rank based almost exclusively on documented duty performance absent any formal testing procedure to measure general AF knowledge. The subjective
opinion of the officer’s rater is the primary criteria for success and subsequent advancement. Officers receive a written officer performance report (OPR) designed to document performance and behavior while engaged in official military duties (see appendix D). The reports are ideally written by superiors with first-hand knowledge of the member’s accomplishments and basically involve a “does/does not meet standards” rating system.

For promotion recommendation, officers are rated as “definitely promote,” “promote,” and “do not promote.” Such a general rating system may make preparing an OPR on several officers possessing similar skills and performing similar duties an extremely arduous process. Differentiating those officers truly worthy of promotion may be inherently difficult using subjective comments that will ultimately be judged by a promotion board with no direct knowledge of the promotion candidate’s actual performance.

**Impact on Professionalism**

The enlisted and officer promotion systems are drastically different. Officer promotions are based almost completely on written subjective performance reports (see appendix B), while enlisted promotions are based on a number of quantitative and qualitative factors (See appendix C). Though subjective criteria increases via a board system for the highest enlisted ranks, members still must take a written supervisory and knowledge exam (USAFE) which is basically a more in-depth PFE. The enlisted system provides a more systematic approach for determining promotions than the officer system. Perhaps most importantly, the inclusion of written examinations not only lessens the
dependence on purely subjective criteria found in the officer promotion system, it may result in greater motivation for enlisted members to master specialty and general AF knowledge, thus increasing professionalism and commitment.

The enlisted promotion system may actually reinforce the PME curriculum by requiring members to focus on subjects related to military professionalism even during significant gaps in formal training. NCOs competing for promotion may be motivated to maintain a higher level of knowledge on subjects directly relating to traditional military functions than would otherwise be expected. Basic expectancy theory dictates that behavior is typically targeted toward actions that offer the greatest reward (Vroom, 1964).

It seems reasonable to expect most enlisted AF members desire a promotion, therefore the expectation that studying the PFE/USAFE will lead to greater rewards may motivate behavior while increasing institutionalism. The constant exposure to the ‘ideal’ standards of conduct and behavior initially taught in PME and reinforced through the promotion system may result in an internalization of these characteristics. Consequently, an individual attaining SNCO rank would not only be an ‘expert’ on the AF by virtue of repeatedly studying for promotion, but also be enamored with the traditional military values and beliefs most closely associated with institutionalism. This would certainly help explain the results of Stahl’s (1977) research which indicate enlisted institutionalism increases over time at a much greater rate compared to officers. Since an officer’s level of professionalism seems to require more self-initiative regarding general AF knowledge and traditions, and considering the reported increase in occupationalism among officers, it isn’t unreasonable to expect differences in their respective level of institutionalism
compared to NCOs.

Research Question and Propositions

Therefore, this study introduces the following research question and propositions.

Q1. Is professionalism consistent among Air Force members?

P1: Rank is related to level of professionalism, suggesting that enlisted NCOs in general will have a greater level of professionalism than commissioned officers in the context of the Moskos (1977) I/O framework.

P2: Officer and enlisted PME programs influence institutional values (i.e. professionalism), suggesting that the enlisted PME program, by virtue of its relationship to the promotion system, is more influential for professionalism than the officer PME program

Summary

Many theories have been developed and numerous research efforts have been conducted in an effort to rationalize professionalism within the military. Despite ongoing research efforts (Daskevich & Nafziger, 1980; Moskos & Wood, 1988; Smith, 1998), none of the previous studies have considered the specific differences between commissioned and non-commissioned officers using the I/O model. Considering the vast majority of AF members are enlisted, as the following table illustrates, the limited focus of these studies may provide an incomplete picture of the actual level of professionalism present within the service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent of AF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airmen (E1-E4)</td>
<td>119,204</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs (E5-E9)</td>
<td>151,084</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers (O1-O6)</td>
<td>68,687</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>338,975</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. AF Officer and Enlisted Assigned  

A broader study encompassing officers and NCOs may provide a much more accurate assessment of the overall level of professionalism in the Air Force. A questionnaire developed through a compilation of items used on previous studies by Stahl (1977), Cotton (1983), and Wood (1988) may provide a more comprehensive measure of I/O attitudes within the service (see appendix A). Such a widespread study of military professionalism would help alleviate the historical research gap by applying the I/O measure to both AF officers and NCOs simultaneously. Significant findings may suggest the existing PME and promotion programs require modification to help foster professionalism within the Air Force by supporting institutional values.
V. Discussion

As early as 1960 in his book, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Janowitz concluded the following after interviewing 113 military officers,

“Those who see the military profession as a calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by a greater concentration of individuals for whom the military is just another job…For a sizable majority—no motive for joining the military could be discerned, except that the military was a job” (Janowitz, 1960: 117).

Based on subsequent work by Moskos (1977) and other military sociologists, this trend has continued. If anything, the factors that may foster occupational tendencies are arguably stronger in today’s AF than ever before. The services reliance on high technology, specialization, monetary incentives, academic versus military instruction, and the desire to duplicate a corporate structure may all further contribute to institutional decline. Although NCOs aren’t totally immune, officers may be more susceptible to occupational influences (Smith, 1998).

If there is an appreciable difference between the level of professionalism among officers and NCOs in the context of Moskos’ institutional/occupational (I/O) model, a reasonable explanation should exist. Rank is the most obvious distinction between officers and NCOs, but whether or not superior rank imparts a greater level of professionalism is less obvious. AF recruits qualify for various commissioning programs by virtue of education completed. High school grads with no additional education qualify for the enlisted force, while applicants possessing a bachelor’s degree or higher may apply for the officer corps. Education aside, potential applicants for either track must be of high moral character and be physically and mentally qualified for military service.
Interestingly enough, while education level plays a prominent role in acceptance and commissioning program, the curriculum does not. Perhaps most significant for the officer corps, a degree related to the conduct of war, such as national security, strategic studies, military theory, or military history, is not required. In fact, the number of officers who have specialized in these subjects is much smaller than their intrinsic value would suggest (van Creveld, 1990).

The AF basically owes its very existence to advanced technology. As ‘deterrence’ strategy came into vogue in response to the emerging Soviet threat after WWII, the AF was the only service that could reliably deliver ‘the bomb’ (Cross, 2006). The enormous leverage this created allowed the AF to finally break way from the Army and become a separate service. The AF has never forgotten its roots and the pursuit of advanced technology has gone unabated in the intervening years. While understandable, this single-minded focus may have come at the expense of traditional military standards and institutional values.

As technology increases our reliance on technology increases as well, requiring specially trained personnel who can operate and maintain a plethora of unique systems. Such specialization eventually leads to the development of fractions or subcultures whose members substitute a shared vision and sense of mission for identification with their immediate specialty (Smith, 1998). Air Force leaders have already recognized the problems associated with the stove pipe culture, and have implemented programs (e.g. Project Warrior, Developing Aerospace Leaders, etc.) intended to break down the barriers and integrate career fields in order to emphasize a shared vision and sense of mission.

Despite noble intentions, many of these initiatives may not focus on the most
suitable areas. For example, attempts to create a more corporate structure in the AF may actually contribute to occupationalism. Initiatives such as Management by Objective, Quality Air Force, and most recently, Lean, tend to de-emphasize traditional standards of military conduct in favor of efficiency. “…These disruptive impacts are becoming increasingly visible and call into question the practice of uncritically applying civilian managerial techniques to military systems: organizational effectiveness and combat effectiveness are not the same thing” (Cotton, 1983: 47). While logical pursuits, the AF may never be comparable to a civilian corporation; its bureaucratic nature may actually be a benefit in times of war and help preserve institutional values (Wilson, 1989).

Perhaps the best way to counteract the occupational trend is through an effective PME program. PME may best serve to unite all AF members toward a common goal and help foster a unified sense of purpose. PME may be the preeminent source of military professionalism and the ideal method to preserve institutional values. Although sociologists have largely ignored the enlisted force when measuring professionalism, it is possible that the enlisted force, in particular NCOs, may actually be more professional than officers in the context of Moskos’ I/O model due in part to a more effective PME program. Considering significant differences in the enlisted PME and promotion process (e.g. PFE), both of which may be more effective at encouraging traditional military values, the enlisted force may be less affected by trends toward occupationalism. PME continually reinforced through the promotion system, may help explain Stahl’s (1978) research which indicated enlisted members experience a greater rate increase in institutionalism over time when compared to officers.

Although some sociologists interpreted Moskos’ original argument in absolute
terms as depicted in figure 2 below, he never intended the I/O model as a ‘zero-sum’ analogy. Rather, he was quick to point out that institutional and occupational tendencies are present in the military simultaneously, and as Stahl’s (1978) research indicated, even present within individuals to varying degrees as depicted in figure 3.

![Figure 2. A Literal Interpretation of Moskos’ I/O Model](image1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Institutional</td>
<td>High Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Occupational</td>
<td>High Occupational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Occupational</td>
<td>High Occupational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Institutional</td>
<td>Low Institutional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 3. Stahl’s Interpretation of Moskos’ I/O Model](image2)
As figure 2 suggests, an individual may possess various levels of institutional and/or occupation characteristics. It is conceivable that excessive occupationalism may not be the most detrimental condition facing the service; rather a lack of institutionalism may be the most damaging situation. Individuals who fall in quadrants I and III may be equally ideal, while quadrants II and IV represent careerists with little or no regard for organizational concerns. The obvious goal would be for the majority of AF members, regardless of rank, to fall in quadrant III. Although this may be an ideal target, in reality, many personnel are less committed by intrinsic rewards and may require motivation via extrinsic factors, such as technical training, educational opportunities, enlistment bonuses, retirement benefits, and other monetary compensation packages.

However, if military members become completely devoid of institutional values and identify exclusively with their respective occupations and extrinsic rewards, their reactions during conflict may be unpredictable at best. As the U.S. military’s involvement in the Middle East continues, low level, high intensity conflict may be the focus of military operations for the foreseeable future. As the Khobar Towers attack so poignantly illustrated, such operations are typically unpredictable in nature with asymmetric attack and indistinct battle lines the norm. The prospect of such erratic violence may motivate increasing numbers of extrinsically motivated AF members to opt for comparable civilian occupations. Perhaps they will join the growing number of civilian contractors on which services rely to perform increasingly complex support functions. An AF composed of a greater proportion of occupationally motivated service members and civilian contractors may not perform effectively during wartime operations. What amount of compensation will be necessary to motivate such a force when faced
with the reality of the ‘unlimited liability’ clause?

Perhaps such a reckoning won’t be necessary at all. The AF has long been forced to share the mantle of nuclear deterrence and is finding it increasingly difficult to differentiate itself from the other services. All branches have aerial components, while the AF lacks any naval forces or appreciable ground combat units. Even the most sacred AF specialty of all, the combat pilot, may eventually be supplanted by the unmanned aerial vehicle operated by a civilian, geographically separated from the front.

The AF is working to become the lead service in the ‘space’ and ‘cyberspace’ mission in an attempt to regain the ‘technical leverage’ enjoyed in the past. However, such a strategy entails cutting various personnel programs, including PME, to accommodate escalating costs. It is possible that this renewed focus on technical superiority, successful or not, may only contribute to the spread of occupationalism and further diminish institutional values and cohesion. Perhaps in the most ironic outcome of all, the very technology that enabled the AF to gain independence in the first place, may ultimately be the most rational argument for it to revert to a mere support role.

**Conclusion**

Despite a lack of recent empirical data, this study has attempted to analyze the difference in levels of professionalism between officers and NCOs in an institutional/occupation context and to offer some possible explanations. While differences in professionalism may exist, the most important consideration may actually be the precarious balancing act between technological expertise and traditional military
values all AF members must contend with. PME may be the single greatest source of institutional values that military members have at their disposal and therefore provide the best chance for members to overcome the ‘professional-technical’ (I/O) paradigm. Enlisted professionalism may be significantly enhanced through the interaction of the enlisted PME and promotion systems; more research devoted to measuring AF professionalism—in all ranks, may provide a more accurate assessment than previous efforts. Professionalism shouldn’t be considered only in the realm of officership—it should be a priority for all AF members.
Appendix A. Survey Questionnaire

Privacy Notice
The following information is provided as required by the Privacy Act of 1974:

Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to measure attitudes and behaviors that influence Air Force culture.

Participation: There are no anticipated risks associated with participation. Your participation is completely voluntary and there is no penalty for non-participation. You do not have to answer any question(s) that you do not wish to answer. However, please consider that the greater the participation, the more insightful and useful the data will be for researchers.

Anonymity: We greatly appreciate your participation. All of your responses and information provided in this survey are confidential and completely anonymous. No personal information will be collected. A limited amount of demographic information will be collected to provide a sample description.

Instructions
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE SHOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTES TO COMPLETE. NO DATA IS ENTERED INTO THE DATABASE UNTIL THE FINISH BUTTON IS SELECTED.

- There are no right or wrong answers, so don’t dwell on any one question—just answer honestly what first comes to mind.
- Please do not discuss your answers with other participants—your responses should be independent. We don’t want your opinions and responses to influence other participants.
- Please select the next tab to start the survey.

I have read the procedures above and voluntarily agree to participate in this survey.

Yes  No

Contact information:
If you have any questions or comments about the survey please contact MSgt Edward K. Boyd at edward.boyd@afit.edu.
Questionnaire Items

Please indicate your level of agreement to the questions below by recording your responses using the following scale:
1-Strongly Disagree; 2-Disagree; 3-Neither Agree/Disagree; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree

1. If I left the Air Force tomorrow, I think it would be very difficult to get a job in private industry with pay, benefits, duties, and responsibilities comparable with those of my present job.
   1       2  3  4  5

2. An Air Force base is a desirable place to live.
   1       2  3  4  5

3. The Air Force requires me to participate in too many activities that are not related to my job.
   1       2  3  4  5

4. Air Force members should take more interest in mission accomplishment and less interest in their personal concerns.
   1       2  3  4  5

5. I wish that more Air Force members had a genuine concern for national security.
   1       2  3  4  5

6. Discipline in today’s Air Force is too lenient.
   1       2  3  4  5

7. More supervision of member performance and behavior is needed at lower levels
8. An individual can get more of an even break in civilian life than in the Air Force.

9. No one should feel compelled to accept an assignment he or she does not want.

10. Military personnel should perform their operational duties regardless of the personal and family consequences.

11. Personal interests and wishes must take second place to operational requirements for military personnel.

12. What a member of the armed forces does in his or her off-duty hours is none of the military’s business.

13. Differences in rank should not be important after duty hours.

14. What a member does in his or her private life should be of no concern of his or her supervisor or commander.
15. Compensation should be based primarily on one’s merit and not on rank and seniority.

1  2  3  4  5

16. Compensation should be based primarily on one’s technical skill level and not on rank and seniority.

1  2  3  4  5

17. Bonuses and off-scale pay should be directed toward military specialties where there are manpower shortages.

1  2  3  4  5

18. Military members with specialties that require advanced training or a high level of technical skill should be paid more than their counterparts of the same rank.

1  2  3  4  5

19. I normally think of myself as a specialist working for the military rather than as a military member.

1  2  3  4  5

20. Holding all economic considerations to the side, I would prefer to live in base housing.

1  2  3  4  5

21. Military personnel should be able to live off base or on base as they prefer.

1  2  3  4  5

22. The spouse of a military member ought to feel as much a part of the military community as the military member.

1  2  3  4  5
23. I would prefer that the dollar value of military “benefits” be added to my pay and the “benefits” dropped.
1  2  3  4  5

24. Military personnel who commit crimes off duty and off post should be tried by a military court martial rather than by civilian courts.
1  2  3  4  5

25. If I suddenly became rich (due to an inheritance, lottery winning, etc.), I would continue my military career until retirement.
1  2  3  4  5

26. Service members need some kind of an association (not a union) to represent their views on compensation matters.
1  2  3  4  5

27. The compensation interests of service members are being adequately served by the senior military command.
1  2  3  4  5

28. As long as it does not interfere with good order and discipline, military personnel need a union to defend their interests.
1  2  3  4  5

29. In today’s technical armed forces, we really don’t need so much military ritual and tradition as in times past.
1  2  3  4  5

Demographics:

1. Current Rank:

56
a. E-4 g. O-1
b. E-5 h. O-2
c. E-6 i. O-3
d. E-7 j. O-4
e. E-8 k. O-5
f. E-9 l. O-6

2. Commissioning Source:
a. Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)
b. USAFA (or other military academy)
c. ROTC
d. OTS
e. AECP (or other enlisted to officer program)
f. Other

3. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed:
a. High School or less
b. Associates Degree
c. Bachelor’s Degree
d. Masters/PhD

4. Primary career field (AFSC): ________________

5. Enlisted PME completed (Please check all that apply):
a. Airman Leadership School
b. Non-Commissioned Officer Academy
c. Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy by correspondence
d. Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy in-residence
e. Not applicable

6. Officer PME completed (please check all that apply):
a. Air and Space Basic Course
b. Squadron Officer School by correspondence
c. Squadron Officer School in-residence
d. Intermediate Developmental Education--Air Command and Staff College program by correspondence
e. Intermediate Developmental Education--any qualified in-residence program such as Air Command and Staff College, Naval Post Graduate School, Army Command and General Staff, etc.
f. Senior Developmental Education--Air War College program by correspondence

g. Senior Developmental Education--any qualified in-residence program, such as Air War College, Naval War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, etc.

h. Not applicable

7. Gender

a. Male

b. Female

8. Total years in service: ______

9. If you are a commissioned officer, how many years were you prior enlisted? ______

10. Total number of assignments: ______

11. Total number of overseas assignments: ______

12. Total number of dependents: ______

13. Please make any final comments that you may have
Appendix B. Officer Promotion Criteria

The below chart is derived from DOD Instruction 1320.13. It shows the point where commissioned officers (in any of the services) can expect to be promoted (assuming they are selected for promotion), based upon their time-in-service. Minimum time-in-grade for promotion is established by federal law (10 U.S.C.) and is also shown in the chart below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promote to:</th>
<th>Time in Service</th>
<th>Minimum Time in Grade Required by Law</th>
<th>Promotion Opportunity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>18 months</td>
<td>18 months</td>
<td>Fully qualified (nearly 100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>Fully qualified (nearly 100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Best qualified (80 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>16 years</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Best qualified (70 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>22 years</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Best qualified (50 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above chart shows promotion time-in-service flow and promotion opportunity rates for "in the zone" promotion.

Commissioned officers are recommended for promotion by their commanders, and are selected by centralized (service-wide) promotion boards, which make promotion determinations based upon the officers' promotion records.

There are basically three promotion opportunities: Below-the-Zone, In-the-Zone, and Above-the-Zone. Below-the-Zone only applies for promotion to the rank of O-4 to O-6. One year before they would be eligible for In-the-Zone consideration, up to 10 percent of those recommended can be promoted Below-the-Zone. Most promotions occur In-the-Zone. Those not selected In-the-Zone have one more chances, a year later -- Above-the-Zone (the selection rate for Above-the-Zone is *extremely small* -- around 3 percent). Those "passed over" Above-the-Zone must separate or retire (if eligible for retirement).

The two most significant factors in an officer's promotion records are inarguably their fitness report(s) and level of responsibility in their current and past assignments. Commanders write promotion recommendation forms that indicate one of three categories: 1. Definitely Promote 2. Promote 3. Do Not Promote

Note: the ‘Definitely Promote’ rating is limited and based on a quota system

(http://usmilitary.about.com/od/promotions/l/blofficerprom.htm)
### Appendix C. Enlisted Promotion Criteria

Table 13.4. Calculating Points and Factors for Promotion to SSgt through MSgt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SKT</td>
<td>100 points. Base individual score on percentage correct (two decimal places). (note 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PFE</td>
<td>then the maximum score is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TIS</td>
<td>40 points. Award 2 points for each year of TAFMS up to 20 years, as of the last day of the last month of the promotion cycle. Credit 1/6 point for each month of TAFMS (15 days or more = 1/6 point; drop periods less than 15 days). Example: The last day of the last month of the cycle (31 Jul 03 minus TAFMS date (18 Jul 96) equals 7 years 14 days (inclusive dates considered equals 7 x 2 = 14 points). (note 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>TIG</td>
<td>60 points. Award 1/2 point for each month in grade up to 10 years, as of the first day of the last month of the promotion cycle (count 15 days or more as 1/2 point; drop periods less than 15 days). Example: The first day of the last month of the promotion cycle (1 Jul 03) minus current DOR. (1 Jan 00) equals 3 years 6 months 1 day (inclusive dates considered) equals 42 x .5 = 21 points. (note 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Decorations</td>
<td>25 points. Assign each decoration a point value based on its order of precedence. (note 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medal of Honor: 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force, Navy, or Distinguished Service Cross: 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star: 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legion of Merit, Defense Superior Service Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross: 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airman, Soldier, Navy-Marine Corps, Coast Guard Bronze Star, Defense/Meritorious Service Medals, Purple Heart: 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air, Aerial Achievement, Air Force Commendation, Army Commendation, Navy-Marine Corps Commendation, Joint Services, or Coast Guard Commendation Medal: 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruiter Ribbon: 2 (note 4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy-Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army, or Joint Service Achievement Medal: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>EPRs</td>
<td>135 points. Multiply each EPR rating that closed out within 5 years immediately preceding the PECD, not to exceed 10 reports, by the time-weighted factor for that specific report. The time-weighted factor begins with 50 for the most recent report and decreases in increments of five (50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5) for each report on file. Multiply that product by the EPR conversion factor of 27. Repeat this step for each report. After calculating each report, add the total value of each report for a sum. Divide that sum by the sum of the time-weighted factors added together for the promotion performance factor (126 60). (notes 1 and 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Example: EPR rating (most recent to oldest): 5B-4B-5B-5B-5B-4B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$5 \times 50 = 250 \times 27 = 6,750$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$4 \times 45 = 180 \times 27 = 4,860$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$5 \times 40 = 200 \times 27 = 5,400$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$5 \times 35 = 175 \times 27 = 4,725$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$5 \times 30 = 150 \times 27 = 4,050$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$4 \times 25 = 100 \times 27 = 2,700$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\text{Total} = 225$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$225$</td>
<td>28.485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 13.5. Calculating Points and Factors for SMSgt and CMSgt Promotions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>A if the factor is</th>
<th>then the maximum score is</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USAFSE</td>
<td>100 points. Base individual score on percentage correct (note 1).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>TIS</td>
<td>25 points. Credit one-twelfth point for each month of TAFMS, up to 25 years, computed as of the last day of the cycle (note 1).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TIG</td>
<td>60 points. Credit one-half point for each month in current grade based on DOR up to 10 years, computed as of the first day of the last month of the cycle (note 1).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4 | Decorations/Awards | 25 points. Assign each decoration a point value based on its order of precedence as follows (note 2):
- Medal of Honor: 15
- AF, Navy, or Distinguished Service Cross: 11
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star: 9
- Legion of Merit, Defense Superior Service Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross: 7
- Airman, Soldier, Navy-Marine Corps, or Coast Guard Bronze Star, Defense/Meritorious Service Medals, Purple Heart: 5
- Air, Aerial Achievement, Air Force Commendation, Army Commendation, Navy-Marine Corps Commendation, Joint Services Commendation, or Coast Guard Commendation Medal: 3
- Recruiter Ribbon: 2 (note 4)
- Navy-Marine Corps Achievement, Coast Guard Achievement, Air Force Achievement, Army Achievement, or Joint Service Achievement Medal: 1 |
| 5 | EPRs | 135 points. Multiply each EPR rating that closed out within 5 years immediately preceding the PESC (not to exceed 10 reports) by the time-weighted factor for that specific report. The time-weighted factor begins with 50 for the most recent report and decreases in increments of 5 (50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5) for each report on file. Multiply that product by the EPR conversion factor of 27. Repeat this step for each report. After calculating each report, add the total value of each report for a sum. Divide that sum by the sum of the time-weighted factors added together for the promotion performance factor; for example, 126.60 (notes 1 and 3). |

**Example:** EPR string (most recent to oldest): 5B-4B-3B-5B-5B-4B

\[
\begin{align*}
5 \times 50 &= 250 \times 27 = 6,750 \\
4 \times 45 &= 180 \times 27 = 4,860 \\
5 \times 40 &= 200 \times 27 = 5,400 \\
5 \times 35 &= 175 \times 27 = 4,725 \\
5 \times 30 &= 150 \times 27 = 4,050 \\
4 \times 25 &= 100 \times 27 = 2,700 \\
\text{Total} &= 2,225 + 28,485 = 30,710 \\
\text{Average} &= \frac{30,710}{4} = 7,677.50 \\
\end{align*}
\]

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### Evaluation Board

The evaluation board is very important because it accounts for over half the total score. The board looks at performance, education, breadth of experience, job responsibility, professional competence, specific achievements, and leadership.

### Scoring:

After the trial run is completed and discussed, panels begin the actual scoring of live records. The same panel evaluates all eligibles competing in a CEM code or AFSC. Each panel member scores each record, using a 6- to 10-point scale using half-point increments. An individual’s record may receive a panel composite score (three members) from a minimum of 18 (6-6-6) to a maximum of 30 (10-10-10) points. The composite score (18 to 30 points) is later multiplied by a factor of 15, resulting in a total board score (270 to 450). Using a secret ballot, panel members score the record individually with no discussion. Records are given to each panel member in a stack of 20; and after they are scored, the ballots are given directly to a recorder. This ensures each panel member has scored each record independently. A record scored with a difference of more than 1 point between
any of the panel members (for example, 8.5, 8.0, and 7.0) is termed a split vote and is returned to the panel for resolution. At this point, all panel members may discuss the record openly among themselves. This allows them to state why they scored the record as they did. Only panel members who caused the split may change their scores. If panel members cannot come to an agreement on the split vote, they give the record to the board president for resolution. This ensures consistency of scoring and eliminates the possibility that one panel member will have a major impact (positive or negative) on an individual’s board score (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).
Appendix D: Officer Performance Report and Promotion Recommendation Forms

### FIELD GRADE OFFICER PERFORMANCE REPORT (MAJ thru COL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. RATEE IDENTIFICATION DATA (Read API 360-240,2 carefully before filling in any item)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. UNIT MISSION DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. JOB DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. DUTY TITLE:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. UNIT MISSION DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV. IMPACT ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V. PERFORMANCE FACTORS</th>
<th>DOES NOT MEET STANDARDS</th>
<th>MEETS STANDARDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Job Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has knowledge required to perform duties effectively.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strives to improve knowledge.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies knowledge to handle nonroutine situations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2. Leadership Skills |
| Sets and enforces standards. Motivates subordinates. Works well with others. Fosters teamwork. |
| Displays initiative. Self-confident. Has respect and confidence of subordinates. |
| Fair and consistent in evaluation of subordinates. |

| 3. Professional Qualities |
| Exhibits loyalty, discipline, dedication, integrity, honesty, and officerism. |
| Adheres to Air Force standards. Accepts personal responsibility. |
| Is fair and objective. |

| 4. Organizational Skills |
| Plans, coordinates, schedules, and uses resources effectively. |
| Schedules work for self and others equitably and effectively. |
| Anticipates and solves problems. Meets deadlines. |

| 5. Judgment and Decisions |
| Makes timely and accurate decisions. Emphasizes logic in decision making. Retains composure in stressful situations. |
| Recognizes opportunities and acts to take advantage of them. |

| 6. Communication Skills |
| Listens, speaks, and writes effectively. |

AF IMT 707A, 20006601, V3

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When filled in)
### VI. RATER OVERALL ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratee Name:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last performance feedback was accomplished on:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(Consistent with the direction in AFI 36-2106. If not accomplished, state the reason.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Grade, Br of SVC, Orgn, Comd &amp; Location</th>
<th>Duty Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VII. ADDITIONAL RATER OVERALL ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concur</th>
<th>Nonconcur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Grade, Br of SVC, Orgn, Comd &amp; Location</th>
<th>Duty Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VIII. REVIEWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concur</th>
<th>Nonconcur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Grade, Br of SVC, Orgn, Comd &amp; Location</th>
<th>Duty Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instructions**

All: Recommendations must be based on performance and the potential based on that performance. Promotion recommendations are prohibited. Do not comment on completion of or enrollment in PME, advanced education, previous or anticipated promotion recommendations on AF Form 709, OER endorsement levels, family activities, marital status, race, sex, ethnic origin, age, or religion. All evaluators enter only last four numbers of SSN.

Rater: Focus your evaluation in Section IV on what the officer did, how well he or she did it and how the officer contributed to mission accomplishment.

Write in concise "bullet" format. Your comments in Section VI may include recommendations for assignment.

Additional Rater: Carefully review the rater's evaluation to ensure it is accurate, unbiased and uninflated. If you disagree, you may ask the rater to review his or her evaluation. You may not direct a change in the evaluation. If you still disagree with the rater, mark "NONCONCUR" and explain. You may include recommendations for assignment.

Reviewer: Carefully review the rater's and additional rater's ratings and comments. If their evaluations are accurate, unbiased and uninflated, mark the form "CONCUR" and sign the form. If you disagree with previous evaluators, you may ask them to review their evaluations. You may not direct them to change their appraisals. If you still disagree with the additional rater, mark "NONCONCUR" and explain in Section VIII. Do not use "NONCONCUR" simply to provide comments on the report.

### IX. ACQUISITION OR FUNCTIONAL EXAMINER/AIR FORCE ADVISOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition Examiner</th>
<th>Functional Examiner</th>
<th>Air Force Advisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name, Grade, Br of SVC, Orgn, Comd &amp; Location</td>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(Reverse)
Appendix E. Sample Enlisted Performance Report

AFPAM36-2241V1  1 JULY 2005

Figure 10.5. Sample AF IMT 911, Senior Enlisted Performance Report (MSGT thru CMSGT).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENIOR ENLISTED PERFORMANCE REPORT (MSGT thru CMSGT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. RATER IDENTIFICATION DATA: (Read AF 36-2406 carefully before completing any item.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RANK: BILLINGTON, CARY D. 900-00-0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. GRADE: MSGT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. DFSC: 3S271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a. FASC CODE: RNAF 990400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9b. BRAC: RJ101141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Occupational Measurement Squadron (AETC), Randolph AFB TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PERIOD OF REPORT: From: 31 Jan 2005 Thu 30 Jan 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. NO DAYS SICK: 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. REASON FOR REPORT: Annual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. JOB DESCRIPTION

1. DUTY TITLE

PFE Volume Manager

2. KEY DUTIES, TASKS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Confinet duties to space allocated in this section. Enter a clear description of the ratee's duties. The description should make clear the nature of the ratee's tasks, degree of assignment selectivity involved, and the number of people supervised. Dollar value of projects managed and the level of responsibility should be included. Avoid jargon and acronyms that obscure rather than clarify meaning. Include prior and additional duties during the reporting period if they influence the ratings and comments. Do not include classified information.

III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

1. DUTY PERFORMANCE (Consider quality, quantity, and timeliness of duties performed)

   - Proficient, unprofessional
   - Good performance, performs routine duties satisfactorily
   - Excellent performance, consistently produces high quality work

   X The exception: Absolutely superior in all areas

2. JOB KNOWLEDGE (Consider whether ratee has technical expertise and is able to apply the knowledge)

   - Limited, needs considerable improvement
   - Sufficient, gets the job accomplished
   - Extensive knowledge of all primary duties and related positions

   X Extends in knowledge of all related positions. May be all duties.

3. LEADERSHIP (Consider whether ratee motivates peers or subordinates, maintains discipline, sets and enforces standards, evaluates subordinates, leads and consults, plans and organizes work, and fosters teamwork)

   - Ineffective
   - Gets satisfactory results
   - Highly effective leader

   X Exceptionally effective leader

4. MANAGERIAL SKILLS (Consider how well member uses time and resources)

   - Ineffective
   - Manages resources in a satisfactory manner
   - Skillful and competent

   Dynamic, capitalizes on all opportunities.

5. JUDGMENT (Consider how well ratee evaluates situations and reaches logical conclusions)

   - Poor
   - Sound
   - Emphasizes logic and decision making

   X Highly respected and skilled.

6. PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES (Consider ratee's dedication and preservation of professional values - integrity and loyalty)

   - Unprofessional, unreliable
   - Meets expectations
   - Sets an example for others to follow

   Epitomizes the Air Force professional.

7. COMMUNICATION SKILLS (Consider ratee's ability to organize and express ideas)

   - Unable to communicate effectively
   - Organizes and expresses thoughts satisfactorily
   - Organizes and expresses ideas clearly and concisely

   X Highly skilled writer and communicator.

AF IMT 911, 200006601, V3

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### IV. PROMOTION RECOMMENDATION

- **Ratee Name:** BILLINGTON, GARY D.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Not Recommended</th>
<th>Highly Deserving</th>
<th>Consider</th>
<th>Ready</th>
<th>Immediate Promotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rater's Recommendation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Rater's Recommendation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Use comments section to provide additional information about the ratee's performance
- Bullet statements and phrases must be used
- Rater comments required. All evaluations must limit their comments to the space allocated unless the report contains referral ratings
- Comments must be compatible with the ratings in sections III and VII

---

**Last performance feedback was accomplished on:** 02 Jul 2005  (Consistent with the direction in AFI 36-2406.) (If not accomplished, state the reason.)

**NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD & LOCATION**

SHANNON K. POLIT, SMSgt, USAF
AF Occupational Measurement Squadron (AETC)
Ralph DAFB TX

**Duty Title:** Superintendent, Professional Development Flight

**DATE:** 31 Jan 2005

SSN 0012

**VI. ADDITIONAL RATER'S COMMENTS**

- The additional rater uses this section to support his or her decisions
- When the additional rater disagrees (marks the nonconcour block) with the rater, he or she must provide one or more reasons for disagreeing

**NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD & LOCATION**

MICHAEL E. O'NEILL, CMSgt, USAF
AF Occupational Measurement Squadron (AETC)
Randolph AFB TX

**Duty Title:** Chief, Professional Development Flight

**DATE:** 31 Jan 2005

SSN 3333

---

**VI. ADDITIONAL RATER'S COMMENTS**

- The reviewer must be at least a major (Navy lieutenant commander) or civilian (at least GS-12 or similar grade)
- The final evaluator (reviewer) completes section VIII
- The reviewer cannot be higher in the rating chain than the senior rater

**NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD & LOCATION**

JOHN W. GARDNER, Major General, USAF
HQ Air Education and Training Command (AETC)
Randolph AFB TX

**Duty Title:** Director of Operations

**DATE:** 31 Jan 2005

SSN 4444
**Appendix F. United States Air Force Supervisory Examination Table of Contents**
(APFAM36-2241V2 1 JULY 2005)

| Chapter 1 — STUDYING EFFECTIVELY |
| Chapter 2 — ORGANIZATION |
| Chapter 3 — AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND JOINT FORCE |
| Chapter 4 — FULL SPECTRUM THREAT RESPONSE |
| Chapter 5 — STANDARDS OF CONDUCT |
| Chapter 6 — ENFORCING STANDARDS AND LEGAL ISSUES |
| Chapter 7 — MILITARY CUSTOMS AND COURTESIES AND PROTOCOL FOR SPECIAL EVENTS |
| Chapter 8 — THE NCO AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS |
| Chapter 9 — LEADERSHIP AND SNCO LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND MENTORSHIP |
| Chapter 10 — THE ENLISTED EVALUATION SYSTEM (EES) |
| Chapter 11 — TRAINING AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND SNCO RESOURCE MANAGEMENT |
| Chapter 12 — COMMUNICATING IN TODAY’S AIR FORCE AND STAFF LEVEL COMMUNICATION |
| Chapter 13 — MISSION SUPPORT |
| Chapter 14 — WING SUPPORT |
| Chapter 15 — DRESS AND APPEARANCE |
| Chapter 16 — FIT FORCE |
| Chapter 17 — SECURITY |
| Chapter 18 — ENLISTED HISTORY |
Bibliography


Zaleznik, A. (1977) "Managers and leaders: is there a difference?" *Harvard Business Review,* 73
Decades ago, military sociologists predicted a rising trend among officers away from traditional institutional military values and toward more economically-based occupational values due to the effects of the transition from a conscription-based military to an all-volunteer force. Subsequent empirical research resulted in data that supports such predictions. More recent researchers have suggested that in addition to the all volunteer force, an increase on technology may also accelerate the trend toward occupationalism and away from traditional institutional military values and the warrior ethos that typically define successful military organizations. The officer corps may be particularly vulnerable to occupationalism due to increased technical specialization and the corporate mindset that is evolving within the service, potentially resulting in reduced organizational commitment and a greater reliance on extrinsic motivational incentives.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of rank structures on professionalism in the context of Moskos’ institutional versus occupational (I/O) professionalism model. Previous studies utilizing the I/O model have been primarily limited to Air Force officers and suggest a trend toward occupationalism among this group. This study proposes that a much broader sample of Air Force personnel is required to determine the magnitude of this trend, both in the officer ranks as well as the NCO ranks. This study analyzes the roots of military professionalism, considers the impact of recent transformations in the military, and makes recommendations about enhancing professionalism within the Air Force among all ranks.