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14. ABSTRACT In response to a new, vigorous emphasis on WMD proliferation, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld named the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as the lead DoD agency for integrating and synchronizing DoD efforts in combating WMD. This is an enormous challenge for STRATCOM to ensure all Combatant Commands (COCOMs) are working together effectively among themselves, interagency participants and our international partners. As more international participants are invited to join the Proliferation Security Initiative and WMD proliferators invent new methods to circumvent interdiction efforts to stop the transfer of WMD among rogue states, STRATCOM and supported COCOMs must have the doctrine, resources and proper command and control structures to deal with these challenges. Although enormous strides have been made in the area of interdiction, more emphasis must be placed on command and control and the types of expertise required in order for PSI interdiction efforts to be effective. The ability to bring military resources to bear to legally interdict a shipment of WMD will be successful only if the groundwork for doctrine, materiel and effective command and control relationships have been cultivated well in advance. This paper will provide a brief background on the PSI and provide examples of the doctrine which supports it from the national to the operational levels. Additionally, it will illustrate the types of resources required for interdiction operations and why command and control is critical for success during these operations. Finally, it will provide a recommendation for establishment of interdiction cells of expertise to allow for effective command and control of both national and international assets participating in the PSI.					
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**The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cooperative Process or Command and Control
Nightmare?**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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16 May 06

**Seminar 4 Moderators:
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"The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed...We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace is the path of action."
-George W. Bush¹

President Bush's "path of action" is codified in the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)"² issued in December of 2002. This strategy outlined an approach to combating WMD based on three pillars: counterproliferation, nonproliferation and consequence management.³ These three elements do not represent a radical new way of attacking the threats of WMD, but the strategy does place new emphasis on counterproliferation efforts. As a result, in May of 2003 at a NATO Summit in Krakow, Poland, President Bush unveiled to the world a new framework to combat the burgeoning threat of WMD proliferation to state and non-state actors of concern. Dubbed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), this announcement defined a dynamic approach to address the ever-increasing problem of WMD proliferation. Simply put, the PSI is a collaborative group of nations committed to stemming the flow of WMD and their associated materials and delivery systems through active interdiction in the air, on land, or sea.⁴ The obvious goal is to stop shipments of these materials from reaching their intended destinations. A daunting task indeed which requires an unprecedented level of cooperation not only between member states, but within our very own instruments of national power.

In response to this emphasis on WMD proliferation, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld named the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as the lead DoD agency for

integrating and synchronizing DoD efforts in combating WMD.⁵ One specific mission area for the DoD is the interdiction of WMD transshipments in the air, on land, and sea, in support of the PSI. This is an enormous challenge for USSTRATCOM to ensure all Combatant Commands (COCOMs) are working together effectively among themselves, interagency participants and our international partners. As more international participants are invited to join PSI and WMD proliferators invent new methods to circumvent interdiction, USSTRATCOM and supported COCOMs must have the doctrine, resources and proper command and control structures to deal with these challenges. Although enormous strides have been made in the area of interdiction, more emphasis must be placed on command and control and the types of expertise required in order for future PSI interdiction efforts to be effective. The success of WMD interdiction is heavily dependent not only on accurate and timely intelligence, but also in specialized knowledge of foreign capabilities, laws and customs. Current DoD doctrine and policy does address the importance of interdiction. However, it is not succinct in its emphasis on the command and control relationships between USSTRATCOM, the respective supported COCOMs and cooperative frameworks with foreign states. A mechanism is needed which clearly delineates roles for all players in a particular interdiction operation. The COCOMs must know who is involved, to what extent, and who will act as lead. With a myriad of national and international actors, these operations will not be executed using familiar DoD tasking criteria. Therefore, a command and control structure is required which will encompass all of the various elements of national and international power employed by the PSI. The ability to bring military resources to bear to legally interdict a shipment of WMD will be successful only if the groundwork for doctrine, materiel and effective command and control relationships have been cultivated well in

advance.

This paper will provide a brief background on the PSI and provide examples of the doctrine which supports it from the national to the operational levels. Additionally, it will illustrate the types of resources required for interdiction operations and why command and control is critical for success during these operations. Finally, it will provide a recommendation for establishment of interdiction cells of expertise to allow for effective command and control of both national and international assets participating in the PSI.

PSI Background

The PSI was conceived as a response to worldwide terrorism and the persistent proliferation of WMD by rogue states, which continue to pose the greatest security challenges to the US as well as the international community. It is inherently obvious that preventing WMD from reaching undesirable actors is preferable to dealing with the potential aftermath of their use; thus the emphasis on interdiction has taken on a more prominent role. However, the concept of countering WMD proliferation as outlined by the PSI is nothing new--states have worked together for some time attempting to prevent shipments of WMD from ever reaching their intended destination. But most of these efforts prior to the PSI were not organized in a coherent fashion and their primary aim was activity in seaports. As WMD and related materials became more readily available and proliferators more savvy in their methods to circumvent international rules, tracking and halting this activity became an increasingly difficult proposition. As mentioned previously, the National Strategy for WMD defines a strategy based on three pillars, but more specifically it outwardly describes interdiction as a critical part of the strategy and the "US must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement

of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorists organizations."⁶

To this end, the Department of State was charged with developing a more effective method in WMD interdiction. The Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile Nonproliferation drafted a simple paper outlining how nations should cooperate with each other across their respective military, legal, and law enforcement agencies to provide significant capabilities to stem the proliferation of WMD. The paper quickly gained steam and made its way to the Oval Office whereupon President Bush promptly gave it his approval and publicly announced it as a presidential initiative at the May 2003 NATO Summit. Ten nations were contacted with the proposal to join in this effort; Australia, Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain.⁷ All agreed on the importance working in concert to stem the flow of WMD and collectively drafted a statement of principles which outlined the methods and objectives of PSI. The statement of principles calls upon the PSI partners not to engage in WMD trade with countries of concern and allow their own vessels and aircraft to be searched if there is suspicion they are transporting WMD related goods. Additionally, the principles put great emphasis on the timely sharing of information of suspicious activities to allow for interdiction opportunities.⁸ In short, the PSI was designed as a tool to use, "...the full range of counterproliferation tools--from diplomacy to intelligence to operations--to stop WMD and missile-related proliferation at sea, in the air, and on land."⁹

Thus the PSI was born, off, and running. The role of the military in PSI became evident early on and US doctrine and policy inculcated the importance of interdiction in support of PSI. For example, the recently published National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction clearly outlines the responsibilities of the military in combating WMD and identifies interdiction as one of the key mission areas. The strategy states the DoD must be

ready to support interdiction efforts and in particular, the PSI, and that "Commanders must be ready to interdict WMD and related materials in both non-permissive and permissive environments and coordinate efforts with other US Government agencies and partner/allied States, as directed."¹⁰ The role of the military is further defined in recently published joint doctrine which states, "Interdiction of WMD shipments by air, sea, or land is the foundation of the new strategy. Interdiction includes both diplomatic and military activities."¹¹ Additionally, each year the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC), (whose members include the Secretary of Defense (Chair), the Secretary of Energy (Vice-Chair), the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) is responsible for reviewing activities and capabilities of interdepartmental and intelligence communities in regard to combating WMD and providing a report to Congress. In the May 2005 report, the CPRC prioritized their top Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACEs)--those areas requiring a concentrated effort to enhance their effectiveness in countering WMD proliferation. Interdiction was listed as the top priority.¹²

The Challenge of Interdiction

As evidenced thus far in this paper, there currently exists adequate doctrine and policy and a seemingly clear path ahead on the role of DoD in support of PSI. In this vein, it would appear the U.S. is relatively well-equipped to execute interdiction operations. But interdicting WMD and associated materials is an extremely difficult proposition to say the least. With interdiction just one part of a much larger, complex plan of attack against WMD, the decidedly more active national strategy will place more and more demands on an already thinly stretched DoD. Improving military capabilities for interdiction has been a major focus since the inception of the PSI. However, today there are simply not enough forces and assets

resident in the DoD to effectively manage all of the varied types of counter WMD missions. Interdiction operations call for personnel with specialized training and equipment and much more are needed to support air, land and sea operations.¹³

Currently, most interdictions have been focused on shipments via the sea.¹⁴ U.S. forces in the affected COCOM are leveraged quite often since usually our naval forces are positioned in close proximity to most of the major shipping routes and can respond fairly rapidly. In a permissive maritime environment where overwhelming force is not needed, the forces at hand, generally navy or coast guard, can handle the job. In a non-permissive environment, more firepower may be needed in the form of special operations personnel, marines or interagency personnel requested from that particular region's COCOM. In many cases, forces or highly trained personnel from a PSI partner will be called in depending on what kind of capabilities they can provide. In any event, once boarding the vessel is accomplished, the real work begins. Depending upon what the suspicious cargo is, it could be like looking for a needle in a haystack--with the vessel serving as the haystack. Today's cargo ships can be enormous containing hundreds if not thousands of containers requiring search or at the very least a thorough review of the bill of lading. Even smaller suspect ships have become very adept at hiding materials in compartments, under false floors, etc. making searches very time consuming and difficult.¹⁵

But this is just the maritime aspect of interdiction. Joint Publication 3-40 makes particular note of incorporating air and land interdiction efforts into WMD counterproliferation stating that, "...most notably, the PSI adds air and ground interdiction options to the long-standing maritime interdiction capability. The scope of the PSI will all but mandate that conventional forces participate in interdiction operations alongside national assets."¹⁶ To expand

interdiction effort in the air and on land will require different capabilities and personnel. In particular, air interdiction presents its own unique challenges. Maritime interdictions normally occur after a few days of planning leading up to the actual operation whereas air interdictions usually provide only a matter of hours in which to take action. Once the decision is made to interdict the air transshipment, assets must be mustered to support and plans must be vetted to determine where and when the interdiction will proceed. Again, it is probable that U.S. air assets, through the affected COCOM, would be leveraged extensively given the fact that we have aircraft stationed virtually around the world that could support and the air expeditionary concept is well established. This could be a very difficult proposition, however, as careful attention must be paid to what may be perceived as hostile acts in some national airspace. Additionally, denying airspace to suspect shipments or forcing an aircraft to land presents its own challenges with issues of safety and right of way to other aircraft in the area.¹⁷

Interdiction on land is probably the mission receiving the least amount of attention--but it is no less important. Porous overland borders between many nations suspected of WMD proliferation efforts compound this problem. In the case of land interdiction, the sheer number of avenues a proliferator could use is staggering. Successful interdiction hinges on speed, good intelligence and cooperation between all participants. Highly specialized, mobile personnel will be needed working in concert with foreign partners to deliver the required capabilities. Currently, the U.S. leads the world in these types of specialized forces and will undoubtedly be called to interdiction duty quite often until PSI partners are sufficiently trained to alleviate some of the taskings.¹⁸

Moreover, not only must the interdiction personnel be knowledgeable of what they are

looking for, they also need to be knowledgeable of appropriate actions once they find it. Given the plethora of WMD materials the interdiction team could come in contact with, to include chemical, biological or nuclear, the proficiency and technical knowledge required simply cannot be overstated.

Supporting the PSI militarily comes with a pretty high price tag, but obviously is a responsibility we should not shirk. Presently, if presented with multiple interdiction operations, Combatant Commanders would quickly run out of these "low density/high demand" resources.¹⁹ Dedicating the appropriate amount of regional COCOM resources to support PSI without diluting their already stressed forces should be a top consideration. To alleviate some of this stress, Combatant Commanders will have to be cognizant of the capabilities other PSI partners can bring to the operation. Although it may be likely U.S. resources will be involved in many PSI interdictions, Combatant Commanders need to leverage these resources to the maximum extent possible, not only for their capabilities, but also to show good faith and confidence.

Command and Control Considerations

Up to this point, this paper has discussed how the doctrine in the combating of WMD has evolved specifically to incorporate the PSI, and how that doctrine will affect the types of military resources needed to support the PSI. Although significant advances have been made across the spectrum of combating WMD, many gaps remain. One of these gaps appears to be the slow development of an effective command and control structure that would include the various national and international agencies. This is arguably the most important factor that needs to be solidly in place for successful interdiction operations. From the original eleven members of PSI, nine more nations have since pledged their support to participate and host

training exercises. The Statement of Principles has also seen a dramatic increase in support as more than 70 UN members have provided their endorsement.²⁰ As the world environment becomes more dynamic, and more partners agree to the PSI principles and participate in interdiction operations, the importance of command and control over interdiction operations will become increasingly important. While growth in cooperation between national agencies and international partners is a good thing, it almost certainly begs the inevitable question: With all of these players, who's in charge?

Why is this question important? It's important because the stakes in this game are simply too high to ignore. Without a solid foundation of cooperation and command and control, the U.S. and its PSI partners run the risk of missing critical interdiction opportunities-- opportunities that if not acted upon, could have devastating effects. A good example of how PSI operations should work was the much-publicized interdiction of the North Korean freighter, *So San* in December of 2002. The U.S. suspected this freighter of transporting WMD materials from the East Asia region to a Middle East destination. The vessel was tracked by a cooperative group of multinational ships in the area. As the *So San* approached Yemen, the U.S. kept in constant contact with the multinational ships tracking it while at the same time working with the government of Spain to plan the interdiction, boarding and inspection. Upon boarding the ship, it became immediately obvious to the Spanish interdiction team that the *So San's* registry was a flimsy attempt to camouflage what was really on board--Scud missile parts bound for Yemen.²¹

The success of this operation wasn't based on luck. It was based on years of cooperation and understanding between U.S. and Spanish military forces under the auspices of NATO exercises and operations. It was also based on relationships and trust between interagency

personnel and international partners which had been cultivated over years of working together. None of this happens overnight and in this particular case, it was fortunate the right people were in place at the right time. This won't always be the case in future operations. Some interdictions may require multiple COCOMs, national agencies and international partners to come together quickly who have never exercised or worked together before. Indeed, the newest National Military Strategy takes this into account in its statement, "In many cases PSI activities will involve U.S. Government agencies and international partners that may not be familiar with U.S. military planning and exercise procedures, requiring commands to adjust to meet the unique requirements of these exercises and operations."²² To further bolster the argument for effective PSI command and control, a COCOM commander, stated, "...our speed of command must operate inside the decision timeline of the enemy. We must streamline national and coalition command and control processes to prevent those supporting elements from dictating operational timelines."²³ Thinking about interdiction opportunities in only operational terms is not enough. Careful thought and consideration to the political ramifications must also be weighed into the decision.

Making the decision to interdict a shipment of suspect material may seem simple enough on the surface--bad guys shipping bad stuff to other bad guys need to be stopped. However, the political climate at the time may dictate if action should be taken. For example, if the targeted country is currently engaged in some form of arms negotiations or other politically sensitive talks, an interdiction may cause significant complications to those proceedings. To further compound the problem of interdiction, PSI partners will also have to consider actions on shipments which may have legitimate use in the civilian sector. Stopping and potentially seizing a shipment of legal dual use materials could foment a negative international response.

Therefore, the PSI decision makers must consider issues across the spectrum (political, diplomatic, military, legal) before giving the go-ahead for an interdiction operation. With multiple players involved, this is yet another argument for a viable command and control structure to encompass all of these participants as well as provide a forum for the sharing of critical information. Although the number of PSI participants has grown tremendously, there are still nations who vehemently oppose its use and will not hesitate to challenge its legality on the world stage. A good example is North Korea's attitude toward the PSI. In fact, North Korea has threatened to become even more difficult during the highly publicized six party talks if they are subjected to an interdiction.²⁴ In a case such as this, the PSI partners cannot afford to have a breakdown in command and control. The various experts involved have to be in constant communication with one another watching the situation carefully and evaluating the environment to ensure the interdiction doesn't cause more harm than good.

One of the original supporters of the PSI, then Undersecretary of State John Bolton, seemed to understand the importance of this in his Washington File interview in December of 2003 after several successful interdiction exercises with PSI partners. He stated the exercises are critical to partners, "developing a command-and-control capability for all of the PSI participants that will then be transmitted ... across all the pertinent combatant commands, so that people can get the benefit of the exercises ... [and] when they're confronted with the possibility of an interdiction in the real world, they're not starting from scratch,"²⁵ Unfortunately, it would appear since the inception of the PSI over three years ago, the development of a well thought out command and control architecture has been slow in its development.

It is imperative that the command and control issue is at the forefront of PSI planning--

especially for military resources involved. This has never been more important as the PSI moves toward air and land interdictions to complement our already formidable maritime operations. Although the PSI international membership continues to grow, it is probably unlikely an interdiction operation would occur without some involvement from the U.S. This puts the regional COCOMs in a familiar position--on the front lines. Thus, the COCOMs will need the appropriate resources to work seamlessly with experts not only within the DoD and other U.S. agencies, but with various foreign governmental entities as well. In many cases this work must be done in a very time compressed and politically charged environment. The PSI prides itself on being lean and mean--that is, the speed at which it can respond to information related to suspicious cargo transshipments without the baggage of an international conglomeration is one of its strengths.²⁶ But as mentioned previously, continued growth could potentially bring with it mass confusion at the operational level. This underscores the need for an organization, such as USSTRATCOM, within the DoD to take the reins in the development of a command and control structure that is robust enough to handle interdiction operations worldwide, but agile enough to be able to respond quickly and work effectively with multiple national and international actors.

To address this problem, USSTRATCOM as the supporting COCOM, should work to develop cells of interdiction expertise within each regional COCOM. These respective cells should contain experts well versed in that specific region. For example, if information concerning a shipment of WMD related materials comes to light, the cell would quickly convene in the affected COCOM to review the intelligence and make a determination on whether to act and depending on type of cargo, who will lead the operation. The cell would consist of political, diplomatic, legal, military and law enforcement experts all analyzing the

political and diplomatic environment currently surrounding the nations involved in the suspected proliferation. Additionally, legal experts would review the pertinent laws of the nation where the planned interdiction operation would take place. And finally, military and law enforcement experts would develop a course of action to conduct the actual operation or perhaps provide support for a foreign partner. All the while, representatives from the cell in the affected region is in communication with other regional cells keeping them abreast of the situation.

If we can assume the U.S. will likely be involved in a majority of interdiction operations at some level, without a viable command and control structure at the COCOM level to focus the assets, PSI runs the risk of collapsing under its own weight.

USSTRATCOM Takes the Lead

However, some would argue that DoD has been extremely proactive in attempting to get its arms around the command and control issue in support of the PSI. On 6 January, 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld formally named the Commander, USSTRATCOM, as the DoD's lead Combatant Command for combating WMD and is responsible for integration and synchronization of all DoD activities related to combating WMD. Key to this responsibility is USSTRATCOM's supporting role to other COCOMs in the execution of WMD operations while at the same time responding to Presidential directives to strike at strategic targets around the globe. Moreover, recent changes to the Unified Command Plan assigned USSTRATCOM the additional missions of DoD information operations, global strike, integrated missile defense and global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).²⁷ Putting these missions under the umbrella of USSTRATCOM, particularly C4ISR, should help streamline transfer of sensitive

intelligence on WMD shipments to regional COCOMs to aid in the speed of response.

As the lead COCOM, USSTRATCOM is currently taking on many initiatives. For example, USSTRATCOM is assessing organizational structures as well as functional areas surrounding interdiction requirements. Additionally, USSTRATCOM is working closely with U.S. Joint Forces Command to explore concepts and training and exercise capabilities needed for future interdiction operations. But perhaps the most significant step taken by USSTRATCOM has been the establishment of the new Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) in partnership with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). This center helps focus the specialized skills needed to tackle the complex issues of WMD interdiction. Moreover, USSTRATCOM has undergone a number of other organizational transformations to support a command structure more streamlined and functionally aligned. This has already paid dividends not only in the interaction between DoD organizations, but has also served to greatly strengthen relationships between national agencies such as the National Security Agency.²⁸

USSTRATCOM has also spearheaded a number of meetings of international PSI experts to discuss interdiction concepts and enhance capabilities of PSI members to conduct operations. The meeting in March of 2005 drew nearly 200 participants from 19 different countries illustrating just how the PSI has grown in just a few short years.²⁹ This meeting also served to discuss the importance of training exercises between PSI participants. Multilateral exercises are critically important for members to practice the tactics and familiarize themselves with the various operational and legal issues that they will encounter. Periodic exercises are especially important with non-NATO PSI partners. With these partners, there is not the luxury of an established command structure and rules of engagement

that have been finely honed and practiced extensively with other PSI partners who also happen to belong to NATO. With NATO partners, interdiction operations are easier for the obvious reason of familiarity and a common set of objectives.

PSI exercises have steadily involved more and more PSI partners and have begun to introduce the complexities of air and land interdiction scenarios. Last year air interdiction exercises were hosted by Spain and Norway, Poland hosted a land interdiction exercise and maritime interdictions were hosted by Singapore and the United Kingdom.³⁰ All told, over 40 nations have played in over a dozen PSI exercises. The exercises not only provide forums to determine operational responses, but perhaps more importantly, serve to establish individual relationships between PSI experts. All of the aforementioned steps currently being taken by USSTRATCOM as the lead COCOM for combating WMD are all appropriate steps in the right direction to develop capabilities and effective command and control mechanisms required for successful interdiction operations.

Even so, there exists an additional argument that despite the advances by USSTRATCOM and PSI participants, a robust command and control infrastructure may not be needed. After all, the PSI considers itself less a formal organization and more a cooperative process. Therefore, a stringent command and control structure could be perceived by some as cumbersome and an impediment to the spirit and intent of the PSI.³¹ Indeed, there have been a number of successful interdictions *without* a formal command and control structure in support of PSI. In these cases, however, interdictions have been accomplished in cooperation with a small number of players, national and international, both of which had been involved with previous PSI exercises. It's hard to argue with these successes, but the common denominator in all of them was the fact that all participants knew their respective roles--in

essence, implied command and control.

Conclusion

The proliferation of WMD and related materials is not a new phenomenon. However, the attacks of September 11th and the subsequent Long War have cast a new light on how the international community perceives the threat of WMD. The threat is real and more prevalent than ever. Numerous nations have responded by accepting the PSI and adopting its principles. The U.S., as the founding nation, has taken many of the correct steps necessary to continue the effectiveness of the PSI by committing appropriate resources and training focused on interdiction operations. Doctrinally, the direction is clear from the national level down to the operational level on the importance of combating WMD, specifically through the use of active interdiction measures. From a resource perspective, more is obviously always better, but the hard truth is the equipment and specialists required for interdiction operations fall into the low density/high demand category. Combatant Commanders must be cognizant of this fact and not spread their high value resources too thin. But the advantage of the PSI is the fact that the collective capability of the members can be leveraged when needed and Combatant Commanders must use them to their advantage. This leads into the final and most important point of this paper--how does it all come together? How does the PSI put the doctrine and resources into practice? It comes down to effective command and control. USSTRATCOM must make the establishment of command and control for the supported COCOMs the top priority. The establishment of interdiction cells within the COCOMs that are populated with regional experts could be a step in the right direction to ensure operations are accomplished efficiently and within the bounds of national and international laws. These cells would also serve to establish critical nodes of information sharing--all kinds of

information among PSI partners. This will aid not only in combating WMD but also bolster invaluable trust and cooperation. To date, great strides have been made to date in the area of command and control, but its importance cannot be overstated. To rely solely on an ad hoc cooperative process to stem the tide of WMD proliferation is risky proposition. History is littered with examples of initiatives and operations that have failed due to poor command and control--the PSI is too important to become one of them.

The PSI has been referred to as the greatest achievement of the State Department during Secretary Powell's tenure.³² A powerful statement to be sure. While the PSI is but one part of a much larger scheme in the fight against WMD proliferation, it is one worth expanding as far as we possibly can. The payoff from the PSI is astounding--halting the transfer of dangerous weapons to dangerous people with hostile intent while cultivating an environment of cooperation and understanding among international partners.

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