SOMALIA: IGAD’S ATTEMPT TO RESTORE SOMALIA’S TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

by

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Political solutions have been found for several longstanding conflicts in Africa in 2003 - in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Burundi. The political arrangements in these countries may not necessarily usher in permanent peace and stability, but they at least afford an opportunity to work toward such goals. Unfortunately, this is not the case for Somalia, where anarchy, violence and chaos have prevailed for over 15 years. A national reconciliation conference - the 14th of its kind – sat in Nairobi for two years and finally formed a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in August, 2004. As usual, the outcome of the conference was not welcomed, either by warlords or later on by Islamic clerics in Somalia. Nonetheless, despite institutional obstacles, the Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has continued to press their intention to send peacekeepers to Somalia to reinstall the fragile transitional government against the wishes of the Islamic Courts Council (ICC). This thesis examines the possible strategies that IGAD should consider using in its intended mission of supporting the restoration of the Transitional Federal Government.
SOMALIA: IGAD’S ATTEMPT TO RESTORE SOMALIA’S TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

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ABSTRACT

Political solutions have been found for several longstanding conflicts in Africa in 2003 - in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Burundi. The political arrangements in these countries may not necessarily usher in permanent peace and stability, but they at least afford an opportunity to work toward such goals. Unfortunately, this is not the case for Somalia, where anarchy, violence and chaos have prevailed for over 15 years. A national reconciliation conference - the 14th of its kind – sat in Nairobi for two years and finally formed a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in August, 2004. As usual, the outcome of the conference was not welcomed, either by warlords or later on by Islamic clerics in Somalia. Nonetheless, despite institutional obstacles, the Inter Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has continued to press their intention to send peacekeepers to Somalia to reinstall the fragile transitional government against the wishes of the Islamic Courts Council (ICC). This thesis examines the possible strategies that IGAD should consider using in its intended mission of supporting the restoration of the Transitional Federal Government.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Somalia has been without a government for over 15 years following the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. During this period, many incidents occurred in Somalia which have devastated the living conditions of the Somalis and also made life difficult for the neighbouring countries. In the summer of 1991, fighting broke out between supporters of different clan factions who were jostling for control of the country. Bloody conflict turned the capital, Mogadishu, into a city of chaotic violence. Factions sought to control economically strategic areas, such as airports and seaports, as well as Somalia’s limited fertile farmland. Enjoying military superiority over the traditionally disadvantaged and despised farmers of the Jubba valley, the clan militias seized the farmland without much resistance. The chaos in Somalia’s “breadbasket” would be responsible for the famine which occurred in 1992. Many people died while 800,000 sought refuge in neighbouring countries (Griffith, 2003). The resulting catastrophe was to be the impetus for the ill-fated humanitarian mission by the UN. After failing in both the humanitarian mission and the state-building attempt that followed, the UN forces left Somalia in March 1995.

The violence continued but did not escalate. In fact, some regions of southern Somalia began to experiment with alternate ways of restoring order to their communities, namely through Islamic law. Tribunals enforcing Islamic law (sharia) begun to spring up in northern Mogadishu. Sharia has a reputation for severity among Westerners, especially due to incidents in Nigeria, Sudan and Indonesia involving severe punishments and human rights abuses.

Throughout the 1990s, several peace conferences were held to address the warfare in Somalia. Regrettably, they were largely unsuccessful. A peace conference held in Djibouti in 2000, however, sparked international optimism when it yielded a three-year plan for governing Somalia. The triumph of the peace conference was the formation of a Somali Transitional National
Government (TNG). Alas, the optimism was premature. The TNG’s authority was not widely accepted within Somalia and the new government faced constant opposition and was never able to rule effectively.

Another series of peace talks began in 2002. These talks, sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and based in Kenya, eventually produced the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). About 365 Somali delegates participated in the talks. In October 2004, Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed was elected interim President for a five-year period. His new government remained in Kenya, however, as much of Somalia, particularly Mogadishu, was unsafe. In July 2005, the new government relocated to the Somali towns of Baidoa and Jowhar in western Somalia. Soon after relocation, the TFG was plagued by internal disagreements. Specifically, the President was at loggerheads with some warlords and government officials over where his administration should be based. The President and the Prime Minister, Ali Mohammed Gedi, were opposed to moving to Mogadishu, citing security concerns and, as a result, settled in Baidoa. The TFG’s Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Adan, and some government officials wanted the government to be established in Mogadishu. The warlords, on the other hand, did not recognize the TFG as a legitimate entity and vowed to destroy it. While these events were happening, another anti-government group was slowly surfacing: the Islamic Court Council (ICC).

The ICC entered the power struggle and displaced the Mogadishu warlords in June 2006. The ICC has been linked to a fundamentalist Somali group, al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI or "Islamic Unity"), which is believed to have ties to al-Qaeda. U.S. intelligence agencies have indicated that al-Qaeda has used Somalia as a regional base of operations, including preparations for the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (Philips, 2002). As of this writing, Somali power politics was featuring two opposing groups: the internationally recognized TFG and the aggressive ICC.
The situation in Somalia is a concern, not only for IGAD, but also for the African Union (AU), the UN and the international community. The AU has a share of responsibility for ensuring stability and development in Africa. Through its regional economic body in the Horn of Africa, IGAD, the AU has a duty to ensure a functional government is established in Somalia. Needless to say, this is an enormous task for IGAD.

Currently, IGAD has a plan to send an ad hoc peacekeeping force to help resettle the TFG, and some IGAD countries have been put on notice to provide troops to deploy to Somalia to aid and assist the TFG. Yet, in spite of the best intentions, it is unclear what strategies IGASOM will use to enable it to achieve its mission.

B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE

This study seeks to suggest a possible solution to the current Somali crisis. In particular, the study looks at possible strategies that can be adopted by IGASOM in its expected mission of restoring the Somalia TFG. The scope of these strategies is centred on weakening the ICC while at the same time empowering the feeble TFG.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In conducting this analysis, the study addressed the following questions:

1. What are the realities in Somalia?
   • Recent past; and
   • Current situation.

2. Who are the actors and how are they influencing the dynamics of Somali conflicts?

3. Why is it important to restore a functioning government in Somalia?

4. What strategies should IGASOM bring to bear to help resolve Somalia problems?

D. METHODOLOGY

The research methods employed in this thesis include the use of primary and secondary literature as well as personal interviews. In addition, I’ve broken the problem down into the main areas on which IGASOM should concentrate in
order to be successful in achieving goals in Somalia. This thesis first seeks to identify the present problems of achieving peace and stability in Somalia. This requires a review of Somalia’s recent past. After identifying the problems, I will follow with a discussion about possible solutions. Lastly, I detail some potential ways in which IGASOM could plan and organize with a view to helping resolve Somalia’s problems.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This present chapter is a brief introduction of my thesis; it lays out the general problem with a brief reference to the key players in the Somalia crisis. Chapter II highlights the Somali culture and social/welfare system. Also discussed is the character of the Somalis, often considered very aggressive, and why war and feuding in Somalia are so prevalent. Chapter II also touches on activities that occurred in Somalia immediately before and after Siad Barre was ousted from power. Chapter III is an analysis of factors that may have contributed to current Somali problems. Both internal and external actors, who have played a significant role in the current conflicts, are highlighted. Chapter IV follows with a discussion of the attempts by African nations to solve armed conflicts within the continent. The discussion begins with the broad strategy of solving conflicts in Africa, which the AU intends to carry out. Chapter IV also discusses efforts taken by East African countries to try solving the conflicts in Somalia. Major challenges that the East African region is facing in dealing with peace and security matters are also reviewed. Next, in Chapter V, I analyze the strategies which IGAD, while coming to the aid of the TFG, could adopt in order to defeat the ICC. In doing so, I have adopted IGAD’s considerations that the TFG is the legitimate government of Somalia while the ICC is not. Lastly, Chapter VI summarizes the key issues discussed throughout my thesis with an emphasis on strategies for success in Somalia. In closing, I offer recommendations to help restore the TFG.
II. THE CULTURE AND MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

Somalia provides social scientists with an interesting natural experiment to test the conditions under which order can be provided in a decentralized setting. Somalia has been without a central government for over 15 years. Today, the newly formed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is under threat of collapsing and joining the ranks of previously failed governments. To understand why Somalia is prone to conflicts, one needs to understand how the Somali people relate to one another. It also helps to have some knowledge of Somalia’s complex clan system.

There is a Somali proverb that says, "Men differ in three things: first, they differ in their ability to forget past grievances; second, they differ in their ability to concentrate on issues relevant to the present; and thirdly, they differ in their ability to foresee the future." Ali (2000) interprets this proverb to mean, "Let us accept conflict as natural and agree to transform it peacefully in order to coexist together." But, are conflicts really natural to Somalis? Why have other pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa managed to resolve differences peacefully, but not the Somalis? More specifically, why do Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti enjoy relative peace, while Somalia does not? These are questions that I intend to answer in this chapter. I will analyze the unique character of the Somali people. At the same time, I will try to shed light on the phenomenon which occurs when Somalis meet. When meeting for the first time, Somalis don’t ask: Where are you from? Rather, they ask: Whom are you from? Could one be right to suggest that genealogy is to Somalis as an address is to Americans?

B. SOMALI CULTURE

1. The People

Primarily a pastoral people, the Somalis are thought to have migrated into northern Kenya and southern Somalia from the lake regions of the southern Ethiopian highlands. The proto-Sam, as they are called by anthropologists, migrated further into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and northern Somalia in
search of water and pasture lands. This expansion was marked by the largely violent expulsion of native people. What followed was the consequent establishment of a single cultural nation in continuous occupation of a vast though impoverished territory. The proto-Sam came to be known as the Samaal, or Samaale, a clear reference to the mythical father figure of the main Somali clan-families, whose name gave rise to the term Somali (Laitin & Samatar, 1987, p. 6).

The geography of Somalia defined the evolution of the Somalis into two sub-cultures. The Somalis of the southern interriverine country adapted to their physical environment by becoming agrarians. They also engaged in slavery. While some communities among them originated from Tanzania, some people believe that the southern interriverine Somalis were the resident indigenous non-Somali people. Conversely, the Somalis who settled outside the interriverine areas became herders, raising camels, sheep, and goats: they migrated as necessary to keep their herds near water and good pasture lands.

Although all Somalis profess strong allegiance to Islam, they hold stronger primary loyalties to self, family and clan, in that order. As we will see in the next paragraph, when analyzing the dynamics of conflicts among the Somali clan families, it is prudent to note that genealogy among ethnic Somalis constitutes the heart of the Somali social system. As Lewis (2002) observes, it is the basis of the collective Somali inclination toward internal fission and internecine conflict, as well as of the Somalis' sense of being distinct, which mobilizes their defensive attitude and hostile stereotypes; a consciousness of others which borders on downright xenophobia (p. 11).

2. The Somali Clans

Somalis are not a unitary people, but rather a grouping of broad clan federations divided by some linguistic differences and clan conflicts. The Somali clan system has two main lineage lines, the Samale and the Sab, which break into six major clan-families: Digil, Rahanweyn, Darod, Hawiye, Isaq, and Dir. In genealogical terms, the Digil and Rahanweyn clan families belong to the Sab, while the Darod, Hawiye, Isaq, and Dir belong to the Samale. Although the
families are not strictly territorially defined, they do tend to occupy distinct geographical locations, (i.e., the Isaq and the Dir in the north; the Digil and Rahanweyn in the agricultural areas in the south; the Hawiye in and around Mogadishu and the Darod in the south and in the north (see Figure 1)). The differentiation between Sab and Samale is reflected in the basic contrast between the nomadic pastoralism of the Samale and the sedentary farming of the Sab. Somalis consider the name Sab to be derogatory in nature. Just as in Rwanda where the Tutsi considers themselves superior to Hutus, in Somalia the Samaale consider themselves superior to the Sab, who have lowered themselves by their reliance on agriculture and a willingness to assimilate foreigners into their clans.

Within the clan-family, lineage group members are divided into clans, which represent more significant aspects of social organization and identification. Clans are, in turn, further subdivided into sub-clans, primary lineages groups, and, at the base of this system, diya-paying groups. Diya is compensation paid by a person who has injured or killed another person, while the diya-paying group is a cluster of close kinsmen, united by a specific contractual alliance. Clans are the most binding and frequently mobilized cooperating group of a few small lineages reckoning descent back four to eight generations to the common founder. The diya-paying groups have a membership of several hundred to a few thousand men. The group’s terms stipulate that they should collectively pay and receive blood-compensation in the settlement of feuds (Lewis, 2002, p. 11). This cultural practice resembles the *mar dushmani* (death enmity) of the Kohistani community in Thull, Afghanistan. As Keiser (2002) explains in his book *Friend by Day, Enemy by Night*, the Kohistani men would usually share death enmity, and the aggrieved would try to kill his enemy unless the enemy sued for peace, which require taking risks. This required the man suing for peace to formally request his *dushman* to accept compensation instead of seeking revenge. There was no guarantee that such requests would always be accepted. Even in cases where truces were accepted, the rule did not require that the *dushman* abandon vengeance (Keiser, 2002, p. 21).

Throughout Somali history, the security of an individual and his property has depended on his membership in his diya-paying group. In general, a Somali’s primary loyalty lies with his diya-paying group, then with his clan, and finally with the kindred clans of the clan-family. However, any lineages acting as a separate political unit are capable of functioning as a diya-paying group, albeit on a short-term basis. Though more prevalent among the nomads, it therefore appears that the Somalis are an aggressive society where war, feud, and fighting are common. As Lewis (2002,) explains, "... the nomadic Somali are a warlike people, driven by poverty of their resources to intense competition for access to water and grazing"(p. 11). While clanship promotes short-term and unstable political alliances, it also acts as the primary source of stability and cohesion in
Somali society. Clan networks provide a means of identification and support that are vital given insecure environmental, social, and political conditions. In general, the clan genealogical system functions as a pastoral mode of adaptation to a harsh physical environment. Although Islam is a strong unifying and defining force in Somali life, it is considered of secondary importance to the lineage and warrior tradition.

3. The “Gun Culture”

Many of Africa’s pastoral groups are threatened by the proliferation of small arms that makes conflicts with their neighbors more lethal. A good example is the Karimojong group of northeast Uganda who for centuries relied on traditional weapons when engaged in cattle-rustling and clan warfare. Such fighting claimed relatively few lives and was generally settled by elders. There were very few guns. By the late 1990s, there were an estimated 150,000 guns, mostly AK-47s, in the hands of Karimojong (Mburu, 2002, p. 8). Ownership of such weapons conferred political, social, and economic status. Oftentimes, an AK-47 became part of the brideprice. Not surprisingly, cattle rustling and clan warfare became more lethal. As a result, the Karimojong society not only is less cohesive, but also has become part of the arc of conflict that stretches throughout the Horn of Africa.

Like the Karamojong, Somalis had access to firearms from Arabs far earlier than other communities in the region. During Siad Barre’s regime, more weapons found their way into Somalia from the Soviet Union. It is estimated that the former Somali army had abandoned more than 40,000 weapons in the early 1990s that were then available to any Somali. These guns have brought significant changes in the culture and social status of the Somali. In an interview with Colonel H. I. Hussein (2006), a Kenya Army officer who concentrates on Somalia, Col. Hussein referred to this epidemic as the “Gun Culture.” He further explained how these guns have changed Somali social culture and lifestyle claiming, “anyone with a gun [used to be] considered special and had privileges in the community. Not only for him, but also his wife.” For instance, when women would queue to draw water, the woman whose husband had a gun would bypass
the line and draw water before anybody else. Equally, after a successful cattle
raid, the raiders with firearms would get a bigger share of the stolen stock than
those without.

Just as the Karamojong would pay bride price with a weapon, for Somalis,
Hussein (2006) asserts, “during marriage ceremonies, a bridegroom would be
required to give his father-in-law a gun or he will risk losing the bride.”

is mourned and when a clansman has been killed in a clash, the first question
people would ask is whether the rifle of the dead person has been recovered.”
The bereaved clan would then demand the firearm that had been used to kill their
clansman, as compensation (Diya). Otherwise, there was risk of “war.”

These few examples clearly indicate the influence of firearms. Due to the
easy accessibility of firearms, the Somali culture has been influenced to the
extent that the value of guns has become so great that future disarmament
appears highly unlikely.

C. MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA

1. Post-Independent Somalia

On July 1, 1960, the nation of Somalia was formed from the union of
British Somaliland and the Italian trust territory of southern Somalia. The new
government was dominated by the Somali Youth League (SYL), the pro-
independence movement. The atmosphere at the time was nationalistic. The
mood of both national leaders and intellectuals was that traditional tribal
structures were destructive to national unity, and must be abolished. Moreover,
they believed the Somali state should govern all Somalis, even those outside its
current boundaries. Thus, their hope was that the French Territory of the Afars
and Issas (later Djibouti), the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and the Northern
Frontier District of Kenya would eventually be incorporated into the nation of
Somalia (see Figure 2). However, despite the appearance of solidarity, there
were significant differences between British Somaliland, the area which later
became the Republic of Somaliland, and Italian Somaliland.
The young democracy rapidly deteriorated into a mechanism for competitive rent-seeking and corruption. Somalia became effectively a one-party state as “opposition” politicians moved to join the dominant SYL after each election. The last democratic administration (1967-1969, wherein Shermaarke was the President and Mohamed Haji Egal the Prime Minister) was marked by open theft from the treasury, electoral fraud, and violence. On October 15, 1969, President Shermaarke was killed by his bodyguard, who was a member of a lineage said to have been badly treated by the President (Lewis, 2002, p. 206). The Prime Minister, Egal, was out of the country during this incident. Six days later, on October 21, 1969, the military deposed the civilian government in a coup d’etat and installed the Army Commander, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, as President.

2. The Rise and Fall of Siad Barre

From 1969 to 1991, Somalia was a dictatorship. Any hopes for improvement under the military rule of Siad Barre's Supreme Revolutionary
Council (SRC) were soon to be dashed. The distinctive features of Barre’s reign were the extent of militarization first under the Soviet Union, in return for substantial military assistance, then U.S. sponsorship, and lastly the centralization of power in Barre’s own hands. The negative features of the Barre regime included economic mismanagement, dependency on military aid, high external debt, and repressive governance. There was also the barely disguised hegemony of the Darod clan-family in the so-called Ministry Of Defense (MOD) alliance, an acronym which stood for Marehan (Siad Barre’s clan), Ogaden (the clan of Siad Barre’s mother), and Dulbahante (the clan of Siad Barre’s son-in-law, Colonel Ahmad Sulayman Abdullah, who headed the National Security Service (NSS)). This alliance administered the state apparatus (Prunier, 1995, p. 5). This was despite the official campaigns condemning tribalism that Barre initiated in 1971.

Despite the atmosphere of fear and intimidation that had developed by the mid-1970s, many Somalis supported the government, especially because it promised to unite all Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti in a Greater Somalia. In keeping with this objective, Somali troops invaded the mostly Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977. The Soviet Union withdrew its support from Somalia and backed Ethiopia. Eventually, Somalia lost the war. After this point, intellectuals and other elites became increasingly embittered toward the regime.

The political manipulation of clanship was a central feature of the Barre regime. As competition for control of state resources intensified between the different clan factions, from the late 1970s onwards, Barre faced a situation of combined crises on military and political fronts as opposition movements began to co-operate. The Majerteen-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) based in the north-east of the country was formed in the late 1970s. The Isaaq-affiliated Somali National Movement (SNM) in the north-west was formed in the Gulf states and UK in the early 1980s. Both groups were singled out for persecution by Barre’s MOD alliance (Prunier, July 1995, p. 5).
Throughout the 1980s, Barre’s hold on power weakened, as he brazenly attempted to incite one clan against another. Clans viewed as recalcitrant were severely punished. However, these tactics failed to postpone his fall for more than a few years. Instead, they created indelible passions and suspicions that would rend the country apart after its collapse. The turning point in the armed opposition to the dictatorship of Siad Barre came in 1988. In that year, after suffering a major defeat in the war against the Eritrean independence movement, Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam decided to make peace with Siad Barre in order to free his troops, which were still involved in the aftermath of the conflict with Somalia. A peace agreement between these two leaders meant that Mengistu’s forces could now concentrate on the Eritrean front while Siad Barre’s forces could be safely ranged against the SNM. In this agreement, Siad Barre secretly agreed to give up Somalia’s irredentist claims to the Ogaden. As Simons (1996, p. 78) put it, “when this finally became public, it became the thin end of the wedge between Siad Barre and members of his mother’s Ogaden clan.” As for the Issaq, by pre-empting a strike by Barre in 1988, the SNM briefly took control of Hargeisa and Burao in the northwest. The government counter-attacked and heavily bombed the towns, causing the SNM to withdraw. Thousands of civilians were killed. Non-MOD elements of the national army began to desert and form their own clan-based organizations. The Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) was formed in 1989. These three opposition groups, including the Ogaden-affiliated Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), converged on Mogadishu in January 1991 and ousted Siad Barre’s regime. As Barre fled the capital on January 27, 1991, the dissolution of the Somali state accelerated.

3. The Dissolution of the Somali State

From the fall of Siad Barre’s regime to the present day, several events have occurred in Somalia. Griffiths (2003) groups these events into four distinctive phases. The first phase was marked by the most intense conflict. This was between 1991-1992 when the different clan factions fought for control of land and resources in southern Somalia. This resulted in the devastation of the interriverine areas, consequently causing famine and the disruption of farming
and livestock production. Increasing numbers of refugees left the country for neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia at that time: the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) increased dramatically. In contrast, the 1991 formation of independent Somaliland in the northwest created an enclave of reconstruction and relative peace.

Phase Two was centered on UN interventions, which lasted from 1993-1995. This phase was illuminated by localized conflicts, specifically around Mogadishu. The humanitarian objectives of the interventions were clouded by the UN’s ambiguous goals and rules of engagement. The UN’s role in “nation building” became a rallying point for united Somali opposition. Somalis continued to flee the country as internal displacement became routine/common in particular regions of the country. Having failed in their mission, the UN troops left Somalia in 1995.

The third phase was the post-intervention phase. This lasted from 1995 to 2000 and witnessed the emergence of regional administrations and the continued dissolution of the Somali state. As conflict continued in different regions of the country, internal displacement and steady refugee flows increased. Puntland in the northeast declared itself a regional administration in 1998. Although not popularly recognized as an autonomous region, Jubaland declared itself autonomous in 1998.

Finally, the fourth phase. This began in 2000 with the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Arta, Djibouti, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Key warlords' opposition to the legitimacy of the TNG resulted in conflict and population displacement in particular areas in the south. By contrast, the process of reconstruction continued in Somaliland and Puntland. The TNG was succeeded by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was formed in October 2004 after two years of peace and a reconciliation conference held under the auspices of IGAD in Kenya. In this phase, the Islamic courts emerged.
D. CONCLUSION

One cannot discuss the intricacies of Somalia without paying attention to the centrality of the clan in Somali culture, and how, to a certain extent, it has enabled the Somali conflict. To briefly describe the essentials of Somalis’ traditional polity, it’s reasonable to argue that it depends, as in any other non-industrialized case, on a sense of collectivism rather than individualism. Nevertheless, it also has its own characteristics.

Kinship represents the only insurance for pre-capitalized nations. The Somalis believe that the clan system is the safeguard that makes them stronger against other nomads. Such a belief gives to the Somalis a cascading lineage identity, a lineage based on a series of stages. In Somali terms: "Myself against my family, my family against other families of my clan, my clan against all other clans, and all the Somalis against the rest of the world."

In this chapter, I have described the Somali way of life and indicated what is acceptable to a Somali. Additionally, I have briefly narrated the modern history of Somalia, describing some of the events that have led to the current conflicts. From here, I will move my discussion in the next chapter towards analyzing the complexity and dynamism in the current context. I will analyze how internal and external actors have influenced the conflicts in Somalia from the fall of Siad Barre to the present date.
III. CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN CONTEMPORARY SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

Various groups, to include the international community, have declared that a lasting peace in Somalia, as in the Middle East and other parts of the world, will be achieved only through addressing the root causes of the conflicts. But as yet, there is no general consensus as to what these root causes are. Are Somali conflicts caused by the warlords, the warmongers (who finance the wars), the government (TFG) or the Islamic fundamentalists? Or, are external powers to blame for these conflicts? What outsiders have forgotten, or perhaps never known, is what constitutes the lived experience which motivates the actors in Somali conflicts. The Somalia conflict is frequently presented as either the continuation of an age-old confrontation between “cultures” defined by bloodlines (clans), or the consequence of an artificial division imposed by colonial powers. Clearly, it is worth reminding external observers of the importance of historical data influencing the actions of Somalis today. It is necessary to focus on the political realities of the country, because it is these realities, more than abstract ideas, which influence the current political situation.

Somalia has been engulfed in confusion arising from factional-clan differences. The crisis started immediately after the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre. Since his overthrow, no central government has emerged. This was the result of clan animosity, leadership wrangles, easy accessibility of arms, lack of commitment to a negotiated settlement and external interference. Failure by factional leaders to agree on the formation of a central government and the unilateral declaration of independence by Somaliland (formally British Somaliland), under the leadership of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of the Somali National Movement (SNM), followed by Puntland under Abdullaahi Yussuf of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), compounded the problem. Unlike most of the south, these regions enjoy some semblance of stability.
In the preceding chapter, I discussed various issues regarding the culture and modern history of Somalia. In the present chapter, I will attempt to analyze factors that may have contributed to current Somali problems. In closing, I will offer possible solutions to solving these problems.

B. INTERNAL FACTORS AND ACTORS

1. The Tribe and Clan Factor

Popular descriptions of the war in Somalia frequently make use of the words “tribe” and “clan” interchangeably, usually as units of kinship and descent. Political affiliation is, thus, represented as being based on, or organized along lines of, primal blood relationships. Yet, “tribe,” in administrative and anthropological usage in most African countries, is a political term. On the other hand, “clan” represents membership of a birth or descent group, relevant mainly in determining degrees of relationship in matters of marriage. A tribe is the largest unit of political combination of smaller affiliated sections. But, unlike many other countries in Africa such as Kenya and its 42 tribes, the Somalis appear to outsiders to be a homogeneous community formed of six clan-families with a common culture, language and way of life. Even so, Somalia has more internecine problems than Kenya. How is this possible? One answer to this question might have to do with the lack of relationships between many tribes. People within a tribe do not necessarily claim direct common descent or kinship links with each other. Below are two examples of how the clan factor has affected the Somali conflict.

a. Hawiye-Darod Rivalry

Since its independence in 1960, Somalia has been ruled predominantly by members of the Darod clan-family. The first President of Somalia, Aadan Abdallah Usmaan, was from the Hawiye clan-family. He ruled Somalia for seven years and was defeated in the July 1967 general elections by his former Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke. President Shermarke was from the Darod clan-family. His rule was characterized by palpable corruption and tribal nepotism, a recipe for growing dissatisfaction within the population. After Shermarke’s assassination, the Prime Minister, Mahammad
Ibrahim Egal, who was out of the country during this incident, returned quickly to arrange for the selection of a new President. His choice was also a Darod clan-family member. Feeling that the Prime Minister’s choice would not improve the deteriorating situation in the country, some government officials and the military became more discontented. As it became apparent that the assembly would support Egal’s choice, on October 21, 1969, the military conducted a coup and deposed the civilian government. The then-Army Commander, Major General Siad Barre, was installed as President, despite the fact that he too was from the Darod clan-family.

In 1991, the Siad Bare government was ousted from power, principally by three factions: the Somali National Movement (SNM, Issaq clan-family), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM, Ogaden clan of Darod clan-family), and the United Somali Congress (USC, Hawiye clan-family) of which Mohamed Farah Aideed is a member. The USC played a more integral role in ousting Barre than the other two factions, an excuse that the Hawiye clan-family may now be using to claim a leadership role in Somalia. After failing to agree on how to share power, the three factions split. Fighting broke out among the Hawiye clans (discussed in the next section) which led to Somalia being without a central government for a period of over 15 years.

In October 2004, after two years of peace talks in Kenya, the Somalia TFG was formed and Abdulahi Yusuf, yet another member of the Darod clan-family, was elected President. This did not go over well with the Hawiye clan-family. They claimed the Darod clan-family had ruled Somalia long enough. It was, they believed, their turn. This may have been one of the reasons why the TFG has not been allowed to relocate to Mogadishu. Though Mogadishu is the capital city, the heavy presence of Hawiye warlords blocked the TFG. Abdi Kadir Dhakane (May 31, 2006), a minister of state in the office of the Prime Minister of Somalia, attempted to explain why the Hawiye clan-family should rule using a Somali metaphor: “You can’t steal a drum and begin playing the drum in the area where you stole it from and expect to invite the owners of the drum to dance to the beat with you.”
The interpretation of this metaphor is that a Darod clan member, President Abdulahi Yusuf, has “stolen the drum” (the presidency) from the Hawiye who are anxiously seeking the whereabouts of their “stolen” drum. Meanwhile, the President is expecting to play the drum in Mogadishu, a city mainly occupied by Hawiye clan members. To exacerbate the problem, Yusuf expects the Hawiye to dance to the “beat of his drum” with him. All the while, he well knows that the Hawiye will not be interested. This is one version of Somalia’s problems, viewed through the clan lens. Essentially, the “stolen drum” metaphor symbolizes the struggle for power, a struggle which the Hawiye clan-family promises will persist.

**b. Inter-Hawiye Clan Conflicts**

There are even bigger problems than the Hawiye-Darod rivalry. These relate to internal fighting within the Hawiye clan. In late 1990, the Hawiye’s USC was formed with two branches. The “external” branch was based in Italy and an “internal” branch based in Ethiopia. The “internal” branch, which was physically involved in fighting against Siad Barre’s regime, was led by General Aideed, while a prominent businessman, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, was a leader of the “external” USC branch. Aideed and Mahdi both belong to the Hawiye clan-family, but were from different clans. Aideed was from the Habar Gadir clan while Mahdi was from Abgal clan (Prunier, July 1995, p. 8).

In the confusion that followed the fall of Siad Barre, while Aideed was busy pursuing the remnants of Siad Barre’s forces, Ali Mahdi was proclaimed “President of Somalia” by his close associates of the “external” branch of the USC. This was done without consultation with other faction leaders (SPM, SNM, and Aideed of USC) who had fought the dictatorial regime. Mahdi’s appointment reflected increased social antagonism between the Habar Gadir and Abgal clans who then resorted to a bitter feud. As a result, the USC split into two factions: the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by Aideed and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) under Mahdi.

The inter-Hawiye clan fighting got worse when other Hawiye clans joined the conflict. Fighting broke out between Mahdi’s Abgal clan and the
Murosade clan of Mohamed Qanyare Afrah as Aideed’s Habar Gidir clan turned on the Hawadle clan. These Hawiye clans fought in skirmishes over the course of 15 years. The prolonged period of fighting tore Mogadishu apart and brought war and devastation to the grain-producing region in southern Somalia.

Based on these two examples (Darod-Hawiye rivalry and Inter-Hawiye clan conflict), it emerges that the clan factor has been a major contributor to Somalia’s problems. It is a deep-rooted issue that has influenced the dynamics in Somali politics in the past and is likely to continue to affect the future of Somalia for quite a while.

2. The Warlords

Somalia has been engulfed by a surfeit of factional and clan conflict. But this is not strictly the result of Barre’s fall from power. Conflict in Somalia has been around since its independence. Not everybody agrees with this assessment. Dalka¹ (June, 2006) is of the opinion that the problems in Somalia are caused by the warlords. The argument put forth officially is that warlordism in Somalia resembles what happens to a sick person, personified by the Somali society, when his disease is misdiagnosed. More specifically, Dalka believes that initial attempts to diagnose the problems in Somali society wrongly concluded that tribalism, spawned by Siad’s dictatorial regime, was the disease. On the contrary, asserts Dalka, the disease is not tribalism, but rather warlordism and colonization by proxy. Dalka’s assessment points to tribalism and modern forms of international business.

Warlordism became famous after the demise of Barre’s regime in 1991. Immediately following his ouster, anarchy spread and fighting intensified. Faction leaders centered their war against opposing clans in a struggle for dominance and survival. Warlords, employing guerrilla tactics, quickly gained control of the cities, harbors, and airports. In turn, warlords expanded their personal fiefdoms, carved out their own sections of the country and completely gutted the infrastructure. Compounding the problem, Somalia was in the midst of three

¹ Dalka is the official newspaper of Somalia’s government. Its articles are not attributed to specific authors.
years of drought which had dried up wells and rivers. When the United Nations peacekeeping force attempted to relieve the suffering, the warlords frustrated their attempts to distribute food and aid.

Up until June 2006, the warlords and their private militias continued to undermine efforts to pacify the country through the establishment of an effective national government. Most warlords had neither an ideology nor a political agenda. Typically, they are motivated by the pursuit of money and war booty. The individual fiefdoms they carved out were used as bases for the exploitation of confiscated properties, as well as arms and drug trafficking. Clearly, warlordism is a successful business in Somalia - a source of income and employment. Warlords’ armed militias are responsible for the death of thousands of innocent people, and warlords carry the primary responsibility for the agony of the people.

The first few warlords to rise to power after the fall of dictator Muhammad Siad Barre made huge fortunes for themselves. Consequently, their numbers increased in the last few years. They led successful “Mafia-style” businesses. Having money allowed them to acquire a large number of followers who viewed them as tribal employers not warlords. With money changing hands, tribal leadership shifted from traditional tribal leaders to warlords who bought tribal loyalty with foreign currency.

Treating the disease of warlordism will be difficult. The treatment will be even more complicated if foreign governments interfere, especially those who desire warlords to continue to rule. Worth remembering is the situation in Somalia in the early 1990s, when Somalis themselves refused assistance from the international community. Little has changed since then; many Somalis remain skeptical of outside assistance. Yet, in terms of addressing societal ills, the international community has the resources and capacity to solve Somalia’s major problems.

Clearly, the situation in Somalia is dynamic. Most recently, with the emergence of Islamic fundamentalists, the power of the warlords has been
significantly reduced. Before discussing the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, I will discuss the warlords’ closest friends and partners: the warmongers.

3. The Warmongers

The majority of Somalia’s warlords were military officers in the government of Siad Barre. Today, they are simple fighters who have little, if any, connection with the outside world. As a result, they receive no external support. Abdulahi Yusuf (2004) writes that during the civil war after the fall of Siad Barre, the warlords had to turn to their closest partners, the warmongers, in order to be connected to the outside world. These were the financiers and business allies of the warlords. The warmongers represent the nexus of power and influence. Arguably, they have become the most powerful entity in Somalia. On behalf of the warlords, they controlled many profit-making activities. They ran the plantations and managed and collected taxes from the seaports and airports. Other additional illicit business endeavors included drug-trafficking and the arms trade. The warmongers served as the middlemen between the warlords and the outside world by establishing contacts with foreign companies.

For almost a decade, the Mogadishu warmongers dealt with the lack of government and security by paying taxes to the warlords in return for protection. Beginning in about 1999, however, they decided to forego their security arrangement with the warlords. In place of warlord protection, the warmongers turned to the militant arm of the sharia court system, which is run by the ICC. This shift in support might have been a precipitant to the recent clashes between the warlords and the Islamic clerics. The warlords, unable to pay their militias, became weaker and weaker as more members of their militias defected to the ICC, which could afford to pay their salaries. For the warlords, losing their primary source of funding drastically shifted the power calculus within Somalia. Meanwhile, from outside of Somalia, external support to the ICC further weakened the position of the warlords.
4. The TNG and TFG

After refusing international support in the early 1990s, the world turned away from Somalia and the population was left to the mercy of the warlords. Numerous attempts, internal to Somalia, were made to strike a compromise among the warlords in order to form a national government. Sadly, they all failed. Unhappy warlords subverted each reconciliation conference. Meanwhile, neighboring Djibouti and Kenya, pained by the abominable predicament of the population, endeavored to take a stab at intra-Somali reconciliation. They invited delegates from various clans to take part in the Djibouti 2000 and Kenya 2002 – 2004 conferences. In Djibouti, the TNG was formed with Abdiquassim Salad Hassan selected as its President.

Initially, the TNG enjoyed solid support from powerful Mogadishu businessmen. In spite of the support, the TNG fell short of expectations, failing to gain any political results. In fact, the TNG never administered more than a portion of Mogadishu. Its desire to effectively govern came to naught because the TNG’s appointed leaders failed to quickly grasp the fleeting nature of popular support. They gave precedence instead to self-enrichment and personal gain. As a result, the international community was skeptical from the start and refused to give the TNG the necessary diplomatic and material support until it could develop the capacity to restore order and collect taxes. As the TNG dissolved, the public simply watched from the sidelines as the promise of the Djibouti conference dissipated (Dalka, July, 2006).

With all these factors in play, the TNG was orphaned. Once again, Somali hopes were dashed. Concerned about the floundering situation in Somalia, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) states convened another reconciliation conference, this time in Kenya with the warlords dominating the debate.

The outcome of the long reconciliation conference was the formation of the Somalia TFG. Not surprisingly, not everyone was satisfied with this outcome. Just the same, the public reluctantly accepted the TFG with the faint hope that
the new government would demonstrate good leadership. To date, a very important question remains: is the TFG going to improve on the weaknesses of its predecessor or make them worse?

Unfortunately, as with the TNG, things have not gone well for the TFG. Nearly two years have elapsed since its inception and little progress has been made.

One thing in the TFG’s favor is that the political environment has not enabled elected leaders to enrich themselves as was the case previously. Instead, they have been “fighting” amongst themselves, with some members aligning with the President and the Prime Minister. Still other groups have aligned with the speaker of the national assembly. The Mogadishu-based warlords, who were previously reluctant to participate in the Djibouti peace conference, actively took part in the Kenya conference. As a result, some of these civic-minded warlords were appointed to the cabinet. But there’s a rub. The problem with the warlords is that they continued commanding their militias and continued to oppose the government’s efforts to resettle in Mogadishu while at the same time occupying their cabinet positions. This is one reason why the donor community remains skeptical of the TFG and has withheld its diplomatic and material support. In donors’ view, the TFG has not demonstrated legitimacy, gained popular support or forged a credible administration.

5. The Islamist Groups

Until recently, there has never been popular support for fundamentalist Islam or Islamic-style governance in Somalia, despite an overwhelmingly Muslim population. Historically, the rule of law in Somalia has been based on clannism and not religion. Various warlords, to include the infamous General Mohammed Farah Aideed, have staked their claims to various portions of the country, enforcing their rule through violence and intimidation. Their authority was absolute. But times have changed.

In the early stages of the Somali civil war, various types of Islamist activism emerged. Famous amongst these are the Al Islah and Al Itihad
(sometimes jointly referred to as AlAI). \textit{Al Islah} seeks to infuse Somali politics with a liberal reading of Islamic values through non-violent means, while \textit{Al Itihad} advocates direct violence to achieve their goals. The strategic objective of \textit{Al Itihad} was to build power by taking control of key economic installations across Somalia. They temporarily gained control of the seaports of Kismayo and Merka in 1991 and administered the commercial crossroad town of Luuq in the Gedo region. Wherever they gained control, they established Islamic law rather than customary law (Tavolato, 2004, p. 9). Along the way, Ethiopian and clan militia forces fought their progress northward.

A second strategy of \textit{Al Itihad} was social and economic consolidation. This strategy marked a complete departure from their more militant approach and is the result of frequent defeats at the hands of clan militias and Ethiopians. The following factors also contributed to a change in tactics. First, \textit{Al Itihad} concluded that holding a town would make it too easy a target for more powerful external forces. Secondly, they realized that Somalis were not yet ready for Islamic rule. Instead, \textit{Al-Itihad} opted to integrate into local communities and concentrate on expanding nation-wide influence as a grassroots movement. Their goal was to establish order, stability and moral rectitude. They established themselves in the local communities and in key sectors of society to include business, local courts, and schools, rather than attempting to assume more direct political control. As a result, today it is very difficult to distinguish between those who promote services to the people following an apolitical agenda (\textit{Al-Islah}), and those who are involved in a deeper Islamization using political-military confrontation with global and political targets (\textit{Al-Itihad}) (Le Sage, 2001).

Until the beginning of 2006, the Islamic courts had been conducting their business without much interference from the government and the warlords. After nearly fifteen years of skirmishing between the Islamists and the warlords, the independent Islamist groups united and formed a consortium called the Islamic Courts Council (ICC). The emergence of the ICC changed the conflict equation in Somalia. Sensing the growing power of the ICC, the disparate warlords, in an
unprecedented move, decided to form an alliance (labeled the Alliance Against Terrorism and Restoration of Peace) to defeat their united foe.

This arrangement among warlords was seen as an alliance of convenience based on the logic that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Normally, such alliances are short-lived. Seeking to deal the ICC a crippling blow, the warlord alliance initiated its first attack against the ICC in February 2006. Contrary to their public claims, the warlords suffered a major setback and were forced to withdraw and regroup (Dalka, July, 2006). The warlord alliance attacked again in June 2006. This time they were soundly defeated. The ICC drove the warlords out of Mogadishu and consolidated their control of the capital.

The ICC’s revolutionary momentum has spread across southern Somalia where they have consolidated their power and displaced the remaining warlords (see Figure 3). With a firm grip on power in Mogadishu and in many southern villages and towns, the ICC has been able to take significant steps to completely transform the law and justice systems into ones which adhere to a strict interpretation of the Koran, similar to the interpretation used by the Taliban in Afghanistan (Le Sage, 2001). The ICC’s strict laws are not so popular with all Somalis. While predominantly a Muslim people, Somalis are reluctant to reject the idea of Islamic rule, however they are not happy with what they perceive as growing fundamentalism in their country. They view restrictions on their choices of social activities such as dancing, viewing television, and Hollywood movies as a denial of their rights. Likewise, Somalia’s neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, are uncomfortable with a Somalia ruled by Islamic fundamentalists for fear that such a government could provide safe havens for terrorists. These same concerns are shared by the western countries.

Challenged by the ICC, the weak TFG has only been able to stand by and watch. The diminution of the TFG’s authority and threat of the spread of fundamentalist Islam in Somalia has put the U.S. and other Western countries on alert.
The ICC named cleric Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys as its leader and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed chairman of its Executive Committee. Aweys was a colonel in the Somali army and fought in the 1977 Ogaden War against Ethiopia, during which he was cited for bravery. He is viewed as one of the more extreme leaders of the Union, which promotes *sharia* law. Sheikh Ahmed is a more moderate figure in the ICC and is not interested in imposing an Islamist social model on Somalia. His primary concern is bringing peace and order to Somalia. The divergent qualities of these two leaders cast doubts as to whether the ICC, which continues to secure and expand its power, is interested in a power-sharing agreement with the TFG. Confident in its eventual military victory over the TFG, yet internally divided about its strategic aims, the answer is unclear.

Today, the TFG is restricted to the area around Baidoa while the ICC operates freely across the southern half of the country, to include Mogadishu. The warlords, though beaten by the ICC, cannot yet be written completely out of this struggle for power. They may well be regrouping and preparing to strike back. Affected by the events in Somalia, external actors have likewise been drawn into the recent conflict.
C. EXTERNAL ACTORS

External actors have played a significant role in influencing the current conflict in Somalia. Such influences come from various countries and organizations that have permanent interests in Somalia for political, historical, strategic or security reasons. Some of these countries continue to try to influence Somali politics by organizing or supporting warring factions and creating misunderstanding amongst them, which has prompted the rivals to clash. Some of these actors and their motivations are listed below.

1. Kenya

Kenya’s national interest in Somalia revolves around issues that are key to its economic survival, territorial integrity, and security. Given the history of Kenya-Somalia relations, particularly over irredentist Somali policies regarding Greater Somalia, it is in the interests of Kenya to have a friendly government in Somalia. Such a government would promote peace and stability, which are essential for the overall stability of the region. Consequently, a strong foothold in Somalia’s post-conflict political situation is crucial for the role Kenya would play in the region.

Kenya has borne the brunt of insecurity in Somalia. The large inflow of illegal arms and refugees from Somalia into Kenya has been a major source of Kenya’s worsening insecurity. This insecurity has compelled the Kenyan government to invest significant resources in protecting her citizens. As such, Kenya should aim to eliminate safe havens for terrorists and Islamic extremist groups which have emerged in Somalia. A peaceful and stable Somalia would be central to Kenya’s fight against organized and cross-border crimes emanating from Somalia.

Kenya invested significant resources in the Somali National Reconciliation Conference that was held between 2002 and 2004. Following the successful formation of the TFG, IGAD states - and Kenya in particular - do not wish to see the TFG disintegrate like its predecessor, due to lack of necessary support and internal structural problems. Kenya, therefore, has the daunting task of ensuring that the new government succeeds. So does Ethiopia.
2. Ethiopia

It is not possible to analyze Somali conflicts without considering her within a regional context. Ethiopia is situated in the middle of the Horn of Africa and is without a seaport. The religious and political history of Ethiopia is such that its Ethiopian Christian government, with about half of its population being Muslim, is permanently obsessed with the dangers of political Islam. Ethiopia has been waging a ten-year battle against numerous insurgent groups who enjoy significant external support. One such group is Al-Itihad Al-Islamia (AlAl) which has its base in Somalia. Beyond the danger of political Islamism, Somalia still lays claim to the Ogaden territories. Ethiopia fears the return of a strong fundamental Islamic state in Somalia, which could take up her irredentist claims to the Ogaden.

With the nexus between irredentist sentiments in Somalia and the spread of fundamentalist Islam to its large Muslim population, Ethiopia is more anxious than any other regional power to prevent a hostile takeover of the Somalia government. Ethiopia believes that there is more to be gained from deterring an Islamic dominance in the region. To this end, Ethiopia constantly interferes in Somali domestic affairs by supporting either one faction or another. Regarding the current crisis, Ethiopia supports the Somali TFG and it is believed that Ethiopia has provided troops to protect the weak TFG from the ICC attacks (Bloomfield, 2006). What is not clear now is whether Addis Ababa is pursuing a limited strategy of buying time for the TFG or whether she is defeating the ICC. Eritrea, Ethiopia’s northern neighbor, has different objectives vis-à-vis Somalia.

3. Eritrea

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000, following territorial disputes. Despite the appearance of calm, tension still exists between these two nations. Both of these countries are competing throughout the region and have backed rebel groups to destabilize one another. Somalia has allowed them to open up new fronts in their “Cold War.”

Ethiopia and the TFG have been trading allegations that Eritrea is arming and helping the ICC militants. They believe Eritrea is fighting a proxy war with
Ethiopia in Somalia by supplying the ICC with weapons to fight the TFG and Ethiopia. The conflict became more complicated when a large cargo plane believed to have come from Eritrea landed at Mogadishu’s airport in July 2006. The TFG alleged that the aircraft was carrying Eritrean military supplies for the ICC, including landmines, bombs, grenades, bazookas, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft missiles. The ICC, however, denied the charges saying that the cargo was made up of "small sewing machines," medicine and medical supplies (Weinstein, August 02, 2006). If these allegations of supplying weapons are true, then it is clear that the ICC has Eritrea as a willing ally. Complicating matters further is the involvement of Egypt.

4. Egypt

Of all the Arab nations, Egypt has enjoyed the greatest influence in policymaking in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. Key to its policymaking concerns has been the use of the Nile waters, of which the Blue Nile contributes 86% of the total volume and originates in Ethiopia. Egyptian leaders believe that their country’s virtual monopoly over the benefits of the Nile over the past half-century was largely due to the level of underdevelopment in the upper basin countries. One reason for this level of underdevelopment was the internal strife in Ethiopia, as opposition groups sought to unseat Mengistu Haile Marium’s regime. The emergence in 1991 of a stronger Ethiopia has pushed Ethiopia to greater use of its critical Blue Nile resource. To the Egyptians, however, this attention threatens their unfettered access to Nile waters and their interest in the region (Tadesse, 2002, p. 170).

Egypt believes that peace in Somalia will have its own positive trickle-down effect on Ethiopia. As such, Egypt fears that any peaceful relationship between Ethiopia and the TFG will negatively affect its regional interests. Moreover, in the regional rivalry for influence, Egypt believes that Somalia is an integral part of the Arab world and should be inclined more to the broader Arab world than the larger African neighborhood. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Egypt will be careful not to let Ethiopia have an unchecked influence in Somalia. Simply put, Egypt desires the greatest share of influence in
Somalia’s political evolution. This is precisely why Egypt has allied itself with anti-Ethiopian Somali forces (Tadesse, 2002, p. 174). Here is where the ICC comes in. By disguising a concern for security of and access to the Nile’s waters, it is almost certain that Egypt is supporting the ICC as a proxy in its competition with Ethiopia.

5. The Western Powers

The Western powers, led by the United States, have also been involved in Somalia. The United States, which secretly backed the defeated warlords in an effort to capture al-Qaeda operatives whom it believes are being sheltered by the Islamists, drew back and now appears to have decided to work with international and regional organizations (Weinstein, June 19, 2006). By expressing her support for the TFG, yet urging it to engage in dialogue with the ICC, the U.S. has lost influence and credibility in Somalia, largely due to its support for the warlords, whom the ICC defeated in June 2006. Interested European powers, especially Great Britain and Italy (the former colonial rulers of Somalia), as well as the United Nations, have also decided to work with international and regional organizations seeking to bolster the TFG.

The main concern of the U.S. in Somalia is that the Islamic militia might impose strict religious courts in Mogadishu and surrounding areas, thus forming a Taliban-style hard-line regime. The United States has accused the ICC of harboring al-Qaeda members, whose leader, Osama bin Laden, denounced the TFG and called for support of the ICC in a July 2, 2006 audio tape recording (Weinstein, July 07, 2006). One of the ICC leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, has been linked with the deadly bombings at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. He has been on the U.S.’s list of people “linked to terrorism” since shortly after the attacks on 9/11 (Winter, 2006).

6. Regional and International Organizations

The African Union (AU) and IGAD have pledged to support the TFG. They have promised to provide peacekeeping troops if an exemption can be made to the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by the UN Security Council in 1992. However, their support has been weak. The effectiveness of the AU and IGAD is
dependent upon diplomatic and financial backing from the Western powers who, despite offering support, are reluctant to empower the TFG.

Due to feeble support from the AU, IGAD and Western powers, the Arab League (AL) has decided to step in and fill the void. In late June 2006, the AL initiated a peace process in Khartoum in an effort to ease tension between the TFG and the ICC. The AU, IGAD and the Western powers quickly and enthusiastically endorsed the peace initiative, only to see it disappear as both the TFG and the ICC refused to resolve the differences between them. At the time of this writing, the AL remains optimistic that the TFG and ICC will agree to open dialogue.

D. CONCLUSION

Until recently, the ICC had not been a key player in Somali developments. Yet, today they are laying the foundation for a more significant political struggle. Their strategy is to use economic leverage, Islamic populism and clandestine patronage networks in order to manipulate leadership and communal tension within the TFG. The West's unwillingness to provide support and advice is allowing the formation of crippling divisions within the TFG.

The future course of Somali politics will depend on the intentions of both internal and external actors, which presently remain unclear. For the time being, it is reasonable to argue that the ICC is the aggressor in the Somalia conflict; Addis Ababa and Nairobi believe this to be so. Both want to prevent the emergence of a fundamentalist Islamic state on their borders, one which might pursue irredentist claims. Asmara, on the other hand, is gaining leverage in Somalia by allying itself with the ICC. The regional organizations, like the AU and IGAD, are proving to be powerless to stop the conflict, mainly because of the lack of Western and UN support. But the West's reluctance doesn't end there. The West is also responsible for failing to bolster its rhetoric with credible incentives to the TFG and sanctions to curtail the ICC.

Lastly, Somali cultural influence must not be underestimated. The usual traditional clan rivalries are likely to hamstring the ICC and force it to split along
clan lines. Equally, Somalia’s generally moderate Muslim population may resist the imposition of Sharia law, thereby expanding the rift between the hard-liners and moderates in the ICC.

Given the shortage of security forces to protect the TFG, the obvious question emerges: who will provide assistance? This is the question I intend to answer in the next chapter. In doing so, I will discuss the plans by IGAD to deploy peacekeepers in Somalia to assist resettling the TFG.
IV. IGAD’S ATTEMPTS TO INTERVENE IN SOMALIA’S CONFLICT

A. INTRODUCTION

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and the collapse of governmental authority in some states are the principle threats to international peace and stability. These threats are common in Africa. To deal with them requires rapid response from groups of well-trained, well-equipped military, police and civilian experts. The most violent and devastating conflicts in Africa have been intrastate in nature with considerable peacekeeping consequences for regional and international players.

Somalia serves as an example of a country that is a threat to international peace and security. It has been in conflict and without a functioning government for over 15 years. The situation in Somalia has become a great concern for the AU, whose member states have indicated their willingness to take risks for restoring peace, stability, and good governance. The AU now has the responsibility of ensuring that the Somali TFG is reinstalled and functional. This is achievable only by defeating the armed militias in the country. For this reason, the AU, through its eastern regional body, IGAD, has planned to deploy peacekeepers in Somalia.

In this chapter, I will provide a synopsis of the attempts by African nations to solve armed conflicts on the continent, by first looking at the broader initiatives by the AU, then narrowing focus to efforts by East African countries to try to solve the conflict in Somalia. I will finally highlight the major challenges that the East African region is facing in dealing with peace and security matters.

B. AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF)

Time is one of the most crucial factors in preventing an emerging crisis from erupting into a major war. Under the current UN peacekeeping structure, it takes an average of between three and six months from the time the UN Security Council decides to establish a peacekeeping mission until the UN is able to deploy peacekeepers and support equipment. Crises in Rwanda, Bosnia and,
more recently, the Congo and Liberia highlight the need for a readily deployable force. It is for this reason that the African Union is developing standby forces, similar to NATO, to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflicts and crises in Africa. The plan involves establishment of regionally-based multinational standby brigades, ready to intercede in situations of armed conflict or genocide. Each participating country is required to pledge soldiers and logistical support to the UN, AU or regional peace support operations (Cilliers and Malan, 2005, p. 15). Currently, Africa plans to establish five regional standby brigades as shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Regional Economic Community</th>
<th>Standby Brigade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>AMU (Arab Maghreb Union)</td>
<td>AMU Standby Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>EASBRIG (East African Standby Brigade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>ESF (ECOWAS Standby Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>SADCBRIG (SADC Brigade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States)</td>
<td>ECCAS Standby Brigade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Africa’s Regional Standby Brigades

Principally, the Standby Brigades will be responsible for preventing emerging crises in member states of their respective regions. Of the five regional economic communities (RECs), ECOWAS is the oldest (formed in 1975) and most active. It is the sole economic community in the western part of Africa and has a membership of 15 countries (Nivet, 2006, p. 13). Its armed component, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), now ESF, is operational and has participated in peace intervention missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote D’Ivoire. However, ECOMOG experienced financial and logistical constraints when it was initially deployed. One important thing about West Africa is that the 15 countries which form ECOWAS are also members of
ESF. This arrangement makes it easier for ECOWAS member states to respond swiftly to situations within their region. The other four regional Standby Brigades are in the formative stages. The AU’s plan is to have all the Standby Brigades operational by the year 2010 (Cilliers and Malan, 2005, p. 3).

Unlike in West Africa, where there is only one dominant regional economic body, East Africa has a plethora of overlapping regional organizations. These organizations include the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and IGAD. Although the AU regards East Africa as a region composed of 13 countries, the region does not have an overarching body. Further, East Africa lacks an integrated conflict prevention, management and mitigation framework similar to that found in West Africa. This is a weakness for the East African region. The 13 countries that form East Africa, according to AU’s definition, include seven countries of IGAD (see Figure 4) and six other countries: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, and Tanzania (Policy Framework, 2005, p. 1). At the time of its establishment, EASBRIG was composed of these 13 countries. The composition has since changed. Recently, Tanzania and Mauritius detached themselves from EASBRIG and are now affiliated with SADC for their standby force commitment.
In the meantime, the AU mandated that IGAD should coordinate all EASBRIG activities (Policy Framework, 2005, p. 4). EASBRIG’s planning element is operational and located in Nairobi. Its Brigade and Logistics headquarters are located in Addis Ababa. EASBRIG, however, has many structural deficiencies which need to be rectified. These deficiencies make EASBRIG far from being ready for deployment.

Even so, all is not negative for EASBRIG. At an April 2006 meeting in Nairobi, EASBRIG’s Ministers of Defense discussed plans to establish an independent coordinating mechanism to replace IGAD. This new body is
expected to enhance cooperation and harmony in the region. It will include countries of East Africa who are not members of IGAD (Communiqué, April 26, 2006). This is a positive move by EASBRIG. If the new coordinating body is formed, then EASBRIG will have a regional body similar to ECOWAS.

As Somalia’s peace and reconciliation meeting in Nairobi came to an end in October 2004, it became necessary for peacekeepers to be deployed to Somalia to assist in resettling the newly formed TFG. Ideally, it could have been EASBRIG’s task to provide the peacekeepers, but, since EASBRIG was not yet fully established, this did not happen. IGAD quickly thought of an alternative plan. In a meeting held in Uganda on March 14, 2005, IGAD’s Ministers of Defense approved an ad hoc plan to deploy peacekeepers formed from IGAD countries to assist in the restoration of Somalia’s TFG. Sudan and Uganda were identified as the countries which would deploy troops under the body tagged IGAD Peace Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). The other IGAD countries were to assist in provision of logistics, equipment, emergency assistance, and training of the Somalia Army and Police (AU, May 12, 2005). IGASOM was expected to be deployed in May 2005 but, unfortunately, this deployment did not take place either. Challenges which I discuss in the next paragraph may have contributed to the failure of the deployment.

C. IGAD’S CHALLENGES

IGAD is currently facing problems similar to those which ECOWAS faced during its initial stages of formation. To begin with, ECOWAS was created to address economic, social and developmental challenges in West Africa. But due to an increase in conflicts in the region, ECOWAS gradually emerged as a regional security actor. In dealing with the new security challenges, ECOWAS faced financial and capability shortfalls, weak institutional preparation and lack of a protocol regarding mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. At the present time, and with the increasing demand for conflict resolution in East Africa, IGAD is struggling to deal with challenges that may affect its future operations. Below is an elaboration of some of these challenges.
1. Organizational Structure

Formed in 1986, IGAD had a very narrow mandate revolving around the issue of drought and desertification. Gradually, it became more involved in regional security and political dialogue.

The secretariat of IGAD is located in Djibouti and is established with three divisions: Economic Co-operation; Agriculture and Environment; and Political and Humanitarian Affairs. It is headed by an executive secretary. IGAD, therefore, lacks a peace and security division. Yet, the region is prone to conflicts. A Peace and Security Division is needed that would have conflict solving mechanisms which may include peacekeeping and peace enforcement capabilities.

Though IGAD member states are willing and committed to provide troops and/or equipment for IGASOM, this mission could be hampered by lack of an organizational structure to support the deployment. For this reason, IGAD should review its mandate and expand its secretariat to create a Peace and Security Division to be responsible for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR). Once this is done, legal adjustments to the IGAD mandate can be made.

2. Legal Requirements

In order for IGAD to deploy troops for any military operations, it is necessary that the agreement establishing IGAD be amended to include the undertaking of peace support and peace enforcement operations. This will require that Article 6A of the agreement establishing IGAD and any other article restricting IGAD to dialogue only, as opposed to intervening in solving conflicts, should be amended to provide for peace support operations, including peace enforcement. Also, Article 7 of the IGAD Charter, which itemizes the Aims and Objectives of IGAD authority to include promoting peace and stability through dialogue, should be amended to include the undertaking of peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement action (Agreement establishing IGAD, 1996). Amendments of these two articles will give IGAD troops the “teeth” to be able to use force to restore security should the situation dictate.
3. **Financial and Logistical Problems**

Funding is important for the success of any mission. IGAD is facing financial problems similar to those that ECOWAS faced on the first deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia. ECOMOG lacked reliable financial and logistical support since it relied on voluntary contributions from ECOMOG member states. This was a miscalculation because most of ECOMOG’s contributing countries had limited resources and therefore they were often unable to respond, even to the urgent needs of their own forces at home. IGAD also depends on her member states to make financial contributions in order to support its activities. Yet, IGAD countries, whose economic mainstay is agriculture, have large areas that are arid and semi-arid lowlands. Being poor productive areas, the region’s economic power is therefore weak. As such, it is expected that the financial contributions by IGAD member countries may not be enough to support military missions which are usually expensive. Without external financial support, IGAD will have difficulties in supporting IGASOM.

4. **UN Arms Embargo**

An arms embargo was imposed on Somalia on January 23, 1992, following the rapid deterioration of the situation and heavy loss of human life after the overthrow of Siad Barre. UN Security Council Resolution 733 restricted deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. Even though there have been many violations of the embargo, it now poses an obstacle for the deployment of troops in Somalia. It also makes it difficult to train Somali national army and other law enforcement agencies. Without a trained national army, and police force, it will be difficult for the TFG to be able to defeat the insurgents in the country while at the same time protecting the local population. It is therefore necessary that the UN lifts the arms embargo so as to allow IGAD to deploy troops in Somalia. IGAD and the AU have, on several occasions, appealed to the UN to lift the arms embargo, but the UN has been reluctant to act.

D. **CONCLUSION**

Do all these challenges mean that East Africans cannot assist one of their own? Structural and legal problems are solvable. Financial constraints can be
alleviated if the international community is willing to assist in solving the current crisis. The lifting of the arms embargo falls directly on the UN.

Militarily, East African countries have had some exposure to peacekeeping operations, given their participation in missions authorized by the UN across the world. Given that Somalia is a problem in their own backyard, one would think IGAD countries would be willing to assist. In any case, they are familiar with Somalia’s terrain and weather. Additionally, East African troops have another advantage. They have benefited a lot from the American sponsored African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program. This program trained troops from East African countries to manage crises and solve conflicts within the African environment. It is now time for them to put into practice what they learned from the ACRI and follow-on training.

With all this said, three questions remain. The ICC declared war on any peacekeeping troops to be deployed in Somalia. Therefore, the first question is whether IGASOM will be a peacekeeping or a peace-enforcement mission? Secondly, since the ICC has adopted an insurgent pattern of resistance, in the event IGASOM is deployed to Somalia, will it be ready for counterinsurgency operations? And if so, what strategies will IGASOM forces use in fighting the insurgents? These are the questions I will attempt to answer in the next chapter.
V. IGAD AND TFG’S STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

Before considering a solution to the Somali problem, one needs to understand the necessity of restoring a viable government in Somalia. Today, fundamentalist Islamism is a growing problem which has come to dominate the ICC-held portions of Somalia. Fundamentalist Islamism has the potential to breed not only domestic terrorism, but also provide a useful cover for international terrorist activities. None of the IGAD countries would like to have a neighbor with terrorists. Therefore, the sooner an effective government in Somalia is able to undermine, crush, or co-opt the ICC, the sooner a potential safe haven for terrorists will be denied. Denying terrorists a sanctuary is one of the principal reasons why it is necessary to resolve the conflict in Somalia.

Prior to spring 2006, the Mogadishu warlords represented the main opposition to the TFG. Due to abrupt changes during the summer, this dynamic has shifted; the ICC now poses the main threat to the nascent government. What’s more, a series of rapid victories over the beleaguered warlords has brought much of southern Somalia into the ICC’s column. What can be done?

One way the Somali crisis can be resolved is through dialogue. If the TFG and the ICC can engage in genuine dialogue and agree to form a coalition government, then a solution to the prolonged Somali anarchy will have been solved. If, however, dialogue fails, as it has so often in the past, then a new round of fighting will commence: this time between the TFG and the ICC.

In the previous chapters, I identified the ICC as the aggressive force in the Somalia crisis. I suggested that they have adapted an insurgent form of warfare against the TFG. Ultimately, their aim is to destroy the TFG and transform Somalia into an Islamic state. In this chapter, I will discuss the strategies which IGAD, while coming to the aid of the TFG, should adopt in order to defeat the ICC.
B. COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

There are scores of models that have been designed based on theories dealing with insurgency and counterinsurgency. But not all of these theories can be applied to all insurgencies. One model that fits the current insurgency problem in Somalia is the Mystic Diamond (see Figure 5). This is an insightful model developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick (2005), chairman of the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The Mystic Diamond model offers a coherent and holistic counterinsurgent plan for state security forces that have to face off against a shadowy insurgency. By understanding and using this model effectively, the Somalia TFG can put itself in a position to reverse the situation on the ground and engender the support of the Somali population.

![The Mystic Diamond Model](image_url)

Figure 5. The Mystic Diamond Model

Defeating the insurgents transcends victory on the battlefield. Complete victory implies working with the population towards building a conducive environment wherein the population will trust the government to provide for its needs: security, education, energy, infrastructure, etc. It is through the population, the insurgency's primary source of support, that the government must center its initial fight against the insurgency. Once the government is able to
uncouple the insurgency from the population, it must then sequentially apply the
strategies as depicted in the Mystic Diamond.

On an abstract level, and from the government’s point of view, there are
five strategies which must be accomplished. The first strategy is “establishing
control of the population.” Here, the government has to build its credibility with
the population. Through credibility comes control. After building legitimacy and
control, the government will then be able to acquire crucial intelligence about the
insurgency through a credible incentive (and disincentive) program.

The second strategy is “disrupting the relationship between the insurgents
and the population.” The purpose of this strategy is to undermine the insurgents’
legitimacy and their level of control over the population. Only after successfully
carrying out Strategies One and Two can a government force advance to
Strategy Three.

The third strategy is the government’s “direct targeting of the insurgent
force.” This strategy can only be employed after the insurgents have been
identified, which comes following intelligence information gained during the
execution of Strategies One and Two.

The fourth strategy is “targeting the infrastructure of the insurgents
through the assistance of the international community.” This strategy is
particularly important in the event the insurgency enjoys external support. If so,
the government must build its legitimacy in the eyes of relevant international
actors and pressure them to impose sanctions on the supporters of the
insurgency.

Lastly, the fifth strategy is to “build an external legitimacy with the
international community.” Building external legitimacy with the international
community is important because it will bring increased external support in the
form of money, equipment and other resources. It is important to note that while
the ideal sequence of defeating insurgents would be to follow strategies in
numerical order, Strategies Four and Five may be conducted concurrently with
the other three strategies. Also, the situation may dictate whether or not there
should be an overlap of these strategies. To reemphasize, it is necessary to achieve Strategies One and Two before advancing to Strategy Three.

If applied in the Somali case, the Mystic Diamond model would resemble Figure 6, where the counter-state is the ICC. Remembering back to Chapter III, the ICC is an illegal armed Islamic movement controlled by Islamic clerics. They have grafted themselves onto the aims and aspirations of the Somali population in Mogadishu and have spread across the entire south. The ICC has so influenced much of the Somali population that it managed to soundly defeat a coalition of warlords in June 2006. This success must be attributed to the trust that the ICC has forged with the population.

On the left side of the model (Figure 6) is the state. The state is the TFG which is currently being supported by IGAD. The population is the Somali people while the international community includes those who support both the TFG (e.g. IGAD) and the ICC.

Figure 6. Mystic Diamond Model depicting the situation in Somalia
C. THE WINNING STRATEGIES

Weak and institutionally divided, the TFG has been idly watching from its sanctuary in Baidoa. The TFG lacks a military or security force. Its federal institutions are virtually non-existent, its parliament split on several issues. Disappointingly, some ministers resigned from the cabinet and allegedly joined the ICC. In Chapter IV, I stated that IGAD is planning to send peacekeepers, IGASOM, to assist the TFG. Upon deployment, it will be necessary for IGASOM to have developed strategies capable of defeating the ICC. The following text outlines a few possible actions, based on the Mystic Diamond model which, if executed properly, could enable the TFG via IGASOM to defeat the ICC.

1. **Strategy 1 - Establishing Control of the Somali Population**

Andrew Krepinevich, in his book, *The Army and Vietnam* (1986), writes “winning the hearts and minds of the people is as desirable for the government as it is for the insurgent” (p. 12). This is particularly important because if the insurgents control the population, then they will eventually win the war and probably control of the country. Insurgents will win because active popular support will provide them with stocks of fresh recruits, food, medicine, and shelter. Moreover, the support of the people assists the government security forces with accurate and timely intelligence. Just as Hezbollah has engrafted itself to the aims and aspirations of the Lebanese Shiite community in order to shield itself from Israel, so too has the ICC brokered a similar arrangement in Somalia. Simply stated, the ICC is in control of the population in southern and central Somalia, to include Mogadishu. The ICC achieved this trust relationship by providing security, reinstalling law and order and providing social services. It is the willingness of the women, children and old men to support the ICC and its political program, at the risk of their lives, that gives the organization power far beyond its military means.

In order for the TFG to be able to reverse this trend and develop popular support from among the population, it must be able to provide pure preferences (public goods/rights to include roads, water, education, etc.) and incentives to sway popular support in their direction. With the support of IGAD, the TFG will
need to undertake certain activities all in support of the actions recommended in Strategy One of the Mystic Diamond model. Below are some such necessary activities.

a. Incentives

The incentives that the TFG and IGAD offer to the Somalis should be carefully selected according to the needs of the population. These incentives can be identified by talking to local leaders and the population. IGAD forces should plan, prioritize and carry out construction projects, such as building schools, hospitals, markets, dams, boreholes, cattle dips and veterinary clinics. They should plan to construct or repair administrative buildings to include offices, court houses, police stations and prisons. Subject to the financial limitations of IGAD, it should conduct road and airfield repair/construction or, if necessary, contract some of these projects out to private companies. This will be no easy task for IGAD and the TFG; and, it will require substantial funding. However, with the concerted efforts of the international community, the seemingly grandiose task can become a reality.

b. Law Enforcement

Countries bordering Somalia, along with the western powers, have raised concerns about transnational terrorist groups and criminals exploiting Somalia’s lack of a security apparatus. The collapse of Somalia, in fact, created conditions for lawlessness, just as armed conflict creates an environment conducive to opportunistic criminal enterprises (looting, rape, and hijacking for ransom). Nevertheless, Somalia has repeatedly shown, even in the context of state collapse and armed conflict, that informal systems of governance can ensure the rule of law and, in some instances, surprisingly high levels of community protection. Indeed, one of the most intriguing paradoxes of contemporary Somalia is how dramatically and quickly rule of law and security can change. Within a year, a town or neighborhood, one which had been habitually bandit-ridden, can reverse its fortunes and become a model of relative tranquility. Likewise, towns lauded for their peace and security can fall quickly into lawless criminality (Tavolato, 2004, p. 9). These opposite ends of the
security pole demonstrate the need to establish organized and effective law enforcement agencies and how, through these agencies, criminal activities, anarchy and terrorism can be controlled and curtailed.

A population’s most important requirement is security. In Somalia, the TFG must satisfy this need or run the risk of losing popular support. The population will rightly fear ICC retaliation if people support a government that won’t be able to protect its citizenry in the future. After all, outside peacekeepers, like IGASOM, are temporary. For this reason, the TFG should request IGAD’s assistance in training the Somali army, police and prison guards. Once trained, Somalis would be responsible for the security of their respective regions. While peace is being restored, IGASOM should assess the best time to begin the process of disarming the ICC. However, due to the Somali addiction to guns, the disarmament process is expected to be difficult in practice.

c. Political Approach

One of the biggest obstacles in African politics is tribalism. Like many other African nations, Somalia has had this problem in terms of clan politics since independence. This time, however, the leaders of the TFG would do well to avoid sticking to ethnic lines in terms of their elected leaders. There is no doubt that power and influence can be acquired and exercised for insidious purposes; this has been the norm in Somalia for several years. This norm has steeped Somalia in a morass of chaos and malfunction.

More than ever, Somalia needs statesmen. It needs charismatic leaders who will lead not through the power of the gun, but through fair play and mature politics. The TFG leaders must put their country first before thinking about their clans. Putting the country first will strengthen Somalia. This may not be achieved overnight, but it is an endeavor to strive for. And local politics is key.

Learning the lessons of Hezbollah, the TFG politicians must be willing and able to work in the underbelly of local politics. Mobilizing the population to pick up trash, caring for the old, women and children, and creating jobs through investments in the economy will raise the image of the TFG.
IGAD should advise and encourage the TFG politicians to rally a national sense of civic duty which would bolster the TFG. It is obvious that the absence of public participation in political matters is seriously “injuring” the government’s efforts in fighting the insurgents. This absence might fracture a tenuous peace which was achieved in Nairobi after intensive diplomacy among the Somali clan representatives.

d. Restoring the Judicial System

During the latter 1990s, informal entities in Somalia, loosely led by clan elders and others, started to become more structured and institutionalized. Though a variety of entities emerged, three were predominant: a coalition of clan leaders, businessmen, and the Muslim clergy who oversee and administer the sharia courts. Ken Menkhaus (2003) argues that several features of these sharia courts make them appealing to the population. This popularity challenges the governing institutions of the TFG. Amongst other accomplishments, the sharia courts have proven able to restore law and order in the south which has engendered popular support.

One may wonder why Somalis would prefer the harsh sharia courts over others. The most probable reason is that the locals want to fill the security gap created after a decade and a half of anarchy. The population is tired of the unrelenting intimidation, kidnappings, theft and violence; the sharia courts offer a remedy to the chaos and fear. Put another way, in the absence of government leadership, the population has opted to accept the sharia courts. This, then, illustrates the ICC’s ability to operate successfully at the grassroots level.

IGAD should therefore work with the TFG towards establishing a properly networked judicial system that would ensure the enforcement of constitutional law. This would be a positive move towards having the necessary judicial links down in the communities. IGAD should assist the TFG in re-establishing the judicial system, since it is an important arm of the government and an important tool in restoring law and order.
e. **Job Opportunities**

The long civil war in Somalia produced a “lost” generation of young Somalis who came of age in a time of a collapsed state. Lacking education, many Somali youth had one choice: employment in a factional, warlord-controlled militia. Beginning in 1999, Mogadishu businessmen, who had previously bankrolled the warlords in return for personal protection, began refusing to pay the warlords. Instead, many started funding their own militias (Tavolato, 2004, p. 7). Most recently, the businessmen have sub-contracted their security needs to the sharia court system who also have private militias. In any case, the salaries that the militiamen used to get were low - a dollar or two per day per militiaman (Menkhaus, 2003).

The decreased status and earning power of the gunmen prompted a gradual, yet spontaneous, demobilization of militiamen. The twisted effect of this development was increased problems of lawlessness, especially kidnapping for ransom since youth were no longer controlled by the militias but still had their weapons.

In order to liberate Somalia’s young generation - who are not to blame for Somalia’s sad state of affairs - the government, with the assistance of IGAD and the broader international community, desperately needs to develop the economy, thereby creating responsible and attractive employment opportunities, attractive in terms of salaries more meaningful than those offered by the ICC and the warmongers. If economic development were to work, we would expect to see a reduction in the ICC’s recruiting pool as the TFG gains a larger, supporting constituency. The end result: a stronger government, shrinking unemployment and a weaker ICC.

2. **Strategy 2 - Disrupting the Relationship Between the ICC and the Population**

Bringing the insurgency back down to tolerable levels is very doable. This second strategy is not about defeating the insurgents, but rather constricting their operating environment. Specifically, Strategy Two seeks to make it harder for the insurgents to operate freely on any level. It seeks to curtail an insurgent group’s
ability to conduct operations, procure and transfer false documents, ferry militia from place to place, and transfer funds. As Krepinevich (1986) asserts, “if denied the ability to move quickly and easily among the population, the insurgents will become, to paraphrase Mao, like fish out of water” (p. 11). In Somalia, however, the insurgents are located in towns, unlike the insurgents in Malaya and Kenya during the Mau Mau, whose operational bases were in the forests. As a result, the insurgent, as Mao once professed, “moves freely as if a fish in the sea.” Taking this fact to heart, IGAD and the TFG need to make it difficult for the ICC to conduct operational, logistical and financial activities. They need to deny the ICC the freedom of movement to conduct these activities. One way is to impose sanctions on both the ICC and its local supporters. Another way is to penetrate the ICC via informants in order to gain information. I elaborate on these two options below.

a. **Sanctions**

The beauty of seeding weakness into an organization is that one can degrade its effectiveness while still monitoring it, and not allowing a new and potentially more dangerous organization from erupting. As the saying goes, better the devil you know than the one you don’t. In other words, keep the organization alive since you know how it works. The same can’t be said for an unknown organization. In Somalia, the TFG must impose sanctions on the ICC and its supporting businessmen. The ICC can be restricted if its illicit assets are frozen and members and their families are levied with strict travel bans.

b. **Intelligence**

Attaining a clear picture inside the ICC will require watertight intelligence. In fact, the TFG’s ability to wage effective intelligence operations will determine this conflict’s outcome. As Joel Garreau (2001) aptly points out, “Intelligence is crucial to analyze the network’s weak links so you can destroy it.” High-quality intelligence enables a clear picture of a networked enemy, a chance to see inside its otherwise shrouded world. From there, the TFG will be able to proceed to Strategy Three.
There are a number of types of intelligence (e.g., signals, imagery, communications and human intelligence), but in Somalia not all apply or serve equal purposes. On the socially networked, Third-World battlefield of Somalia, the value of human intelligence (HUMINT) supersedes the others. So how does one acquire this type of intelligence? Professor Dorothy Denning (2006) has an answer. In her estimation, there are three ways to gather intelligence: through infiltration of the network, effective law enforcement or by using an informant. Exploiting the ICC through infiltration would be only marginally useful. The ICC is based on trust, though not in the same fashion as with social connections via Somalia’s clans. Therefore, an infiltrator would have a very difficult time gaining access to the ICC’s senior leadership. Option two is off the table - there is no traditional law enforcement in Somalia. This leaves option three. But here’s the rub: option three relies on trust, not yet a strong suit of the TFG.

If the government hopes to gain an insider's look at the ICC, it must possess a handful of well-placed informants. This will not be easy as the population has widely embraced and, in many communities in the south, joined the ICC. Similarly, the public's perception of the TFG presents another limitation. As a rule, the population does not trust the TFG. Why not? It does not know the TFG. Nonetheless, there is hope. Playing to the advantage of Somalia's fragile government are the various sects within the ICC, some of which have conflicting goals.

Being able to address the grievances of the disgruntled groups within the ICC will go a long way towards “turning” well-placed insiders. The first order of business for the TFG will be to isolate these scorned groups and make contact with their key personnel. The TFG will need to attend to their grievances in order to develop indispensable informants. This might require offering rewards, such as a sum of cash or a position of authority or a government post, or simply allowing a disgruntled insider to see himself as an activist (Denning, 2006). Once acquired, helpful informants will soon provide the authorities with the requisite intelligence to accurately identify the ICC’s goals, uncover its plans, and detect and locate the senior leadership.
With informants inside the ICC, the TFG will be in a better position to manipulate fissures. If distrust runs deep enough, the ICC could implode from within. But, even if the TFG cannot force an implosion of the ICC, with concrete knowledge of its hierarchy and future plans, it can creatively apply deterrent options.

3. **Strategy 3 - Direct Targeting of the ICC**

Any successful counterinsurgency strategy must involve securing the government’s base areas, separating the insurgent forces from the population, and eliminating the insurgent’s infrastructure. In areas infested by insurgency, like Mogadishu, government troops must concentrate enough force to either destroy or expel the main body of insurgents in clear-and-hold operations while preparing the area for pacification. These two steps represent those which must be taken in order to assert control over the population and win its willing support (Krepinevich, 1986 p. 13).

In Chapter II, I stated that the Somalis are a warlike people who possess a xenophobic character. The intended deployment of peacekeeping forces sponsored by IGAD has been received with resistance. The ICC is unalterably opposed to the deployment of foreign troops in Somalia and has vowed to resist any foreign troops deployed in the country (Weinstein, June 27, 2006). These developments, therefore, call for a specialized peacekeeping force with a robust mandate. Whatever the case, it is quite clear that the TFG’s survival depends upon the peacekeepers.

In the early 1990s, the international community, led by the U.S., attempted to restore peace and public authority. As history makes clear, that effort ended in disarray. Certain factors led to this failure and IGAD would do well to learn from these lessons (Dalka, July 2006). First, as Dalka (2006) argues, “the operation’s mandate was unspecified.” This time, the mandate must be clear and precise, so as to avoid a backlash reminiscent of the early 1990s. Secondly, Dalka (2006) states that “... the militias in Mogadishu, which was the operational center of the intervention, were not disarmed and that gave the faction leaders enough opportunity to do mischief.” As mentioned earlier in this paper, Somalis have an
addiction to guns by virtue of the perceived “gun culture.” No doubt, most Somalis including the ICC will resist any attempts at disarmament. Yet, disarmament is the best way to reduce the violence in Somalia. So what can be done? IGAD must develop a workable disarmament plan so as to ensure that the disarmament is not counterproductive. Participatory disarming, where local vigilantes peacefully disarm the militia, might well be one solution (Mburu, 2002, p. 13). For instance, in 2002, following an increase of ownership of illegal weapons by locals, Uganda introduced armed militia groups in the villages called Local Defense Units (LDU) who were made to implement a voluntary gun surrender program mainly amongst the Karamojong tribe. As an incentive, the surrendered guns were exchanged with items such as building materials, farm implements, schools, new wells, and capital investments (Kopel, 2002). This disarmament initiative can further be improved by issuing registered weapons and ammunition to selected villagers who will become home guards. Their responsibility will be to assist the security forces in providing security to the locals. The home guards should be made accountable for all actions taken with their weapons.

4. Strategy 4 - Targeting Infrastructure of the ICC with the International Community

If the insurgency is receiving external assistance, the TFG and IGAD must target and disrupt these lifelines by all means possible. By determining the key nodes in the insurgents’ network and shutting down the ICC’s front companies and charities, the TFG will have done much to curtail logistical support and stem the flow of funds to and among the Islamic militia groups. Sanctions on foreign corporations doing business with the ICC are a first logical step. This would ensure the isolation of those responsible for the current insurgency in Somalia. However, this can only be done if the TFG receives the assistance of the UN and the Western powers because the TFG is too weak politically and economically to be able to impose sanctions on foreign nations or organizations by itself.
5. **Strategy 5 - Building External Legitimacy with the International Community**

The situation in Somalia presents a range of challenges, from improving socio-economic conditions to governance and human rights. Other challenges include the lack of security, terrorism and regional instability. In order to address these challenges, the international community must support the consolidation of representative and effective governance in Somalia. There are indications of increasing functional cohesion among the ministries in the TFG, which could intensify if given the required political, diplomatic and financial support. The TFG should therefore develop and maintain a good, working relationship with the international community in order to court much-needed support.

**D. CONCLUSION**

The situation in Somalia cannot be solved by military means alone. It requires a host of solutions, ranging from military, political, diplomatic and even economic incentives. Presently, the situation favors a combination of both military and political approaches. Somalia has 18 administrative regions, some of which are relatively calm (see Figure 7). Five regions to the north seceded and formed Somaliland, while the three regions in the northeast formed Puntland. Both Somaliland and Puntland are relatively calm. However, the remaining 10 regions, namely those in the south, are not. It would be wise to provide assistance to those regions where peace and stability have been secured through civilian-based governance as well as to other relatively calm regions before dealing with the south and Mogadishu district. Even so, assisting Somaliland may not achieve much in convincing residents there to merge with Somalia. Unlike Puntland, which considers itself an autonomous state within Somalia, Somaliland declared independence in 1991. Over the years, it has managed to establish itself as a model of stability, good governance and economic discipline, but has failed to receive international recognition. Chances for Somaliland to reintegrate with the south are remote. Helping Puntland and other relatively stable provinces to develop new institutions of self-government while laying the groundwork at the
local level for democratic structures and mechanisms would serve as a powerful incentive for others to follow. This approach could also be seen as one which could attract popular support.

Ultimately, defeating the ICC requires the TFG and IGAD forces to accumulate their strength through first and foremost establishing control of the population. Only after gaining control should they directly target the ICC. As Lt. Col. Eric P. Wendt (September 2005) puts it, “Like the moving bubble on a level, the behavior of the bulk of the populace will shift to assist either the government or the insurgents, depending on the carrots and sticks used by each side.”

Offering incentives to the population is key in this conflict. It increases the government’s chances of winning the hearts and minds of the population since, to the degree that the ICC is in control of the population then, by definition, the TFG stands to lose its legitimacy.
Hoping that IGASOM will apply the Mystic Diamond model strategies in fighting the ICC, how will the ICC react? Since June 2006, the ICC has enjoyed an unbroken string of successes by establishing order in regions under its control. The ICC will therefore want to continue maintaining control of the population in these areas while frustrating government efforts in interacting with the population. The ICC fears that deployment of IGASOM would undermine its authority and popularize the TFG’s. As such, its reaction will likely be to mobilize
popular sentiments against the deployment of the peacekeepers while devoting its attention to recruiting and training its armed forces in anticipation of “war.” This therefore calls for IGASOM to be prepared to confront the ICC should the situation demand, even though an indirect approach to Somali conflict would be a better strategy.
VI. CONCLUSION

Until recently, warlords wreaked havoc across Somalia. In the quest for self-gain, their incessant fighting resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands. Together with their bank-rolling partners, the warmongers, the warlords were responsible for pervasive devastating social conditions. Indeed, decrepit social conditions have stalled development efforts and destroyed most Somalis’ quality of life. In the past year, however, things have changed in the south.

With the defeat of the warlords in June 2006, the ICC emerged as a dominant player in Somalia. Many positive changes have taken place in areas under the ICC rule. Across southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, Somalis have a renewed sense of security and justice thanks to the ICC. On the one hand, this has been encouraging for many a destitute Somali. On the other hand, the ICC’s strict and often severe interpretation of Islamic law has brought to everybody’s mind images of 1990s Afghanistan under Taliban rule. The ICC is opposed to social activities such as dancing, viewing television, and Hollywood movies. It has banned listening to western music, thereby raising public disaffection. And there’s more. The ICC has also prohibited the chewing of Khat², which is an important staple of Somali life and is an enormously lucrative cash crop. Increasingly, many Somalis have begun to fear a future under ICC rule. While Somalis, predominantly a Muslim people, are reluctant to reject the idea of Islamic rule, they are not happy with what they perceive as growing fundamentalism in their country.

Future acts of terrorism can be predicted using theories which explain past patterns of similar events. As a phenomenon, warlordism bred not only mayhem and domestic terrorism, but international terrorist activities. Many experts believe that the plotters of the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were linked to an Al-Qaeda cell operating in Somalia. Moreover, the

² A narcotic plant grown in Ethiopia, Kenya, and northern Somalia whose fresh green leaves are chewed for their stimulating effect, ranging from a pleasant mild insomnia to a mild intoxication.
fact that an Al-Qaeda cell was able to perpetrate a major attack on an Israeli resort near Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002 illustrates the capacity of militants to freely operate within Somalia. In this regard, the ICC is not much different from the warlords. In fact, it is likely to be more closely aligned to fundamentalist Islamist groups than are the warlords.

The ICC’s aggressive posture against the TFG has raised questions amongst regional organizations (IGAD and AU), the UN and the West about the ICC’s true intentions. Which country would accept a fundamentalist Islamic state as its neighbor? Certainly not Kenya or Ethiopia. Likewise, though thousands of miles from Somalia, the U.S. is opposed to a Somalia ruled by Islamic radical clerics. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the sooner the Somalis are rid of the fundamentalist Islamists, and ruled by a representative, secular government, the faster another potential safe haven for international terrorists will have been removed from the map.

Unlike the populations of other countries in the Horn of Africa, Somalis should no longer be mere spectators. Waiting for someone else to salvage their domain is a recipe for failure. Fifteen years of conflict should be long enough for the Somalis to have learned a lesson. Why should they lag behind their neighboring countries when it comes to basic freedoms and security? When will Somalia mature politically?

Kenya transformed into a multiparty democracy in 1992; Ethiopia did the same in 1995. In fact, Ethiopia went further, adopting a tiered system of government consisting of a federal government and ethnically based regional states. Thus far, both Kenya and Ethiopia are doing well. Alas, it is high time that Somalia should break free of clannist politics. Civic organizations, whose purpose would be to support the elected government, are critical. Somalis should insist on a government based upon democracy and accountability. Getting to this point will require Somalia to undergo a complete political evolution just like its neighbors.
Given the poverty and scarcity of resources in Somalia, the international community - for reasons of both self-interest and regional stability - should materially and diplomatically support the TFG. Further, the international community must consider local and international terrorists equally dangerous and warn the ICC to exercise restraint and cease their revolutionary activities. The international community must pressure the ICC to surrender their weapons and disband their militias. Above all, the TFG is Somalia’s legitimate government, at least recognized by IGAD and the UN, but not by the donor community and many Somalis. Nonetheless, the ICC should not be allowed to act as a state within a state, as the world has witnessed in Lebanon with Hezbollah. If the Somalis would desist from their xenophobic and mistrustful attitude toward foreigners, then the international community’s support could galvanize the majority of the Somali population and rekindle a nationalist vision. This will be key to the creation of a new political order. Similarly, as in any representative government, if the ICC desires political participation, they should be allowed to compete as a political party. Without question, however, they must be made to disarm.

In any conflict, resolving problems through mutual consultation and dialogue is always the best way forward. Regrettably, this has not been the case in Somalia where efforts to reconcile differences between the TFG and the ICC have been unsuccessful. Although it is Somalia’s internationally acceptable government, the TFG is fragile and has been threatened by the ICC. For this reason, IGAD came up with the initiative for deploying IGASOM in order to restore the TFG. Enabling IGASOM to succeed will require that its troops be trained and organized for counterinsurgency operations. It is important that IGASOM understand that an effective counterinsurgency strategy requires an appreciation of how and why insurgent movements succeed while developing a strategy to defeat them.

As I have previously discussed, counterinsurgency operations place a premium on winning the hearts and minds of the population. This truism conflicts with the military axiom of massive firepower liberally applied. Therefore, IGASOM must be prepared for a long counterinsurgency campaign in Somalia,
where the emphasis must be on deploying light infantry formations, limiting firepower and avoiding “sweep and clear” or “search and destroy” operations. Success can be found by applying the Mystic Diamond model.

As Sun Tzu once proposed, “to fight and conquer in all battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without resorting to fighting” (Giles, 2003). IGASOM should exploit every available opportunity which avoids the shedding of blood. As the situation now stands, the TFG remains feeble and isolated in Baidoa. Its future relies on the international community recognizing the fight it must wage.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to bolster the TFG, I recommend the following:

- The arms embargo imposed on Somalia by the UN in 1992 should be lifted.
- IGASOM should be deployed to Somalia in order to assist the TFG in resettling. While doing so, IGASOM should also assist the TFG in rebuilding Somalia and training the Somali security forces.
- The UN and the international community should pressure the ICC to surrender their arms and cease military activities against the TFG. They should also impose severe sanctions on external supporters of the ICC.
- The UN and the international community should support IGAD in achieving their goals in Somalia.
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