Previously, the Commander U.S. Pacific Command has been congressionally limited to engage with Indonesia. But new opportunities as a result of 9/11 and the December 2004 tsunami disaster have opened new doors to this nation. Because of its crucial geostrategic position and Muslim character, it is important to create a new plan to engage Indonesia. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) is the centerpiece of the operational commander’s engagement of Indonesia. With an understanding of Indonesia, it is clear that influencing Indonesian military reform will lie at the heart of any plan. A package of TSC tools can be built around education, training, exercises, military sales, and military financing in order to accomplish these goals. In the long run, a successful TSC plan will encourage a stable Indonesia, promote U.S. access in the area, and further U.S. goals in the global war on terrorism.
Time for a New Theater Security Cooperation Plan for Indonesia

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

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INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation and third largest democracy. Sitting astride vital trade routes and targeted for destabilization by terrorists, Indonesia’s success is crucial to peace in the Pacific. Its democratic development requires both effective CT [counterterrorism] efforts and Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian military] reform.

-Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander Pacific Command

Assuming a commanding geostrategic position in the world, Indonesia holds great potential in the Pacific Command area of responsibility (AOR). Southeast Asia is replete with emerging success stories of stability and friendship in countries such as Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. But in spite of these examples, Indonesia could single-handedly tip the balance of stability in Southeast Asia. The Commander United States (U.S.) Pacific Command (PACOM) has a unique tool in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) with which to engage Indonesia and affect U.S. interests there by gaining influence and access. TSC has played an effective role in this region historically in the success of Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Challenges internal to both the U.S. and Indonesian political systems have until now limited the operational commander’s TSC options, and subsequently, potential effectiveness. But new doors are opening which present the opportunity to renew and invigorate a healthy era of cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia. The thesis of this paper is that by understanding the significant Indonesian challenges, PACOM can design a new and more effective TSC plan which favors the evolution of a professional, effective, and responsible Indonesian
military, which will enhance the depth and longevity of stability in Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the greater PACOM AOR.

**TSC BASICS**

Joint doctrine describes TSC as: “A series of defense activities by combatant commanders with allies, friends, and potential coalition partners designed to support the U.S. defense strategy, advance regional defense policy goals, and in the immediate term, enable the war on global terrorism.” While engagement is a diplomatic strategy which uses the energies of all sources of national power, TSC forms the heart of the military’s role in this process. TSC comes in many forms. At its lowest end, TSC starts with simple military contacts and humanitarian assistance. This can include low level professional visits to high level commander’s meetings. It also includes basic low impact humanitarian assistance to complex humanitarian emergency crisis-response. In the median level of cooperation, TSC includes everything from education and training of a foreign nation’s military, to major combat ship visits, to minor foreign military sales. At the most advanced level of cooperation, TSC includes combined exercises, major foreign military equipment sales and financing, and the development of military interoperability.

As the level of TSC advances higher between these three levels of cooperation, so does the benefit to the U.S. There are three major benefits which result from a successful TSC plan. U.S. influence, access, and level of partnership with a targeted nation increase as the level of TSC advances higher. At the basic level of TSC, simple contact will modestly affect U.S. influence within a nation. At the middle-level of cooperation, in addition to expanded influence, more rigorous ties may result in limited access such as airspace and landing rights. And at the highest level of TSC, influence is most
pronounced, access may be possible up to basing rights, and combined combat operations may result from coalition or even alliance partnerships.4

There are three key elements to TSC which are important to understand before designing a TSC plan for any nation. First, TSC is a long term strategy. The benefits from successful TSC will increase over the lifespan that a good plan is followed. While certain meager objectives may be accomplished initially, the most substantial objectives and benefit will only be achieved over long durations. Second, TSC is only effective in advancing shared interests. A nation targeted by a TSC plan must be receptive to its objectives. Without shared interest in the objectives, the probability that a plan will be successful is remote. Finally, TSC is most effective in realizing objectives specific to a foreign nation's military and military influence within that country. TSC may be effective in influencing non-military aspects of a nation and it should not be limited to military-to-military means only. In these cases TSC may simply augment the efforts of other U.S. government organizations. But when TSC is directed to influence a nation’s military, security policy, or civil-military relations, for example, the operational commander may use TSC as the lead method of U.S. engagement.5

WHY FOCUS ON INDONESIA

After over a decade where the focus has been on the Muslim Middle East, Indonesia has quietly grown in prominence in the global war on terrorism. While U.S. leaders are focused on fighting terrorism and promoting democratic transition in the Muslim world, they seem to overlook Indonesia which had its first direct democratic elections for president in 2004. This is in spite of the fact that Indonesia may be one of the most potentially rewarding examples of a new Muslim democracy. Indonesia stands
out from the Muslim Middle East because Islam in Indonesia is historically and culturally
moderate. Indonesian Islamists overwhelmingly favor secular as opposed to Islamic
government. The most powerful Islamic clerics and the most popular Islamic political
parties in Indonesia favor the new democratic model now in place. Islamic leaders in
Indonesia have pioneered thought on democracy, human rights, and women’s rights.
They generally abhor violence committed in the name of Islam. As a testament, then
Indonesian President Megawati was the first Muslim head of state to visit the White
House shortly after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks to voice her support of
the U.S. and opposition to Islamic extremism. Still, many government leaders and the
population at large mirror greater Middle Eastern opposition to American military
intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. While American intentions may be mistrusted by
many Indonesians, the moderate nature of Islam in Indonesia creates conditions which
are receptive to American engagement and PACOM TSC.

THE CASE OF INDONESIA AND THE LEGACY OF ITS INSTITUTIONS

With an understanding of Indonesia’s importance, it is necessary to gain an
understanding of its history, politics, and the challenges it faces in order to create a TSC
plan. The Indonesian military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), is an important
facet of Indonesian society. It is the single institution in Indonesia which cuts across
cultural, ethnic, religious, and regional group lines to proportionally represent these
groups among officers and enlisted personnel. Under its former dictator Suharto, the TNI
adhered to a doctrine called "Dwifungsi", which stated that it was charged with external
defense as well as internal social and political control. The TNI supported Suharto in
power until his downfall amidst the 1997-1998 economic malaise in Southeast Asia. The
TNI’s position in politics was institutionalized with appointed seats in the legislature and traditionally “civilian” positions in the government, such as the Minister of Defense. The TNI preserved its independence with funding through its own private enterprises.\(^9\)

A number of internationally visible and embarrassing incidents occurred under the auspices of TNI independence and its multifaceted doctrine. The TNI was widely cited with a poor record of human rights. In response to a separatist movement in East Timor, TNI leaders were accused of allowing soldiers and TNI trained militia groups free reign to murder thousands of East Timorese civilians in 1999. And in 2002, three aid workers, including two Americans, were killed in Timika, Papua by TNI soldiers.\(^{10}\)

**INDONESIAN REFORMS**

While some vestiges of its former authoritarian system remain, and with much work still to be done, Indonesia is showing some positive efforts to reform its political system and military. Since the fall of the Suharto government, the country has taken the democratic path. In 2004, Indonesia successfully executed its first direct democratic elections for President in history. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono beat incumbent President Megawati in a runoff election winning 60.6% of the votes.\(^{11}\) Although the new president is a former lieutenant general in the TNI, he is widely considered a democratic reformer. He is himself a beneficiary of U.S. TSC having graduated from the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1990.\(^{12}\) After his retirement from the TNI, Yudhoyono was Minister for Security and Political Affairs in the Megawati government, where he was in charge of overseeing civilian control of the military.\(^{13}\)

The TNI itself has undertaken a number of reforms which support the democratic transformation of the country. While he was still on active duty in the TNI, then General
Yudhoyono pioneered a new military doctrine called the “New Paradigm”. This doctrine eliminated TNI responsibility for internal political stability which was the mantra of the previous doctrine. As a result, in 1999 policing activities that were the responsibility of the TNI were shifted to a new civilian police force. This force is still not advanced enough to function without TNI assistance, especially in troubled regions, but this was a major step in initiating the reformist doctrine. The TNI has increased the transparency of its financing by allowing government audits of its private business holdings. A bill passed in the Indonesian legislature in September 2004 requires that the TNI divest itself completely from business interests within 5 years. This will be a difficult transition as the TNI relies on its business holdings to fund some 70% of its budget. The TNI also has a reduced institutional role within government itself. The September 2004 national elections selected a new 550 person legislature which for the first time will not have any TNI officers. Previously, 38 seats were shared between the TNI and the national police. Laws have also been passed requiring that officers retire prior to taking certain government positions. As a result, the Minister of Defense is now a civilian. The TNI still plays a large political role, but a diminished one. While significant reforms have been initiated, they are far from mature, and there have been enough questions as to their sincerity that many restrictions on TSC still remain.

**NEW OPPORTUNITIES**

Two major events have occurred in recent years which open the possibility of a new dialogue between Indonesia and the United States, and their respective militaries, under the auspices of TSC. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 emphasized the new threat the U.S. faces. Certain dialogues opened at that time with a low level of cooperation
between the two countries. There was still much speculation as to whether meaningful reform was ongoing in Indonesia, especially in light of the deaths of American aid workers in Timika in 2002. The December 2004 tsunami, which devastated parts of Indonesia, represented a further opportunity for cooperation. The humanitarian efforts were the most rigorous form of TSC conducted between the two countries in a decade. Ongoing efforts open the possibility that newfound cooperation is ahead. It is with these changes that it can only be assumed that cooperation will expand, and impediments to formal TSC placed on commanders will be eased, if ever so slightly and slowly.

THREATS TO INDONESIA

Given this opportunity, it is necessary to create a new TSC plan for Indonesia. In order to craft a plan, one must have an understanding of the threats Indonesia faces today. Threats to Indonesian democracy and stability are threats to U.S. interests. It is upon identifying these threats, and determining the common interests, that one can begin to define objectives of a TSC plan. Radical Islamic terrorism is one of the greatest threats faced in Indonesia. Until the Bali bombing in October of 2002, which killed 202 people, Indonesian officials denied the threat transnational Islamic terrorist groups presented. The subsequent Jakarta bombings, at the J.W. Marriot in August of 2003 and at the Australian embassy in September 2004, have emboldened the Indonesians to undertake significant legal reforms facilitating the fight against terrorists. The bombings were attributed to Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which is directly linked to Al Qaeda. JI is the most powerful of the handful of transnational Islamic groups operating in Indonesia. Its objective is the establishment of a greater Southeast Asian Islamic state. JI is alleged to have aided two of the 9/11 hijackers in addition to Zacharias Moussaoui. During the
2002 trials of several Al Qaeda suspects in Spain, the Indonesian link to Al Qaeda was highlighted when it was revealed that one of the suspects attended a terrorist training camp in Indonesia. These issues have focused western attention on Southeast Asia, and Indonesia, as the “second front” in the war on terrorism.

While Indonesians have only recently come to realize the Islamic fundamentalist threat, they have long recognized separatist groups as a significant threat within Indonesian borders. After East Timor struggled to gain independence after a 1999 referendum, a number of other secessionist movements appeared, most notably in the Aceh, Riau, and Irian Jaya provinces. Indonesia can ill afford to lose these provinces for their rich value. They represent half the Indonesian oil deposits, have the world's largest gold mine, third largest silver mine, and account for 15% of Indonesia’s foreign earnings. Movements such as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement, have waged effective campaigns against the police and TNI forces. The Indonesian government has agreed to a number of cease fires with these groups, and has attempted a new round of concessions in order to seek diplomatic vice military solutions to the conflicts, although it is unclear whether these efforts will bear fruit.

Alongside separatist insurgencies, ethnic and religious violence marks the areas of the Moluccus and Sulawesi. These conflicts are fueled by regional fundamental Islamic groups such as Laskar Jihad. They differ from the transnational groups, such as JI, as they are focused on instigating religious conflict within Indonesia. Headed by Ja’afar Umar Thalib, a former Afghan fighter, Laskar Jihad has ties to Al Qaeda although they are vehemently denied and denounced by the leadership of the organization.
Other problems, endemic of the greater Southeast Asia area, include maritime piracy, illegal immigration, the drug trade, and human trafficking. These problems lend manpower and resources to the aforementioned threats. The highlight of these is piracy in the Strait of Malacca, through which a quarter of the world’s trade and half its oil passes. Almost 150 pirate attacks take place in the 550 mile Strait each year.\(^{24}\) Finally, China is viewed as a long term threat, but one which is manageable through the multilateral Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).\(^{25}\)

**INDONESIAN CHALLENGES**

There are significant challenges to fighting these threats. The geography of Indonesia presents incredible challenges itself. This archipelagic nation presents a coastline almost 55,000 kilometers long with 14,000 islands.\(^{26}\) As a result, securing the borders of Indonesia is a difficult, if not impossible task. Today, external threats are impossible to thwart, and internal threats take great advantage of unsecured borders to import fighters, supplies, and arms.\(^{27}\)

Compounding this challenge is the poorly equipped state of the TNI. Given the public-private financing of the TNI, it is difficult to determine its true budget. Its federal defense budget in 2004 was $1.5 billion, but this represents only about 30% of its overall operating budget. Still, this is well below military budgets of comparably sized countries.\(^{28}\) A U.S. ban on aircraft spare parts, in place since the East Timor incident but partially lifted after 9/11, has only exacerbated the situation. Air and naval assets, which are required to adequately patrol a vast territory and border, are sorely lacking. Of 25 total C-130 aircraft, only 8 are operational.\(^{29}\) In terms of naval assets, the Indonesian Navy estimates it needs 400 new patrol boats to adequately patrol its seas. Only a third
of its current fleet is operational. The independent police force, in spite of U.S. funding and training, is in its infancy, and not ready to take the job of internal policeman from the TNI. Finally, due to the U.S. weapons and parts embargoes, Indonesia has turned to eastern countries for military supplies. With its current military hardware in decrepit condition, the purchase of two Sukhoi SU-27s and two SU-30s represents the unimaginative procurement policy Indonesia has embraced. These assets do little to combat the significant threats Indonesia faces.

There are also challenges internal to the American political system, which limit PACOM engagement through TSC. The 2005 Congressional Foreign Appropriation Bill limits funding and military-to-military ties to the TNI as a result of past human rights abuses. These limits specifically ban International Military Education and Training (IMET), military sales, and military financing until Indonesia prosecutes TNI leaders responsible for human rights abuses in Timika and East Timor. The opportunity has been there for a complete normalization of relations over the past several years. However, Indonesian courts have overturned previous convictions of TNI officials in the East Timor atrocities, which has precluded normalization. But while these limits remain today, they have been eased, and can be expected to further ease due to the unique opportunities already mentioned. Congressional concerns must be addressed in the design of a TSC plan in order to facilitate the lifting of these restrictions.

**INDONESIAN TSC OBJECTIVES**

With an understanding of the unique circumstances presented by Indonesia, including its threats and challenges, one can craft a number of simple objectives to which a TSC plan will be directed. Those objectives, specific to military TSC attainables, are
grounded in promoting a secure and stable democracy with a civilian controlled military. While one can craft a number of objectives, it benefits the operational commander to ground these objectives specific to the TNI and U.S. military. This will represent the most effective and efficient use of TSC in meeting those objectives. The current PACOM TSC plan incorporates four overall strategic objectives and ten operational objectives associated with four strategic end states. These objectives can be simplified into the following four objectives with a new TSC plan in mind.

- (1) Promote a TNI which is supportive of civilian control and democracy.
- (2) Promote a TNI which acts ethically in concert with universally accepted principles of law and human rights.
- (3) Promote an Indonesia which is secure both internally and externally based on TNI and Indonesian independent law enforcement bodies.
- (4) Promote access to Indonesia for American military forces and access to transnational terrorists operating within Indonesian territory.

THE INDONESIAN TSC PLAN PART 1: TNI PROFESSIONALIZATION

Directing TSC towards attaining the four stated objectives can be done by matching the particular tools of a TSC plan to the objectives. The first objective calls for the TNI to subject itself to the democratic civilian government. This traditional democratic civil-military relationship is predicated on the TNI’s continued reform in the realm of doctrine, which would include a withdrawal from politics and embrace of civilian control over its mission and budget. The second objective calls for the TNI to act ethically in concert with international standards for human rights and law. Of primary importance in achieving this objective, is the creation of an ethical officer and enlisted
leadership base within the TNI. Only with this leadership base established, can the organization as a whole be expected to act responsibly.

The first two objectives are common in that they both deal with the promotion of a professional military force. The most effective TSC tools in affecting the professionalization of the TNI are in education and training. Expanded IMET (E-IMET) is a TSC program which serves to educate a core of personnel versed in U.S. doctrine of civil-military relations and international norms of human rights. E-IMET programs are generally short in duration and specifically directed to the teaching of non-combat disciplines like civil-military relations. The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship (RDCTF) is an E-IMET program which was developed specifically to address fighting terrorism within democratic models of civil-military relations. IMET programs include foreign military student education within U.S. military schools such as the U.S. War Colleges. These are combined educational opportunities which grant exposure between foreign and U.S. students. Educational opportunities within IMET and E-IMET programs which showcase democracy, civil-military relations, international cooperation, human rights, and critical thinking should be implemented in an Indonesian TSC plan. It is through these educational opportunities that Indonesian military personnel will learn the basics of civil-military relations and human rights, and will interact with their U.S. counterparts to see for themselves a future democratic model of Indonesia at work. Not only will future contact and access between students be facilitated, foreign students will accept a higher stake in their future military and nation.

Another TSC opportunity important in affecting the professionalization of the TNI is the high level visit and subject matter expert exchange. These meetings should
serve to emphasize the specifics necessary to achieve a professional military force. The
general discussion of doctrine must be enhanced with specifics on the merits of a military
focus on external threats, civilian control of the TNI, TNI reform in relinquishing private
investments, and the benefits of adhering to international human rights norms. High level
visits and increased contacts should be emphasized in a TSC plan in order to cement and
expand the U.S. view of TNI reform.

THE INDONESIAN TSC PLAN
PART 2: CREATING A CAPABLE TNI

The third objective of the TSC plan is to promote a secure Indonesia. The TSC
plan must help to build a TNI which is capable of addressing the international threats
emphasized in an outward looking doctrine. Capability can be built through training,
exercises, and limited and directed financing and sales of military equipment. Training
must be incorporated in the TSC program. Training TNI personnel in peacekeeping
missions, counterterrorism, and intelligence methods will give Indonesian forces the
ability to face international threats in an efficient, effective, and professional manner.
Training for peacekeeping missions will allow TNI personnel exposure to international
norms for these missions which have appropriate applications within and outside
Indonesia. Counterterrorism training will assist the TNI in addressing threats from
transnational terrorist groups and in promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation
required to combat these groups. Intelligence training will further add to the training in
cooperative techniques in intelligence gathering and sharing among national
organizations and nations.

Further, a program of high level exercises should be scheduled. Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) is a low level bilateral exercise which provides
training for Southeast Asian navies including Indonesia. These exercises should be augmented by an extensive exercise based upon the Regional Maritime Security Initiative. This program builds multilateral capabilities to combat maritime threats prevalent in Southeast Asia. This exercise will train to a higher level for naval forces in combating seaborne threats such as terrorism and piracy as well as tactics in patrol and border enforcement which can be handled cooperatively between nations in the region. Finally, a bilateral or multilateral exercise similar to the Balikatan exercise in the Philippines should emphasize training in counterterrorism ashore. The training given to Indonesians will give them the knowledge to effectively counter the threats Indonesia faces in an efficient and responsible manner in concert with U.S. techniques.38

The TSC plan should include a directed foreign military financing (FMF) and foreign military sales (FMS) program. Given the financial constraints and geographic challenges Indonesia faces, FMF and FMS are necessary to give the TNI the capability to fight international threats. FMF and FMS should be targeted to enable the TNI to monitor and patrol their borders, airspace, and territorial seas. Financing should be provided to enable Indonesia to purchase patrol boats, patrol aircraft, and the equipment necessary to build an effective quick response command and control network in order to unify national and international effort and cooperation in fighting international threats. With a capability to patrol Indonesian territory comes a capability to control the flow of transnational terrorists, illegal immigration supporting terror, and arms shipments supporting terrorists and separatist movements. This capability in itself would serve far reaching dividends in combating the threats Indonesia faces today, and it would facilitate the U.S. global war on terrorism.
THE INDONESIAN TSC PLAN
PART 3: ENABLING ACCESS

The fourth objective is gaining U.S. access to Indonesia. This objective comes as a byproduct of all TSC efforts combined. Training, education, exercises, military sales, and military financing, all favor greater U.S. access to Indonesia. But while TSC tools all add to the objective, it is important that a commander’s actions not detract from this effort by alienating a nation’s public. An operational commander in pursuit of U.S. access through TSC, must keep in mind that he or she must maintain public support in the positive, or perhaps more realistic in Indonesia’s case, he or she must minimize public dissent in the negative.

There are two ways of accomplishing this. First, a focus on humanitarian efforts and rebuilding must continue as the final piece in a TSC plan for Indonesia. While much of the disaster relief effort from the 2004 tsunami is handed off to non-governmental organizations, operational commanders should continue to provide limited efforts to assist. Relief and reconstruction will be ongoing for years in the hardest hit areas of Indonesia. Military Civil Affairs and humanitarian reconstruction money to continue rebuilding infrastructure and institutions within areas throughout Indonesia are important to maintain public support and increase goodwill towards a U.S. presence.

The second way to maintain public support, or avoid public dissent, is by managing the U.S. footprint in Indonesia. While humanitarian efforts will bring a never ending feeling of goodwill towards Americans and their presence, other missions utilizing U.S. personnel will alienate certain sectors of Indonesia’s Muslim population. Because of this, the use of Special Operations Forces, which operate under a small footprint, are appropriate for long term training, exercises, and operations on Indonesian
soil. When larger forces are required, they should be used in short durations in order to maximize effects balanced against negative local public opinion. Large footprints will stir anti-American feelings even within a moderate Muslim population. By alienating the population, one will also alienate government officials, some of whom will play to popular feelings exacerbating the situation. In the Philippines, where the majority of the population is Christian, any American presence, even after years of basing agreements, meets with some level of disapproval. The same can be expected in Indonesia. However, the small U.S. footprint must be balanced against the incredible rewards that can be gained through TSC.

THE PITFALL? ENABLING INDONESIAN MISBEHAVIOR

The argument against expanding TSC in Indonesia is based upon a history of the TNI and its human rights abuses. Some would argue that by expanding the capability of the TNI to wage war, the U.S. will simply increase TNI power within the government and enable it to commit more human rights abuses with more capable means. The U.S. cannot absolutely guarantee that the TNI will continue to reform. However, political and military forces within the country appear to understand the merits of reform and have taken the difficult initial steps down this road. As well, the proposed TSC plan does mitigate this risk by directing funds which promote the reformist path. Money for education and training of the proper use of force within democratic models of government directly leverages money for combat training in specific areas such as counterterrorism. One is not complete without the other. And in terms of FMS and FMF, money is directed towards technologies and capabilities such as patrol and coordination on borders and seas, as opposed to purely combat capabilities such as
defense of those borders. TNI effectiveness, not lethality, is increased by the proposed plan. By tailoring education, training, and financing, the TNI is nudged in the direction they are currently taking, which supports the four U.S. objectives. Without these incentives, it is only reasonable to believe that the reformist path would be less likely taken. By abandoning TSC as a tool to influence the TNI, the U.S. will have missed a golden opportunity favoring influence, access and stability in a key region.

CONCLUSION

Theater Security Cooperation is the key to influencing Indonesia to pursue a road of military reforms which will enhance the stability of that nation and region. With the combined interests of both countries involved and the risks inherent given the challenges of the situation, a TSC plan which addresses key deficiencies within the TNI, both tangible and intangible, can be written which leverages the risks cited by critics. Training, military sales, and financing, focused on enhancing the tangible deficiencies of the TNI, is buoyed by education, focused on enhancing the intangible deficiencies of the TNI. With this approach, realistic long term objectives which favor U.S. and Indonesian interests are realistic and attainable. It is up to PACOM to ensure that resources directed to Indonesia under this TSC plan are balanced between education, training, and financing/sales. Resources for the first must be adequate to ensure proper employment of the latter. Finally, a continuing dialogue must be present throughout the life of this TSC plan, to ensure its direction, to ensure its execution, and to ensure that the limitless potential of Indonesia is channeled in a way which supports the interests of Indonesians and Americans alike.
NOTES


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