There are both conventional and intuitive ways to measure success in Iraq. Both types of measures when analyzed together give a much better picture of the progress being made in Iraq vice relying on one kind of indicator. Conventional indicators can also provide misleading information when not viewed in a comprehensive holistic fashion. This paper proposes some non conventional measures of effectiveness which can be predictive in nature when viewed from the right perspective. Iraqi moods and attitudes are hard to judge and it is imperative that all indicators are analyzed together to get a true picture for decision makers.
Finding the Right Measures of Effectiveness for Rebuilding the State of Iraq

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

There are both conventional and intuitive ways to measure success in Iraq. Both types of measures when analyzed together give a much better picture of the progress being made in Iraq vice relying on one kind of indicator. Conventional indicators can also provide misleading information when not viewed in a comprehensive holistic fashion. This paper proposes some non-conventional measures of effectiveness which can be predictive in nature when viewed from the right perspective. Iraqi moods and attitudes are hard to judge and it is imperative that all indicators are analyzed together to get a true picture for decision makers.
“Captain, I can tell you how many bridges have been built, the progress of infrastructure programs, schools built, and a whole host of other conventional measures of effectiveness. What I am most concerned with are the things we have a hard time measuring; the attitudes and moods of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people will decide the fate of their nation”

General Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 9 May 2005, The Pentagon

‘Most senators monitor the attacks and casualties to Americans in Iraqi, that’s a good indicator of what’s going on in Iraqi.”

Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 10 May 2005, The Capitol

The struggle in Iraq continues to be costly in terms of both men and treasure. The U.S. Central Command has been charged with rebuilding many of the institutions in Iraq and has become the de facto leading and coordinating agency in many other related areas. The overall outcome in Iraq is a top priority for both the State Department and the Department of Defense (CENTCOM); having been given guidance from the National Command Authority. State-building depends on a vast array of factors but if leading indicators can be developed and practically applied that point to identifiable outcomes, decision makers can make more effective resource allocation choices. State-building by the United States has a long history which has not always been successful.

This paper proposes measures of effectiveness for progress toward the stated objectives in Iraq. To some readers these measures will seem to be rather unconventional but I believe they are in fact sound, practical indicators as to the probability for a successful end state in Iraq. I argue that intuitive and anecdotal measures of effectiveness provide better indicators of progress in Iraq than more traditional measures of effectiveness typically based on quantifiable measurements. Each proposed measure of effectiveness presented in this
paper is directly tied to a goal for the rebuilding of Iraq as established by the NCA and the State Department.

Addressed in this paper are the problems and issues of state-building, not those of nation building. Nations are not built, they grow over time. History shows us that a nation may take centuries to form and no new self governing state becomes a nation overnight. State-building has been successful in some instances where the conditions were conducive to the mission and in most cases had plenty of support from neighboring states. There are achievable state-building goals that are within reach and decision makers need to make crucial decisions in the near term about the paths to these goals, decisions that must be informed by practical measures of effectiveness. The primary reason to develop good measures of effectiveness is to facilitate the decisions required for properly investing resources. These measures should also be used to evaluate if a real impact was made and to know when the effort has produced the desired results. There will obviously be times where resources will be shifted from one priority to another. Some programs or institutions may become self-sustaining at which time it may be prudent to shift resources. Decision makers will always be looking for the right point to reduce presence without setting the state up for future failure.

State-building can be a predecessor to nation building. Since World War II the United States has been involved in everything from rebuilding successful nation states such as Germany and Japan to attempting to build a basic working state infrastructure in Somalia and Afghanistan which, arguably, have never constituted states. In some cases the U.S. has tried to build a basic democratic functioning state while in others the attempt has been to build a functioning economic and political structure. “The cases of Germany and Japan set a
standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been matched. For the next 40 years, there were few attempts to replicate these early successes. During the Cold War, U.S. policy emphasized containment, deterrence, and maintenance of the status quo. Efforts were made to promote democratic and free market values but generally without the element of compulsion.”6 The U.S. has dealt with failed states or states that needed to be rebuilt in a variety of ways with different agendas, but it seems that the only consistent factor has been that all state-building attempts have been costly endeavors.

In both Somalia and Haiti the U.S. entered the operations with limited objectives. It soon found that many more resources were needed than those initially allocated to achieve those limited objectives. Perhaps in the cold light of day, the objectives really were not so limited after all. In Somalia the humanitarian goals the U.S. set became too expensive in terms of men and treasure. With the help of the U.S.’s European allies, in Bosnia the goal was to obtain a multiethnic state which might provide some useful information for building a multiethnic state in Iraq. “In Iraq, the United States has taken on the task with a scope comparable to the transformational attempts still under way in Bosnia and Kosovo and a scale comparable only to the earlier U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan. Nation-building it appears, is the inescapable responsibility of the world’s only superpower.”7

“According to the great German sociologist Max Weber, states are institutions that exert a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence in a given territory.”8 U.S. policy makers have obviously asked the COCOM to do much more than simply insure that the new Iraqi state is the legitimate means of violence within its borders.9 The President has stated that he wants Iraq to be a fully functioning democratic state which will be a shining example for other states in the Middle East. In order to meet the President’s objectives the COCOM
has some very ambitious goals, which at the very least will take a lot of time, effort, money and unfortunately a significant loss of life.

Success in state building is largely dependent on the amount of money and commitment that a state building nation puts toward the program. Per Capita external assistance has varied greatly from state-building efforts in Germany and Japan to Bosnia and Kosovo. The key will always be to make the right allocation in regard to the internal environment. Today the Congressional Budget Office predicts that the cost of rebuilding Iraq will cost between 100 and 150 billion dollars making it the most costly reconstruction effort in history-this for a country with the population roughly the size of California’s. Even with substantial oil revenue the Iraqi government is projected to run a deficit for years to come.

Every stated objective for post war Iraq will be a politically charged issue because of the high cost in money and men both directly and counted in terms of opportunity costs and long-term effects on the military. Each state building attempt inevitably has unique characteristics; however, there appears to be several basic objectives the U.S. is working towards in Iraq.

1. Iraq must be able to protect itself from foreign intervention both externally and internally.

2. Iraq needs to have a fully functioning economy which can supply citizens with basic needs without having to rely on another nation’s direct financial support.

3. The State of Iraq must respect basic human rights and the rule of law.

4. A democratic form of government is the preferred system for which the U.S. has attempted laid the groundwork for in Iraq.

Beyond these basic objectives, there are other intermediate and long term goals which
will have to be met to reach these broad objectives, such as a functioning health care system and a primary educational program. Some feel that the Iraqi “military, security services, and bureaucracy need to be radically reformed and purged” in order to make Iraq an effective functioning state.¹⁷

As it embarks on its most ambitious program of nation-building since 1945, the United States can learn important lessons from history. It has staked its credibility on a successful outcome in Iraq. This will require an extensive commitment of financial, personnel, and diplomatic resources over a long period of time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed. The real question for the United States should not be how soon it can leave, but rather how fast and how much to share power with Iraqis and the international community while retaining enough power to oversee an enduring transition to democracy and stability.¹⁸

State-building is not a race to see how fast a nation can extract itself from the state that is being built. “There is no quick route to nation building. Five years seems to be the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy.”¹⁹

The key to judging success or failure in Iraq will be to build measures of effectiveness which directly and indirectly point to progress in achieving the stated mission objectives. Each stated measure of effectiveness in this paper is tied to one or more of the four basic stated goals. Some indicators are very easy to measure while others are more difficult and require very careful analysis. Reliance on the wrong indicators can lead to false conclusions about objective goals. Moreover, all of the measures of effectiveness must be analyzed together to understand what the situation is and how the state-building nation can be a catalyst for true permanent change. Political policies have economic results; the state of the economy dictates the resources available for internal and external defense. In many ways, good measures of effectiveness provide both a micro and a macro view of what is going on in
the country. Rigorous analysis of appropriate measures of effectiveness can mean the difference between mission failure or success in both the long run and on the short time horizon.

It is also important to find indicators which can be successfully measured in order to evaluate progress. The importance of linking indicators together cannot be overemphasized. Different areas of the country may display very different signals. For example, the Kurdish North seems to be progressing ahead of the Sunni Triangle in terms of internal stability; but both of these factors (stability and relative lack of stability) are keys to understanding where the larger state of Iraq is heading. Successes in some parts of the country may be replicated in other areas, while some may not be due to environmental factors; a good analysis of the environment of success may point to other factors which may be influenced.

The U.S. government presently gauges success in Iraq by such traditional indicators as the number of attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi police force and military numbers, oil production, and increases in basic services such as water and food. The decision makers at home and in Iraq have substantial amounts of data but sometimes very little analysis. Moods and attitudes are best assessed by objective indicators, complemented by subjective indicators. People rarely begin to build or rebuild family lodging if they feel it will be damaged or destroyed the next day. This paper considers predictive indicators to enable the U.S. to reinforce the areas that are weak and in some cases eliminate aid altogether for areas that have reached a tipping point and have become self-sustaining.

One of the crucial conventional indicators of success is the extent of restoration of Iraq’s electrical system. The Restore Iraqi Electricity Program (RIE) had a goal of providing 4,775MW of electricity by 2004; the actual output was 4,200MW. A General Accounting
Office Report of 28 June 2004 noted that “some improvements have been made over the immediate post war levels of May 2003 but the nation as a whole has made little progress. For example, in May 2003, 7 of Iraq’s 18 governorates had 16 or more hours of electricity a day, but as of late May 2004, only one governorate in northern Iraq was at that level.” It will be important in the future that each area of the state has access to an adequate power grid, not just the areas Saddam chose to build an electrical power infrastructure. The U.S. has pledged 12.1 billion dollars to increase electrical generation to 8,760MW by 2007.

In the past, analysts might simply have asked how much the government built grid is producing without asking the why and how questions. As the Iraqi economy grows, the increased demand for electricity will dictate the need. If Iraqi citizens were able to buy into the program and invest in their future it might provide a more accurate way to really measure and gauge Iraqi involvement and commitment. Internal and external investment can really gauge commitment to the long term program.

An intuitive look at the Iraqi power grid might be a night satellite picture to see where the electricity is being used and by whom (by recording lighting). Low earth orbit satellites can detect activity on the ground. Economic activity based on observable events by the satellites may be useful when describing the macro picture. Satellites can also pick up smoke which might be an indicator of industrial activity. Satellite data combined with other measures of effectiveness probably give a better overall economic picture of the situation in Iraq than just one stand alone indicator.

It is not only important to analysis the correct measures of effectiveness, it is just as important to address the most pressing needs first. Water and sanitation are basic needs that must be met immediately. There is a direct cause and effect relationship between safe
drinking water/good sanitation and health. It would be illuminating to note how the Iraqis now obtain their potable water and the real status of the sanitation facilities around the nation. Bechtel reports that major water and sanitation programs need to be improved around Baghdad and Basra at the cost of more than 3 billion dollars. As one would expect, anecdotal evidence points to a wide spectrum in the quality of the water and sanitation systems throughout the country. The bottom line is that the vast majority of Iraqis are making do with what they have but the situation could be drastically improved with some resources placed in the right areas. Health costs are directly tied to this program and the amount of resources spent on the Iraqi health system could be substantial. Careful analysis of water and sanitation indicators must be in the forefront to prevent future issues.

The Congressional Budget office predicts that it will take over $6.8 billion, to restore the Iraqi water and sanitation sector to pre-1991 levels and then even more money to improve the program for an expanding population. The World Bank reports that in 2004 the demand for safe water and sanitation exceeds the available supply. Little of Iraq’s water and sanitation was damaged in the recent conflict; its problems resulted from the 1990-1991 Gulf War, long-term neglect by the Hussein regime, and looting after the recent conflict.

Oil revenues are expected to increase from 12 billion dollars in 2004 to 19.3 dollars in 2007. The money from oil may be a key to making the Iraqi government a legitimate governing body. Iraq has potentially some of the most productive oil fields in the area and the real measure of effectiveness here is not only export capability but domestic use. As the economy starts to recover a good indicator of economic activity will be the domestic consumption of Iraqi oil. The recent price jump in the cost of oil could bode well for export programs. U.N. Security Council resolution 1483 requires Iraq to pay 5 percent of its gross
revenues from oil exports to meet reparations claims from the 1990-1991 Gulf War; war reparations will continue to be a drag on the Iraqi economy for years to come unless some sort of agreement can be reached with the creditor countries. The longer regional viewpoint might call for a reprieve on some of the Iraqi debt in order to build a stable state. It really makes little sense to invest the kind of resources the coalition partners are making in Iraq and then force Iraqis to send a percentage of their revenues to other much wealthier states such as Kuwait.

Attacks on Iraqi oil facilities have directly affected Iraqi oil production and not incidentally, the global cost of oil. Stability in oil production has been viewed as a key indicator of Iraq becoming an economically successful state. Every effort must be made to keep that revenue stream open. An intuitive approach to analyzing this traditional measure of effectiveness may be to analyze not only the amount of revenue but also how the money is being spent. It has been well documented that in the past the very little Iraqi oil revenue went to improving the Iraqi people’s standard of living or even improving the economic status of the state. Key investments will have to be made in the oil producing infrastructure itself if oil revenues are going to continue in the future and help fund the legitimate Iraqi government. Until the Iraqis have the political and economic hierarchy to monitor oil revenues and outlays (U.N. results not withstanding) every effort must be made to ensure the revenues are headed to an area where a positive impact can be made. It will be of no use to produce billions of dollars of revenue if the money gets into the wrong hands.

One conventional measure of effectiveness that gets a lot of play in the press is the number of attacks against coalition forces. The number and human toll of the attacks may not be a good indicator of success. Some believe that as the terrorists observe that their
country is moving into a more stable phase it may be important to the insurgents to increase the amount of violence to bring attention to their cause. Obviously, it would be better without the attacks but one must be careful as to how to judge the effect on the overall picture in Iraq. Some would argue that neighboring powers in the Middle East have a vested interest in keeping Iraq unstable in order to further their own goals in the region and have been known to sponsor terrorist acts. Iraqis have recently held demonstrations renouncing terrorist acts within their country which may be an indicator of a national consensus against these violent acts. Another indicator of success against the insurgents might very well be how many private citizens are turning in insurgents to local authorities. When people value their environment and want to make it better it really means that they have a stake in the future of that environment.

Another very powerful indicator of Iraqi sentiment may be “actionable intelligence” provided by the local population. “The higher the percentage, the greater the likelihood that the locals share our objectives and feel secure enough to volunteer information. The goal here, of course, is to determine whether two key objectives are being met. First, are the Iraqi forces taking an increasing share of the burden in the war against the insurgents? Second, what kind of cooperation are they receiving from the people in terms of actionable intelligence? If the trends are positive, it offers considerable encouragement.” In the long run it is Iraqis that will have to fight the insurgents for the right reasons. In the past there has been evidence that some attacks against coalition forces were cash transactions between insurgent true believers and mercenaries out to make a profit. An intuitive look at this dynamic would measure whether the cost of third party or mercenary activity was on the rise; the true believer insurgent would find it more difficult to recruit people who would want to
become involved which would be a good sign for the pro-government forces. People usually value their own self interest when looking at options which could have a drastic effect on their lives.

The current monetary unit in Iraq is the new dinar which is tied to the U.S. dollar. Currency speculators have made the dinar move in value in relation to other currencies over the past year so it would be very hard to tell if the value of the dinar was an indicator of a more prosperous country. There is an indicator that more and more Iraqi citizens are using the currency for everyday transactions. As time passes the dinar may be an accurate indicator of the value the international community puts in the future of Iraq by watching how the currency is valued on the free market as compared to other local Middle East currencies.

It has been noted that some foreigners have arrived in southern Iraq looking for work within the last 3 months. This anecdotal fact may be very telling in that outsiders now consider southern Iraq safe enough to come and look for work. With the infusion of large amounts of hard currency for major projects in the country it is very reasonable to expect non-Iraqi workers to arrive on the scene as was the case in Saudi Arabia during the massive infrastructure buildup of that country several years ago. There are probably many people around the Middle East that would make Iraq home if it were a free and prosperous country. Another fact which might be interesting to analyze is the return of expatriates to their homeland of Iraq. When people with the means to live elsewhere begin to return to Iraq in significant numbers that may very well be an indication that things are truly changing within the country and that state development may have reached a tipping point where development is self-sustaining.

Some Iraqis have begun to attend sporting events in recent months. This intuitive
fact may be an indicator of not only a safer environment but also the development of free
time. Leisure activities can signal both a change in mood and priorities. Although probably
not a prime indicator on a stand alone basis it most certainly is very telling when combined
with other indicators. When people feel safe enough to gather in large groups it is a sign that
in their eyes that security in that time and place is adequate for their personal safety. Pre-war
attendance levels can be compared to a number of public gatherings to compare progress.
Success may in fact breed success in that when people see others exercising the freedom to
assemble they may in fact join.

Attendance at educational institutions is also a very telling sign. Parents do not send
their children to school unless two critical factors are taken into account. First, the parents
must feel that the school environment and the transportation route to and from the school are
safe. Second, the parents must feel that the education will be of value to the child and his or
her family in the future. At the very basic level education deals with the expectations.
Attendance at school is one of the easier metrics to measure and it really goes to the heart of
Iraqi expectations about the future. The World Bank estimates that 2.2 billion to 2.9 billion
dollars are needed to rebuild and rehabilitate existing primary and secondary schools and
purchase needed textbooks and supplies.\textsuperscript{38} There is currently no funding for higher education
and technical schools.\textsuperscript{39} Small amounts of seed money invested in the Iraqi educational
system could pay huge dividends in the future. The expectation of a better educated
generation in the future has driven many societies to put a high value on making sure the
environment is conducive to learning.

Another very telling indicator of domestic environmental improvement is the building
and rebuilding of homes. People do not spend a large part of their income and effort to build
a dwelling which they think will be destroyed or damaged. Permits for new homes or even major home repair can be tracked. It should be very easy to analyze where Iraqis are building new homes or are choosing to repair an existing home. There may be a tipping point where Iraqis feel that it is indeed time to invest in the future.

The level of crime inside Iraq can also be used to make some general conclusions. Saddam released almost all of the criminals from the Iraqi jails prior to the ending of major combat operations. Many of these criminals have continued to commit crimes against Iraqi society. The new government will be judged on how the crime issue is handled. If the lawlessness of the state is worse than when Saddam was in power the people may turn to a very authoritarian government to handle the problem of crime. Crime also can help fund insurgents which only complicates the state’s problems. Every asset spent on crime prevention and persecution can only help the Iraqi society as a whole. As the level of crime goes down many of the other leading indicators of Iraqi progress are bound to improve.

The Iraqi Stock Exchange has recently opened with 15 listed companies trading about 1 billion Iraqi Dinars ($683,000) daily. The total market capitalization is about 1.5 billion dollars as compared to the Egyptian stock market valued at 40 billion dollars. Foreign investors are permitted to invest in Iraqi stocks. A good indicator of macro economic growth will be the rate of increase of market capitalization. Investors who are not risk adverse will move capital to a situation which could pay handsomely. Another good indicator is the percentage of Iraqis who invest in their own markets. Expatriate Iraqi investment may also be an indicator.

The one measure of effectiveness which seems to be a common thread running across many of the other areas of interest is the unemployment rate. There is still a large group of
Iraqi men who don’t hold regular jobs; many of which once held a position in Saddam’s army or state bureaucracy. It can be argued that a stable family economic environment can go a long way in bringing basic stability to a state. People engaged in productive and satisfying work have a stake in the political and economic status quo.

Jobs for Iraqis must be a top priority. According to the State Department’s Weekly Iraqi Update under goal 3.0- Create Jobs and Provide Essential Services 16 April 2005, there was a 44.4% decrease in the number of Iraqis working in the AIRP (Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program) and no increase in CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program). Both of these programs are critical for putting the Iraqi people back to work. CERP is especially important because local commanders can target projects and areas that need direct assistance. A local jobs program can pay substantial dividends not only in building infrastructure but in putting people back to work where the other option for the unemployed is counterproductive to the State.

All of the measures of effectiveness for building an Iraqi state must be measured and analyzed in relation to all of the other indicators. A single indicator in a vacuum, like American deaths in country, could send out the wrong signal and tell the wrong story. There is a real danger that civilian decision makers or the news media could focus on one indicator and use that indicator to tell only one side of the story. It is also important that the long view be considered. The elementary schools being built today may not have an immediate impact in establishing a foundation for a strong economy but the groundwork for a better educated workforce will be seen years from now.

In the Middle East it is traditional for people to bring their issues or grievances to the head of the village or local clerics once a month. These meetings between the populace and
their leaders could be excellent opportunities to gather valuable data. Issues could be discussed and analyzed in order to gain true objective and subjective data. Analysis needs to be made at the local level and also at the national level to establish overall and regional trends and moods. It does little good to state that the aggregate unemployment level in Iraq was reduced by 1.4% on 6 April 2005 when in the Sunni Triangle of the state the actual unemployment rose by 5%. Because the rebuilding of Iraq is such a highly politicized endeavor it will be more important than ever to make sure the proper information and data is thoroughly analyzed to tell the whole story so that the decision maker understands the issues.

An argument can be made those subjective indicators like numbers of people attending sporting events can be manipulated to show progress or decline in the mood of the Iraqi people. I would counter that anecdotal evidence in conjunction with conventional indicators such as essential services development, neutralizing of insurgents, unemployment rate paint a much more comprehensive picture than just one set of indicators. Many of the measures of effectiveness are interwoven and the good analyst will see trends and indicators between the indicators. The placement of resources may have a direct effect on the measure being evaluated and it also may have an effect on a related measure. Synergistic effects are possible with the right placement of resources. Reducing the unemployment rate can have effects throughout the entire spectrum of measures of effectiveness. Employment reduces the pool of people the insurgents can recruit; few suicide bombers are fully employed men. Most insurgents are disenfranchised from the economic system in some way. People who are employed tend to support a political system that at least provides the opportunity for a better life. Basic infrastructure can be built by men and women who are employed by the government or better yet private industry with the help of coalition resources. Employed
citizens are usually supporters of good governance and the rule of law. I would argue that when each coalition dollar is spent the question should be asked, “How many Iraqis are being employed by this act and is there a possibility this could be a long term employment opportunity?” Both conventional and antidotal measures of effectiveness are either directly or indirectly affected by the employment rate.

There will come a time when a critical political decision of whether coalition forces should remain in Iraq and what supporting role the U.S. should play in the future will have to be made. Many statistics such as those used in the State Department’s Iraq Weekly Status Report will probably be debated and analyzed in regard to agendas. All measures of effectiveness must be considered in relation to the long term goals and aspirations of people everywhere. If human nature is any guide then most of the Iraqi people want to live in a safe environment where they can raise their children and have at least the hope of economic prosperity. In regard to the current violence in Iraq “It is important to note that the vast majority of the population typically remains uncommitted, providing support only when coerced, or when a clear winner emerges. As T.E. Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”) noted, “rebellions can be made by two percent active striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic.”45 “The reason for this passivity among the population is that, so long as their security is at risk, individuals that take sides in an insurgency expose themselves to retribution.”46 The correct analysis of measures of effectiveness can help marginalize the insurgent population in Iraq and empower the majority to make positive progress.

Neither conventional nor intuitive indicators tell the whole story in Iraq. Compounding the analytic problem is that the results from state building cannot really be known until 20 years from now. The perspective of 20 years from now should give the
evaluator a viewpoint from which to judge the full geopolitical effect of U.S. intervention and state-building in Iraq. The coalition’s actions in Iraq today will have repercussions throughout the Middle East and Moslem world for years to come.

History has shown that it takes time, resources and a substantial effort to rebuild a state. The multidiscipline approach to deciding what each indicator or measure is depicting is a very difficult task. A holistic comprehensive approach must be used. Intuitive measures are valid and must always be taken into account along with conventional indicators. The attitude and perspective of the Iraqi people will determine their future, not the political view from Washington.

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