The Role of Culture on Joint Operations

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The Role of Culture on Joint Operations

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ______________________

(13 FEB 2006)
Abstract

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Multiple United States (U.S.) military after-action reports (AAR) and lessons learned studies from Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and most recently Afghanistan and Iraq, have consistently pointed to a lack of cultural awareness as a major impediment to mission success. Commanders at all echelons have continually acknowledged that cultural awareness would have reduced battlefield friction and the fog of war. Better cultural awareness and cultural intelligence would have given their commands the much needed insight into the intent of supportive, non-hostile, and hostile actors in their battlespace reducing battlefield friction and allowing them to more effectively accomplish their mission.
Why are Cultural Awareness and Cultural Intelligence Important?

… if we had better understood the Iraqi culture and mindset, our war plans would have been even better than they were, [and] the plan for the post-war period and all of its challenges would have been far better…we must improve our cultural awareness…to inform the policy process. Our policies would benefit from this not only in Iraq, but…elsewhere, where we will have long-term strategic relationships and potential military challenges for many years to come.¹ (Ike Skeleton in a letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.)

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intent of supportive, non-hostile, and hostile actors in their battlespace reducing battlefield friction and allowing them to more effectively accomplish their mission.

Recently, traditional methods of war fighting have proven inadequate in the asymmetric battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. As acknowledged by the AARs, cultural knowledge has become imperative in the application of the full spectrum of military operations. U.S. technology, training, and doctrine that were designed to counter the Soviet threat and that worked so well for 50 years, are not designed for low-intensity counterinsurgency operations where civilians mingle freely with combatants in complex urban terrain, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The same Cold War technology that countered the Soviet Union allowed coalition forces to quickly defeat Saddam Hussein. Since Phase IV Operations (Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations) (SSTR) have begun in Iraq however, coalition forces have been fighting a complex war against an enemy they do not yet understand. The organizational structure of the insurgency is not hierarchical, but based on tribal and family affiliations. Their tactics are not symmetric as are conventional operations, but asymmetrical. Their weapons are not tanks and fighter aircraft, but improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombers, and the AK-47. They do not abide by the Laws of War, nor do they appear to have any informal rules of engagement.²

Countering the insurgency in Iraq requires cultural and social knowledge of the adversary. Yet, none of the elements of U.S. national power -- diplomatic, information, military, or economic -- explicitly take adversary culture into account in the formation or execution of policy. This knowledge gap throughout the U.S. government has one similar root cause - the almost total absence of anthropology within the national-security establishment. “The lack of anthropology in the national-security arena since the Vietnam
War has had grave consequences for countering the insurgency in Iraq, particularly because political policy and military operations based on partial and incomplete cultural knowledge are often worse than no cultural knowledge at all.” With this failure at the strategic level, how can the U.S. military be successful at the operational level of war?

Lieutenant General (LTG) William S. Wallace, the first commanding general of the U.S. Army forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom, had considered the adaptive nature of the enemy. Apparently he had not expected the intensity of the insurgency that followed decisive operations in Iraq. The Army and its sister services and coalition partners discovered that, contrary to assumptions, defeating Saddam Hussein’s forces and seizing Baghdad did not produce a decisive victory. The initial assessment that the center of gravity was the Iraqi Republican Guard, Baghdad, the Ba’ath Party or possibly Saddam Hussein was a good assessment for phase I-III operations; but this center of gravity did not apply to Phase IV Operations or the insurgency that followed. During the critical transition between combat operations (Phase III) and SSTR operations (Phase IV), U.S. planners clearly made the mistake of assuming Iraqis would view the world through lenses similar to our own. It can be argued that U.S. planning efforts for Phase IV were built on numerous faulty assumptions of Iraqi culture and mirror imaging of U.S. military and social culture. Coalition planners falsely attributed American perspectives and American motivations to the Iraqis. This resulted in an unexpected outcome, a failed quick decisive victory, and a prolonged insurgency.

The center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations is the population. Therefore, understanding the local society and gaining its support is critical to success. For U.S. forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs. (U.S. Army FMI 3-07.22)
Over the last 3 years, numerous senior leaders within the U.S. military and DOD have endorsed the view that cultural knowledge of the adversary is critical to mission success.

In August 2004, Major General (MG) Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (retired), wrote an article for the U.S. Naval Institute's *Proceedings* magazine that opposed the commonly held view within the U.S. military that success in war is best achieved by overwhelming technological advantage. Scales argues that the type of conflict we are now witnessing in Iraq requires "an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation." In October 2004, Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force Transformation, concluded that "knowledge of one's enemy and his culture and society may be more important than knowledge of his order of battle." In that same article, then U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2) of the U.S. Army and current Director of the National Security Agency, LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA, acknowledges the fact that the Intelligence Community within the DOD is ill-prepared to fully take on the role of subject matter experts for cultural or social factors and that significant hurdles and training remain for intelligence soldiers to effectively assume the task. He acknowledges the fact that the intelligence community’s “symmetric approach (to collecting and analyzing intelligence) is … also biased on how we do intelligence." An asymmetric approach to intelligence collection and analysis of the continuous emerging asymmetric threat continues to be the greatest challenge. In November 2004, the Navy also acknowledged the importance of culture in war fighting. The Office of Naval Research and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored the Adversary Cultural Knowledge and National Security Conference. This was the first major DOD conference on the social sciences since 1962. Finally, following his experiences in Iraq, LTG Wallace, now the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Commander, was interviewed in March 2005 and he discussed the importance of culture at the operational level of war.

The final thing I would mention is the importance of culture to military operations. It’s not just something nice to understand, it’s not just something nice to know, it’s not just the ability to converse with people in their languages—it’s being able to understand cultures and how those cultures impact military operations. And the more dramatically different a culture might be from our own, the more important it becomes to attain a high degree of cultural acuity within our military. This is something that we are beginning to understand in Afghanistan and Iraq, but something that may apply to some future environment as well. Additionally, cultural acuity must be resident all the way down to the lowest-ranking members of the organization. It is they who normally have the most direct contact with the civilian population and therefore have the opportunity to make cultural mistakes or take cultural advantage of the situation—and that advantage or those mistakes have an impact on our ability to operate.10

**Defining Cultural Intelligence**

One can only fully understand cultural intelligence by first understanding the terms culture and cultural awareness. First, culture may be defined as a shared set of traditions, belief systems, and behaviors. *The Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* defines culture as: “the integrated pattern of human knowledge, beliefs, and behavior that depends upon man’s capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations… the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group.”11

Culture is shaped by history, religion, ethnic identity, language, and nationality. A society’s culture will continuously evolve in response to variables that include internal or external pressures and influences. It is important to note that culture is learned through socialization and is not inherent or genetic. “The word ‘culture’ is often used loosely in everyday language to describe a number of quite distinct concepts. What all of these concepts have in common is the implication that culture is an abstract entity which [sic] involves a
number of usually man-made, collective and shared artifacts, behavioral patterns, values or other concepts which taken together form the culture as a whole."\textsuperscript{12}

Cultural awareness is a term commonly used throughout the DOD, U.S. Other Government Agencies (OGAs), and U.S. and International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). It can be defined as the process of incorporating cultural study into military operations. Cultural awareness is a knowledge of all cultural factors and interpreting which ones are important for a given situation and why. An operational commander must gain and maintain cultural awareness in his Joint Operations Area (JOA) during the full range of military operations. Specifically, during any low intensity conflict (LIC), stability and support operation (SASO), or Phase IV (SSTR) following major combat operations, a joint force will be more likely to succeed if it deeply understands the asymmetric operating environment. The Joint Forces Commander must make the link between any operational action and the cultural reaction.

Cultural awareness during military operations can also be commonly referred to as cultural terrain (one more element of the physical terrain).\textsuperscript{13}

Cultural terrain parallels geographic terrain for military considerations: Just as a hill or saddle effects maneuver, we find that religion, perceptions, and language effect maneuver warfare by helping us find centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and assist in campaign planning and the proper allocation of resources.\textsuperscript{14}

Just as physical terrain is analyzed for advantages and disadvantages, so must cultural terrain. A coalition or joint force must continuously be cognizant of the cultural terrain during all military operations.\textsuperscript{15}

An operational commander and his staff will analyze this cultural terrain through incorporating as many military cultural factors (MCFs) as possible into the joint intelligence cycle. This interjection and analysis of these MCFs is cultural intelligence. Cultural
intelligence can, therefore, be defined as a product of in-depth analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviors. It assists the commander in determining why people and groups act as they do and how they think. It also provides a baseline for designing successful strategies to interact with supportive, hostile, or non-hostile people.

The challenge for the senior intelligence officer and the commander is to identify which MCFs are important and why. This in turn will provide them with initial guidelines for collection, primarily through Human Intelligence (HUMINT) or Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Using a baseline of Cultural Awareness, commanders direct this collection of appropriate raw cultural data, which is then processed with other data (geographic, military, technical, etc.) by intelligence analysts. The resulting products should represent not only the physical nature of the area of responsibility (AOR) but also the cultural terrain.16

Following analysis by trained cultural analysts, several products should be developed by the intelligence production staff for dissemination throughout the Joint Force. Some of these cultural intelligence products are focused analytical reports that include MCFs, constantly updated biographies on key players (hostile, supportive, and non-hostile), atmospheric reports on each area; failed infrastructure and security reports, and intelligence reports (INTREPS) based on cultural information gathered from Civil Affairs, NGOs, commanders, and soldiers.17

Cultural intelligence is more than a simple compilation of demographic statistics. It must provide the operational commander with an understanding of not only how other groups act, but why. It also gives the operational commander and his staff the knowledge to
anticipate reactions to selected courses of action during the planning process. Cultural intelligence, if considered and analyzed properly, will provide commanders, at every level, additional knowledge in guiding their actions. Cultural analysis is a continual process; just like the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), cultural intelligence is never complete.^{18}

If properly focused, cultural intelligence will lead to an intimate knowledge of an adversary (or allies) motivation, intent, will, and tactical methods. Intelligence should always drive maneuver and this does not change with cultural intelligence. Cultural intelligence, for historical purposes only, does not work. The commander must fuse and incorporate this cultural awareness into the operational planning process. The cultural intelligence gathered from focused collection and detailed analysis should be included into a cohesive plan or operation (or cultural campaign) to reach the desired results of a targeted population.

Just as we have an operational campaign plan, we should have a cultural campaign plan that plots a “way forward” with each group, tribe, government agency, etc. in any military environment. Ideally, the cultural campaign plan would be an integral part of the operational campaign plan. Any campaign planning requires input from all staff sections; cultural planning is not just a “G-2” or CA task. This is how Military Cultural Competence is “operationalized” to help win the fight.^{19}

Cultural intelligence should provide the foundation of knowledge for all types of operations in foreign lands and for all levels of war. The commander must not only understand the culture of the people within the area in which he is operating, the commander must also understand the culture of the organizations, armies, and people that will be part of any coalition force. The local culture and their reaction to any coalition, NGOs, OGAs, host nations, or other regional power brokers are critical for a Joint Force Commander to understand and leverage.
The Current State of Cultural Awareness and Cultural Intelligence within Each Service

A logical argument may be forwarded that culture is very much in the front of every services minds and that the current effort is sufficient. The Army and Marine Corps have long recognized the importance of culture. The Army established a Foreign Area Officer program that has been in high demand throughout the 20th and 21st Centuries. The Army has recently begun a Red Team Training Program at the University of Foreign Military and Culture Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas that will train cultural advisors and teams for commanders at the tactical and operational level. “Intellectual and culturally smart red teams will add value to concept development, experimentation, wargaming, orders, and plans.”

The Marine Corps established the Small Wars Center of Excellence that has hosted numerous Joint Cultural Intelligence Seminars for over 10 years and has also established the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in November 2000 as well as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) in May 2005. CETO was established “at the direction of the Senate Armed Service's Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities out of a growing concern for the wide range of security challenges the U.S. will face in the 21st Century. CETO, in conjunction with the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, conducts Cultural Intelligence Seminars for deploying forces, providing timely and tailored training focused on cultural aspects of specific countries and regions or functional issues.”

CAOCL ensures Marines are equipped with operationally relevant regional, cultural, and language knowledge to allow them to plan and operate successfully in the joint and combined expeditionary environment. Within the last 12 months, the U.S. Navy has established the Navy’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program as a legitimate and permanent career field and
the U.S. Air Force established the International Affairs Specialist Program to augment their
long established Foreign Area Officer Program.

At the operational level of war, Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted significant
gaps in each service component’s cultural awareness training and cultural intelligence
collection and analysis. Each service, government agency, and OGA operating in Iraq, has
developed individual tactics, techniques, and procedures for cultural intelligence and
awareness. This mentality has proven completely inadequate at the operational level of war
and precludes the Joint Force Commander from developing any cohesive cultural operation
or campaign plan. In many cases in Afghanistan and Iraq, each service continues to operate
with cultural training and doctrine that is still ad-hoc, out dated, stove piped, and inadequate;
to the point, where any contribution to operational planning is minimal. Although each of
these programs is defined and operating as planned, they are deficient in their ability to train
and provide processes for the joint force in the ever-changing asymmetric operating
environment. Even if each individual service initiative was successful, there exists no
unifying joint doctrine.

U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and the DOD Intelligence Community have
reevaluated culture and its role in the intelligence cycle. With the rewrite of JP 2-01, Joint
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, in
2004, culture was recognized as a key element within the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (JIPB) process. Culture is listed as a critical intelligence requirement and broken
down into seven sub-categories and defined as:

(1) Demographics/Culture 1. Identify languages, dialects, ethnic and tribal
composition (both national and target area).
(2) Demographics/Culture 2. Describe customs (social, weapons, religious, cultural,
mores).
(3) Demographics/Culture 3. Identify tensions (regional and national; causes, intensity, degree, and exploitability by the United States or opposition).
(4) Demographics/Culture 4. Identify foreign influences (sources, leaders, themes, influence on government, unions, students, insurgents and general public).
(5) Demographics/Culture 5. Characterize attitude of civilians and civilian groups to U.S. involvement (friendly, unfriendly, or neutral), and for planned U.S. operations (support, oppose, tolerate).
(6) Demographics/Culture 6. Estimate assistance available to U.S. forces (extent and capabilities, laborers, linguists, liaison, analysts, administrators); determine attitude of neutral population toward host country, threat policies, and actions.
(7) Demographics/Culture 7. Determine probable reactions of leadership and population in country to U.S. UW or other SOF activities. Determine how a country (government and population) will treat those indigenous personnel who participated in wartime UW or SOF activities in a post-conflict environment.23

Although culture and its role in the JIPB are redefined in JP 2-01, it has only scratched the surface of its criticality. Joint doctrine identifies it, and even attempts to define it, but it does not begin to integrate it into the planning cycle and into joint operations.

Although some advances have been made in cultural awareness and cultural intelligence at the individual service level, they are not sufficient for the current asymmetric operational environment and are still simply emerging concepts.

General Anthony Zinni (USMC, Retired), former commander of Operations Restore Hope, Continue Hope, and United Shield, acknowledges the importance of cultural intelligence to an operational commander. In his vast experience of over 35 years in the Marine Corps from Vietnam to the Middle East, he has assessed and identified the cultural shortfalls within the intelligence community and the planning process at the tactical and operational levels of war.

What we need is cultural intelligence. What makes them [the faction leaders and people] tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality? What you need to know isn’t what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you.24
**Recommendations**

The Department of Defense, at the very least, must concentrate its effort on resourcing and developing various joint cultural initiatives in order to support the Joint Force Commander; such initiatives should include a joint and inter-agency training program. Another logical initiative could be the development of an unclassified cultural awareness database that each participating joint force or agency would be able to access and update. Lastly, the intelligence community and USJFCOM need to modify current joint doctrine in order to account for the significant role that culture plays in the entire intelligence cycle and joint operational planning.

*Joint and Interagency Training Program*

DOD must formalize cultural training at the leader and advisor level and at the operational unit level. Such a program would be similar to the Marine Corps CAOCL or Army Red Team program but would be required by every service and DOD agency. Once trained in the program, individuals would then be assigned to a Joint Force Headquarters and would be responsible for providing cultural expertise and advice to the commander and to his staff. The end state would be for each operational commander to be fielded a team of resident cultural anthropologists.

The training and resident knowledge for this leader and advisor program would initially come from the academic world. Anthropologists, linguists, historians, economists, and regional and cultural experts will be crucial in providing the depth of understanding necessary that will lay the foundation for successful cultural training to the joint forces.

DOD must also formalize cultural training at the individual and the unit level. DOD may cite examples of preparatory, home station cultural training for individuals and units
from the U.S. Army or Marine Corps, but must make it mandatory across the services and DOD agencies. Ultimately, it would be the individual service responsibility to validate this lowest level cultural training in preparation for service within a specific joint operations area.

There are many other opportunities for formal individual cultural training during the career of an enlisted member or an officer. Mandatory acculturation across initial entry training for officers and enlisted members for each service, enlisted professional development courses, and various levels of mandated Professional Military Education and Joint Professional Military Education must be required. Ample opportunity for this training exists; DOD simply needs to formulate the training program and formalize the requirement. DOD must refrain from teaching specific lessons from the current war and teach officers and enlisted members how to think culturally as an anthropologist.

Cultural Database

Currently, some OGAs, U.S. services, and coalition partner military forces actively study and database cultural factors on specific countries, regions, or people. These databases are often limited in scope and further, are outdated and focused narrowly on the needs of that specific element. No single agency or department is, however, developing, maintaining, or sharing a centralized database of detailed cultural factors at the unclassified level. There are a few databases at the classified level that are shared by some of the intelligence community. Collecting and consolidating cultural information into a central unclassified database is a logical way to provide joint and coalition forces with cultural factors that can be used to support operations. Each participating agency and military force will have the capability to access and update the database as cultural factors are collected and analyzed. This database would also provide a reach back capability to subject matter experts out of theater; allowing
individuals in theater to reach back to civilian institutions or educators with particular skills in cultural anthropology, regional studies, language, or culture. This unclassified database would be considered an enormous tool in developing a common cultural operating picture for the joint force commander.

**Joint Cultural Intelligence Doctrine**


Rarely are there even references in the joint publication to the role of culture in joint operations. It is, however, referred to in JP 3-07 as one of many essential elements of information that drives collection during MOOTW.

Intelligence collection in MOOTW, however, might require a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. Information collection and analysis in MOOTW must often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered in war. It will require a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. It is only through an understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervenor can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive, do in fact have the intended effect.  

Although culture is referenced in JP 2-01 and JP 3-07, they only begin to impart the criticality that culture plays during joint operations. The joint publications lack the process of how to integrate culture into the planning cycle and into joint operations. Joint doctrine needs to define the procedures for the collection and analysis of military cultural factors; the indications and warnings associated with cultural missteps; and finally, the interjection of
this analysis into developing cultural operations or cultural campaigns for the joint force commander. This new intelligence doctrine should emphasize the role of the senior joint force intelligence officer (J2) in defining the cultural terrain impacting not only the Joint Operations Area (JOA) but also the Joint Force Command’s Area of Interest and must emphasize the fact that cultural IPB will never be complete.

This redefined joint cultural doctrine should not be completely new doctrine or defined as a separate process. It should be an integrated element within the current all-source intelligence doctrine and the joint operational doctrine for MOOTW. Furthermore, it should incorporate all cultural factors and interactions into the commander’s estimate. This fusion, like all other aspects of the mission analysis process, will allow the commander to make the best informed decisions.

Conclusion

When cultural intelligence is leveraged properly it will enable U.S. forces to more successfully interact with foreigners and facilitate mission objectives. Success will flow from the ability of culturally informed leaders to think and adapt faster than the enemy. Proper cultural intelligence and cultural analysis will also produce an individual that thrives in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unfamiliar cultural circumstances.

The complexity of today’s operational environment requires leaders to view problems through multiple lenses. Ambiguous, non-traditional adversaries seek new means to defeat us. Events in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have unmistakably confirmed the operational environment as being dynamic in nature. Everyday, our adversaries rapidly adapt, requiring us to reassess how they think about themselves, their environment, and how they view our force, goals, and intentions.
Senior leaders in all areas of the U.S. government, including DOD, have acknowledged our weakness in assessing culture and its effects on joint operations. There are numerous articles, books, papers, AARs and lessons learned available from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Each has identified cultural awareness, cultural intelligence, and cultural training as being inadequate. Yet, each rotation of new forces into the various theaters experiences the same issues of deficient cultural awareness, training, and analysis. From top to bottom, cultural training, cultural doctrine, and cultural systems need to be reevaluated by U.S. Joint Forces Command, DOD, and each service in order to ensure their relevance on the asymmetric battlefield.
End Notes


3 Ibid, 2.


8 Ibid, 21.

9 McFate, 1.


14 Ibid, slide 7.
15 Ibid, slides 7 and 10.

16 Ibid, slides 47 and 49.

17 Ibid, slide 49.


19 Connable, slide 49.


21 From the USMC Center for Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities homepage at http://www.ceto.quantico.usmc.mil/about.asp.

22 From the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning homepage at http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/.


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U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 2-01. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*
