OPERATIONALIZING THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION MECHANISMS BETWEEN STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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Thesis Title: Operationalizing the Coordination Mechanisms between State and the Department of Defense for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

In the past decade, DoD has shouldered the majority of US stabilization and reconstruction operations due to an inability of other government agencies to deploy and integrate. In April 2004, President Bush approved a concept to institutionalize US civilian efforts under the Department of State called State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The primary question of this paper is whether this coordination between S/CRS and DoD provides a new USG capability to translate policy into stabilization and reconstruction operations at the tactical level, for the short term. Recent literature provides criteria against which to evaluate the S/CRS-DoD model: synchronized policy and authority; institutionalized organization and manning; synchronized and flexible planning; integrated doctrine, training and exercises; and resources and interoperability that enable transition. This paper finds the S/CRS-DoD model strong on policy and planning but insufficient. The USG must move forward on connecting many outlying organizations and national security structures to implement this model and continue the momentum towards a true capability. Additionally, a critical gap in understanding of this topic exists between the strategic and operational/tactical levels. If the USG wants this model to succeed, doctrine, education, and training across the spectrum of stabilization and reconstruction operators should become a top priority.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

OPERATIONALIZING THE COORDINATION MECHANISMS BETWEEN STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS, by Elizabeth Anne Medina, 107 pages.

In the past decade, DoD has conducted the majority of US stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO) due to an inability of other government agencies to deploy and integrate. In April 2004, President Bush approved a concept to institutionalize US civilian efforts under the Department of State called the Secretary’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

The primary question of this paper is whether coordination between S/CRS and DoD provides a new US government (USG) capability to translate policy into SRO down to the tactical level, for the near term. Recent literature provides criteria against which to evaluate the S/CRS-DoD model: synchronized policy and authority; institutionalized organization and manning; synchronized and flexible planning; integrated doctrine, training and exercises; and resources and interoperability that enable transition.

This paper finds the S/CRS-DoD model strong on policy and planning, but insufficient on implementation. The USG must move forward on connecting many outlying organizations and national security structures to continue the momentum towards a true USG capability. Additionally, a critical gap exists in understanding of this topic between the strategic and operational/tactical levels. If the USG wants this model to succeed, doctrine, education, and training across the spectrum of stabilization and reconstruction operators should become a top priority.
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# ACRONYMS

**ACT** | Advanced Civilian Teams of S/CRS that deploy forward with field units such as Joint Task Forces, Divisions or Brigade Combat Teams  
**CAPOC** | United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command  
**CMOC** | Civil Military Operations Center, a standing interagency coordination center for the US military that resides in all Army Civil Affairs units no matter the level  
**COCOM** | Regional or Functional Combatant Commander as identified in the US Unified Command Plan  
**CRSG** | Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups, stood up by the NSA at the recommendation of Secretary of State to NSC; functions as a PCC reporting to the Deputies  
**DC/PC** | US National Security Council’s decision-making bodies: Deputies Committee and Principals Committee  
**DoD** | US Department of Defense  
**FSI** | Foreign Service Institute  
**HRST** | Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team of S/CRS that is assigned to work at the COCOM connected through the JIACG or CMOC  
**JFCOM** | Joint Forces Command, one of nine combatant commands, the only one focused on transformation of U.S. military capabilities  
**JIACG** | Joint Interagency Coordination Group  
**NDU** | National Defense University  
**NSPD** | National Security Presidential Directive, title used in the George W. Bush administration  
**NSC** | US National Security Council as established by President Bush in National Security Presidential Directive-1  
**NSS** | US National Security Strategy; most recent version by President Bush in March 2006  
**PCC** | Policy Coordination Committee
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<td>Presidential Defense Directive, used in the William J. Clinton administration</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review Report</td>
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<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command; leads, plans, synchronizes, and as directed executes global operations against terrorist networks</td>
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<td>SRO</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, term used throughout this paper</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Transforming America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-first Century

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed. . . . At home we will pursue three priorities [the third of which is], . . . Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate and execute responses covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges. We need to strengthen the capacity of departments and agencies to do comprehensive, results-oriented planning. Agencies that traditionally played only a domestic role increasingly have a role to play in our foreign and security policies. This requires us to better integrate interagency activity both at home and abroad.¹

President Bush, National Security Strategy

Achieving Unity of Effort

The Department of Defense cannot meet today’s complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad. . . . Just as the Second World War posed immense challenges that spurred joint and combined operations within the military, today’s environment demands that all agencies of government become adept at integrating their efforts into a unified strategy. This requires much more than mere coordination: the Department must work hand in glove with other agencies to execute the National Security Strategy. Interagency and international combined operations truly are the new Joint operations. Supporting and enabling other agencies, working toward common objectives, and building the capacity of partners are indispensable elements of the Department’s new missions.²

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
Background

Reviewing postconflict reconstruction and stabilization over the past decade in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has conducted complex operations, often transitioning responsibility and tasks to and from the Department of State. By referring to figure 1, one sees the historical requirement for personnel for the spectrum of operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO).

![Achieving political objectives, not “just” military objectives, depends on preparation years in advance and stabilization*/reconstruction years after open hostilities](image)

*Stabilization: The period following cessation of high-intensity conflict wherein violence is the decisive factor in daily life and indigenous capabilities, e.g., law enforcement, are unable to achieve security and stability.

Figure 1. Historical Perspective of Forces Need for the Spectrum of Operations

*Source: Defense Science Board Summer Study 2004*

In the contemporary environment where the US is involved in nonpeer conflict resolution, the duration of major combat operations has decreased. Gaps between combat
and the need for military response for nation building have been created just as the forces needed for SRO have increased. In the past decade, DoD has filled the postconflict civil assistance requirement shown in figure 2 on an ad hoc basis with military presence in the conflict area.

![Magnitude of the Challenge](image)

**Figure 2.** Human Resources Required During SRO

*Source: Defense Science Board Summer Study 2004*

For operations in Iraq, the Secretary of Defense created an organization called the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to be responsible for the occupation of Iraq, replaced within four months by the Coalition Provisional Authority which then transitioned to an interim Iraqi government with sovereignty of the Iraqi people.
In Afghanistan, with a large military force supporting the Afghani Transitional Authority, the Secretary of Defense created an organization called the Afghanistan Reachback Office to coalesce Provincial Reconstruction Teams out of the Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force to assist and advise on the growing stabilization and reconstruction mission, as seen in an initial plan in figure 3.

![Figure 3. Early PRT Planning](source: Afghanistan CJCMOTF MDMP Presentation)

To preclude the military from having to fill this gap on an ad hoc basis in the future, the President and National Security Council (NSC) approved a concept, to be located under the Department of State, in April 2004. This concept included a deployable interagency civilian corps that could institutionalize the US civilian reconstruction and
stabilization efforts called “the Secretary’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).” The President assigned the S/CRS to “coordinate and lead integrated USG [US government] efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” This was supported by the military through a DoD Directive. Under both directives, the military is required to conduct SRO along the spectrum of conflict as well as to support postconflict operations lead by S/CRS. Therefore, in order for the US to effectively prepare for and address the next complex contingency mission, interagency coordination mechanisms between S/CRS and the DoD must be detailed, particularly regarding transition points as highlighted in figure 4.

Figure 4. Current Transitions Required
Source: Afghanistan CJCMOTF MDMP Presentation
There have been recommendations that US policy in the interagency coordination arena take its cue from the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which established a joint military environment in the late 1980s. Following operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as Somalia during the late 1990s and early 2000s, President Clinton issued *Presidential Defense Directive (PDD)* 56 and *The Interagency Handbook for Complex Contingencies*, which mandated coordination beyond joint military coordination: interagency coordination. Despite this directive, there was no institutional or integrated follow-through on the planning and execution so the US continued to see critical gaps between agencies through the spectrum of operations and up and down the levels of implementation. In the past eight years, the US has only published a handful of the political implementation plans, or “Pol-Mil” plans as they are called, as required by PDD56. They have been put into action even fewer times. There were plans for Kosovo, Bosnia, Central Africa, and Iraq. However, they were complex, duplicative and could not fit easily into the military’s newly adopted capabilities or effects based operations. Although they were supposed to include US policy and interests with well-developed transition points, the format issued with *PDD 56* was only a guide. It was not easy to use nor connected to the military operations on the ground. There was no way to “operationalize” these plans. Based on observations of SRO in Afghanistan and Iraq, Congress, the professional military community, national institutes and defense corporations have made recommendations to the USG. The recommendations are that the US integrate all national elements of power through interagency planning and coordination, paralleling what the Goldwater-Nichols Act achieved for joint forces.
Problem

If the US goal is to reach a level of interagency interoperability required to keep failing or failed states from impacting on US interests in the future, the primary question is whether the US government now has new capability. Does the US have a new capability through coordination between S/CRS and DoD to execute national strategy through the conduct of SRO at the tactical level, in the short term? According to S/CRS, as depicted in their conflict transformation model in figure 5, the US policy goal is achieved as the drivers of conflict are reduced and the national capacity is increased enough to pass the lead to local actors.

Figure 5.  S/CRS Conflict Transformation
Source: S/CRS Presentation at Joint Worldwide Planners Conference
Beyond this central question, secondary questions must be answered. First, it will be important to determine whether there will be an institutionalized process for integrating all elements of power into a synchronized USG plan for reconstruction and stabilization operations along the conflict spectrum.

Next it will be important to determine whether the agencies will have built the relationships and familiarity to operationalize the plans and work together. Will qualified candidates that can deploy or be assigned to other agencies fill positions? Will the plans include the transition operations between government agencies and the metrics required to transition? Will there be doctrine published, training planned and exercises conducted that require agencies to test plans and mechanisms?

Lastly it will be important to clarify whether the agencies will be physically interoperable: whether the procedures, information, funding, equipment, and environment will be conducive for multiple agencies or the best agency to operate.

**Assumptions**

There are a number of assumptions to make: (1) that State will retain the mission of lead, and coordinator for US civilian reconstruction and stabilization efforts through and after the decision of the Deputies and Principals Committee approval summer 2006, (2) the establishment of S/CRS by Presidential Directive will enhance the provision of crisis response funds as a line item in the budget, (3) in the short term, the majority of personnel and funding resources for executing SRO will continue to come from DoD, (4) DoD will coordinate with other civilian agencies for homeland security, counter terrorism, counter proliferation and intelligence, and (5) the US National Security Strategy (NSS) will continue to identify the Global War on Terrorism as the USG’s
priority effort, protecting US citizens through preventative means which leads to the
importance of planning for failing and failed states. The underlying assumption to this
last item is that the context for US SRO is in failing, failed, or postconflict states where
US national interests and objectives are advanced by addressing the conditions in which
terrorists and terrorism are allowed to flourish.

Definition of Terms

The term “operationalize” will be defined as in the Webster’s New Millennium
Dictionary of English: “to define a concept or variable so that it can be measured or
expressed quantitatively; to put into operation, start working.” The primary question
asks whether the coordination mechanisms between S/CRS and DoD will enable the USG
to translate policy and strategic goals into tactical action that can be measured,
quantitatively.

The term “capability” is used as defined in the Joint Publication 1-02, “the ability
to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by
an intention.)”

“Institutionalize” is a term used in the research questions to evaluate whether the
USG has a standard process to plan for and use a capability at all levels. Although there is
no definition in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, The National
Incident Management Service recently adopted a useful definition in response to a failure
through all levels to respond to Hurricane Katrina. The framework of that definition is
that “to institutionalize . . . means [all] government officials . . . adopt the . . . system and
. . . launch activities that use the . . . system for operations . . . at two levels--policy and
organizational or operational. At the policy level, government officials [or agency] adopt
the system through executive order, proclamation or legislation; direct their [agencies] to train, exercise and use the system. At the organizational/operational level, the system is integrated into operations policies, plans and procedures; training is planned, exercises conducted with multi-discipline and multi-jurisdiction [or multi-agency] personnel.8

Finally, there are many terms in use today for stabilization and reconstruction operations: Stability Operations (SO), Stability and Support Operations (SASO), Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) and Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (RSO) the term used by S/CRS. There is also the new DoD phrase Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations which has been used as an expanded descriptor for stability operations and may be the acronym used in an updated joint operating concept. Currently, stability operations are one of four joint operating concepts, and just as important as the other three: Strategic Deterrence, Homeland Security and Major Combat Operations.9

In this paper the term Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations or the acronym SRO will be used synonymously for all of these terms to mean the potential critical missions of the USG in stabilization and reconstruction.

Limitations

Much of S/CRS documentation talks about postconflict reconstruction and stabilization. Although S/CRS is responsible for planning postconflict operations, because NSPD-44 does not use the term and the military has responsibilities for the full spectrum of SRO, this paper will not limit the identification of USG stabilization and reconstruction coordination requirements and mechanisms. Not only is the discussion hampered by a multiplicity of emerging terms, the national security structure and
organizations are evolving as this paper is written. There have been, are and will be many scheduled conferences, studies and seminars at the strategic level to discuss the very issue of this paper. The S/CRS model goes to the Deputies’ and Principals’ Committee for approval in June 2006. In that respect, a large amount of dynamic documentation, recommendations, and policy will be forthcoming. The most significant pending decision is the decision by the Deputies’ and Principals’ Committees as to whether the S/CRS Overview and Action Plan is approved. Another pivotal national security document is the pending update to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism that potentially will assign tasks to USG agencies as precedence. From DoD, the updated Joint Operations Concept remains to be published addressing interagency and stability operations at length.

**Delimitations**

Although the nature of a US response would likely be multilateral, this paper will focus on whether or not the USG will have a new capability to conduct deliberate and successful SRO in the next complex contingency by the addition of the new State structure as a complement to DoD, in the near term. The near term is within the same administration, with the current S/CRS Directors, the Secretary of Defense, and NSC. Because so much policy, doctrine, manning, and budgeting is pending update, long-term capability assessments must be made in subsequent studies or papers.

Facets of the issue that will not be covered are: changes to the national oversight structure as defined in the NSPD-1; relation between the new national security structures, such as the National Counter-Terrorism Center, the National Counter-Proliferation Center, the Director of Foreign Assistance, the Director of National Intelligence and
S/CRS; requirements for a new US grand strategy; involvement or engagement of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ); or definition of the missions the interagency body should be coordinating beyond reconstruction and stabilization.

**Significance of Study**

Best case, this study will provide a baseline or snapshot of the currently planned interagency connectivity and institutionalization for SRO, identify any possible gaps, and provide a view as to whether or not the US will be able to translate the national policy into tactical action with the current structures and mechanisms of the S/CRS model. At a minimum, this paper will serve as an update to operational level planners and operators who are mostly unaware of the magnitude of NSC, State and DoD activities occurring at the national level. And, finally this study can serve as feedback from this operational level planner to strategists involved in providing future solutions, better resolution on existing solutions, or a baseline for conducting a formal Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) as described in the Joint Staff J-8 White Paper on Conducting a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA).10

**Summary**

The US has moved forward from the Presidential Decision Directive of 1997, *PDD56*, and political-military implementation planning to a time when the current president, congress, secretary of state, and DoD realize the USG needs a lead agency, and legislation to create an institutionalized capability to conduct coordinated interagency support to the next SRO. Beginning in the next chapter, this paper will look at the recent publications, doctrine and recommendations to determine what the contemporary
requirements are for interagency coordination. In Chapter 3, the paper will lay out the research methodology and criteria for evaluating whether the S/CRS-DoD model provides a new USG capability to plan and execute SRO in the near future. Chapter 4 will describe the model and evaluate to identify gaps, and answer the primary and secondary questions. The final chapter, Chapter 5, will summarize the findings, offer some insights as conclusions and make recommendations for a successful USG way forward.


7Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 12 April 2001), 76.


10Joint Chiefs of Staff, *White Paper on Conducting a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Under the joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 2006), 12.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

The review of literature in this chapter is to identify the requirements of an interagency coordination process for the next US stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO). These requirements or criteria will be used to determine whether through S/CRS and DoD planned coordination, the US government is building a new capability for interagency interoperability with a capacity to plan and execute SRO for the near term complex contingencies. This chapter will lay out what written requirements, doctrine and mandates exist for both S/CRS and the military for conducting SRO. The literature review will also show what is currently being improved within DoD, what is being built from scratch within S/CRS, and what the academic community is recommending.

Relevant literature is largely from the past five years in which the Bush administration has been in the White House. Since the event of 11 September 2001, the policies and strategies have changed significantly from previous strategy versions and administrations. Because of these recent US policy changes, both military and civilian official publications have been updated to define and relate to this subject. As well, recent independent professional and academic studies and reviews of these policies and publications are also abundant.
**Schools of Thought**

The literature can be categorized into three schools of thought towards a solution to institutionalizing interagency coordination: (1) those within S/CRS and DoD who are actively working the solution set within the processes established and in support of the current national strategies to be able to act now, such as ambassadors, Congress, former military, the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) and the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute; (2) those that recommend a new national security structure and/or new US grand strategy like many of the student research papers and CSIS; and (3) those who have recommendations that deal with outlying or related issues that must be integrated in the central concept, such as Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the National Defense University (NDU) and the Civil Affairs community. Of these schools of thought the first is the most informative for looking at the near-term solutions that might allow mechanisms for the next contingency. The second school is the most conceptual on looking at long-term solutions. The third school is the audience or customers that must understand the efforts and end-state to be able to operationalize the result.

**National Strategy Documents**

Beginning at the national level, President Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, *Organization of the National Security Council System* streamlined the structure for policy and decision making with regard to interagency coordination. According to NSPD-1, the NSC and the PCC make policy and decisions for interagency operations. Interagency working groups are established as needed for identified topics to provide information and recommendations to the PCC.¹ Temporarily established PCCs,
such as the one for Reconstruction and Stabilization, are not reflected in the NSC standing organizations as depicted in figure 6.

Figure 6. National Security Structure

Source: CJCS, Joint Publication 3-08

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), published in March of 2006 follows the NSS of 2002, in which a new course was set for the US after 11 September 2001. The
2002 strategy was the first to outline prevention or preemption of terrorists and terrorism which requires a concerted offensive from all elements of power, to include a military that deters and dissuades to diplomats serving on front lines. The 2006 strategy expands from that version into nine essential tasks, four of which require specific S/CRS and DoD coordination for SRO for the way ahead. This strategy also confirms the president’s pronouncement of a new Director of Foreign Assistance who is to be dually assigned as the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The US *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, published in February of 2003, describes the need for all US elements of power to integrate in order to help nations reduce the terrorist threat down to a criminal level that can be controlled by them within their own borders as a subset of caring for their own people. There is a pending update that will assign specific tasks to USG agencies. There is discussion that this forthcoming strategy could become the model for interagency operations--the president assigns responsibilities and tasks in his strategies.

Lastly from the executive office is the recent NSPD-44, which establishes the S/CRS. It identifies critical functions: develop and approve strategies; ensure program and policy coordination; identify states at risk; lead interagency planning; develop contingency plans integrated with military contingency plans; provide USG decision makers detailed options for integrated response; coordinate responses with DoD; and coordinate with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities, among others. It also makes the Reconstruction and Stabilization PCC permanent. NSPD-44 does not use the term postconflict to describe the responsibilities of S/CRS. The policy is to increase US ability
“to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife . . . [with the] aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven.”

In a recent session of Congress, Senators Biden, Hagel and Lugar introduced the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (SARCMA–S2127, 108th Congress). It was endorsed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and discussed by Congress twice but has been tabled, not passed into law. This well-researched bill requested the establishment by the NSC of an International Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction, a substantial authorization for crisis response, promotions, and training for personnel among other items.

Within the State Department, the most recent related literature is Secretary Rice’s transformational diplomacy speech and fact sheet. On 18 January 2006, Secretary Rice announced that for the State Department to achieve its role in the current US national security strategy, it would need to make changes. Her vision is to reposition diplomatic resources from Cold War embassies to emerging areas of Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Middle East. She will require that diplomats be forward deployed and become more flexible and collaborative with specific emphasis on assignment to S/CRS and as political advisors to the military.

Prior to this initiative, translating national strategy for the Department of State and USAID, their combined Strategic Plan for FY 2004-2009 states that USAID and the diplomatic corps must focus on preventing troubled states from becoming failed states. This is still the basis for postconflict stabilization and reconstruction planning. Despite
being written by Secretary Powell and Administrator Natsios, this strategic plan has a well-developed model that identifies strategic objectives, strategic goals, and performance goals. With the Senate approval of the new USAID Administrator, Ambassador Tobias, the US has the first concurrent Director of Foreign Assistance nominated by the President.\textsuperscript{11} It will be Ambassador Tobias’ responsibility to ensure that USG agencies have coordinated, coherent, and comprehensive plans for the greatest effect towards US goals.\textsuperscript{12} With a new national security vision, as depicted in figure 7, USAID works with the military through its departments of Military Affairs, Conflict Management and Mitigation, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Office of Transition Initiatives, and the Disaster Assistance and Response Teams.\textsuperscript{13}

![USAID New “3D” National Security Vision](source: USAID-DoD Briefing)

**Figure 7. USAID New “3D” National Security Vision**

*Source: USAID-DoD Briefing*
In consultation with the greater interagency community, academic institutions, and national think tanks, S/CRS has published multiple concept papers itself, most of which are posted on the Department of State web pages. Given the mission from NSC principals in April 2004 and the functions in NSPD-44, it has established divisions and hired directors. The Office of Early Warning and Prevention division identifies the states at risk. The Office of Planning brings all elements of the US government together to plan for an intervention. The Office of Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination is responsible for monitoring, evaluation and lessons learned. The Office of Response Strategy and Resource Management is responsible for developing and deploying US resources to SRO. Although the majority of the staff is from the foreign service, a proportion of the staff of fifty has been hired or received from other agencies so that it is by origin interagency and joint.

On 30 November 2005, S/CRS provided recommendations to the, then temporary, Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), which included an overall action plan and military exercise participation schedule. S/CRS expects the Deputies’ and Principals’ Committees (DC/PC) to approve this plan by summer 2006. Having revised the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework by Association of the United States of America and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), S/CRS has published a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task List, similar to the Universal Joint Task List of the military.

The S/CRS organization chart identifies operational models of a Washington-based, decision-making group that, in the event of a crisis, the NSC will allocate from within the PCC on Reconstruction and Stabilization. This Country Reconstruction and
Stabilization Group (CRSG) will initiate crisis action planning, and with S/CRS, develop a planning framework for the country in crisis. The remaining elements recommended to the PCC are the Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Teams (HRSTs) that deploy to work at the COCOM level and Advanced Civilian Teams (ACTs) that work at the joint task force, division, brigade, and battalion level. According to press release updates, S/CRS is soliciting candidates for its cadre positions, as well as exercising with JFCOM, NDU, and some of the COCOMs on standard contingency plan and functional plan exercises.17

S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute have designed and are providing training through a series of courses to prepare interagency members for SRO: PD560, Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Response Operations; PD561, Coordination for Conflict and Instability; PD 562, Interagency Planning for Conflict Transformation; and PD563, Leading Integrated Planning for Conflict Transformation.

The State Department’s Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) serves as “an interagency center to identify, collect, analyze and disseminate unclassified information critical to USG decision makers and partners.”18 The HIU has worked with civil affairs knowledge management in Iraq for CENTCOM, is coordinating similar work with SOUTHCOM, has planned and supported exercises with NDU and continues to support crisis and contingency planning with country assessments and product development. Most recently, the critical data and graphics HIU tabulated regarding Darfur won it acclaim in the Geointelligence Magazine.19
Military Publications

Recently the Department of Defense published the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006 (QDR)*. To address the “Long War,” the military favors economy of force and indirect missions of integrated national elements, and humanitarian and early preventative measures. To defeat terrorism the military needs specific capabilities such as multipurpose forces that support security, stability, transition and reconstruction as well as command, communications, and support for integrated interagency operations. The QDR references the need to build credit for interagency assignments and skills similar to the joint credit that came out of the *Gold-Water Nichols Act*. Further, DoD committed to the growth of the NDU into a National Security University to consolidate for both military and other government agencies the expertise needed to develop interagency strategy, policy, and outcomes-oriented, capabilities-based planning. Finally, for complete unity of effort, the QDR discussed in detail the military requirement and obligations, critical to the long war, to perform tasks along the full spectrum of SSTR alone or in conjunction with other agencies. DoD supports increased resources for S/CRS to establish a deployable corps, broader presidential authorities to redirect resources to the best-situated agency, strengthened internal mechanisms for interagency coordination, improved ability of DoD to assess security cooperation for better resource allocation, and strengthened DoD regional centers that are USG assets.

*The National Defense Strategy of the United States* was published in March of 2005. While reiterating the requirements of the military to dissuade, deter, and defeat, this strategy identifies the need to build on global and regional security cooperation efforts. In specific, one of the partner capabilities the military needs increased by US
domestic and international partners, the need for a deployable civilian response, led to the creation of S/CRS. DoD is cooperating with S/CRS so that nonmilitary stabilization and reconstruction tasks will not fall to the military by default, allowing DoD to focus on long-term security.\textsuperscript{21}

DoD Directive 3000.05, dated 28 November 2005, was written on the subject of Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR). This directive provides guidance that will become updated joint operating concepts and mission sets and establishes policy for planning, training, and preparing to support or conduct stability operations in order to establish order that advances US interests and values. Immediate goals are often to provide security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs of the local populace. Long-term goals are to develop a nation’s capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. Although many of the tasks in stability operations must be performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals, the US military must be prepared to perform them as necessary when the conditions preclude others from doing them.\textsuperscript{22}

Published in 2005, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) requires a capabilities-based approach to defeat a broad array of capabilities in an adversary. To shorten the planning timelines and get joint responses, this approach defines ideas and concepts for future joint military operations. In order to achieve full-spectrum dominance, this publication repeats that the military must accomplish all it does in an interagency and multinational context. The end state and strategic objectives can only be
achieved through integrated, networked, interoperable joint, interagency, and multinational force.23

The more specific Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept from September 2004 spells out the requirements of the joint force across the full spectrum of conflict. Preconflict, the military must conduct SRO to prevent conflict and achieve national objectives and preserve national interests. During conflict there will be major combat operations and simultaneously the military will continue to conduct security, transition and reconstruction operations. At the point in time where the situation becomes post conflict, the military will transition operations to S/CRS and become a supporting force.24

The Joint Staff has published prescriptive guidance for the military, such as Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, of 14 November 2000. Although it introduces interagency operations early on and has a chapter about the interagency environment, it mentions very little about how, when, and why the military would conduct coordination. It does not identify anything specific that is required during the preconflict or postconflict phases of operation, known as SRO.25 The current Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, dated 10 September 2001, discusses the national elements of power, but does not draw the interagency connections during the discussion of the strategic estimate or the campaign plan, particularly in the discussion of the military operations other than war.26 Both volumes of Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, were updated as of 17 March 2006 and include more thorough descriptions of most agencies and their connections to the military during
operations in the US or in other nations. However, neither volume mentions S/CRS, the Director of Foreign Assistance, the Director of National Intelligence, nor their new responsibilities and connections in the interagency coordination process. The old structure continues to be depicted in the newest doctrine as seen in figure 8.

Figure 8. Interagency Coordination Process
*Source:* CJCS, Joint Publication 3-08
These volumes also, however, depict the capability of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) at any level, as the coordination center for all elements of USG power as seen in figure 9. This capability is no longer ad hoc. With the new Civil Affairs doctrine it is a standing body in Civil Affairs units at every level.

Figure 9. Coordination Potential of Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC)
Source: CJCS, Joint Publication 3-08

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) provides the common language for describing capabilities of US Armed Forces. UJTL version 5.0 is the current UJTL baseline. UCP changes, Defense Transformation Initiatives, and other factors require the
UJTL to be revised. The updated August 2005 version of the *Universal Joint Task List* is better able to incorporate the types of tasks involved in SRO as defined in a contemporary context in the categories of ST 5 and 8, SN 5 and 8, and OP 3. However, it neither covers the tasks as identified in the *S/CRS Essential Task List* nor provides enough detail for operators to connect them to USG strategy or policy.

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is the combatant command responsible for joint concept development and experimentation, joint training, joint interoperability and integration, and the primary conventional force provider as outlined in the Unified Command Plan approved by the president. JFCOM has published a substantial amount of material in the past five years regarding the Standing Joint Forces Headquarters and the prototype Joint Interagency Coordination Group called the JIACG. Recently, all of the COCOMs have established JIACGS, but each with different foci. JFCOM has published a pamphlet for the COCOMs to recommend linkages and coordination with S/CRS, as well as describe their Planning Framework and process in detail. JFCOM has posted this pamphlet, the NSPD-44, DoD Directive 3000.05, the *Essential Tasks List* and other S/CRS documents on the Joint Electronic Library under stabilization and reconstruction training for all military members to access.

The NDU has been chartered to be the training center for interagency coordination and continues to host interagency conferences as well as offer training in interagency management of complex crisis operations, with a handbook that describes the political-military planning that takes place under the new NSPD-1 structure of the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC). NDU supports the JIACG concept with an additional recommendation that there be a national interagency contingency coordination center. In
1997, NDU established a federally funded program called Interagency Transformation, Education, and After-Action Review (ITEA) to improve coordination among the executive departments and agencies responsible for crisis planning and response. In the latest issue of this programs newsletter Interagency News, it describes the seminars being held at COCOMs, announces an Interagency Education Symposium in September 2006, an exercise with S/CRS, and an Executive Steering Group meeting held 13 April 2006 to discuss developing education and training requirements for integrated interagency operation. This year, NDU announced its forty-hour certificate producing Joint Interagency and Multinational Planners Course (JIMPC) which has been scheduled for three iterations in 2006.

US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has been assigned the lead command for the military’s Global War on Terrorism plan. Based on the guidance in both the NSS and the QDR, this plan must include not only coordination and integration with the National Counter Terrorism Center, the National Counter Proliferation Center, and the Director of National Intelligence but also the critical components of the War on Terror, S/CRS, and the Director of Foreign Assistance. Within SOCOM, the element engaged in the interagency coordination and the emplacement of planners and liaison officers to S/CRS is the US Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command or CAPOC. This element has recently been split out from SOCOM, with the large proportion of troops and the strategic capacity being assigned under the United States Army Reserve Command (USARCl. The remaining civil affairs forces are those that support the special operations units such as Special Forces, and the Rangers.

CAPOC is finalizing the updated Civil Affairs doctrine that reflects today’s
environment. New Civil Affairs doctrine requires CA to engage the civil component of the operational environment by assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning--both actively and passively--political, economic, and information (social and cultural) institutions and capabilities to achieve U.S. national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation both abroad and at home.37

Civil Affairs soldiers are to be employed to provide the primary interface with all civilian agencies and organizations (indigenous, U.S. government, nongovernment, and international) in the AO; establish and maintain a CMOC to manage, coordinate and synchronize key CAO/CMO functions/activities; analyze the civil component of the AO for CASCOP to determine the impact of the civil environment on military operations, as well as, the impact of military operations on the civil environment; monitor operations to minimize the negative impacts of both sides, to identify requirements for follow-on CA operations and CMO, and to identify when MOEs have been achieved; assist commanders at all levels to fulfill their responsibilities inherent in CMO directly (by conducting CA activities/operations) and indirectly (in an advisory role for all CMO); and facilitate transition of operations from military to civilian control built on the premise that interagency coordination and planning is key to national success.38

By providing new doctrine and coordinating closely with S/CRS, CAPOC has been able to draft a feasible lash-up across the battlefield with all of the S/CRS stabilization and reconstruction assets that will incorporate lessons from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and the State Embedded Teams in Iraq, as seen in figure 10. This figure also depicts the CMOC and Civil Affairs teams at each level, from strategic to tactical, which function as interagency coordination elements.
National Studies and Effectiveness Reviews

Over the past five years, studies on interagency coordination, planning and execution have proliferated among the DoD supported think tanks, the national security organizations, governmental organizations and the professional academic institutions as the USG looks for answers. What one finds is that they agree on critical gaps: an identified lead agency, infrastructure and processes for interagency coordination, and relationships that will produce the kind of operational planning and execution that is required to address reconstruction and stabilization.

As part of the Princeton Project on National Security, former general William Nash and Ciara Knudsen wrote Reform and Innovation in Stabilization, Reconstruction...
This report summarizes a couple of related issues that are at the forefront of any solution: getting a deployable force of Foreign Service officers, getting legislation to support the interagency coordination requirements, and getting an organization that can actually lead, synchronize, plan and execute operations as necessary including a more broad group of participants from other countries as well.39

The Center for Strategic and International Studies has published reports, phases I and II, called “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era.” Recommendations made were: (1) a Quadrennial National Security Review to develop US national security strategy and determine capabilities required to implement the strategy, (2) creation of a National Security Planning Guidance signed by the President, (3) eliminate interagency barriers by codifying terminology, concepts of operations, roles and responsibilities in a series of NSPDs, (4) the budget reflects national security priorities by having NSC/Office of Management and the Budget review, (5) establish a national security career path for interagency experience, education and training, and finally (6) a common template for dividing the globe into regions with interagency regional summits to deconflict efforts and prevent crisis.40

In April 2004, during a conference hosted by John’s Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies titled “Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq,” Michele Flournoy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies outlined “Historical Lessons, Learned and Unlearned.” Her lessons were: (1) strategies for successful nation building must integrate all the elements of power, similar to what PDD 56 attempted, (2) a lead federal agency and chain of command relationships must be clear up front, (3) the US and international public must also understand the US interests, (4)
military forces must be continually tailored for the specific missions of stabilization and reconstruction, (5) supervision of tactical actions according to strategy must be continuous, and (6) planning and executing smooth transitions can win or lose the battle. Ms Flournoy recommends creating a greater integration role for the NSC, and an interagency training center.41

From the Center for Technology and National Security Policy under NDU, authors Binnendijk and Johnson wrote *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. This extensive report on stabilization and reconstruction reviews historical cases to propose an organizational model of two joint headquarters with two modular divisions made up of Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Medical and Psychological Operations supported by tactical combat forces for US SRO. Technologies that support the mission and forces would be unclassified, wireless, interoperable packages. To develop more efficient interagency aspects of these missions they recommend the establishment of a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group under the NSC and the creation of JIACGs at the COCOMs as “J-10” directorates. Lastly, they encourage the identification of international capabilities and encouraging NATO to develop a parallel force.42

In an article written by a staff writer of the *Washington Post* on 13 October 2005, called “Pentagon Plans to Beef up Domestic Rapid Response Forces,” Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense sees, in catastrophic events, the military providing a rapid, early response and then quickly transferring responsibilities to civilian authorities.43 This leads to the question as to whether the interagency will need to plan for SRO even here at home in the US.
The US Army War College has been the impetus of many professional studies and seminars. Their Peace Keeping Institute hosted a seminar in July 2001 with findings published as Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper 7-02, *An Interagency Approach Toward Complex Contingencies: Narrowing the Gaps Between Planning and Action*. In this seminar, attended by representatives of the interagency body, they identified requirements for a better system of: (1) written implementation plans, (2) an identified accountable authority for planning, (3) more effective and combined training, (4) PCC drafting top level guidance for the NSC to publish, and (6) a basic common planning format such as a modified political-military plan. In June of 2005, the USAWC again hosted a seminar with findings published as Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper 11-05, *Aligning the Interagency Process for the War on Terrorism*. The recommendations made were: (1) creating a State counterpart to the COCOM, (2) better tasking of specific responsibilities, (3) fixing the lack of power in the NSC to coordination interagency operations, and (4) maintaining centralized focus or strategy and building decentralized action, or in the words of this paper “operationalize” the strategy into tactical action.

A War College student, Lieutenant Colonel Alan F. Mangan, wrote a research paper titled “Planning for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations without a Grand Strategy” in March of 2005. His conclusion was that there are no coordination mechanisms or structures that will be successful until there is a new US Grand Strategy that better defines US national interests and goals with regard to stabilization and reconstruction.
Another War College student Colonel Jeffrey B. Clark wrote a research paper in May 2005 called “Lesson Relearned: the Urgent Need to Replace Post-Conflict Improvisation with Policy.” His conclusion was that the executive and legislative branches of US government need to provide policy synchronization, similar to President Clinton’s PDD 56, of the elements of power to achieve US interests. Specific recommendations he made beyond policy were: (1) put an agency in charge, (2) give the agencies the infrastructure and funding necessary to build the appropriate organization, and (3) build national level or NSC doctrine for dealing with postconflict operations.\textsuperscript{47}

Michael Donley of Hicks and Associates, Inc., has written two papers entitled “Rethinking the Interagency System,” parts I and II. In these two papers Donley identifies specific shortcomings and alternatives to the current system or lack of a system. He noted key problems: (1) the lack of horizontal and vertical integration efforts [and interoperability], (2) the legitimacy of authorities below the president to make decisions, (3) the weakness of operational level planning, (4) coordination and execution; and (5) the lack of institutional development and support for interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{48}

Tom Barnett has published The Pentagon’s New Map in which he describes the need for two military forces to provide the response to the nations that cannot integrate themselves into the globalized world. To cover the nonintegrating gap of nations, Mr. Barnett proposes a military that deals with conflict and a separate and larger military that deals with stabilization and reconstruction, like tasks that help nations build free-market economies and trade.\textsuperscript{49}
Summary

By conducting a thorough review of the existing literature on the subject of interagency interoperability with regard to conducting stability and reconstruction operations, specific requirements become clear. These requirements serve as the criteria in the next chapter with which the S/CRS–DoD model will be evaluated.

There have been gaps in policy and legislation of exactly who assigns and conducts what tasks and how the interagency process achieves strategic objectives by translating plans into tactical action. By taking the requirements from the literature and describing the currently planned model, one can compare and contrast whether a new US capability for interagency interoperability has been established that will operationalize US strategy for stabilization and reconstruction.

The next chapter will present the research methodology and criteria pulled from the literature in order to evaluate whether the S/CRS–DoD model provides the USG a new capability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction.

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5Bush, NSPD-44, 3.
6Ibid., 2.


9Ibid.


12Ibid.


14Carlos Pascual, Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), briefing slides with commentary, Marshall Center, July 2005 [briefing on-line].


16Ibid.


28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task List version 2.4 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2005), SN and ST tasks 5.0 and 8.0, OP tasks 3.0.


31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JEL, SSTR site.


National Defense University, JIMPC Course info.


USACAPOC, *Organizational Design Paper for Civil Affairs (USAR) FDU 05-01* (Fort Bragg, NC: USACAPOC G8, 30Jun05), 2-3.

Ibid. 2-3.


CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

To determine whether the USG has a new capability to conduct SRO through S/CRS and DoD coordination, this paper will follow a modified research methodology. The research steps will compare and contrast requirements versus planned capability, and evaluate whether the US will be able to use the S/CRS-DoD model to translate policy and strategy into tactical action in the near future.

Research Model

The research model used in this paper is the general model as presented by the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Department of Graduate Degree Programs (DGDP) customized to allow for evaluation of the S/CRS-DoD model.¹

For this paper, the modified steps of the model are: (1) defining the problem by the use of primary and secondary questions, (2) reviewing the literature to identify previous research, the parameters of the proposed model and requirements for an interagency coordination model, (3) developing evaluation criteria and evaluating the S/CRS-DoD model to answer the questions, (4) collecting additional evidence through interviews to question, validate or flesh out the research as necessary, (5) analyzing and interpreting the evidence, and (6) drawing conclusions from the findings and making recommendations.

This paper is organized logically to follow the research model. Chapter one described the problem and outlined the primary and secondary research questions.
Chapter two provided a review of the literature that lays out the current USG plans, the requirements for interagency coordination for SRO, and the S/CRS-DoD model. Chapter three identifies the research methodology and defines the criteria developed to evaluate the S/CRS-DoD model in order to determine whether gaps exist. Chapter four will present the S/CRS-DoD model then combines the data gathered in the literature review and personal interviews to qualitatively analyze the capacity of the S/CRS-DoD model against the criteria to determine whether it provides the USG a new capability or whether gaps continue to exist. Chapter five will summarize the findings to answer the research questions, make conclusions and provide recommendations for the USG to be able to operationalize national reconstruction and stabilization strategy.

Because of continuing work regarding this topic, among each of these steps, it may be necessary to gather newly published information and documents to apply to the paper. However, the literature and reference cut off date established is 1 April 2006. Personal interview information will be accepted through 16 May 2006. Any material published or received after these cut off dates, although suited for follow-on research, will not be included in the paper.

Established Criteria

Because this paper will evaluate an interagency capability, in lieu of using a familiar set of military elements for force or capability generation: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Material, and Facilities (DOTLMPF), it will use specific criteria generated in the literature review. This allows the research to be a baseline of support for a more detailed Capabilities-Based Assessment model as offered by the Joint Staff in figure 11.²
In keeping with the DGDP modified model, but in support of the CBA process, the criteria in this paper are pulled from a literature review of strategic guidance, doctrine, and interviews of affiliated experts. To evaluate the S/CRS-DoD model to determine whether the model provides a new USG capability, the following criteria will be used:

**Synchronized Policy and Authority**

According to strategic guidance from the President and DoD, and experts from CSIS experts\(^3\), in SRO, the end state is a policy goal. Also, as defined in the literature, all elements of power must integrate to achieve the policy goal. Therefore, the first priority criterion is whether the model provides the capability for the elements of power to gain a synchronized USG policy goal. The second part of this criterion is whether the model provides the authority to agencies to implement their actions in achieving the goal. The strategic guidance contained in the current NSS and expert opinion as contained in the SARCMA states that leaders of each agency must have institutional mechanisms to
convey the goal, the ability to create a nested agency plan, and the authority to follow up with their subordinates.\textsuperscript{4}

**Institutionalized Organization and Manning**

The second criterion derived from the literature is whether the agencies have standing or institutionalized organizations and manning tables. Various experts, authors of scholarly papers and SARCMA, and Mr. Barnett, recommend each agency be able to show an ability to hire the right people that can deploy into the field through incentives for career progression and longevity. They argue that each agency must be obligated to fill manning tables as well as liaison elements by position with the other organizations, even if it means creating specific units or forces.\textsuperscript{5} The military acknowledges the need for other agencies to be deployable, along with its own multipurpose forces that support SSTR, with career enhancement for interagency assignments\textsuperscript{6}

**Synchronized and Flexible Planning**

This paper will analyze the actual planning process and products as the third criterion. The plans or parts identified as a responsibility of each agency will be evaluated to determine whether the information distributed from the strategic guidance is clear and understood, translated into operational guidance, can be measured by effects, and used to write plans and orders at the tactical level. Through Army War College papers, military experts state the importance that each agency’s internal planning system or style be able to accommodate the top down process and product.\textsuperscript{7} This is pivotal in whether this model can be accepted for the near term. According to the experts in S/CRS and the Beyond Goldwater Nichols commission, the interagency plans cannot be as long and cumbersome
as a political-military implementation plan under PDD56. Yet, according to a USAID expert, they must be more clearly tied in to the NSS and detailed for the near term than a country Mission Performance Plan. They must take into account regional efforts found in State’s Bureau Plans or COCOM Theater Security Cooperation Strategies. S/CRS reiterates the importance of the interagency plans being unclassified, different from the COCOM contingency and functional plans and the SOCOM Global War on Terror or they will be inaccessible to the majority of operators. The plans must be flexible enough to incorporate potential international or multinational efforts towards conflict resolution as well.

**Integrated Doctrine, Training, and Exercises**

In addition to the need for updated military doctrine, doctrine for interagency must also be written for the contemporary environment to support the national security strategy. This study must show what has been institutionalized and published to date. It is important to note which and how many agencies have begun updating or integrating strategies, doctrine and organization, specifically USAID and the COCOMs, to show linkages for this model. It will be important to identify how JIACGs at each COCOM will participate, down to what level and in which sectors they will work and plan. This study will identify how much interagency training is to be provided and for whom by the Foreign Service Institute, JFCOM, NDU or other agencies. Finally it will evaluate whether the training is the same at each agency, who is attending, and whether it is supported by doctrine. Finally this paper will identify to what level interagency exercises are being conducted and planned and whether lessons learned are being incorporated from exercises or real world situations.
Resources and Interoperability That Enable Transition

Whether the organizations have resources and funding that are interoperable and relate to each other no matter what the circumstances or location on the spectrum from peacetime through wartime will be important for interagency success. This paper will look at what the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) collaboration provides, as well as connectivity to classified planning and reporting. This information linkage will be the backbone for both horizontal and vertical integration, interoperability and implementation. All levels must be able to plan and execute off of the same operational picture. Whether there are official coordinating bodies within the model, such as the JIACG or the CMOC, to translate a common interagency policy or understanding into operational or tactical planning is important for DoD to be successful in the short term.

It will be just as important to evaluate the availability and flexibility of US authorized and appropriated funding throughout the spectrum of operations to support a common policy goal no matter which agency leads. Finally, in order for the USG to provide the strong and seamless action required to achieve policy, this paper will need to identify whether any and all agencies will be familiar enough with each other and the policy to be able to transition operations as often as required.

Summary

By following the methodology and using the criteria extracted from the literature, this paper will evaluate the S/CRS-DoD model of coordination to determine whether the USG has a new capability to conduct SRO in the near term in order to achieve policy goals. The presentation and evaluation of the model will be done in the next chapter. In the remaining and final chapter, this paper will summarize the findings to answer the
research questions, provide conclusions and offer recommendations for a successful way ahead.


3 Bush, NSPD-44, DoD Directive 3000.05 and the Joint Operations Concept push for integrated policy and clarity of end-state aligned clearly with achieving the national security strategy; CSIS findings underpin the need for institutionalized interagency collaboration on gaining a USG policy, then having the authority to implement it in independent agencies.

4 Bush, NSS 2006 and Lugar, SARCMA require ability for leaders to operationalize policy through integrated DIME planning within their own organizations, with the authorities needed to plan, execute and follow-up.


6US Department of Defense, *QDR* notes the need for a multi-purpose force to support SSTR, and requirement for interagency credit to make successful career path for national security track.


8 S/CRS and BGN report.

9 USAID, interviews with representatives and leadership revealed a new strategy by Ambassador Tobias to link every country development plan to the national security strategy through a detailed plan prior to budgeting. 35 priority countries will accomplish this FY07, the remaining to accomplish planning for FY08.

10 S/CRS, Presentation at the FSI courses describing value of planning template.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

In order to evaluate the near term capacity of the US government to respond to a stabilization and reconstruction crisis through the currently proposed coordination model between S/CRS and DoD, it is necessary to identify whether the model meets the requirements. This chapter will describe the S/CRS-DoD model as designed and proceed by evaluating the S/CRS-DoD model using the criteria identified in Chapter 3, highlighting any critical gaps. Responses from personal interviews will be integrated into the evaluation of the model as well as to the answers to the research questions by filling gaps, and validating, changing or challenging previous findings.

Description of the Model

The S/CRS-DoD model must be described as clearly as feasible before the evaluation is attempted. The bulk of the model comes from NSPD-44, S/CRS documentation, planning, and briefings, FSI training courses and the JFCOM J7 Pamphlet. There is a substantial amount of information from personal interviews of how this process has worked as applied to real world scenarios and exercises. This paper will describe the published structure as well as the modifications made from lessons learned, which may not be reflected in the documents yet.

The basis of the S/CRS-DoD Model involves three levels of planning, (1) policy formulation, (2) strategy development, and (3) implementation planning as seen in figure 12.
According to the S/CRS Overview, Action Plan and attachments submitted to the Reconstruction and Stabilization PCC by Ambassador Pascual on 21 November 2005, the first step in the policy formulation stage is when the National Intelligence Center identifies a country or prioritized countries that are failing, fragile, falling into crisis, or post conflict. The Secretary of State recommends to the NSC that a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group be established to provide country specific recommendations and policy to the Deputies and Principals Committees (DC/PC) of NSC. The National Security Advisor establishes the CRSG to coordinate the interagency process and provide options to the DC/PC for goals and policies. The DC/PC issues initial guidance to the CRSG.
Next, the CRSG works with S/CRS to conduct an immediate crisis assessment of the country. According to the S/CRS Director of Planning, the two times this has been done in the recent past for Haiti and the Sudan, a CRSG committee was established with representatives from S/CRS, the NSC, the Department of State Regional Bureaus, and interested agencies numbering over 30 members. An S/CRS planner was detailed to pull the initial conflict assessment together. This planner conducted interviews of the Country Team and other in-country organizations, and US based experts and representatives of organizations and agencies to develop a draft template with a US policy goal and potential Major Mission Elements (MME).\(^2\) Beyond interviews and analysis, this process required the S/CRS planner to read, get buy-in, counsel, negotiate and sometimes provide healing to get a valid template for policy makers.\(^3\)

Once this template is drafted, it is presented to the CRSG then forwarded for DC/PC approval and further planning. In the recent applications, S/CRS got approval to move forward on both the Haiti and Sudan templates with specific policy guidance as to length of operation and policy focus. In each case the policy goal and length of operation were not the same as what was proposed. For Haiti the time given was one year to achieve the policy of Haitian elections. In the Sudan the timeline of two to three years was given, to achieve humanitarian assistance in the south but to not compromise current sanctions in the North or Darfur. Once the DC/PC have made a decision or issued policy goal, the CRSG is responsible to make sure it is implemented.\(^4\)

The next level of planning is the strategy development. During this phase with the revised and specific policy guidance and timeline, S/CRS leads the work to refine the Major Mission Elements (MME): “all things that are necessary and sufficient” to
transform the conflict. This is done by reducing the drivers of conflict sufficiently enough or building the capacity of the local authorities enough that they can resume full responsibility and control of the country.\textsuperscript{5} If the “President has requested a specific military contingency plan” or the analysis of the crisis leads the CRSG to believe that a significant military force will be necessary, the S/CRS may put together the right mix of civilians to make up an Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team. This HRST must be ready to deploy, as the COCOM requires.

Chairmen are established for each MME, one from S/CRS and one or more from organizations that have experts in the MME area. These chairmen select members from the interested or related agencies to participate in their working group. Each MME must be developed and written as an outcome statement that reduces drivers of conflict or builds capacity.\textsuperscript{6} If there is military equity, it is not specified in the documentation but the military liaison officers assigned to S/CRS should ensure that both DoD and the COCOM have the opportunity to contribute planners to this level of planning.\textsuperscript{7}

When all MMEs have been refined in the individual interagency groups, the same groups move forward to identify and review the essential tasks that are required in that country to achieve each MME. During this time the group identifies the lead agency or bureau, any gaps that must be addressed, any crossover issues between MMEs, or issues for policy makers. The chairmen help the groups produce an MME strategy paper, an executive summary, resource constraints and a sequencing recommendation among other products for the policy makers.\textsuperscript{8}

At this point in the model, the detailed or implementation planning begins. In this level or phase, MMEs can be assigned to one or more agencies to implement as
practicable. These agencies or bureaus will manage the MME through the implementation of the USG operation. The lead agency or bureau will develop subtasks, measures of evaluation and resource or funding requirements. The lead agency or bureau must also ensure that the group plans for any assumptions made, or begins to consider what the military calls branches and sequels to the original plan in the event the situation changes. Figure 13 depicts a sample MME lead agency identification.

Figure 13. Agency Lead and Management of MME by Tasks

Source: S/CRS Presentation during FSI Course, PD562

If assigned an MME then, DoD or the COCOM would be responsible for the operational or implementation planning required to achieve that element. DoD and the
COCOM could logically connect other regional or country plans, like contingency or functional plans, into this scenario as branches or sequels to this template.

The last element of the implementation-planning phase involves whether or not the S/CRS will establish an Advanced Civilian Team or ACT. Although there are two detailed information papers which Ambassador Pascual submitted to the PCC, this paper will not refer to them as they were classified as sensitive but unclassified or for official use only. According to unclassified sources, ACTs can be established and deployed as country or provincial coordinators in a number of situations. ACTs can deploy as a staff element of a Joint Task Force during combat operations, with subordinate ACTs deployed out to divisions or brigade combat teams in multiple provinces. If there is an existing US Embassy they can provide liaison with the military for the Chief of Mission. If not, they can provide a reach back to the State Department regional bureau, or Washington, DC. If there are no combat operations or no significant military forces, the ACT can deploy as a support element to the Chief of Mission. These elements can work with and under existing USAID deployable platforms such as Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance’s Disaster Assessment and Response Team, a long standing and deployable corps.

One last item that must be discussed as part of the model is funding. To date the short-term funding available for the S/CRS-DoD model has primarily come from DoD. Although the S/CRS was appropriated over $20 million dollars for administrative set up, the remaining $100 million in crisis response dollars were not. Currently, DoD transferred $200 million under section 1207 that congress approved for S/CRS crisis response. Much of the funding that was identified for use in Haiti and the Sudan to
support the planning templates was made available by S/CRS investigating current
earmarks by agency, and building a consolidated budget of funds available for each
MME, as seen below for Haiti in figure 14.

**Resources by major mission element – Haiti**

![Diagram of resources by major mission element – Haiti]

**Figure 14. Example of S/CRS Current Resourcing Requirements**

*Source: S/CRS Presentation during FSI Course, PD562*

S/CRS intends to use expenditures from fiscal year 2006 as a basis to forecast and
request its own funding in future years.

**Evaluation of the S/CRS-DoD Model**

Now that the model has been described as planned and evolved through
application, this chapter can evaluate it against the criteria. The S/CRS-DoD model for
US reconstruction and stabilization operations will be evaluated using the consolidated
criteria from the literature review. These criteria in priority order are synchronized policy and authority; institutional organization and manning; synchronized and flexible planning; integrated doctrine, training and exercises; and resources and interoperability that enable transition.

Synchronized Policy and Authority

The greatest strength of the S/CRS-DoD model is the simplicity of the template and the relative ease with which S/CRS has been able to secure clear US policy goals. S/CRS has been able to tie this goal, through an interagency collaboration process, to the necessary and sufficient major mission elements that all agencies, even international organizations, affect to achieve the US goal.

The S/CRS framework gives the interagency working group under its lead the ability to present the Reconstruction and Stabilization PCC, now permanent, a succinct estimate for feedback and has been applied to garner decisions for two templates with clear guidance in the past year: Haiti and Sudan. It is important to point out these two countries are not “postconflict” but could be defined as fragile or failing states.

Even though detailed back up products are developed, the one page template is simple with enough detail to provide the PCC the information necessary to make a policy recommendation. It provides enough detail for the NSC to select and convey the final policy. It is easier for the agencies involved to execute the major mission elements after having been a part of the planning process since it begins with a clear and mutual understanding of the USG problem. Although the product is essential, the process of coming together to agree to the problem and the best solutions up front, makes effective use of crisis planning and sets each organization or agency up for rapid action. By
garnering policy up front, this planning process complements and supports the new military model for adaptive planning.

Despite the strength of the one-page template, S/CRS perceives its lead in the process to generate a planning framework only in certain circumstances: postconflict stabilization and reconstruction or as directed. Therefore this synchronized policy may not be generated for all circumstances. If inconsistently prepared, it cannot yet be counted on for each country where the USG may have operations or programs to transform conflict. For instance, to date there has been no S/CRS led USG policy-planning framework for current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, Colombia, or the Philippines. There are no templates for COCOM use to integrate defense, development and diplomatic theater security cooperation activities during what can be considered phase 0 in most countries. Most integration for the “3-D” model offered by USAID is occurring when individuals link the country Mission Performance Plan to COCOM country-specific activities, or by the country team itself.

Due to these limitations, there appears to be a perception in the interagency community, including USAID and DoD, that S/CRS is not the only or final authority for conflict transformation planning. Key documents outlining S/CRS lead continue to say postconflict stabilization and reconstruction which pertains to a part of the spectrum of SRO. Representatives from USAID are unsure what the final ramifications will be of their own reorganization under the new dual positioning of their Administrator as the Director of Foreign Assistance. The DFA has conveyed to congress that he will have his own strategic planning framework in the near future. The USAID Office of Military Affairs is getting larger, has higher priority and focus to work issues such as these in the
future. This type of reorganization coupled with the limitation in the S/CRS mission statement make authorities of the interagency community unclear. To date then, there is a perceived gap in SRO responsibility and planning.

Perceived tasking authority is a by-product of the process but is not an official authority of the model. However, for civilian agencies this is the typical style of authority: creating ownership and buy-in. Not only are “chain of command” and “tasking authority” unnecessary to the interagency community, the most successful method of operating for the State Department and USAID is through collaboration. The S/CRS planning framework process provides the opportunity for this, as seen in the preparations for the Haiti and Sudan templates. By the time the policy decision was made, the interagency working groups had spent a lengthy and thorough process together deliberating over the major mission elements and supporting tasks. Together each group responsible for an MME identified the lead agency or bureau and supported that authority.

On the other hand, the action-oriented DoD seeks structure to plan and execute SRO across the spectrum of conflict. A consistent process, reliable products and a definitive and prescriptive doctrine could best overcome this perceived shortfall for DoD. According to the Overview and Action Plan provided to the R&S PCC in November 2005, these are the products S/CRS intends to coordinate once the DC/PC approves of it. For DoD then, there is a perceived gap in this model of authority as it translates to military action.
Institutionalized Organization and Manning

S/CRS is organized into a front office and four standing departments as described in the literature review: (1) Early Warning and Prevention, (2) Planning, (3) Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination, and (4) Response Strategy and Resource Management. The organizational chart in figure 15 below depicts the current department heads that lead the S/CRS full staff numbering approximately fifty, some of which is provided by other agencies.

![Organizational Chart]

Figure 15. Current S/CRS Staff Organization
Source: S/CRS Presentation at CGSOC

By nature of how the positions were filled, the S/CRS staff is inherently an interagency staff. There are liaison officers from the military and multiple other USG agencies including FBI, CIA, and USAID. Currently the vulnerability in assignment of officers is that it is voluntary or ad hoc. To become an institutionalized organization with deliberate interagency Manning, each agency must create standing billets through memoranda of agreement to fill positions for the standing staff and the deployable field.
staff positions. S/CRS has been chartered to identify and organize a deployable civilian corps of up to 200 individuals that can serve in a crisis as stabilization and reconstruction experts for the USG. This deployable corps is to fill any future gap between major combat operations and the normal civilian response in postconflict operations. According to the S/CRS model, these personnel may be required to deploy in the Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST) to support COCOMs or in the Advanced Civilian Teams (ACT) to support joint task forces, divisions or brigade combat teams. Figure 16 depicts the organizations that will require additional manning at the time of a crisis.

![Figure 16. S/CRS Deployable Elements](source: S/CRS Presentation at CGSOC)
S/CRS set a goal of having fifteen deployable staff hired by January 2006, and fifty by mid-2006. The first Active Response Corps team is currently in training although the number of people included is uncertain. So far, there are 400 active and retired State Department employees who have volunteered to be on a roster.17

Training, coordination, planning and exercises with regard to the S/CRS and DoD model have largely been done with the staff from the standing S/CRS. Although there have been two templates completed in the past year, neither template has required or was supported by personnel from the deployable corps. In two exercises conducted between S/CRS and CAPOC, it became apparent to CAPOC that the ad hoc ACTs were functioning much like the USAID Disaster Assistance and Response Teams have traditionally. This redundancy may be due to role playing of the ACTs by the standing S/CRS staff.18 For this criteria, the model has two gaps to date: (1) institutionalized Manning documents, and (2) no solid corps of deployable civilians that are trained that have exercised with DoD down to the tactical level.

Synchronized and Flexible Planning

The S/CRS three-level planning process and the four planning tools available to every agency are the strength of the model; the four tools are the CRSG assessment, the planning framework, the essential task matrix, and the metrics developed. The format provides clear and synchronized interagency major mission elements for conflict transformation and solicits an overall USG policy goal. It can link interagency plans and tasks of the intervention to policy goals, determine what is necessary and sufficient to achieve these goals transforming the conflict, ensure a match between goals and available resources, orchestrate the application of all USG tools, gain synergy across agency lines,
and create meaningful indicators to measure progress towards goals. According to the S/CRS planning staff, the template and by-products are also intended to provide the background to Congress if the interagency must make the case for adjustments. The following figure, figure 17 shows the overall format, the levels of planning, and provides a brief reasoning of the relationship between levels.

**Planning Template for Conflict Transformation**

Focus all intervention elements on a conflict transformation goal in order to...

- **transform** conflict dynamics, and
- make it possible to **pass lead** to local actors.

Figure 17. S/CRS One-Page Planning Framework

*Source: S/CRS Presentation at FSI Course, PD562*

The USG policy goal is critical as the start point for all agencies, and clarifies the USG understanding of the problem. It can serve as guidance for the USAID conflict mitigation planning process and fits into their long-established planning model. This framework is flexible enough for DoD to use as higher guidance with its military
adaptive planning process and as a frame for operational design. The policy goal defines the operational end-state. The relevant MMEs can become operational objectives. From this, not only is there agreement from the interagency community, synchronized operational effects can be extrapolated from the individual tasks that need to be achieved by each. The following figure, figure 18, depicts the Joint Staff preference for centralized and integrated policy and decentralized operational design and execution like this as a planning framework.

![Centralized Strategy, Decentralized Integrated Execution](image)

**Figure 18. Centralized Strategy, Decentralized Integrated Execution**
*Source: CJCS, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*

In the case of Haiti, the agencies were able to recognize the need for synchronous or choreographed activities to best achieve the policy by the strong visual relationships provided by the planning framework. The actual integration of all elements of national
power for Haiti is represented in the crosswalk of major mission elements with correlation of success from one MME to another apparent as described in figure 19.

**Integration of major mission elements – Haiti**

Figure 19. S/CRS Integration of MME
*Source: S/CRS Presentation at FSI Course, PD562*

Those major mission elements that can be achieved directly by or with assistance from military capabilities can become the logical lines of operation in military operational design. As an unclassified plan towards a common USG goal, this format can be the framework used specifically by the CMOCs, to monitor, integrate, coordinate and support the civilian efforts towards stabilization and reconstruction. By using S/CRS’s *Essential Task List* as a baseline for SRO and civil-military operations activities, the military can have prescriptive and interagency generated measures of success.
The gap in the model for this criterion is the lack of capability and preparedness in DoD to link the template and any assigned MMEs to military planning for SRO.

Integrated Doctrine, Training, and Exercise

S/CRS expected to publish a handbook as a standard operating procedure for their ACTs and HRSTs that would have “job descriptions, reporting responsibilities, authority designations, equipment lists, and training procedures.” Although the document may be complete, it has not been distributed to the interagency community. Once their plan is approved by the DC/PC in summer 2006, they intend to infuse the model into joint and organizational doctrine. The S/CRS Essential Task List is a good interagency product, complimentary to the Universal Joint Task List that does not currently drill down into stabilization and reconstruction tasks enough for operators to take action. The S/CRS list can serve the military now as a baseline of tasks in the absence of doctrine or tasks in the Universal Joint Task List.

Some of the most recent military joint doctrine makes no mention of S/CRS and their coordination role for stabilization and reconstruction. The two new volumes of Joint Publication 3-08 regarding interagency coordination do not reference S/CRS. There is currently no interagency or military doctrine regarding the coordination between S/CRS and any other agency. The only military publications that describe S/CRS and the planning framework to date are the DoD Directive which does not provide enough detail for action and the JFCOM pamphlet which does not require its understanding or use. The pamphlet simply recommends that COCOMs develop means to optimize this new element. There is not yet a corresponding publication by the Joint Staff, the service components, SOCOM, CAPOC or NDU that apply or require this model be implemented.
for SRO. The COCOM contingency and functional plans remain classified, as does the SOCOM GWOT plan. Consequently the level of interagency integration and coordination remains limited for components of the US national strategy.

Training available at the Foreign Service Institute, the National Defense University, JFCOM or the Naval Post Graduate School is offered and has been taken by individuals who self-select into the courses. S/CRS, JFCOM, USAID, and other military medical or civil affairs officers have been the majority of attendees of these courses. FSI has trained 200 individuals total since this early 2006 in PD560, 561, 562 and 563. To date, S/CRS reports that although they have made numerous briefings and held equal seminars, there have been few other agencies that take the training en masse. There is no deliberate or detailed SRO training that incorporates this model at the professional military academic centers or colleges, although there have been a handful of related briefings and conferences. Mid-level officer students at the Army’s Command and General Staff College remain unaware of the S/CRS planning framework and consequently of how they must translate the policy into operational or tactical action. The training gap in this model is that it is not required nor consistent and integrated.

To implement this training in exercises, State and DoD have tested the S/CRS model of HRSTs and ACTs in strategic exercises. S/CRS participated in two exercises with SOUTHCOM, including Fuerzas Defensas regarding Cuba. It also did two tabletop exercises with CAPOC and participated in a multinational exercise with JFCOM.

There has not been any participation at the lower operational or tactical levels yet, such as the field grade professional military education courses or the Combat Training Centers. During culminating exercises where there are interagency participants from the
State Department, USAID, FBI, and nongovernmental organizations, there has been no direct participation by S/CRS nor has there been recognition of the planning process and framework. A handful of students experimented with the draft S/CRS template. The result was clarity in interagency planning and coordinating and an easier visualization of policy for the student staff to develop a campaign. The template, figure 20, became a tool that led the important policy and operational design discussions for both the military and interagency actors. At CGSC, one instructor noted that the model for the exercises in the next academic year would include more interfaces with the S/CRS model and the template.
Figure 20. Student Draft Template for CGSOC Joint Exercises

Although in the S/CRS Overview and Action Plan there is a published exercise schedule for S/CRS through the fiscal year, there is no standing plan for DoD to incorporate S/CRS in every exercise at all levels from JFCOM through the Combat Training Centers. There is currently no S/CRS participation in exercises below the strategic level so it is difficult to ensure the policy translation into tactical action. Only
exercises that replicate actions down to the tactical level will manifest true gaps. One officer, assigned to S/CRS, has the goal of the first S/CRS participation in a Combat Training Center for summer 2006. This officer believes it will become standardized procedure following that rotation.28

One could argue that the HRST and ACT concept has been tested in both Afghanistan and Iraq with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the State Embedded Teams, respectively. In fact, feedback from these sources is what led to the creation of the HRST and ACT concept. The State Department is currently advertising the positions available in Iraq, and in the near future there will be additional evidence to validate the model. Until then the gap in exercises is that they have only been conducted at the strategic level to date.

Resources and Interoperability That Enable Transition

Regarding terminology, like the joint community, the stabilization and reconstruction community should focus on the fewest of terms that are central to all operations, define them, and leave it at that. S/CRS has noted that the planning process takes significant strides to ensure a common definition of the problem is used by all agencies involved.29 This same process, if used, can help develop the few necessary common definitions and procedures. In the short term, it will be necessary for each agency to understand when there is a difference in terminology such as for the term “conflict” and “transformation”.

Like terminology, the doctrine at the interagency level will most likely be prescriptive and so should be minimal and general, covering what must be commonly understood such as the planning framework and process. By all agencies incorporating at
a minimum, the use of the four tools: assessment, template, task list, and metrics the USG efforts for stabilization and reconstruction could be synchronized.

Currently each training location is providing different curriculum to a different set of students. If there continues to be multiple forums for training, the USG should encourage individuals from each agency and department to go to another agency’s training.

The Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) has taken great strides in providing a common unclassified picture of the situation for USG agencies as seen in figure 21.

Figure 21. HIU Operational Picture for Sudan

*Source:* HIU database

The data collection that generated this picture has not been written into the coordination mechanisms for DoD to date. Although the CMO staff in Iraq worked with
the HIU, the Civil Affairs mission of Civil Information Management as described in doctrine does not specifically include the connectivity to these interagency unclassified data processes yet.

In the important category of funding to date, Congress has authorized $27 million for S/CRS administrative start up. DoD requested to transfer $200 million of line 1207 of their budget that was approved and is now in the process of being appropriated to S/CRS for conflict response, beginning with Haiti and the Sudan. The institutionalizing of this model depends on the full and programmed budget being authorized and appropriated by congress, or authorization for continued use of funding that can be earmarked for conflict transformation no matter what the agency.

Interoperability and transparency not only allow USG interagency transition it also positions the US for the next phase of transition between the USG and the host nation.

Summary

By evaluating the S/CRS-DoD model against the established criteria from the literature this paper has identified the gaps in the model that exist.

In the next and final chapter, this paper will summarize the findings of the research to answer the primary and secondary questions, draw out conclusions, and make recommendations for a way ahead.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1}Pascual, S/CRS Information Paper to R&S PCC 21 November 2005}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2}Discussion during PD562, FSI, 16 February 2006, Arlington, VA.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.}
Pascual, CRSG Information Paper.

S/CRS definition of Conflict Transformation, see figure 3.

Nancy Izzo Jackson, S/CRS, planner for Sudan.

S/CRS, discussion with current military representatives.

Jackson, discussion.

Ibid.

Pascual, Overview and Action Plan.

Ibid.

Bush, NSPD-44.

Interviews with various USAID reps.

Ibid.

Bush, NSPD-44 “mission to lead, coordinate and manage”.

Bush, NSPD-44.

Pascual, Overview and Action Plan.

CAPOC, Table-top exercise AAR.

S/CRS, presentation

Pascual, Overview and Action Plan.

Ibid.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08.


Author, personal experience from participation in the Special Operations Force (SOF) Track, Joint Advance Warfighting Staff (JAWS) track exercises, ILE and AOWC curriculum. Author prepared and presented briefings to each audience on S/CRS-DoD model, as well as interfaced with representative from S/CRS who visited to brief JAWS track.
Author, personal experience in EOCCE, AOWC and JAWS-JSOTF course exercises during CGSOC 2006-01.

Instructor, Department of Joint and Multinational Operations in update briefing to the Advance Civil Affairs elective course.

Pascual, Overview and Action Plan.

Jim Ruf, Interview and lessons learned communication with Medina.

Public Diplomacy (PD) 562 course discussions.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
This study has provided an overview of current literature, a snapshot of current US government efforts to prepare for future SRO in a more integrated manner and evaluation of those efforts to determine whether gaps exist. The final step in this research will be to consolidate findings to answer the research questions and draw conclusions. Also, in order to “operationalize” the model of coordination between S/CRS and DoD to provide a true interagency response in the near term, this paper will offer recommendations on the USG way forward.

Summarizing the Findings to Answer the Questions
The creation of the Secretary’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, or S/CRS, by the President and the NSC Principals committee, clearly highlights the focus of the USG to get all elements of national power integrated for the next US SRO response. However, does this new department and its coordination with DoD give the USG a new capability for stabilization and reconstruction in the near term? Is there an institutionalized process for planning, to include transitions? Will the model build the relationships necessary to execute the plans? And, finally, will the USG agencies by physically interoperable enough to use the model? By summarizing the findings of chapter four, this chapter will answer the primary and secondary research questions.
Does the USG have a new capability to operationalize SRO?

In conducting the literature review and comparing what is required against what exists or is being built, the primary question is answered. Using the current model of coordination between S/CRS and DoD, the USG does not yet have a new or institutionalized capability for operationalizing reconstruction and stabilization strategy into action in the short term. At this point in time, the S/CRS-DoD model is strong on policy, authority, and planning but it is still insufficient at the operational level to translate this policy or planning into action. If this model is to move forward, there must be significant work done in Congress and all agencies to develop the institutionalized backbone of law, doctrine, training, manning and materiel to support S/CRS. It is apparent that this model is a work in progress, which with DC/PC approval of the plan may evolve into a feasible USG capability. Despite the short time S/CRS has existed, some answers to the secondary questions were positive but some have yet to be addressed fully.

Is there an institutionalized process for planning?

S/CRS has a prescriptive process for planning that led to success with its first two examples of interagency planning on the one-page frameworks for Haiti and the Sudan, yet the application of these templates is not recognized by the relevant interagency community, nor institutionalized in any one agency. S/CRS is able to garner critical policy decisions from the PCC and NSC that drive interagency planning and implementation as the recent applications have shown. However, until the DC/PC approval expected in mid-2006, it is neither institutionalized nor put into practice at the operational and tactical levels. Due to lack of staff connectivity and awareness, these two
plans have not been specifically coordinated with DoD to ensure they are synchronized with and supported by DoD plans under the COCOMs or with SOCOM’s GWOT plan. This paper has not compared the plans due to the problem of classification in unclassified writing.

Will the model build the relationships required to execute the plans?

To date, the model does not provide the relationships necessary to execute plans between S/CRS and DoD. Only with DC/PC approval of the plan, formal establishment of training and exercises at all levels between S/CRS and DoD, and deployment of personnel together for training, exercises and operations will this model build the necessary relationships.

With the reorganization of USAID to include sharing planning, resource management and monitoring staff with the Department of State, the creation of the Director for Foreign Assistance, the assignment of S/CRS as a NSC deputy, the top level relationships are built. S/CRS has been able to field a headquarters element with some of the staff coming from other agencies.

There is in-depth training available at the Foreign Service Institute and Joint Forces Command regarding this new model that is dynamic and real. 200 students have taken the FSI courses and more are to be offered this fall. S/CRS has conducted many seminars with strategic level organizations to teach the model and “grow” it into a more institutional one. However, there is very little training going on outside a small strategic circle. These processes have not been written into long-term USG law, publications, or doctrine nor does the interagency community acknowledge them yet as a standard.
However, it has not yet been able to hire a deployable corps, and consequently not able to field a CRSG, an HRST, or an ACT into the strategic, operational or tactical arena. The S/CRS goal is to have one tenth of the deployable corps hired by this summer and has a good start with 400 volunteers on an initial roster. DoD, on the other hand, has very few representatives inside or outside of S/CRS and JFCOM, working this new coordination. It is being incorporated slowly into JFCOM and NDU exercises, as well as a smattering of COCOM exercises. However, these exercises remain at the strategic level, not enabling the individuals who will be responsible for translating this policy mechanism into operational planning, such as the Army War College, or Command and General Staff Officers Course.

Additional relationships that must exist are those between the HRST, the JIACG, and the CMOCs at the COCOMs as they work deliberate plans. There must also be relationships between field commanders, CMOCs, and ACTs built during training and exercises that build the familiarity that enables action.

Will USG Agencies be physically interoperable?

To answer the last research question regarding interoperability, initial steps have been taken to provide more funding from the DoD budget to S/CRS for conflict response but without law or an individual S/CRS budget for SRO there cannot be an institutionalized process.

S/CRS was required to report back to Congress on what authorized money in earmarks it might be able to consolidate amongst the interagency community for the two sample conflicts in Haiti and the Sudan. Otherwise, S/CRS remains unsure of what long-term programmed funding Congress will authorize, what staff it will have and whether it
will be authorized to deploy them. To date, there are no memoranda of agreement to share staff, equipment, doctrine or methodology beyond the planning framework to be able to compare to the requirements. There is no hard connectivity between the DoD classified information systems and the State’s Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) currently. Although S/CRS appears to be waiting for the DC/PC approval to move ahead on joint doctrine and exercises, this interoperability will take law and resources to execute.

Conclusions

There is a tremendous amount of positive momentum in the USG with regard to reorganizing and building capabilities that will help secure US interests by achieving US policy. Accordingly, every USG agency appears to be working hard to reorganize, reposition, and collaborate with other agencies to guarantee US interests are secured. The individual agencies have taken action over the past four years: set up new structure corresponding to the current security environment, created and started to fill new positions, tested new interlocking plans, and started transforming agency culture. However, with all the inertia comes the chaos before the calm. The USG has not come to the final solution yet. When the dust settles it will be important to get basic information such as an updated national security organizational chart to the nation of USG employees involved.

In this critical effort where super empowered individuals can affect US national security, the USG must move beyond presidential directives, which can be superceded with follow-on administrations, to get stabilization and reconstruction structure and processes into law, doctrine and training to truly institutionalize integrated SRO. By
acknowledging the level of effort required to shape, deter, stabilize and enable civil authority that is reflected in current literature, and shown in figure 22, the USG must put their efforts against building an integrated and institutionalized SRO capability that can operate seamlessly under changing conditions.

![Figure 22. Concept for Unified and Joint Operations](source: CJCS, Joint Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations)

Although there is an updated NSS, NDS and NMS for the military, there is no clear and prescriptive military Joint Operating Concept for SRO. Consequently there is no corresponding joint or service doctrine that details to operators how this model is used to plan campaigns or translate the policy and strategy into an end state with operational objectives under the operational design framework to be published in the new JP 3-0.

There continues to be a significant gap of understanding at the operational level. The operational level employees en masse are not yet aware of what is being planned and
implemented at the strategic level. Although they may have seen or experienced what was required at the tactical and operational level in Afghanistan or Iraq, it was largely ad hoc and misunderstood. If in the future the US military is to execute SRO in the near term based on interagency planning, with interagency teams, there should be education and training occurring across the spectrum of operators right now. The priority should be to train the operational level planners on how to translate this policy tool into tasks and effects. This education and training cannot remain at the strategic, as is the case.

Recommendations for the Way Ahead

Interagency National Defense Strategy

In addition to the US National Security Strategy, the USG should institute integrated planning from all elements of power into a detailed National Defense Strategy in lieu of one that comes solely from the DoD. In the environment where failing and failed states have become a threat to US national security and must be addressed by all elements of national power to resolve potential conflict, the USG defense strategy should prioritize regions and countries and develop a single document using all USG capabilities combined to defend national interests: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. This would set the stage for an integrated and institutionalized approach to SRO throughout the spectrum of operations that each agency could ensure was reflected in internal planning and action.

Interagency National Security University

Training for the stabilization and reconstruction planning process would be best consolidated in either a National Security University as DoD plans to implement and the
Foreign Service Institute to provide the most common and integrated experience and practice of the interagency body. The USG should consolidate training efforts to establish the NDU into an integrated National Security University that partner with the Foreign Service Institute to offer the same course to train USAID, DoD, DoS and other agencies. This can institutionalize not only the stabilization and reconstruction curriculum and training efforts but also evolve US forces into comfortably unified interagency elements with the relationships and familiarity to conduct transitions.

Interagency Organization and Doctrine for SRO across the Spectrum

The interagency community needs to define and relate the many outlying agencies, organizations, elements, and individuals to the SRO mission. Specifically, the USG should define the relationships between State, S/CRS, USAID, the DFA and DoD. This community needs to come to a common understanding of which organizations will do crisis action planning and which will do deliberate planning. The CRSG and S/CRS are best suited and positioned to conduct the crisis action planning. However, with the shortfall of permanent personnel, the JIACG or CMOC elements at a COCOM should be assigned the responsibility of deliberate planning in the case of contingency and functional plans. There should be common understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the JIACG versus the CMOC which are largely divided along the lines of classification. The CMOC must remain an unclassified center for integration of all civilian entities and has the mission of Civil Information Management. The CMOC should be assigned the linkage and analysis of the HIU databases. The CMOS should provide the venue to declassify information as feasible for the civilian community. The JIACG could function as the internal COCOM staff cell that remains operational in the
classified environment providing the civilian agency feeds into the deliberate planning process. Lastly there needs to be a common understanding of which agencies and organizations operate using classified information and which must operate in the unclassified domain as well as provide a transparent linkage for information to be shared to those agencies on either side with the need for access. This common organization and understanding must then be translated into interagency, joint and service doctrine.

Full-Spectrum Responsibility and Authority for S/CRS Lead

The caveat “postconflict” used with regard to these operations should be deleted from any official documentation. Whether S/CRS or another agency or department is in charge of stabilization and reconstruction, the lead should be for the full spectrum. It makes sense that the Department of State with its new shared staff with USAID be that agency. SRO should be considered continuous just as Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction or SSTR is not just one phase of a military plan any longer, but in all phases. In priority regions and countries, an overall SRO strategy should be reflected in the State and USAID strategic planning, the COCOMs theater security cooperation strategies, and the Country Team’s mission performance planning.

Providing a 3-D Analysis to Congress

All agencies must provide the best context to and leverage Congress to get the right legislation passed to allow the funding, the hiring and deploying of the S/CRS deployable corps, as well as the building of a seamless transition apparatus. The USAID 3-D model should be the goal for any opportunity to present an event or program before
Congress: the diplomatic, defense and development agencies should have integrated efforts to report or request with one voice.

S/CRS Framework for All Conflict Transformation

The State Department should recommend the widest use of the S/CRS planning framework and tools for SRO in any country or region. S/CRS should be requested to prepare interagency planning templates on all failing or failed states, countries in crisis, or countries where there are ongoing operations. The State Department should encourage all Country Teams to use the planning framework for their mission planning, if not in lieu of their Mission Performance Plan. COCOMs should ask JIACGs or CMOCs to develop a draft planning framework for inclusion in the deliberate planning process and products. These templates can be reviewed and updated as opportunity arises to work with S/CRS, CRSG or HRST personnel.

S/CRS Framework Connected to Military Operational Design

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should address S/CRS in joint publications and connect the planning template to operational design in doctrine, potentially the new Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* and a new Joint Publication 3-08, *Joint Interagency Operations*. The overall policy goal should be described in terms that provide for a US military end-state. The Major Mission Elements or MMEs should be related to the operational objectives within the country and can be used to derive the military commander’s logical lines of operation. Additional objectives or effects can be derived from the tasks identified to achieve the MMEs. If military planners are involved in the S/CRS planning framework process, they can prepare in parallel the operational design
for any potential military operation in the country that can be reviewed and edited by the COCOM commander at the same time as the policy makers are making decisions. The Joint Chiefs also need to develop doctrine that provides the full context to Soldiers for all entities such as the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, and Civil-Military Operations Centers with their linkage to the interagency for SRO.

**DoD Formalize SSTR Capability**

DoD should teach Foreign Area Officers, Civil Affairs Officers, Special Operations Force officers and those assigned to a Joint Interagency Task Force or Coordination Group how to use the planning template. All students of the Army War College and Command and General Staff Officers Course should get training on S/CRS, the planning framework and tools that provide the USG policy goal.

DoD must also prepare to fill the personnel gap of the deployable civilian corps in the near term. This should be done by looking directly into the reserve components for civilian expertise before the next crisis to identify subject matter experts that could be called for duty.

TRADOC should insert a component for basic interagency SRO training into professional schools and ensure that S/CRS is included in all training events down to the tactical level.

SOCOM should immediately assign Global War on Terrorism planners to S/CRS to integrate the military plan with the policy and long-term planning. With the separation of CAPOC from SOCOM the critical coordination element within the special operations community will no longer be available. If SOCOM is to coordination the Global War on
Terror, as well as assist with conflict transformation in failing and failed states, then it does not currently have its own staff liaisons within S/CRS.

As newly responsible for CAPOC, the United States Army Reserve Command should address the strategic Civil Affairs force that is housed in the four Civil Affairs Commands to ensure that these assets are trained in and using the S/CRS model in support of each COCOM, as well as in direct support to the S/CRS staff.

Further Assessment after DC/PC Decision

After the DC/PC meets to approve the S/CRS Overview and Action Plan, there should be an additional assessment started, using this paper as a baseline. This assessment should be a full Capabilities Based Assessment to provide feedback to DoD and the PCC as to the status of the USG capability to conduct SRO.

Summary

This paper has presented the S/CRS-DoD model of interagency coordination for SRO in the near term. It has conducted a recent literature review to identify requirements and consequent evaluation criteria for the model. This paper has answered the primary and secondary research questions and identified gaps in capability. Although the findings are that this S/CRS-DoD model does not currently provide the USG a concrete capability, it may in the future as the DC/PC decides whether to approve the S/CRS Overview and Action Plan. It will take efforts from every agency to coordinate and support this new coordinator and provide the US another capability to ensure US interests.

Once this capability is institutionalized, the USG must focus on furthering the work with the international or multinational community to make sure that these same
efforts are being made to provide a combined capability for stabilization and reconstruction.
GLOSSARY

Conflict Transformation. The process of diminishing the means and motivations for conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, security, economic development and the rule of law. Success in this process would permit an evolution from a large-scale intervention to a peace that is sustainable by local actors, with the international community providing continued support at a greatly reduced cost. (S/CRS working definition, JFCOM J7 Pamphlet)

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. The CCJO is an overarching description of how the joint force will operate 10-20 years in the future in all domains across the range of military operations within a multilateral environment in collaboration with interagency and multinational partners. It guides the development of future joint concepts and joint force capabilities. The CCJO establishes the unifying framework for the family of joint concepts, the attributes and broad strategic and operational tasks for the future joint force, a campaign framework for future operations, the long-range focus for joint experimentation, and the conceptual foundation for unified action towards implementing the military aspects of national strategy.

Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR). Department of Defense activities that support US Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing US interests. (DoD Directive 3000.05, November 2005)

Reconstruction. The process of rebuilding the political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory where it has been damaged or destroyed to create the foundation for longer-term development. (S/CRS working definition, JFCOM J7 Pamphlet)

Stability Operations. Multiagency operations that involve all instruments of national and multinational action, including the international humanitarian and reconstruction community to support major conventional combat operations if necessary; establish security; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish the political, social, and economic architecture; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. Stability operations establish a safe and secure environment; provide essential social services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate local civil governance. The objective is clearly to establish governance that enables a country or regime to provide for its own security, rule of law, social services, and economic activity and eliminate as many of the root causes of the crisis as feasible to reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of another crisis. (Stability Operations, Joint Operating Concept, September 2004)
Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions. (DoD Directive 3000.05, November 2005)

Stabilization. The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to a resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development. (S/CRS working definition, JFCOM J7 Pamphlet)
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW: INTERAGENCY STRUCTURE AND SUCCESS

Name:
Position:
Organization:
Time in position/organization:
Length of service to interagency community:

Do you think the following organizations have the elements they need to complete their stability and reconstruction mission:
(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S/CRS</th>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>Your Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Synchronized Policy / Authority</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Top reason why:</td>
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<td>2. Institutional Organization and Manning</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>Top reason why:</td>
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<td>3. Synchronized and Flexible Planning</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>Top reason why:</td>
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<td>4. Integrated Doctrine Training / Exercises</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>Top reason why:</td>
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<td>5. Resources Interoperability</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>Top reason why:</td>
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Do you understand the organization and linkages between S/CRS and DoD for the planning and executing of the Stability and Reconstruction mission?

Do you understand the S/CRS – DoD planning templates and linkages for the translation of strategy into tactical action?

Have you participated in S/CRS – DoD Conferences, Seminars or Planning Sessions? If yes, which ones?

What were your observations?

Will you be participating in one of the planned S/CRS-DoD exercises? If yes, which one?

Do you have any other comments, documents or updates that you would like to share?

Do you authorize me to include your comments in this thesis? If so, do you want me to include them with or without attribution (meaning: using your name, or “representative of” your organization)?

Do you have any other preferences?


Birmingham, Guillermo, Luann Barndt, and Thomas Salo. *Achieving Unity of Effort: A Call for Legislation to Improve the Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing Interservice Interoperability So All May Labor as One.* Norfolk, NC: Joint Forces Staff College, 18 September 2003


Clays, Michelle M. *The Interagency Process and America’s Second Front in the Global War on Terrorism.* Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 2003.


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