HONDURAS’ NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

by

Raynel E. Funes Ponce

December 2006

Thesis Advisor: Douglas Borer
Second Reader: Hy Rothstein

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
# Honduras' National Security Strategy To Combat Terrorism

## Title and Subtitle
Honduras' National Security Strategy To Combat Terrorism

## Author(s)
Raynel E. Funes Ponce

## Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

## Supplementary Notes
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

## Distribution / Availability Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

## Subject Terms
Terrorism in Latin America, Counterterrorism Organizations, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism

## Number of Pages
105

## Security Classification of Report
Unclassified

## Security Classification of This Page
Unclassified

## Security Classification of Abstract
Unclassified

## Limitation of Abstract
UL

## Abstract
After the September 11 attacks, Honduras committed to support the GWOT, but priorities in national objectives other than terrorism have kept the Honduran government from developing a strategy and the necessary counterterrorism infrastructure to combat this emerging threat. This research examines current threats in Latin America and Honduras in particular. It also suggests a developmental strategy to enhance the country's capabilities to combat terrorism by the employment of instruments of national power in a multidimensional way capable to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts. This study uses a brief analysis based on the concepts of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability in order to identify the risk that the proposed strategy could incur. The study concludes by proposing a series of recommendations that should minimize risk and make this strategy feasible for supporting the GWOT.
HONDURAS’ NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Raynel E. Funes Ponce
Lieutenant Colonel Honduras Army
B.S., Honduras Military Academy, 1984

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2006

Author: Raynel E. Funes Ponce

Approved by: Douglas Borer
Thesis Advisor

Hy Rothstein
Second Reader

Gordon H. McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis
ABSTRACT

After the September 11 attacks, Honduras committed to support the GWOT, but priorities in national objectives other than terrorism have kept the Honduran government from developing a strategy and the necessary counterterrorism infrastructure to combat this emerging threat. This research examines current threats in Latin America and Honduras in particular. It also suggests a developmental strategy to enhance the country’s capabilities to combat terrorism by the employment of instruments of national power in a multidimensional way capable to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts. This study uses a brief analysis based on the concepts of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability in order to identify the risk that the proposed strategy could incur. The study concludes by proposing a series of recommendations that should minimize risk and make this strategy feasible for supporting the GWOT.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1
   A. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 1
   B. THE NATURE OF THE STUDY .................................................................................. 4
   C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS .................................................................................... 5

II. EMERGING THREATS IN LATIN AMERICA ............................................................... 7
   A. THE EVOLVING LATIN AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT .............................................. 8
   B. TERRORISM ............................................................................................................... 11
      1. Proposed Definition .............................................................................................. 13
      2. Terrorist Threats in Latin America .................................................................... 13
      3. Terrorist threats in Honduras ....................................................................... 15
         a. Domestic Terrorism Threat ...................................................................... 17
         b. Transnational Terrorism Threat .............................................................. 19
   C. DRUG TRAFFICKING ............................................................................................... 22
      1. Drug Trafficking in Latin America .................................................................... 23
      2. Drug Trafficking in Honduras .................................................................... 24
   D. GANGS (MARAS) ....................................................................................................... 25
      1. Gangs in Latin America .................................................................................... 26
      2. Gangs in Honduras ............................................................................................ 27
   E. ORGANIZED CRIME ................................................................................................. 29
      1. Organized Crime in Latin America .................................................................. 30
      2. Organized Crime in Honduras ....................................................................... 31
   F. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 33

III. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ................................................................................. 35
   A. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 35
      1. Strategy Definitions ............................................................................................. 37
      2. Approaches Against Terrorism ....................................................................... 38
      3. Strategic Intent .................................................................................................... 39
   B. STRATEGY FORMULATION ................................................................................... 39
      1. Goal: Prevent Terrorist Actions ....................................................................... 39
         a. Objective: Organize the Counterterrorism Infrastructure .................................. 40
         b. Objective: Structure Pre-Incident Plans ......................................................... 41
         c. Objective: Share Intelligence and Apply Information Controls .................. 42
         d. Objective: Conduct Risk Assessment ............................................................. 44
         e. Objective: Implement Target Hardening Programs .................................. 45
         f. Objective: Enhance Financial Control ............................................................ 46
         g. Objective: Exercise Border and Transportation Control ............................. 47
      2. Goal: Deter and Influence Terrorism .................................................................. 49
a. Objective: Identify Motivations and Root Causes.... 49
b. Objective: Manifest Strength, Determination and Effectiveness............................. 50
c. Objective: Create Threats to Terrorists........................................... 51

3. Goal: Respond to Terrorist Actions................................................. 52
   a. Objective: Crisis Management........................................... 53
   b. Objective: Consequence Management.............................. 54

C. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 56

IV. STRATEGY EVALUATION ....................................................................... 59
   A. OVERVIEW ................................................................................... 59
      1. Facts ....................................................................................... 60
      2. Assumptions.......................................................................... 61
   B. ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 62
      1. Suitability................................................................................ 62
      2. Feasibility ............................................................................... 63
      a. Assessment ........................................................................... 64
      3. Acceptability ......................................................................... 68

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................. 71

APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................... 75
   COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATION ........................................... 75

APPENDIX B ......................................................................................................... 77
   INTELLIGENCE FLOW MODEL ............................................................ 77

APPENDIX C ......................................................................................................... 79
   PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE TABLE ........................................ 79

APPENDIX D ......................................................................................................... 81

APPENDIX E ......................................................................................................... 83
   INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER ............................................ 83

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 85

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................. 89
## LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure 1. | Map of Central America | 16 |
| Figure 2. | Drug Trafficking Routes | 24 |
| Figure 3. | Mara Salvatrucha Ambush on December 23, 2004 | 29 |
# LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Probability-Impact Matrix ................................................................. 45  
Table 2. Suitability Comparison Matrix ......................................................... 62  
Table 3. Feasibility Comparison Matrix .......................................................... 64
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first and foremost thank my wife Zoila and my son Raynel for all their encouragement and support during those sleepless nights preceding the culmination of my Master's degree. I would also like to thank my thesis advisors, Dr. Douglas Borer and Dr. Hy Rothstein, for their expertise, guidance, and tutelage, not only with this thesis but throughout my studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, Special Operations curriculum. A special recognition is owed to Mrs. Barbara Young for her endless support in proofreading this thesis and helping me to improve my English skills. Lastly, I would like to thank Colonel Brian Greenshields and all Defense Analysis faculty members whom I had the privilege to learn from; your insight and knowledge are much appreciated.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

There are few things that can create as deep a fear in society as terrorist violence. Terrorism has been employed at different levels since the beginning of history. In the same way that society has evolved, terrorism has evolved as well. Terrorism has become sophisticated and, in some circumstances, has gained legitimacy.

Since the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the following strikes in Madrid and London, the world has realized that terrorism has become an obvious topic of global concern. “The last two decades of the twentieth century saw the rise of extreme Islamic radicalism to levels that threaten regimes throughout the Muslim world, Asia, Europe, much of Africa, and America.”

Some countries immediately mobilized forces to protect themselves from further strikes, others mobilized means to support the U.S., and certain ones committed to engage in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In Latin America, most countries condemned the 9-11 strikes and talks started to take place at the regional level in order to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism.

Following the 9-11 attacks, the U.S. has focused its attention on the Middle East. However, a potential threat could emerge from a much closer source; its southern neighbors. Although Latin America has not been a focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades, and international terrorist groups have at times used the region as the battleground to advance their causes. Recent intelligence reports suggest that Osama bin Laden and his associates are stacking their resources in

---


South American countries that have clandestine financial networks based on drug trafficking, because the resources are beyond regulatory scrutiny.  

"Ten of thirty terrorist organizations operating worldwide, including one linked to Osama bin Laden, are located or operate in Latin America." The U.S has to understand that security and survival do not rely solely on a strong military power, but also depend on policies and programs that can strengthen international relationships. These would result in mutual cooperative efforts to face emerging challenges, from global context through continental, regional, and individual state.

Throughout the periodic presidents' reunions of the Summits of the Americas Process, responsibilities have been assigned to the Organization of American States (OAS) to promote a shared vision among the countries of the region. The OAS letter contains a chapter concerning “collective security,” which prescribes for the member countries the application of measures and procedures stated in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) establishing a continental system for collective security. Several declarations made during the Summits of the Americas have stated the new concept of hemispheric security, with an integral and multidimensional reach, thus including traditional threats, emerging threats, and other challenges. Throughout this declarative act it is recognized that the hemispheric security model has to be flexible and must include characteristics of each region and every state.

In 1995, the Summit of the Americas also incorporated the Ministers of Defense (MOD) conference which adopted security policies focusing on transparent measures for defense issues, peacekeeping operations, demining-operations, counter-drug trafficking operations, and the role of the military in the present century. In November 2002, during the fifth conference of MOD, the

---


signatories agreed to support the OAS and its Counterterrorism Inter-American Council’s (CTIAC) policies against terrorism.⁶

The constitution of the Central American Integration System (SICA) that was adopted during the Summit of Central American Presidents in Tegucigalpa, Honduras on December 13, 1993, replaced the former Organization of Central American States (OECA), and now is recognized by all countries on the isthmus, including Panama and Belize. SICA’s fundamental objective is to have Central America become a region based on peace, liberty, democracy and development; furthermore, the integration, respect and promotion of human rights, and integral development of Central American states. On December 15, 1995, under SICA, the Central American Treaty of Democratic Security (CATDS) was signed and included in its letter the fight against institutional corruption and the introduction of the concept of security under an indivisible union of development, democracy, peace, and liberty.

The Central American presidents called an emergency meeting in Honduras on September 19, 2001. At this meeting, on behalf of the Central American population, they condemned such terrorist attacks and agreed to support President Bush’s declarations against international terrorism; support the UN resolution 1368 in order to apply justice against the perpetrators of the 9-11 terrorist attacks; agreed to join their countries within the OAS in conferences to discuss themes such as “terrorism as a threat to democracy and hemispheric security.” The presidents also made a commitment to improve information sharing systems; reinforce border, marine port, and airport security; control immigrant flow; deny their territories to terrorist organizations’ operations; call up a Central American Security Council emergency meeting in order to look up and

---

evaluate regional actions against terrorism; and offered the commitment of the Central American Humanitarian and Rescue Unit to the U.S.\(^7\)

Honduras has not yet committed to any bilateral agreement to combat terrorism. In 1954, Honduras and the U.S. ratified the bilateral agreement for military aid, in which both countries agreed to commit military resources for common defense and to maintain a peaceful and secure environment in the Western Hemisphere. Based on this agreement, the U.S. agreed to provide the necessary equipment, training, personnel, and funds in order to upgrade the Honduran military capabilities. In return, Honduras agreed to provide the raw materials, personnel, proper employment, and security of the military aid provided by the U.S. in fulfillment of UN international accords.\(^8\) There are several protocols in place expanding the 1954 agreement, which include U.S. military bases, radar emplacements, and combined joint exercises in Honduras’ territory.

\section*{B. THE NATURE OF THE STUDY}

Even though the government has conveyed its intention of cooperating in the GWOT, Honduras lacks a national security strategy to achieve this cooperation. The underlying purpose of this study is to formulate such a strategy and conduct an analysis to examine a small handful of policy options to determine which option can best align with Honduras’ national objectives and support international efforts to combat terrorism. Moreover, it will delineate what the threats to Honduras are, what the approaches that seek to reduce those threats are, and how the U.S. may take part in a strategy for creating a cooperative environment in the GWOT.

The Honduras’ National Security Strategy to Combat Terrorism will be the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to achieve national objectives. The formulation of such a strategy will be based on

\(^7\) \textit{Central America Unified Against Terrorism}, 1, Extraordinary Declaration. (September 19, 2001), 1-3.  

\(^8\) \textit{Convenio Bilateral De Ayuda Militar}, (15 de febrero de 1954, 1954).  
how (strategic concepts) the government will employ the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) as the resources available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographical locations to achieve the national objectives (ends) in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives.9

The information used to formulate this strategy comes from primary and secondary source material, international accords, reports, and personal interviews with key personnel of the Honduran government. The personnel interviewed include the Honduran Vice-President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Honduran Armed Forces, The Honduran Army Commandant, several Honduran congressmen, and several midlevel government officials.

C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

This thesis is organized in five chapters. Chapter II provides an historical overview along with a discussion of the emerging threats in Latin America. Although the time frame for this study is focused on the recognition of transnational terrorism since the 9-11 attacks in Washington and New York, for a more accurate study it is important to review the historical context of Latin America in order to understand the potential postures of governments in Latin America and the effects of U.S. foreign policy on the region. This chapter also presents a suggested definition of terrorism and the basic terminology used. It also discusses the impact of drug trafficking, gangs, organized crime, and the potential threat of terrorism in Latin America and focuses special attention of Honduras.

Chapter III suggests the formulation of Honduras’ National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. It is known that a strategy formulation is a process that has to proceed year after year, so that advances in technology can be absorbed,
account taken of the changing geopolitical environment, and the budget matched to the availability of funds.\textsuperscript{10} There are two levels of strategy: operational and developmental. Strategies based on existing capabilities are operational strategies which require specific plans for action in the short range period. Longer-range strategies may be based on estimates of future threats, objectives, and requirements. These longer-range strategies are more often global in nature and may require improvements in current capabilities.\textsuperscript{11} This thesis will be focused on developmental strategy. It is important to understand that Honduras’ national objective priorities have not been based on terrorism and its circumstances; therefore, Honduras has not yet developed a strategy to combat terrorism. The lack of this strategy emphasizes the relevance of this thesis.

Chapter IV provides a list of existing facts and assumptions of the Honduran context which will assist in analyzing this developmental strategy. Then the strategy is analyzed through the variables of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability in order to find an appropriate balance of objectives, strategic concepts, and resources with the aim of reducing risk. Moreover, the analysis also provides certain recommendations that would make such a strategy appropriate to prevent, deter and respond to any terrorist threat in Honduras.

Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations that might be helpful for decision makers considering the evolution of the Latin American environment, current trends, the potential threats of terrorism, as well as policies in play to improve the formulation of strategies to counter transnational terrorism.


II. EMERGING THREATS IN LATIN AMERICA

The previous chapter presented the background for the study, the nature of the study, and how it will be presented. This chapter provides the theoretical framework and theoretical precepts for the study. The chapter also addresses an historical evolving environment in Latin America, and points out the emerging threats in the region.

Historically, Latin America has struggled with traditional threats including international territorial disputes, ideological revolutions, poor economic performance, and social structure problems have been the Achilles’ heel for this region. Foreign countries have made the mistake of treating Latin America as a single region. However, Latin America shares common roots and influence from Spain and Portugal, different ethnic cultures, different institutional evolution and development including specific problems that are not shared among the countries in the region, makes the region a composition of individual nation-states. Problems in Central America look different from those in South America, and not all countries in Latin America share the same modernization and development levels.

After the Cold War, ideological issues were displaced to a second stage. Democratic regimes were reestablished, military forces were sized down and economic reforms became the principal concerns in the region. The beginning of the “twenty first century” has been a period of momentous change worldwide, changes that are part of an epochal shift, of a complete reorganization of social structures worldwide known as globalization, have emerged as a transnational stage. So far, these changes have not cause the improvement of microeconomics in Latin America because they have been focused on assuring macroeconomic stability. Therefore, internal social cohesion has declined along with national economic integration.12 The lack of microeconomic performance has divided even the deeper the social structures in Latin America, making the gap bigger between local dominant groups and the lower classes. This gap has

allowed threats such as drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime to emerge, and now the Latin American governments are having to employ national security resources to control these problems. At this time while Latin America is struggling to control new internal threats, terrorism, which is now transnational, could exploit these domestic problems to infiltrate into Latin America. What is even worse is the possibility of them blending with the domestic threats with the intention of reaching their own goals.

A. THE EVOLVING LATIN AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT

Culture in “ancient” America was based in two major locations. In Mexico and Central America were the Aztecs and the Mayas, and in Peru were the Incas, where advanced civilizations fought the atrocities of the Spanish “conquistadores.” The conquistadores had been delegated powers by the Spanish monarchy to found an empire in America, which later generated deep resentments against foreign occupation.

In the early eighteenth century, most Latin American countries became independent from Spain and developed unionist efforts that did not succeed due to marked differences between the countries. Once Spain represented no threat to the area, the aspiring imperialist U.S. started seeking territorial control over the former European colonies, preventing other powers from challenging the U.S. span of control, and supporting Latin American independence campaigns with the aim of establishing hegemony within the region. The U.S. established the Monroe Doctrine, which considered any attempt from Europe to extend European control to any portion of the Western Hemisphere as dangerous to the peace and safety of the region. In 1982, the Malvinas War between Argentina and England cast doubt on the Monroe Doctrine. In this conflict the U.S. supported England. This support revealed the clear intentions of the U.S. and focused on the U.S.’s own interests in the hemisphere regardless of the Monroe doctrine and the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Agreement (TIAR).

After WWII, the Soviet Union attempted to spread communism in all directions, based on the “Theory of Revolutions,” which focused on social and
political changes theory focused on social and political changes. The attempt of the Soviet Union, added to the history of interventions in Latin America, created a vulnerable environment for the region’s stability. Therefore, a lack of harmony between the continent’s social systems and the political systems and the downturn that the U.S.’s foreign policy created were the leading reasons for the creation of the revolutionary movements in Latin America. Moreover, interest in guerrilla warfare grew following the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba, and the tactics of guerrilla warfare were translated to internal wars rather than external wars against foreign occupiers.

In order to stop communism from spreading in Latin America, for almost three decades the U.S. foreign policy supported the establishment of military governments in the hemisphere. They easily achieved a consensus on the need to unite against a shared security threat. The U.S. focused its attention on the region and provided strong foreign aid, heavy in military assistance, with the intention of rebuilding the countries’ counterinsurgency capabilities to control their internal situations and protect the U.S. interests in the region. These military governments completely controlled the national tools of power with the intention of denying all possibilities of success to the communist insurgents. However, some military leaders took advantage of this environment to establish dictatorships that worsened the internal situations of those countries and provided stronger reasons for the insurgents’ cause and sustained the mobilization of popular support. These ideological struggles in Latin America generated terrorist actions from both sides, government and insurgents, characteristic of this struggled context and which imported similar strategies from other parts of the world.

During these decades of political and social struggles, some countries in the region found that transitioning from military governments to democratic regimes would be part of the strategy that would help to stabilize the internal situation; furthermore, “the fall of the Soviet Union altered the context in which
both Washington and Latin America operate.” Once the communism threat in the region was not a threat to U.S. interests, the U.S. started to suspend most military assistance to Latin America in order to size down the military apparatus in the region. This was a part of the U.S.’s strategy to consolidate efforts so it could reach its goal of being a “global power.” Thus, the military, as a tool of Latin American countries’ national power, became useless to support the U.S.’s interests and exposed Latin American security issues to a new trend of emerging threats.

Two major trends have altered the security issues in Latin America. One, the failure of neoliberalism in Latin America has worsened social problems. Two, the “increased preoccupation of the U.S. with terrorism as the premier security threat” which will be addressed further ahead in this chapter.

Latin America seemed poised to begin a virtuous cycle of economic progress and improved democratic governance overseen by a growing number of centrist technocratic governments. Since there are certain obvious ties between economics and security, there could be speculations that disappointing economic performance might impact several factors of security interest such as: weakened democracies, economic suasions available to criminals and terrorists to undermine security operations, military and security forces that are less capable of addressing threats and more susceptible to corruption due to limited resources, desire to emigrate due to poorly performing economies, sick economies shifting the trend away from hemispheric integration, and indifferent economic support from the U.S. All of these issues could make security cooperation more difficult.

The neoliberal model has failed in Latin America and has aggravated social problems in almost every country. Poor economic performances and corruption in traditional governments were factors that did not allow satisfaction

14 Ibid., 1.
15 Ibid., 50-51.
of even the most basic needs of the population, stretching, even more, the gap between the rich and the poor. The latter was due to governments that managed their administrations with the best interests of specific groups of power in mind, the imposed policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other factors that replaced corrupted governments. This situation led to the re-birth of socialist ideologies among Latin American governments and moved them away from the capitalist policies of the U.S. The following leaders all subscribed to these socialist ideas. Fidel Castro in Cuba, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Luiz Inacio Lula in Brazil, Nestor Kichner in Argentina, Tabare Vasquez in Uruguay, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.

B. TERRORISM

Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, in part because the term has evolved, and in part because it is associated with an activity that is designed to be subjective. Several specialists and scholars have devoted great efforts to decide on a standard definition of terrorism and have come to the conclusion that those efforts are fruitless. Terrorism is intended to be a matter of perception and therefore is regarded differently by different observers.16 Terrorism has often been conceived in intractably broad ways; while the costs of terrorism and in the ways of combat, it tends to be constructed too narrowly. The general idea of terrorism is related to matters involving force against political authority in some way, but sometimes it is applied even more broadly to include just about any disliked action associated with someone else’s policy agenda.17

In order to find a more accurate definition for contemporary terrorism, it is important to understand its evolution. According to Hoffman, terrorism was first popularized during the French revolution. Terrorism was adopted as a means of establishing order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprising of 1789, which was associated with the ideals of virtue


and democracy. The massive socio-economic changes engendered by the
industrial revolution were creating new “universalist” ideologies (such as
communism/Marxism), that were born of the alienation and exploitative
conditions of capitalism. These conditions stimulated the emergence of a new
era of terrorism, in which the concept gained many of the familiar revolutionary,
anti-state connotations of today, and lasted until World War I.\textsuperscript{18}

By 1930, the meaning of terrorism changed again. It was now used less to
refer to revolutionary changes against governments, and more to describe the
practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and leaders against
their own citizens. After World War II, terrorism gained back the revolutionary
connotations with which it is more associated in Latin America and other
developing regions. It was during this period that the “politically correct”
appellation of “freedom fighters” appeared. During the 70s, terrorism continued to
be viewed within a revolutionary context and was expanded to include nationalist
and ethnic separatists groups. Even though the purpose of terrorism remained
unchanged during the 80s, in recent years terrorism has been used to denote
broader, less distinct phenomena. For example, it has come to be regarded as a
calculated means to destabilize the West as part of a vast global conspiracy.\textsuperscript{19}

In the 1990s, the meaning of terrorism was indistinct from the emerging
terms such as “narco-terrorism” and “gray-area” phenomena On one hand,
Narco-terrorism was used for drug-trafficking, mainly in Latin America, and to
advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations
identified as Marxist-Leninist regimes. On the other hand, gray area phenomena
highlighted the increasingly fluid and variable nature of sub-national conflicts in
the post-Cold War era. Thus the term “gray area phenomenon” was focused on
threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors and non-government
organizations.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 9-12.
1. Proposed Definition

It has been very difficult to fit one consistent definition to terrorism. Even though the UN tried to establish a definition, there were concerns from various countries. These countries pointed out that, from their perspective, the definition which the U.N was proposing defined what they called “freedom fighters.” Therefore, it is very important to understand the connotation of the term terrorism in a particular use or situation.

There are several common elements in hundreds of “terrorism” definitions. The frequent use of these elements will help to form a definition which can be best used for the purpose of the present study. These elements may include, but are not limited to: violence, force, politics, fear, threat, psychological effects, innocent victims, planning, tactics, coercion, and publicity. Therefore, by using these frequent terms, the following definition is suggested:

*Terrorism is the unlawful and planned method of use of—or threatened use of—force and violence against innocent victims, exploiting of the information domain, designed to create fear among the population, and aim coerce the government in order to attain political objectives.*

2. Terrorist Threats in Latin America

Latin America has not received a direct attack organized through current international terrorism; therefore, terrorism is not the first priority in Latin America policy. While Latin America has not been the focal point in the GWOT, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have, at times, used the region as a battleground to advance their causes. Even though the terrorism threat in Latin America seems to be low, terrorists may seek safe-havens, financing, recruiting, illegal travel, illegal documentation activities, or access to the U.S. from the area and pose a serious threat to the Western Hemisphere. U.S. has engaged in the GWOT and focused its attention towards the Middle East. Unfortunately, the terrorist threat has become transnational with the capability of reaching ungoverned areas in

---

Latin America. Most of the anxiety in the U.S. is based on the presumption of the relative facility with which Islamic terrorists groups can establish themselves in cities and lawless areas in Latin America. There are large concentrations of Middle Eastern immigrants in Venezuela, Colombia, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Honduras and Bolivia. The majority of these populations are Christian Arabs and Palestinians, but there are also Muslims among them.\(^{21}\) Although there is no evidence of financial support to al Qaeda, there is information about remittances from Middle Eastern immigrants to the HAMAS organization in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Human smuggling is another way terrorists are attempting to take advantage of an illegal activity; the “American Dream” that is sought by many illegal immigrants. During 2004 and 2005, a number of individual Muslim and Middle Eastern illegal immigrants were captured in Central and South America traveling north. Some of the more unusual cases include: A Turkish citizen with a false Dutch passport who was arrested in Nicaragua on September 22, 2004; and Jordanians with false European passports who were arrested in Costa Rica. In early 2005, members of the fundamentalist Jamaat Tabligh Movement were in Argentina after attending a meeting in Chile.\(^{22}\)

Although terrorism is not the main focus of U.S. policy in regards to Latin America, there is an anti-terrorism assistance program (ATA) run by the Department of State. The problem is that there are not enough funds provided to improve the counterterrorism capabilities of any Latin American country except for Colombia. Colombia is the biggest recipient of U.S assistance funds. In FY2002, a total of $27.5 million was provided for Latin America, with $25 million for an anti-kidnapping program in Colombia and $2.5 million for the regular Western Hemisphere program. For FY2003 $3.6 million in ATA assistance was provided for the region, with $3.3 million of that for Colombia. For FY2004, $5.3

\(^{21}\) Taylor, Latin America Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South, 7.

million in ATA assistance was provided for the region. For FY2005, an estimated $11.1 million in ATA was provided for the region, with $3.9 million for Colombia and $0.5 million for the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Human smuggling is another way terrorists are attempting to take advantage of an illegal activity; the “American Dream” that is sought by many illegal immigrants. The FY 2006 ATA request for Latin America is $9.7 million, again with $3.9 for Colombia and $0.5 million for the tri-border area. This situation leaves the rest of Latin American countries with minimal funds to improve counterterrorism capabilities; therefore, “the Latin American perspective is that the main concerns of the U.S. regarding hemispheric security and the war on terrorism are related almost exclusively to the Colombian conflict situation.”

The U.S.-Latin American relationship is an unequal relationship. The current U.S. administration has introduced significant changes in National Security Strategy and in international relations that do not represent any positive change in U.S.-Latin American relations, but continue to neglect and show indifference to the region’s stability problems.

3. Terrorist threats in Honduras

Honduras is located in Central America. It is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and has a population of seven million people and a territory of 112,491 square kilometers. Honduras has access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and manages five sea ports and four international airports as well. The country holds a very important strategic position that embraces several natural sea, air, and land traffic routes from North America to South America and vice versa. For example, it takes only two hours flying from Tegucigalpa (the capital) to Miami and/or Houston International Airports and only about one hour and a half to reach Panama. Part of the Pan-American Highway, that transits from Canada to Panama, runs through the southern part of Honduras.

---

25 Ibid.
Due to the country’s strategic location, Honduras could be a target for transnational terrorism. However, the main problems in Honduras have so far related to poverty, corruption, internal insecurity, and social inequality.

Figure 1. Map of Central America

There are two types of terrorism that could threaten Honduras’ national security: domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is represented by existing revolutionary ideological groups that oppose the legally established government. Although these groups were declared officially inactive after the Cold War, they operate from the “underworld” using legal organizations as facades in order to harass the government and to create an unstable environment. On the other hand, transnational terrorism activities have not been confirmed, but existing conditions in Honduras could facilitate terrorist infiltration with the goal of targeting national and hemispheric related objectives; establishing safe-havens in ungoverned areas with the intention of financing, training, indoctrinating, and recruiting indigenous personnel; or projecting attacks across national borders. However, trying to deal with terrorist threats in a separate context [internal, external] is becoming very difficult due to globalization.
a. Domestic Terrorism Threat

In 1967, the Guatemalan government saw the first large-scale emergence of right-wing actions against revolutionary movement. This generated almost three decades of internal war. In 1979, the Sandinistan Front for National Liberation (FSLN) took over the government in Nicaragua after defeating the dictatorial government of Anastasio Somoza. After the Sandinista’s success in Nicaragua, the Salvadoran Frabundo Marti for Popular Liberation front started armed and political actions to attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government. This started a civil war that lasted almost two decades. All these conflicts had direct and indirect implications on the internal situation in Honduras.

During the 1980s, left-wing insurgency groups in Honduras implemented armed and terrorist actions against the government in a series of political assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, hostages takings, hijackings and guerilla operations sponsored by Cuba through Nicaragua’s Sandinista Government and the Salvadoran FMLN. During this decade the U.S. provided foreign aid to Honduras in order to stabilize the tumultuous internal situation and attempt to limit revolutionary support for similar conflicts in neighboring countries.

The insurgency groups identified in Honduras that conducted terrorist acts included:

- The Popular Movement of Libereation Cinchonero (MPL-C), founded on September 7, 1979 after the Sandinistas took over the government in Nicaragua. This group operated as a clandestine-independent organization whose leaders settled in Nicaragua. Thereafter, some of them were mobilized inside Honduras to conduct guerrilla operations.26

- The Morazanist Front for National Liberation (FMLN), founded on September 16, 1979 at the Northern Regional University Center

---

(CURN) in San Pedro Sula. On the same day they were founded they detonated six “propaganda” bombs in different sites in the city.27

• The Revolutionary Workers Party of Central America (PRTC).28

• The Revolutionary Popular Force “Lorenzo Zelaya” initiated subversive urban operations on September 19, 1980 in Tegucigalpa. This organization had existed since 1975 under the name of Popular Of Unity Movement (MUP).29

Honduras established the “National Security Policy” which strengthened the military apparatus and the government’s course of action to counter the insurgencies and terrorism emerging in the early 1980s. Some of the government actions and other situations that avoided a civil war in Honduras included: agrarian reform, which allowed the distribution of a great amount of land to the peasantry; the restoration of democracy by allowing free elections in 1979; the existence of two well-rooted political parties with more than two centuries of history; the government allowed workers to affiliate into unions; and the application of necessary early and selective repression. Although the insurgents conducted a series of operations to gain popular support, they were not able to acquire a mass following.

Most of these insurgent groups returned to the underground organization and operations after the return to democracy in Nicaragua in 1990 and the peace agreements in El Salvador in 1992 and Guatemala in 1996. Although these organizations are not currently active, they still posses the doctrine and organizational framework that would allow them to mobilize at any time; moreover, several of the organization’s leaders and members are politically active and have infiltrated several government organizations to date. It is also

27 Mario Berrios, 57.
28 Ibid., 63.
29 Ibid., 78.
argued that some operatives of these insurgent groups have fractionated into organized crime and other illicit activities with the intention of making easy money.

b. **Transnational Terrorism Threat**

After the 9-11 attacks, Honduras condemned those terrorist actions and precipitately offered a commitment by signing regional and international agreements to agree combat transnational terrorism. Even though Honduras has not received a direct attack from transnational terrorism, it does not mean that it is not vulnerable. On June 2004, the Honduran Minister of Security announced that the Saudi Arabian Adnan Gulshar al Shrrikjumah, a suspected al Qaeda militant, was spotted in an internet café in Tegucigalpa. According to the minister’s declarations, “these terrorists have been entering the country in order to find out the way to infiltrate into the U.S. and in Central America with the aim to strike North Americans and their allies.” He also stated, “We have the hypothesis that terrorists have recruited persons in our country in order to set off explosives in Central America or the U.S.”

Besides the knowledge of terrorists transiting through Honduras, there are several conditions that could encourage terrorists to conduct operations and select targets inside the country. Among those conditions are:

- The fact that Honduras is signatory to international agreements to combat terrorism, would position Honduras as a potential terrorist target.
- Honduras sent troops to participate in the International Coalition Force for the Iraq War; therefore, the fact that Honduras supported the coalition makes the country a potential threat to transnational terrorism.

---

• Honduras possesses several poorly governed areas, which could be used by terrorists as safe-havens. One of the areas is La Mosquitia, an isolated region of eastern Honduras that can be accessed only by plane or boat. Two other areas are Colon and Olancho, where the poor communication infrastructure, overextended areas, and difficult terrain make it difficult for the government to exercise control.

• After the Cold War, Honduras was forced to downsize its military apparatus and, consequently, has neglected control of sea and land borders. Honduras has three international land borders and eight maritime borders. Moreover, according to the Latin American Security and Defense Network, Honduras is one of the Latin American countries with the least investment in national defense; therefore, the country is almost unprotected and is vulnerable to any internal or external threat.

• There is not an efficient air and sea port security.

• Law enforcement and the legal system are inefficient and corrupt. It is argued that these systems are permeable to the influence of organized crime and drug trafficking. The huge profits involved in these activities have lead to corruption in law enforcement and legal systems, and even politicians have been affected by the political power of drug traffickers.

• The country’s legislation is not clear concerning perpetrators of terrorism.

• There are several U.S. capital investment enterprises in the country. More than 150 American companies operate in Honduras.

---


32 Law enforcement is backward looking, reactive in character. As a result it cannot hope to be an effective instrument to prevent terrorist attacks. The Honduran police have been incapable of controlling domestic crime, nor drug trafficking and organized crime; therefore, it would be expected a failure rate in trying to prevent or respond to terrorism.
and U.S. franchises which are present in increasing numbers which could represent potential targets for terrorists.

- The U.S. military presence through Joint Task Force Bravo in Comayagua might be seen by terrorists as a strong military relationship between the U.S. and Honduras.
- Two major airlines working in Honduras are from the U.S.’ American and Continental Airlines.
- There is not an efficient infrastructure to provide control over financial transactions.
- The current military counterterrorism capability is almost null.
- There is not a governmental structure in place which can directly handle a terrorism crisis.
- The economy is still plagued by over-regulation and still dominated to a significant degree by Arab-Lebanese and Jewish family monopolies which reduce opportunities for the creation of new business.33
- The potential nexus between terrorism and organized crime are conditions that would put security issues at risk in Honduras.

The current “left turn” tendency in Latin America seems to offer more options than the economic, social and political reforms implemented in Honduras in the mid-1980s. Those reforms made promises they did not deliver on. Socialist regimes are taking over countries in South America34 and promising what neoliberal models were not capable of providing. The U.S. is not paying close attention to what is going on in the region. If Honduras’ national interests are not congruent with those of the U.S., the Honduran government would tend to look for different options other than the U.S. support. This would leave empty spaces so that groups with different ideologies and even terrorists could take the opportunity to increase the population’s dislike to the current U.S. policy. A

34 Including Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Ecuador
product of the latter is the Honduran President’s declaration on September 14, 2006 that “the future is in South America.” The President Manuel Zelaya stated that the economic and social future for Honduras and Central America relies on sharing experiences and making alliances with their southern neighbors; moreover, that the economic models and parts of the political systems of various South American nations should be the patterns to follow. 35 Due to the complexity of this subject it will not be addressed in depth in this thesis and the subject will left open for further analysis.

The current situation in Honduras, besides the previously expressed conditions, reveals vulnerabilities that terrorists or groups with different ideologies could take advantage of. Moreover, these vulnerabilities and the current trend of Latin American population to dislike the foreign policies the U.S. has toward the region could threaten security in the Western Hemisphere.

C. DRUG TRAFFICKING

The international drug trade is considered by many to be one of the great global challenges of modern times. Drug use remains steady or increasing in both the developed and developing worlds. Drug production, at least partly in response to this increasing demand, is similarly on the increase—again, in both developing and developed worlds. However, the international aspect of drug markets goes further than the geographical disparity between production and consumption. The proceeds from trafficking are often laundered on a global scale, utilizing international financial markets. Corruption associated with the drug trade affects national governments and, in turn, permeates into the international relationships between governments.36


1. **Drug Trafficking in Latin America**

The most demanding country for drugs in the Western Hemisphere is the U.S. "Almost 80% of the cocaine and 90% of the marijuana entering the U.S. come from Latin America. Produced in the Andes region (Bolivia, Peru and Colombia), the drugs transit via the West Indies, Central America and Mexico (fig. 2), which are the trafficking centers of the international mafia allied with the Colombian drug cartels that establish the law in the region."\(^{37}\) According to the UN, Plan Colombia\(^{38}\) produced a modest displacement of coca to other countries. By 2003, cultivation was up slightly in Bolivia but stable in Peru. Overall, the UN calculated that the total potential output of Andean cocaine was 655 tons in 2003.\(^{39}\)

---


\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.
2. Drug Trafficking in Honduras

Honduras is a transit country for South American cocaine destined for the United States. In fact, the majority of all drugs entering Honduras are destined for the United States. The remaining amount is consumed domestically or transported to other Central American and Caribbean countries. Maritime

---

Cecile Marin, “Major Drug Routes in Latin America.”
vessels and land vehicles are the primary conveyances used in cocaine movement into, and through, Honduras. Noncommercial aircraft also are used to smuggle cocaine, as demonstrated by a seizure of 630 kilograms of cocaine brought into the country by plane. Honduran authorities believe that the volume of illegal drugs transiting the country has risen, as the local consumption of cocaine and crack is escalating.41

D. GANGS (MARAS)

During the late 1980’s, the Sandinistas were consolidating the revolution in Nicaragua, the FMLN were on the brink of overthrowing the government in El Salvador and the radical movements in Guatemala and Honduras were gaining ground. Today it is a region convulsed by massive delinquency and state corruption whose economies are surviving tenuously on remittance money sent by migrants.42

Some of the factors that contribute to the increase of gang activities in Central America, Mexico, and the U.S. are: income inequality, poverty; highly urbanized populations, unemployment, and family disintegration in their home countries.

The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18), and their main rival, the *Mara Salvatrucha* (MS-13). The 18th Street gang was formed by Mexican immigrants in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s by youths who were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who fled their country’s civil conflict. It now has an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 members in the U.S. and about 60,000 in

---

41 DEA, "Drug Intelligence Brief," University of Hawaii. 

Mexico and Central America. The MS-13 gang has expanded geographically, and may pose an increasing regional security threat as it becomes more organized and sophisticated.43

1. Gangs in Latin America

Although many Latin American countries are facing serious crime problems associated with gangs (maras), the largest and most violent gangs in the region operate in Central America and Mexico. These gangs could pose a serious threat to the region’s stability. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are at the epicenter of the gang crisis, with some of the highest murder rates in the world. In 2004, the estimated murder rate per 100,000 people was 45.9 in Honduras, 41.2 in El Salvador, and 34.7 in Guatemala. In the U.S., the corresponding figure was 5.7. Salvadoran police estimate that at least 60% of the 2,576 murders committed there in 2004 were gang-related. Estimates of the number of gang members in Central America vary widely, but the U.S. Southern Command has placed that figure at around 70,000. The gangs are reportedly involved in human trafficking; drug, automobile, and weapons smuggling; and kidnapping. In the last two years, nearly 1,100 gang members have been arrested in Mexico. Many of those arrested were charging migrant smugglers to let their groups pass or working with Mexican drug cartels. Regional and U.S. authorities have confirmed gang involvement in regional drug trafficking. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has found no credible evidence of a connection between Central American gangs and al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups.44 However, U.S. efforts to contain terrorism in the Middle East and the lack of attention to Latin America in general may attract terrorists to displace and occupy ungoverned areas in this region and pose an even greater threat to the Western Hemisphere.


2. Gangs in Honduras

The gangs (maras) are currently the worst public safety concern in Honduras. The main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18, originated in California in the 1980s after nearly one million Salvadorans fled to the United States during El Salvador’s civil war and settled in impoverished neighborhoods in Los Angeles where gang violence was rife. As the Central American region began to recover from an almost 12-year insurgency conflict that ended with a peace accord in 1992, U.S. authorities began to deport thousands of gang members to Central America where the explosion of gang violence during the late 1990s lifted homicide rates above those seen during the armed conflict. The gangs spread to Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, and more recently to Mexico.45

During the first six months of 2005, the Honduran authorities tallied more than 1,400 homicides—all in a country of seven million people. Many of these homicides were gang-related. The U.S. estimates that between 15,000 and 25,000 Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18 members are in the country and pose a serious threat, because members use violence to protect drug and weapons trafficking operations from rival gangs, according to a 2004 intelligence report. If these rates remain steady or increase, it is possible that the stability of the democracies might fail, and it would then be next to impossible to implement social development policies46

In 2002, the Honduran government established the “mano dura” (strong hand) policy against “maras.” The policy has focused mainly on those people suspected of having ties with youth gangs. Reports stated that 204 members of gangs were arrested in Honduras in 2005, and 321 members of gangs were arrested in Honduras in the first quarter of this year alone. These arrests were

http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=2&did=929352361&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1163040120&clientId=1
made under a special law that allows people to be arrested merely on suspicion of belonging to gangs (under the charge of “illicit association”) even if they are not suspected of committing a crime. But this “tough on crime” stance has drawn warnings from human rights groups, which point to the risk that the draconian legislation could lead to an increase in human rights abuses and police brutality.47 During the Central American Integration System’s 26th regular meeting in the Honduran capital in late June, a commitment to create a “rapid response” force to tackle the problem of youth gangs was signed by the region’s leaders and the presidents of Mexico and the United States.

Gang activity has now escalated to the level of domestic terrorism. On December 23, 2004, Mara Salvatrucha members ambushed a public transportation bus in Northern Honduras (fig. 3). The gangs fired AK-47s at innocent civilians who were traveling for Christmas shopping. “Twenty-eight” were shot dead; sixteen men, six women and six children. The gangs left a written message on the bus stating that they were against the government’s policies on handling crime and gangs. The [mara] were directly threatening the Honduran President, the president of the congress, and the minister of security because of their policies.

---

Figure 3. Mara Salvatrucha Ambush on December 23, 2004

E. ORGANIZED CRIME

Organized crime has its roots deep in the economic and cultural framework of Latin America. Organized crime has evolved from its simplest form of brawling, by larcenous and predatory stick-up gangs of nineteenth century to a more complex criminal organization. Even though criminal activity has evolved, the objective remains the same: getting easy money.\(^ {48}\) In a few cases, links do exist between transnational criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations, although those links do not amount to a systematic organized crime-terrorism nexus. In some instances, organized crime uses terror tactics; more often, terrorist organizations use organized crime activities to fund their political and military campaigns. Each type of group, in effect, appropriates the strategies and tactics of the other when necessary or expedient. Yet this does not necessarily mean that there is a convergence of organized crime and terrorism. Throughout Latin America, the distinctions between organized crime—which is essentially

profit driven—and terrorism—which is about the pursuit of political change through the use of violence—have remained clear and distinct.\textsuperscript{49} However, there is a “gray area” where terrorism and organized crime could converge. The gray area includes illegal activities where neither terrorists nor criminals take credit, but the blend of both activities may prove advantageous for each organization in reaching its goals.

1. **Organized Crime in Latin America**

Organized crime has grown in Latin America as in other parts of the world. Although organized crime is a great threat to Latin America, governments have overlooked this situation, or even worse, they [governments] have already been penetrated by this flagellum. All kinds of illicit activities have grown to frightening proportions since the end of the Cold War including prostitution, trafficking in migrants, arms smuggling, money laundering, vehicle smuggling, and kidnappings.

When the Cold War was over, Latin America focused on strengthening economic progress and improving democratic governance. New economic models were introduced and “globalization has blurred the economic distinctions between countries creating a borderless world.”\textsuperscript{50} These economic reforms have perhaps improved the macroeconomic situations of the Latin American countries, but the reforms have worsened microeconomics in Latin America as well. The poor microeconomic performance throughout Latin America has created a high rate of unemployment; moreover, unemployment has induced the population to emigrate from their home countries with the intention of looking for better job opportunities. On the other hand, many who stay in their own countries and do not find jobs or are looking for an easy way to make money, engage in illicit activities to satisfy their demands. Globalization has introduced new elements characterized by the opening of borders, the elimination of currency regulations,


and the rise of the internet. Although these factors have facilitated economic trade, they also have weakened security issues and have given organized crime more opportunities to operate. With globalization, communications are more direct and discreet and provide organized crime with the capability of performing anonymous transactions and allow for the placement of criminal networks.

2. Organized Crime in Honduras

Organized crime has grown in Honduras at an alarming rate. The majority of organized crime activities in Honduras include trafficking in migrants, arms smuggling, money laundering, automobile smuggling, and kidnapping performed both by transnational criminal networks and domestic criminal organizations. These illegal activities are inter-related and sometimes connected to drug trafficking. One hypothesis regarding organized crime in Honduras is that revolutionary conflicts are not an internal issue anymore; therefore, insurgents have evolved their actions into organized crime. In early 1990s, once these insurgent groups were disbanded, although their leadership kept working underground or actually in government organizations, their operatives fractionalized into small cells with individual interests. Additionally, there is the knowledge that the “maras” also provide operatives to organized crime groups. The organized crime leaders then exploit the “maras’” drug trafficking, arm smuggling, and clandestine assassination channels to perpetrate their illicit activities while allowing leaders of organized crime to remain covert. Moreover, the transition from homemade guns to a more sophisticated arsenal, including AK-47s, and the improvement of communications is a reference point by which to address the relationship between the gangs and organized crime. The gangs are known for exchanging drugs for arms and for operating a cell-phone robbery network which provides their means of communication.

In Honduras, trafficking in migrants has been detected and the incidents have risen. Since 2001, several migration officers have been arrested due to trafficking in migrants or document falsification. The main ethnic groups involved in this illegal activity include Colombians, Chinese, Lebanese, and Cubans. For
example, Chinese mob have been identified trying to move illegal Chinese into Honduras through connections in Cuba and the Caribbean. This is at a cost of $20,000 per individual and is paid to corrupt government officials who have connections to organized crime. Once these illegal immigrants get temporary or permanent resident status, they [illegal immigrants] wait for some time and then move to the U.S.

The kidnapping industry has been one of the more notorious in Honduras, and often does not correspond to political demands, but is often for ransom. Around 25 to 35 kidnappings take place every year in Honduras, mostly in major cities like Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The police have not been able to resolve these criminal actions; therefore, in most cases, the family members have to negotiate ransoms with kidnappers to release their relatives. This situation and the inefficiency of law enforcement has turned kidnapping into a highly profitable criminal industry. Moreover, there had been cases where corrupt police members have been in league with this criminal activity.

Automobile stealing has increased in Honduras by about 52% since 2004. This means that in 2006 around fifty vehicles are lost every month and represents a loss of $450,000 a month. Only 10% of these stolen cars are ever recovered.\footnote{El Heraldo, “Aumenta Robo De Autos,” sec. Economia, March 16, 2006. \url{http://www.elheraldo.hn/nota.php?nid=47461&sec=9&fecha=2006-03-16} accessed October 12, 2006.) This situation is part of the automobile smuggling network operating in Central America that moves stolen vehicles mainly between Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. It is known that car smugglers are now employing “maras” to perform this illegal activity, showing the connection among “gangs” and all kinds of activities of organized crime.

In the past four years there have been nearly 200 reported cases of money laundering in Honduras. This illicit activity has been identified by monetary deposits, real estate investments, and facade businesses that people or business companies are conducting without proving records of a reliable credit history. Most money laundering activities come from drug trafficking, but they
also include a small percentage from kidnapping and vehicle smuggling. There is a suspicion that corrupt government officials are involved in this activity. For example, it is currently known that the Supreme Court is managing at least twelve money laundering cases, but slowness in the judicial process demonstrates suspicious involvement of judges, or at least, shows possible common interests between judges and perpetrators.

F. CONCLUSION

Globalization has increased international economic trade, but it also has opened borders and facilitated conditions for non-traditional emerging threats. Terrorism, drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime are illicit activities with a transnational connotation currently affecting Latin America. Honduras is trying to maintain an internally stable situation. However, drug trafficking, gangs and organized crime seems to be controlling the environment. The lack of resources, poor economic conditions, and corruption at different levels is leading this country to be a potential candidate for the list of failed-states. The Latin American trend to the “left” might be a vision and opportunity that the current Honduran government is looking at in order to experiment with new “economic” models with the intention of fulfilling the population’s needs and wants.

Although terrorism is not currently a priority for Honduras, the transnational trend of terrorist organizations, the importance of Honduras geo-strategic location, and the weakness of the country’s security infrastructure might be seen by terrorists as an opportunity to establish safe-havens and initiate actions with the intention of harming the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, it would be preferable to think ahead and formulate a specific national strategy to combat eventual terrorist actions rather than jump abruptly into a situation of crisis management that would reveal to the international community the Honduran government’s lack of readiness for combating terrorism.
III. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Chapter II addresses, in a generic form, the emerging threats of the twentieth century in Latin America; moreover, it provides an overall picture of the influence of those threats, in a Honduran context. The present chapter provides an overview of the national security strategy, and a strategic intent for Honduras to combat terrorism. Furthermore, this chapter suggests the formulation of a Honduran National Security Strategy to Combat Terrorism. This strategy establishes the objectives (ends), strategic concepts (ways), and resources (means) to manage any terrorist threat.

A. OVERVIEW

Even though terrorism is not the first priority in Honduras’ national objectives, it is of primary importance for the country’s government to formulate a national strategy that would avoid the Honduran government jumping abruptly into a terrorism crisis-management situation. Moreover, the international agreements and commitments to which Honduras is signatory require an internal stratagem capable of integrating national efforts into the regional and hemispheric strategies to combat terrorism.

The key element in formulating a strategy to combat terrorism is the development of “political vision and political will to carry out the fight.” Therefore, it is fundamental that the Honduran government officials understand the importance of their role in such a strategy and the importance that they must place on the threats of internal and transnational terrorism to the country’s national interests. Because combating terrorism is not the priority for Honduras, governmental officials have neglected the importance of formulating a specific strategy to deal with terrorism; moreover, the Honduran officials have only employed diplomatic efforts. In this way they are demonstrating a subjective

---

52 Crisis management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails.

53 Alex P. Shmid and Ronald D. Crelisten, eds., Western Response to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass Publisher, 1993), 257.
governmental position to deal with the “real” threat of terrorism, namely domestic or transnational. Since a strategy process is an intensely human activity concentrated in the upper level of governments, leadership plays a crucial role.\textsuperscript{54}

Although Central America is pursuing a regional effort to support the GWOT, Honduras needs to formulate a national strategy with the intention to integrate domestic resources into the overall context. In order to integrate these efforts, the Central American countries need first to eliminate several “showstoppers” that make this regional intention unrealistic. These showstoppers include, but are not limited to, territorial disputes,\textsuperscript{55} the lack of willingness of the governments to see terrorism as a clear and present danger, the military governments’ syndrome,\textsuperscript{56} unbalanced and poor economies, differences in the countries’ legislations, and the military power balance within the region.

The formulation of the strategy in this thesis may not perfectly align with the regional and/or hemispheric vision to combat terrorism; however, it does provide basic elements that would facilitate the integration of these strategies and encourage further study on the integration topic. Although this thesis identified several emerging threats in Latin America, including Honduras, it focused on the specific objective of combating terrorism. It is also important to understand that a strategy is fundamentally a choice; it reflects a preference for a future state or condition.\textsuperscript{57} Therefore, the present strategy is a flexible model that can be refined to fulfill a specific goal in combating terrorism; moreover, this strategy could be adapted to reach different objectives against threats related to

\textsuperscript{54} Grattan, \textit{The Strategy Process}, 155.

\textsuperscript{55} Honduras maintains territorial disputes with Nicaragua and El Salvador. Nicaragua disputes the boundaries of Honduran national waters in the Atlantic Ocean and the Nicaraguans and Salvadorans present an argument over maritime borders in the Fonseca Gulf in the Pacific. According to their argument, Honduras is limited in the continental sea to internal waters in the gulf only, which constraints Honduras’ overseas reach and the exploitation of resources in open waters. El Salvador lays claim to land areas along the international border as well as claiming possession of Isla Conejo (Honduran island). Isla Conejo is strategically located in the Fonseca Gulf and allows the projection of the Honduran maritime border further out of the gulf.

\textsuperscript{56} Military governments ruled Central America for more than three decades; therefore, politicians see the military as a threat to the democratic system instead of an instrument of national power.

\textsuperscript{57} Yarger, \textit{Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model}, 2.
terrorism. Some of these threats are drug trafficking, gang activities, organized crime, or the amalgamation of all of them. “National Security Strategy lays out broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instruments of power. From this National Security Strategy the major activities and departments develop subordinates strategies.”

1. **Strategy Definitions**

Richard Yarger points out that strategy is the employment of the instruments of national power to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation with, or in competition with, other actors pursuing their own objectives. The U.S. Army War College defines national security strategy as the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Yarger also argues that strategy provides direction for the coercive and persuasive use of national power to achieve specified objectives; thus strategy is proactive and anticipatory.

Strategy formulation is a process that is to end in outcomes. The decision provides ways of achieving the objectives or aims established for the organization within the means available. The process and the decision are influenced by the nature of the decision maker and the context in which the decision is made. Therefore, it is important that the political leadership understand their role in such a strategy, and that their responsibility to then fulfill the international commitments be acquired.

---

59 Ibid., 1-3
2. Approaches Against Terrorism

According to Steven and Gunaratna, there are two different approaches to combat terrorism: the *criminal justice model* (CJM), and the *war model* (WM). The CJM prioritizes the preservation of democratic principles, even at the expense of reduced effectiveness of counterterrorist measures. The WM places a stronger emphasis on restraining or countering terrorism rather than upholding liberal democratic rights.61

“During the second half of the 1980s, terrorism came to be defined by the U.S. as a crime, and terrorist criminals to be persecuted.”62 Even now, when President Bush has declared a war on terrorism, “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” a report issued by the State Department, says that terrorists must be brought to justice for their crimes.63 This is a contradiction that has created discrepancies among approaches for dealing with transnational terrorism. These discrepancies, augmented by the nature of contemporary terrorism, generate a “gray area” where it is not clear if terrorism should be treated as *crime* or as *war*.

“The debate over whether terrorism is a crime or an act of war is an old argument that is fundamentally artificial: Terrorism is both, of course, and the response must include law enforcement and military means, depending on the situation.”64 In Honduras, which has a different policy from other countries, there is limitation as to the use of employing the military in internal security issues, but not a restriction against employing the military in internal security issues as there is in the U.S.(as set forth in the Posse Comitatus Act). However, the Honduran constitution states, in article No. 274, that “the military will cooperate with law enforcement organizations, by request of the Ministry of Security, to combat terrorism, arms smuggling and organized crime.”65 The problem is that although

---

63 Ibid.
the constitution was amended in 1995, it does not actually address what organizations will be directly responsible for combating terrorism; therefore, it is necessary to create new legislative amendments in order to delegate and coordinate such responsibilities.

Due to its legislation and the current situation, Honduras could adopt a hybrid approach for combating terrorism. This hybrid approach might be a blend of the criminal justice model and the war model that could integrate national resources, thereby “encouraging organizations to cooperate with each other in pursuit of a common goal.”66 “The need for flexibility and the ability to use and combine all measures to suit specific cases are paramount in countering terrorism effectively.”67

3. Strategic Intent

The intent of the Honduran National Strategy must be to neutralize any attempt at a terrorist attack or terrorism threat to national interests, the government, the population, any infrastructure or means of transportation that could cause large numbers of civilian casualties. It must also be to deny the utilization of national territory to conduct and/or project acts of terrorism attacks, through defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive (counterterrorism) actions and to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism in order to maintain a stable environment and to secure the desired national objectives.

B. STRATEGY FORMULATION

1. Goal: Prevent Terrorist Actions

In order to prevent terrorist actions, Honduras has to integrate national resources in order to apply coordinated defensive measures with the intention of defending the sovereignty, territory, population, and national interests from terrorist threats.


a. **Objective: Organize the Counterterrorism Infrastructure**

The organization of a Counterterrorism infrastructure (Appendix A) makes necessary the assignment of authority and responsibility for every person involved, from the political authority down to the executors.

The strategic concept requires the government to reactivate the National Defense and Security Council (NSC) and to create a National Counterterrorism Group (NCTG)\(^{68}\) under the NSC. The NCTG would integrate and exercise control over necessary national counterterrorism resources. It would also integrate, in its organization, appropriate staff personnel and supportive teams capable of managing any act of terrorism. This counterterrorism organization would establish levels of authority, a structure, and a chain of command, with lines of communication as short and direct as possible, in order to reduce bureaucracy and expedite the “decision making” process. This strategic concept would create government controlled conditions that could prevent, deter, and respond to any terrorism threat.

The resources required for this organization include the National Security Council which would be the top “decision making” organization; the National Counterterrorism Group, which would be responsible for managing crisis situations; the Strategic National Intelligence Bureau (SNIB)\(^{69}\) which would be responsible for integrating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence input from the different intelligence agencies; the Honduran Armed Forces, which would be in a leading role and would provide the Counterterrorism Tactical Assault Unit\(^{70}\) and all sea, air and land assets required to combat terrorism; the Honduran National Police, which would be in a supporting role and would provide first responder assets; and the Fire Department, which would be responsible for managing first-aid and fire control systems. Every organization within the

---

\(^{68}\) The NCTG may include permanent staff members, crisis management, evacuation, risk analysis, public affairs, and public safety teams.

\(^{69}\) The SNIB is actually in the foundation process.

\(^{70}\) The CTAU exists as part of the Special Forces Battalion, but needs to be reorganized and reequipped. The armament and equipment ages from the 1980’s; therefore, most of it is obsolete; moreover, the unit lacks transportation and communication systems. These are areas where foreign military aid would be very beneficial.
counterterrorism infrastructure would be responsible for formulating its own strategies and organizing their individual resources as part of the overall Honduran national security systems to combat terrorism.

b. Objective: Structure Pre-Incident Plans

Pre-incident planning involves preparing for an occurrence that the government hopes will never come to pass. However, efforts involving information gathering, risk analysis, organization, training, information operations, determining logistical needs, and purchasing necessary supplies and equipment must be implemented.71

The strategic concept requires that pre-incident planning would be a joint effort as part of a counterterrorism policy with the intention of integrating necessary resources, coordinating specific operations, and delineating authority and responsibilities for the organization in order to anticipate any terrorist incident. Pre-incident plans would include “what if” situations and would be reviewed periodically and updated as necessary.72 Furthermore, the pre-incident stage should be based on “capability-base planning” where more flexible, adaptive, and robust capabilities are offered to engage a wider range of challenges that depict the emerging threats in Honduras.73

Diplomats might not be the leaders in the pre-planning process, but they could be required to develop the international consensus to integrate regional and hemispheric strategies, due to the fact that transnational terrorism is a political matter. Intelligence and the military forces would be the supported instruments providing detailed information gathering and planning expertise to the NCTG. The National Police and Fire Department would provide their respective input and expertise for pre-incident planning. The Ministry of the

72 Ibid., 44.
73 Paul K. Davis and Brian Jenkins Michael, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,[2002]), 37.
Treasury would present an adequate budget to finance the strategy and would coordinate with other instruments of national power to overcome shortages through foreign aid if necessary.

c. **Objective: Share Intelligence and Apply Information Controls**

The role of intelligence agencies is paramount in the fight against terrorism. Intelligence might be considered the “first line of defense” against terrorism, as well for other important policy instruments of national power. On the other hand, the relationship and importance of the media to terrorism and counterterrorism is another factor, (of the informational instrument of power) to have in mind in the prevention of terrorism. The media and public opinion are central elements in the terrorist organization’s attack policy. Terrorists can use the media to convey propaganda, mobilize support, and disrupt counterterrorism responses. The media are supposed to be neutral, but can change or influence a situation.

The strategic concept requires that intelligence should be gathered and shared among leading agencies combating terrorism, but it also should be centrally directed and coordinated by the government (Appendix B). “Whatever the resources, and however the data are collected, intelligence must include at least potential targets, target profiles and terrorists.” Although intelligence is critical for pre-incident planning, it should be updated throughout all other stages. Due to the variety of emerging threats in Honduras, it is suggested that for improving efficiency, specific information requirements should be established for every agency. Therefore, as general guidance, military intelligence requirements should be focused on terrorism and drug trafficking threats. Due to the nature of potential external influences, this would let the police intelligence focus on gangs.

---


75 Steven and Gunaratna, *Counterterrorism*, 117-118.

and domestic crime and the General Criminal Investigation Directorate (DGIC) focus on organized crime. The military and international police (INTERPOL) should be the connecting agencies for sharing intelligence between SNIB and international intelligence agencies.

The informational instrument would employ strategic psychological operations with the intention of enhancing the image of the legitimate government by institutionalizing the process of public diplomacy, in order to demonstrate the national counterterrorism policy with the aim to integrating the national policy with regional and hemispheric efforts against terrorism. The NCTG’s public affairs team also would be responsible for controlling the media, because accuracy is often sacrificed in the media environment by speed or emotional impact. This implies that the media runs on financial impetus but not on moral principles. Although the media can benefit the terrorists, it can also benefit the government; therefore, the government should take advantage of the media through informational campaigns covering terrorist acts and atrocities to harden public resolve against terrorism. The media should exercise voluntary self-restraint, try to avoid live coverage, use experts on terrorism, obey the crisis authorities, and work closely with security forces; moreover, journalists also need training in how to responsibly cover the terrorist crisis.77

The government would provide the national information policy and would integrate all information operations from the other instruments of power. The SNIB should be the agency leading the intelligence instrument and would centralize all intelligence flows from domestic and international intelligence agencies (Appendix B). The NCTG should have a public affairs team in charge of issuing media coverage policies and training journalists in how to deal with terrorist incidents. Military forces should handle intelligence regarding terrorism; however, all other intelligence agencies should cooperate in merging information that could contribute to the prevention of terrorism acts.

---

77 Steven and Gunaratna, Counterterrorism, 119-120.
d. **Objective: Conduct Risk Assessment**

Risk can be described in terms of its potential for occurrence and its capacity for loss. Risk assessment should attempt to evaluate the possibility of a terrorism incident and assign a degree of risk to it. Moreover, risk assessment would survey to ascertain how high the probability is of one of these risks occurring, how well the government can respond, and how well the government can carry out its response once the terrorism incident materializes. Once the risk is identified, the objective is to neutralize or eliminate the hazards creating that risk.78

The strategic concept requires that all instruments of power involved in counterterrorism conduct a risk analysis to identify and assess factors that may jeopardize the success of achieving the prevention of terrorist actions. Every governmental organization’s risk assessment team analysis should include: an asset definition, which would establish the boundaries of what is to be reviewed; threat identification, which would identify any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to the asset under review; determination of the probability of occurrence (Appendix C), which would procure an overall indication of how probable it is that a potential threat might be exercised against the risk assessment asset under review; a determination of the impact of the threat (Fig. 4), which would identify the risk level that could be assigned to each threat, resulting in a decision of the appropriate action to be taken; a recommendation of controls that would possibly eliminate the risk or at least reduce the risk to an acceptable level; and the submittal of the proper documentation, which, once the risk assessment is complete, would help decision makers to decide on policy, procedures, budget, and system and management changes for neutralizing terrorism threats.79

The NCTG’s risk analysis team would be the centralized organization where risk assessments from subordinates (intelligence, police,

---


armed forces, fire department) and external organizations (ministries of foreign affairs, internal affairs, and treasury) would be reevaluated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBABILITY</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>MEDIUM</th>
<th>LOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPACT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High – Corrective actions must be implemented  
Medium – Corrective actions should be implemented  
Low – No actions required at this time

Table 1. Probability-Impact Matrix

**e. Objective: Implement Target Hardening Programs**

The physical security program must be an essential element in antiterrorism models. The main limitation is the cost of defensive measures and the restriction of movement; therefore, a basic approach is to start the “target hardening” program based on a crime prevention plan and build it up to reach counterterrorism standards through constant evaluations and identification of high-risk facilities or areas. The purpose of “target hardening” programs is to make it more difficult for terrorist intelligence cells to gain access to areas from which they could collect information or even from getting access those areas at all.

---


82 High risk areas include, but are not limited to, governmental buildings, power plants, oil refineries, airports, maritime ports, industrial facilities, military bases, health infrastructures, cybernetic networks, and international embassies.

The strategic concept requires that all instruments of national power would provide guidance to their agencies in order to identify “high risk” facilities or areas. Once these areas have been identified, physical security programs and evaluation actions should be implemented to prevent terrorist action and to ensure the effectiveness of the security systems. Every agency would implement or enhance physical security plans with emphasis on “access control, parking areas, visitor areas, barriers around sensitive areas, intrusion-detection systems, and security guards.” 84 Private security agencies must be incorporated into the national security system. These security systems should be validated through physical security surveys, (conducted in a cross-agency fashion) in order to facilitate the identification of weaknesses in the security system; moreover, random checks and inspections should also be used to test the program. 85 The state should establish proper government infrastructure in unattended areas in La Mosquitia, Olancho, and, Colon in order to deny these areas to terrorist activities.

The resources include the security departments of all civil governmental ministries and would also include military forces, police forces, and private security agencies; however, the validation of security systems would rely on the NCTG.

f. Objective: Enhance Financial Control

Money laundering and drug trafficking can lead to the financing of terrorism. The government is encouraged to enhance a “transparent” nationwide financial control system capable of detecting and analyzing financial transactions that may be related to illegal activities.

The strategic concept requires the establishment of a governmental database system capable of providing domestic financial information to agencies involved in counterterrorism operations. Moreover, this capability should be able to exchange international financial information with other countries to encourage international cooperation for combating transnational terrorism. The economic

---

84 Karl A. Seger, 145-147.
85 Ibid., 142-149.
instrument should establish a Terrorist Financial Tracking Center capable of identifying terrorist groups, assessing their funding sources and fundraising methods, and providing information to intelligence agencies in order to prevent terrorist actions. This center should also include a drug trafficking financial branch capable of tracking money laundering from drug trafficking and to identify the relationship of those illegal transactions with terrorist groups.

The resources involved in this objective include the diplomatic, economic, and intelligence instruments of national power. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would ensure that public diplomacy would create the necessary conditions to track down illegal financial transactions of an international nature and carry out the fulfillment of extradition accords of identified illegal transaction performers. The Terrorist Financial Tracking Center should provide information of all domestic and transnational financial transactions to the SNIB that would then process the information and provide intelligence regarding money laundering and illicit financial actions to the NCTG.

g. **Objective: Exercise Border and Transportation Control**

To better secure and control the country’s borders, border and transportation programs should be enhanced with the intention of improving document security; tracking, monitoring, and interdicting suspected terrorists; strengthening port security and aviation security; protecting critical infrastructure; and improving cybersecurity.

The strategic concept requires an inter-agency coordinated effort. The government should establish an interlinked general database connecting the SNIB agency, the General Immigration Office, and the Persons’ National Registration Office (RNP), in order to secure the distribution of national identification documents and track down possible terrorist infiltrations. The NSI would also track down and monitor potential terrorists and would provide this

---


87 Ibid., 37.
information to the NCTG, which would direct the military or the police to intercept the potential terrorists. The military is responsible for the security of Honduras’ international borders in order to prevent any transnational terrorism activity. However, due to “international political advisory,” the Honduran government sized down its military forces. For example, the military ground forces were sized down from a battalion size of 700 men to a battalion size of 300 men. Therefore, the military should be reconstituted in order to have enough strength to assign personnel for securing international land borders. The security of maritime borders relies on the Honduran Navy; therefore, the government should look for the ways, perhaps through foreign international aid, to enhance the Honduran Navy’s capabilities. The National Port Enterprise (ENP) supervised and supported by the military, would provide sea port, cargo container ships, rail cars and truck security; moreover, the security of cruise ships and ferry boats would also need supervision to prevent terrorist attacks. The control and security of airports and national air space will continue to rely on the Civil Aeronautical General (DGAC) and the Honduran Air Force (FAH). The DGAC is currently capable of controlling and tracking commercial air traffic and to linking/sharing this information with regional air traffic control agencies; however, it has to generate programs and introduce updated technology to improve airport and aircraft security. The government should improve the interception capabilities of the FAH through the enhancement and acquisition of better combat and radar units/equipment. The National Telecommunications Council (CONATEL) would generate policies in order to employ necessary measures to prevent any cyber attack to national cyber-networks.

The resources to attain this objective include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would employ public policy to enhance borders and transportation control and to obtain foreign aid; the intelligence instrument, which would submit updated information of potential terrorists trying to circulate in Honduras; military forces, which would be paramount in establishing defensive measures; ENP, which would manage maritime port operations; DGAC, which would manage commercial air traffic and airport security; CONATEL, which would monitor cyber-
networks; and the Ministry of the Treasury, which would finance this strategy and
would also advise the government of ways to finance the activities to exercise
border and transportation control.

2. **Goal: Deter and Influence Terrorism**

“Terrorists are not a single foe, and no simple theory of deterrence can
possibly apply to the spectrum”\(^8\) of current terrorists; therefore, in the long-term,
“influence” on terrorists is one way to prevent terrorists from executing actions.
The other way for terrorists to be “deterred” in the short-term is by creating
antiterrorism and counterterrorism measures at a tactical level to persuade the
terrorists that a contemplated attack would fail.\(^9\)

a. **Objective: Identify Motivations and Root Causes**

Political, social, and economic factors are the root problems that
lead to terrorism. On the other hand, separatism, groups’ rivalry, capitalist
interventions from outside, mercenary, political, religious, repression, frustration,
and transformation of governments are some motivations that might marry with
the root problems of terrorism. \(^90\)

The strategic concept would require that the Honduran government
establish dedicated research and analysis corporations (think tanks)\(^91\) that would
help to identify the motivations and roots, namely domestic and transnational,
that could cause an unstable environment in the country. Furthermore, these
analysis agencies should advise the government in delineating proper policies
and formulating potential solutions that could help the government to deter and
influence terrorists from becoming active. Analysis teams within the SNIB, the

---

\(^8\)Davis and Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda*, 7.


\(^90\)David J. Whittaker, *Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World*, First ed. (New

\(^91\) These corporations should be high-quality, objective, research and analysis organizations
with governmental or private nonprofit backgrounds.
military, and the police intelligence agencies would perform their own assessments of domestic and international situations and would also incorporate the research corporations’ reports to their [intelligence agencies] analysis in order to provide inputs that could identify motivations for terrorists and causes of terrorism.

The resources required for this objective would include the Ministry of the Treasury to finance these non-profit corporations and national intelligence assets; and the SNIB, which would facilitate information analysis, dissemination and intelligence exchange with the NCTG, military, police, and DGIC intelligence agencies.

b. Objective: Manifest Strength, Determination and Effectiveness

Terrorism is not the first priority for the Honduran government; therefore, there is a sense of weakness caused by the lack of exhibiting the government’s strength and determination to deter terrorism in Honduras. However, historically effective counterterrorist actions, led by the military during the 1980s, had a long-term deterrence effect on domestic terrorism.

The strategic concept requires that specialists in the terrorism arena would encourage the government to project a sense of strength and determination to combat terrorism. This could be achieved by a “well established” democratic Honduran government by implementing firm government policies against terrorism, by improving military capabilities,92 and by providing the military with specific legal functions through legislation reforms, which would recognize the military as the leading instrument to combat terrorism. Terrorism indeed is a political act; therefore, it should be managed by a professional and apolitical agency such as the military.93 The government should also take

---

92 It is important to point out that currently the military needs to reorient its doctrine towards an unconventional environment in order to adapt its doctrine to the strategy against terrorism; moreover, the needs for transportation and communication equipment, and the lack of funds to maintain existing assets, would require an increment of the military aid provided by the U.S.

93 There have been situations where members of the National Police have gone on strikes against the government; such actions reveal how unstable the security environment can become.
advantage of the military’s experience from managing terrorist situations in the past, which might also influence terrorists to not attempt to confront a professional adversary who was already to be proven to be effective in the future. Moreover, it would be easier to align the government effort through a coordinated policy led by the military that would align with the hemispheric and global campaign against terrorism. However, “a high quality intelligence system, public support and cooperation of the mass media and the private sector”\textsuperscript{94} would also strengthen the government policy.

The resources for achieving this goal include the President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who would demonstrate to the hemispheric community the will and determination of the Honduran government for combating terrorism and would aim to gain public support; the SNIB, which would exploit a high-quality intelligence system and the cooperation of the mass media; the armed forces, which would employ newly-enhanced capabilities (in a supported role) to deter terrorist actions; and the Ministry of the Treasury, which would reframe the governmental budget in order to support the objective achievement and would advise the diplomatic instrument towards obtaining foreign aid.

c. \textit{Objective: Create Threats to Terrorists}

Davis and Jenkins point out that options that might cause threat to terrorists should be identified. For this purpose, these analysts argue that terrorist systems have to be broken down into participant categories; namely, leaders, foot soldiers, financers, logisticians, state supporters, populations, and religious leaders.\textsuperscript{95}

The ultimate strategic concept would require that the government incorporate political warfare and actions that could (Davis and Jenkins 2002, 1-86) harm the terrorist’s power, cause, families, and survival. For leaders, the


\textsuperscript{95}Davis and Jenkins, \textit{Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda}, 15.
government should create conditions that would turn leaders against each other, convince them that attacking Honduras would undermine their cause, and punish their families by withholding privileges and prevent rewards. For foot soldiers, raising operational risks, the effectiveness of military and security forces, the folly of the cause’s path, and the punishment of their families would act as deterre nts. For financiers, discrediting their cause with society, loss of wealth, prison, death, and dishonor, and the same previous actions against their families, would deter their actions. For logisticians, prison, death, and dishonor would prevent their illicit activities. For state supporters, the imposition of military, diplomatic, and economic sanctions, within the Honduran government capabilities, and an effort to convince them that attacking Honduras would undermine their cause would deter their support to terrorists. For the population, providing hope and reminding them that the legal government is more powerful should help to deter the spread of terrorism.96

The resources required for this objective would include the Ministry of the Treasury, which would employ national economical sanctions; the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, which would employ political actions and undermine transnational and domestic terrorist’s causes; the armed forces, which would employ coercive diplomacy and counterterrorism operations; police forces, which would control the population and support military operations; and the SNIB, which would employ covert political warfare against terrorists.

3. Goal: Respond to Terrorist Actions

Once terrorists are able to overwhelm the antiterrorist measures and other deterrence measures that are in place, the situation turns into a crisis. The problems of a terrorism crisis are too complex to expect a single agency to deal with them successfully;97 therefore, the response needs a multidimensional counterterrorist capability, including economic, military, legal, political, punitive,
social, psychological, and communication measures. Additionally, the possibility of integrating national assets with an international response would demand interoperability means and common techniques, tactics, and procedures. However, regardless of the possibility of an integral response, specific responsibilities should also be delineated to prevent doubling of efforts, competing rivalries, and turf wars over jurisdiction, funding, and institutional interests.\(^98\) For example, the Honduran government should enact legislative reforms to incorporate the NCTG into the NSC and to allow the military the leading role in combating terrorism; however, the police and other agencies would have a supporting role as part of this strategy.

Even though specific responsibilities should be delineated, a more coordinated response would require employing the “hybrid” model, previously described in this chapter, which could provide a more flexible approach for combating terrorism. In organizing the response to terrorist actions, the goal of responding to terrorist actions should be divided into two broad objectives: crisis management and consequence management.

**a. Objective: Crisis Management**

“Effective crisis management depends on anticipating and planning for even the worst-case scenario and requires training and regular exercises to allow responders to practice and understand their appropriate roles.”\(^99\) Crisis management would be focused on terrorist attacks, bomb threats, hijacking, and hostage taking.

The strategic concept would require that, in the event of a terrorist crisis, the police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians would be the “first responders” who would contain the area, stabilize the situation, and evacuate victims and bystanders while the initial information is confirmed and the NCTG notified. Once the incident is confirmed as a terrorist action, the

---

\(^98\) Steven and Gunaratna, *Counterterrorism*, 114, 122.


jurisdiction would be transferred to the NCTG. Then the NCTG would activate intelligence collection activities and proper contingency plans. The plans should consider long-term, diversionary, or “multiple event” situations. Once the NCTG is in charge, a negotiation process would take place, while the CTAU would occupy a forwarding base and act as relief-first responders from the crisis site in the event of a terrorist attack threat, hijacking, or a hostage taking situation. In the event of a bomb threat, the military bomb squad would be in charge of neutralizing the bomb. In any event, if the situation requires it, additional resources would be called up to support and manage a potential long-term crisis. If NCTG negotiations fail, a tactical assault could be the course of action; however, a military assault would be considered as the last resource (Appendix D).

The resources required for crisis management would include the NSC would be the organization with overall responsibility for decision making in the event of a crisis; the NCTG, which would be in charge of crisis management on the site; the military forces which would be the leading agency in the crisis management as critical responders; the police, fire department, and emergency medical technicians who would be the first responders; the SNIB, which would manage the intelligence process; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would employ public diplomacy to coordinate foreign counterterrorism resources whenever required; and the Supreme National Court, which would manage all legal circumstances.

b. **Objective: Consequence Management**

“Consequence Management is predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by an act of terrorism.”

---

"There is often no clear point in time when resolution of a terrorist incident moves from the crisis to the consequence management stage. Indeed, these phases may occur simultaneously or, in some cases, the consequence management phase may actually precede the identification of a terrorist event."101

The strategic concept would require creating a terrorism consequence management team under the Permanent Contingencies Committee (COPECO). COPECO is the national agency in charge of preventing, mitigating and dealing with consequences of natural disasters. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack or other crisis situation, COPECO would direct the consequence management team to work under the control of the NCTG. The NCTG would issue policies and direct actions in order to deal with “emergencies, physical damage, and possible collateral damage, and the need to get operations back to normal as quickly and safely as possible”102 after a terrorist attack. In the event of the transition from crisis management to consequence management, the NCTG would transfer jurisdiction from military/police to the Fire Department and the Health and Medical Department in order to manage emergencies and evacuate victims. The military would turn into a supporting agency in order to provide necessary assets to mitigate the situation and provide assistance to the police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians. The police would be the leading agency in charge of controlling the population and preventing vandalism. In the event of a successful terrorist attack, the NCTG would provide direct jurisdiction to first responders (police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians) in order to stabilize the situation.

The resources required for consequence management would be similar in a crisis management situation, with the exception of the supporting role of the military and the incorporation of COPECO.

---


C. CONCLUSION

Even though terrorism is not the first priority for Honduras, the proposed strategy formulated in this chapter would provide a choice in determining how Honduras should use its instruments of national power abroad to pursue the goals of preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism. The strategy would establish a framework that would facilitate determining how the country should spend its national resources in order to build up a counterterrorism infrastructure to attain the strategic intent. It is fundamental that Honduran political leaders understand the importance of their role in this strategy and the importance that they must place on the threats that internal and transnational terrorism can inflict on the country’s national interests.

It is of paramount importance that a multidimensional approach, where diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments (Appendix E) would convey a synergetic effort; however, specific responsibilities and leading roles should be established for the executors. Honduras cannot afford to have two executing organizations (military Special Forces and police Cobras) oriented to the same counterterrorism task. The police forces are not currently able to adequately deal with domestic crime and gangs; therefore, the police should employ all their assets in controlling domestic crime and gangs and leave the leading counterterrorism role to the military. The military is more experienced and better equipped; therefore, it would be easier for them to rebuild the counterterrorism capability. Moreover, it would be more convenient for the military to cross train and operate with regional and hemispheric forces and to build up interoperability capabilities.

“Some risk is inherent to all strategy and the best any strategy can offer is a favorable balance against failure.”103 Art Lykke gave coherent form to a theory of strategy with his articulation of the three key elements (ends, ways, and means), and if these three elements are not in balance there is an assumption of

---

greater risk.\textsuperscript{104} Any strategy should be evaluated in order to minimize risk by identifying shortages in any of the three elements of such strategy. Once shortages are identified, it is important to recommend possible solutions in order to make the strategy functional.

\textsuperscript{104} Yarger, 5.
IV. STRATEGY EVALUATION

Chapter III formulated the Honduran National Security Strategy to Combat Terrorism. The proposed formulation applied for a developmental strategy based on future threats to Honduras and objectives which are not limited by the state’s existing capabilities. Moreover, the improvement of state capabilities must be focused on balancing the employment of national resources, strategic concepts, and objectives with the intention of reducing risks and the attainment of preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorist actions. The present chapter will evaluate if the implementation of such strategy could reach the desired effect, if the designed actions could be accomplished by the resources committed, and if the consequences of the expenditures were justified by the importance of the desired effect.

A. OVERVIEW

Although Honduras has not yet suffered a transnational terrorist attack and domestic terrorist activities have not been detected since the peace accords in Central America in the early 1990s, the convulsive internal environment, other conditions that make Honduras vulnerable to terrorism, and the evolving characteristics of emerging transnational terrorism threats require that the Honduran national security strategy should be analyzed and validated. Moreover, that validated strategy should be constantly reviewed in order to keep it current with the performance characteristics needed to fulfill its purpose.

“A valid strategy must have an appropriate balance of objectives, strategic concepts, and resources or its success is at great risk.”\(^{105}\) Therefore, with the intention of examining the balance in the formulated Honduran strategy, it is necessary to identify the strategy’s potential risks and suggest possible changes

to find the proper balance. In order to find this balance, the Honduran security strategy will be analyzed through the following concepts: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to point out the existing facts and assumptions of the Honduran situation. Such facts and assumptions include:

1. Facts
   • Counterterrorism is not the first priority in Honduras for its national objectives.
   • Honduras has not yet suffered a direct transnational terrorism attack.
   • Honduras committed to support the “Global War on Terrorism” and signed international agreements with the OAS and the UN.
   • Honduras currently lacks a counterterrorism strategy; moreover, it does not even have a current counterterrorism structure.
   • Honduras does not have enough economic resources to support counterterrorism efforts.
   • Historically, the Honduran counterterrorism apparatus has been led by the military.
   • A Strategic National Intelligence Bureau is in the founding process.
   • There have been no domestic terrorist incidents since the early 1990s.
   • Middle Eastern terrorist groups have declared war against the Eastern Hemisphere.
   • Honduran politicians underestimate the military as an instrument of national power.
   • Law enforcement has been incapable of controlling drug trafficking, organized crime, and gangs (maras).
Honduras and the U.S. signed a bilateral military assistance agreement in 1954.

The Honduran government deployed military troops to Iraq in order to support the “GWOT.”

U.S. foreign aid to Honduras has been decreasing since 2003.

Most critical infrastructure security is overseen by private security agencies.

2. Assumptions

- The Honduran government is willing to support the GWOT.

- The Honduran government would activate the National Security Council and organize the national counterterrorism infrastructure.

- The U.S. would increase in increments the foreign aid in order to enhance the Honduran counterterrorism capability.

- The Honduran strategy would be suitable for integration into regional and hemispheric counterterrorism efforts.

- The military and the police would carry out inter-agency cooperation to combat terrorism, regardless of institutional interests.

- The Honduran population would support counterterrorism policies regardless of the discomfort that these policies might impose.

- Honduras faces an unprecedented terrorism threat.

- Some counterterrorism preparation is good, but more is better.106

---

B. ANALYSIS

1. Suitability

The proposed strategy to combat terrorism now can be evaluated in terms of finding out its appropriateness for the purpose of its strategic intent. This strategic intent involves neutralizing any attempt at terrorist attack, denying the use of national territory as a platform for conducting and/or projecting terrorist attacks, and the employment of antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations in order to maintain a stable environment and to secure national objectives. The strategic intent will be compared and analyzed with the strategy’s objectives in the following matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organize Counterterrorism Infrastructure</td>
<td>Neutralizing Terrorist Attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure Pre-Incident Plans</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Intelligence and Information Control</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Risk Assessment</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement “Target Hardening” Programs</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance Financial Control</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Border and Transportation Control</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify Motivations and Root Causes</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifest Strength, Determination, Effectiveness</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Threats to Terrorists</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Management</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Suitability Comparison Matrix

As seen in this comparison matrix, most of the strategy’s objectives are aligned with the purposes of the strategic intent; however, creating threats to
terrorists might only apply to domestic terrorists due to the assumption that transnational terrorists might be transitory on Honduran territory. Moreover, it would be important to prioritize the purpose parameters in relationship to attaining objectives. In conclusion, by comparing parameters and objectives, the attainment of this strategy would accomplish the strategy’s end state.

2. Feasibility

One of the big challenges for small countries like Honduras is to identify limits in committing national resources for a specific strategy. As stated early in this chapter, one of the facts is that Honduras has scarce resources, even for fulfilling the requirements of priority national objectives. It is important to set priorities in any strategy, “but priorities require clear, results-oriented objectives.”

It is important to identify whether Honduran national resources are available and likely to achieve the strategy’s objectives; moreover, if the actions of this strategy can be accomplished by the resources available. “Defining where the limits might be could determine how effective a strategy can be.”

For the purpose of this analysis, the resources have been grouped in the traditional DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) model (Appendix E). The following matrix will compare the national resources that are available and a priority to attain the strategy’s objectives in Honduras, in order to find out deficiencies that might put such strategy at risk.

---


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Informational</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organize Counterterrorism</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure Pre-Incident Plans</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Intelligence and Information Control</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Risk Assessment</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement “Target Hardening”</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance Financial Control</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Border and Transportation Control</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify Motivations and Root Causes</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifest Strength, Determination, Effectiveness</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Threats to Terrorists</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Management</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence Management</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resources Availability:**
1= Available  2= Capable to Mobilize  3= Not on hand
4= Need Internal Support  5= Need External Support  N/A= Not Applicable

**Table 3.** Feasibility Comparison Matrix

**a. Assessment**

This assessment of the Honduran capability in the GWOT includes the strategy's objectives, the priority of such objectives, and the resources available. For the purpose of an objective analysis, the strategy’s priorities are rated A (first priority), B (second priority), or C (last priority). National resources are rated 1 (resources are available), 2 (resources that the government needs to mobilize and/or organizations that the government is capable of creating), 3 (Resources that are not on hand but with minimal effort can be made available), 4 (resources that are not available for counterterrorism but that the government has the capability to reorient from other missions based on priorities), or 5
(resources that are not available and need international foreign assistance in order to finance or acquire). An overall average is provided that depicts the lower average as the areas with less resources shortages.

(1) Diplomacy. Diplomacy is the instrument that currently possesses the best level of resources available. Most resources that are not in place for this strategy could be mobilized with minimal constraints by the government.

(2) Informational. Intelligence is the primary resource for combating terrorism. Even though the Honduran government is in the process of organizing the SNIB, this bureau is not designed as the central intelligence managing agency. The main purpose of such a bureau is simply to provide strategic intelligence estimates to the president; therefore, this organization needs a broader reach, along with extended economic and personnel resources, to make it functional to fulfill the present strategy requirements. Moreover, military intelligence capabilities are at a minimum due to the past lack of vision of the military leadership in adapting to a new context, the down-sizing of military forces, and the lack of funds to run intelligence operations. It is recommended that military intelligence capabilities similar to the capabilities that Honduras had during the 1980s be reestablished. Furthermore, there is the need to request additional funds, both domestic and international to enhance this capability. Police intelligence is in a similar situation as military intelligence. “Agencies allow information to fall between the cracks, with one agency failing to communicate effectively with another;”\textsuperscript{110} therefore, an inter-agency intelligence integration is recommended to make this strategy successful. Moreover, the implementation of a functional intelligence model suitable for this strategy (Appendix B) is needed.

\textsuperscript{110} Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes, \textit{Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy}, 294.
(3) Military. The military role is the cornerstone of the Honduran strategy. There are six objectives in this strategy that depict the military operating under major resource constraints (doctrine, personnel, equipment, and financial). The reasons for such deficiencies are due to the lack of understanding of the emerging context; the down-sizing of the armed forces; the incapability of political leadership to provide for the renewal of weapons, transportation, and information systems; the lack of willingness to improve Special Forces capabilities; and the lack of financial resources to support the role of the military in this strategy.

In order to overcome these deficiencies, it is important that the political leadership come to understand that the important issue is not the problem of controlling the military but of assessing if the military will be capable and efficient in accomplishing the mission. On the other hand, the military leadership must understand that the current context requires the transformation of the “unbreakable” conventional wisdom into a more flexible and adaptive unconventional model capable of neutralizing any emerging threat. Therefore, a comprehensive review of current military doctrine is recommended, along with a reorientation towards a more unconventional model. It is also necessary for the military mind-set to reorient at all ranks in order to frame a more capable and efficient asset to counter the current and emerging threat. The Honduran military hardware ages from the 1980’s; therefore, an incremental change in weapons, transportation, and information systems is essential to succeed in fighting terrorism. The U.S. military aid to Honduras is at such a low level that these technological changes are, in essence, utopian. The 2006 Congressional Research Service report to the U.S. Congress about U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America states that Honduras is allocated $2.09 million for FY2005 military assistance and 2.1 for FY2006. This is in contrast to El Salvador, which was allocated $ 3.09 million for FY2005 and $ 14.6 million for FY2006.111 Was the Salvadoran increment the product of its supporting to the war in Iraq or does the

U.S. considers El Salvador a better ally? Then, why was there not an equivalent benefit for Honduras for deploying its troops to Iraq?\textsuperscript{112} The question here is whether the U.S. is considering the time that El Salvador has been in Iraq compared to the quality and willingness of the Honduran support for such a war.

The military actions proposed in this strategy could not be accomplished with the means available; therefore, the military leadership should implement necessary reforms to make the military more suitable for accomplishing the desired effect. The government also should look for the appropriate way to overcome these deficiencies by employing diplomatic measures in order to persuade foreign governments to invest in Honduras for hemispheric security.

(4) Economic. The most deficient of all instruments of this strategy is the economic one. The U.S. has been one of the most important contributors of foreign aid to Honduras. Although Honduras deployed troops to Iraq, and is also commitment to supporting the GWOT, the U.S. has been decreasing foreign aid to its long time ally.

Sullivan pointed out that the U.S. provided considerable foreign assistance to Honduras over the past two decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $1.6 billion in economic and military aid as the country struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts. During that period, Honduras became a staging area for U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by anti-Sandinista opponents known as “The Contras.” In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts subsided. Foreign aid funding amounted to $41 million for FY2002, $53 million for FY2003, $43 million for FY2004, and an estimated $41 million for FY2005. The Bush Administration requested almost $37 million for FY2006. These amounts include support for a variety of development assistance projects and a large “Peace Corps” presence of over 250 volunteers.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{112} Honduras deployed two battalion size contingents to Iraq, one in 2003 and the other in 2004.

Honduras has one of the poorest economies in the hemisphere; therefore, in order to have a balanced strategy and reduce risk, the Honduran government must look for the appropriate way to acquire the necessary funds to make this security strategy feasible. Intelligence and the military are the two major areas where additional funds are required. To overcome this deficiency it is suggested that the Honduran government persuade the U.S., as the proponent government of the GWOT, to provide the necessary resources to support this approach that would be an effort multiplier for hemispheric security. However, in order to convince the U.S. to invest in this small country, Honduras must demonstrate how these resources would be employed. This is where the proposed strategy becomes valuable.

3. Acceptability

It is known that not all terrorist actions can be prevented and that implementing security strategies might result in discomfort for the population, but it is preferable to sacrifice some national resources and personal comfort in order to reduce the risk to common welfare.

Honduras has limited resources and priorities other than committing to combat terrorism. However, it would not be acceptable to let terrorism exploit the country’s vulnerabilities; therefore, essential measures need to be taken. In the U.S., “several analysts have suggested that it will be difficult to invest the necessary time and resources to prepare for what they view as a low-probability event”\textsuperscript{114} in their country. Consequently, if this reasoning comes from the world’s most powerful nation, how can one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere employ its limited resources in the campaign against terrorism that has not yet directly threatened the country? The problem is that preventing terrorist incidents emphasizes the need to rely on domestic resources and manpower that are both scarce in Honduras. However, if the government were able to mobilize the population and the private business sector in order to create a comprehensive national effort against terrorism, the cost consequences of the strategy would be

\textsuperscript{114} Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes, \textit{Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy}, 278.
justified due to the importance of the attainment of national objectives. Even though this strategy was designed to combat terrorism, it could be adapted to support combating current threats of drug trafficking and organized crime, which are different in nature but similar in reach.

This national security strategy suggests a multidimensional approach in which all instruments of national power need to converge. However, this hybrid model suggests that the military should be the primary element leading counterterrorism efforts; therefore, the Honduran government should accept such an approach and support it with political will and diplomacy in order to enhance the military’s counterterrorism capability. Once again, it is fundamental that the government come to understand that the important issue is not the problem of controlling the military but enhancing its capability to carry out this critical strategy. Moreover, the Ministry of Security, in charge of the National Police, has to understand that this is not a budgeting-war; it is a fight against terrorism that could put national objectives and the survivability of the nation at stake. Therefore, the police should accept the supporting role and allow the military to be the leading organization in combating terrorism.

---

115 Military coups are not an issue anymore. The Honduran government needs to understand that current military generations are committed to supporting the country’s development; therefore, political leaders should see the military as a comprehensive element of national power, rather than as a threat to the democratic system.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Current world economic models have opened borders and facilitated conditions for non-traditional threats. Terrorism, drug trafficking, gang activities, and organized crime are illegal activities with a transnational connotation currently affecting Latin America.

There are two major trends that have altered security issues in this region: On one hand is the failure of neoliberalism that has aggravated social problems, and on the other hand is the increased concern of the U.S. with terrorism as the primary security threat. Honduras has not yet received a direct attack organized though current international terrorism; therefore, the government has moved the threat of terrorism to a lower level of importance. Even though terrorism is not currently a priority for Honduras, the transnational trend of terrorist organizations, the importance of Honduras’ geo-strategic location, and the weakness of the country’s security infrastructure might be seen by terrorists as an opportunity to establish safe-havens and initiate actions with the intention of harming the Western Hemisphere.

The Honduran government has to be aware of the potential threat that transnational terrorism could represent to its national objectives. Therefore, it is important to formulate a specific national strategy to combat eventual terrorist actions rather than jumping abruptly into a situation of crisis management that would reveal to the international community the Honduran government’s lack of readiness for combating terrorism.

This thesis suggests a developmental strategy that would allow the Honduran government to reframe its national organizations and create new ones that would provide the government with new counterterrorist capabilities. Moreover, the international agreements and commitments, to which Honduras is a signatory, require a domestic stratagem capable of integrating national efforts into the regional and hemispheric strategies to combat terrorism.
To combat terrorism, this thesis suggests a hybrid approach that might be a blend of the criminal justice model and the war model and could create a multidimensional counterterrorist capability and integrate national assets. The approach would be characterized by interoperable means and common procedures that would allow Honduras to be part of the worldwide synergetic effort to combat terrorism. Even though a hybrid model is suggested, the response to terrorism needs to be limited and well defined; therefore, this strategy suggests that the military should be the leading instrument to carry out the fight, due to the characteristics and experience that the Honduran military possesses.

The evaluation of the proposed strategy in this thesis reveals that most of the strategy's objectives are aligned with the purpose of the strategic intent and make such a strategy suitable for attainment of the goal of combating terrorism. However, Honduras has scarce resources and this analysis has identified that the Honduran informational, military, and economic instruments of national power present shortages that would impede the feasibility of this national security strategy. Therefore, in order to balance the proposed strategy and reduce risk, the Honduran government has to find a way to reframe national resources and request international cooperation to fill these shortages.

Honduras not only has limited resources but it also has priorities other than the commitment to combat terrorism; however, the government, the private economic sector, and the entire population need to be aware of the country's current vulnerabilities to terrorist actions and accept the military in the role of the leading organization to reduce such vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it would be feasible for the Honduran government to align its military instrument of power with the regional and hemispheric military organizations currently carrying out the GWOT.

It is recommended that the Honduran government mobilize the counterterrorism infrastructure, provide the military with the leading role and the
means to the fight, and employ public diplomacy to acquire the necessary resources in order to enhance the country’s counterterrorism capabilities.

It is important for the U.S. to understand that the GWOT demands international cooperation. Even small countries in Latin America can make a considerable contribution to combating terrorism by taking advantage of the synergetic efforts in the hemisphere. Cooperation will result in benefits in both directions. The U.S. is trying to encourage international cooperation for the GWOT, but the current government has not even accomplished one of its objectives in the national strategy for combating terrorism; this strategy is to strengthen and sustain the international effort for fighting terrorism by enabling weak states. In this case, Honduras has not received enough fiscal support to enhance the counterterrorism capability to fulfill the country’s sovereign responsibility. The Honduran commitment to support the Global War on Terrorism has had political benefits but not tangible gains.
APPENDIX A

COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

President
Vice President
Minister of Defense
Minister of Security

CJCS
Secretary of Presidency
Minister of Treasury
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Internal Affairs
Director of National Strategic Intelligence

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS CORPORATIONS

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM GROUP

JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF

ARMY

UNIT COMMANDER

STRIKE TEAM 1

UNIT HQ STAFF
(Includes unit intelligence specialists)

STRATEGIC NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

NATIONAL POLICE

ARMED FORCES

FIRE DEPARTMENT

HEALTH AND MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

COUNTERTERRORISM TACTICAL ASSAULT UNIT

UNIT HQ STAFF
(National strategic intelligence)

UNIT COMMANDER

ASSAULT TEAM

SNIPER TEAM

ASSAULT TEAM

SNIPER TEAM

ASSAULT TEAM

SNIPER TEAM

ASSAULT TEAM

SNIPER TEAM

AIR FORCE

NAVY
APPENDIX B

INTELLIGENCE FLOW MODEL

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

INTERNATIONAL CHANNELS

DOMESTIC CHANNELS

INTERPOL

POLICE INTELLIGENCE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

DGIC INTELLIGENCE

Gangs and Domestic Crime

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking

Organized Crime
## APPENDIX C

### PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Applicable</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Risk Level</th>
<th>Control Selected</th>
<th>New Risk Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage/terrorism: Transnational-Physical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage/terrorism: Domestic-Physical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism: Biological</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism: Chemical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism: Nuclear</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Taking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxic Contamination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(After (Peltier 2005, 344))
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
COUNTERTERRORISM CRISIS MANAGEMENT FLOW

**TERRORIST ACTION**

**NCTG CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

**NEGOTIATIONS**

- SUCCESS
- FAILURE

**CRISIS TERMINATION**

**TACTICAL ASSAULT**

**CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT**

**DIME**

- Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic

**CTAU**

- Counterterrorism Tactical Assault Unit

**FIRST RESPONDERS**

NCTG  National Counterterrorism Group
DIME  Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
CTAU  Counterterrorism Tactical Assault Unit
## APPENDIX E

### INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomacyc</th>
<th>Informational</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The President</td>
<td>SNIB</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>Ministry of the Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council *</td>
<td>Strategic PSYOPS</td>
<td>CTAU *</td>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Counterterrorism Group *</td>
<td>NCTG Public Affairs Team *</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Terrorist Financial Tracking Center *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>Fire Department</td>
<td>Economic Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Mass Media</td>
<td>Security Departments of Gov. Agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Private Security Agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Port Enterprise</td>
<td>Police Intelligence</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONATEL</td>
<td>General Criminal Investigation Directorate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Analysis Corporations *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPECO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Organizations to be created or reframed


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

3. Military Attaché
   Honduran Embassy
   Washington, DC

4. Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras
   Estado Mayor Conjunto
   Tegucigalpa, Honduras

5. Dr. Douglas Borer
   Department of Defense Analysis
   Naval Postgraduate school
   Monterey, California

6. Dr. Hy Rothstein
   Department of Defense Analysis
   Naval Postgraduate school
   Monterey, California

7. Jennifer Duncan
   Department of Defense Analysis
   Naval Postgraduate school
   Monterey, California