Saluting Suits: A Case for Military Subordination to Civilian Command During War Termination

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

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by

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Signature:____________________

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Abstract

Joint military and USG doctrine for interagency coordination relies on exhortations to cooperate, but lacks an effective command structure to ensure outcomes. Historical examples from the Balkans and Iraq illustrate that interagency coordination is particularly critical in the stability and reconstruction phase. A single chain of command at the operational level, led by a civilian Joint Executive Commander, is proposed to solve the problems inherent to current doctrinal solutions for interagency coordination during war termination.
Introduction

Many wars in this century have been started with only the most nebulous expectations regarding the outcome, on the strength of plans that paid little, if any, attention to the ending. – Prof Fred Ickle, 1971

Twenty months after the official end of major combat operations in Iraq the United States joint military force is strapped to meet its commitments in two ongoing major regional operations while facing the challenges of a Global War on Terror. Professor Ickle suggested that “every war must end,” but not always successfully for one or even all parties. From the joint force commander’s perspective, ending wars successfully depends on achieving strategic objectives through the application of operational art.

The joint force commander is expected to understand and apply, as necessary, all the elements of national power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic. Command and control, one of the most important operational functions, “…is the principal means by which the operational commander sequences and synchronizes the actions and activities of both military and non-military sources of national power…” Yet neither current practice nor joint doctrine supports effective operational war termination. We rely instead on a hopeful and demonstrably flawed strategy of interagency coordination in lieu of clear command and control.

This essay will argue that war termination operations demand a single, linear chain of command and, further, that the military should be subordinate to a civilian Joint Executive Commander at the operational level. We shall narrow our scope to the interagency process in war termination because of its complexity and relevance to recent operations.
Historical Interagency Coordination: A Strategy of Hope

The literature of joint military doctrine, blue ribbon panels, and academic scholarship is diverse in its terminology. What exactly do we mean for our discussion when we consider the interagency process and war termination? Interagency is an adjective; it is not a place to apply for a federal job. Joint military doctrine defines “interagency coordination” as forging “the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the US Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies.” For example, the National Security Council (NSC) is the highest level interagency organization within the executive branch. The interagency process is the system of formal and informal procedures and links that facilitate coordination between agencies and departments. For our discussion we will only address the USG component of interagency coordination, something over which, theoretically, we have control. This focus is not intended to diminish the importance of coordination with other governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Logically, by improving our intra-governmental coordination we will become a more effective partner with other nations and organizations.

War termination is a broad area of concern for strategists and operational leaders. It encompasses criteria for electing to terminate violent conflict, processes for transition to non-military control and measures to ensure long term maintenance of peace. It is the process by which we endeavor to match our pre-war policy with a strategy for regaining peace. The interagency process is more challenging during war termination because the military element of power is so disproportionately strong during war, thus making the subordinate transition to diplomacy and the other elements of power more difficult. War termination presents an operational imperative to stabilize and re-build in order to secure a lasting peace. This phase
has been referred to as post-conflict operations, Security and Stability Operations or stability and reconstruction (S&R). In fact, the Department of Defense (DoD) leadership now suggests that S&R is a critical area for improvement. Stability includes physical security, economic viability and political activity; reconstruction entails the rebuilding of infrastructure and institutions to make the result permanent.

*Operational art* is used by commanders “to ‘orchestrate’ the employment of military forces and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish strategic and operational objectives in a given theater.” Interagency coordination, as currently defined in doctrine, must be an element of the commander’s operational plan. Interagency implementation becomes the rub. The fact that current doctrine is inadequate should not discourage us because we have an opportunity to drive doctrinal revision through operational improvement.

*Challenges of Stability and Reconstruction.* Stability and reconstruction missions are generated by calamities ranging from natural disasters to war. Humanitarian Assistance operations will inevitably involve some degree of S&R. To the extent that our focus is on S&R in the wake of combat, the required efforts are made more difficult by the physical and psychological effects of war. Stability and reconstruction is also an increasingly common operational requirement for the joint force:

> “Since the end of the cold war the United States has begun new stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months. Since each operation typically lasts for five to eight years, cumulative requirements for human resources can add up to three to five times what are needed for a single operation.”

Our challenge in terminating Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) further highlights the importance of solving this aspect of warfighting. With the current analytic microscope on war termination, as highlighted by the 2004 Defense Science Board Summer Study,
“Transition To and From Hostilities,” it is important to note that this is not a unique perspective from which to view the importance of effective interagency coordination. In a late-1990s study devoted to conflict prevention, the Carnegie Commission asserted that “…preventing or suppressing the re-emergence of conflict…presents unique challenges and is particularly illustrative of the need for effective civilian-military implementation.”\textsuperscript{10} Whether our perspective is conflict prevention or better war fighting, we must master the interagency process.

A plan for S&R, like any war plan, must be flexible to account for interaction and adaptation. Achieving flexibility is more challenging when multiple organizations are involved. Unity of effort, a doctrinal principle of military operations other than war (MOOTW)\textsuperscript{11}, is a somewhat obvious goal. But how does a diverse group achieve it without some guiding authority?

Stability and reconstruction is personnel-intensive in ways that modern conventional warfare is not. Estimates suggest five to 20 troops per 1000 indigenous people are required depending on the initial level of post-conflict disorder and the magnitude of our ambition.\textsuperscript{12} We can achieve swift, decisive combat effects with relatively few forces, but it takes many more bodies to stabilize and re-build.

Who performs S&R? Within the USG several agencies may be involved, including the Departments of Defense, State (DoS), Treasury and Justice to name a few. However, DoD and DoS are the primary agencies. Joint military forces execute Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Nation Assistance, etc.\textsuperscript{13} Department of State and its subsidiary USAID perform a host of S&R functions from initial surveys to humanitarian relief coordination, banking, government and direct diplomacy.\textsuperscript{14}
How well do we plan these overlapping missions? A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) survey argues that “unlike the military, which has doctrine and a standard approach to planning operations, the U.S. government as a whole lacks established procedures for developing integrated strategies and plans.”15 This criticism holds true at the national strategic level in particular, where initial strategy is formulated and the degree of interagency coordination is subject to the discretion of the President and his advisors. The National Security Council is the most obvious venue for strategic interagency coordination, but the degree to which this occurs is up to the statutory members. Where established procedures do exist, it is up to the members to utilize them.

Thus, S&R is essential to terminating wars. It requires coordinated effort by several organizations and it takes a lot of people and resources. In short, like most things that are important and worthwhile, it is difficult. Despite differences in scale and scope, post-Cold War operations in the Balkans and Iraq offer examples of the challenges and shortfalls of the interagency process in securing a lasting peace.

**Bosnia: An Easy Lesson Unlearned.** In the wake of NATO air strikes against Serbian positions in Bosnia during the late summer and fall of 1995, United Nations peacekeeping forces were augmented by a multi-national Implementation Force (IFOR) that executed an “easy, untroubled entry” into their positions. Representatives from several international government organizations, including the United Nations High Representative and DoS personnel, had a more difficult time setting up than the military because of poor integration with the much better-equipped IFOR.16 The subsequent interagency coordination challenges were the subject of a comprehensive study by the former Commander-in-Chief European Command, General George Joulwan. His conclusions offer broadly applicable principles for
implementing S&R objectives and a vivid description of the war termination phase. While his study deals with an operation that was decidedly multinational, its lessons are noteworthy and applicable to USG interagency coordination.

In terms of key principles for implementation, Joulwan argues for unity of authority and integration of effort. “In many instances, autonomous organizations must surrender a measure of independence.” This is closer to the principle of war that calls for “unity of command” than to the principle of MOOTW that extols “unity of effort.” In fact, Joulwan recognizes the latter principle in addition to unity of authority. However, IFOR and its ostensible interagency partners achieved neither unity of authority nor real unity of effort. This was due in large measure to the disparities in force size, capability, communications and, always the bogeyman of the interagency: organizational cultures. As IFOR drove and flew into its positions, equipped with western communications technology and firepower, the UN High Representative had to scrounge for offices and use his personal cell phone for official communication. The disparity in physical capacity was mirrored in the ensuing dysfunctional parallel and loosely coordinated command structures used by military and civilian participants in the Dayton Accord (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Dayton Accords Implementation

The only structural civilian-military coordination mechanism was the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which met abroad and attended to strategic matters. Derived from Joulwan, 1998, Fig. 4
What’s more, the civilian element of the Bosnia mission straddled the strategic and operational level, further clouding the focus on the operational level.

The Carnegie Commission study describes the strategic, operational and tactical levels of S&R management. One of the most important aspects of the war termination phase that the operational commander must manage is relative level of effort by the three primary participants: military, civilian (interagency) partners and the indigenous government (Figure 2).

During S&R the focus shifts from achieving to maintaining security; from demobilization to re-establishment of self-defense; and from restoration of the most basic services to the restoration of political services (schools, financial institutions, etc.).

The strategic and operational lessons from Bosnia for the United States were had at a relatively cheap cost of national blood and treasure. Did we learn from them? Did we improve the interagency process at any level or in any phase of conflict? Yes, to a degree.
Leveraging on our experience in Bosnia and earlier operations in Somalia, interagency planning for complex contingencies at the national strategic level was formalized in the 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56. However, PDD-56 was officially discarded by the new administration in 2001. According to one Foreign Service Officer (FSO), who vouched for PDD-56 viability in interagency planning, “there’s been no replacement for PDD-56. I was a PDD-56 planner for two years in the late 1990s and we don’t do it anymore.”

During the Kosovo Force (KFOR) S&R mission subsequent to NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 1999, many of the lessons of Bosnia were fresh in the minds of key players and they were heeded to a large extent. An FSO who served there speaks in positive terms about the interagency process at the operational and tactical levels. She says that, despite parallel command structures, there was a consistent effort to coordinate between DoS and DoD, while noting that it was a less drastic situation to what we faced in Iraq.

**Iraq: A Costly Lesson Re-Learned.** The geostrategic jury is out on the wisdom of initiating OIF, but the operational lessons derived from planning and execution have circulated for nearly two years. Even DoD acknowledges that the plans for war termination were inadequate and that the implementation has been problematic. National strategic level processes for interagency coordination in planning and execution were modified to the significant exclusion of DoS. Put more bluntly: “The National Security Council failed to perform its mission.” In their defense, there was no presidential directive in effect to guide them. Critics of the pre-OIF planning process cite the NSC’s failure to proactively coordinate key interagency players, in particular DoS and DoD, who were at odds over the very nature of the war termination problem. The Department of State’s Future of Iraq Project fell on deaf ears in DoD.
At the operational level during the post-hostilities phase, civilians and military commanders failed to adapt. Fred Ickle summed it up in reference to World War II’s defeated powers:

“...contradictory evidence regarding the military situation and conflicting views of the nation’s priorities become intertwined with personal concerns about one’s future public career, and perhaps even one’s private life, after a war that had to be ended in failure.”

As students of strategy and policy we learn that adaptation is a hallmark of interaction with an enemy. Anthony Cordesman, in a 2003 CSIS report that dovetails closely with that organization’s Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study, drafts a long list of failures in OIF at the strategic and operational level. Most boil down to ineffective USG interagency coordination.

After a brief tenure, an impotent Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was rightly, albeit embarrassingly, replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). However, the result was not significantly better from the standpoint of S&R at the tactical level because “the lack of civil-military coordination greatly complicated the practical problems in actually providing aid and keeping promises.”

U.S. Army company commanders found themselves e-mailing DoS Economics Officers from the field regarding the best way to set up a village banking system. Foreign Service Officers in Iraq could not safely travel to execute their missions because, while their security was provided by DoS personnel, their transportation was provided by the Joint Force Land Component Commander who often had other priorities.

In other instances we duplicated effort unnecessarily. Rice seed for the Basra region was ordered by a gung-ho Civil Affairs officer before consultation with a CPA agricultural expert. A priority request for cargo trucks and inspectors had to be generated to fetch up an
emergency shipment of climatically inappropriate Egyptian rice in peril of rotting at the Jordanian border. The well-intentioned request created a mini-crisis and necessitated additional construction to refrigerate the perishable seed until the planting season. This may seem a small thing in comparison to the thousands of Americans and Iraqis who have died to secure a peace, but it is very much a part of the S&R process. Our tactical level soldiers and civilians were hampered by a dysfunctional operational command structure that impeded communication and coordination. From the strategic and operational perspectives we failed to account for lessons in war termination planning and interagency coordination that had been learned and codified in politically eclipsed policy. Figure 3 depicts the CPA’s position within the operational-strategic spectrum and conjures the Dayton Accords implementation structure.

Figure 3
Coalition Provisional Authority

Derived from CRS Report to Congress, 2004, Fig. 1
Limits to Interagency Effectiveness. Our Constitution states: “The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and…may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.”35 In other words, the President decides; advice optional. Once decisions are made, as in tasking DoD to lead the planning for OIF, it is up to the Secretaries to manage coordination. We may reasonably conclude that the President did not tell the Secretary of Defense, “Don’t coordinate with State.” But absent presidential guidance to the contrary, interagency coordination appears to have been minimal.

Reporting in early 2001, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission, after the chairmen) asserted: “The Department of State, in particular, is a crippled institution, starved for resources by Congress because of its inadequacies, and thereby weakened further.”36 Regardless of presidential intent, interdepartmental management or the operational commander’s artful incorporation of interagency coordination, the argument suggests that DoS is ineffective. In the ensuing three years DoS has made significant strides under Secretary of State Powell, including the adoption of several of the Hart-Rudman Commission’s recommendations.37 However, DoS is still playing catch-up. Probably the most significant handicap is the limited number of FSOs available for deployment and the limited nature of their representation in operational command structures. “There are more Army band members than FSOs.”38 Any solution to this problem will take more time and money than we can afford. Immediate solutions must therefore optimize State’s existing limited assets.

The management or mismanagement of one agency means someone must pick up the slack. Author Dana Priest writes a compelling account of the wide-ranging power wielded
by the erstwhile “CinCs.” Their ability to project military and diplomatic power and their transnational focus made them more important than the President’s ambassadors. The geographic combatant commanders still hold significant sway through their areas of responsibility (AORs) and influence, if not actually wield, all the elements of power. The combatant commands possess the physical infrastructure and personnel to carry the burden while DoS struggles to keep pace.

Current joint interagency doctrine is a recipe for ineffectiveness. If operational art translates into doctrine, then our current interagency doctrine reflects the joint force’s failure to optimize a vital enabler of effective operations. Two factors influence the situation. First, joint doctrine lumps USG interagency coordination with NGOs and international organizations (IOs). It is logical to bind them doctrinally only to the extent that joint military forces will inevitably interact and, ideally, coordinate efforts with NGOs and IOs in addition to USG agencies. But it is subtly deceptive and undermines the potential we have for meaningful and persistent USG interagency collaboration. Unlike NGOs and IOs, the executive agencies are all part of the same government. We can change the rules.

Second, we stipulate different principles of war and MOOTW and doctrinally apply only the latter principles to war termination and interagency coordination. The most relevant principle concerns “unity of command” in war versus “unity of effort” in MOOTW. We accept the handicap of disunity of command simply based on the interagency factor. We choose instead to exhort our joint force to “cooperate” or “coordinate.” This may be the best we can hope for when dealing with an NGO such as Medicins Sans Frontieres, but surely we can do more than “hope” within our own government.
What about joint doctrinal and experimental moves to improve interagency coordination by incorporating the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) within the Joint Force Headquarters? As a staff participant in Joint Forces Command’s Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02), I observed the JIACG as exercising only an advisory role. The intent, to foster greater “interagency coordination” in a game scenario that was designed to evolve into major combat operations, was noble yet insufficient. Admittedly, neither interagency coordination nor war termination was the focus of MC02, but we should seize every opportunity to exercise the full gamut of interagency coordination.

Overall, the difficult nature of war termination and the critical transition period of S&R are made more challenging by the requirement to share responsibilities among diverse agencies, each with their own important expertise, unique capabilities and substantial limitations. The U.S. joint force is further burdened by its disproportionate share of the S&R load in a strategy-making environment which has recently eschewed interagency coordination. Despite a decade of lessons from the post-Cold War Balkan upheaval and, more recently, unlimited wars aimed at regime change and nation building, we have not achieved an effective degree of interagency performance in war termination.

**A Way Ahead –Joint Executive Operations**

We must recognize that virtually no structural or procedural solution alone will coerce an unwilling participant. Our system relies on strength of character and qualities of personal leadership. One of the key qualities of leadership, a pinnacle trait of the operational art, is the ability to bring divergent interests and perspectives into alignment for the pursuit of the goal. Clear lines of command foster leadership where elsewhere it may be obscured by unclear relationships and authority. With limited resources we must increase our capacity for
response, unify interagency command at the operational level and prepare our interagency leaders to accomplish these goals. These solutions must be inexpensive and tenable.

**Interagency Planning and Implementation Guidance.** In order for the operational commander to have tenable strategic objectives to translate into operational missions, it is axiomatic that adequate planning at the theater and national strategic level occur. To the extent that this solution is “quick and cheap,” we have a fully staffed executive branch apparatus ready to do the job. In fact, this is the job of the NSC and its relevant Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), should the President direct it.\(^{46}\) We must expedite a successor to PDD-56. This “NSPD-XX,” in a state of limbo for four years, must include specific guidance for the integral coordination of S&R into any complex contingency plan.\(^{47}\) From a military doctrinal perspective, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should delay the release of revised Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (JP 3-08). Previews reveal that the revised JP 3-08 is not substantially different than its predecessor.\(^{48}\) Joint military doctrine does not prohibit changes to improve operational implementation. However, it should reflect improvements in the commander’s operational art such as those proposed here.

**Operational Unity of Command.** “There is neither a more important principle, nor one more difficult to abide by, than establishing and maintaining unity of authority in the planning and execution of civilian-military operations…”\(^{49}\) Several studies suggest the need for unity of authority during S&R and propose measures such as a more robust JIACG with paramount civilian leadership.\(^{50}\) The DoD’s own Defense Science Board argued: “Coordination, the traditional interagency currency in the government, is necessary but insufficient for orchestration and success.”\(^{51}\) None, however, make what should be the most
obvious yet radical recommendation: Put a civilian in overall command at the operational level during stability and reconstruction. Taking the “jointness” beyond the military arm of the executive branch, this person will be called the Joint Executive Commander (JEC).

General Joulwan’s graphical depiction of the preponderant level of activity surrounding civilian agencies during S&R (Figure 2) suggests a measure of justification for civilian command. Analogous to the widely accepted notion that the military commands during combat operations, it follows that a competent civilian commands during S&R. That said, there is still a significant need for military forces in S&R, whose presence in terms of sheer numbers and current capability to support humanitarian and reconstruction operations warrants integration with other agencies. What type of command over the Joint Executive Team (JET), including subordinate joint military forces, will the civilian commander assert? Where do we find competent JECs? At what point in the larger operation will the shift in authority take place? What will the JET organization look like? Can we make these changes at all; are they legal and practicable?

The JEC will be a supported commander under slightly modified joint doctrine. Establishment of the JEC as the supported commander will be directed by the President and the Secretaries of Defense and State. “The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement.” The JEC will be much less vague than the current system of parallel consultative relationships at the operational level. The JEC will receive “general support” and be authorized, consistent with current doctrine, to exercise general direction of the effort. Perhaps of equal significance, the supporting forces, military and USG agencies, will be compelled to “advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations…of such support.”
The formally supported JEC will overcome the doctrine of hope upon which interagency coordination is currently based.

Competent JECs will be vetted by the NSC, or comparable cabinet level advisors, and recommended for appointment by the President. The specific individuals will, under current circumstances, likely come from DoS. If the S&R operation is conducted within a nation with which the U.S. has diplomatic relations, the Ambassador could be the JEC. The combatant commanders’ political advisors (POLADs), logical candidates for JEC selection, would not be ideal because their regular duties span the entire command’s AOR.

During war termination, the JEC will assume command at a time approved by the combatant commander in consultation with the President and Secretary of Defense. To this end, the shift of authority will be pushed by DoD, thus avoiding the appearance of usurpation by DoS. If the operation is conceived as non-combat in nature then the JEC will assume command at the initial establishment of the task force, in this case a JET. Prior to command transition during a combat operation the JEC will build situational awareness via the JIACG. In some circumstances, contingent upon overall size and scope of the operation, the JEC may be the JIACG director prior to transition. Until virtual collaboration technology slips the bonds of experimentation and until the unlikely day that S&R operations are no longer labor intensive, the JIACG and the JEC should be forward deployed. Non-DoD executive agencies may not compel their personnel to deploy. However many DoS, Justice and Commerce specialists did volunteer for service in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. Until executive agencies revise their basic organizational guidelines, a prime motivator to volunteer will be the greater prospect for effective performance and mission success. The JEC concept will make these volunteers’ contributions more worthwhile.
Joint Executive Team

Figure 4 offers an organizational design for the Joint Executive Team. The Deputy JEC will be a joint force military officer such as the former JFC of the combat operation. As to the question of whether this command structure is achievable, consider this an initiative by the combatant commanders with neither doctrinal nor legal prohibition. The largest impediment will be institutional. Therefore, the agency with the most at stake in terms of personnel and power should lobby for the change. It is DoD’s plan to champion.

We’ve discussed contemporary examples that highlight the inadequacies of the current parallel system of operational control during S&R. What if the CPA administrator and the JTF commander had committed themselves to seamless integration and broken down the physical and bureaucratic walls of their parallel commands? That may have worked in Iraq, but we shouldn’t have to “hope” for future cooperation absent a supporting command structure. History suggests that seamlessness is elusive.
Will a hierarchical command structure be sufficient to ensure greater interagency effectiveness in war termination? How can it be measured? By itself, no structure within an inherently personality and passion-driven process such as war and politics will suffice. Look only as far as our constitutional government’s design, where friction is built into the process to avoid the dictatorship of efficiency. Might we court too much efficiency by implementing a single chain of command at the operational level of war termination? Perhaps, but it is a risk against which we must weigh the cost of lives and operational failure. No plan is perfect so it follows that we should attempt the best implementation to mitigate imperfection.

Structure provides a default system on which to rely when friction threatens failure. Greater interagency implementation effectiveness, at the risk of tautology, will only be measured in the attainment of strategic objectives.

*Training and Experimentation.* In the Chairman’s own words: “Experimentation is fertile ground for exercising interagency processes.”

We must fast track, test and refine the JEC concept in ongoing Joint Forces Command experimentation. Experimentation will not only validate the JEC concept, but provide an environment in which to train prospective JET commanders. The JEC pool will ideally consist of former ambassadors, flag officers, or even corporate leaders who are often tapped for executive cabinet positions. Periodic refresher training will include war games, exercises and schools to ensure readiness. As the JEC concept evolves through real world operations and experimental lessons learned the standards (metrics) for readiness will correspondingly evolve. As a conceptual test, we should transition to a JET and designate a JEC during the Naval War College’s Department of Joint Maritime Operations headquarters exercise.
Conclusion

It is almost too easy to condemn the state of USG interagency coordination in stability and reconstruction unless we look to the tactical level, where the American spirit reveals itself in people doing the best they can despite obstacles and challenges. For example, that Army officer in Iraq got the information he needed to successfully establish a rudimentary local banking system. In Afghanistan, special operations units working in small teams alongside FSOs were able to synthesize political considerations into their plans for direct actions.\textsuperscript{58} However, we should not count on this as a matter of policy or doctrine. The best tactics and unit level intentions must be guided and supported by coherent operational leadership, the pinnacle of operational art.

“The [United States] military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions.”\textsuperscript{59} If we learn the lessons of these and other late 20\textsuperscript{th} century operations and act on the aforementioned solutions, we can avoid such excursions with respect to poor war termination implementation. “The need for ‘jointness’ does not apply simply to the U.S. military; it must apply to the entire U.S. government.”\textsuperscript{60} The Joint Executive Team should lead by example.

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NOTES


2 Ickle, i.


6 Vego, Operational Warfare, 1.

7 Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department, Syllabus and Study Guide for Joint Maritime Operations 2004 (Newport, RI: November 2004), 25. “Effective doctrine is a derivative of sound operational art.”

8 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (Washington, DC: 16 July 1997), 318-322. Humanitarian Assistance is often performed by the joint force, which has unique capacity to provide relief from suffering and stave off potentially destabilizing crises.

9 Defense Science Board, iv.


12 Defense Science Board, viii.


14 Stephanie A. Miley, FSO-1, Deputy Director for Economic Policy, Department of State, telephone interview with author, 28 January 2005.


17 Joulwan, 1-7.

18 Ibid., 2.

19 Joint Pub 1, B-2, C-1.
Joulwan, 16. It is helpful in our study of other cases to note what characterizes the operational level of S&R: In-country headquarters; specific tasks are assigned to subordinates to achieve broader strategic policy; integration and allocation of resources; interagency feedback on issues.

Ibid., 13-15.


James McNaught, FSO-2, Department of State, Student College of Naval Command and Staff, interview with author, 31 January 2005.

Miley interview.

Defense Science Board, iii.


Ibid.

Ickle, 85.

Cordesman, 10-14.

Ibid., 12.

Miley interview.

Steven Kornatz, CAPT USN, Instructor in Joint Military Operations and former advisor, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, interview with author, 1 December 2004.

Cordesman, 12.


United States Constitution, Article II Section 2. Italics added for emphasis.
Miley interview. Despite limited time and resources to support initiatives, there was a noticeable improvement in morale and appearance of programs specifically aimed at planning and leadership during the Powell tenure at DoS. Whether these changes were a direct result of the Hart-Rudman Commission’s recommendations was unknown to Ms. Miley.

McNaught interview. There are approximately 6,000 FSOs in the DoS.


Anthony Zinni, Address, United States Naval Institute Forum, Arlington, VA (4 September 2003) <http://www.usni.org/Seminar/Forum/03/forum03zinni.htm/> [28 January 2005] Former Commander-in-Chief Central Command General Anthony Zinni quipped, “You know we’re no longer commanders-in-chief; we’re combatant commanders, whatever the hell that means.” It may simply mean more precision of language when it comes to denoting the President as Commander-in-Chief. Reading more into the change suggests a desire to reign in a group of commanders who have in many cases exerted the most influence of any USG representative in their areas of responsibility (AORs).

Priest, 61.


Joint Pub 1, Appendix B&C.


For more on Millennium Challenge 02 see <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/experiments/mc02.htm>


49 Joulwan, 20.

50 The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 11.

51 Defense Science Board, 166.

52 Only two sources broached military subordination to civilian control at the operational level. General Joulwan offers a model for unitary command with respect to the Dayton Accords implementation (Joulwan 42-43). Cordesman suggests that the U.S. failed “to clearly subordinate the military to…Ambassador Bremer…” (Cordesman, 12), however he offers no specific recommendations for military subordination.


54 Ibid., III-9.

55 Ibid.

56 Murdock, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, 62.


58 McNaught interview.

59 Defense Science Board, iii.

60 Cordesman, 16.
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