

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
ANOTHER BUREAUCRATIC LAYER OR AN EFFECTIVE OFFICE?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: ANOTHER BUREAUCRATIC LAYER OR AN EFFECTIVE OFFICE? by Heinisha Jacques, 70 pages.

Since its inception, the intelligence community (IC) has had several persistent problems that continue today--information sharing, activity coordination, and validity of analysis.

As a result of 9/11, the IC was closely scrutinized. The findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States led to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence.

The 9/11 Commission's recommendation is thought to be an all-encompassing solution to some problems plaguing the IC. While creating a unbiased director who could equally focus on all members of the IC may seem like an all-encompassing solution, this research will examine the responsibilities of the DNI and determine what solutions it can bring to the existing problems of the IC. The primary research question is: Is the DNI able to solve the persisting problems of the IC as required by the Intelligence Reform Act?

The conclusion of the analysis indicates the most likely hypothesis to the research question is that the DNI will be able to help solve the problems of the IC; however, the director requires additional authority.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

We are safer today but we are not safe, and much work remains.

9/11 Commission

Since its inception, the intelligence community (IC) has had several persistent problems in the past that continue today. Three problems that are prevalent are information sharing, activity coordination, and validity of analysis. There have been “walls” within military and civilian intelligence organizations since World War I. These artificial barriers were used to compartmentalize information between emerging intelligence organizations. One of the best examples of compartmentalization occurred between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It was expected that the CIA would not share its intelligence with any other agency. The FBI did not want to share its information because of law enforcement sensitivities. As an intelligence employee of the Department of Defense, my personal observation is that the Naval Criminal and Investigative Service (NCIS) and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) are not seen as “real” counterintelligence organizations by Army counterintelligence professionals.

During World War II, US Army Military Intelligence (MI), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the FBI were at odds about their respective responsibilities. The FBI believed they were responsible for all domestic intelligence. The ONI believed it was responsible internal security and domestic counterintelligence.¹ As a result of this

conflict, the intelligence organizations were reluctant to share intelligence. President Franklin Roosevelt hired an old and trusted friend, William “Wild Bill” Donovan to review the nation’s intelligence. Donovan suggested that Roosevelt create a central agency to collate information and report significant issues to the President. Thus, the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) was created on July 11, 1941. Donovan was appointed to lead the COI, which had a staff of 600 and a budget of \$10 million. Although COI was helping in reducing redundancies, it did not have the Army or Navy intelligence, or the FBI because they all feared COI would take over their current duties.² COI was eventually dissolved October 1, 1945. The Central Intelligence Group (CIG) followed in 1947, then it became the CIA with the National Security Act of 1947.³

Around the time the CIA was established, President Truman created the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). After the dissolution of COI, its various intelligence functions were divided between the State Department and the military services. Truman quickly realized the necessity for a centralized organization to oversee all intelligence; thus, the creation of the DCI. The National Security Act of 1947 determined the duties of the DCI, who was to be the head of the U.S. IC, act as the principal advisor to the President, and serve as the head of the CIA.⁴ Over the years, concern grew that the DCI was more focused on the CIA, than other organizations in the IC. Additionally, many believed having one person for both positions was overwhelming. As stated by Senator Feinstein in 2002, “The demands of these two full time jobs on the time and attention of any person, no matter how skilled in management, are overwhelming . . . Even if one person could handle both jobs . . . there would remain the perception that he or she is favoring either the community or the Agency.”⁵

On 11 September 2001, terrorists attacked the United States. Four planes were hijacked; two hitting the World Trade Center in New York, one hitting the Pentagon in Virginia, and a fourth, possibly heading for the White House, crashed in Pennsylvania.⁶ Approximately 3,000 people died in the attacks.⁷ In his address to the nation, President Bush said:

The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.⁸

After the events of September 11th, walls within the IC came down, to some extent. The nation's leadership recognized the need to eliminate or reduce the "walls" which were now identified as obstructing the flow of intelligence. However, problems remained that can and have sometimes led to failed operations or an incomplete picture on certain situations. As a result of September 11th, the IC was closely scrutinized. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, investigated the failures of the IC. The findings of the 9/11 Commission led to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter cited as the Intelligence Reform Act, PL 108-458) creating a Director of National Intelligence to serve as the "principal intelligence adviser to the President, and oversee and direct the acquisition of major collections systems."⁹

Activities of intelligence communities have been limited in dissemination and coordination. Analysts are often required to coordinate their products before having them published. Depending on the product, analysts will have to coordinate with external agencies. It is not uncommon to receive a nonconcurrency from other agencies or even internally. While a nonconcurrency does not necessarily preclude an analyst from

publishing a product, it can take away from the credibility of the product. Frustration often sets in which often leads to untimely, inaccurate or “nonactionable” information.

Similar to information sharing, there are barriers in the world of intelligence operations, which prevent coordination. Some confuse the term coordination with the term, permission. Coordination does not imply obtaining approval. Rather, it is a way of letting agencies or services that perform similar operations know what their sister agencies are doing and to receive feedback. However, avoiding surprises is paramount. In the operational world, coordination normally does not occur because of the sensitivity of operations. There is always concern that too many people will be involved in an operation, possibly ruining it. Coordination is now viewed as essential, but the culture has to change--or there should be the elimination of one or more redundant agencies.

Coincident with these problems, intelligence organizations are facing a mini crisis of personnel. Some are losing senior people to retirement, who will be difficult to replace. Thus began a mass recruiting and hiring effort. While most agencies were able to replenish, there was a companion problem--lack of experience. Although the newcomers were college graduates usually with a background in some regional study, they were new to intelligence analysis. Some new hires were placed in positions with little or no training until months later. While bringing a new perspective is positive, analysts’ work would often be questioned due to their inexperience in intelligence. The second problem that often slowed the process with personnel, particularly for military intelligence, is a shortage. They do not have enough intelligence officers. With the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, there was an increase in requests for intelligence officers. As demand increased, supply declined.

The 9/11 Commission's recommendation--the establishment of a cabinet level DNI--if followed, was to be the solution to some problems plaguing the IC. While creating a non-biased director who could equally focus on all members of the IC seems like a panacea, this research will examine the current status of the DNI in its role to accomplish the legislative intent of the Intelligence Reform Act and determine what solutions it can bring to the existing shortfalls of the IC. It has not been uncommon, in United States history, to create new offices to solve problems (i.e., Department of Homeland Security after September 11th). While the new offices may look good in organizational chart graphics, that sometimes can be the only "change." Eventually, the excitement wears off and one is left with another bureaucratic layer that has not solved any existing problems. Will the DNI be this type of office?

The Research Question

The primary research question to be answered is: Is the DNI able to solve the persisting problems of the IC as required by the Intelligence and Reform Act?

Before answering this question, there are subordinate questions that must be answered. What were the major problems in the IC before the establishment of the DNI? What authority does the DNI have over the IC? How does this authority differ from that of the predecessor of the DNI--the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)?

Definitions

Intelligence Community (IC). Consists of sixteen members: Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard intelligence; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of

Energy (DOE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of State (DOS), Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Geospatial Agency (NGA).

Counterintelligence (CI). “The aspect [phase] of intelligence [covering all] activity [which is] devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities, and to the protection of information against espionage; individuals [personnel] against subversion; and installations, equipment, records, or material against sabotage.”¹⁰

Human Intelligence (HUMINT). “The flow of intelligence information from those who gather it to the customer; it may come from information gathering activities wither within or outside the Intelligence Community. (A form of the term is also used to denote an item of information being conveyed, as in human source report).”¹¹

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). “An all-inclusive term covering both radar and other forms of electronic imagery.”¹²

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). “Any activity conducted for the purpose of producing signals intelligence.”¹³

Acronym List

DCI – Director of Central Intelligence

DNI – Director of National Intelligence

DoD – Department of Defense

IC – Intelligence Community

IZ – Iraq

NIP – National Intelligence Program

PDDNI – Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

Limitations and Delimitations

The DNI is a newly established office. As such, there are limits on the analysis of its accomplishments. This research project is unclassified. Therefore, classified documents that could potentially contribute to this project will be omitted. While this research will address problems in Human Intelligence, the discussion of operations and methodology will be limited due to the classification. Additionally, this research will be limited to an outlook of the next five years.

Significance of the Study

The study of the DNI was a topic of interest on the 2005 Key Strategic Issues List from the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. Because the DNI is so new, research will assist the IC and military intelligence services in understanding its capabilities and limitations.

The next chapter will review a variety of literature that has been written on the topic of intelligence. The literature review is divided by the intelligence subjects of analysis, policy, and reform..

¹Michael Lee Lanning, *Senseless Secrets: The Failures of U.S. Military Intelligence, from George Washington to the Present* (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1996), 168.

²Ibid.

³"CIA," 9 November; available from <http://www.cia.gov>; Internet; accessed on 16 July 2006.

⁴Ibid.

⁵*Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions*, S. 2645 (19 June 2002): S5774.

⁶"A Daily Chronology and Timeline of Events from September 11, 2001 to September 30, 2001," available from www.september11th.com; Internet; accessed on 14 August 2006.

⁷"September 11, 2001 Attacks" [article on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11,_2001_attacks; Internet; accessed on 14 August 2006.

⁸"Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation," Washington, DC, 11 September [article on-line]; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>; Internet; accessed on 2006.

⁹Richard A Best Jr., "Intelligence Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief for Congress*, no. IB10012 (9 May 2006): 3.

¹⁰Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military Terms* (Washington, DC: Stackpole Books, 1999), 493.

¹¹Leo D. Carl and Elizabeth A. Bancroft, *The International Dictionary of Intelligence* (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1993), 480.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Intelligence has increasingly become a popular topic of discussion, especially since the events of 11 September 2001. As a result, there have been many books and articles written about various aspects of intelligence. Most of the focus concerns analysis and intelligence relationships with policy makers. Since the DNI is new; there are no authoritative and cogent books written on the topic. However, the recent events of Porter Goss' (former Director of CIA) resignation have sparked a number of articles about intelligence reform. Additionally, the status of U.S. intelligence efforts is a frequent subject in numerous periodicals and opinion pages across America. This review is divided into three sections: analysis, policy, and reform.

Analysis

Analysis has often been criticized for its lack of accuracy and inability to be predictive. In his essay, "Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology," which appears in *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence*, Woodrow J. Kuhns partially supports the argument, stating there have been no studies identifying the statistics of analysts' forecasting in terms of accuracy.¹ *Intelligence Policy & Process* discusses the conditions that are believed to be necessary for good analysis. One key is reducing rapid rotations amongst new analysts. Keeping an analyst on a particular subject matter for an extended period allows him to eventually become a subject matter expert, which the author believes is lacking in analysts today.² *The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, and Political* by Robert David Steele mentions the findings of the

House Permanent Select Committee (Intelligence Community in the 21st Century – IC21) and the appointed commission on intelligence during the reform of the National Security Act of 1992. The commission on intelligence advocated shifting intelligence budget more to intelligence analysis and analytical tools versus satellite technology. In his list of seven items that are wrong with the intelligence community, Robert David Steele identifies the two following problems with analysis:

We have an all-source analysis service that is very young and generally does not have advanced degrees nor the historical, cultural, and language skills necessary to fully monitor and comprehend information only available in the original foreign language. We invest almost nothing in collecting, digitizing, and translating open sources of information in foreign languages.³

Steele suggests part of the solution to improving analysis is creating a global analyst. He recommends looking harder to more open source material and creating a larger, more diverse language capability. While the Internet provides some good open source information, Steele emphasizes the need for analysts to consider other sources such as older texts that are currently out of print, or books that only come in a particular language (not English).

Gregory F. Treverton, in *Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information*, writes that the analytical problem is with the organizational structure. He suggests dividing analysts into two organizations--“tactical puzzle solving” and “mystery framing.” Tactical puzzle solving requires analysts to be close to collectors and secret information. The concept of the tactical puzzle-solving team is establishing virtual teams with representatives from all intelligence functions, providing continuous feedback to collectors. The framers would be closer to consumers, including policy makers. The job of the framer would be to become an expert on customer needs and the sense in the

policy arena. Ideally, a framer would be able to help the intelligence community better meet the needs of the customer and also be able to influence policy.⁴

In *Intelligence Policy and Process*, Stafford T. Thomas identifies rivalry and lack of coordination as the problems plaguing intelligence community analysts. Because agencies have competing interests in certain fields (i.e., counterintelligence), the concept of “knowledge is power” holds true. Additionally, there is a lack of coordination of analysis products due to these rivalries. Thomas discusses the rivalry between military intelligence and non military intelligence agencies. He identifies part of the problem as the competition to influence policy makers. Policy makers partly base their decisions on intelligence products they read. Naturally, each agency wants to be the “favorite” of the policy makers. An analytical concern specific to military intelligence is that there is a high rotation; either because military members are due for a rotation or civilian employees move on to other jobs. The high turnover rate affects the quality of produced intelligence.⁵

In the same book, Glenn P. Hastedt not only agrees with Thomas that rivalry blocks information sharing, but also points out another intelligence failure being the lack of distinction between prediction and forecasting, each which require a different type of analyst. Hastedt defines forecasting as “judging contingencies and weighing the likelihood of alternative outcomes.”⁶ Hastedt defines prediction as “making judgements about the outcome of a specific event or state of affairs in the future.” The former requires “presenting conclusions” while prediction are usually a “yes or no answer.”⁷

Policy

Intelligence policy has been reviewed with a particular focus in its relationship with Congress and the role it plays in strategic decisions. Michael I. Handel, a leading theorist of strategic surprise and deception, addressed this in his essay, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise.” Handel describes intelligence as an art; that intelligence professionals get better at it the longer they remain in the field. Handel categorizes the types of intelligence collected as either about intentions or capabilities. He suggests focusing more on intentions, as a sole or heavy focus on capabilities can lead to misperception. For example, just because a country has a large military capability, it does not imply the country intends to use its capability. Additionally, Handel says the type of leadership plays a big role in the way intelligence is received. Is the leader open-minded? Does the leader encourage criticism? Lastly, Handel writes about the political factors. Sometimes a leader may have spent so much time advocating a particular position, that he is unwilling to change his mind, even when presented with overwhelming evidence.⁸

In “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” Richard K. Betts writes policy should never influence intelligence. Betts served as Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and on the staffs of the original Senate committee investigating the US intelligence community. He suggests the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) should be someone with no hidden agendas or further ambition for advancement so as to help in decreasing the politicization of intelligence. There will always be politicization in intelligence analysis, but it is up to leaders to decrease it. They must have standards for evidence and comparison.

Richard K. Betts writes that intelligence and policy failures are intermingled. Betts sees intelligence as a discipline which tries to “extract certainty from uncertainty.” In the uncertainty lies a certain amount of ambiguity. If a policy maker receives an intelligence product that has some ambiguity, the policy maker is highly likely to use the ambiguity to support a viewpoint. It is also the typical persona of policy makers that lead them to interpreting ambiguity to their own needs – policy makers, Betts writes, are “decisive, aggressive, and self-confident.”⁹

Hans Heymann, in *Intelligence Policy and Process*, identifies five ways that intelligence can be unpopular with policy makers: when intelligence fails to reduce uncertainty, when intelligence restricts options, when intelligence undercuts policies, when intelligence provokes public controversy, and when intelligence fails to persuade. Heymann concludes that intelligence and policy are intertwined, but if intelligence gives in to policy makers, then the intelligence provided may be unwanted.¹⁰

Reform

In *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, Mark M. Lowenthal describes some of the ideas for intelligence reform, before the existence of the DNI. The role of the DCI and his extensive responsibilities compared to his limited authority was always a point of discussion. Some suggested expanding the authority of the DCI to better match his authority and responsibility and to better manage the intelligence community. Others, while agreeing with the expansion, only believed it should occur if the DCI relinquished control of the CIA, in effect becoming a director of national intelligence. Still others, Lowenthal notes, suggested making the DCI position more like that of a chief executive officer “with greater authority to give coherent general direction without sacrificing the

independence of various agencies.”¹¹ At a lower level, there have been suggestions to place all the technical intelligence functions--IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT under one agency to prevent stovepipes. The director of the agency would determine which function would be used to answer requirements. A final suggestion was that CIA and DIA HUMINT be combined to avoid duplication of effort. Lowenthal concludes by writing, “What is certain is that the debate over intelligence reform will go on, largely on its own momentum, with heightened attention during crises or after incidents deemed to be intelligence failures.”¹²

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, reviews the functions of each agency in the intelligence community. The Commission ultimately identified the need for an authority over the entire intelligence community, thus the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

Richard Best, in the *CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Intelligence Issues for Congress*, notes that a lack of human intelligence was blamed, in part, for US not having prior knowledge of 9/11. Best describes how during the Cold War, intelligence targets of interest were generally military officials or political figures. Therefore, defense attaches and intelligence officers working in the embassies were sufficient to collect human intelligence. However, the nature of terrorism and unconventional threats is such that requires a new breed of human intelligence. The high value intelligence no longer comes from military officials or political figures; rather there is a low level network. Informants are now average persons such as the storekeeper, the waiter, or the cab driver. As such, a new type of HUMINT officer is required. With the new requirement comes difficulty, as

officers would be placed under nonofficial cover (NOC). There are administrative complications with NOC. In addition to administrative complications, there are problems with recruitment. That is, a big part of HUMINT is having language capability for each officer's regional specialty. It is difficult to find persons with language skills for lesser known, non-romance languages. Lastly, there has been issue with the backgrounds of informants. In 1995, then DCI, John Deutch, established guidelines to limit the types of informants that officers could recruit. Officials, then, frowned upon using individuals with drug smuggling, human rights violations, or similar backgrounds. After September 11th, things changed. The FY2002 Intelligence Authorization Act directed the DCI to replace the guidelines.

Analysis of the research will be done using analysis of competing hypotheses. The next chapter will discuss this methodology and theory that will be used to conduct the research.

¹Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., *Paradoxes of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), 80.

²Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle, eds., *Intelligence Policy and Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 401.

³Robert David Steele, *The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, and Political* (Oakton, VA: OSS, Inc., 2002), 13.

⁴Gregory F. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 243.

⁵Maurer, Tunstall, and Keagle, *Intelligence Policy and Process*, 125.

⁶Hastedt, Glenn P., *Intelligence Policy and Process*, 149.

⁷*Ibid.*, 140.

⁸Betts and Mahnken, *Paradoxes of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*, 210.

⁹*Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁰Maurer, Tunstall, and Keagle, *Intelligence Policy and Process*, 57.

¹¹Lanning, "Senseless Secrets: The Failures of U.S. Military Intelligence, from George Washington to the Present," 227.

¹²*Ibid.*, 232.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Organizational structure and culture theory will be used to analyze this research project. While organizational structure refers to the way groups are interrelated, a culture refers to the values, attitudes, beliefs, norms, and customs of an organization.¹

The IC has a definite culture within individual organizations and the IC as a whole. Additionally, the structure of the IC varies depending on the discipline or function. The purpose of using this model is to identify the key weaknesses of the IC and determine -based on certain criteria- if the DNI will be able to improve the identified weaknesses.

The research will specifically focus on organizational effectiveness.

Organizational effectiveness, for the purpose of this research, will be defined as:

Capable of attaining the *highest degree of efficiency* and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form on precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high *degree of calculability* of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.²

The term organization, for the purpose of this research, will be defined as a particular entity or discipline, as opposed to a formal organization, such as the CIA, for example.

The three organizations to be examined will be analysis, operations and collection, and information sharing. Nine criteria will be used as indicators to determine the effectiveness of the organizations. Those criteria are:

1. Turnover: The rate at which current employees leave and new employees are hired.

2. Quality: “The quality of the primary service or product provided by the organization may take many operational forms, which are largely determined by the kind of product or service provided by the organization.”³

3. Readiness: “The probability that an organization could successfully perform some specified task if asked to do so.”⁴

4. Conflict Cohesion: “The organization with verbal and physical clashes, poor coordination, and ineffective communication (conflict). An organization in which the members like one another, work well together, communicate fully and openly, and coordinate their work efforts (cohesion).”⁵

5. Evaluations by External Entities: “Evaluations of the organization . . . by those individuals and organizations in its environment with which it interacts. Loyalty to, confidence in, and support given the organization by such groups as . . . customers . . . enforcement agencies, and the general public.”⁶

6. Managerial Interpersonal Skills: “The level of skill and efficiency with which the management deals with superiors, subordinates, and peers and includes the extent to which managers give support, facilitate constructive interaction, and generate enthusiasm for meeting goals and achieving excellent performance.”⁷

7. Satisfaction: “The achievement or possession of certain outcomes provided by the organization and . . . an individual’s perception of the degree to which he or she has received an equitable amount of the outcome.”⁸

8. Training and Development Emphasis: The amount of attention paid to further developing and training employees.

9. Efficiency: The capacity of an organization to produce desired results with a minimum expenditure of energy, time, money, personnel, and materiel.⁹

These criteria were selected because previous research identified them, in some way as failures or successes in the IC. These criteria are the top nine--believed by the researcher- based on literature review, which can best determine the effectiveness of analysis, operations and collection, and information sharing.

After analyzing the effectiveness of the three listed organizations, the research will then address the research question: Is the DNI able to solve the persisting problems of the IC as required by the Intelligence Reform Act?

The question will be answered by examining the following criteria of the DNI:

- (1) Authority- The legitimate right to command and the right to be obeyed based on the Intelligence Reform Act
- (2) Ability to influence – The art of persuasion
- (3) Prudence – “exercise of sound judgment in practical affairs.”¹⁰
- (4) Person-centered policy--"Reason, meanings, motives, attributions, concerns, emotions, and strivings for fulfillment all animate and guide human behavior. These aspects of the person need to be understood if we are to understand why some policies succeed and others fail."¹¹

Analysis of competing hypotheses is the methodology that will be used to analyze the research information.¹² This analysis involves creating a chart of hypotheses and evidence. A hypothesis is “a declarative statement that has not been established as true.”¹³ Evidence is information that can be connected to a hypothesis. Analysis of competing hypotheses consists of testing hypotheses against evidence using a matrix and ultimately ranking the hypotheses by the degree to which evidence is inconsistent. In the end, the hypothesis with the least inconsistencies is the most favored. The three categories used to

test the hypotheses are: Consistent (C)--the hypothesis could be true given the evidence, Inconsistent (I)--the hypothesis cannot be true given the evidence, or Ambiguous (A)--the evidence is not applicable to the hypothesis. The matrix will resemble table 1.

Table 1. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses	
Evidence	Hypotheses

The hypotheses, in this research, are possible answers to the research question: Is the DNI able to solve the persisting problems of the IC as required by the Intelligence and Reform Act? The hypotheses to be used in this research are: (1) Yes; (2) Yes, but not in 5 years; (3) Yes, but needs more authority; (4) No; (5) No, but after 5 years. Below is a list of relevant evidence and a brief explanation:

1. Has Tasking Authority--the DNI has direct tasking authority over national intelligence elements and advisory tasking over non-national intelligence organizations.
2. Intelligence professional for deputy--the current principle deputy DNI (PDDNI) is an Army intelligence officer, which implies that he has experience in working within the IC and is familiar with the various functions of intelligence;
3. Limited budget authority over DoD--the DNI does not have the authority to dictate how the DoD's intelligence budget will be spent, but can provide input;
4. Budget authority over others--the DNI has budget authority over non-DoD members of the IC and can ensure the National Intelligence Program (NIP) is properly implemented;

5. Desire to improve--the current DNI has expressed a commitment to improving the IC;

6. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Involvement--the SECDEF has a critical role in the IC because eight of the 16 agencies fall under the DoD, of which the SECDEF is the head. Additionally, the SECDEF has budgetary authority over DoD organizations that do not fall under the National Intelligence Program (NIP).

7. Some changes do not require budget authority--there are certain improvements that could be made in the IC which do not involve money; rather they may require a change in organizational culture or just the art of persuasion;

8. NCTC Director reports direct to President--it is written in the Intelligence Reform Act that the NCTC director will report directly to the President on issues regarding the War on Terrorism and will coordinate with the DNI. However, the NCTC director is still required to report to the DNI, and not the President, on all other matters;

9. New CIA head is former DNI deputy--General Hayden was approved by Congress to be the next CIA director. Hayden was previously the PDDN. Hayden's previous position could have a positive impact of the relationship between the DNI and CIA;

10. Support of Bush--the DNI has the full support of President Bush. There may be a time when another president does not fully support the DNI;

11. Diplomat vs. Intelligence professional as director--the current DNI is not an intelligence professional; rather he is an ambassador. The possibility exists that the nature of the DNI's professional background could affect his ability to help the IC;

12. Neutral Director--the current DNI is neutral in that he is not a member of any of the IC organizations; therefore it is likely that he is more unbiased than a member of the IC might be;

13. No congressional oversight reform--congressional oversight over the IC remains unchanged. There are certain portions of the Intelligence Reform Act that are vague and are left to the interpretation of the reader;

14. No operational control--while the DNI is to be kept informed about ongoing operations, he does not dictate operations;

15. Lead for establishing PIRs--the DNI has been appointed as the lead in establishing PIRs for the IC; this should better help guide everyone in one direction and minimize redundancies;

16. Hiring authority over heads--the Intelligence Reform Act states that all heads of the IC must seek the "concurrence" of the DNI when making an appointment and if the DNI does not concur, the appointment cannot be made;

17. No clear fire authority--the Intelligence Reform Act clearly outlines the DNI's hiring responsibilities but mentions nothing about firing. Can the DNI recommend that someone be fired?

18. Turnover--because of the increased use of contract companies in the War on Terrorism and also the increased need of personnel within the IC, current and potential intelligence professionals have many options. Therefore, the rate of turnover has increased in some IC organizations. Someone may work at an agency for a few years or less, and then join another organization in the IC either through the civil service or a contractor;

19. New analysts and operators--a number of organizations in the IC experienced a gap in the workforce and as a result embarked on a hiring campaign. A number of new hires were recent college graduates with no previous work experience. As a result, for the first couple years, new hires are hardly taken seriously because they are so new to the IC;

20. Personalities of agency heads--individuals who are in leadership positions in the IC have different leadership styles. Do their leadership styles affect the DNI trying to solve IC problems?

21. No penal authority--other than budgetary control, which is not the case for DoD, the DNI does not have any way of penalizing an agency that does not comply with set policies;

22. Vague parts of bill require interpretation--some parts of the Intelligence Reform Act are ambiguous and can be interpreted in different ways.

The evidences were gathered based on personal assessments and previously written products. Additionally, each piece of evidence falls into one of the nine categories of organizational effectiveness or the four criteria assessing the DNI. The scope of the research and time constraints only allow for 13 of the 22 evidences to be adequately addressed. The nine items not addressed in the study should be the basis for further research.

Primary and secondary sources encompass the preponderance of research material. Some sources will include editorials, journals, official reports, television specials, and personal accounts.

To support in measuring the criteria, interviews will be conducted. Potential interviewees include: members of the DNI staff, J2 staff, DIA, Military Intelligence, and

non-Department of Defense intelligence organizations. Interview questions will likely ask about each individual's interpretation of the listed nine criteria and necessary traits for the DNI to fix problems.

Additionally, some surveys may be conducted. Surveys will likely contain the same questions presented to interviewees. Because this is a new office, there will be limited information on the accomplishments of the DNI. However, the DNI website has posted several memorandums that have been written since the establishment of the office, which can provide pertinent information.

There are weaknesses to this research method. First, the measurement of the criteria will not entirely be quantitative and therefore results may be subjective. Also, the selected criteria were based on previously written materials. However, according to organizational structure theory, there are well over nine criteria to determine effectiveness. In essence, this list is not finite or definite. The personality assessment of the current DNI, will be limited in scope. Research will be based on publicly available documents and will not likely include any official clinical or psychological assessments. The interviews will be with a myriad of IC professionals. Additionally it should be noted that the survey may be too small a survey of a certain level (i.e., junior, mid-level, senior) will be interviewed to truly make a valid assessment of the effectiveness of the IC.

The next chapter will use the analysis of competing hypotheses to determine the most likely hypothesis to the main research question.

¹Wikipedia, Organizational Culture [web site on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organizational_culture; Internet; accessed 16 November 2006.

²S. Lee Spray, *Organizational Effectiveness: Theory, Research, Utilization* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1976), 15.

³Ibid., 36.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., 38.

⁷Ibid., 37.

⁸Ibid., 36.

⁹"Organizational Efficiency," 3 October [Biology Online database]; available from http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Efficiency_organizational; Internet; accessed on June 2006.

¹⁰"Prudence," [Wikipedia database online]; available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prudence>; Internet; accessed on March 2006.

¹¹Stuart S. Nagel, *Policy Analysis Methods* (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), 112.

¹²Morgan D. Jones, *The Thinker's Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving* (New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 1998), 178.

¹³Ibid., 179.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Background

The IC's problems in analysis, information sharing, and activity coordination have existed for some time. With the creation of the DNI, there is renewed hope that the new office will be able to solve the existing problems and improve the IC. This chapter will address the identified problems and then examine the DNI's ability to solve the problems.

One of the problems with analysis is the lack of using all resources available. Analysts in the IC generally work from classified computer systems and use classified reports to do their analysis. Intelink, the IC's classified version of the Internet is used by analysts to search for various documents or information.¹ It is not uncommon for intelligence analysts to think that if it is not classified, then the information is deficient. One reason for such beliefs could be the source of information. Some believe the harder it is to acquire the information, the more valuable it is. Perhaps this is the reason why open source information is not as valued. If, for example, information is acquired through a secret human source, it holds more importance than information that was acquired through an interview. Also, while it is not discouraged, analysts are not actively pushed to use open source material for analysis. One reason could be the difficulty in finding a computer data-mining program to use open source information. There is such an abundance of information available, that there is not enough time to cull through everything to find relevant and reliable information. Open source information does not only refer to information found on the Internet. This misconception can also be limiting.

Author Robert David Steele suggests analysts should become more global and fuse more sources of information into analysis. He writes, “Only a global process of discovery, operating . . . ideally in 29 languages, will yield a proper appreciation of current human knowledge in any given domain.”² Not every written product can be found in English. This is particularly true in areas outside of Western Europe. This is why political officers of the US State Department read newspapers of foreign countries as opposed to relying on US news. There are certain nuances and viewpoints from a local language that may not be captured in English. Directly tied in with operating in different languages is cultural understanding or cultural awareness, at the least. Speaking the language of a foreign country is a great asset for analysts; however, it is also important to know the culture in order to better understand the undertones or nuances of the country. This can particularly be helpful when analyzing in a foreign language. These skills can be particularly helpful in assessing HUMINT sources. In addition to operating in various languages, the IC should make a concerted effort to seek out known and less publicized experts in various topics of interest.

There are two problems that hinder information sharing in the IC: technological systems compatibility and an unwillingness to share. In the latter, the common “need to know” culture prevails across the intelligence community. But how does one know that another agency does not have the need to know? For example, The 9/11 Commission reports that NSA had undistributed information that would have helped identify Nawaf al Hamzi in January 2000.³ But no one asked for the information and it was not distributed. Therefore, it was never used. In 1999, the German government provided to the US, the name “Marwan” and an associated United Arab Emirates (UAE) phone number, which

were the subject of a German investigation. CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) examined the information for a short period, but with so little information, efforts dwindled. The CTC did not ask any other member of the IC for assistance. "Marwan" turned out to be Marwan al Shehhi, the individual who piloted United Airlines flight 175 into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. This occurrence is being investigated.⁴ There have also been occasions when someone did ask for the information, but could not have access because it was compartmented. "Intelligence needs to be opened wide, not cosseted in secret compartments."⁵ There is a battle in information sharing. While on one hand, it is important to have the widest dissemination possible in the IC; this can become a counterintelligence nightmare. Widely disseminated intelligence is bound to fall into the wrong hands, such as a Bill Gertz article in the *Washington Post*, or a blog on the Internet, or worst yet, an adversary's intelligence service. In regards to compatibility, each agency has its own system, which is not necessarily compatible with any other agency. If an FBI analyst wanted to access a CIA database, the analyst would have to physically go to CIA. In addition, the analyst would have to be given permission to gain access to the CIA system. While there are security reasons as to why this is a good thing, it can be a hindrance to sharing information. With the advanced technology of today, there must be a way to still restrict access to certain databases while still being compatible with other systems in the IC.

Coordinating HUMINT operational activities is not always done in the IC. A major reason is the nature of HUMINT--it is a sensitive business. If too many people know about an operation, there is a higher likelihood that it could be compromised. One problem in coordination has been between intelligence agencies with law enforcement

functions and those without. Two prime examples are the FBI and CIA. An agency with law enforcement functions primarily looks to prosecute individuals guilty of espionage while an agency with no law enforcement does not have the same outlook. An agency like the FBI would not disseminate information or evidence collected as it could spoil a case.

The analytical scheme of this complex topic can be presented in table form with an accompanying explanation (see table 2). The four hypotheses that are used in the analysis of competing hypotheses are: Yes (column 2); Not in five years (column 3); Needs more authority (column 4); and No (column 5). “Not in five years” means that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC after five years have passed. “Needs more authority” means the DNI will need more authority in order to solve the problems of the IC. Each item of evidence is either given a grading of Consistent (C) meaning that the hypothesis could be true given the evidence, Inconsistent (I) meaning the hypothesis cannot be true given the evidence, or Ambiguous (A) which means the evidence is not applicable to the hypothesis.

To gain some real-world insight, several interviews were conducted with senior intelligence officials in the IC. The officials interviewed were: Lieutenant General (LTG) William G. Boykin, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence; Colonel Robert A. Carr, Assistant J2, Joint Staff; Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Mr. Michael Leiter, Deputy Chief of Staff , Office of Director of National Intelligence; and James Wright, Director for Program Management , Counterintelligence Field Activity. They were asked selected questions related to the evidences used in the competing hypotheses.

Table 2. Research Questions				
EVIDENCE	HYPOTHESES			
	Yes	Not in 5 Years	Needs More Authority	No
1. Has Tasking Authority				
2. Intelligence Professional for Deputy				
3. No budget authority over DoD				
4. Budget authority over others				
5. SECDEF Involvement				
6. New CIA Head is former Deputy				
7. Support of President Bush				
8. Diplomat vs. Intel Professional as Director				
9. No Congressional Oversight Reform				
10. No Operational Control				
11. Lead for establishing PIRs				
12. Hiring Authority over heads				
13. New Analysts and Operators				

Background Questions

To establish a framework for the interviews, two questions not included as evidence, were asked: (1) Do you believe the IC is homogenous or disjointed? and (2) What do you believe are the current challenges of the IC? The responses to those questions were as follows.

1. Do you believe the IC is homogenous or disjointed?

Of the five senior intelligence experts interviewed, four responded that the IC is neither homogenous nor disjointed. COL Carr likened the IC to a modern day family-- everyone is off doing something different, may have different religions, sexual preferences, or various marital situations, but they all come together for emergencies. Also, families may have small disagreements, but they still do things together. LTG Boykin believes each organization demonstrates allegiance to its own agency and there is a lack of cooperation. LTG Maples opined the Intelligence Reform Act tried to bring

about integration in the IC. However, the IC is not integrated although it is more federated than in the past. The way that the Reform Act is structured, each agency is established for a different reason and customer, so the operations and output of each agency is different. Michael Leiter believed the IC is not homogenous, which is a strength in many ways. The IC is not completely unified but not disjointed.

James Wright believes the IC is disjointed. This is primarily because there is a lack of true integration-synchronization of data. Different agencies use different systems, which are not compatible, to keep data and conduct analysis. Also, information sharing does not happen because of stovepipes and an unwillingness to share. Another reason the IC is disjointed is standards. Products, Wright opined, are not homogenous and standards of proof are different among various organizations. He suggested the DNI could standardize the level of standards for all organizations. Otherwise, “a shred of evidence with an artful writer get[s] blown out of proportion.”

2. What do you believe are the current challenges of the IC?

While the interviewees agreed with the IC problems identified in this research, some added a few additional problems. The current challenges of the IC can be placed in three categories: working together, managing resources, and integration. In working together, it is important to learn how to cohesively operate in today’s environment (i.e., Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), office of DNI). The IC must maintain “a healthy workforce while proactively supporting a war”⁶ Also, in working together, intelligence officers should think outside their own agency’s perspective.⁷ As LTG Maples mentioned, the IC needs to have a common vision of where it is going and acceptance of it. Integration not only refers to systems but also data. There is a problem in getting

information to analysts due partly to a lack of data sharing. Also, there is a lack of cultural awareness in the IC and not enough cultural anthropologists. Analysts do not have such expertise and as a result end up “looking at data through Western eyes.”⁸ Personnel and financial resources can have a tremendous impact on the IC. Properly managing such resources is another current problem of the IC. COL Carr warned the IC must be more judicious with how it manages budget supplementals.

There is a lack of crossover in the IC. LTG Boykin suggests training all analysts to a common standard for easy crossover. If a China expert is needed at the FBI and the analyst is currently located at the DIA, the analyst should be able to make an easy transition from the parent agency to the other. Currently, there is no standardized training for analysts. They are trained differently depending on the organization. LTG Boykin recommends instituting something similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, so that jointness is better enforced. This is also a suggestion Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, made to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2004. As LTG Maples says, “Change is okay as long as it’s not for the sake of change.”

Research Questions

The following are the results of the evidence used in the analysis of competing hypotheses. Each item of evidence contains the question, comments, and an assessment.

1. Tasking Authority

The DNI has direct tasking authority over national intelligence elements and advisory tasking over non-national intelligence organizations.

(ii) . . . direct the tasking of, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community, including—

(iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence elements of those agencies and departments not within the National Intelligence Program.⁹

Question: Could it be true that the DNI could solve the problems of the IC given he has tasking authority?

Comments: The Intel Reform Act honed in on the DNI’s tasking authorities. The DCI had collection authorities, but the law did not mention other like analysis and production. The new Act addresses collection as well as others that were not with the DCI. With more specific verbage, there will be less ambiguity in the DNI’s authority on tasking.

Assessment: Yes, the DNI’s tasking authority is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and in five years. It is not true, given the DNI’s tasking authority, that the DNI will not be able to solve the problems of the IC. Given the DNI has tasking authority, it is consistent the DNI may need more authority.

2. Principal deputy is intelligence professional.

The current principal deputy DNI (PDDNI) is an Army intelligence officer, which implies that he has experience in working within the IC and is familiar with the various functions of intelligence;

SEC. 103A. (a) PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—(1) There is a Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

.....
(3) Any individual nominated for appointment as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security experience and management expertise.

(5) The individual serving as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community.

.....
(1) Not more than one of the individuals serving in the positions . . . may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in active status.

(2) The positions referred to in this paragraph are the following:

(A) The Director of National Intelligence.

(B) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

(3) It is the sense of Congress that, under ordinary circumstances, it is desirable that one of the individuals serving in the positions—

(A) be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, in active status; or

(B) have, by training or experience, an appreciation of military intelligence activities and requirements.¹⁰

Question: Could it be true the DNI could solve the problems of the IC, given the principal deputy is an intelligence professional?

Comments: Because the DNI is not an intelligence professional, it is ideal that the PDDNI have an intelligence background. While the DNI may have certain experiences with intelligence, it is not comparable to someone who is an intelligence professional. Someone who has been in the intelligence field for a long time would likely have more detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the IC and some of the ongoing issues. While, according to the Intelligence Reform Act, it is not a requirement for the PDDNI to have an intelligence background, such experience, would be helpful; especially if the DNI is not an intelligence professional.

Assessment: Yes, having an intelligence professional, as the principal deputy is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and in five years. It is not true, given the principal deputy is an intelligence professional, that the DNI will not be able to solve the problems of the IC. Given that the principal deputy is an intelligence professional, it is not true the DNI may need more authority.

3. Limited Budget Authority

The DNI does not have the authority to dictate how the DoD's intelligence budget will be spent, but can provide input.

(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities.

(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide guidance for the development of the annual budget for each element of the intelligence community that is not within the National Intelligence Program.¹¹

(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming funds made available under the Joint Military Intelligence Program.¹²

Question: Could it be true that the DNI could solve the problems of the IC given he has limited budget authority over DoD?

Comments: "One of the things that amazed me is that everything is driven by dollars and billets."¹³ The Intel Reform Act does not give the DNI control of the Joint Military Intelligence Program nor Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities budget programs, however it is stated that the SECDEF will "consult" the DNI before reprogramming any funds in the JMIP. Additionally, the DNI is to "participate" in developing the JMIP and TIARA budgets. Unlike TIARA and JMIP, the DNI does control the National Intelligence Program (NIP). When the Intel Reform Act first was approved, many were concerned with the DNI's limited budgetary control. There was concern that the DNI's authorities would affect his ability to make changes to intelligence organizations within DoD. One article opined that while Rumsfeld would not likely directly challenge the DNI, he might do more "subtle" things such as "keeping him [DNI] out of the loop on small budget issues."¹⁴

But Mr. Leiter stated the DNI's authority is sufficient, as he has virtually all authority over defense agencies. Also, it would be inappropriate for the DNI to be involved in tactical intelligence issues. As LTG Maples pointed out, about 90 percent of the DIA budget comes from the NIP, which the DNI controls. As a result, the DNI has major influence and impact on the DIA budget, and equally importantly, over ensuring programs are resourced.

If the concern over the DNI's budgetary authorities affecting his ability to make changes in the IC were valid, then alternatives to encourage compliance would need to be considered. Control of the "purse strings" is usually what encourages compliance. That is, an organization will likely comply with a policy, if it knows that it can be financially penalized for non-compliance. So, if the DNI lacks sufficient budgetary control, how can he ensure compliance with his policies? As former ADCI, James Simon stated, "Without control of budget . . . all you have in the authority to use tact and goodwill."¹⁵ The DNI would have to find alternative penalties or go to the President. Mr. Wright believes that penalty is through policy. If a policy is written, and an organization does not comply, it must be made to appear that the organization is breaking a law. Better yet, it would be optimal to get a policy codified as a law so that one truly is breaking the law when there is no compliance. Wright also adds that the SECDEF can have impact. Perhaps LTG Boykin makes a valid point by saying that the IC could be overdoing the budget issue. Whatever alternatives are decided, COL Carr noted that it would take great leadership and organizational skills to find effective solutions.

Assessment: Yes, having limited budget authority over DoD, is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and in five years. It is true,

given the DNI has limited budget authority over DoD, that the DNI will not be able to solve the problems of the IC. Given that the DNI has limited authority over the DoD budget, it is true the DNI may need more authority.

4. Budget Authority over non-DoD

The DNI has budget authority over non-DoD members of the IC and can ensure the National Intelligence Program is properly implemented.

(c) BUDGET AUTHORITIES.—(1) With respect to budget requests and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the Director of National Intelligence shall—

(A) . . . based on intelligence priorities set by the President, provide to the heads of . . . the intelligence community . . . guidance for developing the National Intelligence Program budget;

(B) . . . develop and determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence Program budget;

(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence related activities.

.....
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the implementation and execution of the National Intelligence Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that manage programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and evaluations.¹⁶

Question: Could it be true that the DNI could solve the problems of the IC, given he has more budget authority over non-DoD agencies?

Comments: As was mentioned in the previous question, having control of funds is one way to help ensure compliance with policies and directives. The DNI has the authority to develop and appropriate the NIP budget. Such authorities allow the DNI the latitude to implement programs or changes that can help the IC.

Assessment: Yes, having more budget authority over non-DoD agencies is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and in five

years. Having more budget authority over non-DoD agencies is inconsistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. Given the DNI has more budget authority over non-DoD agencies, it is not true the DNI will need more authority.

5. SECDEF Involvement

The SECDEF has a critical role in the IC because eight of the sixteen agencies fall under the DoD, of which the SECDEF is the head. Additionally, the SECDEF has budgetary authority over DoD organizations that do not fall under the National Intelligence Program (NIP).

Question: Could it be true that the DNI could solve the problems of the IC given the involvement of the SECDEF?

Comments: The SECDEF plays a big role in the IC as a result of its organization. COL Carr believes the SECDEF should have a similar role like the other department heads of the IC, but he should be more participatory because he has more resources. COL Carr refers to the SECDEF's role as the "most equal of equals." LTG Maples noted how the SECDEF tells him what to do through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is very well meshed, with the national intelligence strategy. The two are mutually supportive. LTG Maples does not feel conflicted in responding to two different bosses and sees them both heading in the same direction. The SECDEF is critical to the success of the IC. James Wright pointed out, the DoD has global jurisdictions and military agreements such as military to military exchanges, which are helpful to the IC. LTG Boykin says the SECDEF is an advocate for the DNI, in terms of his authority and responsibility. He insists on coordination and collaboration with the DNI on everything. As Michael Leiter compared the DNI and SECDEF relationship to that of the three

branches of the government; there is a system of checks and balances in place to prevent one branch from having too much power. With the DNI and SECDEF, there is an inherent tension in the design of the intelligence structure. Ultimately, it is very important that there be a good relationship between the DNI and the SECDEF.

Assessment: Yes, having the SECDEF involved in intelligence is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC. Having the SECDEF involved in intelligence is inconsistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. Given the involvement of the SECDEF, it is not true the DNI will need more authority.

6. New CIA Director

General Hayden was approved by Congress to be the next CIA director. Hayden was previously the PDDN. Hayden's previous position could have a positive impact of the relationship between the DNI and CIA.

Question: Could it be true that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC, given the new CIA director, GEN Hayden, is the former PDDNI?

Comments: General Michael Hayden became the director of the CIA in May 2006 following the resignation of Mr. Porter Goss. Prior to that, Hayden was the PDDNI. Some in Congress were concerned about placing a military person in the position of CIA director because it would only expand the DoD "empire."¹⁷ Nonetheless, Hayden was eventually approved to be the next director of CIA.

There was speculation that part of the reason for Goss' resignation was the shift in certain roles with the creation of the DNI. While the CIA used to brief the president daily, it would now be the DNI.¹⁸

All the senior intelligence officials interviewed believe that having Hayden as the CIA director will help to mold the CIA's relationship with the DNI. COL Carr said there was an imminent need for a unique leader like Hayden. He understands what the DNI is trying to achieve and knows how to work in that framework. Also, LTG Maples believes that GEN Hayden having been around the IC for so long and his knowledge of the IC will help foster the relationship between the CIA and the DNI. The fact the Hayden and Negroponte have a personal relationship is also helpful. Despite their personal relationship, it will take some time for the CIA to get accustomed to there not being a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

Assessment: Yes, the CIA director being the former PDDNI is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC. The CIA director being the former PDDNI is ambiguous to the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC, as the director could change by then. The CIA director being the former PDDNI is inconsistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. The CIA director being the former PDDNI is inconsistent with the DNI needing more authority.

7. Presidential Support

The DNI has the full support of President Bush. There may be a time when another president does not fully support the DNI.

Question: Could it be true that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC, given he has the support of President Bush?

Comments: "Let's see if I can say it as plainly as I can: I support the intelligence bill," said President Bush to reporters during a visit to Canada in December 2004.¹⁹ After the events of 9/11, President Bush faced pressure to make changes to intelligence. There

was some opposition in the House to the bill, which initially slowed its passage. Rep. Duncan Hunter, Republican-California, head of the House Armed Services Committee and Representative James Sensenbrenner, Republican-Wisconsin, the House Judiciary Committee chairman, both opposed the bill. Bush made efforts to urge Congress to pass the bill by sending letters and making phone calls to opponents.²⁰

Assessment: Yes, the support of Bush is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC. The support of Bush is Ambiguous with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC after five years have passed because there will be a new president. The support of Bush is inconsistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. The support of Bush is ambiguous to the DNI needing more authority.

8. DNI Background

The current DNI is not an intelligence professional; rather he is an ambassador. The possibility exists that the nature of the DNI's professional background could affect his ability to help the IC.

SEC. 102. (a) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.--(1) There is a Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Any individual nominated for appointment as Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security expertise.”²¹

SEC. 103A. (a) PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.--(1) There is a Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(2) In the event of a vacancy in the position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National Intelligence shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

(3) Any individual nominated for appointment as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security experience and management expertise.

(4) The individual serving as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community.

(5) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director.

(6) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of National Intelligence during the absence or disability of the Director of National Intelligence or during a vacancy in the position of Director of National Intelligence.²²

Question: Could it be true that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC, given the director is a diplomat as opposed to intelligence professional?

Comments: Ambassador John D. Negroponte served as the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2001 to 2004, and then was appointed as the US Ambassador to Iraq from 2004--until being sworn in as the DNI on 21 April 2005. These two positions placed Negroponte in the unique position of being able to understand the situation in Iraq, first hand, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Intelligence played a critical role in the US decision to declare war on Iraq and Negroponte, as a representative to the UN, was involved. Many believe Negroponte was a good first choice for the DNI. He did not come with any agenda or baggage and was an objective leader. One of the advantages that Negroponte has is that with his background in the UN and IZ, he understands the intelligence needs of the wide variety of agencies in the IC. However, there still needs to be an individual with knowledge and expertise in the IC as a balance.

While Negroponte was a good first choice, some senior IC officials believe future DNIs will be intelligence professionals. The key, according to LTG Boykin, is that the

next DNI have a broad background in intelligence. A broad background will help ensure the DNI will not have a bias or lend favor toward one agency or intelligence function. Having an intelligence professional as the DNI also allows for greater continuity than would a political appointee. James Wright believes the DNI should not only have an intelligence background, but should also have exposure to process. With a political appointee, more time would be spent explaining the business of intelligence than would be spent executing. The IC “can’t be jerked around by [the] whims of people,” he said. Mr. Wright is not opposed to having the PDDNI as the intelligence official, however. It is just important to have an intelligence professional at some level, whether it is the DNI or the PDDNI. The benefit of having a political appointee as the DNI or PDDNI is that the individual will likely have experience in the inner workings of the politics of Washington, DC. The individual may also have access to certain networks that an intelligence professional would not.

Assessment: Yes, the director as a diplomat as opposed to intelligence professional is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and in five years. The DNI director being a diplomat as opposed to intelligence professional is consistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. The DNI director being a diplomat as opposed to intelligence professional is ambiguous to the DNI needing more authority.

9. Congressional Oversight Reform

Congressional oversight over the IC remains unchanged. There are certain portions of the Intelligence Reform Act that are vague and are left to interpretation.

Question: Could it be true that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC, given there was no congressional oversight reform in the Intelligence Reform Act?

Comments: Congressional oversight reform remained in high demand after the signing of the Intelligence Reform Act. The Intel Reform Act is missing congressional oversight reform, which some describe as “a mess.”²³ Without reform, the DNI could have trouble getting some initiatives through Congress. The 9/11 Commission identified congressional oversight as an issue requiring attention. They wrote, “So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need.”²⁴ The Commission recommended either a joint committee similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in the Senate and the House, combining authorities.²⁵ However these suggestions were not addressed in the Intel Reform Act.

Assessment: Yes, no congressional oversight reform is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and in five years. No congressional oversight reform is also consistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. No congressional oversight reform is ambiguous to the DNI needing more authority.

10. Operational Control

While the DNI is to be kept informed about ongoing operations, he does not dictate operations.

The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall develop joint procedures to be used by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations that involve elements of both the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency

consistent with national security and the protection of human intelligence sources and methods. Those procedures shall, at a minimum, provide the following:

(1) Methods by which the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense can improve communication and coordination in the planning, execution, and sustainment of operations, including, as a minimum—

(A) information exchange between senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and senior officers and officials of the Department of Defense when planning for such an operation commences by either organization; and

(B) exchange of information between the Secretary and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to ensure that senior operational officials in both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have knowledge of the existence of the ongoing operations of the other.

(2) When appropriate, in cases where the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are conducting separate missions in the same geographical area, a mutual agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear delineation of operational responsibilities to prevent conflict and duplication of effort.²⁶

Question: Could it be true that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC, given the limited operational control?

Comments: While the DNI may not have direct control over HUMINT operations, in the Intelligence Reform Act, he is tasked with ensuring operations are sufficiently coordinated between the CIA and DoD. In late 2005, the National Clandestine Service (NCS), which is responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, was established.²⁷ “The NCS will serve as the national authority for the integration, coordination, deconfliction and evaluation of human intelligence operations across the entire intelligence community.”²⁸ The NCS is based at CIA and will take over what was known as the agency’s Directorate of Operations (DO). While the NCS cannot task any other agency’s HUMINT operations, it will work to coordinate such activities.²⁹ Another mission for the NCS is to standardize the HUMINT community in training, tradecraft, asset validation, and reporting.

Assessment: Yes, limited operational control is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and after five years. Limited operational control is also consistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. Limited operational control is consistent with the DNI needing more authority.

11. PIRs

The DNI has been appointed as the lead in establishing PIRs for the IC; this should better help guide everyone in one direction and minimize redundancies.

(6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)³⁰

(i) Establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the intelligence community to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination (including access by users to collected data consistent with applicable law and as appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection (b) and analytic products generated by or within the intelligence community) of national intelligence; “(ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community, including—
(I) approving requirements (including those requirements responding to needs provided by consumers) for collection and analysis; and
(II) resolving conflicts in collection requirements and in the tasking of national collection assets of the element of the intelligence community³¹

Question: Could it be true that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC, given it is the lead for establishing PIRs?

Comments: The problem of competing requirements in the IC has been persistent. Some agencies may believe their requirement has primacy over another. An agency may determine their priorities based on the preferences of a policymaker; while others may base requirements on something else. Resources for requirements are also a concern. There are not enough resources to cover all requirements. As a result, some decision must

be made on which has a greater priority or is more feasible. Having the DNI as the final authority on PIRs could be a possible solution to resolving competing requirements.

Some, like LTG Boykin, believe this authority will help the DNI to enforce intelligence sharing. Although, it cannot be done alone, rather it has to be a joint effort with interagency points of view.³² Others say there was never an issue with PIRs in the past, but this authority is good for consistency, having a common understanding and goal.³³

Assessment: Yes, being the lead for establishing PIRs is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and after five years. Being the lead for establishing PIRs is inconsistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. Being the lead for establishing PIRs is ambiguous to the DNI needing more authority.

12. Hiring Authority

The Intelligence Reform Act states that all heads of the IC must seek the “concurrence” of the DNI when making an appointment and if the DNI does not concur, then the appointment cannot be made.

(b) CONCURRENCE OF DNI IN APPOINTMENTS TO POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may not fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be). In the case in which the Director does not concur in such a recommendation, the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned may advise the President directly of the intention to withhold concurrence or to make a recommendation, as the case may be.

(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:

- (A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
- (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
- (C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
- (D) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.
- (E) The Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy.
- (F) The Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
- (G) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
- (H) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any successor to that position.
- (I) The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis.

(c) CONSULTATION WITH DNI IN CERTAIN POSITIONS.—(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall consult with the Director of National Intelligence before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy.

(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:

- (A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
- (B) The Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence.³⁴

Question: Could it be true that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC, given the DNI has hiring authority over agency heads?

Comments: The DNI's authority to weigh in on certain new hires in the IC will help in solving the problems of the community. While the DNI should have a voice or vote on hiring new heads, he should not have a veto.³⁵ As it is written in the Intelligence Reform Act, if the DNI nonconcurs with a potential hire, the DNI and the head of the agency concerned may inform the President, who could make the final decision. However, with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence, the DNI is to be consulted, but concurrence is not required.³⁶ Although this authority alone will not solve any problems, it helps to create an atmosphere of collaboration, which is essential to solving the problems of the IC.³⁷

Assessment: Yes, having hiring authority is consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and after five years. Having hiring authority over agency heads is inconsistent with the DNI not being able to solve the problems of the IC. Having hiring authority is ambiguous to the DNI needing more authority.

13. New Hires

A number of organizations in the IC experienced a gap in the workforce and as a result embarked on a hiring campaign. A number of new hires were recent college graduates with no previous work experience. As a result, for the first couple years, new hires are hardly taken seriously because they are so new to the IC:

(iii). . .encourage and facilitate the recruitment and retention by the intelligence community of highly qualified individuals for the effective conduct of intelligence activities;

(iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds.³⁸

Question: Could it be true that the DNI will be able to solve the problems of the IC, given the number of new analysts and operators in the IC?

Comments: Turnover and retirement are common in the work force. As a result new hires come in to organizations. New hires also come as a result of recruiting efforts to increase the numbers of analysts or operators. In the Intelligence Reform Act, Congress indicated that increasing the “breadth and depth” of HUMINT should be among the DNI’s top priorities.³⁹ There is a particular shortage of analysts in the GS 13-15 grades. Training and education of middle management grades are also lacking. While it does not appear to significantly hinder the DNI’s ability to solve problems, new hires do have an effect on the IC. There is a lot of knowledge and structure in the IC; therefore, it

will not crumble overnight because of a gap. One major benefit of new hires in the IC is that they offer an opportunity to transform the community and get in synch with the ODNI. New hires also bring with them new ideas.⁴⁰ According to a senior IC official, the DNI and others in the IC are working on changing the organizational structure to one that is more decentralized and networked, where information is gathered and distributed more rapidly. New analysts and operators will be able to enhance this new approach if they are enabled, allowed more creativity, and made aware that their efforts are making a difference. Taking such actions will decrease the possibility of new hires seeking new jobs in other agencies.⁴¹ All too often, analysts can be under appreciated and under focused. There is not enough focus on training new hires and career progression.⁴² These issues are best solved by the DNI, as the head of the IC, as it is not a single agency solution.⁴³

Assessment: Yes, the new analysts and operators are consistent with the DNI being able to solve the problems of the IC currently and after five years. Having new analysts and operators is consistent with the DNI not being to solve the problems of the IC. Having new analysts and operators is ambiguous to the DNI needing more authority.

In conclusion, the results of the analysis of competing hypotheses, as shown in table 3, indicates the most likely hypothesis to the question of whether the DNI will be able to help solve the problems of the IC, is yes, but with more authority. The next chapter will go into more detail about the results of the analysis.

Table 3. Research Results				
EVIDENCE	HYPOTHESES			
	Yes	Not in 5 Years	Needs More Authority	No
1. Has Tasking Authority	C	C	C	I
2. Intelligence Professional for Deputy	C	C	C	C
3. No budget authority over DoD	I	I	C	C
4. Budget authority over others	C	C	I	I
5. SECDEF Involvement	C	I	C	I
6. New CIA Head is former Deputy	C	I	C	I
7. Support of President Bush	C	C	C	I
8. Diplomat vs. Intel Professional as Director	C	C	A	C
9. No Congressional Oversight Reform	I	I	C	C
10. No Operational Control	I	I	C	C
11. Lead for establishing PIRs	C	A	C	I
12. Hiring Authority over heads	C	A	C	I
13. New Analysts and Operators	C	C	A	I
INCONSISTENCY (I) TOTAL	3	5	1	8

¹Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information*, 118.

²Steele, *The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, and Political*, 17.

³National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2004), 417.

⁴*Ibid.*, 328.

⁵Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information*, 17.

⁶COL Carr, Assistant J2, interview by author, 19 July 2006, Washington, DC.

⁷Michael Leiter, Deputy Chief of Staff, ODNI, interview by author, 17 August 2006, Washington, DC.

⁸James Wright, Director of Program Management, CIFA, interview by author, 18 July 2006, Crystal City, Virginia.

⁹Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, sec. 102A (2004).

¹⁰*Ibid.*, sec. 03A.

¹¹*Ibid.*, sec. 102A.

¹²Ibid., sec. 102A(d).

¹³LTG Michael D. Maples, Director, DIA, interview by author, 24 August 2006, Washington, DC., phone interview.

¹⁴Daniel Eisenberg, "Bush's New Intelligence Czar," *Time Magazine*, 20 February 2005, 22.

¹⁵David E. Kaplan and Kevin Whitelaw, "Remaking US Intelligence," *US News and World Report*, 20 December 2004, 31.

¹⁶House of Representatives, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 1011-1020.

¹⁷Nancy Gibbs, "Thinker, Briefer, Soldier, Spy," *Time Magazine*, 22 May 2006, 37.

¹⁸Mark Mazzetti, Scott Shane, and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Exit of Spy Chief Viewed as Move to Revamp C.I.A." *The New York Times*, 7 May 2006, A1.

¹⁹Charles Babington and Walter Pincus, "Bush Vows Action on Intelligence Bill," *The Washington Post*, 1 December 2004, A23.

²⁰Elisabeth Bumiller and Philip Shenon, "Bush Urged to Get Pentagon in Step on Intelligence Bill," *The New York Times*, 13 November 2004, sec. National, A18.

²¹House of Representatives, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, sec. 102A.

²²Ibid., sec. 103A.

²³Douglas Waller, "Inside the New Spy Bill," *Time Magazine*, 20 December 2004, 22.

²⁴National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "*the 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*," 419.

²⁵Ibid., 420.

²⁶House of Representatives, "*Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*," sec1013A.

²⁷CIA, "CIA,"

²⁸"New U.S. Spy Service Created," in CNN, 13 October [database online]; available from <http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/13/goss.spies/>; Internet; accessed on 2006.

²⁹Walter Pincus, "CIA Spies Get a New Home Base," *The Washington Post*, 14 October 2005, A06.

³⁰House of Representatives, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, sec. 102.

³¹*Ibid.*

³²LTG Michael D. Maples, Director, DIA, interview by author, 24 August 2006, Washington, DC., phone interview.

³³James Wright, Director for Program Management, CIFA, interview by author, 18 July 2006, Crystal City, Virginia.

³⁴House of Representatives, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, sec. 1014

³⁵James Wright, Director for Program Management, CIFA, interview by author, 18 July 2006, Crystal City, Virginia.

³⁶House of Representatives, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, sec. 102.

³⁷James Wright, Director for Program Management, CIFA, interview by author, 18 July 2006, Crystal City, Virginia.

³⁸House of Representatives, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, sec. 118 .

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰COL Carr, Assistant J2, interview by author, 19 July 2006, Washington, DC.

⁴¹LTG Michael D. Maples, Director, DIA, interview by author, 24 August 2006, Washington, DC., phone interview.

⁴²LTG William G. Boykin, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, interview by author, 19 July 2006, Washington, DC.

⁴³Michael Leiter, Deputy Chief of Staff, ODNI, interview by author, 17 August 2006, Washington, DC.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Is the Director of National Intelligence able to solve the persisting problems of the IC as required by the Intelligence and Reform Act? After conducting the analysis of competing hypotheses, the most likely hypothesis was that the DNI can help solve the problems of the IC, but the office will need more authority, both legislatively and administratively. The most likely hypothesis was the one with the least number of inconsistencies. The results of inconsistencies (I) by hypothesis were: yes (3), not in 5 years (5), needs more authority (1), and no (8). The results in the analysis were determined based on previously written books and articles, current newspapers, and interviews with senior intelligence officials. The DNI generally seems to have sufficient authority to make the changes recommended by the 9/11 Commission, with the exception of the intelligence budget. With additional budgetary authority, the DNI would not have to so heavily rely less on personal and professional relationships.

The DNI will not likely receive additional authorities. Therefore, the ability of the DNI to solve the problems of the IC will partly depend on relationships. The DNI needs to forge a cooperative working relationship with the heads of the various intelligence organizations within the IC. In areas where the DNI does not have authority, he will have to rely on good working relationships to help reach agreements or ensure compliance with policies. One example of important relationships is with the CIA. There were a number of media reports indicating the CIA initially had some trouble adjusting to the Office of the DNI. This was because the DCI, also the director of the CIA, was dissolved

which decreased some functions of the CIA. Certain routines and products for which the CIA was responsible, such as briefing the president daily, were taken over by the DNI; reportedly a major cause of the rift between the two agencies. Once GEN Hayden was confirmed as the new director of the CIA, the outlook on its relationship with the DNI changed. As the former PDDNI, GEN Hayden had a great working relationship already established with Ambassador Negroponte. Several senior intelligence officials believe this positive relationship will help foster better ties between the CIA and the DNI.

While the most likely hypothesis is that the DNI needs more authority to better help solve the problems of the IC, having sufficient time also plays a role. The DNI already has a number of recommendations to implement from the President. With a community of 16 different agencies, it will take time to implement the recommendations. For example, if the DNI required that all analysts complete one six-month deployment and spend at least two years outside their parent agency, then each agency head would likely take steps to ensure the requirement was met. There might be some officials who believe they cannot afford to lose one or more analysts on deployments or rotations to another agency. Those heads would probably take steps to express their opinion to the DNI, in an effort to avoid doing it. It would take time for that process to occur. For those agencies that would begin implementation, that also would involve time. The training and preparation involved to send an analyst on deployment would likely take at least thirty days. There are also a limited number of billets for analysts in deployment areas, and a certain region of expertise is generally required. In order to measure the success of implementation, there would likely be a survey done across the IC. In an ideal world, where analyst deploy one month after notification and are gone for six months, it would

probably take at least one year to distribute and analyze the results of a survey. It would then take more time to make adjustments and new recommendations for improvement. The point here is having sufficient time to implement recommendations is a major concern.

There are several areas that were not covered in this research that should be considered for further research. This research was unclassified, which limited the information that could be used. Examining the same thesis using classified information would likely impact this research, particularly in the area of intelligence operations. Due to time constraints, interviews were only conducted with senior intelligence officials. Interviews with mid and entry-level intelligence officers would likely add a different perspective on the ability of the DNI to solve the problems of the IC. Also due to time constraints, nine evidences were not covered. Those evidences are: desire to improve, some changes do not require budget authority, NCTC director reports directly to President, neutral director, no clear fire authority, turnover, leadership style of agency heads, no penal authority, and vague parts of Intelligence Reform Act require interpretation. As mentioned above, the DNI does not have certain authorities, so fostering good intra-agency working relationships is critical. An area of further study would be to examine the personalities and leadership styles of key agency heads and analyze the compatibility amongst each other. There are some sections of the Intelligence Reform Act that could be interpreted differently by individuals. One research area concerns how large a portion of the Act is vague, the ways in which those parts could be interpreted, and the impact it has on the IC. A final area that merits further research is that of employee turnover. It is not uncommon for a government employee to move to

another government agency within the government system or to switch to contracting. Either way, the parent agency is losing an employee. Some leave for more money, others for greater opportunities, and finally, out of dissatisfaction with the leadership in their parent organization. Promotions are a related problem. Some agencies require that an analysts change to a more managerial position once promoted to a certain grade. There will be occasions where an analyst does not desire a management level position but prefers to remain an analyst. In some cases the analysts may not seek promotion, knowing the consequences. Others may seek employment elsewhere, allowing them to remain analysts while gaining an increase in pay.

This study demonstrated that a number of factors affect the ability of the DNI to solve the problems of the IC. Solving or at least mitigating these problems will increase in complexity and difficulty over time. Additional authority would in all probability eventually improve the DNI. However, until those authorities are in place, the DNI can and should insist on inter and intra-agency coordination through cooperative programs and make the creation of positive working relationships a management priority.

So, yes, we do face a daunting set of challenges in today's world, and they are different challenges from those of the last century...There are ways in which we can maintain and extend important advantages, however, if we act with a sense of urgency and if we embrace the imperatives and inevitability of change.¹

¹“Remarks by the Director of National Intelligence Ambassador John D. Negroponte,” Washington, DC, 25 September 2006 [article online]; available from http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20060925_speech.pdf; Internet; accessed on 23 October 2006.

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